diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 0a4a73d..508d80d 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -45,3 +45,6 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
 /openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz
 /openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc
 /pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz.asc
+/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch b/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
index fa0717f..664e11a 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
 @@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
- void
- log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
+     int on_stderr)
  {
 +	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
 +}
 +
 +void
-+log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
++log_init_handler(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
  #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
  	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
  #endif
@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
 --- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
 @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
- typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+     const char *, void *);
  
- void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
-+void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
+ void     log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
++void     log_init_handler(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
  LogLevel log_level_get(void);
  int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
  int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
@@ -59,14 +59,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
  	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
  	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
 @@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ 	/* Log it */
  	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
- 		    __func__, level);
--	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
-+	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
+ 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
+-	sshlog(file, func, line, 0, level, NULL, "%s [preauth]", msg);
++	sshlog(file, func, line, 0, level, NULL, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
  
  	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
- 	free(msg);
+ 	free(file);
 @@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
  	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
  	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 +		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
 +
 +		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
++			debug_f("/dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", chroot_dir);
 +			do_logfds = 1;
 +		}
 +		free(dev_log_path);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch b/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
index 3a7193e..fa9d591 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
@@ -34,19 +34,19 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +
 +	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
 +	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
-+		debug3("%s: Failed to get the path to SELinux context", __func__);
++		debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Failed to open SELinux context file", __func__);
++		debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
 +	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
-+		    " and not writable by anyone else", __func__);
++		logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
++		    " and not writable by anyone else");
 +		fclose(contexts_file);
 +		return;
 +	}
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
 +			arg = strdelim(&cp);
 +			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-+				debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__);
++				debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty");
 +				fclose(contexts_file);
 +				return;
 +			}
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +	fclose(contexts_file);
 +
 +	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
-+		    " SELinux context file", __func__);
++		debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
++		    " SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
@@ -101,10 +101,11 @@ index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
  	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
  		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
 -	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
-+	debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
++	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'",
  	    oldctx, newctx);
  	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+ 		do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+		    __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
index 01ea156..6ee2535 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
 @@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
index 9e71efe..2aa14bd 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/auth.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
+@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
  			_exit(1);
  		}
- 
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
@@ -12,10 +12,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
 +			_exit(127);
 +		}
 +#endif
-+
- 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
- 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
- 		_exit(127);
+ 		if (env != NULL)
+ 			execve(av[0], av, env);
+ 		else
 diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 --- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 +++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
index 5009e2a..407ff4c 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
 @@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
  	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
  	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
index 3d4c287..8047fc3 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 --- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
 @@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("done");
  }
  
 +void
@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 +		return;
 +
 +	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		return;
 +	}
 +	if (ctx != NULL) {
 +		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
 +		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		freecon(ctx);
 +	}
 +}
diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
index 3f34464..5b75dda 100644
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 @@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
  	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
  	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+ 		error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
 -		if (tmp1 > 0)
 +		if (tmp1 >= 0)
  			close(tmp1);
@@ -120,11 +120,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
 -		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
 +	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
 +		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
  }
  
 @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
- 		debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
+ 		debug_f("invalid tun");
  		goto done;
  	}
 -	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
diff --git a/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch b/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
index de70ff5..b5895f7 100644
--- a/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
@@ -13,33 +13,33 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +	int r, ret = 0;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
++	debug3_f("entering");
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	do {
 +		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
 +		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
 +			break;
 +		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to read the buffer from child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +
 +		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
 +		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
-+			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
++			fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len);
 +		sshbuf_reset(m);
 +		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to read the the buffer content from the child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
 +		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to write the message to the monitor");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch b/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
index 242294a..80e7678 100644
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +	int ret = 0;
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
-+	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
++	debug3_f("k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", k5login_directory, ret);
 +	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
 +		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
 +		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
 +			pw->pw_name);
 +	}
-+	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
++	debug_f("Checking existence of file %s", file);
  
 -	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
  	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
index 35a1a8a..85d0650 100644
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ diff -up openssh/kex.c.audit openssh/kex.c
  		return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
 +	}
  	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
- 		error("%s: unsupported cipher %s", __func__, name);
+ 		error_f("unsupported cipher %s", name);
  		free(name);
 @@ -783,8 +788,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma
  {
@@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ diff -up openssh/kex.c.audit openssh/kex.c
  		return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
 +	}
  	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
- 		error("%s: unsupported MAC %s", __func__, name);
+ 		error_f("unsupported MAC %s", name);
  		free(name);
 @@ -796,12 +805,16 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma
  }
@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.audit openssh/Makefile.in
 --- openssh/Makefile.in.audit	2019-04-03 17:02:20.705885965 +0200
 +++ openssh/Makefile.in	2019-04-03 17:02:20.715886060 +0200
 @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	sntrup4591761.o kexsntrup4591761x25519.o kexgen.o \
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
  	kexgssc.o \
 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
 -	sshbuf-io.o
@@ -1172,15 +1172,15 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.audit openssh/monitor.c
 @@ -1455,6 +1474,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
  	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
  	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
- 		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
 +	if (type != key_blobtype)
-+		fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
++		fatal_f("bad key type");
  
  	/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
  	if (*sigalg == '\0') {
-@@ -1470,25 +1491,28 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+@@ -1470,27 +1491,30 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
  	case MM_USERKEY:
- 		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
+ 		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
  		auth_method = "publickey";
 +		ret = user_key_verify(ssh, key, signature, signaturelen, data,
 +		    datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
@@ -1198,15 +1198,17 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.audit openssh/monitor.c
  		break;
  	}
  	if (!valid_data)
- 		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("bad %s signature data blob",
+ 		    key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "userkey" :
+ 		    (key_blobtype == MM_HOSTKEY ? "hostkey" : "unknown"));
  
  	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
  	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
  
 -	ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
 -	    sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
- 	debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s%s%s", __func__, auth_method, key,
+ 	debug3_f("%s %p signature %s%s%s", auth_method, key,
  	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
  	    (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
 @@ -1536,13 +1560,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session
@@ -1216,14 +1218,14 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.audit openssh/monitor.c
 -mm_session_close(Session *s)
 +mm_session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
  {
- 	debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
+ 	debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- 		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ 		debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
  		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
  	}
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	if (s->command != NULL) {
-+		debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
++		debug3_f("command %d", s->command_handle);
 +		session_end_command2(ssh, s);
 +	}
 +#endif
@@ -1237,11 +1239,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.audit openssh/monitor.c
 -		mm_session_close(s);
 +		mm_session_close(ssh, s);
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
  	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
 @@ -1628,7 +1658,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, i
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
  	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
 -		mm_session_close(s);
 +		mm_session_close(ssh, s);
@@ -1271,7 +1273,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.audit openssh/monitor.c
 -	audit_run_command(cmd);
 +	s = session_new();
 +	if (s == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
++		fatal_f("error allocating a session");
 +	s->command = cmd;
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	s->command_handle = audit_run_command(ssh, cmd);
@@ -1293,15 +1295,15 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.audit openssh/monitor.c
 +	u_char *cmd = NULL;
 +	Session *s;
 +
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++	debug3_f("entering");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cmd, &len)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	s = session_by_id(handle);
 +	if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
 +	    strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
++		fatal_f("invalid handle");
 +	mm_session_close(ssh, s);
  	free(cmd);
  	return (0);
@@ -1311,13 +1313,13 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.audit openssh/monitor.c
  mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  {
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
- 	debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
  
  	if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 @@ -1774,6 +1842,19 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct
  	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
  	    child_state);
- 	debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("GOT new keys");
 +
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	m = sshbuf_new();
@@ -1345,7 +1347,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.audit openssh/monitor.c
 +	int what, r;
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &what)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what);
 +
@@ -1370,10 +1372,10 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.audit openssh/monitor.c
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &compress, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pfs, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +	pid = (pid_t) tmp;
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +	uid = (pid_t) tmp;
 +
 +	audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid);
@@ -1398,10 +1400,10 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.audit openssh/monitor.c
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ctos)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +	pid = (pid_t) tmp;
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +	uid = (uid_t) tmp;
 +
 +	audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, pid, uid);
@@ -1423,10 +1425,10 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.audit openssh/monitor.c
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &fp, &len)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +	pid = (pid_t) tmp;
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +	uid = (uid_t) tmp;
 +
 +	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
@@ -1470,7 +1472,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 @@ -525,7 +525,8 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
  		*sig_detailsp = NULL;
  	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 -	if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
@@ -1522,7 +1524,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +
 +	return (handle);
@@ -1534,13 +1536,13 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	int r;
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
-+	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
++	debug3_f("entering command %s", command);
 +
 + 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, handle)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, m);
  	sshbuf_free(m);
@@ -1558,9 +1560,9 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
 + 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, what)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
@@ -1577,7 +1579,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
 + 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, cipher)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, (mac ? mac : "<implicit>"))) != 0 ||
@@ -1585,7 +1587,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fps)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
@@ -1601,11 +1603,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
 + 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
@@ -1620,11 +1622,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
 + 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fp)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
@@ -1903,7 +1905,7 @@ diff -up openssh/session.c.audit openssh/session.c
 +		if (s->used)
 +			return s;
 +	}
-+	debug("%s: unknown id %d", __func__, id);
++	debug_f("unknown id %d", id);
 +	session_dump();
 +	return NULL;
 +}
@@ -2115,7 +2117,7 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.audit openssh/sshd.c
  			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
  			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
  		}
-@@ -400,14 +437,26 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+@@ -400,20 +437,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
  
  /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
  void
@@ -2142,9 +2144,8 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.audit openssh/sshd.c
 +				fp = NULL;
  			if ((r = sshkey_from_private(
  			    sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0)
- 				fatal("could not demote host %s key: %s",
-@@ -415,6 +464,12 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
- 				    ssh_err(r));
+ 				fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key",
+ 				    sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]));
  			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
  			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
 +			if (fp != NULL) {
@@ -2254,7 +2255,7 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.audit openssh/sshd.c
  		do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
  		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
 @@ -2414,9 +2482,16 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 				    pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
+ 			}
  		}
  	}
 +	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch b/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
index 08cd349..f7cd50f 100644
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
 @@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+ 
+ /* import */
  extern ServerOptions options;
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
 +extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
@@ -12,59 +12,59 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
  static char *
  format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
 @@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
- 
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
--	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
++	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
 +	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
 @@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
- 
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
--	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
++	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
 +	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c
---- openssh/auth.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
 @@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
-  */
  pid_t
- subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
--    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
-+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd,
-+    void *the_authctxt)
+ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+     int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
+-    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
++    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs,
++    privrestore_fn *restore_privs, int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
  {
  	FILE *f = NULL;
  	struct stat st;
 @@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			_exit(1);
  		}
- 
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
  			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
  			    strerror(errno));
  			_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h
---- openssh/auth.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
+--- openssh/misc.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
 @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE  (1<<1)  /* Redirect stdout */
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD  (1<<2)  /* Discard stderr */
- pid_t	subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
--    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
-+    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *);
- 
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
+ pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
+-    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
++    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *, int, void *);
  
+ typedef struct arglist arglist;
+ struct arglist {
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  	char *role;
 @@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
  
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
 -	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
@@ -203,10 +203,10 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
  			switch (security_getenforce()) {
  			case -1:
- 				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ 				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
  
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
 -	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
@@ -269,3 +269,15 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
  #endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
+diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor	2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100
++++ openssh/sshconnect.c	2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100
+@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h
+ 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
+-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
++	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
index 19f3d97..f199fb2 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h
 +
  /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
  #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
- 	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.334525723 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c
  	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
  	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
 +			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
++				logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
  		goto out;
  	}
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
index 506c79a..3b9ef3a 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
 +	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template);
++	debug3_f("called, template = %s", template);
 +	if (template == NULL)
 +		return -1;
 +
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		} else {
 +			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
 +			*p_o = '\0';
-+			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
++			debug_f("unsupported token %s in %s", p_n, template);
 +			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
 +			goto cleanup;
 +		}
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	int ret = 0;
 +	char *value = NULL;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	debug3_f("called");
 +	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
 +	if (ret)
 +		return ret;
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname);
++	debug3_f("returning with ccname = %s", *ccname);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
 -		return oerrno;
 -	}
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	debug3_f("called");
 +	if (need_environment)
 +		*need_environment = 0;
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -	close(tmpfd);
  
 -	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
++	debug3_f("setting default ccname to %s", ccname);
 +	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
 +	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
 +	if (ret)
@@ -304,13 +304,13 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
 +	 */
 +	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname);
 +		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
 +		free(type);
 +		if (ret)
 +			return ret;
 +
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_switch()");
 +		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
 +	} else {
 +		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		 * collections
 +		 */
 +		free(type);
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_resolve(%s)", ccname);
 +		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
 +	}
  }
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
  	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
 @@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
  	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
  	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch b/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
index add4727..a6c3bae 100644
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
  	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
  	const char *displayname;
 @@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  	mic.value = p;
  	mic.length = len;
 -	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +#endif
 +		micuser = authctxt->user;
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
- 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
  
  	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
 @@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
 +++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
 @@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
  	/* reconstruct packet */
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	    (authctxt->role
@@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 +	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	debug3("%s: role=%s", __func__, authctxt->role);
++		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	debug3_f("role=%s", authctxt->role);
 +
 +	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
 +		free(authctxt->role);
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 @@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 @@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
@@ -305,12 +305,12 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	int r;
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++	debug3_f("entering");
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 -void
 -ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
 -{
--	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
 -
 -	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
 -		return;
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
  
 -	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
 +	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	access_vector_t bit;
 +	security_class_t class;
 +
-+	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
++	debug_f("src:%s dst:%s", src, dst);
 +	class = string_to_security_class("context");
 +	if (!class) {
 +		error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +			    /* we actually don't change level */
 +			    reqlvl = "";
 +
-+			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
++			debug_f("current connection level '%s'", reqlvl);
 +
 +		}
 +
@@ -720,8 +720,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (r != 0) {
-+		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
-+		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
++		error_f("Failed to get default SELinux security "
++		    "context for %s", pwname);
 +	}
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	char *use_current;
 +	int rv;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +
@@ -783,32 +783,30 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
 +			switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +			case -1:
-+				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +			case 0:
-+				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+				    __func__);
++				error_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
 +			break;
 +			default:
-+				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
-+				    __func__);
++				fatal_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.");
 +			}
 +		}
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	if (r >= 0) {
 +		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
 +		if (r < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++			error_f("Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
++			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
 +		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++			error_f("Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
++			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#endif
 +	}
@@ -823,14 +821,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (r < 0) {
 +		switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +		case -1:
-+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++			fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +		case 0:
-+			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+			    __func__);
++			error_f("ELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
 +			break;
 +		default:
-+			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
-+			    __func__);
++			fatal_f("SELinux failure. Aborting connection.");
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
@@ -838,7 +834,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (default_ctx != NULL)
 +		freecon(default_ctx);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
++	debug3_f("done");
 +}
 +
 +#endif
diff --git a/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch b/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 24598b8..0000000
--- a/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 22bfdcf060b632b5a6ff603f8f42ff166c211a66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 10:02:45 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fail hard on the first failed attempt to write the
- authorized_keys_file
-
----
- ssh-copy-id | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 392f64f..e69a23f 100755
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
- 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
--	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE}; } &&
-+	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
- 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
- 	  exit 1;
- 	if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
--- 
-GitLab
-
-
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
index fe2f7cd..813b7ac 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
 --- openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.546775605 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5	2020-03-26 14:52:20.700649727 +0100
-@@ -359,17 +359,17 @@ or
+@@ -359,14 +359,13 @@ or
  .Qq *.c.example.com
  domains.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -14,19 +14,15 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
  by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  .Xr ssh 1
  will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
  specified.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm CertificateFile
- Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
- A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
 @@ -424,20 +424,25 @@ If the option is set to
- .Cm no ,
+ (the default),
  the check will not be executed.
  .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
@@ -133,8 +129,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q kex .
 @@ -1231,37 +1228,33 @@ The default is INFO.
- DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+ file.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
@@ -179,56 +175,57 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1394,36 +1387,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
+@@ -1394,37 +1387,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
  The default is
  .Cm no .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
- as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
+-character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default
 -instead of replacing it.
-+character, then the key types after it will be appended to the built-in
++character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default instead of replacing it.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq ^
- character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
 diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 --- openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.530775355 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5	2020-03-26 14:48:56.732468099 +0100
-@@ -375,16 +375,16 @@ If the argument is
+@@ -375,14 +375,13 @@ If the argument is
  then no banner is displayed.
  By default, no banner is displayed.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -241,16 +238,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
  public key or host-based authentication.
-+.Pp
  .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
- PAM or through authentication styles supported in
 @@ -446,20 +446,25 @@ The default is
  indicating not to
  .Xr chroot 2 .
@@ -295,7 +289,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -681,22 +679,24 @@ For this to work
+@@ -681,21 +679,22 @@ For this to work
  .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -326,11 +320,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 -.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 -gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
  This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
-@@ -793,25 +793,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+@@ -793,26 +793,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
  .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  environment variable.
  .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
@@ -339,26 +331,27 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 +To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the host key algorithms
+ Specifies the host key signature algorithms
  that the server offers.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
  .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
 @@ -943,20 +931,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
@@ -392,7 +385,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
 @@ -988,15 +981,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
- sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
+ sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
@@ -408,8 +401,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
  .It Cm ListenAddress
 @@ -1065,21 +1049,26 @@ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
- Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+ file.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
@@ -454,49 +447,50 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm Match
-@@ -1480,36 +1460,25 @@ or equivalent.)
+@@ -1480,37 +1460,25 @@ or equivalent.)
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
  Alternately if the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the built-in
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq ^
- character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
index 770e99e..2c29486 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
 @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
  	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
  	kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
- 	sntrup4591761.o kexsntrup4591761x25519.o kexgen.o \
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
 +	kexgssc.o \
  	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
  	sshbuf-io.o
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
 -	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 +	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
  	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ 	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
  	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
 diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
 index 086b8ebb..687c57b4 100644
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 --- a/auth2-gss.c
 +++ b/auth2-gss.c
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.29 2018/07/31 03:10:27 djm Exp $ */
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.32 2021/01/27 10:15:08 djm Exp $ */
  
  /*
 - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -165,19 +165,19 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "parsing");
 +
 +	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	mic.value = p;
 +	mic.length = len;
 +
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+	    "gssapi-keyex");
++	    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
 +
 +	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
   * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
 @@ -260,7 +302,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
  
 -	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
 +	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 --- a/gss-genr.c
 +++ b/gss-genr.c
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.26 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
  
