rpms
/
nss
7
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity
nss/SOURCES/nss-ike-patch.patch

4514 lines
158 KiB
Diff
Raw Blame History

diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/README b/cmd/fipstest/README
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/fipstest/README
@@ -0,0 +1,1 @@
+The scripts have been moved to tests/fips/cavs_scripts
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/aes.sh b/cmd/fipstest/aes.sh
deleted file mode 100644
--- a/cmd/fipstest/aes.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-#
-# A Bourne shell script for running the NIST AES Algorithm Validation Suite
-#
-# Before you run the script, set your PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ... environment
-# variables appropriately so that the fipstest command and the NSPR and NSS
-# shared libraries/DLLs are on the search path. Then run this script in the
-# directory where the REQUEST (.req) files reside. The script generates the
-# RESPONSE (.rsp) files in the same directory.
-
-BASEDIR=${1-.}
-TESTDIR=${BASEDIR}/AES
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-REQDIR=${TESTDIR}/req
-RSPDIR=${TESTDIR}/resp
-
-cbc_kat_requests="
-CBCGFSbox128.req
-CBCGFSbox192.req
-CBCGFSbox256.req
-CBCKeySbox128.req
-CBCKeySbox192.req
-CBCKeySbox256.req
-CBCVarKey128.req
-CBCVarKey192.req
-CBCVarKey256.req
-CBCVarTxt128.req
-CBCVarTxt192.req
-CBCVarTxt256.req
-"
-
-cbc_mct_requests="
-CBCMCT128.req
-CBCMCT192.req
-CBCMCT256.req
-"
-
-cbc_mmt_requests="
-CBCMMT128.req
-CBCMMT192.req
-CBCMMT256.req
-"
-
-ecb_kat_requests="
-ECBGFSbox128.req
-ECBGFSbox192.req
-ECBGFSbox256.req
-ECBKeySbox128.req
-ECBKeySbox192.req
-ECBKeySbox256.req
-ECBVarKey128.req
-ECBVarKey192.req
-ECBVarKey256.req
-ECBVarTxt128.req
-ECBVarTxt192.req
-ECBVarTxt256.req
-"
-
-ecb_mct_requests="
-ECBMCT128.req
-ECBMCT192.req
-ECBMCT256.req
-"
-
-ecb_mmt_requests="
-ECBMMT128.req
-ECBMMT192.req
-ECBMMT256.req
-"
-
-if [ ${COMMAND} = "verify" ]; then
- for request in $cbc_kat_requests $cbc_mct_requests $cbc_mmt_requests $ecb_kat_requests $ecb_mct_requests $ecb_mmt_requests; do
- sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} $request
- done
- exit 0
-fi
-
-for request in $cbc_kat_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest aes kat cbc ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $cbc_mct_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest aes mct cbc ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $cbc_mmt_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest aes mmt cbc ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $ecb_kat_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest aes kat ecb ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $ecb_mct_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest aes mct ecb ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $ecb_mmt_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest aes mmt ecb ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/aesgcm.sh b/cmd/fipstest/aesgcm.sh
deleted file mode 100644
--- a/cmd/fipstest/aesgcm.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# A Bourne shell script for running the NIST AES Algorithm Validation Suite
-#
-# Before you run the script, set your PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ... environment
-# variables appropriately so that the fipstest command and the NSPR and NSS
-# shared libraries/DLLs are on the search path. Then run this script in the
-# directory where the REQUEST (.req) files reside. The script generates the
-# RESPONSE (.rsp) files in the same directory.
-
-BASEDIR=${1-.}
-TESTDIR=${BASEDIR}/AES_GCM
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-REQDIR=${TESTDIR}/req
-RSPDIR=${TESTDIR}/resp
-
-gcm_decrypt_requests="
-gcmDecrypt128.req
-gcmDecrypt192.req
-gcmDecrypt256.req
-"
-
-gcm_encrypt_extiv_requests="
-gcmEncryptExtIV128.req
-gcmEncryptExtIV192.req
-gcmEncryptExtIV256.req
-"
-gcm_encrypt_intiv_requests="
-"
-
-#gcm_encrypt_intiv_requests="
-#gcmEncryptIntIV128.req
-#gcmEncryptIntIV192.req
-#gcmEncryptIntIV256.req
-#"
-
-if [ ${COMMAND} = "verify" ]; then
- for request in $gcm_decrypt_requests $gcm_encrypt_extiv_requests; do
- sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} $request ' ' '-e /Reason:/d'
- done
- for request in $gcm_encrypt_intiv_requests; do
- name=`basename $request .req`
- echo ">>>>> $name"
- fipstest aes gcm decrypt ${RSPDIR}/$name.rsp | grep FAIL
- done
- exit 0
-fi
-
-for request in $gcm_decrypt_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest aes gcm decrypt ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $gcm_encrypt_intiv_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest aes gcm encrypt_intiv ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $gcm_encrypt_extiv_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest aes gcm encrypt_extiv ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/dsa.sh b/cmd/fipstest/dsa.sh
deleted file mode 100755
--- a/cmd/fipstest/dsa.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# A Bourne shell script for running the NIST DSA Validation System
-#
-# Before you run the script, set your PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ... environment
-# variables appropriately so that the fipstest command and the NSPR and NSS
-# shared libraries/DLLs are on the search path. Then run this script in the
-# directory where the REQUEST (.req) files reside. The script generates the
-# RESPONSE (.rsp) files in the same directory.
-BASEDIR=${1-.}
-TESTDIR=${BASEDIR}/DSA2
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-REQDIR=${TESTDIR}/req
-RSPDIR=${TESTDIR}/resp
-
-
-#
-# several of the DSA tests do use known answer tests to verify the result.
-# in those cases, feed generated tests back into the fipstest tool and
-# see if we can verify those value. NOTE: th PQGVer and SigVer tests verify
-# the dsa pqgver and dsa sigver functions, so we know they can detect errors
-# in those PQGGen and SigGen. Only the KeyPair verify is potentially circular.
-#
-if [ ${COMMAND} = "verify" ]; then
-# verify generated keys
- name=KeyPair
- echo ">>>>> $name"
- fipstest dsa keyver ${RSPDIR}/$name.rsp | grep ^Result.=.F
-# verify generated pqg values
- name=PQGGen
- echo ">>>>> $name"
- fipstest dsa pqgver ${RSPDIR}/$name.rsp | grep ^Result.=.F
-# verify PQGVer with known answer
-# sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} PQGVer.req ' ' '-e /^Result.=.F/s;.(.*);; -e /^Result.=.P/s;.(.*);;'
-# verify signatures
- name=SigGen
- echo ">>>>> $name"
- fipstest dsa sigver ${RSPDIR}/$name.rsp | grep ^Result.=.F
-# verify SigVer with known answer
- sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} SigVer.req ' ' '-e /^X.=/d -e /^Result.=.F/s;.(.*);;'
- exit 0
-fi
-
-request=KeyPair.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest dsa keypair ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=PQGGen.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest dsa pqggen ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=PQGVer1863.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest dsa pqgver ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=SigGen.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest dsa siggen ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=SigVer.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest dsa sigver ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/ecdsa.sh b/cmd/fipstest/ecdsa.sh
deleted file mode 100644
--- a/cmd/fipstest/ecdsa.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# A Bourne shell script for running the NIST ECDSA Validation System
-#
-# Before you run the script, set your PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ... environment
-# variables appropriately so that the fipstest command and the NSPR and NSS
-# shared libraries/DLLs are on the search path. Then run this script in the
-# directory where the REQUEST (.req) files reside. The script generates the
-# RESPONSE (.rsp) files in the same directory.
-BASEDIR=${1-.}
-TESTDIR=${BASEDIR}/ECDSA2
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-REQDIR=${TESTDIR}/req
-RSPDIR=${TESTDIR}/resp
-
-#
-# several of the ECDSA tests do not use known answer tests to verify the result.
-# In those cases, feed generated tests back into the fipstest tool and
-# see if we can verify those value. NOTE: PQGVer and SigVer tests verify
-# the dsa pqgver and dsa sigver functions, so we know they can detect errors
-# in those PQGGen and SigGen. Only the KeyPair verify is potentially circular.
-#
-if [ ${COMMAND} = "verify" ]; then
-# verify generated keys
- name=KeyPair
- echo ">>>>> $name"
- fipstest ecdsa keyver ${RSPDIR}/$name.rsp | grep ^Result.=.F
- sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} PKV.req ' ' '-e /^X.=/d -e /^Result.=.F/s;.(.*);; -e /^Result.=.P/s;.(.*);;'
-# verify signatures
- name=SigGen
- echo ">>>>> $name"
- fipstest ecdsa sigver ${RSPDIR}/$name.rsp | grep ^Result.=.F
-# verify SigVer with known answer
- sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} SigVer.req ' ' '-e /^X.=/d -e /^Result.=.F/s;.(.*);; -e /^Result.=.P/s;.(.*);;'
- exit 0
-fi
-
-request=KeyPair.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest ecdsa keypair ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=PKV.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest ecdsa pkv ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=SigGen.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest ecdsa siggen ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=SigVer.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest ecdsa sigver ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/fipstest.c b/cmd/fipstest/fipstest.c
--- a/cmd/fipstest/fipstest.c
+++ b/cmd/fipstest/fipstest.c
@@ -29,16 +29,21 @@
#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
#undef __PASTE
#define SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH 32
#if 0
#include "../../lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h"
#endif
+#define MATCH_OPENSSL 1
+/*#define MATCH_NIST 1 */
+#ifdef MATCH_NIST
+#define VERBOSE_REASON 1
+#endif
extern SECStatus
EC_DecodeParams(const SECItem *encodedParams, ECParams **ecparams);
extern SECStatus
EC_CopyParams(PLArenaPool *arena, ECParams *dstParams,
const ECParams *srcParams);
#define ENCRYPT 1
@@ -3164,16 +3169,20 @@ ecdh_functional(char *reqfn, PRBool resp
fprintf(stderr, "generate key had invalid public value len\n");
goto loser;
}
uit_len = (uit_len - 1) / 2;
if (ecpriv->publicValue.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) {
fprintf(stderr, "generate key was compressed\n");
goto loser;
}
+ fputs("deIUT = ", ecdhresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, ecpriv->privateValue.data, ecpriv->privateValue.len);
+ fputs(buf, ecdhresp);
+ fputc('\n', ecdhresp);
fputs("QeIUTx = ", ecdhresp);
to_hex_str(buf, &ecpriv->publicValue.data[1], uit_len);
fputs(buf, ecdhresp);
fputc('\n', ecdhresp);
fputs("QeIUTy = ", ecdhresp);
to_hex_str(buf, &ecpriv->publicValue.data[1 + uit_len], uit_len);
fputs(buf, ecdhresp);
fputc('\n', ecdhresp);
@@ -3210,17 +3219,16 @@ loser:
}
}
if (pubkey.data != NULL) {
PORT_Free(pubkey.data);
}
fclose(ecdhreq);
}
-#define MATCH_OPENSSL 1
/*
* Perform the ECDH Validity Test.
*
* reqfn is the pathname of the REQUEST file.
*
* The output RESPONSE file is written to stdout.
*/
void
@@ -3403,42 +3411,47 @@ ecdh_verify(char *reqfn, PRBool response
if (strncmp(buf, "QeIUTx", 6) == 0) {
fputs(buf, ecdhresp);
continue;
}
if (strncmp(buf, "QeIUTy", 6) == 0) {
fputs(buf, ecdhresp);
continue;
}
- if (strncmp(buf, "CAVSHashZZ", 10) == 0) {
+ if ((strncmp(buf, "CAVSHashZZ", 10) == 0) ||
+ (strncmp(buf, "HashZZ", 6) == 0)) {
fputs(buf, ecdhresp);
- i = 10;
+ i = (buf[0] == 'C') ? 10 : 6;
while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
i++;
}
from_hex_str(cavsHashBuf, fips_hashLen(hash), &buf[i]);
if (current_ecparams == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "no curve defined for type defined\n");
goto loser;
}
/* validate CAVS public key */
if (EC_ValidatePublicKey(current_ecparams, &pubkey) != SECSuccess) {
-#ifdef MATCH_OPENSSL
+#ifdef VERBOSE_REASON
+ fprintf(ecdhresp, "Result = F # key didn't validate\n");
+#else
fprintf(ecdhresp, "Result = F\n");
-#else
- fprintf(ecdhresp, "Result = F # key didn't validate\n");
#endif
continue;
}
/* ECDH */
if (ECDH_Derive(&pubkey, current_ecparams, &private_value,
PR_FALSE, &ZZ) != SECSuccess) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Derive failed\n");
- goto loser;
+#ifdef VERBOSE_REASON
+ fprintf(ecdhresp, "Result = F # derive failure\n");
+#else
+ fprintf(ecdhresp, "Result = F\n");
+#endif
+ continue;
}
/* output ZZ */
#ifndef MATCH_OPENSSL
fputs("Z = ", ecdhresp);
to_hex_str(buf, ZZ.data, ZZ.len);
fputs(buf, ecdhresp);
fputc('\n', ecdhresp);
#endif
@@ -3450,20 +3463,20 @@ ecdh_verify(char *reqfn, PRBool response
SECITEM_FreeItem(&ZZ, PR_FALSE);
#ifndef MATCH_NIST
fputs("IUTHashZZ = ", ecdhresp);
to_hex_str(buf, hashBuf, fips_hashLen(hash));
fputs(buf, ecdhresp);
fputc('\n', ecdhresp);
#endif
if (memcmp(hashBuf, cavsHashBuf, fips_hashLen(hash)) != 0) {
-#ifdef MATCH_OPENSSL
+#ifdef VERBOSE_REASON
+ fprintf(ecdhresp, "Result = F # hash doesn't match\n");
+#else
fprintf(ecdhresp, "Result = F\n");
-#else
- fprintf(ecdhresp, "Result = F # hash doesn't match\n");
#endif
} else {
fprintf(ecdhresp, "Result = P\n");
}
#ifndef MATCH_OPENSSL
fputc('\n', ecdhresp);
#endif
continue;
@@ -3670,17 +3683,16 @@ dh_functional(char *reqfn, PRBool respon
}
loser:
if (dsapriv != NULL) {
PORT_FreeArena(dsapriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE);
}
fclose(dhreq);
}
-#define MATCH_OPENSSL 1
/*
* Perform the DH Validity Test.
*
* reqfn is the pathname of the REQUEST file.
*
* The output RESPONSE file is written to stdout.
*/
void
@@ -3841,19 +3853,20 @@ dh_verify(char *reqfn, PRBool response)
continue;
}
/* YephemUIT = ... */
if (strncmp(buf, "YephemIUT", 9) == 0) {
fputs(buf, dhresp);
continue;
}
/* CAVSHashZZ = ... */
- if (strncmp(buf, "CAVSHashZZ", 10) == 0) {
+ if ((strncmp(buf, "CAVSHashZZ", 10) == 0) ||
+ (strncmp(buf, "HashZZ", 6) == 0)) {
fputs(buf, dhresp);
- i = 10;
+ i = buf[0] == 'C' ? 10 : 6;
while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
i++;
}
from_hex_str(cavsHashBuf, fips_hashLen(hash), &buf[i]);
/* do the DH operation*/
if (DH_Derive(&pubkey, &pqg.prime, &privkey,
&ZZ, pqg.prime.len) != SECSuccess) {
fprintf(stderr, "Derive failed\n");
@@ -3866,17 +3879,17 @@ dh_verify(char *reqfn, PRBool response)
fputs(buf, dhresp);
fputc('\n', dhresp);
#endif
if (fips_hashBuf(hash, hashBuf, ZZ.data, ZZ.len) != SECSuccess) {
fprintf(stderr, "hash of derived key failed\n");
goto loser;
}
SECITEM_FreeItem(&ZZ, PR_FALSE);
-#ifndef MATCH_NIST_
+#ifndef MATCH_NIST
fputs("IUTHashZZ = ", dhresp);
to_hex_str(buf, hashBuf, fips_hashLen(hash));
fputs(buf, dhresp);
fputc('\n', dhresp);
#endif
if (memcmp(hashBuf, cavsHashBuf, fips_hashLen(hash)) != 0) {
fprintf(dhresp, "Result = F\n");
} else {
@@ -6895,16 +6908,1306 @@ loser:
if (master_secret)
free(master_secret);
if (key_block)
free(key_block);
if (tlsreq)
fclose(tlsreq);
}
+void
+ikev1(char *reqfn)
+{
+ char buf[4096]; /* holds one line from the input REQUEST file.
+ * needs to be large enough to hold the longest
+ * line "g^xy = <2048 hex digits>\n".
+ */
+ unsigned char *gxy = NULL;
+ int gxy_len;
+ unsigned char *Ni = NULL;
+ int Ni_len;
+ unsigned char *Nr = NULL;
+ int Nr_len;
+ unsigned char CKYi[8];
+ int CKYi_len;
+ unsigned char CKYr[8];
+ int CKYr_len;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ FILE *ikereq = NULL; /* input stream from the REQUEST file */
+ FILE *ikeresp; /* output stream to the RESPONSE file */
+
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotList[10];
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
+ CK_ULONG slotListCount = sizeof(slotList) / sizeof(slotList[0]);
+ CK_ULONG count;
+ static const CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11args = {
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS,
+ (void *)"flags=readOnly,noCertDB,noModDB", NULL
+ };
+ static CK_OBJECT_CLASS ck_secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ static CK_KEY_TYPE ck_generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ static CK_BBOOL ck_true = CK_TRUE;
+ static CK_ULONG keyLen = 1;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE gxy_template[] = {
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 }, /* must be first */
+ { CKA_CLASS, &ck_secret, sizeof(ck_secret) },
+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ck_generic, sizeof(ck_generic) },
+ { CKA_DERIVE, &ck_true, sizeof(ck_true) },
+ };
+ CK_ULONG gxy_template_count =
+ sizeof(gxy_template) / sizeof(gxy_template[0]);
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE derive_template[] = {
+ { CKA_CLASS, &ck_secret, sizeof(ck_secret) },
+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ck_generic, sizeof(ck_generic) },
+ { CKA_DERIVE, &ck_true, sizeof(ck_true) },
+ { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) }, /* must be last */
+ };
+ CK_ULONG derive_template_count =
+ sizeof(derive_template) / sizeof(derive_template[0]);
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE skeyid_template =
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE skeyid_d_template =
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE skeyid_a_template =
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE skeyid_e_template =
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 };
+ unsigned char skeyid_secret[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ unsigned char skeyid_d_secret[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ unsigned char skeyid_a_secret[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ unsigned char skeyid_e_secret[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+
+ CK_MECHANISM ike_mech = { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_MECHANISM ike1_mech = { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike_prf;
+ CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike1_prf;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ /* set up PKCS #11 parameters */
+ ike_prf.bDataAsKey = PR_TRUE;
+ ike_prf.bRekey = PR_FALSE;
+ ike_prf.hNewKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CKYi_len = sizeof(CKYi);
+ CKYr_len = sizeof(CKYr);
+ ike1_prf.pCKYi = CKYi;
+ ike1_prf.ulCKYiLen = CKYi_len;
+ ike1_prf.pCKYr = CKYr;
+ ike1_prf.ulCKYrLen = CKYr_len;
+ ike_mech.pParameter = &ike_prf;
+ ike_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ike_prf);
+ ike1_mech.pParameter = &ike1_prf;
+ ike1_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ike1_prf);
+ skeyid_template.pValue = skeyid_secret;
+ skeyid_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+ skeyid_d_template.pValue = skeyid_d_secret;
+ skeyid_d_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+ skeyid_a_template.pValue = skeyid_a_secret;
+ skeyid_a_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+ skeyid_e_template.pValue = skeyid_e_secret;
+ skeyid_e_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+
+ crv = NSC_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11args);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_Initialize failed crv=0x%x\n", (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ count = slotListCount;
+ crv = NSC_GetSlotList(PR_TRUE, slotList, &count);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetSlotList failed crv=0x%x\n", (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ if ((count > slotListCount) || count < 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "NSC_GetSlotList returned too many or too few slots: %d slots max=%d min=1\n",
+ (int)count, (int)slotListCount);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ slotID = slotList[0];
+ ikereq = fopen(reqfn, "r");
+ ikeresp = stdout;
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof buf, ikereq) != NULL) {
+ /* a comment or blank line */
+ if (buf[0] == '#' || buf[0] == '\n') {
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* [.....] */
+ if (buf[0] == '[') {
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-1]", 7) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA_1_HMAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA_1_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-224]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA224_HMAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA224_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-256]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-384]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA384_HMAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA384_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-512]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA512_HMAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA512_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[AES-XCBC", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[g^xy", 5) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[g^xy length = %d]",
+ &gxy_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ gxy_len = gxy_len / 8;
+ if (gxy)
+ free(gxy);
+ gxy = malloc(gxy_len);
+ gxy_template[0].pValue = gxy;
+ gxy_template[0].ulValueLen = gxy_len;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[Ni", 3) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[Ni length = %d]", &Ni_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ Ni_len = Ni_len / 8;
+ if (Ni)
+ free(Ni);
+ Ni = malloc(Ni_len);
+ ike_prf.pNi = Ni;
+ ike_prf.ulNiLen = Ni_len;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[Nr", 3) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[Nr length = %d]", &Nr_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ Nr_len = Nr_len / 8;
+ if (Nr)
+ free(Nr);
+ Nr = malloc(Nr_len);
+ ike_prf.pNr = Nr;
+ ike_prf.ulNrLen = Nr_len;
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* "COUNT = x" begins a new data set */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "COUNT", 5) == 0) {
+ /* zeroize the variables for the test with this data set */
+ memset(gxy, 0, gxy_len);
+ memset(Ni, 0, Ni_len);
+ memset(Nr, 0, Nr_len);
+ memset(CKYi, 0, CKYi_len);
+ memset(CKYr, 0, CKYr_len);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Ni = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "Ni", 2) == 0) {
+ i = 2;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < Ni_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &Ni[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Nr = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "Nr", 2) == 0) {
+ i = 2;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < Nr_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &Nr[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* CKYi = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "CKY_I", 5) == 0) {
+ i = 5;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < CKYi_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &CKYi[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* CKYr = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "CKY_R", 5) == 0) {
+ i = 5;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < CKYr_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &CKYr[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* g^xy = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "g^xy", 4) == 0) {
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE gxy_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE skeyid_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE skeyid_d_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE skeyid_a_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE skeyid_e_handle;
+ i = 4;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < gxy_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &gxy[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ crv = NSC_OpenSession(slotID, 0, NULL, NULL, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_OpenSession failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = NSC_CreateObject(session, gxy_template,
+ gxy_template_count, &gxy_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_CreateObject failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* get the skeyid key */
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike_mech, gxy_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count - 1,
+ &skeyid_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(skeyid) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ skeyid_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, skeyid_handle,
+ &skeyid_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(skeyid) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* use the length of the skeyid to set the target length of all the
+ * other keys */
+ keyLen = skeyid_template.ulValueLen;
+ ike1_prf.hKeygxy = gxy_handle;
+ ike1_prf.bHasPrevKey = PR_FALSE;
+ ike1_prf.keyNumber = 0;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike1_mech, skeyid_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count,
+ &skeyid_d_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(skeyid_d) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ike1_prf.hKeygxy = gxy_handle;
+ ike1_prf.bHasPrevKey = CK_TRUE;
+ ike1_prf.hPrevKey = skeyid_d_handle;
+ ike1_prf.keyNumber = 1;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike1_mech, skeyid_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count,
+ &skeyid_a_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(skeyid_a) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ ike1_prf.hKeygxy = gxy_handle;
+ ike1_prf.bHasPrevKey = CK_TRUE;
+ ike1_prf.hPrevKey = skeyid_a_handle;
+ ike1_prf.keyNumber = 2;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike1_mech, skeyid_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count,
+ &skeyid_e_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(skeyid_e) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("SKEYID = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, skeyid_secret, keyLen);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ skeyid_d_template.ulValueLen = keyLen;
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, skeyid_d_handle,
+ &skeyid_d_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(skeyid_d) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("SKEYID_d = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, skeyid_d_secret, skeyid_d_template.ulValueLen);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ skeyid_a_template.ulValueLen = keyLen;
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, skeyid_a_handle,
+ &skeyid_a_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(skeyid_a) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("SKEYID_a = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, skeyid_a_secret, skeyid_a_template.ulValueLen);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ skeyid_e_template.ulValueLen = keyLen;
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, skeyid_e_handle,
+ &skeyid_e_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(skeyid_e) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("SKEYID_e = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, skeyid_e_secret, skeyid_e_template.ulValueLen);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ crv = NSC_CloseSession(session);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+loser:
+ NSC_Finalize(NULL);
+ if (gxy)
+ free(gxy);
+ if (Ni)
+ free(Ni);
+ if (Nr)
+ free(Nr);
+ if (ikereq)
+ fclose(ikereq);
+}
+
+void
+ikev1_psk(char *reqfn)
+{
+ char buf[4096]; /* holds one line from the input REQUEST file.
+ * needs to be large enough to hold the longest
+ * line "g^xy = <2048 hex digits>\n".
+ */
+ unsigned char *gxy = NULL;
+ int gxy_len;
+ unsigned char *Ni = NULL;
+ int Ni_len;
+ unsigned char *Nr = NULL;
+ int Nr_len;
+ unsigned char CKYi[8];
+ int CKYi_len;
+ unsigned char CKYr[8];
+ int CKYr_len;
+ unsigned char *psk = NULL;
+ int psk_len;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ FILE *ikereq = NULL; /* input stream from the REQUEST file */
+ FILE *ikeresp; /* output stream to the RESPONSE file */
+
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotList[10];
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
+ CK_ULONG slotListCount = sizeof(slotList) / sizeof(slotList[0]);
+ CK_ULONG count;
+ static const CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11args = {
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS,
+ (void *)"flags=readOnly,noCertDB,noModDB", NULL
+ };
+ static CK_OBJECT_CLASS ck_secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ static CK_KEY_TYPE ck_generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ static CK_BBOOL ck_true = CK_TRUE;
+ static CK_ULONG keyLen = 1;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE gxy_template[] = {
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 }, /* must be first */
+ { CKA_CLASS, &ck_secret, sizeof(ck_secret) },
+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ck_generic, sizeof(ck_generic) },
+ { CKA_DERIVE, &ck_true, sizeof(ck_true) },
+ };
+ CK_ULONG gxy_template_count =
+ sizeof(gxy_template) / sizeof(gxy_template[0]);
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE psk_template[] = {
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 }, /* must be first */
+ { CKA_CLASS, &ck_secret, sizeof(ck_secret) },
+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ck_generic, sizeof(ck_generic) },
+ { CKA_DERIVE, &ck_true, sizeof(ck_true) },
+ };
+ CK_ULONG psk_template_count =
+ sizeof(psk_template) / sizeof(psk_template[0]);
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE derive_template[] = {
+ { CKA_CLASS, &ck_secret, sizeof(ck_secret) },
+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ck_generic, sizeof(ck_generic) },
+ { CKA_DERIVE, &ck_true, sizeof(ck_true) },
+ { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) }, /* must be last */
+ };
+ CK_ULONG derive_template_count =
+ sizeof(derive_template) / sizeof(derive_template[0]);
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE skeyid_template =
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE skeyid_d_template =
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE skeyid_a_template =
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE skeyid_e_template =
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 };
+ unsigned char skeyid_secret[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ unsigned char skeyid_d_secret[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ unsigned char skeyid_a_secret[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ unsigned char skeyid_e_secret[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+
+ CK_MECHANISM ike_mech = { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_MECHANISM ike1_mech = { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike_prf;
+ CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike1_prf;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ /* set up PKCS #11 parameters */
+ ike_prf.bDataAsKey = PR_FALSE;
+ ike_prf.bRekey = PR_FALSE;
+ ike_prf.hNewKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CKYi_len = 8;
+ CKYr_len = 8;
+ ike1_prf.pCKYi = CKYi;
+ ike1_prf.ulCKYiLen = CKYi_len;
+ ike1_prf.pCKYr = CKYr;
+ ike1_prf.ulCKYrLen = CKYr_len;
+ ike_mech.pParameter = &ike_prf;
+ ike_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ike_prf);
+ ike1_mech.pParameter = &ike1_prf;
+ ike1_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ike1_prf);
+ skeyid_template.pValue = skeyid_secret;
+ skeyid_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+ skeyid_d_template.pValue = skeyid_d_secret;
+ skeyid_d_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+ skeyid_a_template.pValue = skeyid_a_secret;
+ skeyid_a_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+ skeyid_e_template.pValue = skeyid_e_secret;
+ skeyid_e_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+
+ crv = NSC_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11args);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_Initialize failed crv=0x%x\n", (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ count = slotListCount;
+ crv = NSC_GetSlotList(PR_TRUE, slotList, &count);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetSlotList failed crv=0x%x\n", (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ if ((count > slotListCount) || count < 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "NSC_GetSlotList returned too many or too few slots: %d slots max=%d min=1\n",
+ (int)count, (int)slotListCount);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ slotID = slotList[0];
+ ikereq = fopen(reqfn, "r");
+ ikeresp = stdout;
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof buf, ikereq) != NULL) {
+ /* a comment or blank line */
+ if (buf[0] == '#' || buf[0] == '\n') {
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* [.....] */
+ if (buf[0] == '[') {
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-1]", 7) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA_1_HMAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA_1_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-224]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA224_HMAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA224_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-256]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-384]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA384_HMAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA384_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-512]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA512_HMAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA512_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[AES-XCBC", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC;
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[g^xy", 5) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[g^xy length = %d]",
+ &gxy_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ gxy_len = gxy_len / 8;
+ if (gxy)
+ free(gxy);
+ gxy = malloc(gxy_len);
+ gxy_template[0].pValue = gxy;
+ gxy_template[0].ulValueLen = gxy_len;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[pre-shared-key", 15) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[pre-shared-key length = %d]",
+ &psk_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ psk_len = psk_len / 8;
+ if (psk)
+ free(psk);
+ psk = malloc(psk_len);
+ psk_template[0].pValue = psk;
+ psk_template[0].ulValueLen = psk_len;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[Ni", 3) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[Ni length = %d]", &Ni_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ Ni_len = Ni_len / 8;
+ if (Ni)
+ free(Ni);
+ Ni = malloc(Ni_len);
+ ike_prf.pNi = Ni;
+ ike_prf.ulNiLen = Ni_len;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[Nr", 3) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[Nr length = %d]", &Nr_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ Nr_len = Nr_len / 8;
+ if (Nr)
+ free(Nr);
+ Nr = malloc(Nr_len);
+ ike_prf.pNr = Nr;
+ ike_prf.ulNrLen = Nr_len;
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* "COUNT = x" begins a new data set */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "COUNT", 5) == 0) {
+ /* zeroize the variables for the test with this data set */
+ memset(gxy, 0, gxy_len);
+ memset(Ni, 0, Ni_len);
+ memset(Nr, 0, Nr_len);
+ memset(CKYi, 0, CKYi_len);
+ memset(CKYr, 0, CKYr_len);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Ni = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "Ni", 2) == 0) {
+ i = 2;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < Ni_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &Ni[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Nr = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "Nr", 2) == 0) {
