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nss/SOURCES/nss-3.44-cmac.patch
CentOS Sources 2f9926f1ba import nss-3.44.0-14.el8
2021-10-08 14:07:50 +00:00

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diff -up ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/build_softoken.sh.cmac ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/build_softoken.sh
--- ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/build_softoken.sh.cmac 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
+++ ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/build_softoken.sh 2019-11-06 16:49:57.878508650 -0800
@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@ export NSS_BUILD_SOFTOKEN_ONLY=1
rm -rf dist
make -C nss-softoken nss_build_all
-mv dist/private/nss/blapi.h dist/public/nss
-mv dist/private/nss/alghmac.h dist/public/nss
+for i in blapi alghmac cmac; do
+ mv "dist/private/nss/${i}.h" dist/public/nss
+done
# Package.
test -d artifacts || mkdir artifacts
diff -up ./cmd/lib/pk11table.c.cmac ./cmd/lib/pk11table.c
--- ./cmd/lib/pk11table.c.cmac 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
+++ ./cmd/lib/pk11table.c 2019-11-06 16:49:57.879508660 -0800
@@ -333,6 +333,8 @@ const Constant _consts[] = {
mkEntry(CKM_SHA512, Mechanism),
mkEntry(CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, Mechanism),
mkEntry(CKM_SHA512_HMAC, Mechanism),
+ mkEntry(CKM_AES_CMAC, Mechanism),
+ mkEntry(CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, Mechanism),
mkEntry(CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN, Mechanism),
mkEntry(CKM_CAST_ECB, Mechanism),
mkEntry(CKM_CAST_CBC, Mechanism),
diff -up ./cpputil/freebl_scoped_ptrs.h.cmac ./cpputil/freebl_scoped_ptrs.h
--- ./cpputil/freebl_scoped_ptrs.h.cmac 2019-11-06 16:49:35.504266721 -0800
+++ ./cpputil/freebl_scoped_ptrs.h 2019-11-06 16:49:35.504266721 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
+ * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef freebl_scoped_ptrs_h__
+#define freebl_scoped_ptrs_h__
+
+#include <memory>
+#include "blapi.h"
+
+struct ScopedDelete {
+ void operator()(CMACContext* ctx) { CMAC_Destroy(ctx, PR_TRUE); }
+};
+
+template <class T>
+struct ScopedMaybeDelete {
+ void operator()(T* ptr) {
+ if (ptr) {
+ ScopedDelete del;
+ del(ptr);
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+#define SCOPED(x) typedef std::unique_ptr<x, ScopedMaybeDelete<x> > Scoped##x
+
+SCOPED(CMACContext);
+
+#undef SCOPED
+
+#endif // freebl_scoped_ptrs_h__
diff -up ./gtests/freebl_gtest/cmac_unittests.cc.cmac ./gtests/freebl_gtest/cmac_unittests.cc
--- ./gtests/freebl_gtest/cmac_unittests.cc.cmac 2019-11-06 16:49:35.504266721 -0800
+++ ./gtests/freebl_gtest/cmac_unittests.cc 2019-11-06 16:49:35.504266721 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
+// You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+#include "gtest/gtest.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <memory>
+
+#include "blapi.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "freebl_scoped_ptrs.h"
+
+class CmacAesTest : public ::testing::Test {
+ protected:
+ bool Compare(const uint8_t *actual, const uint8_t *expected,
+ unsigned int length) {
+ return strncmp((const char *)actual, (const char *)expected, length) == 0;
+ }
+};
+
+TEST_F(CmacAesTest, CreateInvalidSize) {
+ uint8_t key[1] = {0x00};
+ ScopedCMACContext ctx(CMAC_Create(CMAC_AES, key, sizeof(key)));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ctx, nullptr);
+}
+
+TEST_F(CmacAesTest, CreateRightSize) {
+ uint8_t *key = PORT_NewArray(uint8_t, AES_128_KEY_LENGTH);
+ ScopedCMACContext ctx(CMAC_Create(CMAC_AES, key, AES_128_KEY_LENGTH));
+
+ ASSERT_NE(ctx, nullptr);
+ PORT_Free(key);
+}
+
+// The following tests were taken from NIST's Cryptographic Standards and
+// Guidelines page for AES-CMAC Examples with Intermediate Values. These same
+// test vectors for AES-128 can be found in RFC 4493, Section 4.
+
+static const uint8_t kNistKeys[][AES_256_KEY_LENGTH] = {
+ {0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15,
+ 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+ {0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3,
+ 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C,
+ 0x6B, 0x7B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
+ {0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE,
+ 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61,
+ 0x08, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4}};
+static const size_t kNistKeyLengthsCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kNistKeys);
+static const unsigned int kNistKeyLengths[kNistKeyLengthsCount] = {
+ AES_128_KEY_LENGTH, AES_192_KEY_LENGTH, AES_256_KEY_LENGTH};
+
+static const uint8_t kNistPlaintext[64] = {
+ 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E,
+ 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03,
+ 0xAC, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51, 0x30,
+ 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19,
+ 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF, 0xF6, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x4F, 0x9B,
+ 0x17, 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10};
+static const unsigned int kNistPlaintextLengths[] = {0, 16, 20, 64};
+static const size_t kNistPlaintextLengthsCount =
+ PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kNistPlaintextLengths);
+
+// This table contains the result of a CMAC over kNistPlaintext using keys from
+// kNistKeys. For each key, there are kNistPlaintextLengthsCount answers, all
+// listed one after the other as the input is truncated to the different sizes
+// in kNistPlaintextLengths.
+static const uint8_t kNistKnown[][AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {
+ {0xBB, 0x1D, 0x69, 0x29, 0xE9, 0x59, 0x37, 0x28, 0x7F, 0xA3, 0x7D, 0x12,
+ 0x9B, 0x75, 0x67, 0x46},
+ {0x07, 0x0A, 0x16, 0xB4, 0x6B, 0x4D, 0x41, 0x44, 0xF7, 0x9B, 0xDD, 0x9D,
+ 0xD0, 0x4A, 0x28, 0x7C},
+ {0x7D, 0x85, 0x44, 0x9E, 0xA6, 0xEA, 0x19, 0xC8, 0x23, 0xA7, 0xBF, 0x78,
+ 0x83, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0xDE},
+ {0x51, 0xF0, 0xBE, 0xBF, 0x7E, 0x3B, 0x9D, 0x92, 0xFC, 0x49, 0x74, 0x17,
+ 0x79, 0x36, 0x3C, 0xFE},
+ {0xD1, 0x7D, 0xDF, 0x46, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0xCD, 0xE5, 0x31, 0xCA, 0xC4, 0x83,
+ 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x93, 0x67},
+ {0x9E, 0x99, 0xA7, 0xBF, 0x31, 0xE7, 0x10, 0x90, 0x06, 0x62, 0xF6, 0x5E,
+ 0x61, 0x7C, 0x51, 0x84},
+ {0x3D, 0x75, 0xC1, 0x94, 0xED, 0x96, 0x07, 0x04, 0x44, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x7E,
+ 0xC7, 0x40, 0xEC, 0xF8},
+ {0xA1, 0xD5, 0xDF, 0x0E, 0xED, 0x79, 0x0F, 0x79, 0x4D, 0x77, 0x58, 0x96,
+ 0x59, 0xF3, 0x9A, 0x11},
+ {0x02, 0x89, 0x62, 0xF6, 0x1B, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x9E, 0xFC, 0x6B, 0x55, 0x1F,
+ 0x46, 0x67, 0xD9, 0x83},
+ {0x28, 0xA7, 0x02, 0x3F, 0x45, 0x2E, 0x8F, 0x82, 0xBD, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0x8D,
+ 0x8C, 0x37, 0xC3, 0x5C},
+ {0x15, 0x67, 0x27, 0xDC, 0x08, 0x78, 0x94, 0x4A, 0x02, 0x3C, 0x1F, 0xE0,
+ 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x6D, 0x93},
+ {0xE1, 0x99, 0x21, 0x90, 0x54, 0x9F, 0x6E, 0xD5, 0x69, 0x6A, 0x2C, 0x05,
+ 0x6C, 0x31, 0x54, 0x10}};
+PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kNistKnown) ==
+ kNistKeyLengthsCount * kNistPlaintextLengthsCount);
+
+TEST_F(CmacAesTest, AesNistAligned) {
+ for (unsigned int key_index = 0; key_index < kNistKeyLengthsCount;
+ key_index++) {
+ ScopedCMACContext ctx(CMAC_Create(CMAC_AES, kNistKeys[key_index],
+ kNistKeyLengths[key_index]));
+ ASSERT_NE(ctx, nullptr);
+
+ for (unsigned int plaintext_index = 0;
+ plaintext_index < kNistPlaintextLengthsCount; plaintext_index++) {
+ CMAC_Begin(ctx.get());
+
+ unsigned int known_index =
+ (key_index * kNistPlaintextLengthsCount) + plaintext_index;
+ CMAC_Update(ctx.get(), kNistPlaintext,
+ kNistPlaintextLengths[plaintext_index]);
+
+ uint8_t output[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ CMAC_Finish(ctx.get(), output, NULL, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(Compare(output, kNistKnown[known_index], AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_F(CmacAesTest, AesNistUnaligned) {
+ for (unsigned int key_index = 0; key_index < kNistKeyLengthsCount;
+ key_index++) {
+ unsigned int key_length = kNistKeyLengths[key_index];
+ ScopedCMACContext ctx(
+ CMAC_Create(CMAC_AES, kNistKeys[key_index], key_length));
+ ASSERT_NE(ctx, nullptr);
+
+ // Skip the zero-length test.