  /*
 - * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -41,12 +41,36 @@
+@@ -41,9 +41,33 @@
  #include "sshbuf.h"
  #include "log.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -461,9 +461,6 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
- 
 +typedef struct {
 +	char *encoded;
 +	gss_OID oid;
@@ -486,7 +483,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */
  int
  ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
-@@ -62,6 +86,162 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
+@@ -62,6 +86,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -548,7 +545,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +	    (gss_supported->count + 1));
 +
 +	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	oidpos = 0;
 +	s = cp = xstrdup(kex);
@@ -565,8 +562,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +			        gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
 +			        gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 ||
 +			    (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+				fatal("%s: digest failed: %s", __func__,
-+				    ssh_err(r));
++				fatal_fr(r, "digest failed");
 +			ssh_digest_free(md);
 +			md = NULL;
 +
@@ -581,12 +577,10 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
 +				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
 +				    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0)
-+					fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8 error: %s",
-+					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
++					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8 error");
 +				if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, strlen(p))) != 0 ||
 +				    (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0)
-+					fatal("%s: sshbuf_put error: %s",
-+					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
++					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put error");
 +			}
 +
 +			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
@@ -599,7 +593,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
 +
 +	if ((mechs = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(buf);
 +
@@ -721,7 +715,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +
  void
  ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
-     const char *context)
+     const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id)
 @@ -273,11 +500,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
  }
  
@@ -1123,10 +1117,10 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +
 +	if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
 +		if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
-+			debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
++			debug_f("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
 +				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
 +		} else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
-+			debug("%s: krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s", __func__,
++			debug_f("krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s",
 +				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
 +		} else {
 +			krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
@@ -1375,7 +1369,7 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 @@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
  	sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
  	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
- 	free(kex->session_id);
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	free(kex->gss_host);
 +#endif /* GSSAPI */
@@ -1389,7 +1383,7 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
 @@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
  	KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
  	KEX_C25519_SHA256,
- 	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512,
+ 	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
@@ -1498,7 +1492,7 @@ new file mode 100644
 index 00000000..f6e1405e
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,606 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,599 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -1597,7 +1591,7 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
 +		break;
 +	default:
-+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +	}
 +	if (r != 0)
 +		return r;
@@ -1785,7 +1779,7 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	    server_blob,
 +	    shared_secret,
 +	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +
 +	gssbuf.value = hash;
 +	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
@@ -2074,13 +2068,6 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +
 +	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
 +
-+	/* save session id */
-+	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+	}
-+
 +	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
 +		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
 +
@@ -2202,12 +2189,12 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		free(mechs);
 +	}
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
 +	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
@@ -2242,7 +2229,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +				    &shared_secret);
 +				break;
 +			default:
-+				fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++				fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +			}
 +			if (r != 0)
 +				goto out;
@@ -2398,12 +2385,12 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
 +			free(mechs);
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
 +	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
@@ -2641,44 +2628,44 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
 @@ -1713,6 +1730,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 		kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
  # endif
 +# ifdef GSSAPI
-+		if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+		}
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
++	}
 +# endif
  #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 		kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- 		kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
 @@ -1806,8 +1834,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	u_char *p;
  	int r;
  
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
--		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
 @@ -1839,8 +1867,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
  	int r;
  
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
--		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
 @@ -1860,6 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
@@ -2692,9 +2679,9 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  	int r;
  
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
--		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
@@ -2707,13 +2694,13 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  	const char *displayname;
  
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
--		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
  
 -	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
 +	    ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, kex);
@@ -2721,7 +2708,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  	sshbuf_reset(m);
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
 @@ -1913,7 +1946,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- 	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ 	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
  	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
  
 -	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
@@ -2733,7 +2720,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
  		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
-@@ -1921,5 +1958,85 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1921,5 +1958,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
  	return (authenticated);
  }
@@ -2749,16 +2736,15 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +	int r;
 +
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +	data.value = p;
 +	data.length = len;
 +	/* Lengths of SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes that are used */
 +	if (data.length != 20 && data.length != 32 && data.length != 64)
-+		fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
-+		    (int) data.length);
++		fatal_f("data length incorrect: %d", (int) data.length);
 +
 +	/* Save the session ID on the first time around */
 +	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
@@ -2774,7 +2760,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
 +
@@ -2795,12 +2781,12 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +	int r, ok;
 +
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envval, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
 +
@@ -2810,7 +2796,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +
 +	sshbuf_reset(m);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +
@@ -2847,14 +2833,14 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
  	int r, authenticated = 0;
  
  	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
  
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
  	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
 @@ -1012,4 +1014,57 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- 	debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ 	debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
  	return (authenticated);
  }
 +
@@ -2866,16 +2852,16 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	int r;
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data->value, data->length)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, hash)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +
@@ -2889,7 +2875,7 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	int r, ok;
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
 +	    store->filename ? store->filename : "")) != 0 ||
@@ -2897,13 +2883,13 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	    store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
 +	    store->envval ? store->envval : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ok)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +
@@ -3124,7 +3110,7 @@ index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
 @@ -531,6 +543,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
@@ -3246,7 +3232,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
 --- a/ssh-gss.h
 +++ b/ssh-gss.h
 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.14 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
  /*
 - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -3332,7 +3318,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
 @@ -123,17 +149,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
  OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
  void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *,
-     const char *, const char *);
+     const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *);
 -int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
 +int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
 +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
@@ -3382,7 +3368,7 @@ index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
 +.It GSSAPITrustDns
  .It HashKnownHosts
  .It Host
- .It HostbasedAuthentication
+ .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
 @@ -579,6 +585,8 @@ flag),
  (supported message integrity codes),
  .Ar kex
@@ -3526,9 +3512,9 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +
  	xxx_host = host;
  	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
- 
+ 	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
 @@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
  	}
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3588,7 +3574,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +# endif
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
- 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
  	ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3604,7 +3590,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  
  	/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
  	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
- 	    compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
+ 	    compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	/* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
 +	/* ext-info removal above */
@@ -3616,7 +3602,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	}
 +#endif
  	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
- 		fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf");
  