+ i = 2;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < Nr_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &Nr[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* CKYi = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "CKY_I", 5) == 0) {
+ i = 5;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < CKYi_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &CKYi[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* CKYr = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "CKY_R", 5) == 0) {
+ i = 5;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < CKYr_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &CKYr[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* g^xy = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "g^xy", 4) == 0) {
+ i = 4;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < gxy_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &gxy[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* pre-shared-key = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "pre-shared-key", 14) == 0) {
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE gxy_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE psk_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE skeyid_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE skeyid_d_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE skeyid_a_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE skeyid_e_handle;
+ i = 14;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < psk_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &psk[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ crv = NSC_OpenSession(slotID, 0, NULL, NULL, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_OpenSession failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = NSC_CreateObject(session, psk_template,
+ psk_template_count, &psk_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_CreateObject(psk) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = NSC_CreateObject(session, gxy_template,
+ gxy_template_count, &gxy_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_CreateObject(gxy) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* get the skeyid key */
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike_mech, psk_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count - 1,
+ &skeyid_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(skeyid) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ skeyid_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, skeyid_handle,
+ &skeyid_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(skeyid) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* use the length of the skeyid to set the target length of all the
+ * other keys */
+ keyLen = skeyid_template.ulValueLen;
+ ike1_prf.hKeygxy = gxy_handle;
+ ike1_prf.bHasPrevKey = PR_FALSE;
+ ike1_prf.keyNumber = 0;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike1_mech, skeyid_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count,
+ &skeyid_d_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(skeyid_d) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ike1_prf.hKeygxy = gxy_handle;
+ ike1_prf.bHasPrevKey = CK_TRUE;
+ ike1_prf.hPrevKey = skeyid_d_handle;
+ ike1_prf.keyNumber = 1;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike1_mech, skeyid_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count,
+ &skeyid_a_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(skeyid_a) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ ike1_prf.hKeygxy = gxy_handle;
+ ike1_prf.bHasPrevKey = CK_TRUE;
+ ike1_prf.hPrevKey = skeyid_a_handle;
+ ike1_prf.keyNumber = 2;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike1_mech, skeyid_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count,
+ &skeyid_e_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(skeyid_e) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("SKEYID = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, skeyid_secret, keyLen);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ skeyid_d_template.ulValueLen = keyLen;
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, skeyid_d_handle,
+ &skeyid_d_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(skeyid_d) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("SKEYID_d = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, skeyid_d_secret, skeyid_d_template.ulValueLen);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ skeyid_a_template.ulValueLen = keyLen;
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, skeyid_a_handle,
+ &skeyid_a_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(skeyid_a) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("SKEYID_a = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, skeyid_a_secret, skeyid_a_template.ulValueLen);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ skeyid_e_template.ulValueLen = keyLen;
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, skeyid_e_handle,
+ &skeyid_e_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(skeyid_e) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("SKEYID_e = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, skeyid_e_secret, skeyid_e_template.ulValueLen);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ crv = NSC_CloseSession(session);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+loser:
+ NSC_Finalize(NULL);
+ if (psk)
+ free(psk);
+ if (gxy)
+ free(gxy);
+ if (Ni)
+ free(Ni);
+ if (Nr)
+ free(Nr);
+ if (ikereq)
+ fclose(ikereq);
+}
+
+void
+ikev2(char *reqfn)
+{
+ char buf[4096]; /* holds one line from the input REQUEST file.
+ * needs to be large enough to hold the longest
+ * line "g^xy = <2048 hex digits>\n".
+ */
+ unsigned char *gir = NULL;
+ unsigned char *gir_new = NULL;
+ int gir_len;
+ unsigned char *Ni = NULL;
+ int Ni_len;
+ unsigned char *Nr = NULL;
+ int Nr_len;
+ unsigned char *SPIi = NULL;
+ int SPIi_len = 8;
+ unsigned char *SPIr = NULL;
+ int SPIr_len = 8;
+ unsigned char *DKM = NULL;
+ int DKM_len;
+ unsigned char *DKM_child = NULL;
+ int DKM_child_len;
+ unsigned char *seed_data = NULL;
+ int seed_data_len = 0;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ FILE *ikereq = NULL; /* input stream from the REQUEST file */
+ FILE *ikeresp; /* output stream to the RESPONSE file */
+
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotList[10];
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
+ CK_ULONG slotListCount = sizeof(slotList) / sizeof(slotList[0]);
+ CK_ULONG count;
+ static const CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11args = {
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS,
+ (void *)"flags=readOnly,noCertDB,noModDB", NULL
+ };
+ static CK_OBJECT_CLASS ck_secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ static CK_KEY_TYPE ck_generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ static CK_BBOOL ck_true = CK_TRUE;
+ static CK_ULONG keyLen = 1;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE gir_template[] = {
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_CLASS, &ck_secret, sizeof(ck_secret) },
+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ck_generic, sizeof(ck_generic) },
+ { CKA_DERIVE, &ck_true, sizeof(ck_true) },
+ };
+ CK_ULONG gir_template_count =
+ sizeof(gir_template) / sizeof(gir_template[0]);
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE gir_new_template[] = {
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_CLASS, &ck_secret, sizeof(ck_secret) },
+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ck_generic, sizeof(ck_generic) },
+ { CKA_DERIVE, &ck_true, sizeof(ck_true) },
+ };
+ CK_ULONG gir_new_template_count =
+ sizeof(gir_new_template) / sizeof(gir_new_template[0]);
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE derive_template[] = {
+ { CKA_CLASS, &ck_secret, sizeof(ck_secret) },
+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ck_generic, sizeof(ck_generic) },
+ { CKA_DERIVE, &ck_true, sizeof(ck_true) },
+ { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) },
+ };
+ CK_ULONG derive_template_count =
+ sizeof(derive_template) / sizeof(derive_template[0]);
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE skeyseed_template =
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE dkm_template =
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE dkm_child_template =
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 };
+ unsigned char skeyseed_secret[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+
+ CK_MECHANISM ike_mech = { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_MECHANISM ike2_mech = { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_MECHANISM subset_mech = { CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike_prf;
+ CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS ike2_prf;
+ CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS subset_params;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ /* set up PKCS #11 parameters */
+ ike_mech.pParameter = &ike_prf;
+ ike_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ike_prf);
+ ike2_mech.pParameter = &ike2_prf;
+ ike2_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ike2_prf);
+ subset_mech.pParameter = &subset_params;
+ subset_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(subset_params);
+ subset_params = 0;
+ skeyseed_template.pValue = skeyseed_secret;
+ skeyseed_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+
+ crv = NSC_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11args);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_Initialize failed crv=0x%x\n", (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ count = slotListCount;
+ crv = NSC_GetSlotList(PR_TRUE, slotList, &count);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetSlotList failed crv=0x%x\n", (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ if ((count > slotListCount) || count < 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "NSC_GetSlotList returned too many or too few slots: %d slots max=%d min=1\n",
+ (int)count, (int)slotListCount);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ slotID = slotList[0];
+ ikereq = fopen(reqfn, "r");
+ ikeresp = stdout;
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof buf, ikereq) != NULL) {
+ /* a comment or blank line */
+ if (buf[0] == '#' || buf[0] == '\n') {
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* [.....] */
+ if (buf[0] == '[') {
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-1]", 7) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA_1_HMAC;
+ ike2_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA_1_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-224]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA224_HMAC;
+ ike2_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA224_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-256]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
+ ike2_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-384]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA384_HMAC;
+ ike2_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA384_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[SHA-512]", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA512_HMAC;
+ ike2_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA512_HMAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[AES-XCBC", 9) == 0) {
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC;
+ ike2_prf.prfMechanism = CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[g^ir", 5) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[g^ir length = %d]",
+ &gir_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ gir_len = gir_len / 8;
+ if (gir)
+ free(gir);
+ if (gir_new)
+ free(gir_new);
+ gir = malloc(gir_len);
+ gir_new = malloc(gir_len);
+ gir_template[0].pValue = gir;
+ gir_template[0].ulValueLen = gir_len;
+ gir_new_template[0].pValue = gir_new;
+ gir_new_template[0].ulValueLen = gir_len;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[Ni", 3) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[Ni length = %d]", &Ni_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ Ni_len = Ni_len / 8;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[Nr", 3) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[Nr length = %d]", &Nr_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ Nr_len = Nr_len / 8;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[DKM", 4) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[DKM length = %d]",
+ &DKM_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ DKM_len = DKM_len / 8;
+ if (DKM)
+ free(DKM);
+ DKM = malloc(DKM_len);
+ dkm_template.pValue = DKM;
+ dkm_template.ulValueLen = DKM_len;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(buf, "[Child SA DKM", 13) == 0) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "[Child SA DKM length = %d]",
+ &DKM_child_len) != 1) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ DKM_child_len = DKM_child_len / 8;
+ if (DKM_child)
+ free(DKM_child);
+ DKM_child = malloc(DKM_child_len);
+ dkm_child_template.pValue = DKM_child;
+ dkm_child_template.ulValueLen = DKM_child_len;
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* "COUNT = x" begins a new data set */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "COUNT", 5) == 0) {
+ /* zeroize the variables for the test with this data set */
+ int new_seed_len = Ni_len + Nr_len + SPIi_len + SPIr_len;
+ if (seed_data_len != new_seed_len) {
+ if (seed_data)
+ free(seed_data);
+ seed_data_len = new_seed_len;
+ seed_data = malloc(seed_data_len);
+ Ni = seed_data;
+ Nr = &seed_data[Ni_len];
+ SPIi = &seed_data[Ni_len + Nr_len];
+ SPIr = &seed_data[new_seed_len - SPIr_len];
+ ike_prf.pNi = Ni;
+ ike_prf.ulNiLen = Ni_len;
+ ike_prf.pNr = Nr;
+ ike_prf.ulNrLen = Nr_len;
+ ike2_prf.pSeedData = seed_data;
+ }
+ memset(gir, 0, gir_len);
+ memset(gir_new, 0, gir_len);
+ memset(seed_data, 0, seed_data_len);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Ni = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "Ni", 2) == 0) {
+ i = 2;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < Ni_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &Ni[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Nr = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "Nr", 2) == 0) {
+ i = 2;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < Nr_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &Nr[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* g^ir (new) = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "g^ir (new)", 10) == 0) {
+ i = 10;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < gir_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &gir_new[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* g^ir = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "g^ir", 4) == 0) {
+ i = 4;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < gir_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &gir[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* SPIi = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "SPIi", 4) == 0) {
+ i = 4;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < SPIi_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &SPIi[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* SPIr = ... */
+ if (strncmp(buf, "SPIr", 4) == 0) {
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE gir_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE gir_new_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE skeyseed_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE sk_d_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE skeyseed_new_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dkm_handle;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dkm_child_handle;
+ i = 4;
+ while (isspace(buf[i]) || buf[i] == '=') {
+ i++;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < SPIr_len; i += 2, j++) {
+ hex_to_byteval(&buf[i], &SPIr[j]);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ crv = NSC_OpenSession(slotID, 0, NULL, NULL, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_OpenSession failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = NSC_CreateObject(session, gir_template,
+ gir_template_count, &gir_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_CreateObject (g^ir) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = NSC_CreateObject(session, gir_new_template,
+ gir_new_template_count, &gir_new_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_CreateObject (g^ir new) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* get the SKEYSEED key */
+ ike_prf.bDataAsKey = CK_TRUE;
+ ike_prf.bRekey = CK_FALSE;
+ ike_prf.hNewKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike_mech, gir_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count - 1,
+ &skeyseed_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(skeyid) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ skeyseed_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, skeyseed_handle,
+ &skeyseed_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(skeyid) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("SKEYSEED = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, skeyseed_secret, skeyseed_template.ulValueLen);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ /* get DKM */
+ keyLen = DKM_len;
+ ike2_prf.bHasSeedKey = CK_FALSE;
+ ike2_prf.hSeedKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ ike2_prf.ulSeedDataLen = seed_data_len;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike2_mech, skeyseed_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count,
+ &dkm_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(DKM) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, dkm_handle,
+ &dkm_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(DKM) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("DKM = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, DKM, DKM_len);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ /* get the sk_d from the DKM */
+ keyLen = skeyseed_template.ulValueLen;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &subset_mech, dkm_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count,
+ &sk_d_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(sk_d) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* get DKM child */
+ keyLen = DKM_child_len;
+ ike2_prf.bHasSeedKey = CK_FALSE;
+ ike2_prf.hSeedKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ ike2_prf.ulSeedDataLen = Ni_len + Nr_len;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike2_mech, sk_d_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count,
+ &dkm_child_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(DKM Child SA) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, dkm_child_handle,
+ &dkm_child_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(DKM Child SA) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("DKM(Child SA) = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, DKM_child, DKM_child_len);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ /* get DKM child D-H*/
+ keyLen = DKM_child_len;
+ ike2_prf.bHasSeedKey = CK_TRUE;
+ ike2_prf.hSeedKey = gir_new_handle;
+ ike2_prf.ulSeedDataLen = Ni_len + Nr_len;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike2_mech, sk_d_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count,
+ &dkm_child_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(DKM Child SA D-H) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, dkm_child_handle,
+ &dkm_child_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(DKM Child SA D-H) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("DKM(Child SA D-H) = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, DKM_child, DKM_child_len);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ /* get SKEYSEED(rekey) */
+ ike_prf.bDataAsKey = CK_FALSE;
+ ike_prf.bRekey = CK_TRUE;
+ ike_prf.hNewKey = gir_new_handle;
+ crv = NSC_DeriveKey(session, &ike_mech, sk_d_handle,
+ derive_template, derive_template_count - 1,
+ &skeyseed_new_handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_DeriveKey(skeyid rekey) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ skeyseed_template.ulValueLen = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+ crv = NSC_GetAttributeValue(session, skeyseed_new_handle,
+ &skeyseed_template, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSC_GetAttribute(skeyid) failed crv=0x%x\n",
+ (unsigned int)crv);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fputs("SKEYSEED(rekey) = ", ikeresp);
+ to_hex_str(buf, skeyseed_secret, skeyseed_template.ulValueLen);
+ fputs(buf, ikeresp);
+ fputc('\n', ikeresp);
+
+ crv = NSC_CloseSession(session);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+loser:
+ NSC_Finalize(NULL);
+ if (gir)
+ free(gir);
+ if (gir_new)
+ free(gir_new);
+ if (seed_data)
+ free(seed_data);
+ if (DKM)
+ free(DKM);
+ if (DKM_child)
+ free(DKM_child);
+ if (ikereq)
+ fclose(ikereq);
+}
+
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
if (argc < 2)
exit(-1);
RNG_RNGInit();
SECOID_Init();
@@ -7066,11 +8369,19 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
rng_mct(argv[3]);
}
} else if (strcmp(argv[1], "drbg") == 0) {
/* Variable Seed Test */
drbg(argv[2]);
} else if (strcmp(argv[1], "ddrbg") == 0) {
debug = 1;
drbg(argv[2]);
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[1], "tls") == 0) {
+ tls(argv[2]);
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[1], "ikev1") == 0) {
+ ikev1(argv[2]);
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[1], "ikev1-psk") == 0) {
+ ikev1_psk(argv[2]);
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[1], "ikev2") == 0) {
+ ikev2(argv[2]);
}
return 0;
}
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/hmac.sh b/cmd/fipstest/hmac.sh
deleted file mode 100755
--- a/cmd/fipstest/hmac.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# A Bourne shell script for running the NIST HMAC Algorithm Validation Suite
-#
-# Before you run the script, set your PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ... environment
-# variables appropriately so that the fipstest command and the NSPR and NSS
-# shared libraries/DLLs are on the search path. Then run this script in the
-# directory where the REQUEST (.req) files reside. The script generates the
-# RESPONSE (.rsp) files in the same directory.