+ for (unsigned int plaintext_index = 1;
+ plaintext_index < kNistPlaintextLengthsCount; plaintext_index++) {
+ unsigned int known_index =
+ (key_index * kNistPlaintextLengthsCount) + plaintext_index;
+ unsigned int plaintext_length = kNistPlaintextLengths[plaintext_index];
+
+ // Test all possible offsets and make sure that misaligned updates
+ // produce the desired result. That is, do two updates:
+ // 0 ... offset
+ // offset ... len - offset
+ // and ensure the result is the same as doing one update.
+ for (unsigned int offset = 1; offset < plaintext_length; offset++) {
+ CMAC_Begin(ctx.get());
+
+ CMAC_Update(ctx.get(), kNistPlaintext, offset);
+ CMAC_Update(ctx.get(), kNistPlaintext + offset,
+ plaintext_length - offset);
+
+ uint8_t output[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ CMAC_Finish(ctx.get(), output, NULL, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(Compare(output, kNistKnown[known_index], AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_F(CmacAesTest, AesNistTruncated) {
+ for (unsigned int key_index = 0; key_index < kNistKeyLengthsCount;
+ key_index++) {
+ unsigned int key_length = kNistKeyLengths[key_index];
+ ScopedCMACContext ctx(
+ CMAC_Create(CMAC_AES, kNistKeys[key_index], key_length));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ctx != nullptr);
+
+ // Skip the zero-length test.
+ for (unsigned int plaintext_index = 1;
+ plaintext_index < kNistPlaintextLengthsCount; plaintext_index++) {
+ unsigned int known_index =
+ (key_index * kNistPlaintextLengthsCount) + plaintext_index;
+ unsigned int plaintext_length = kNistPlaintextLengths[plaintext_index];
+
+ // Test truncated outputs to ensure that we always get the desired values.
+ for (unsigned int out_len = 1; out_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; out_len++) {
+ CMAC_Begin(ctx.get());
+
+ CMAC_Update(ctx.get(), kNistPlaintext, plaintext_length);
+
+ unsigned int actual_out_len = 0;
+ uint8_t output[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ CMAC_Finish(ctx.get(), output, &actual_out_len, out_len);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(actual_out_len == out_len);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(Compare(output, kNistKnown[known_index], out_len));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
diff -up ./gtests/freebl_gtest/freebl_gtest.gyp.cmac ./gtests/freebl_gtest/freebl_gtest.gyp
--- ./gtests/freebl_gtest/freebl_gtest.gyp.cmac 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
+++ ./gtests/freebl_gtest/freebl_gtest.gyp 2019-11-06 16:49:35.617267943 -0800
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
'ecl_unittest.cc',
'ghash_unittest.cc',
'rsa_unittest.cc',
+ 'cmac_unittests.cc',
'<(DEPTH)/gtests/common/gtests.cc'
],
'dependencies': [
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/manifest.mn.cmac ./gtests/pk11_gtest/manifest.mn
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_aes_cmac_unittest.cc.cmac ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_aes_cmac_unittest.cc
--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_aes_cmac_unittest.cc.cmac 2019-11-06 16:49:57.879508660 -0800
+++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_aes_cmac_unittest.cc 2019-11-06 16:49:57.879508660 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
+ * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include <memory>
+#include "nss.h"
+#include "pk11pub.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "sechash.h"
+
+#include "blapi.h"
+
+#include "gtest/gtest.h"
+#include "nss_scoped_ptrs.h"
+#include "util.h"
+
+namespace nss_test {
+
+class Pkcs11AesCmacTest : public ::testing::Test {
+ protected:
+ ScopedPK11SymKey ImportKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, SECItem *key_item) {
+ ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
+ if (!slot) {
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Can't get slot";
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ ScopedPK11SymKey result(PK11_ImportSymKey(
+ slot.get(), mech, PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_SIGN, key_item, nullptr));
+
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ void RunTest(uint8_t *key, unsigned int key_len, uint8_t *data,
+ unsigned int data_len, uint8_t *expected,
+ unsigned int expected_len, CK_ULONG mechanism) {
+ // Create SECItems for everything...
+ std::vector<uint8_t> output(expected_len);
+ SECItem key_item = {siBuffer, key, key_len};
+ SECItem output_item = {siBuffer, output.data(), expected_len};
+ SECItem data_item = {siBuffer, data, data_len};
+ SECItem expected_item = {siBuffer, expected, expected_len};
+
+ // Do the PKCS #11 stuff...
+ ScopedPK11SymKey p11_key = ImportKey(mechanism, &key_item);
+ ASSERT_NE(nullptr, p11_key.get());
+
+ SECStatus ret = PK11_SignWithSymKey(p11_key.get(), CKM_AES_CMAC, NULL,
+ &output_item, &data_item);
+
+ // Verify the result...
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, SECITEM_CompareItem(&output_item, &expected_item));
+ }
+};
+
+// Sanity check of the PKCS #11 API only. Extensive tests for correctness of
+// underling CMAC implementation conducted in the following file:
+// gtests/freebl_gtest/cmac_unittests.cc
+
+TEST_F(Pkcs11AesCmacTest, Aes128NistExample1) {
+ uint8_t key[AES_128_KEY_LENGTH] = {0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE,
+ 0xD2, 0xA6, 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88,
+ 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C};
+ uint8_t known[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {0xBB, 0x1D, 0x69, 0x29, 0xE9, 0x59,
+ 0x37, 0x28, 0x7F, 0xA3, 0x7D, 0x12,
+ 0x9B, 0x75, 0x67, 0x46};
+
+ RunTest(key, AES_128_KEY_LENGTH, NULL, 0, known, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ CKM_AES_CMAC);
+}
+
+TEST_F(Pkcs11AesCmacTest, General) {
+ uint8_t key[AES_128_KEY_LENGTH] = {0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE,
+ 0xD2, 0xA6, 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88,
+ 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C};
+ uint8_t known[4] = {0xBB, 0x1D, 0x69, 0x29};
+
+ RunTest(key, AES_128_KEY_LENGTH, NULL, 0, known, 4, CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL);
+}
+
+TEST_F(Pkcs11AesCmacTest, InvalidKeySize) {
+ uint8_t key[4] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
+ SECItem key_item = {siBuffer, key, 4};
+
+ ScopedPK11SymKey result = ImportKey(CKM_AES_CMAC, &key_item);
+ ASSERT_EQ(nullptr, result.get());
+}
+}
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_gtest.gyp.cmac ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_gtest.gyp
--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_gtest.gyp.cmac 2019-11-06 16:49:57.880508671 -0800
+++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_gtest.gyp 2019-11-06 17:12:07.541834483 -0800
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
'type': 'executable',
'sources': [
'pk11_aeskeywrap_unittest.cc',
+ 'pk11_aes_cmac_unittest.cc',
'pk11_aes_gcm_unittest.cc',
'pk11_chacha20poly1305_unittest.cc',
'pk11_cipherop_unittest.cc',
diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapi.h.cmac ./lib/freebl/blapi.h
--- ./lib/freebl/blapi.h.cmac 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/blapi.h 2019-11-06 16:49:35.618267953 -0800
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include "blapit.h"
#include "hasht.h"
+#include "cmac.h"
#include "alghmac.h"
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
diff -up ./lib/freebl/cmac.c.cmac ./lib/freebl/cmac.c
--- ./lib/freebl/cmac.c.cmac 2019-11-06 16:49:35.620267975 -0800
+++ ./lib/freebl/cmac.c 2019-11-06 16:49:35.620267975 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
+#include "stubs.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "rijndael.h"
+#include "blapi.h"
+#include "cmac.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "nspr.h"
+
+struct CMACContextStr {
+ /* Information about the block cipher to use internally. The cipher should
+ * be placed in ECB mode so that we can use it to directly encrypt blocks.
+ *
+ *
+ * To add a new cipher, add an entry to CMACCipher, update CMAC_Init,
+ * cmac_Encrypt, and CMAC_Destroy methods to handle the new cipher, and
+ * add a new Context pointer to the cipher union with the correct type. */
+ CMACCipher cipherType;
+ union {
+ AESContext aes;
+ } cipher;
+ int blockSize;
+
+ /* Internal keys which are conditionally used by the algorithm. Derived
+ * from encrypting the NULL block. We leave the storing of (and the
+ * cleanup of) the CMAC key to the underlying block cipher. */
+ unsigned char k1[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char k2[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ /* When Update is called with data which isn't a multiple of the block
+ * size, we need a place to put it. HMAC handles this by passing it to
+ * the underlying hash function right away; we can't do that as the
+ * contract on the cipher object is different. */
+ unsigned int partialIndex;
+ unsigned char partialBlock[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ /* Last encrypted block. This gets xor-ed with partialBlock prior to
+ * encrypting it. NIST defines this to be the empty string to begin. */
+ unsigned char lastBlock[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+};
+
+static void
+cmac_ShiftLeftOne(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, int length)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ for (; i < length - 1; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] << 1;
+ out[i] |= in[i + 1] >> 7;
+ }
+ out[i] = in[i] << 1;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+cmac_Encrypt(CMACContext *ctx, unsigned char *output,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ if (ctx->cipherType == CMAC_AES) {
+ unsigned int tmpOutputLen;
+ SECStatus rv = AES_Encrypt(&ctx->cipher.aes, output, &tmpOutputLen,
+ ctx->blockSize, input, inputLen);
+
+ /* Assumption: AES_Encrypt (when in ECB mode) always returns an
+ * output of length equal to blockSize (what was pass as the value
+ * of the maxOutputLen parameter). */
+ PORT_Assert(tmpOutputLen == ctx->blockSize);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* NIST SP.800-38B, 6.1 Subkey Generation */
+static SECStatus
+cmac_GenerateSubkeys(CMACContext *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned char null_block[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 };
+ unsigned char L[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char v;
+ unsigned char i;
+
+ /* Step 1: L = AES(key, null_block) */
+ if (cmac_Encrypt(ctx, L, null_block, ctx->blockSize) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* In the following, some effort has been made to be constant time. Rather
+ * than conditioning on the value of the MSB (of L or K1), we use the loop
+ * to build a mask for the conditional constant. */
+
+ /* Step 2: If MSB(L) = 0, K1 = L << 1. Else, K1 = (L << 1) ^ R_b. */
+ cmac_ShiftLeftOne(ctx->k1, L, ctx->blockSize);
+ v = L[0] >> 7;
+ for (i = 1; i <= 7; i <<= 1) {
+ v |= (v << i);
+ }
+ ctx->k1[ctx->blockSize - 1] ^= (0x87 & v);
+
+ /* Step 3: If MSB(K1) = 0, K2 = K1 << 1. Else, K2 = (K1 <, 1) ^ R_b. */
+ cmac_ShiftLeftOne(ctx->k2, ctx->k1, ctx->blockSize);
+ v = ctx->k1[0] >> 7;
+ for (i = 1; i <= 7; i <<= 1) {
+ v |= (v << i);
+ }
+ ctx->k2[ctx->blockSize - 1] ^= (0x87 & v);
+
+ /* Any intermediate value in the computation of the subkey shall be
+ * secret. */
+ PORT_Memset(null_block, 0, MAX_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ PORT_Memset(L, 0, MAX_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ /* Step 4: Return the values. */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* NIST SP.800-38B, 6.2 MAC Generation step 6 */
+static SECStatus
+cmac_UpdateState(CMACContext *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->partialIndex != ctx->blockSize) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Step 6: C_i = CIPHER(key, C_{i-1} ^ M_i) for 1 <= i <= n, and
+ * C_0 is defined as the empty string. */
+
+ for (unsigned int index = 0; index < ctx->blockSize; index++) {
+ ctx->partialBlock[index] ^= ctx->lastBlock[index];
+ }
+
+ return cmac_Encrypt(ctx, ctx->lastBlock, ctx->partialBlock, ctx->blockSize);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+CMAC_Init(CMACContext *ctx, CMACCipher type,
+ const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* We only currently support AES-CMAC. */
+ if (type != CMAC_AES) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ ctx->blockSize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ ctx->cipherType = CMAC_AES;
+ if (AES_InitContext(&ctx->cipher.aes, key, key_len, NULL, NSS_AES, 1,
+ ctx->blockSize) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return CMAC_Begin(ctx);
+}
+
+CMACContext *
+CMAC_Create(CMACCipher type, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ CMACContext *result = PORT_New(CMACContext);
+
+ if (CMAC_Init(result, type, key, key_len) != SECSuccess) {
+ CMAC_Destroy(result, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+CMAC_Begin(CMACContext *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure that our blockSize is less than the maximum. When this fails,
+ * a cipher with a larger block size was added and MAX_BLOCK_SIZE needs
+ * to be updated accordingly. */
+ PORT_Assert(ctx->blockSize <= MAX_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ if (cmac_GenerateSubkeys(ctx) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the index to write partial blocks at to zero. This saves us from
+ * having to clear ctx->partialBlock. */
+ ctx->partialIndex = 0;
+
+ /* Step 5: Let C_0 = 0^b. */
+ PORT_Memset(ctx->lastBlock, 0, ctx->blockSize);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* NIST SP.800-38B, 6.2 MAC Generation */
+SECStatus
+CMAC_Update(CMACContext *ctx, const unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned int data_len)
+{
+ int data_index = 0;
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (data == NULL || data_len == 0) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy as many bytes from data into ctx->partialBlock as we can, up to
+ * the maximum of the remaining data and the remaining space in
+ * ctx->partialBlock.
+ *
+ * Note that we swap the order (encrypt *then* copy) because the last
+ * block is different from the rest. If we end on an even multiple of
+ * the block size, we have to be able to XOR it with K1. But we won't know
+ * that it is the last until CMAC_Finish is called (and by then, CMAC_Update
+ * has already returned). */
+ while (data_index < data_len) {
+ if (ctx->partialIndex == ctx->blockSize) {
+ if (cmac_UpdateState(ctx) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ctx->partialIndex = 0;
+ }
+
+ unsigned int copy_len = data_len - data_index;
+ if (copy_len > (ctx->blockSize - ctx->partialIndex)) {
+ copy_len = ctx->blockSize - ctx->partialIndex;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(ctx->partialBlock + ctx->partialIndex, data + data_index, copy_len);
+ data_index += copy_len;
+ ctx->partialIndex += copy_len;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* NIST SP.800-38B, 6.2 MAC Generation */
+SECStatus
+CMAC_Finish(CMACContext *ctx, unsigned char *result,
+ unsigned int *result_len,
+ unsigned int max_result_len)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL || result == NULL || max_result_len == 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (max_result_len > ctx->blockSize) {
+ /* This is a weird situation. The PKCS #11 soft tokencode passes
+ * sizeof(result) here, which is hard-coded as SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH.
+ * This later gets truncated to min(SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH, requested). */
+ max_result_len = ctx->blockSize;
+ }
+
+ /* Step 4: If M_n* is a complete block, M_n = K1 ^ M_n*. Else,
+ * M_n = K2 ^ (M_n* || 10^j). */
+ if (ctx->partialIndex == ctx->blockSize) {
+ /* XOR in K1. */
+ for (unsigned int index = 0; index < ctx->blockSize; index++) {
+ ctx->partialBlock[index] ^= ctx->k1[index];
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Use 10* padding on the partial block. */
+ ctx->partialBlock[ctx->partialIndex++] = 0x80;
+ PORT_Memset(ctx->partialBlock + ctx->partialIndex, 0,
+ ctx->blockSize - ctx->partialIndex);
+ ctx->partialIndex = ctx->blockSize;
+
+ /* XOR in K2. */
+ for (unsigned int index = 0; index < ctx->blockSize; index++) {
+ ctx->partialBlock[index] ^= ctx->k2[index];
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Encrypt the block. */
+ if (cmac_UpdateState(ctx) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Step 7 & 8: T = MSB_tlen(C_n); return T. */
+ PORT_Memcpy(result, ctx->lastBlock, max_result_len);
+ if (result_len != NULL) {
+ *result_len = max_result_len;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+void
+CMAC_Destroy(CMACContext *ctx, PRBool free_it)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->cipherType == CMAC_AES) {
+ AES_DestroyContext(&ctx->cipher.aes, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+
+ /* Destroy everything in the context. This includes sensitive data in
+ * K1, K2, and lastBlock. */
+ PORT_Memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ if (free_it == PR_TRUE) {
+ PORT_Free(ctx);
+ }
+}
diff -up ./lib/freebl/cmac.h.cmac ./lib/freebl/cmac.h
--- ./lib/freebl/cmac.h.cmac 2019-11-06 16:49:35.621267986 -0800
+++ ./lib/freebl/cmac.h 2019-11-06 16:49:35.621267986 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef _CMAC_H_
+#define _CMAC_H_
+
+typedef struct CMACContextStr CMACContext;
+
+SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
+
+/* Enum for identifying the underlying block cipher we're using internally. */
+typedef enum {
+ CMAC_AES = 0
+} CMACCipher;
+
+/* Initialize an existing CMACContext struct. */
+SECStatus CMAC_Init(CMACContext *ctx, CMACCipher type,
+ const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len);
+
+/* Allocate and initialize a new CMAC context with the specified cipher and
+ * key. */
+CMACContext *CMAC_Create(CMACCipher type, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_len);
+
+/* Called automatically by CMAC_*{Create,Init}(...). Only useful for restarting
+ * an already-started CMAC instance. */
+SECStatus CMAC_Begin(CMACContext *ctx);
+
+/* Add the specified bytes into the CMAC state. */
+SECStatus CMAC_Update(CMACContext *ctx, const unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned int data_len);
+
+/* Finalize the CMAC state and return the result. */
+SECStatus CMAC_Finish(CMACContext *ctx, unsigned char *result,
+ unsigned int *result_len,
+ unsigned int max_result_len);
+
+/* Note: CMAC_Clone isn't implemented here because AES doesn't expose a
+ * context-cloning operation. */
+
+/* Destroy a CMAC context, optionally freeing it. */
+void CMAC_Destroy(CMACContext *ctx, PRBool free_it);
+
+SEC_END_PROTOS
+
+#endif
diff -up ./lib/freebl/exports.gyp.cmac ./lib/freebl/exports.gyp
--- ./lib/freebl/exports.gyp.cmac 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/exports.gyp 2019-11-06 16:49:35.621267986 -0800
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
},
{
'files': [
+ 'cmac.h',
'alghmac.h',
'blapi.h',
'blake2b.h',
diff -up ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi.cmac ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
--- ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi.cmac 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi 2019-11-06 16:49:35.622267997 -0800
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
'sources': [
'aeskeywrap.c',
'alg2268.c',
+ 'cmac.c',
'alghmac.c',
'arcfive.c',
'arcfour.c',
diff -up ./lib/freebl/ldvector.c.cmac ./lib/freebl/ldvector.c
--- ./lib/freebl/ldvector.c.cmac 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/ldvector.c 2019-11-06 16:49:35.623268007 -0800
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ extern int FREEBL_InitStubs(void);
#endif
#include "loader.h"
+#include "cmac.h"
#include "alghmac.h"
#include "hmacct.h"
#include "blapii.h"
@@ -317,10 +318,18 @@ static const struct FREEBLVectorStr vect
/* End of Version 3.020 */
- ChaCha20_Xor
+ ChaCha20_Xor,
/* End of version 3.021 */
+ CMAC_Init,
+ CMAC_Create,
+ CMAC_Begin,
+ CMAC_Update,
+ CMAC_Finish,
+ CMAC_Destroy
+
+ /* End of version 3.022 */
};
const FREEBLVector*
diff -up ./lib/freebl/loader.c.cmac ./lib/freebl/loader.c
--- ./lib/freebl/loader.c.cmac 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/loader.c 2019-11-06 16:49:35.624268018 -0800
@@ -2245,3 +2245,54 @@ BLAKE2B_Resurrect(unsigned char *space,
}
return (vector->p_BLAKE2B_Resurrect)(space, arg);
}
+
+/* == New for CMAC == */
+SECStatus
+CMAC_Init(CMACContext *ctx, CMACCipher type, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ if (!vector && PR_SUCCESS != freebl_RunLoaderOnce())
+ return SECFailure;
+ return (vector->p_CMAC_Init)(ctx, type, key, key_len);
+}
+
+CMACContext *
+CMAC_Create(CMACCipher type, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ if (!vector && PR_SUCCESS != freebl_RunLoaderOnce())
+ return NULL;
+ return (vector->p_CMAC_Create)(type, key, key_len);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+CMAC_Begin(CMACContext *ctx)
+{
+ if (!vector && PR_SUCCESS != freebl_RunLoaderOnce())
+ return SECFailure;
+ return (vector->p_CMAC_Begin)(ctx);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+CMAC_Update(CMACContext *ctx, const unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len)
+{
+ if (!vector && PR_SUCCESS != freebl_RunLoaderOnce())
+ return SECFailure;
+ return (vector->p_CMAC_Update)(ctx, data, data_len);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+CMAC_Finish(CMACContext *ctx, unsigned char *result, unsigned int *result_len,
+ unsigned int max_result_len)
+{
+ if (!vector && PR_SUCCESS != freebl_RunLoaderOnce())
+ return SECFailure;
+ return (vector->p_CMAC_Finish)(ctx, result, result_len, max_result_len);
+}
+
+void
+CMAC_Destroy(CMACContext *ctx, PRBool free_it)
+{
+ if (!vector && PR_SUCCESS != freebl_RunLoaderOnce())
+ return;
+ (vector->p_CMAC_Destroy)(ctx, free_it);
+}
diff -up ./lib/freebl/loader.h.cmac ./lib/freebl/loader.h
--- ./lib/freebl/loader.h.cmac 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/loader.h 2019-11-06 16:49:35.625268029 -0800
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
#include "blapi.h"
-#define FREEBL_VERSION 0x0315
+#define FREEBL_VERSION 0x0316
struct FREEBLVectorStr {
@@ -765,6 +765,20 @@ struct FREEBLVectorStr {
/* Version 3.021 came to here */
+ SECStatus (*p_CMAC_Init)(CMACContext *ctx, CMACCipher type,
+ const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len);
+ CMACContext *(*p_CMAC_Create)(CMACCipher type, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_len);
+ SECStatus (*p_CMAC_Begin)(CMACContext *ctx);
+ SECStatus (*p_CMAC_Update)(CMACContext *ctx, const unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned int data_len);
+ SECStatus (*p_CMAC_Finish)(CMACContext *ctx, unsigned char *result,
+ unsigned int *result_len,
+ unsigned int max_result_len);
+ void (*p_CMAC_Destroy)(CMACContext *ctx, PRBool free_it);
+
+ /* Version 3.022 came to here */
+
/* Add new function pointers at the end of this struct and bump
* FREEBL_VERSION at the beginning of this file. */
};
diff -up ./lib/freebl/manifest.mn.cmac ./lib/freebl/manifest.mn
--- ./lib/freebl/manifest.mn.cmac 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/manifest.mn 2019-11-06 16:49:35.626268040 -0800
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ EXPORTS = \
$(NULL)
PRIVATE_EXPORTS = \
+ cmac.h \
alghmac.h \
blake2b.h \
blapi.h \
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ CSRCS = \
md2.c \
md5.c \
sha512.c \
+ cmac.c \
alghmac.c \
rawhash.c \
alg2268.c \
@@ -162,6 +164,7 @@ CSRCS = \
ALL_CSRCS := $(CSRCS)
ALL_HDRS = \
+ cmac.h \
alghmac.h \
blake2b.h \
blapi.h \
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/debug_module.c.cmac ./lib/pk11wrap/debug_module.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/debug_module.c.cmac 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/debug_module.c 2019-11-06 16:49:57.881508682 -0800
@@ -376,6 +376,8 @@ print_mechanism(CK_MECHANISM_PTR m)
CASE(CKM_AES_KEY_GEN);
CASE(CKM_AES_MAC);
CASE(CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL);
+ CASE(CKM_AES_CMAC);
+ CASE(CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL);
CASE(CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC);
CASE(CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA);
CASE(CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD);
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c.cmac ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c.cmac 2019-11-06 16:49:20.284102148 -0800
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c 2019-11-06 16:49:57.882508693 -0800
@@ -236,6 +236,8 @@ PK11_GetKeyType(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
case CKM_AES_GCM:
case CKM_AES_MAC:
case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL:
+ case CKM_AES_CMAC:
+ case CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL:
case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP:
@@ -453,6 +455,8 @@ PK11_GetKeyGenWithSize(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
case CKM_AES_GCM:
case CKM_AES_MAC:
case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL:
+ case CKM_AES_CMAC:
+ case CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL:
case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
return CKM_AES_KEY_GEN;
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.cmac ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.cmac 2019-11-06 16:49:20.315102483 -0800
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2019-11-06 16:49:57.887508747 -0800
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include "lowpbe.h" /* We do PBE below */
#include "pkcs11t.h"
#include "secoid.h"
+#include "cmac.h"
#include "alghmac.h"
#include "softoken.h"
#include "secasn1.h"
@@ -1971,6 +1972,84 @@ sftk_doHMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *cont
}
/*
+ * common CMAC initialization routine
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_doCMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *session, CMACCipher type,
+ SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
+{
+ SFTKAttribute *keyval;
+ CMACContext *cmacContext;
+ CK_ULONG *intpointer;
+
+ /* Unlike HMAC, CMAC doesn't need to check key sizes as the underlying
+ * block cipher does this for us: block ciphers support only a single
+ * key size per variant.