 @@ -330,6 +392,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -3714,13 +3700,13 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
-+	    "gssapi-keyex");
++	    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
 +
 +	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
@@ -3734,7 +3720,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "parsing");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(b);
 +	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
@@ -3751,11 +3737,11 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +++ b/sshd.c
 @@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
  	}
- 	debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
+ 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
  	if (nkeys == 0)
--		fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
 -	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		debug3("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
++		debug3_f("no hostkeys");
 +	else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
  		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
  	sshbuf_free(buf);
@@ -3772,7 +3758,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
  	}
 @@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- 	    list_hostkey_types());
+ 	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	{
@@ -3818,7 +3804,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +
  	/* start key exchange */
  	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
- 		fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
 @@ -2362,7 +2405,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
@@ -3837,7 +3823,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +# endif
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
  	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
 diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
 index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
@@ -3898,9 +3884,9 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
 +.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 +gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
 +This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
 diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
 index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
 --- a/sshkey.c
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
index 1db95c3..5d76a4f 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+	    kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
++	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id));
 +	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
index 0713ffe..748ab48 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
@@ -57,26 +57,26 @@ index e7549470..4511f82a 100644
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
 +	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o
 +	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT)
- 	rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o
- 	rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
  	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
 @@ -322,6 +324,8 @@ distclean:	regressclean
  	rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
 +	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o
 +	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11
- 	rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o
- 	rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
  	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
+ 	if test -d pkg ; then \
+ 		rm -fr pkg ; \
 @@ -490,6 +494,7 @@ regress-prep:
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/match
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
 +	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/pkcs11
- 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/kexfuzz
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy
  	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
+ 	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
 @@ -617,6 +622,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \
  	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
  	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
@@ -91,17 +91,17 @@ index e7549470..4511f82a 100644
 +	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
 +	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 +
- MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS=\
- 	regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.o \
- 	$(SKOBJS)
+ # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
+ SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
+ 	regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \
 @@ -655,6 +670,7 @@ regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(REGRESSLIBS) \
  	regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \
  	regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \
  	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
 +	regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) \
- 	regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
  
  tests:	file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit
+ 	echo all tests passed
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
 index b689db4b..98d3ce4f 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
@@ -1075,10 +1075,10 @@ index 7eb6f0dc..27d8e4af 100644
 +	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, *sane_uri = NULL;
  	char **comments = NULL;
  	int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
- 	u_int seconds;
+ 	u_int seconds = 0;
 @@ -681,33 +743,28 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
- 			goto send;
- 		}
+ 		error_f("failed to parse constraints");
+ 		goto send;
  	}
 -	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
 -		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
@@ -1093,13 +1093,13 @@ index 7eb6f0dc..27d8e4af 100644
 +	if (sane_uri == NULL)
  		goto send;
 -	}
--	debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
+-	debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider);
 +
  	if (lifetime && !death)
  		death = monotime() + lifetime;
  
 -	count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments);
-+	debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, sane_uri);
++	debug_f("add %.100s", sane_uri);
 +	count = pkcs11_add_provider(sane_uri, pin, &keys, &comments);
  	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
  		k = keys[i];
@@ -1147,8 +1147,8 @@ index 7eb6f0dc..27d8e4af 100644
  		goto send;
 -	}
  
--	debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
-+	debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, sane_uri);
+-	debug_f("remove %.100s", canonical_provider);
++	debug_f("remove %.100s", sane_uri);
  	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
  		nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
  		/* Skip file--based keys */
@@ -1165,7 +1165,7 @@ index 7eb6f0dc..27d8e4af 100644
 +	if (pkcs11_del_provider(sane_uri) == 0)
  		success = 1;
  	else
- 		error("%s: pkcs11_del_provider failed", __func__);
+ 		error_f("pkcs11_del_provider failed");
  send:
  	free(provider);
 +	free(sane_uri);
@@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ index 8a0ffef5..ead8a562 100644
  	u_int nkeys, i;
  	struct sshbuf *msg;
  
-+	debug("%s: called, name = %s", __func__, name);
++	debug_f("called, name = %s", name);
 +
  	if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0)
  		return (-1);
@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ index 8a0ffef5..ead8a562 100644
  		*keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
  		if (labelsp)
  			*labelsp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(char *));
-+		debug("%s: nkeys = %u", __func__, nkeys);
++		debug_f("nkeys = %u", nkeys);
  		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
  			/* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */
  			if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ new file mode 100644
 index 00000000..e1a7b4e0
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
 + *
@@ -1493,13 +1493,12 @@ index 00000000..e1a7b4e0
 +	size_t scheme_len = strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME);
 +	if (strlen(uri) < scheme_len || /* empty URI matches everything */
 +	    strncmp(uri, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, scheme_len) != 0) {
-+		error("%s: The '%s' does not look like PKCS#11 URI",
-+		    __func__, uri);
++		error_f("The '%s' does not look like PKCS#11 URI", uri);
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 +
 +	if (pkcs11 == NULL) {
-+		error("%s: Bad arguments. The pkcs11 can't be null", __func__);
++		error_f("Bad arguments. The pkcs11 can't be null");
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 +
@@ -1510,7 +1509,7 @@ index 00000000..e1a7b4e0
 +	/* everything before ? */
 +	tok = strtok_r(str1, "?", &saveptr1);
 +	if (tok == NULL) {
-+		error("%s: pk11-path expected, got EOF", __func__);
++		error_f("pk11-path expected, got EOF");
 +		rv = -1;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
@@ -1536,35 +1535,32 @@ index 00000000..e1a7b4e0
 +		case pId:
 +			/* CKA_ID */
 +			if (pkcs11->id != NULL) {
-+				verbose("%s: The id already set in the PKCS#11 URI",
-+					__func__);
++				verbose_f("The id already set in the PKCS#11 URI");
 +				rv = -1;
 +				goto out;
 +			}
 +			len = percent_decode(arg, &pkcs11->id);
 +			if (len <= 0) {
-+				verbose("%s: Failed to percent-decode CKA_ID: %s",
-+				    __func__, arg);
++				verbose_f("Failed to percent-decode CKA_ID: %s", arg);
 +				rv = -1;
 +				goto out;
 +			} else
 +				pkcs11->id_len = len;
-+			debug3("%s: Setting CKA_ID = %s from PKCS#11 URI",
-+			    __func__, arg);
++			debug3_f("Setting CKA_ID = %s from PKCS#11 URI", arg);
 +			break;
 +		case pToken:
 +			/* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> label */
 +			charptr = &pkcs11->token;
 + parse_string:
 +			if (*charptr != NULL) {
-+				verbose("%s: The %s already set in the PKCS#11 URI",
-+				    keywords[opcode].name, __func__);
++				verbose_f("The %s already set in the PKCS#11 URI",
++				    keywords[opcode].name);
 +				rv = -1;
 +				goto out;
 +			}
 +			percent_decode(arg, charptr);
-+			debug3("%s: Setting %s = %s from PKCS#11 URI",
-+			    __func__, keywords[opcode].name, *charptr);
++			debug3_f("Setting %s = %s from PKCS#11 URI",
++			    keywords[opcode].name, *charptr);
 +			break;
 +
 +		case pObject:
@@ -1584,8 +1580,7 @@ index 00000000..e1a7b4e0
 +
 +		default:
 +			/* Unrecognized attribute in the URI path SHOULD be error */
-+			verbose("%s: Unknown part of path in PKCS#11 URI: %s",
-+			    __func__, tok);
++			verbose_f("Unknown part of path in PKCS#11 URI: %s", tok);
 +		}
 +	}
 +
@@ -1608,32 +1603,31 @@ index 00000000..e1a7b4e0
 +		case pModulePath:
 +			/* module-path is PKCS11Provider */
 +			if (pkcs11->module_path != NULL) {
-+				verbose("%s: Multiple module-path attributes are"
-+				    "not supported the PKCS#11 URI", __func__);
++				verbose_f("Multiple module-path attributes are"
++				    "not supported the PKCS#11 URI");
 +				rv = -1;
 +				goto out;
 +			}
 +			percent_decode(arg, &pkcs11->module_path);
-+			debug3("%s: Setting PKCS11Provider = %s from PKCS#11 URI",
-+			    __func__, pkcs11->module_path);
++			debug3_f("Setting PKCS11Provider = %s from PKCS#11 URI",
++			    pkcs11->module_path);
 +			break;
 +
 +		case pPinValue:
 +			/* pin-value */
 +			if (pkcs11->pin != NULL) {
-+				verbose("%s: Multiple pin-value attributes are"
-+				    "not supported the PKCS#11 URI", __func__);
++				verbose_f("Multiple pin-value attributes are"
++				    "not supported the PKCS#11 URI");
 +				rv = -1;
 +				goto out;
 +			}
 +			percent_decode(arg, &pkcs11->pin);
-+			debug3("%s: Setting PIN from PKCS#11 URI", __func__);
++			debug3_f("Setting PIN from PKCS#11 URI");
 +			break;
 +
 +		default:
 +			/* Unrecognized attribute in the URI query SHOULD be ignored */
-+			verbose("%s: Unknown part of query in PKCS#11 URI: %s",
-+			    __func__, tok);
++			verbose_f("Unknown part of query in PKCS#11 URI: %s", tok);
 +		}
 +	}
 +out:
@@ -1727,7 +1721,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  };
  
  int pkcs11_interactive = 0;
-@@ -106,26 +114,63 @@ pkcs11_init(int interactive)
+@@ -106,26 +114,61 @@ pkcs11_init(int interactive)
   * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
   */
  static void
@@ -1740,8 +1734,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 -	debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d",
 -	    p, p->refcount, p->valid);
 -	if (!p->valid)
-+	debug("%s: %p refcount %d valid %d", __func__,
-+	    m, m->refcount, m->valid);
++	debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", m, m->refcount, m->valid);
 +	if (!m->valid)
  		return;
 -	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
@@ -1769,11 +1762,11 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +static void
 +pkcs11_module_unref(struct pkcs11_module *m)
 +{
-+	debug("%s: %p refcount %d", __func__, m, m->refcount);
++	debug_f("%p refcount %d", m, m->refcount);
 +	if (--m->refcount <= 0) {
 +		pkcs11_module_finalize(m);
 +		if (m->valid)
-+			error("%s: %p still valid", __func__, m);
++			error_f("%p still valid", m);
 +		free(m->slotlist);
 +		free(m->slotinfo);
 +		free(m->module_path);
@@ -1790,8 +1783,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +static void
 +pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
 +{
-+	debug("%s: %p refcount %d valid %d", __func__,
-+	    p, p->refcount, p->valid);
++	debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", p, p->refcount, p->valid);
 +	if (!p->valid)
 +		return;
 +	pkcs11_module_unref(p->module);
@@ -1807,7 +1799,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
  {
 -	debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount);
-+	debug("%s: %p refcount %d", __func__, p, p->refcount);
++	debug_f("%p refcount %d", p, p->refcount);
  	if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
 -		if (p->valid)
 -			error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p);
@@ -1853,7 +1845,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +	int rv;
 +	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
 +
-+	debug("%s: called, provider_id = %s", __func__, provider_id);
++	debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id);
 +
 +	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
 +	if (uri == NULL)
@@ -1881,7 +1873,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
  
 -	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
-+	debug3("%s(%s): called", __func__, provider_uri);
++	debug3_f("called with provider %s", provider_uri);
 +
 +	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_uri)) != NULL) {
  		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
@@ -1977,7 +1969,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  		    si->token.label);
 -		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) {
 +		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) {
- 			debug("%s: no pin specified", __func__);
+ 			debug_f("no pin specified");
  			return (-1);	/* bail out */
  		}
  	}
@@ -2296,7 +2288,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  		error("BN_bin2bn failed");
  		goto fail;
 @@ -871,7 +1032,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
- 		fatal("%s: set key", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("set key");
  	rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
  
 -	if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa))
@@ -2508,7 +2500,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  	int ret = -1;
  	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
  	void *handle = NULL;
-@@ -1484,167 +1670,303 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+@@ -1484,164 +1670,298 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
  	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
  	CK_ULONG i;
@@ -2522,7 +2514,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +#ifdef PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER
 +		provider_module = strdup(PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER);
 +#else
-+		error("%s: No module path provided", __func__);
++		error_f("No module path provided");
  		goto fail;
 -	*providerp = NULL;
 -
@@ -2536,16 +2528,14 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +	}
  
 -	if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
--		debug("%s: provider already registered: %s",
--		    __func__, provider_id);
+-		debug_f("provider already registered: %s", provider_id);
 -		goto fail;
 +	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
 +	p->name = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
 +
 +	if ((m = pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(provider_module)) != NULL
 +	   && m->valid) {
-+		debug("%s: provider module already initialized: %s",
-+		    __func__, provider_module);
++		debug_f("provider module already initialized: %s", provider_module);
 +		free(provider_module);
 +		/* Skip the initialization of PKCS#11 module */
 +		m->refcount++;
@@ -2605,8 +2595,8 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +	rmspace(m->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(m->info.manufacturerID));
 +	if (uri->lib_manuf != NULL &&
 +	    strcmp(uri->lib_manuf, m->info.manufacturerID)) {
-+		debug("%s: Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer",
-+		    __func__, m->info.manufacturerID);
++		debug_f("Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer",
++		    m->info.manufacturerID);
 +		goto fail;
 +	}
 +	rmspace(m->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(m->info.libraryDescription));
@@ -2634,9 +2624,8 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  	}
 -	if (p->nslots == 0) {
 +	if (m->nslots == 0) {
- 		debug("%s: provider %s returned no slots", __func__,
--		    provider_id);
-+		    provider_module);
+-		debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_id);
++		debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_module);
  		ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS;
  		goto fail;
  	}
@@ -2663,8 +2652,8 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +		if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(m->slotlist[i], token))
  		    != CKR_OK) {
  			error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu "
--			    "failed: %lu", provider_id, (unsigned long)i, rv);
-+			    "failed: %lu", provider_module, (unsigned long)i, rv);
+-			    "failed: %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i, rv);
++			    "failed: %lu", provider_module, (u_long)i, rv);
 +			token->flags = 0;
  			continue;
  		}
@@ -2735,25 +2724,23 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +	for (i = 0; i < p->module->nslots; i++) {
 +		token = &p->module->slotinfo[i].token;
  		if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
- 			debug2("%s: ignoring uninitialised token in "
- 			    "provider %s slot %lu", __func__,
--			    provider_id, (unsigned long)i);
-+			    provider_uri, (unsigned long)i);
+ 			debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in "
+-			    "provider %s slot %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i);
++			    "provider %s slot %lu", provider_uri, (u_long)i);
 +			continue;
 +		}
 +		if (uri->token != NULL &&
 +		    strcmp(token->label, uri->token) != 0) {
-+			debug2("%s: ignoring token not matching label (%s) "
-+			    "specified by PKCS#11 URI in slot %lu", __func__,
++			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching label (%s) "
++			    "specified by PKCS#11 URI in slot %lu",
 +			    token->label, (unsigned long)i);
 +			continue;
 +		}
 +		if (uri->manuf != NULL &&
 +		    strcmp(token->manufacturerID, uri->manuf) != 0) {
-+			debug2("%s: ignoring token not matching requrested "
++			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested "
 +			    "manufacturerID (%s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in "
-+			    "slot %lu", __func__,
-+			    token->manufacturerID, (unsigned long)i);
++			    "slot %lu", token->manufacturerID, (unsigned long)i);
  			continue;
  		}
 -		rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label));
@@ -2789,8 +2776,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  			 * expose keys.
  			 */
 -			if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i],
-+			debug3("%s: Trying to login as there were no keys found",
-+			    __func__);
++			debug3_f("Trying to login as there were no keys found");
 +			if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->module->slotinfo[i],
  			    CKU_USER) < 0) {
  				error("login failed");
@@ -2802,8 +2788,8 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
 +		}
 +		if (nkeys == 0 && uri->object != NULL) {
-+			debug3("%s: No keys found. Retrying without label (%s) ",
-+			    __func__, uri->object);
++			debug3_f("No keys found. Retrying without label (%s) ",
++			    uri->object);
 +			/* Try once more without the label filter */
 +			char *label = uri->object;
 +			uri->object = NULL; /* XXX clone uri? */
@@ -2852,7 +2838,7 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +	struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL;
 +	int r;
 +
-+	debug("%s: called, provider_id = %s", __func__, provider_id);
++	debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id);
 +
 +	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
 +	if (uri == NULL)
@@ -2878,12 +2864,11 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
 +pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin,
 +    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp)
  {
--	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
+ 	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
  	int nkeys;
-+	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
 +	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
 +
-+	debug("%s: called, provider_uri = %s", __func__, provider_uri);
++	debug_f("called, provider_uri = %s", provider_uri);
  
 -	nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp,
 -	    &p, CKU_USER);
@@ -2892,11 +2877,11 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  	/* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */
  	if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) {
 @@ -1652,7 +1974,37 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+ 		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
  	}
  	if (nkeys == 0)
- 		debug("%s: provider %s returned no keys", __func__,
--		    provider_id);
-+		    provider_uri);
+-		debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_id);
++		debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_uri);
 +
 +	free(provider_uri);
 +	return nkeys;
@@ -2930,26 +2915,6 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  
  	return (nkeys);
  }
-@@ -1674,7 +2026,7 @@ pkcs11_gakp(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned int slotidx, char *label,
- 
- 	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL)
- 		debug("%s: provider \"%s\" available", __func__, provider_id);
--	else if ((ret = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL,
-+	else if ((rv = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL,
- 	    &p, CKU_SO)) < 0) {
- 		debug("%s: could not register provider %s", __func__,
- 		    provider_id);
-@@ -1746,8 +2098,8 @@ pkcs11_destroy_keypair(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned long slotidx,
- 
- 	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
- 		debug("%s: using provider \"%s\"", __func__, provider_id);
--	} else if (pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL, &p,
--	    CKU_SO) < 0) {
-+	} else if ((rv = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL,
-+	    &p, CKU_SO)) < 0) {
- 		debug("%s: could not register provider %s", __func__,
- 		    provider_id);
- 		goto out;
 diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.h b/ssh-pkcs11.h
 index 81f1d7c5..feaf74de 100644
 --- a/ssh-pkcs11.h
@@ -2995,7 +2960,7 @@ index 15aee569..976844cb 100644
 +	pkcs11_terminate();
  
   skip_connect:
- 	exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, pw);
+ 	exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo);
 @@ -2076,6 +2085,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw)
  	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
  }
@@ -3041,7 +3006,7 @@ index 15aee569..976844cb 100644
 +
  /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
  static void
- load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *pw)
+ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
 @@ -2090,11 +2138,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *pw)
  	char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
  	struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
@@ -3117,9 +3082,9 @@ index 15aee569..976844cb 100644
 +		}
 +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
 +		cp = tilde_expand_filename(name, getuid());
- 		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp,
- 		    pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
+ 		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
  		free(cp);
+ 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
 diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
 index 06a32d31..4b2763bd 100644
 --- a/ssh_config.5
diff --git a/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch b/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
index 18b0376..8b83bc3 100644
--- a/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
  			if (x11_use_localhost)
  				set_reuseaddr(sock);
  			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 				debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
- 				    port, strerror(errno));
+ 				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
+ 				    strerror(errno));
  				close(sock);
 +
 +				/* do not remove successfully opened
diff --git a/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch b/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
index 0af1d3d..1285979 100644
--- a/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@
 +	 * SHA2 signature types.
 +	 */
 +	if (alg == NULL &&
-+	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) {
-+		oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types);
++	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) {
++		oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
 +		while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
 +			if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
 +				continue;
diff --git a/openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch b/openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ac4ee61..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index e0768c06..5065ae7e 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_pselect6
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_read
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
- #endif
diff --git a/openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch b/openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7bc4c7d..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-From 66f16e5425eb881570e82bfef7baeac2e7accc0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Oleg <Fallmay@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 12:09:08 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix `EOF: command not found` error in ssh-copy-id
-
----
- contrib/ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 392f64f94..a76907717 100644
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
-   #    the -z `tail ...` checks for a trailing newline. The echo adds one if was missing
-   #    the cat adds the keys we're getting via STDIN
-   #    and if available restorecon is used to restore the SELinux context
--  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF)
-+  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
- 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
- 	  restorecon -F .ssh ${AUTH_KEY_FILE};
- 	fi
- EOF
-+  )
- 
-   # to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
-   printf "exec sh -c '%s'" "${INSTALLKEYS_SH}"
-
-From de59a431cdec833e3ec15691dd950402b4c052cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
-Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2020 00:20:07 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] un-nest $() to make ksh cheerful
-
----
- ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-From 02ac2c3c3db5478a440dfb1b90d15f686f2cbfc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
-Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 21:30:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ksh doesn't grok 'local'
-
-and AFAICT it's not actually doing anything useful in the code, so let's
-see how things go without it.
----
- ssh-copy-id | 11 +++++------
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index a769077..11c9463 100755
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ quote() {
- }
- 
- use_id_file() {
--  local L_ID_FILE="$1"
-+  L_ID_FILE="$1"
- 
-   if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then
-     printf '%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n' "$0"
-@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ use_id_file() {
-   # check that the files are readable
-   for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do
-     ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || {
--      local L_PRIVMSG=""
-+      L_PRIVMSG=""
-       [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG="	(to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)"
-       printf "\\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
-       exit 1
-@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ fi
- # populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
- # and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
- populate_new_ids() {
--  local L_SUCCESS="$1"
-+  L_SUCCESS="$1"
- 
-   # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-   if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then
-@@ -181,13 +181,12 @@ populate_new_ids() {
-   eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
- 
-   umask 0177
--  local L_TMP_ID_FILE
-   L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
-   if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
-     printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2
-     exit 1
-   fi
--  local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
-+  L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
-   # shellcheck disable=SC2064
-   trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
-   printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
-@@ -237,7 +236,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- #    produce a one-liner to add the keys to remote authorized_keys file
- #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
- installkeys_sh() {
--  local AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
-+  AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
- 
-   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
-   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
--- 
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 11c9463..ee3f637 100755
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
- installkeys_sh() {
-   AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
-+  AUTH_KEY_DIR=$(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}")
- 
-   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
-   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
-@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
-   INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
--	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-+	mkdir -p "${AUTH_KEY_DIR}" &&
- 	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
- 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
- 	  exit 1;
--- 
diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec
index f01fa5e..4eb4d16 100644
--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@@ -50,21 +50,21 @@
 %{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}
 
 # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
-%global openssh_ver 8.4p1
-%global openssh_rel 5
+%global openssh_ver 8.5p1
+%global openssh_rel 1
 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4
-%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 1
+%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 2
 
 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
 Name: openssh
 Version: %{openssh_ver}
-Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}.2
+Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}
 URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
 #URL1: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
 Source2: sshd.pam
-Source3: DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
+Source3: gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
 Source4: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/archive/pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}.tar.gz
 Source5: pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
 Source6: ssh-keycat.pam
@@ -178,9 +178,6 @@ Patch950: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
 Patch951: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
 # Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts (#1620333)
 Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
-# ssh-copy-id is unmaintained: Aggreagete patches
-# https://gitlab.com/phil_hands/ssh-copy-id/-/merge_requests/2
-Patch958: openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
 # Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325)
 Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
 # Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485)
@@ -191,9 +188,6 @@ Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
 Patch965: openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
 # Do not break X11 without IPv6
 Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
-Patch967: openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
-# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3232
-Patch968: openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3213
 Patch969: openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
 
@@ -266,7 +260,7 @@ Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 %package -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
 Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent
 Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
-Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}.4
+Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}
 License: BSD
 
 %description
@@ -364,14 +358,11 @@ popd
 %patch950 -p1 -b .sandbox
 %patch951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
 %patch953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6
-%patch958 -p1 -b .ssh-copy-id
 %patch962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies
 %patch963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp
 %patch964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
 %patch965 -p1 -b .visibility
 %patch966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
-%patch967 -p1 -b .ssh-copy-id
-%patch968 -p1 -b .seccomp
 %patch969 -p0 -b .debian
 
 %patch200 -p1 -b .audit
@@ -648,6 +639,9 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Mar 03 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 8.5p1-1 + 0.10.4-2
+- New upstream release (#1934336)
+
 * Tue Mar 02 2021 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> - 8.4p1-5.2
 - Rebuilt for updated systemd-rpm-macros
   See https://pagure.io/fesco/issue/2583.
diff --git a/sources b/sources
index 41d33d0..173dd73 100644
--- a/sources
+++ b/sources
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz) = d65275b082c46c5efe7cf3264fa6794d6e99a36d4a54b50554fc56979d6c0837381587fd5399195e1db680d2a5ad1ef0b99a180eac2b4de5637906cb7a89e9ce
-SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc) = 3d9a026db27729a5a56785db3824230ccf2a3beca4bb48ef465e44d869b944dbc5d443152a1b1be21bc9c213c465d3d7ca1f876a387d0a6b9682a0cfec3e6e32
+SHA512 (openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz) = af9c34d89170a30fc92a63973e32c766ed4a6d254bb210e317c000d46913e78d0c60c7befe62d993d659be000b828b9d4d3832fc40df1c3d33850aaa6293846f
+SHA512 (openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz.asc) = 264a991c7207f2215875e2b472a649ede1a69f6486d25777bf522047c26ea77c2995d34b6917a993ea9a250b7dd5298a30f1975e20e471f079c9064ce283cec2
 SHA512 (pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz) = caccf72174d15e43f4c86a459ac6448682e62116557cf1e1e828955f3d1731595b238df42adec57860e7f341e92daf5d8285020bcb5018f3b8a5145aa32ee1c2
-SHA512 (DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg) = db1191ed9b6495999e05eed2ef863fb5179bdb63e94850f192dad68eed8579836f88fbcfffd9f28524fe1457aff8cd248ee3e0afc112c8f609b99a34b80ecc0d
+SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21