-
-BASEDIR=${1-.}
-TESTDIR=${BASEDIR}/HMAC
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-REQDIR=${TESTDIR}/req
-RSPDIR=${TESTDIR}/resp
-
-hmac_requests="
-HMAC.req
-"
-
-if [ ${COMMAND} = "verify" ]; then
- for request in $hmac_requests; do
- sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} $request
- done
- exit 0
-fi
-for request in $hmac_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest hmac ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/kas.sh b/cmd/fipstest/kas.sh
deleted file mode 100755
--- a/cmd/fipstest/kas.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# A Bourne shell script for running the NIST DSA Validation System
-#
-# Before you run the script, set your PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ... environment
-# variables appropriately so that the fipstest command and the NSPR and NSS
-# shared libraries/DLLs are on the search path. Then run this script in the
-# directory where the REQUEST (.req) files reside. The script generates the
-# RESPONSE (.rsp) files in the same directory.
-BASEDIR=${1-.}
-TESTDIR=${BASEDIR}/KAS
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-REQDIR=${TESTDIR}/req
-RSPDIR=${TESTDIR}/resp
-
-
-#
-if [ ${COMMAND} = "verify" ]; then
-#
-# need verify for KAS tests
-
-# verify generated keys
-# name=KeyPair
-# echo ">>>>> $name"
-# fipstest dsa keyver ${RSPDIR}/$name.rsp | grep ^Result.=.F
-# verify generated pqg values
-# name=PQGGen
-# echo ">>>>> $name"
-# fipstest dsa pqgver ${RSPDIR}/$name.rsp | grep ^Result.=.F
-# verify PQGVer with known answer
-# sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} PQGVer.req ' ' '-e /^Result.=.F/s;.(.*);; -e /^Result.=.P/s;.(.*);;'
-# verify signatures
-# name=SigGen
-# echo ">>>>> $name"
-# fipstest dsa sigver ${RSPDIR}/$name.rsp | grep ^Result.=.F
-# verify SigVer with known answer
-# sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} SigVer.req ' ' '-e /^X.=/d -e /^Result.=.F/s;.(.*);;'
- exit 0
-fi
-
-request=KASFunctionTest_ECCEphemeralUnified_NOKC_ZZOnly_init.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest ecdh init-func ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=KASFunctionTest_ECCEphemeralUnified_NOKC_ZZOnly_resp.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest ecdh resp-func ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=KASValidityTest_ECCEphemeralUnified_NOKC_ZZOnly_init.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest ecdh init-verify ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=KASValidityTest_ECCEphemeralUnified_NOKC_ZZOnly_resp.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest ecdh resp-verify ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=KASFunctionTest_FFCEphem_NOKC_ZZOnly_init.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest dh init-func ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=KASFunctionTest_FFCEphem_NOKC_ZZOnly_resp.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest dh resp-func ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=KASValidityTest_FFCEphem_NOKC_ZZOnly_init.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest dh init-verify ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=KASValidityTest_FFCEphem_NOKC_ZZOnly_resp.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest dh resp-verify ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/rng.sh b/cmd/fipstest/rng.sh
deleted file mode 100644
--- a/cmd/fipstest/rng.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# A Bourne shell script for running the NIST RNG Validation Suite
-#
-# Before you run the script, set your PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ... environment
-# variables appropriately so that the fipstest command and the NSPR and NSS
-# shared libraries/DLLs are on the search path. Then run this script in the
-# directory where the REQUEST (.req) files reside. The script generates the
-# RESPONSE (.rsp) files in the same directory.
-BASEDIR=${1-.}
-TESTDIR=${BASEDIR}/DRBG800-90A
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-REQDIR=${TESTDIR}/req
-RSPDIR=${TESTDIR}/resp
-
-drbg_requests="
-Hash_DRBG.req
-"
-
-if [ ${COMMAND} = "verify" ]; then
- for request in $drbg_requests; do
- sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} $request
- done
- exit 0
-fi
-for request in $drbg_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest drbg ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/rsa.sh b/cmd/fipstest/rsa.sh
deleted file mode 100644
--- a/cmd/fipstest/rsa.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# A Bourne shell script for running the NIST RSA Validation System
-#
-# Before you run the script, set your PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ... environment
-# variables appropriately so that the fipstest command and the NSPR and NSS
-# shared libraries/DLLs are on the search path. Then run this script in the
-# directory where the REQUEST (.req) files reside. The script generates the
-# RESPONSE (.rsp) files in the same directory.
-BASEDIR=${1-.}
-TESTDIR=${BASEDIR}/RSA2
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-REQDIR=${TESTDIR}/req
-RSPDIR=${TESTDIR}/resp
-
-if [ ${COMMAND} = "verify" ]; then
-#verify the signatures. The fax file does not have any known answers, so
-#use our own verify function.
- name=SigGen15_186-3
- echo ">>>>> $name"
- fipstest rsa sigver ${RSPDIR}/$name.rsp | grep ^Result.=.F
-# fipstest rsa sigver ${REQDIR}/SigVer15_186-3.req | grep ^Result.=.F
-#The Fax file has the private exponent and the salt value, remove it
-#also remove the false reason
- sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} SigVer15_186-3.req ' ' '-e /^SaltVal/d -e/^d.=/d -e /^p.=/d -e /^q.=/d -e /^EM.with/d -e /^Result.=.F/s;.(.*);;'
-#
-# currently don't have a way to verify the RSA keygen
-#
- exit 0
-fi
-
-request=SigGen15_186-3.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest rsa siggen ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-request=SigVer15_186-3.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest rsa sigver ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-
-#request=KeyGen_186-3.req
-request=KeyGen_RandomProbablyPrime3_3.req
-response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
-echo $request $response
-fipstest rsa keypair ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/runtest.sh b/cmd/fipstest/runtest.sh
deleted file mode 100644
--- a/cmd/fipstest/runtest.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-TESTDIR=${1-.}
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-TESTS="aes aesgcm dsa ecdsa hmac kas tls rng rsa sha tdea"
-for i in $TESTS
-do
- echo "********************Running $i tests"
- sh ./${i}.sh ${TESTDIR} ${COMMAND}
-done
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/sha.sh b/cmd/fipstest/sha.sh
deleted file mode 100644
--- a/cmd/fipstest/sha.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# A Bourne shell script for running the NIST SHA Algorithm Validation Suite
-#
-# Before you run the script, set your PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ... environment
-# variables appropriately so that the fipstest command and the NSPR and NSS
-# shared libraries/DLLs are on the search path. Then run this script in the
-# directory where the REQUEST (.req) files reside. The script generates the
-# RESPONSE (.rsp) files in the same directory.
-BASEDIR=${1-.}
-TESTDIR=${BASEDIR}/SHA
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-REQDIR=${TESTDIR}/req
-RSPDIR=${TESTDIR}/resp
-
-sha_ShortMsg_requests="
-SHA1ShortMsg.req
-SHA224ShortMsg.req
-SHA256ShortMsg.req
-SHA384ShortMsg.req
-SHA512ShortMsg.req
-"
-
-sha_LongMsg_requests="
-SHA1LongMsg.req
-SHA224LongMsg.req
-SHA256LongMsg.req
-SHA384LongMsg.req
-SHA512LongMsg.req
-"
-
-sha_Monte_requests="
-SHA1Monte.req
-SHA224Monte.req
-SHA256Monte.req
-SHA384Monte.req
-SHA512Monte.req
-"
-
-if [ ${COMMAND} = "verify" ]; then
- for request in $sha_ShortMsg_requests $sha_LongMsg_requests $sha_Monte_requests; do
- sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} $request
- done
- exit 0
-fi
-
-for request in $sha_ShortMsg_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest sha ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $sha_LongMsg_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest sha ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $sha_Monte_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest sha ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/tdea.sh b/cmd/fipstest/tdea.sh
deleted file mode 100644
--- a/cmd/fipstest/tdea.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# A Bourne shell script for running the NIST tdea Algorithm Validation Suite
-#
-# Before you run the script, set your PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ... environment
-# variables appropriately so that the fipstest command and the NSPR and NSS
-# shared libraries/DLLs are on the search path. Then run this script in the
-# directory where the REQUEST (.req) files reside. The script generates the
-# RESPONSE (.rsp) files in the same directory.
-
-BASEDIR=${1-.}
-TESTDIR=${BASEDIR}/TDES
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-REQDIR=${TESTDIR}/req
-RSPDIR=${TESTDIR}/resp
-
-#CBC_Known_Answer_tests
-#Initial Permutation KAT
-#Permutation Operation KAT
-#Subsitution Table KAT
-#Variable Key KAT
-#Variable PlainText KAT
-cbc_kat_requests="
-TCBCinvperm.req
-TCBCpermop.req
-TCBCsubtab.req
-TCBCvarkey.req
-TCBCvartext.req
-"
-
-#CBC Monte Carlo KATs
-cbc_monte_requests="
-TCBCMonte1.req
-TCBCMonte2.req
-TCBCMonte3.req
-"
-#Multi-block Message KATs
-cbc_mmt_requests="
-TCBCMMT1.req
-TCBCMMT2.req
-TCBCMMT3.req
-"
-
-ecb_kat_requests="
-TECBinvperm.req
-TECBpermop.req
-TECBsubtab.req
-TECBvarkey.req
-TECBvartext.req
-"
-
-ecb_monte_requests="
-TECBMonte1.req
-TECBMonte2.req
-TECBMonte3.req
-"
-
-ecb_mmt_requests="
-TECBMMT1.req
-TECBMMT2.req
-TECBMMT3.req
-"
-
-
-if [ ${COMMAND} = "verify" ]; then
- for request in $cbc_kat_requests $cbc_monte_requests $cbc_mmt_requests $ecb_kat_requests $ecb_monte_requests $ecb_mmt_requests
- do
- sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} $request "-e /^NumKeys/d"
- done
- exit 0
-fi
-
-for request in $cbc_kat_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest tdea kat cbc ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $cbc_mmt_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest tdea mmt cbc ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $cbc_monte_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest tdea mct cbc ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $ecb_kat_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest tdea kat ecb ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $ecb_mmt_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest tdea mmt ecb ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
-for request in $ecb_monte_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest tdea mct ecb ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/tls.sh b/cmd/fipstest/tls.sh
deleted file mode 100644
--- a/cmd/fipstest/tls.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# A Bourne shell script for running the NIST RNG Validation Suite
-#
-# Before you run the script, set your PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ... environment
-# variables appropriately so that the fipstest command and the NSPR and NSS
-# shared libraries/DLLs are on the search path. Then run this script in the
-# directory where the REQUEST (.req) files reside. The script generates the
-# RESPONSE (.rsp) files in the same directory.
-BASEDIR=${1-.}
-TESTDIR=${BASEDIR}/KDF135
-COMMAND=${2-run}
-REQDIR=${TESTDIR}/req
-RSPDIR=${TESTDIR}/resp
-
-drbg_requests="
-tls.req
-"
-
-if [ ${COMMAND} = "verify" ]; then
- for request in $drbg_requests; do
- sh ./validate1.sh ${TESTDIR} $request
- done
- exit 0
-fi
-for request in $drbg_requests; do
- response=`echo $request | sed -e "s/req/rsp/"`
- echo $request $response
- fipstest tls ${REQDIR}/$request > ${RSPDIR}/$response
-done
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/validate.sh b/cmd/fipstest/validate.sh
deleted file mode 100644
--- a/cmd/fipstest/validate.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-sh ./runtest.sh ${1-.} verify
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/validate1.sh b/cmd/fipstest/validate1.sh
deleted file mode 100644
--- a/cmd/fipstest/validate1.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# Validate1.sh is a helper shell script that each of the base test shell
-# scripts call to help validate that the generated response (response)
-# matches the known answer response (fax). Sometimes (depending on the
-# individual tests) there are extraneous output in either or both response
-# and fax files. These allow the caller to pass in additional sed commands
-# to clear out those extraneous outputs before we compare the two files.
-# The sed line always clears out Windows line endings, replaces tabs with
-# spaces, and removed comments.
-#
-TESTDIR=${1-.}
-request=${2}
-extraneous_response=${3}
-extraneous_fax=${4}
-name=`basename $request .req`
-echo ">>>>> $name"
-sed -e 's;
;;g' -e 's; ; ;g' -e '/^#/d' $extraneous_response ${TESTDIR}/resp/${name}.rsp > /tmp/y1
-# if we didn't generate any output, flag that as an error
-size=`sum /tmp/y1 | awk '{ print $NF }'`
-if [ $size -eq 0 ]; then
- echo "${TESTDIR}/resp/${name}.rsp: empty"
- exit 1;
-fi
-sed -e 's;
;;g' -e 's; ; ;g' -e '/^#/d' $extraneous_fax ${TESTDIR}/fax/${name}.fax > /tmp/y2
-diff -i -w -B /tmp/y1 /tmp/y2
diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
@@ -234,16 +234,18 @@ PK11_GetKeyType(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
case CKM_AES_CTS:
case CKM_AES_GCM:
case CKM_AES_MAC:
case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL:
case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD:
+ case CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC:
+ case CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96:
return CKK_AES;
case CKM_DES_ECB:
case CKM_DES_CBC:
case CKM_DES_MAC:
case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS:
diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c
--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c
+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c
@@ -1593,16 +1593,17 @@ PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(PK11SymKey *base
} else {
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
}
}
if (newBaseKey)
PK11_FreeSymKey(newBaseKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
return NULL;
}
return symKey;
}
/* Create a new key by concatenating base and data
*/
static PK11SymKey *
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
--- a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
@@ -7,16 +7,17 @@
#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
#include "seccomon.h"
#include "blapi.h"
#include "softoken.h"
#include "lowkeyi.h"
#include "secoid.h"
#include "secerr.h"
+#include "pkcs11i.h"
/*
* different platforms have different ways of calling and initial entry point
* when the dll/.so is loaded. Most platforms support either a posix pragma
* or the GCC attribute. Some platforms suppor a pre-defined name, and some
* platforms have a link line way of invoking this function.
