rpms
/
nss
7
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity
nss/SOURCES/nss-3.79-fips-review.patches

498 lines
22 KiB
Plaintext
Raw Permalink Blame History

diff -up ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review ./lib/freebl/dh.c
--- ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/dh.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.453233170 -0700
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ cleanup:
PRBool
KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, SECItem *subPrime)
{
- mp_int p, q, y, r;
+ mp_int p, q, y, r, psub1;
mp_err err;
int cmp = 1; /* default is false */
if (!Y || !prime || !subPrime) {
@@ -456,13 +456,30 @@ KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, S
MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&y) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
+ MP_DIGITS(&psub1) = 0;
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&y));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&psub1));
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*prime, &p);
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*subPrime, &q);
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*Y, &y);
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&p, 1, &psub1));
+ /*
+ * We check that the public value isn't zero (which isn't in the
+ * group), one (subgroup of order one) or p-1 (subgroup of order 2). We
+ * also check that the public value is less than p, to avoid being fooled
+ * by values like p+1 or 2*p-1.
+ * This check is required by SP-800-56Ar3. It's also done in derive,
+ * but this is only called in various FIPS cases, so put it here to help
+ * reviewers find it.
+ */
+ if (mp_cmp_d(&y, 1) <= 0 ||
+ mp_cmp(&y, &psub1) >= 0) {
+ err = MP_BADARG;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
/* compute r = y**q mod p */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&y, &q, &p, &r));
/* compare to 1 */
@@ -472,6 +489,7 @@ cleanup:
mp_clear(&q);
mp_clear(&y);
mp_clear(&r);
+ mp_clear(&psub1);
if (err) {
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
return PR_FALSE;
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review 2023-06-12 15:29:04.096403884 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
@@ -4785,6 +4785,10 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
* handle the base object stuff
*/
crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+ /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
+ * key length against fips requirements */
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
@@ -4792,9 +4796,6 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
- /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
- * fips requirements */
- key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
*phKey = key->handle;
}
@@ -5098,60 +5099,67 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
if (isDerivable) {
SFTKAttribute *pubAttribute = NULL;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKey;
PRBool isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
- CK_RV crv2;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
- CK_KEY_TYPE generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
- CK_ULONG keyLen = 128;
- CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
- { CKA_CLASS, &secret, sizeof(secret) },
- { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &generic, sizeof(generic) },
- { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) },
- { CKA_DERIVE, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue) }
- };
- CK_ULONG templateCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template);
- CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS ecParams;
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lowPrivKey = NULL;
+ ECPrivateKey *ecPriv;
+ SECItem *lowPubValue = NULL;
+ SECItem item;
+ SECStatus rv;
crv = CKR_OK; /*paranoia, already get's set before we drop to the end */
- /* FIPS 140-2 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key.
- * The easiest way to do this is to do a derive operation, which checks
- * the validity of the key */
-
+ /* FIPS 140-3 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key
+ * by recalculating the public can an compare it to our own public
+ * key. */
+ lowPrivKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(privateKey, keyType, &crv);
+ if (lowPrivKey == NULL) {
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ }
+ /* recalculate the public key from the private key */
switch (keyType) {
- case CKK_DH:
- mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
- pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
- if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
- }
- mech.pParameter = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
- mech.ulParameterLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
- break;
- case CKK_EC:
- mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
- pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
- if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
- }
- ecParams.kdf = CKD_NULL;
- ecParams.ulSharedDataLen = 0;
- ecParams.pSharedData = NULL;
- ecParams.ulPublicDataLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
- ecParams.pPublicData = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
- mech.pParameter = &ecParams;
- mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ecParams);
- break;
- default:
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ case CKK_DH:
+ rv = DH_Derive(&lowPrivKey->u.dh.base, &lowPrivKey->u.dh.prime,
+ &lowPrivKey->u.dh.privateValue, &item, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&item);
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&item, PR_FALSE);
+ pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
+ break;
+ case CKK_EC:
+ rv = EC_NewKeyFromSeed(&lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPriv,
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.data,
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ /* make sure it has the same encoding */
+ if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
+ lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
+ } else {
+ lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));;
+ }
+ pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
+ /* clear out our generated private key */
+ PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
-
- crv = NSC_DeriveKey(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle, template, templateCount, &newKey);
- if (crv != CKR_OK) {
- sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
- return crv;
+ /* now compare new public key with our already generated key */
+ if ((pubAttribute == NULL) || (lowPubValue == NULL) ||
+ (pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen != lowPubValue->len) ||
+ (PORT_Memcmp(pubAttribute->attrib.pValue, lowPubValue->data,
+ lowPubValue->len) != 0)) {
+ if (pubAttribute) sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
+ if (lowPubValue) SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
+
/* FIPS requires full validation, but in fipx mode NSC_Derive
* only does partial validation with approved primes, now handle
* full validation */
@@ -5159,44 +5167,78 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
SECItem pubKey;
SECItem prime;
SECItem subPrime;
+ SECItem base;
+ SECItem generator;
const SECItem *subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
pubKey.data = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
pubKey.len = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
- prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
- prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
+ base.data = prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
+ base.len = prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto done;
}
- crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &base, privateKey, CKA_BASE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto done;
+ }
/* we ignore the return code an only look at the length */
- if (subPrime.len == 0) {
- /* subprime not supplied, In this case look it up.
- * This only works with approved primes, but in FIPS mode
- * that's the only kine of prime that will get here */
- subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, isFIPS);
- if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
- crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ /* do we have a known prime ? */
+ subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, &generator, isFIPS);
+ if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
+ if (subPrime.len == 0) {
+ /* if not a known prime, subprime must be supplied */
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ /* not a known prime, check for primality of prime
+ * and subPrime */
+ if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&prime)) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&subPrime)) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* if we aren't using a defined group, make sure base is in the
+ * subgroup. If it's not, then our key could fail or succeed sometimes.
+ * This makes the failure reliable */
+ if (!KEA_Verify(&base, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+ subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
+ } else {
+ /* we're using a known group, make sure we are using the known generator for that group */
+ if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&generator, &base) != 0) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
goto done;
}
+ if (subPrime.len != 0) {
+ /* we have a known prime and a supplied subPrime,
+ * make sure the subPrime matches the subPrime for
+ * the known Prime */
+ if (SECITEM_CompareItem(subPrimePtr, &subPrime) != 0) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
}
if (!KEA_Verify(&pubKey, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
- crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
}
done:
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&base, PR_FALSE);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&subPrime, PR_FALSE);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&prime, PR_FALSE);
}
/* clean up before we return */
sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
- crv2 = NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, newKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
return crv;
}
- if (crv2 != CKR_OK) {
- return crv2;
- }
}
return CKR_OK;
@@ -5714,8 +5756,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
* created and linked.
*/
crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
- sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
@@ -5757,6 +5799,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
@@ -5766,6 +5809,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
/* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
@@ -8386,7 +8431,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
/* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
* checks. */
- subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, isFIPS);
+ subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, NULL, isFIPS);
if (subPrime == NULL) {
SECItem dhSubPrime;
/* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
@@ -8568,6 +8613,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
secretlen = tmp.len;
} else {
secretlen = keySize;
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
&tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.fips-review 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
@@ -4625,7 +4625,10 @@ NSC_CreateObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSess
if (object == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
- object->isFIPS = PR_FALSE; /* if we created the object on the fly,
+ /* object types that we aren't allowed to create in FIPS mode are
+ * already rejected explicitly. If we get here, then the object is
+ * FIPS OK (most notably public key objects )*/
+ /* object->isFIPS = PR_FALSE; if we created the object on the fly,
* it's not a FIPS object */
/*
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review 2023-06-12 15:29:04.097403894 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h 2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
/* dh verify functions */
/* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes, and if so return
* it's subprime value */
-const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS);
+const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *generator, PRBool isFIPS);
/* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
/* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review 2023-06-12 15:29:04.097403894 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
@@ -2403,15 +2403,27 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
switch (mechInfo->special) {
case SFTKFIPSDH: {
SECItem dhPrime;
+ SECItem dhBase;
+ SECItem dhGenerator;
+ PRBool val = PR_FALSE;
const SECItem *dhSubPrime;
CK_RV crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime,
source, CKA_PRIME);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
- dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, PR_TRUE);
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhBase, source, CKA_BASE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, &dhGenerator, PR_TRUE);
+ val = (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+ if (val && (SECITEM_CompareItem(&dhBase, &dhGenerator) != 0)) {
+ val = PR_FALSE;
+ }
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
- return (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhBase, PR_FALSE);
+ return val;
}
case SFTKFIPSNone:
return PR_FALSE;
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.455233191 -0700
@@ -6726,11 +6726,20 @@ static const SECItem subprime_tls_8192 =
(unsigned char *)subprime_tls_8192_data,
sizeof(subprime_tls_8192_data) };
+/* generator for all the groups is 2 */
+static const unsigned char generator_2_data[] = { 2 };
+
+
+static const SECItem generator_2 =
+ { siBuffer,
+ (unsigned char *)generator_2_data,
+ sizeof(generator_2_data) };
+
/*
* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes
*/
const SECItem *
-sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS)
+sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *g, PRBool isFIPS)
{
/* use the length to decide which primes to check */
switch (dhPrime->len) {
@@ -6741,56 +6750,67 @@ sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PR
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_1536,
sizeof(prime_ike_1536)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_1536;
}
break;
case 2048 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_2048,
sizeof(prime_tls_2048)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_tls_2048;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_2048,
sizeof(prime_ike_2048)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_2048;
}
break;
case 3072 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_3072,
sizeof(prime_tls_3072)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_tls_3072;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_3072,
sizeof(prime_ike_3072)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_3072;
}
break;
case 4096 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_4096,
sizeof(prime_tls_4096)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_tls_4096;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_4096,
sizeof(prime_ike_4096)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_4096;
}
break;
case 6144 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_6144,
sizeof(prime_tls_6144)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_tls_6144;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_6144,
sizeof(prime_ike_6144)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_6144;
}
break;
case 8192 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_8192,
sizeof(prime_tls_8192)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_tls_8192;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_8192,
sizeof(prime_ike_8192)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_8192;
}
break;
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.455233191 -0700
@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
goto fail;
}
} else {
+ /* ikev1 isn't validated, if we use this function in ikev1 mode,
+ * mark the resulting key as not FIPS */
+ if (!params->bRekey) {
+ outKey->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink