diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-fips.patch b/openssh-6.7p1-fips.patch
index c5c5dda..b8d5ede 100644
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-fips.patch
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.0p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-7.0p1/readconf.c
 --- openssh-7.0p1/readconf.c.fips	2015-08-19 12:36:51.138412921 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.0p1/readconf.c	2015-08-19 12:36:51.152412889 +0200
 @@ -1915,9 +1915,12 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 		options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+ 	}
  	if (options->update_hostkeys == -1)
  		options->update_hostkeys = 0;
 -	if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, &options->ciphers) != 0 ||
diff --git a/openssh-7.0p1-show-more-fingerprints.patch b/openssh-7.0p1-show-more-fingerprints.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..368f152
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-7.0p1-show-more-fingerprints.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+From e1d58c44bd911e5ee4dddb6205e16eb9a03cc736 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2015 10:18:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Possibility tu specify more fingerprint algorithms on client
+ side for smother transition
+
+---
+ clientloop.c  |  8 ++++----
+ readconf.c    | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ readconf.h    |  4 +++-
+ ssh_config.5  |  4 ++--
+ sshconnect.c  | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ sshconnect2.c |  6 +++---
+ 6 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index 87ceb3d..4553114 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -2194,7 +2194,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+ 		if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i],
+-		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
++		    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ 		do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp);
+@@ -2202,7 +2202,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+ 	}
+ 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
+ 		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i],
+-		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
++		    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ 		do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp);
+@@ -2245,7 +2245,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+ 	    (r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0],
+ 	    ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys,
+ 	    options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
+-	    options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0)
++	    options.fingerprint_hash[0])) != 0)
+ 		error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s",
+ 		    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+@@ -2358,7 +2358,7 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void)
+ 			error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ 		debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__,
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), fp);
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 1d03bdf..6af4c62 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1471,16 +1471,18 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ 		goto parse_string;
+ 
+ 	case oFingerprintHash:
+-		intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash;
+-		arg = strdelim(&s);
+-		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+-			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+-			    filename, linenum);
+-		if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
+-			fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg);
+-		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+-			*intptr = value;
++		if (*activep && options->num_fingerprint_hash == 0)
++			while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
++				value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg);
++				if (value == -1)
++					fatal("%s line %d: unknown fingerprints algorithm specs: %s.",
++						filename, linenum, arg);
++				if (options->num_fingerprint_hash >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
++					fatal("%s line %d: too many fingerprints algorithm specs.",
++						filename, linenum);
++				options->fingerprint_hash[
++					options->num_fingerprint_hash++] = value;
++			}
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case oUpdateHostkeys:
+@@ -1673,7 +1675,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1;
+ 	options->canonicalize_hostname = -1;
+ 	options->revoked_host_keys = NULL;
+-	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
++	options->num_fingerprint_hash = 0;
+ 	options->update_hostkeys = -1;
+ 	options->hostbased_key_types = NULL;
+ 	options->pubkey_key_types = NULL;
+@@ -1851,8 +1853,10 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
+ 	if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
+ 		options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
+-	if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
+-		options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
++	if (options->num_fingerprint_hash == 0) {
++		options->fingerprint_hash[options->num_fingerprint_hash++] = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
++		options->fingerprint_hash[options->num_fingerprint_hash++] = SSH_DIGEST_MD5;
++	}
+ 	if (options->update_hostkeys == -1)
+ 		options->update_hostkeys = 0;
+ 	if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, &options->ciphers) != 0 ||
+@@ -2189,6 +2193,17 @@ dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+ }
+ 
+ static void
++dump_cfg_fmtarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, int *vals)
++{
++	u_int i;
++
++	printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
++	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
++		printf(" %s", fmt_intarg(code, vals[i]));
++	printf("\n");
++}
++
++static void
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+ {
+ 	u_int i;
+@@ -2259,7 +2274,6 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure);
+-	dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted);
+@@ -2328,6 +2342,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
+ 	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles);
+ 	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles);
+ 	dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env);
++	dump_cfg_fmtarray(oFingerprintHash, o->num_fingerprint_hash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ 
+ 	/* Special cases */
+ 
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index bb2d552..d817f92 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ #define MAX_SEND_ENV		256
+ #define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES	32
+ #define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS	32
++#define MAX_SSH_DIGESTS	32
+ #define PATH_MAX_SUN		(sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path)
+ 
+ struct allowed_cname {
+@@ -146,7 +147,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+ 	char	*revoked_host_keys;
+ 
+-	int	 fingerprint_hash;
++	int num_fingerprint_hash;
++	int 	fingerprint_hash[MAX_SSH_DIGESTS];
+ 
+ 	int	 update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */
+ 
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 5b0975f..e8e6458 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -647,13 +647,13 @@ or
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ .It Cm FingerprintHash
+-Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
++Specifies the hash algorithms used when displaying key fingerprints.