*/
@@ -621,16 +622,20 @@ sftk_startup_tests(void)
return;
}
if (!BLAPI_SHVerify(libraryName,
(PRFuncPtr)&sftk_fips_RSA_PowerUpSelfTest)) {
/* something is wrong with the library, fail without enabling
* the token */
return;
}
+ rv = sftk_fips_IKE_PowerUpSelfTests();
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return;
+ }
sftk_self_tests_success = PR_TRUE;
}
/*
* this is called from nsc_Common_Initizialize entry points that gates access
* to * all other pkcs11 functions. This prevents softoken operation if our
* power on selftest failed.
*/
diff --git a/lib/softoken/manifest.mn b/lib/softoken/manifest.mn
--- a/lib/softoken/manifest.mn
+++ b/lib/softoken/manifest.mn
@@ -41,16 +41,17 @@ CSRCS = \
lowpbe.c \
padbuf.c \
pkcs11.c \
pkcs11c.c \
pkcs11u.c \
sdb.c \
sftkdb.c \
sftkhmac.c \
+ sftkike.c \
sftkpars.c \
sftkpwd.c \
softkver.c \
tlsprf.c \
jpakesftk.c \
$(NULL)
ifdef SQLITE_UNSAFE_THREADS
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
@@ -323,16 +323,18 @@ static const struct mechanismList mechan
{ CKM_AES_ECB, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE_WR_UN }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_CBC, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE_WR_UN }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_MAC, { 16, 32, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, { 16, 32, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE_WR_UN }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_CTS, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_CTR, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_AES_GCM, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE }, PR_TRUE },
+ { CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96, { 12, 12, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE },
+ { CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC, { 16, 16, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE },
/* ------------------------- Camellia Operations --------------------- */
{ CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN, { 16, 32, CKF_GENERATE }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE_WR_UN }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE_WR_UN }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC, { 16, 32, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL, { 16, 32, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD, { 16, 32, CKF_EN_DE_WR_UN }, PR_TRUE },
/* ------------------------- SEED Operations --------------------------- */
@@ -504,17 +506,21 @@ static const struct mechanismList mechan
{ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1, { 0, 0, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256, { 0, 0, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE },
{ CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE },
/* -------------------- Constant Time TLS MACs ----------------------- */
{ CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME, { 0, 0, CKF_DIGEST }, PR_TRUE },
- { CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME, { 0, 0, CKF_DIGEST }, PR_TRUE }
+ { CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME, { 0, 0, CKF_DIGEST }, PR_TRUE },
+ /* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE }
};
static const CK_ULONG mechanismCount = sizeof(mechanisms) / sizeof(mechanisms[0]);
/* sigh global so fipstokn can read it */
PRBool nsc_init = PR_FALSE;
#if defined(CHECK_FORK_PTHREAD) || defined(CHECK_FORK_MIXED)
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
@@ -94,49 +94,16 @@ sftk_Space(void *data, PRBool freeit)
PORT_Free(data);
}
/*
* map all the SEC_ERROR_xxx error codes that may be returned by freebl
* functions to CKR_xxx. return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for backward
* compatibility.
*/
-static CK_RV
-sftk_MapCryptError(int error)
-{
- switch (error) {
- case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS:
- case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: /* MP_RANGE gets mapped to this */
- return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
- case SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN:
- return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
- case SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN:
- return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
- case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE:
- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
- case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
- return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
- case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
- return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
- case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY:
- return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
- case SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY: /* an EC public key that fails validation */
- return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; /* the closest error code */
- case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM:
- return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
- case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG:
- return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
- case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE:
- return CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID;
- /* key pair generation failed after max number of attempts */
- case SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM:
- return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
- }
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
-}
/* used by Decrypt and UnwrapKey (indirectly) */
static CK_RV
sftk_MapDecryptError(int error)
{
switch (error) {
case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA:
return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
@@ -2075,19 +2042,22 @@ sftk_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
CK_MECHANISM cbc_mechanism;
CK_ULONG mac_bytes = SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE;
CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_params;
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS rc5_params;
CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *rc5_mac;
#endif
unsigned char ivBlock[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char k2[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char k3[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
SFTKSessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv;
unsigned int blockSize;
+ PRBool isXCBC = PR_FALSE;
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL:
if (!pMechanism->pParameter) {
return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
}
mac_bytes =
((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
@@ -2181,43 +2151,82 @@ sftk_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
/* fall through */
case CKM_AES_MAC:
blockSize = 16;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
break;
+ case CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96:
+ case CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC:
+ /* The only difference between CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC
+ * and CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96 is the size of the returned mac. */
+ mac_bytes = pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96 ? 12 : 16;
+ blockSize = 16;
+ PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+ cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
+ cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+ cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+ /* is XCBC requires extra processing at the end of the operation */
+ isXCBC = PR_TRUE;
+ /* The input key is used to generate k1, k2, and k3. k2 and k3
+ * are used at the end in the pad step. k1 replaces the input
+ * key in the aes cbc mac */
+ crv = sftk_aes_xcbc_new_keys(hSession, hKey, &hKey, k2, k3);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return crv;
+ }
+ break;
default:
return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* if MAC size is externally supplied, it should be checked.
*/
if (mac_bytes == SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE)
mac_bytes = blockSize >> 1;
else {
- if (mac_bytes > blockSize)
- return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ if (mac_bytes > blockSize) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ goto fail;
+ }
}
crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, &cbc_mechanism, hKey,
CKA_ENCRYPT, /* CBC mech is able to ENCRYPT, not SIGN/VERIFY */
keyUsage, contextType, PR_TRUE);
if (crv != CKR_OK)
- return crv;
+ goto fail;
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, contextType, PR_TRUE, NULL);
/* this shouldn't happen! */
PORT_Assert(crv == CKR_OK);
if (crv != CKR_OK)
- return crv;
+ goto fail;
context->blockSize = blockSize;
context->macSize = mac_bytes;
+ context->isXCBC = isXCBC;
+ if (isXCBC) {
+ /* save the xcbc specific parameters */
+ PORT_Memcpy(context->k2, k2, blockSize);
+ PORT_Memcpy(context->k3, k3, blockSize);
+ PORT_Memset(k2, 0, blockSize);
+ PORT_Memset(k3, 0, blockSize);
+ /* get rid of the temp key now that the context has been created */
+ NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, hKey);
+ }
return CKR_OK;
+fail:
+ if (isXCBC) {
+ PORT_Memset(k2, 0, blockSize);
+ PORT_Memset(k3, 0, blockSize);
+ NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, hKey); /* get rid of our temp key */
+ }
+ return crv;
}
/*
* encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
*/
static SECStatus
sftk_RSAHashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
@@ -2823,16 +2832,23 @@ sftk_MACBlock(SFTKSessionContext *ctx, v
*
* Call once, then terminate MACing operation.
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_MACFinal(SFTKSessionContext *ctx)
{
unsigned int padLen = ctx->padDataLength;
/* pad and proceed the residual */
+ if (ctx->isXCBC) {
+ CK_RV crv = sftk_xcbc_mac_pad(ctx->padBuf, padLen, ctx->blockSize,
+ ctx->k2, ctx->k3);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ return sftk_MACBlock(ctx, ctx->padBuf);
+ }
if (padLen) {
/* shd clr ctx->padLen to make sftk_MACFinal idempotent */
PORT_Memset(ctx->padBuf + padLen, 0, ctx->blockSize - padLen);
return sftk_MACBlock(ctx, ctx->padBuf);
} else
return CKR_OK;
}
@@ -2861,31 +2877,31 @@ sftk_MACUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessio
unsigned int blkSize = context->blockSize;
unsigned char *residual = /* free room in context->padBuf */
context->padBuf + context->padDataLength;
unsigned int minInput = /* min input for MACing at least one block */
blkSize - context->padDataLength;
/* not enough data even for one block */
- if (ulPartLen < minInput) {
+ if (ulPartLen <= minInput) {
PORT_Memcpy(residual, pPart, ulPartLen);
context->padDataLength += ulPartLen;
goto cleanup;
}
/* MACing residual */
if (context->padDataLength) {
PORT_Memcpy(residual, pPart, minInput);
ulPartLen -= minInput;
pPart += minInput;
if (CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock(context, context->padBuf)))
goto terminate;
}
/* MACing full blocks */
- while (ulPartLen >= blkSize) {
+ while (ulPartLen > blkSize) {
if (CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock(context, pPart)))
goto terminate;
ulPartLen -= blkSize;
pPart += blkSize;
}
/* save the residual */
if ((context->padDataLength = ulPartLen))
PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, pPart, ulPartLen);
@@ -6513,16 +6529,55 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
if (att == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
}
switch (mechanism) {
+ case CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE:
+ if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
+ sizeof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_ike_prf(hSession, att,
+ (CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter, key);
+ break;
+ case CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE:
+ if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
+ sizeof(CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_ike1_prf(hSession, att,
+ (CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+ key, keySize);
+ break;
+ case CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE:
+ if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
+ sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_ike1_appendix_b_prf(hSession, att,
+ (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+ key, keySize);
+ break;
+ case CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE:
+ if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
+ sizeof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_ike_prf_plus(hSession, att,
+ (CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+ key, keySize);
+ break;
/*
* generate the master secret
*/
case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256:
case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256:
case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
@@ -248,22 +248,25 @@ typedef enum {
* multi=0 hashInfo=0 PKC S/V one shot (w/o hashing)
* multi=0 hashInfo=X *** shouldn't happen ***
*/
struct SFTKSessionContextStr {
SFTKContextType type;
PRBool multi; /* is multipart */
PRBool rsa; /* is rsa */
PRBool doPad; /* use PKCS padding for block ciphers */
+ PRBool isXCBC; /* xcbc, use special handling in final */
unsigned int blockSize; /* blocksize for padding */
unsigned int padDataLength; /* length of the valid data in padbuf */
/** latest incomplete block of data for block cipher */
unsigned char padBuf[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
/** result of MAC'ing of latest full block of data with block cipher */
unsigned char macBuf[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char k2[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char k3[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
CK_ULONG macSize; /* size of a general block cipher mac*/
void *cipherInfo;
void *hashInfo;
unsigned int cipherInfoLen;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE currentMech;
SFTKCipher update;
SFTKHash hashUpdate;
SFTKEnd end;
@@ -600,16 +603,17 @@ extern CK_RV SFTK_SlotInit(char *configd
extern CK_RV SFTK_SlotReInit(SFTKSlot *slot, char *configdir,
char *updatedir, char *updateID,
sftk_token_parameters *params, int moduleIndex);
extern CK_RV SFTK_DestroySlotData(SFTKSlot *slot);
extern CK_RV SFTK_ShutdownSlot(SFTKSlot *slot);
extern CK_RV sftk_CloseAllSessions(SFTKSlot *slot, PRBool logout);
/* internal utility functions used by pkcs11.c */
+extern CK_RV sftk_MapCryptError(int error);
extern SFTKAttribute *sftk_FindAttribute(SFTKObject *object,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type);
extern void sftk_FreeAttribute(SFTKAttribute *attribute);
extern CK_RV sftk_AddAttributeType(SFTKObject *object, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type,
const void *valPtr, CK_ULONG length);
extern CK_RV sftk_Attribute2SecItem(PLArenaPool *arena, SECItem *item,
SFTKObject *object, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type);
extern CK_RV sftk_MultipleAttribute2SecItem(PLArenaPool *arena,
@@ -681,16 +685,40 @@ extern void sftk_CleanupFreeLists(void);
extern NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *sftk_GetPubKey(SFTKObject *object,
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, CK_RV *crvp);
extern NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *sftk_GetPrivKey(SFTKObject *object,
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, CK_RV *crvp);
extern void sftk_FormatDESKey(unsigned char *key, int length);
extern PRBool sftk_CheckDESKey(unsigned char *key);
extern PRBool sftk_IsWeakKey(unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type);
+/* ike and xcbc helpers */
+extern CK_RV sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ const SFTKAttribute *inKey,
+ const CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS *params, SFTKObject *outKey);
+extern CK_RV sftk_ike1_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ const SFTKAttribute *inKey,
+ const CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS *params, SFTKObject *outKey,
+ unsigned int keySize);
+extern CK_RV sftk_ike1_appendix_b_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ const SFTKAttribute *inKey,
+ const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *params, SFTKObject *outKey,
+ unsigned int keySize);
+extern CK_RV sftk_ike_prf_plus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ const SFTKAttribute *inKey,
+ const CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS *params, SFTKObject *outKey,
+ unsigned int keySize);
+extern CK_RV sftk_aes_xcbc_new_keys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey,
+ unsigned char *k2, unsigned char *k3);
+extern CK_RV sftk_xcbc_mac_pad(unsigned char *padBuf, unsigned int bufLen,
+ int blockSize, const unsigned char *k2,
+ const unsigned char *k3);
+extern SECStatus sftk_fips_IKE_PowerUpSelfTests(void);
+
/* mechanism allows this operation */
extern CK_RV sftk_MechAllowsOperation(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op);
/* helper function which calls nsslowkey_FindKeyByPublicKey after safely
* acquiring a reference to the keydb from the slot */
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *sftk_FindKeyByPublicKey(SFTKSlot *slot, SECItem *dbKey);
/*
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
@@ -10,16 +10,57 @@
#include "secasn1.h"
#include "blapi.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "prnetdb.h" /* for PR_ntohl */
#include "sftkdb.h"
#include "softoken.h"
/*
+ * ******************** Error mapping *******************************
+ */
+/*
+ * map all the SEC_ERROR_xxx error codes that may be returned by freebl
+ * functions to CKR_xxx. return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for backward
+ * compatibility.
+ */
+CK_RV
+sftk_MapCryptError(int error)
+{
+ switch (error) {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: /* MP_RANGE gets mapped to this */
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ case SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN:
+ return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
+ case SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN:
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE:
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY:
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY: /* an EC public key that fails validation */
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; /* the closest error code */
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM:
+ return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG:
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE:
+ return CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID;
+ /* key pair generation failed after max number of attempts */
+ case SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM:
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+}
+/*
* ******************** Attribute Utilities *******************************
*/
/*
* create a new attribute with type, value, and length. Space is allocated
* to hold value.
*/
static SFTKAttribute *
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkike.c b/lib/softoken/sftkike.c
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkike.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1288 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * This file implements PKCS 11 on top of our existing security modules
+ *
+ * For more information about PKCS 11 See PKCS 11 Token Inteface Standard.
