diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch index 6db16be..a605a41 100644 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c return -1; } -@@ -5099,8 +5102,18 @@ +@@ -5099,8 +5102,19 @@ connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) { char buf[1024]; @@ -41,10 +41,11 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c + int len, ret; + len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); +#ifdef linux -+ /* try abstract socket first */ -+ buf[0] = '\0'; -+ if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf, len + 1)) >= 0) -+ return ret; ++ if (getenv("SSH_INSECURE_ABSTRACT_SOCKET_ENABLED") != NULL) { ++ buf[0] = '\0'; ++ if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf, len + 1)) >= 0) ++ return ret; ++ } +#endif + if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf + 1, len)) >= 0) + return ret; diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch index 9f83eee..7ad6b1a 100644 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch @@ -106,17 +106,18 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c #include #include -@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32 - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; +@@ -117,6 +118,11 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32 } + p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ + + if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } - p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ - ++ /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */ + if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) + goto out; diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h --- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h 2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200 diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-cve-2026-60002.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-cve-2026-60002.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab16479 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-cve-2026-60002.patch @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +--- a/ssh.c 2026-07-14 11:58:09.036496915 +0200 ++++ b/ssh.c 2026-07-14 12:00:55.044542741 +0200 +@@ -619,26 +619,6 @@ set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs + } + } + +-static void +-ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) +-{ +- if (cinfo == NULL) +- return; +- free(cinfo->conn_hash_hex); +- free(cinfo->shorthost); +- free(cinfo->uidstr); +- free(cinfo->keyalias); +- free(cinfo->thishost); +- free(cinfo->host_arg); +- free(cinfo->portstr); +- free(cinfo->remhost); +- free(cinfo->remuser); +- free(cinfo->homedir); +- free(cinfo->locuser); +- free(cinfo->jmphost); +- free(cinfo); +-} +- + /* + * Main program for the ssh client. + */ +@@ -1765,8 +1745,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); + + /* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */ +- ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, +- options.port, pw, timeout_ms, cinfo); ++ ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, &hostaddr, options.port, ++ pw, timeout_ms, cinfo); + + /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */ + if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) { +diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +--- a/sshconnect2.c 2026-07-14 11:58:09.031477028 +0200 ++++ b/sshconnect2.c 2026-07-14 12:01:56.374803123 +0200 +@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ extern Options options; + */ + + static char *xxx_host; +-static struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; ++static struct sockaddr_storage xxx_hostaddr; + static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info; + static int key_type_allowed(struct sshkey *, const char *); + +@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey * + fatal("Server host key %s not in HostKeyAlgorithms", + sshkey_ssh_name(hostkey)); + } +- if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey, ++ if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, (struct sockaddr *)&xxx_hostaddr, hostkey, + xxx_conn_info) != 0) + fatal("Host key verification failed."); + return 0; +@@ -222,8 +222,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc + } + + void +-ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, +- const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) ++ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, ++ u_short port, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) + { + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]; + char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL; +@@ -234,9 +234,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st + char *gss_host = NULL; + #endif + +- xxx_host = host; +- xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; +- xxx_conn_info = cinfo; ++ xxx_host = xstrdup(host); ++ xxx_hostaddr = *hostaddr; ++ xxx_conn_info = ssh_conn_info_dup(cinfo); + + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, +@@ -259,8 +259,10 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st + fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist"); + free(all_key); + +- if (use_known_hosts_order) +- hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo); ++ if (use_known_hosts_order) { ++ hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, (struct sockaddr *)hostaddr, ++ port, cinfo); ++ } + + filtered_algs = hkalgs ? match_filter_allowlist(hkalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos) + : match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms, +diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c +--- a/sshconnect.c 2026-07-14 11:58:08.892659011 +0200 ++++ b/sshconnect.c 2026-07-14 12:00:55.045767462 +0200 +@@ -84,6 +84,49 @@ extern char *__progname; + static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *); + static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *); + ++void ++ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) ++{ ++ if (cinfo == NULL) ++ return; ++ free(cinfo->conn_hash_hex); ++ free(cinfo->shorthost); ++ free(cinfo->uidstr); ++ free(cinfo->keyalias); ++ free(cinfo->thishost); ++ free(cinfo->host_arg); ++ free(cinfo->portstr); ++ free(cinfo->remhost); ++ free(cinfo->remuser); ++ free(cinfo->homedir); ++ free(cinfo->locuser); ++ free(cinfo->jmphost); ++ freezero(cinfo, sizeof(*cinfo)); ++} ++ ++struct ssh_conn_info * ++ssh_conn_info_dup(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) ++{ ++ struct ssh_conn_info *ret; ++ ++ if (cinfo == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ++ ret->conn_hash_hex = xstrdup(cinfo->conn_hash_hex); ++ ret->shorthost = xstrdup(cinfo->shorthost); ++ ret->uidstr = xstrdup(cinfo->uidstr); ++ ret->keyalias = xstrdup(cinfo->keyalias); ++ ret->thishost = xstrdup(cinfo->thishost); ++ ret->host_arg = xstrdup(cinfo->host_arg); ++ ret->portstr = xstrdup(cinfo->portstr); ++ ret->remhost = xstrdup(cinfo->remhost); ++ ret->remuser = xstrdup(cinfo->remuser); ++ ret->homedir = xstrdup(cinfo->homedir); ++ ret->locuser = xstrdup(cinfo->locuser); ++ ret->jmphost = xstrdup(cinfo->jmphost); ++ return ret; ++} ++ + /* Expand a proxy command */ + static char * + expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user, +@@ -1589,8 +1632,8 @@ out: + */ + void + ssh_login(struct ssh *ssh, Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, +- struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms, +- const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) ++ struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, ++ int timeout_ms, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) + { + char *host; + char *server_user, *local_user; +diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect.h b/sshconnect.h +--- a/sshconnect.h 2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/sshconnect.h 2026-07-14 12:00:55.045948953 +0200 +@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const cha + void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void); + + void ssh_login(struct ssh *, Sensitive *, const char *, +- struct sockaddr *, u_short, struct passwd *, int, ++ struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, struct passwd *, int, + const struct ssh_conn_info *); + + int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *, +@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ int verify_host_key(char *, struct sock + void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, + char **, char **); + +-void ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, ++void ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, + const struct ssh_conn_info *); + + void ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *, const char *, +@@ -98,3 +98,6 @@ void load_hostkeys_command(struct hostk + const struct sshkey *, const char *); + + int hostkey_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *); ++ ++void ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *); ++struct ssh_conn_info *ssh_conn_info_dup(const struct ssh_conn_info *); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-scp-remote-glob.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-scp-remote-glob.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c08101e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-scp-remote-glob.patch @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +diff --color -ruNp a/scp.c b/scp.c +--- a/scp.c 2026-07-14 11:40:47.754600847 +0200 ++++ b/scp.c 2026-07-14 11:43:04.077524517 +0200 +@@ -2070,6 +2070,10 @@ throughlocal_sftp(struct sftp_conn *from + goto out; + } + ++ /* Special handling for source of '..' */ ++ if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) ++ filename = "."; /* Download to dest, not dest/.. */ ++ + if (targetisdir) + abs_dst = sftp_path_append(target, filename); + else diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch index 237e45d..2a74740 100644 --- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch @@ -1,38 +1,7 @@ -From 5d5a66e96ad03132f65371070f4fa475f10207d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Alexander Bokovoy -Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 23:00:03 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] support authentication indicators in GSSAPI - -RFC 6680 defines a set of GSSAPI extensions to handle attributes -associated with the GSSAPI names. MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA use -name attributes to add information about pre-authentication methods used -to acquire the initial Kerberos ticket. The attribute 'auth-indicators' -may contain list of strings that KDC has associated with the ticket -issuance process. - -Use authentication indicators to authorise or deny access to SSH server. -GSSAPIIndicators setting allows to specify a list of possible indicators -that a Kerberos ticket presented must or must not contain. More details -on the syntax are provided in sshd_config(5) man page. - -Fixes: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2696 - -Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy ---- - configure.ac | 1 + - gss-serv-krb5.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- - gss-serv.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- - servconf.c | 15 ++++++- - servconf.h | 2 + - ssh-gss.h | 7 ++++ - sshd_config.5 | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++ - 7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index d92a85809..2cbe20bf3 100644 ---- a/configure.ac -+++ b/configure.ac -@@ -5004,6 +5004,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], +diff --color -ruNp a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +--- a/configure.ac 2026-03-10 12:43:36.860784813 +0100 ++++ b/configure.ac 2026-03-10 12:46:27.022297835 +0100 +@@ -4932,6 +4932,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h]) @@ -40,10 +9,159 @@ index d92a85809..2cbe20bf3 100644 AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1], [Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])]) -diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c -index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644 ---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c -+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c +--- a/gss-serv.c 2026-06-16 15:38:26.590728235 +0200 ++++ b/gss-serv.c 2026-06-16 15:41:13.717696103 +0200 +@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options; + + static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = + { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, +- GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; ++ GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL}; + + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = + { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; +@@ -295,6 +295,99 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + ++ ++/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication ++ * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators". ++ * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket. ++ * Each indicator is an utf8 string. */ ++ ++#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators" ++#define SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_INDICATORS 64 ++ ++/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */ ++static OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_getindicators(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_name_t gss_name, ssh_gssapi_client *client) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_set_t attrs = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET; ++ gss_buffer_desc value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ gss_buffer_desc display_value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ int is_mechname, authenticated, complete, more; ++ size_t count, i; ++ ++ /* always initialize client->indicators */ ++ client->indicators = NULL; ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_inquire_name(&ctx->minor, gss_name, ++ &is_mechname, NULL, &attrs); ++ if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ return ctx->major; ++ ++ if (attrs == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) { ++ /* no indicators in the ticket */ ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ /* client->indicators is NULL terminated */ ++ count = 0; ++ client->indicators = xcalloc(count + 1, sizeof(char *)); ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) { ++ authenticated = 0; ++ complete = 0; ++ more = -1; ++ ++ /* skip anything but auth-indicators */ ++ if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) || ++ memcmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG, attrs->elements[i].value, ++ sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0) ++ continue; ++ ++ /* retrieve all indicators */ ++ while (more != 0) { ++ value.value = NULL; ++ display_value.value = NULL; ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name, ++ &attrs->elements[i], ++ &authenticated, &complete, ++ &value, &display_value, &more); ++ if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ goto out; ++ ++ if (value.value == NULL || !authenticated) ++ continue; ++ ++ if (count >= SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_INDICATORS) { ++ logit("ssh_gssapi_getindicators:" ++ " too many indicators, truncating at %d", ++ SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_INDICATORS); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1); ++ memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length); ++ client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0'; ++ count++; ++ ++ /* add NULL terminator */ ++ client->indicators = xrecallocarray(client->indicators, count, ++ count + 1, sizeof(char *)); ++ } ++ } ++ ++out: ++ if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && client->indicators != NULL) { ++ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) ++ free(client->indicators[i]); ++ free(client->indicators); ++ client->indicators = NULL; ++ } ++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value); ++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value); ++ gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs); ++ return ctx->major; ++} ++ + /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably + * be called once for a context */ + +@@ -384,6 +477,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g + } + + gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); ++ /* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */ ++ if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx, ++ ctx->client, client))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } + + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; +@@ -446,6 +545,7 @@ int + ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex) + { + OM_uint32 lmin; ++ size_t i; + + (void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */ + +@@ -464,8 +564,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct pas + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); + gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds); +- explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client, +- sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client)); ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) { ++ for (i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) ++ free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]); ++ free(gssapi_client.indicators); ++ } ++ ++ explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client, sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client)); + return 0; + } + else +diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c 2026-03-10 12:43:36.823015336 +0100 ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c 2026-03-11 12:58:56.024455238 +0100 @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" @@ -52,7 +170,7 @@ index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644 #include "ssh-gss.h" -@@ -87,6 +88,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void) +@@ -87,6 +88,33 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void) return 1; } @@ -67,6 +185,7 @@ index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644 +{ + int ret; + u_int i; ++ *matched = -1; + + /* Check indicators */ + for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) { @@ -85,218 +204,112 @@ index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644 /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own. * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0 -@@ -193,7 +220,7 @@ static int +@@ -193,15 +221,15 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) { krb5_principal princ; - int retval; -+ int retval, matched; ++ int retval, matched, success; const char *errmsg; int k5login_exists; -@@ -216,17 +243,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) + return 0; + +- if ((retval = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value, +- &princ))) { ++ retval = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value, &princ); ++ if (retval) { + errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, retval); + logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg); + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); +@@ -216,17 +244,60 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client if (k5login_exists && ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) { retval = 1; - logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", - name, (char *)client->displayname.value); -+ errmsg = "krb5_kuserok"; ++ errmsg = "krb5_kuserok"; } else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value, name, k5login_exists)) { retval = 1; - logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s " - "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)", - name, (char *)client->displayname.value); +- } else + errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok"; - } else - retval = 0; - -+ if ((retval == 1) && (options.gss_indicators != NULL)) { -+ /* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators -+ * so we drop the authorization result again */ ++ } else { + retval = 0; -+ if (client->indicators) { -+ matched = -1; -+ retval = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched); -+ if (retval != 0) { -+ retval = (retval == 1); -+ logit("Ticket contains indicator %s, " -+ "krb5 principal %s is %s", -+ client->indicators[matched], -+ (char *)client->displayname.value, -+ retval ? "allowed" : "denied"); -+ goto cont; -+ } -+ } -+ if (retval == 0) { -+ logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced " -+ "but not matched. krb5 principal %s denied", -+ (char *)client->displayname.value); -+ } ++ goto out; + } -+cont: ++ ++ /* At this point we are good if no indicators were defined */ ++ if (options.gss_indicators == NULL) { ++ retval = 1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* At this point we have indicators defined in the configuration, ++ * if clientt did not provide any indicators, we reject */ ++ if (!client->indicators) { ++ retval = 0; ++ logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced " ++ "but indicators not provided by the client. " ++ "krb5 principal %s denied", ++ (char *)client->displayname.value); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators ++ * check the match */ ++ matched = -1; ++ success = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched); ++ ++ switch (success) { ++ case 1: ++ logit("Provided indicator %s allowed by the configuration", ++ client->indicators[matched]); ++ retval = 1; ++ break; ++ case -1: ++ logit("Provided indicator %s rejected by the configuration", ++ client->indicators[matched]); ++ retval = 0; ++ break; ++ default: ++ logit("Provided indicators do not match the configuration"); + retval = 0; ++ break; ++ } + ++out: + if (retval == 1) { + logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)", -+ name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg); ++ name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg); + } krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); return retval; } -diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c -index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644 ---- a/gss-serv.c -+++ b/gss-serv.c -@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options; - - static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = - { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, -- GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; -+ GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL}; - - ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = - { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; -@@ -296,6 +296,92 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name) - return GSS_S_COMPLETE; - } - -+ -+/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication -+ * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators". -+ * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket. -+ * Each indicator is a utf8 string. */ -+ -+#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators" -+ -+/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */ -+static OM_uint32 -+ssh_gssapi_getindicators(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_name_t gss_name, ssh_gssapi_client *client) -+{ -+ gss_buffer_set_t attrs = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET; -+ gss_buffer_desc value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ gss_buffer_desc display_value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ int is_mechname, authenticated, complete, more; -+ size_t count, i; -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_inquire_name(&ctx->minor, gss_name, -+ &is_mechname, NULL, &attrs); -+ if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ if (attrs == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) { -+ /* No indicators in the ticket */ -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ count = 0; -+ for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) { -+ /* skip anything but auth-indicators */ -+ if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) || -+ strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG, -+ attrs->elements[i].value, -+ sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0) -+ continue; -+ count++; -+ } -+ -+ if (count == 0) { -+ /* No auth-indicators in the ticket */ -+ (void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ client->indicators = recallocarray(NULL, 0, count + 1, sizeof(char*)); -+ count = 0; -+ for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) { -+ authenticated = 0; -+ complete = 0; -+ more = -1; -+ /* skip anything but auth-indicators */ -+ if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) || -+ strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG, -+ attrs->elements[i].value, -+ sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0) -+ continue; -+ /* retrieve all indicators */ -+ while (more != 0) { -+ value.value = NULL; -+ display_value.value = NULL; -+ ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name, -+ &attrs->elements[i], &authenticated, -+ &complete, &value, &display_value, &more); -+ if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if ((value.value != NULL) && authenticated) { -+ client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1); -+ memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length); -+ client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0'; -+ count++; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ -+out: -+ (void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value); -+ (void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value); -+ (void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs); -+ return (ctx->major); -+} -+ -+ - /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably - * be called once for a context */ - -@@ -385,6 +471,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) - } - - gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); -+ /* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */ -+ if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx, -+ ctx->client, client))) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } - - /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ - client->creds = ctx->client_creds; -@@ -447,6 +539,7 @@ int - ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex) - { - OM_uint32 lmin; -+ size_t i; - - (void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */ - -@@ -465,6 +558,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex) - gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); - gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); - gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds); -+ -+ if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) { -+ for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) { -+ free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]); -+ } -+ free(gssapi_client.indicators); -+ } -+ - explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client, - sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client)); - return 0; -diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c -index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644 ---- a/servconf.c -+++ b/servconf.c -@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) +diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +--- a/servconf.c 2026-03-10 12:43:36.928060353 +0100 ++++ b/servconf.c 2026-03-11 13:20:09.725354925 +0100 +@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; ++ options->gss_indicators = NULL; options->gss_store_rekey = -1; options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; -+ options->gss_indicators = NULL; options->use_kuserok = -1; - options->enable_k5users = -1; - options->password_authentication = -1; -@@ -598,7 +599,7 @@ typedef enum { +@@ -557,6 +558,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->routing_domain); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_agent); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->per_source_penalty_exempt); ++ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->gss_indicators); + + for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++) + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]); +@@ -594,7 +596,7 @@ typedef enum { sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor, @@ -305,7 +318,7 @@ index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644 sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, -@@ -694,6 +695,7 @@ static struct { +@@ -690,6 +692,7 @@ static struct { { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL }, @@ -313,7 +326,7 @@ index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644 #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -703,6 +705,7 @@ static struct { +@@ -699,6 +702,7 @@ static struct { { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, @@ -321,7 +334,7 @@ index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644 #endif { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -1730,6 +1733,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, +@@ -1715,6 +1719,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; @@ -337,7 +350,7 @@ index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644 case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; -@@ -3351,6 +3363,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) +@@ -3329,6 +3342,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms); @@ -345,10 +358,9 @@ index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644 #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, -diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h -index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644 ---- a/servconf.h -+++ b/servconf.h +diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.h b/servconf.h +--- a/servconf.h 2026-03-10 12:43:36.833119920 +0100 ++++ b/servconf.h 2026-03-11 13:21:36.742117033 +0100 @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct { char **allow_groups; u_int num_deny_groups; @@ -357,7 +369,7 @@ index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644 u_int num_subsystems; char **subsystem_name; -@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item); +@@ -309,6 +310,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item); M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \ M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \ M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \ @@ -365,36 +377,10 @@ index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644 M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \ -diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h -index a894e23c9..59cf46d47 100644 ---- a/ssh-gss.h -+++ b/ssh-gss.h -@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ - #include - #endif - -+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H -+#include -+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H) -+#include -+#endif -+ - #ifdef KRB5 - # ifndef HEIMDAL - # ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H -@@ -107,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct { - ssh_gssapi_ccache store; - int used; - int updated; -+ char **indicators; /* auth indicators */ - } ssh_gssapi_client; - - typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { -diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 -index 583a01cdb..90ab87edd 100644 ---- a/sshd_config.5 -+++ b/sshd_config.5 -@@ -785,6 +785,50 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256- +diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +--- a/sshd_config.5 2026-03-10 12:43:36.859313302 +0100 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 2026-03-11 13:28:04.541970063 +0100 +@@ -785,6 +785,52 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256- gss-curve25519-sha256- .Ed This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI. @@ -441,10 +427,33 @@ index 583a01cdb..90ab87edd 100644 +FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens +.El +.Pp -+The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions. ++The default ++.Dq none ++is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions. .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms The default is handled system-wide by .Xr crypto-policies 7 . --- -2.49.0 - +diff --color -ruNp a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h +--- a/ssh-gss.h 2026-03-10 12:43:36.898148309 +0100 ++++ b/ssh-gss.h 2026-03-11 13:23:07.601956965 +0100 +@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ + #include + #endif + ++#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H ++#include ++#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H) ++#include ++#endif ++ + #ifdef KRB5 + # ifndef HEIMDAL + # ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H +@@ -112,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct { + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; + int used; + int updated; ++ char **indicators; /* auth indicators */ + } ssh_gssapi_client; + + typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { diff --git a/SPECS/openssh.spec b/SPECS/openssh.spec index fcad963..0ed38c1 100644 --- a/SPECS/openssh.spec +++ b/SPECS/openssh.spec @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1 %global openssh_ver 9.9p1 -%global openssh_rel 7 +%global openssh_rel 9 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4 %global pam_ssh_agent_rel 7 @@ -258,6 +258,11 @@ Patch1043: openssh-9.9p1-authorized-keys-principles-option.patch # upstream 607bd871ec029e9aa22e632a22547250f3cae223 # upstream 1340d3fa8e4bb122906a82159c4c9b91584d65ce Patch1044: openssh-9.9p1-proxyjump-username-validity-checks.patch +# upstream 36480181fa22f98e180b4f9e10203480c0346c78 +Patch1045: openssh-9.9p1-scp-remote-glob.patch +# upstream e8bdfb151a356d0171fea4194dd205fbb252be23 +Patch1046: openssh-9.9p1-cve-2026-60002.patch + License: BSD Requires: /sbin/nologin @@ -478,6 +483,8 @@ popd %patch1042 -p1 -b .ecdsa-incomplete-application %patch1043 -p1 -b .authorized-keys-principles-option %patch1044 -p1 -b .proxyjump-username-validity-checks +%patch1045 -p1 -b .scp-remote-glob +%patch1046 -p1 -b .cve-2026-60002 autoreconf pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} @@ -766,6 +773,25 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \ %endif %changelog +* Tue Jul 14 2026 Zoltan Fridrich - 9.9p1-9 +- CVE-2026-59996: Fix remote glob result of ".." causing files to be placed + in unintended parent directories when scp performs remote-to-remote copy + via the local host + Resolves: RHEL-193178 +- CVE-2026-60002: Fix use-after-free in cached hostkey during key re-exchange + Resolves: RHEL-193024 + +* Tue Jun 30 2026 Zoltan Fridrich - 9.9p1-8 +- CVE-2026-55653: Fix double free in openssh DH-GEX client path during + FIPS known-group validation that leads to client-side denial of service + Resolves: RHEL-186439 +- CVE-2026-55654: Fix heap out-of-bounds read during GSSAPI indicator + cleanup due to missing NULL terminator + Resolves: RHEL-185836 +- CVE-2026-55655: Fix MITM of X11 forwarding via abstract UNIX socket + pre-binding + Resolves: RHEL-185854 + * Mon Apr 13 2026 Zoltan Fridrich - 9.9p1-7 - CVE-2026-35385: Fix privilege escalation via scp legacy protocol when not in preserving file mode