+ *
+ * To introduce support for a CMAC based on a new block cipher, first add
+ * support for the relevant block cipher to CMAC in the freebl layer. Then
+ * update the switch statement at the end of this function. Also remember
+ * to update the switch statement in NSC_SignInit with the PKCS#11
+ * mechanism constants.
+ */
+
+ keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (keyval == NULL) {
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+ }
+
+ /* Create the underlying CMACContext and associate it with the
+ * SFTKSessionContext's hashInfo field */
+ cmacContext = CMAC_Create(type,
+ (const unsigned char *)keyval->attrib.pValue,
+ keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
+
+ if (cmacContext == NULL) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS) {
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+ }
+
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+ session->hashInfo = cmacContext;
+
+ /* MACs all behave roughly the same. However, CMAC can fail because
+ * the underlying cipher can fail. In practice, this shouldn't occur
+ * because we're not using any chaining modes, letting us safely ignore
+ * the return value. */
+ session->multi = PR_TRUE;
+ session->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash)CMAC_Update;
+ session->end = (SFTKEnd)CMAC_Finish;
+ session->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy)CMAC_Destroy;
+
+ intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
+ if (intpointer == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+ *intpointer = mac_size;
+ session->cipherInfo = intpointer;
+
+ /* Since we're only "hashing", copy the result from session->end to the
+ * caller using sftk_SignCopy. */
+ session->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_SignCopy;
+ session->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_HMACCmp;
+ session->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
+
+ /* Will need to be updated for additional block ciphers in the future. */
+ switch (type) {
+ case CMAC_AES:
+ session->maxLen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
* SSL Macing support. SSL Macs are inited, then update with the base
* hashing algorithm, then finalized in sign and verify
*/
@@ -2729,7 +2808,7 @@ NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
PORT_Assert(pMechanism->pParameter);
- if (!pMechanism->pParameter) {
+ if (!pMechanism->pParameter || pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS)) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
@@ -2739,7 +2818,17 @@ NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_AlgSHA1, key, SHA1_LENGTH);
break;
-
+ case CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL:
+ PORT_Assert(pMechanism->pParameter);
+ if (!pMechanism->pParameter || pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_doCMACInit(context, CMAC_AES, key, *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+ break;
+ case CKM_AES_CMAC:
+ crv = sftk_doCMACInit(context, CMAC_AES, key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ break;
case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
PORT_Assert(pMechanism->pParameter);
if (!pMechanism->pParameter) {
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.cmac ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.cmac 2019-11-06 16:49:57.884508714 -0800
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c 2019-11-06 16:51:37.330584008 -0800
@@ -324,6 +324,8 @@ static const struct mechanismList mechan
{ CKM_AES_CBC, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE_WR_UN }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_MAC, { 16, 32, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, { 16, 32, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE },
+ { CKM_AES_CMAC, { 16, 32, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE },
+ { CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, { 16, 32, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE_WR_UN }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_CTS, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_CTR, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE }, PR_TRUE },
diff -up ./lib/util/pkcs11t.h.cmac ./lib/util/pkcs11t.h
--- ./lib/util/pkcs11t.h.cmac 2019-11-06 16:49:20.289102202 -0800
+++ ./lib/util/pkcs11t.h 2019-11-06 16:49:57.887508747 -0800
@@ -882,6 +882,9 @@ typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
#define CKM_AES_GCM 0x00001087
#define CKM_AES_CCM 0x00001088
#define CKM_AES_CTS 0x00001089
+/* AES-CMAC values copied from v2.40 errata 1 header file */
+#define CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL 0x0000108A
+#define CKM_AES_CMAC 0x0000108B
#define CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC 0x0000108C
#define CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96 0x0000108D
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