+ * This implementation has two slots:
+ * slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login.
+ * It supports Public Key ops, and all they bulk ciphers and hashes.
+ * It can also support Private Key ops for imported Private keys. It does
+ * not have any token storage.
+ * slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It
+ * can store Private Keys and Certs as token objects. Currently only private
+ * keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token.
+ *
+ * In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session
+ * that created or generated them.
+ */
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secport.h"
+#include "blapi.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#include "pkcs11i.h"
+#include "pkcs1sig.h"
+#include "lowkeyi.h"
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "secdig.h"
+#include "lowpbe.h" /* We do PBE below */
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "alghmac.h"
+#include "softoken.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+
+#include "prprf.h"
+#include "prenv.h"
+
+/*
+ * A common prfContext to handle both hmac and aes xcbc
+ * hash contexts have non-null hashObj and hmac, aes
+ * contexts have non-null aes */
+typedef struct prfContextStr {
+ HASH_HashType hashType;
+ const SECHashObject *hashObj;
+ HMACContext *hmac;
+ AESContext *aes;
+ unsigned int nextChar;
+ unsigned char padBuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char macBuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char k1[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char k2[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char k3[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+} prfContext;
+
+/* iv full of zeros used in several places in aex xcbc */
+static const unsigned char iv_zero[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+};
+
+/*
+ * Generate AES XCBC keys from the AES MAC key.
+ * k1 is used in the actual mac.
+ * k2 and k3 are used in the final pad step.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_aes_xcbc_get_keys(const unsigned char *keyValue, unsigned int keyLen,
+ unsigned char *k1, unsigned char *k2, unsigned char *k3)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ unsigned int tmpLen;
+ AESContext *aes_context = NULL;
+ unsigned char newKey[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ /* AES XCBC keys. k1, k2, and k3 are derived by encrypting
+ * k1data, k2data, and k3data with the mac key.
+ */
+ static const unsigned char k1data[] = {
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01
+ };
+ static const unsigned char k2data[] = {
+ 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02,
+ 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02
+ };
+ static const unsigned char k3data[] = {
+ 0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03,
+ 0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03
+ };
+
+ /* k1_0 = aes_ecb(0, k1data) */
+ static const unsigned char k1_0[] = {
+ 0xe1, 0x4d, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0xe2, 0x77, 0x15, 0xdf,
+ 0x08, 0xb4, 0x15, 0x2b, 0xa2, 0x3d, 0xa8, 0xe0
+
+ };
+ /* k2_0 = aes_ecb(0, k2data) */
+ static const unsigned char k2_0[] = {
+ 0x5e, 0xba, 0x73, 0xf8, 0x91, 0x42, 0xc5, 0x48,
+ 0x80, 0xf6, 0x85, 0x94, 0x37, 0x3c, 0x5c, 0x37
+ };
+ /* k3_0 = aes_ecb(0, k3data) */
+ static const unsigned char k3_0[] = {
+ 0x8d, 0x34, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x3b, 0xd5, 0x45, 0xca,
+ 0x06, 0x2a, 0xec, 0xdf, 0xef, 0x7c, 0x0b, 0xfa
+ };
+
+ /* first make sure out input key is the correct length
+ * rfc 4434. If key is shorter, pad with zeros to the
+ * the right. If key is longer newKey = aes_xcbc(0, key, keyLen).
+ */
+ if (keyLen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(newKey, keyValue, keyLen);
+ PORT_Memset(&newKey[keyLen], 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - keyLen);
+ keyValue = newKey;
+ } else if (keyLen > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ /* calculate our new key = aes_xcbc(0, key, keyLen). Because the
+ * key above is fixed (0), we can precalculate k1, k2, and k2.
+ * if this code ever needs to be more generic (support any xcbc
+ * function rather than just aes, we would probably want to just
+ * recurse here using our prf functions. This would be safe because
+ * the recurse case would have keyLen == blocksize and thus skip
+ * this conditional.
+ */
+ aes_context = AES_CreateContext(k1_0, iv_zero, NSS_AES_CBC,
+ PR_TRUE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ /* we know the following loop will execute at least once */
+ while (keyLen > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ rv = AES_Encrypt(aes_context, newKey, &tmpLen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ keyValue, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ keyValue += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ keyLen -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(newKey, keyValue, keyLen);
+ sftk_xcbc_mac_pad(newKey, keyLen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, k2_0, k3_0);
+ rv = AES_Encrypt(aes_context, newKey, &tmpLen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ newKey, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ keyValue = newKey;
+ AES_DestroyContext(aes_context, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ /* the length of the key in keyValue is known to be AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ * either because it was on input, or it was shorter and extended, or
+ * because it was mac'd down using aes_xcbc_prf.
+ */
+ aes_context = AES_CreateContext(keyValue, iv_zero,
+ NSS_AES, PR_TRUE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (aes_context == NULL) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ rv = AES_Encrypt(aes_context, k1, &tmpLen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ k1data, sizeof(k1data));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ rv = AES_Encrypt(aes_context, k2, &tmpLen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ k2data, sizeof(k2data));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ rv = AES_Encrypt(aes_context, k3, &tmpLen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ k3data, sizeof(k3data));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ AES_DestroyContext(aes_context, PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_Memset(newKey, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ return CKR_OK;
+fail:
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ if (aes_context) {
+ AES_DestroyContext(aes_context, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ PORT_Memset(k1, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ PORT_Memset(k2, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ PORT_Memset(k3, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ PORT_Memset(newKey, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* encode the final pad block of aes xcbc, padBuf is modified */
+CK_RV
+sftk_xcbc_mac_pad(unsigned char *padBuf, unsigned int bufLen, int blockSize,
+ const unsigned char *k2, const unsigned char *k3)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (bufLen == blockSize) {
+ for (i = 0; i < blockSize; i++) {
+ padBuf[i] ^= k2[i];
+ }
+ } else {
+ padBuf[bufLen++] = 0x80;
+ for (i = bufLen; i < blockSize; i++) {
+ padBuf[i] = 0x00;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < blockSize; i++) {
+ padBuf[i] ^= k3[i];
+ }
+ }
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* Map the mechanism to the underlying hash. If the type is not a hash
+ * or HMAC, return HASH_AlgNULL. This can happen legitimately if
+ * we are doing AES XCBC */
+static HASH_HashType
+sftk_map_hmac_to_hash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
+ case CKM_SHA_1:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA1;
+ case CKM_MD5_HMAC:
+ case CKM_MD5:
+ return HASH_AlgMD5;
+ case CKM_MD2_HMAC:
+ case CKM_MD2:
+ return HASH_AlgMD2;
+ case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
+ case CKM_SHA224:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA224;
+ case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
+ case CKM_SHA256:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
+ case CKM_SHA384:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA384;
+ case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
+ case CKM_SHA512:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA512;
+ }
+ return HASH_AlgNULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generally setup the context based on the mechanism.
+ * If the mech is HMAC, context->hashObj should be set
+ * Otherwise it is assumed to be AES XCBC. prf_setup
+ * checks these assumptions and will return an error
+ * if they are not met. NOTE: this function does not allocate
+ * anything, so there is no requirement to free context after
+ * prf_setup like there is if you call prf_init.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+prf_setup(prfContext *context, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
+{
+ context->hashType = sftk_map_hmac_to_hash(mech);
+ context->hashObj = NULL;
+ context->hmac = NULL;
+ context->aes = NULL;
+ if (context->hashType != HASH_AlgNULL) {
+ context->hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(context->hashType);
+ if (context->hashObj == NULL) {
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ return CKR_OK;
+ } else if (mech == CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC) {
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+}
+
+/* return the underlying prf length for this context. This will
+ * function once the context is setup */
+static CK_RV
+prf_length(prfContext *context)
+{
+ if (context->hashObj) {
+ return context->hashObj->length;
+ }
+ return AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* AES */
+}
+
+/* set up the key for the prf. prf_update or prf_final should not be called if
+ * prf_init has not been called first. Once prf_init returns hmac and
+ * aes contexts should set and valid.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+prf_init(prfContext *context, const unsigned char *keyValue,
+ unsigned int keyLen)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ context->hmac = NULL;
+ if (context->hashObj) {
+ context->hmac = HMAC_Create(context->hashObj,
+ keyValue, keyLen, PR_FALSE);
+ if (context->hmac == NULL) {
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ }
+ HMAC_Begin(context->hmac);
+ } else {
+ crv = sftk_aes_xcbc_get_keys(keyValue, keyLen, context->k1,
+ context->k2, context->k3);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ context->nextChar = 0;
+ context->aes = AES_CreateContext(context->k1, iv_zero, NSS_AES_CBC,
+ PR_TRUE, sizeof(context->k1), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (context->aes == NULL) {
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ PORT_Memset(context->k1, 0, sizeof(context->k1));
+ PORT_Memset(context->k2, 0, sizeof(context->k2));
+ PORT_Memset(context->k3, 0, sizeof(context->k2));
+ return crv;
+ }
+ }
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * process input to the prf
+ */
+static CK_RV
+prf_update(prfContext *context, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
+{
+ unsigned int tmpLen;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (context->hmac) {
+ HMAC_Update(context->hmac, buf, len);
+ } else {
+ /* AES MAC XCBC*/
+ /* We must keep the last block back so that it can be processed in
+ * final. This is why we only check that nextChar + len > blocksize,
+ * rather than checking that nextChar + len >= blocksize */
+ while (context->nextChar + len > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ if (context->nextChar != 0) {
+ /* first handle fill in any partial blocks in the buffer */
+ unsigned int left = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - context->nextChar;
+ /* note: left can be zero */
+ PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf + context->nextChar, buf, left);
+ /* NOTE: AES MAC XCBC xors the data with the previous block
+ * We don't do that step here because our AES_Encrypt mode
+ * is CBC, which does the xor automatically */
+ rv = AES_Encrypt(context->aes, context->macBuf, &tmpLen,
+ sizeof(context->macBuf), context->padBuf,
+ sizeof(context->padBuf));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ }
+ context->nextChar = 0;
+ len -= left;
+ buf += left;
+ } else {
+ /* optimization. if we have complete blocks to write out
+ * (and will still have leftover blocks for padbuf in the end).
+ * we can mac directly out of our buffer without first copying
+ * them to padBuf */
+ rv = AES_Encrypt(context->aes, context->macBuf, &tmpLen,
+ sizeof(context->macBuf), buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ }
+ len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ buf += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf + context->nextChar, buf, len);
+ context->nextChar += len;
+ }
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * free the data associated with the prf. Clear any possible CSPs
+ * This can safely be called on any context after prf_setup. It can
+ * also be called an an already freed context.
+ * A free context can be reused by calling prf_init again without
+ * the need to call prf_setup.
+ */
+static void
+prf_free(prfContext *context)
+{
+ if (context->hmac) {
+ HMAC_Destroy(context->hmac, PR_TRUE);
+ context->hmac = NULL;
+ }
+ if (context->aes) {
+ PORT_Memset(context->k1, 0, sizeof(context->k1));
+ PORT_Memset(context->k2, 0, sizeof(context->k2));
+ PORT_Memset(context->k3, 0, sizeof(context->k2));
+ PORT_Memset(context->padBuf, 0, sizeof(context->padBuf));
+ PORT_Memset(context->macBuf, 0, sizeof(context->macBuf));
+ AES_DestroyContext(context->aes, PR_TRUE);
+ context->aes = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * extract the final prf value. On success, this has the side effect of
+ * also freeing the context data and clearing the keys
+ */
+static CK_RV
+prf_final(prfContext *context, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
+{
+ unsigned int tmpLen;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (context->hmac) {
+ unsigned int outLen;
+ HMAC_Finish(context->hmac, buf, &outLen, len);
+ if (outLen != len) {
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* prf_update had guarrenteed that the last full block is still in
+ * the padBuf if the input data is a multiple of the blocksize. This
+ * allows sftk_xcbc_mac_pad to process that pad buf accordingly */
+ sftk_xcbc_mac_pad(context->padBuf, context->nextChar, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ context->k2, context->k3);
+ rv = AES_Encrypt(context->aes, context->macBuf, &tmpLen,
+ sizeof(context->macBuf), context->padBuf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(buf, context->macBuf, len);
+ }
+ prf_free(context);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * There are four flavors of ike prf functions here.
+ * ike_prf is used in both ikeV1 and ikeV2 to generate
+ * an initial key that all the other keys are generated with.
+ *
+ * These functions are called from NSC_DeriveKey with the inKey value
+ * already looked up, and it expects the CKA_VALUE for outKey to be set.
+ *
+ * Depending on usage it returns either:
+ * 1. prf(Ni|Nr, inKey); (bDataAsKey=TRUE, bRekey=FALSE)
+ * 2. prf(inKey, Ni|Nr); (bDataAsKkey=FALSE, bRekey=FALSE)
+ * 3. prf(inKey, newKey | Ni | Nr); (bDataAsKey=FALSE, bRekey=TRUE)
+ * The resulting output key is always the length of the underlying prf
+ * (as returned by prf_length()).
+ * The combination of bDataAsKey=TRUE and bRekey=TRUE is not allowed
+ *
+ * Case 1 is used in
+ * a. ikev2 (rfc5996) inKey is called g^ir, the output is called SKEYSEED
+ * b. ikev1 (rfc2409) inKey is called g^ir, the output is called SKEYID
+ * Case 2 is used in ikev1 (rfc2409) inkey is called pre-shared-key, output
+ * is called SKEYID
+ * Case 3 is used in ikev2 (rfc5996) rekey case, inKey is SK_d, newKey is
+ * g^ir (new), the output is called SKEYSEED
+ */
+CK_RV
+sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, const SFTKAttribute *inKey,
+ const CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS *params, SFTKObject *outKey)
+{
+ SFTKAttribute *newKeyValue = NULL;
+ SFTKObject *newKeyObj = NULL;
+ unsigned char outKeyData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ unsigned char *newInKey = NULL;
+ unsigned int newInKeySize;
+ unsigned int macSize;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ prfContext context;
+
+ crv = prf_setup(&context, params->prfMechanism);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return crv;
+ }
+ macSize = prf_length(&context);
+ if ((params->bDataAsKey) && (params->bRekey)) {
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ }
+ if (params->bRekey) {
+ /* lookup the value of new key from the session and key handle */
+ SFTKSession *session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ newKeyObj = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(params->hNewKey, session);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ if (newKeyObj == NULL) {
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ newKeyValue = sftk_FindAttribute(newKeyObj, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (newKeyValue == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ if (params->bDataAsKey) {
+ /* The key is Ni || Np, so we need to concatenate them together first */
+ newInKeySize = params->ulNiLen + params->ulNrLen;
+ newInKey = PORT_Alloc(newInKeySize);
+ if (newInKey == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(newInKey, params->pNi, params->ulNiLen);
+ PORT_Memcpy(newInKey + params->ulNiLen, params->pNr, params->ulNrLen);
+ crv = prf_init(&context, newInKey, newInKeySize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* key as the data */
+ crv = prf_update(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
+ inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ } else {
+ crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
+ inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (newKeyValue) {
+ crv = prf_update(&context, newKeyValue->attrib.pValue,
+ newKeyValue->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ crv = prf_update(&context, params->pNi, params->ulNiLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_update(&context, params->pNr, params->ulNrLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ crv = prf_final(&context, outKeyData, macSize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(outKey, CKA_VALUE, outKeyData, macSize);
+fail:
+ if (newInKey) {
+ PORT_Free(newInKey);
+ }
+ if (newKeyValue) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(newKeyValue);
+ }
+ if (newKeyObj) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(newKeyObj);
+ }
+ PORT_Memset(outKeyData, 0, macSize);
+ prf_free(&context);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The second flavor of ike prf is ike1_prf.