+ Valid options are:
+ .Dq md5
+ and
+ .Dq sha256 .
+ The default is
+-.Dq sha256 .
++.Dq "sha256 md5".
+ .It Cm ForwardAgent
+ Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
+ will be forwarded to the remote machine.
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index f41960c..e12932f 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -920,9 +920,9 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
+ 		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
+ 			fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+-			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++			    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ 			ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+-			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++			    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 			if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ 				fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ 			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
+@@ -964,12 +964,6 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 			else
+ 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
+ 			/* The default */
+-			fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+-			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+-			ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+-			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+-			if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+-				fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ 			msg2[0] = '\0';
+ 			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+ 				if (matching_host_key_dns)
+@@ -983,16 +977,28 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 			}
+ 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ 			    "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
+-			    "established%s\n"
+-			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
++			    "established%s\n", host, ip, msg1);
++			for (i = 0; i < options.num_fingerprint_hash; i++) {
++				fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
++				    options.fingerprint_hash[i], SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++				ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
++				    options.fingerprint_hash[i], SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++				if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
++					fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
++				len = strlen(msg);
++				snprintf(msg+len, sizeof(msg)-len,
++				    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s",
++				    type, fp,
++				    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
++				    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
++				    msg2);
++				free(ra);
++				free(fp);
++			}
++			len = strlen(msg);
++			snprintf(msg+len, sizeof(msg)-len,
+ 			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
+-			    "(yes/no)? ",
+-			    host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
+-			    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
+-			    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
+-			    msg2);
+-			free(ra);
+-			free(fp);
++			    "(yes/no)? ");
+ 			if (!confirm(msg))
+ 				goto fail;
+ 			hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */
+@@ -1241,7 +1247,7 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
+ 	struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+-	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
++	    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		r = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -1405,9 +1411,9 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key)
+ 		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
+ 			continue;
+ 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
+-		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++		    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ 		ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
+-		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		    options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ 			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ 		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+@@ -1430,7 +1436,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+ {
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ 	if (fp == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 7751031..82ed92e 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 		    key->type, pktype);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ 		goto done;
+ 	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
+@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+ 	int have_sig = 1;
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
+@@ -1635,7 +1635,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash,
++	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ 		goto out;
+-- 
+2.1.0
+
+
diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec
index dc92806..09cba7b 100644
--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@@ -227,7 +227,8 @@ Patch929: openssh-6.9p1-permit-root-login.patch
 Patch931: openssh-6.9p1-scp-progressmeter.patch
 # Add GSSAPIKexAlgorithms option for server and client application
 Patch932: openssh-7.0p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch
-
+# Possibility to validate legacy systems by more fingerprints (#1249626)(#2439)
+Patch933: openssh-7.0p1-show-more-fingerprints.patch
 
 
 License: BSD
@@ -464,6 +465,7 @@ popd
 %patch929 -p1 -b .root-login
 %patch931 -p1 -b .progressmeter
 %patch932 -p1 -b .gsskexalg
+%patch933 -p1 -b .fingerprint
 
 %patch200 -p1 -b .audit
 %patch700 -p1 -b .fips