+ *
+ * It is used by ikeV1 to generate the various session keys used in the
+ * connection. It uses the initial key, an optional previous key, and a one byte
+ * key number to generate a unique key for each of the various session
+ * functions (encryption, decryption, mac). These keys expect a key size
+ * (as they may vary in length based on usage). If no length is provided,
+ * it will default to the length of the prf.
+ *
+ * This function returns either:
+ * prf(inKey, gxyKey || CKYi || CKYr || key_number)
+ * or
+ * prf(inKey, prevkey || gxyKey || CKYi || CKYr || key_number)
+ * depending on the stats of bHasPrevKey
+ *
+ * This is defined in rfc2409. For each of the following keys.
+ * inKey is SKEYID, gxyKey is g^xy
+ * for outKey = SKEYID_d, bHasPrevKey = false, key_number = 0
+ * for outKey = SKEYID_a, prevKey= SKEYID_d, key_number = 1
+ * for outKey = SKEYID_e, prevKey= SKEYID_a, key_number = 2
+ */
+CK_RV
+sftk_ike1_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, const SFTKAttribute *inKey,
+ const CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS *params, SFTKObject *outKey,
+ unsigned int keySize)
+{
+ SFTKAttribute *gxyKeyValue = NULL;
+ SFTKObject *gxyKeyObj = NULL;
+ SFTKAttribute *prevKeyValue = NULL;
+ SFTKObject *prevKeyObj = NULL;
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ unsigned char outKeyData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ unsigned int macSize;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ prfContext context;
+
+ crv = prf_setup(&context, params->prfMechanism);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return crv;
+ }
+ macSize = prf_length(&context);
+ if (keySize > macSize) {
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+ }
+ if (keySize == 0) {
+ keySize = macSize;
+ }
+
+ /* lookup the two keys from their passed in handles */
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ gxyKeyObj = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(params->hKeygxy, session);
+ if (params->bHasPrevKey) {
+ prevKeyObj = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(params->hPrevKey, session);
+ }
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ if ((gxyKeyObj == NULL) || ((params->bHasPrevKey) &&
+ (prevKeyObj == NULL))) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ gxyKeyValue = sftk_FindAttribute(gxyKeyObj, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (gxyKeyValue == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (prevKeyObj) {
+ prevKeyValue = sftk_FindAttribute(prevKeyObj, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (prevKeyValue == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* outKey = prf(inKey, [prevKey|] gxyKey | CKYi | CKYr | keyNumber) */
+ crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue, inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (prevKeyValue) {
+ crv = prf_update(&context, prevKeyValue->attrib.pValue,
+ prevKeyValue->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ crv = prf_update(&context, gxyKeyValue->attrib.pValue,
+ gxyKeyValue->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_update(&context, params->pCKYi, params->ulCKYiLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_update(&context, params->pCKYr, params->ulCKYrLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_update(&context, &params->keyNumber, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_final(&context, outKeyData, macSize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(outKey, CKA_VALUE, outKeyData, keySize);
+fail:
+ if (gxyKeyValue) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(gxyKeyValue);
+ }
+ if (prevKeyValue) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(prevKeyValue);
+ }
+ if (gxyKeyObj) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(gxyKeyObj);
+ }
+ if (prevKeyObj) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(prevKeyObj);
+ }
+ PORT_Memset(outKeyData, 0, macSize);
+ prf_free(&context);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The third flavor of ike prf is ike1_appendix_b.
+ *
+ * It is used by ikeV1 to generate longer key material from skeyid_e.
+ * Unlike ike1_prf, if no length is provided, this function
+ * will generate a KEY_RANGE_ERROR.
+ *
+ * This function returns (from rfc2409 appendix b):
+ * Ka = K1 | K2 | K3 | K4 |... Kn
+ * where:
+ * K1 = prf(K, 0x00)
+ * K2 = prf(K, K1)
+ * K3 = prf(K, K2)
+ * K4 = prf(K, K3)
+ * .
+ * Kn = prf(K, K(n-1))
+ * K = inKey
+ */
+CK_RV
+sftk_ike1_appendix_b_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, const SFTKAttribute *inKey,
+ const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *mech, SFTKObject *outKey, unsigned int keySize)
+{
+ unsigned char *outKeyData = NULL;
+ unsigned char *thisKey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *lastKey = NULL;
+ unsigned int macSize;
+ unsigned int outKeySize;
+ unsigned int genKeySize;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ prfContext context;
+
+ crv = prf_setup(&context, *mech);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ macSize = prf_length(&context);
+
+ if (keySize == 0) {
+ keySize = macSize;
+ }
+
+ if (keySize <= inKey->attrib.ulValueLen) {
+ return sftk_forceAttribute(outKey, CKA_VALUE,
+ inKey->attrib.pValue, keySize);
+ }
+ outKeySize = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, macSize);
+ outKeyData = PORT_Alloc(outKeySize);
+ if (outKeyData == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * this loop generates on block of the prf, basically
+ * kn = prf(key, Kn-1)
+ * Kn is thisKey, Kn-1 is lastKey
+ * key is inKey
+ */
+ thisKey = outKeyData;
+ for (genKeySize = 0; genKeySize <= keySize; genKeySize += macSize) {
+ crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue, inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (lastKey == NULL) {
+ const unsigned char zero = 0;
+ crv = prf_update(&context, &zero, 1);
+ } else {
+ crv = prf_update(&context, lastKey, macSize);
+ }
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_final(&context, thisKey, macSize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ lastKey = thisKey;
+ thisKey += macSize;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(outKey, CKA_VALUE, outKeyData, keySize);
+fail:
+ if (outKeyData) {
+ PORT_ZFree(outKeyData, outKeySize);
+ }
+ prf_free(&context);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The final flavor of ike prf is ike_prf_plus
+ *
+ * It is used by ikeV2 to generate the various session keys used in the
+ * connection. It uses the initial key and a feedback version of the prf
+ * to generate sufficient bytes to cover all the session keys. The application
+ * will then use CK_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY to pull out the various subkeys.
+ * This function expects a key size to be set by the application to cover
+ * all the keys. Unlike ike1_prf, if no length is provided, this function
+ * will generate a KEY_RANGE_ERROR
+ *
+ * This function returns (from rfc5996):
+ * prfplus = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 |... Tn
+ * where:
+ * T1 = prf(K, S | 0x01)
+ * T2 = prf(K, T1 | S | 0x02)
+ * T3 = prf(K, T3 | S | 0x03)
+ * T4 = prf(K, T4 | S | 0x04)
+ * .
+ * Tn = prf(K, T(n-1) | n)
+ * K = inKey, S = seedKey | seedData
+ */
+
+CK_RV
+sftk_ike_prf_plus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, const SFTKAttribute *inKey,
+ const CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS *params, SFTKObject *outKey,
+ unsigned int keySize)
+{
+ SFTKAttribute *seedValue = NULL;
+ SFTKObject *seedKeyObj = NULL;
+ unsigned char *outKeyData = NULL;
+ unsigned int outKeySize;
+ unsigned char *thisKey;
+ unsigned char *lastKey = NULL;
+ unsigned char currentByte = 0;
+ unsigned int getKeySize;
+ unsigned int macSize;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ prfContext context;
+
+ if (keySize == 0) {
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+ }
+
+ crv = prf_setup(&context, params->prfMechanism);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return crv;
+ }
+ /* pull in optional seedKey */
+ if (params->bHasSeedKey) {
+ SFTKSession *session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ seedKeyObj = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(params->hSeedKey, session);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ if (seedKeyObj == NULL) {
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ seedValue = sftk_FindAttribute(seedKeyObj, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (seedValue == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ } else if (params->ulSeedDataLen == 0) {
+ crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ macSize = prf_length(&context);
+ outKeySize = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, macSize);
+ outKeyData = PORT_Alloc(outKeySize);
+ if (outKeyData == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * this loop generates on block of the prf, basically
+ * Tn = prf(key, Tn-1 | S | n)
+ * Tn is thisKey, Tn-2 is lastKey, S is seedKey || seedData,
+ * key is inKey. currentByte = n-1 on entry.
+ */
+ thisKey = outKeyData;
+ for (getKeySize = 0; getKeySize < keySize; getKeySize += macSize) {
+ /* if currentByte is 255, we'll overflow when we increment it below.
+ * This can only happen if keysize > 255*macSize. In that case
+ * the application has asked for too much key material, so return
+ * an error */
+ if (currentByte == 255) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
+ inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (lastKey) {
+ crv = prf_update(&context, lastKey, macSize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ /* prf the key first */
+ if (seedValue) {
+ crv = prf_update(&context, seedValue->attrib.pValue,
+ seedValue->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ /* then prf the data */
+ if (params->ulSeedDataLen != 0) {
+ crv = prf_update(&context, params->pSeedData,
+ params->ulSeedDataLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ currentByte++;
+ crv = prf_update(&context, &currentByte, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_final(&context, thisKey, macSize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ lastKey = thisKey;
+ thisKey += macSize;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(outKey, CKA_VALUE, outKeyData, keySize);
+fail:
+ if (outKeyData) {
+ PORT_ZFree(outKeyData, outKeySize);
+ }
+ if (seedValue) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(seedValue);
+ }
+ if (seedKeyObj) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(seedKeyObj);
+ }
+ prf_free(&context);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* sftk_aes_xcbc_new_keys:
+ *
+ * aes xcbc creates 3 new keys from the input key. The first key will be the
+ * base key of the underlying cbc. The sign code hooks directly into encrypt
+ * so we'll have to create a full PKCS #11 key with handle for that key. The
+ * caller needs to delete the key when it's through setting up the context.
+ *
+ * The other two keys will be stored in the sign context until we need them
+ * at the end.
+ */
+CK_RV
+sftk_aes_xcbc_new_keys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey,
+ unsigned char *k2, unsigned char *k3)
+{
+ SFTKObject *key = NULL;
+ SFTKSession *session = NULL;
+ SFTKObject *inKeyObj = NULL;
+ SFTKAttribute *inKeyValue = NULL;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_AES;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_BBOOL ck_true = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+ unsigned char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ if (!slot) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ /* get the session */
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ inKeyObj = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey, session);
+ if (inKeyObj == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ inKeyValue = sftk_FindAttribute(inKeyObj, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (inKeyValue == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_aes_xcbc_get_keys(inKeyValue->attrib.pValue,
+ inKeyValue->attrib.ulValueLen, buf, k2, k3);
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+ */
+ key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN);
+
+ /* Add the class, key_type, and value */
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS, &objclass, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &ck_true, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * finish filling in the key and link it with our global system.
+ */
+ crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ *phKey = key->handle;
+fail:
+ if (session) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ }
+
+ if (inKeyValue) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(inKeyValue);
+ }
+ if (inKeyObj) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(inKeyObj);
+ }
+ if (key) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ }
+ /* clear our CSPs */
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Memset(k2, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ PORT_Memset(k3, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function that tests a single prf test vector
+ */
+static SECStatus
+prf_test(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
+ const unsigned char *inKey, unsigned int inKeyLen,
+ const unsigned char *plainText, unsigned int plainTextLen,
+ const unsigned char *expectedResult, unsigned int expectedResultLen)
+{
+ PRUint8 ike_computed_mac[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ prfContext context;
+ unsigned int macSize;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ crv = prf_setup(&context, mech);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ macSize = prf_length(&context);
+ crv = prf_init(&context, inKey, inKeyLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_update(&context, plainText, plainTextLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_final(&context, ike_computed_mac, macSize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (macSize != expectedResultLen) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (PORT_Memcmp(expectedResult, ike_computed_mac, macSize) != 0) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* only do the alignment if the plaintext is long enough */
+ if (plainTextLen <= macSize) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ /* do it again, but this time tweak with the alignment */
+ crv = prf_init(&context, inKey, inKeyLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_update(&context, plainText, 1);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_update(&context, &plainText[1], macSize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_update(&context, &plainText[1 + macSize], plainTextLen - (macSize + 1));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ crv = prf_final(&context, ike_computed_mac, macSize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (PORT_Memcmp(expectedResult, ike_computed_mac, macSize) != 0) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+fail:
+ prf_free(&context);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS Power up Self Tests for IKE. This is in this function so it
+ * can access the private prf_ functions here. It's called out of fipstest.c
+ */
+SECStatus
+sftk_fips_IKE_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
+{
+ /* PRF known test vectors */
+ static const PRUint8 ike_xcbc_known_key[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_xcbc_known_plain_text[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_xcbc_known_mac[] = {
+ 0xd2, 0xa2, 0x46, 0xfa, 0x34, 0x9b, 0x68, 0xa7,
+ 0x99, 0x98, 0xa4, 0x39, 0x4f, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0x63
+ };
+ /* test 2 uses the same key as test 1 */
+ static const PRUint8 ike_xcbc_known_plain_text_2[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_xcbc_known_mac_2[] = {
+ 0x47, 0xf5, 0x1b, 0x45, 0x64, 0x96, 0x62, 0x15,
+ 0xb8, 0x98, 0x5c, 0x63, 0x05, 0x5e, 0xd3, 0x08
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_xcbc_known_key_3[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09
+ };
+ /* test 3 uses the same plaintest as test 2 */
+ static const PRUint8 ike_xcbc_known_mac_3[] = {
+ 0x0f, 0xa0, 0x87, 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x86, 0x6e, 0x76,
+ 0x53, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x60, 0x2f, 0xdd, 0xe8, 0x35
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_xcbc_known_key_4[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+ 0xed, 0xcb
+ };
+ /* test 4 uses the same plaintest as test 2 */
+ static const PRUint8 ike_xcbc_known_mac_4[] = {
+ 0x8c, 0xd3, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0xe5, 0x98, 0xa9, 0x80,
+ 0x30, 0x06, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x7c, 0x40, 0xe9, 0xe4
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha1_known_key[] = {
+ 0x59, 0x98, 0x2b, 0x5b, 0xa5, 0x7e, 0x62, 0xc0,
+ 0x46, 0x0d, 0xef, 0xc7, 0x1e, 0x18, 0x64, 0x63
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha1_known_plain_text[] = {
+ 0x1c, 0x07, 0x32, 0x1a, 0x9a, 0x7e, 0x41, 0xcd,
+ 0x88, 0x0c, 0xa3, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0x10, 0xc7, 0x3b,
+ 0xf0, 0x0e, 0x7a, 0xe3, 0xcf, 0xc6, 0xfd, 0x8b,
+ 0x51, 0xbc, 0xe2, 0xb9, 0x90, 0xe6, 0xf2, 0x01
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha1_known_mac[] = {
+ 0x0c, 0x2a, 0xf3, 0x42, 0x97, 0x15, 0x62, 0x1d,
+ 0x2a, 0xad, 0xc9, 0x94, 0x5a, 0x90, 0x26, 0xfa,
+ 0xc7, 0x91, 0xe2, 0x4b
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha256_known_key[] = {
+ 0x9d, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x8f, 0x57, 0xf0, 0x39, 0xf9,
+ 0x20, 0x4e, 0x0d, 0xd0, 0xef, 0x04, 0xf3, 0x72
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha256_known_plain_text[] = {
+ 0x33, 0xf1, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x13, 0x4c, 0xbf,
+ 0x1c, 0xab, 0x59, 0x87, 0x7d, 0x42, 0xdb, 0x35,
+ 0x82, 0x22, 0x6e, 0xff, 0x74, 0xdd, 0x37, 0xeb,
+ 0x8b, 0x75, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x64, 0x5f, 0xc1, 0x69
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha256_known_mac[] = {
+ 0x80, 0x4b, 0x4a, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0xc5, 0x93, 0xcf, 0xb6,
+ 0xe4, 0x54, 0x52, 0x41, 0x49, 0x39, 0x6d, 0xe2, 0x34,
+ 0xd0, 0xda, 0xe2, 0x9f, 0x34, 0xa8, 0xfd, 0xb5, 0xf9,
+ 0xaf, 0xe7, 0x6e, 0xa6, 0x52
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha384_known_key[] = {
+ 0xce, 0xc8, 0x9d, 0x84, 0x5a, 0xdd, 0x83, 0xef,
+ 0xce, 0xbd, 0x43, 0xab, 0x71, 0xd1, 0x7d, 0xb9
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha384_known_plain_text[] = {
+ 0x17, 0x24, 0xdb, 0xd8, 0x93, 0x52, 0x37, 0x64,
+ 0xbf, 0xef, 0x8c, 0x6f, 0xa9, 0x27, 0x85, 0x6f,
+ 0xcc, 0xfb, 0x77, 0xae, 0x25, 0x43, 0x58, 0xcc,
+ 0xe2, 0x9c, 0x27, 0x69, 0xa3, 0x29, 0x15, 0xc1
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha384_known_mac[] = {
+ 0x6e, 0x45, 0x14, 0x61, 0x0b, 0xf8, 0x2d, 0x0a,
+ 0xb7, 0xbf, 0x02, 0x60, 0x09, 0x6f, 0x61, 0x46,
+ 0xa1, 0x53, 0xc7, 0x12, 0x07, 0x1a, 0xbb, 0x63,
+ 0x3c, 0xed, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x57, 0x21, 0x56, 0xc7,
+ 0x83, 0xe3, 0x68, 0x74, 0xa6, 0x5a, 0x64, 0x69,
+ 0x0c, 0xa7, 0x01, 0xd4, 0x0d, 0x56, 0xea, 0x18
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha512_known_key[] = {
+ 0xac, 0xad, 0xc6, 0x31, 0x4a, 0x69, 0xcf, 0xcd,
+ 0x4e, 0x4a, 0xd1, 0x77, 0x18, 0xfe, 0xa7, 0xce
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha512_known_plain_text[] = {
+ 0xb1, 0x5a, 0x9c, 0xfc, 0xe8, 0xc8, 0xd7, 0xea,
+ 0xb8, 0x79, 0xd6, 0x24, 0x30, 0x29, 0xd4, 0x01,
+ 0x88, 0xd3, 0xb7, 0x40, 0x87, 0x5a, 0x6a, 0xc6,
+ 0x2f, 0x56, 0xca, 0xc4, 0x37, 0x7e, 0x2e, 0xdd
+ };
+ static const PRUint8 ike_sha512_known_mac[] = {
+ 0xf0, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x36, 0xdf, 0xce, 0x45, 0xa5,
+ 0x58, 0xd4, 0x04, 0x18, 0xde, 0xa9, 0x80, 0x96,
+ 0xe5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x78, 0x41, 0xe3, 0xdb, 0x3d,
+ 0xd9, 0x36, 0x58, 0xd1, 0x18, 0xc3, 0xe8, 0x3b,
+ 0x50, 0x2f, 0x39, 0x8e, 0xcb, 0x13, 0x61, 0xec,
+ 0x77, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0x88, 0x55, 0xef, 0xff, 0x40,
+ 0x7f, 0x6f, 0x77, 0x2e, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb5, 0x8e,
+ 0xb1, 0x13, 0x40, 0x96, 0xe8, 0x47, 0x8d, 0x2b
+ };
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = prf_test(CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC,
+ ike_xcbc_known_key, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_key),
+ ike_xcbc_known_plain_text, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_plain_text),
+ ike_xcbc_known_mac, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_mac));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+ rv = prf_test(CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC,
+ ike_xcbc_known_key, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_key),
+ ike_xcbc_known_plain_text_2, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_plain_text_2),
+ ike_xcbc_known_mac_2, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_mac_2));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+ rv = prf_test(CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC,
+ ike_xcbc_known_key_3, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_key_3),
+ ike_xcbc_known_plain_text_2, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_plain_text_2),
+ ike_xcbc_known_mac_3, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_mac_3));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+ rv = prf_test(CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC,
+ ike_xcbc_known_key_4, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_key_4),
+ ike_xcbc_known_plain_text_2, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_plain_text_2),
+ ike_xcbc_known_mac_4, sizeof(ike_xcbc_known_mac_4));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+ rv = prf_test(CKM_SHA_1_HMAC,
+ ike_sha1_known_key, sizeof(ike_sha1_known_key),
+ ike_sha1_known_plain_text, sizeof(ike_sha1_known_plain_text),
+ ike_sha1_known_mac, sizeof(ike_sha1_known_mac));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+ rv = prf_test(CKM_SHA256_HMAC,
+ ike_sha256_known_key, sizeof(ike_sha256_known_key),
+ ike_sha256_known_plain_text,
+ sizeof(ike_sha256_known_plain_text),
+ ike_sha256_known_mac, sizeof(ike_sha256_known_mac));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+ rv = prf_test(CKM_SHA384_HMAC,
+ ike_sha384_known_key, sizeof(ike_sha384_known_key),
+ ike_sha384_known_plain_text,
+ sizeof(ike_sha384_known_plain_text),
+ ike_sha384_known_mac, sizeof(ike_sha384_known_mac));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+ rv = prf_test(CKM_SHA512_HMAC,
+ ike_sha512_known_key, sizeof(ike_sha512_known_key),
+ ike_sha512_known_plain_text,
+ sizeof(ike_sha512_known_plain_text),
+ ike_sha512_known_mac, sizeof(ike_sha512_known_mac));
+ return rv;
+}
diff --git a/lib/softoken/softoken.gyp b/lib/softoken/softoken.gyp
--- a/lib/softoken/softoken.gyp
+++ b/lib/softoken/softoken.gyp
@@ -53,16 +53,17 @@
'lowpbe.c',
'padbuf.c',
'pkcs11.c',
'pkcs11c.c',
'pkcs11u.c',
'sdb.c',
'sftkdb.c',
'sftkhmac.c',
+ 'sftkike.c',
'sftkpars.c',
'sftkpwd.c',
'softkver.c',
'tlsprf.c'
],
},
},
{
diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
--- a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+++ b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
@@ -147,16 +147,22 @@
#define CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD (CKM_NSS + 2)
/* HKDF key derivation mechanisms. See CK_NSS_HKDFParams for documentation. */
#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 3)
#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 4)
#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 5)
#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 6)
+/* IKE mechanism (to be proposed to PKCS #11 */
+#define CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 7)
+#define CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 8)
+#define CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 9)
+#define CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 10)
+
/* J-PAKE round 1 key generation mechanisms.
*
* Required template attributes: CKA_PRIME, CKA_SUBPRIME, CKA_BASE,
* CKA_NSS_JPAKE_SIGNERID
* Output key type: CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1
* Output key class: CKO_PRIVATE_KEY
* Parameter type: CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params
*
@@ -337,16 +343,82 @@ typedef struct CK_NSS_HKDFParams {
CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt;
CK_ULONG ulSaltLen;
CK_BBOOL bExpand;
CK_BYTE_PTR pInfo;
CK_ULONG ulInfoLen;
} CK_NSS_HKDFParams;
/*
+ * CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to
+ * the CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE mechanism.
+ * The fields of the structure have the following meanings:
+ * prfMechanism underlying MAC mechanism used to generate the prf.
+ * bHasSeedKey hSeed key is present.
+ * hSeedKey optional seed from key
+ * pSeedData optional seed from data.
+ * ulSeedDataLen length of optional seed data.
+ * If no seed data is present this value is NULL.
+ */
+typedef struct CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfMechanism;
+ CK_BBOOL bHasSeedKey;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hSeedKey;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeedData;
+ CK_ULONG ulSeedDataLen;
+} CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+/* CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to
+ * the CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE mechanism.
+ *
+ * The fields of the structure have the following meanings:
+ * prfMechanism underlying MAC mechanism used to generate the prf.
+ * bRekey hNewKey is present.
+ * pNi Ni value
+ * ulNiLen length of Ni
+ * pNr Nr value
+ * ulNrLen length of Nr
+ * hNewKey New key value to drive the rekey.
+ */
+typedef struct CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfMechanism;
+ CK_BBOOL bDataAsKey;
+ CK_BBOOL bRekey;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNi;
+ CK_ULONG ulNiLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNr;
+ CK_ULONG ulNrLen;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hNewKey;
+} CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+/* CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters
+ * to the CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE mechanism.
+ *
+ * The fields of the structure have the following meanings:
+ * prfMechanism underlying MAC mechanism used to generate the prf.
+ * bRekey hNewKey is present.
+ * pCKYi CKYi value
+ * ulCKYiLen length of CKYi
+ * pCKYr CKYr value
+ * ulCKYrLen length of CKYr
+ * hNewKey New key value to drive the rekey.
+ */
+typedef struct CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfMechanism;
+ CK_BBOOL bHasPrevKey;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKeygxy;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrevKey;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pCKYi;
+ CK_ULONG ulCKYiLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pCKYr;
+ CK_ULONG ulCKYrLen;
+ CK_BYTE keyNumber;
+} CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+/*
* Parameter for the TLS extended master secret key derivation mechanisms:
*
* * CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE
* * CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
*
* For the TLS 1.2 PRF, the prfHashMechanism parameter determines the hash
* function used. For earlier versions of the PRF, set the prfHashMechanism
* value to CKM_TLS_PRF.
diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11t.h b/lib/util/pkcs11t.h
--- a/lib/util/pkcs11t.h
+++ b/lib/util/pkcs11t.h
@@ -877,16 +877,18 @@ typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084
#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085
/* new for v2.20 amendment 3 */
#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086
/* new for v2.30 */
#define CKM_AES_GCM 0x00001087
#define CKM_AES_CCM 0x00001088
#define CKM_AES_CTS 0x00001089
+#define CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC 0x0000108C
+#define CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96 0x0000108D
/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090
#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091
#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092
#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093
/* Camellia is proposed for v2.20 Amendment 3 */
diff --git a/tests/common/init.sh b/tests/common/init.sh
--- a/tests/common/init.sh
+++ b/tests/common/init.sh
@@ -646,18 +646,21 @@ if [ -z "${INIT_SOURCED}" -o "${INIT_SOU
TOTAL_CRL_RANGE=`expr ${CRL_GRP_1_RANGE} + ${CRL_GRP_2_RANGE} + \
${CRL_GRP_3_RANGE}`
TOTAL_GRP_NUM=3
RELOAD_CRL=1
- NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"
- export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE
+ # if test mode isn't set, test scripts default to expecting dbm
+ if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "" ]; then
+ NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"
+ export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE
+ fi
MSG_ID=0
#################################################
# Interoperability testing constatnts
#
# if suite is setup for testing, IOPR_HOSTADDR_LIST should have
# at least one host name(FQDN)
diff --git a/tests/fips/fips.sh b/tests/fips/fips.sh
--- a/tests/fips/fips.sh
+++ b/tests/fips/fips.sh
@@ -40,27 +40,31 @@ fips_init()
SCRIPTNAME=fips.sh
html_head "FIPS 140 Compliance Tests"
grep "SUCCESS: FIPS passed" $CERT_LOG_FILE >/dev/null || {
Exit 15 "Fatal - FIPS of cert.sh needs to pass first"
}
COPYDIR=${FIPSDIR}/copydir
+ CAVSDIR=${FIPSDIR}/cavs/tests
+ CAVSRUNDIR=${FIPSDIR}/cavs/scripts
R_FIPSDIR=../fips
P_R_FIPSDIR=../fips
R_COPYDIR=../fips/copydir
if [ -n "${MULTIACCESS_DBM}" ]; then
P_R_FIPSDIR="multiaccess:${D_FIPS}"
fi
mkdir -p ${FIPSDIR}
mkdir -p ${COPYDIR}
+ mkdir -p ${CAVSDIR}
+ mkdir -p ${CAVSRUNDIR}
cd ${FIPSDIR}
}
############################## fips_140 ##############################
# local shell function to test basic functionality of NSS while in
# FIPS 140 compliant mode
########################################################################
@@ -269,25 +273,51 @@ fips_140()
fi
html_msg ${RESULT} 46 "Init NSS with a corrupted library (dbtest -r)" "."
else
html_failed "Mangle ${DLL_PREFIX}softokn3.${DLL_SUFFIX}"
fi
}
+fips_cavs()
+{
+ if [ "${CAVS_VECTORS}" = "all" ]; then
+ VECTORS=
+ elif [ "${CAVS_VECTORS}" = "" ]; then
+ VECTORS="aesgcm ecdsa hmac kas tls ike rng sha"
+ else
+ VECTORS=${CAVS_VECTORS}
+ fi
+ echo "Copying CAVS vectors"
+ cp -r ${QADIR}/fips/cavs_samples/* ${CAVSDIR}
+# we copy the scripts to the test directory because they are designed to run from their
+# own directory and we want any resulting core dumps to wind up in the test_results directory.
+ echo "Copying CAVS scripts"
+ cp -r ${QADIR}/fips/cavs_scripts/* ${CAVSRUNDIR}
+ echo "cd ${CAVSRUNDIR}"
+ cd ${CAVSRUNDIR}
+ echo "Running CAVS tests in ${CAVSDIR}"
+ ./runtest.sh ${CAVSDIR} run ${VECTORS}
+ echo "Verifying CAVS results in ${CAVSDIR}"
+ ./runtest.sh ${CAVSDIR} verify ${VECTORS}
+ RESULT=$?
+ html_msg $RESULT 0 "NIST CAVS test" "${CAVSDIR}"
+}
+
############################## fips_cleanup ############################
# local shell function to finish this script (no exit since it might be
# sourced)
########################################################################
fips_cleanup()
{
html "</TABLE><BR>"
cd ${QADIR}
. common/cleanup.sh
}
################## main #################################################
fips_init
fips_140
+fips_cavs
fips_cleanup
echo "fips.sh done"
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink