# HG changeset patch # User Daiki Ueno # Date 1603691171 -3600 # Mon Oct 26 06:46:11 2020 +0100 # Node ID b03a4fc5b902498414b02640dcb2717dfef9682f # Parent 6f79a76958129dc09c353c288f115fd9a51ab7d4 Bug 1672703, always tolerate the first CCS in TLS 1.3, r=mt Summary: This flips the meaning of the flag for checking excessive CCS messages, so it only rejects multiple CCS messages while the first CCS message is always accepted. Reviewers: mt Reviewed By: mt Bug #: 1672703 Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D94603 diff -r 6f79a7695812 -r b03a4fc5b902 gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc --- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc Fri Oct 23 16:14:36 2020 -0700 +++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc Mon Oct 26 06:46:11 2020 +0100 @@ -348,8 +348,8 @@ client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT); } -// The server rejects a ChangeCipherSpec if the client advertises an -// empty session ID. +// The server accepts a ChangeCipherSpec even if the client advertises +// an empty session ID. TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCipherSpecAfterClientHelloEmptySid) { EnsureTlsSetup(); ConfigureVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); @@ -358,9 +358,8 @@ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello client_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs))); // Send CCS - server_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage); - server_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS - server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + Handshake(); + CheckConnected(); } // The server rejects multiple ChangeCipherSpec even if the client @@ -381,7 +380,7 @@ server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); } -// The client rejects a ChangeCipherSpec if it advertises an empty +// The client accepts a ChangeCipherSpec even if it advertises an empty // session ID. TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCipherSpecAfterServerHelloEmptySid) { EnsureTlsSetup(); @@ -398,9 +397,10 @@ // send ServerHello..CertificateVerify // Send CCS server_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs))); - client_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage); - client_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS - client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + + // No alert is sent from the client. As Finished is dropped, we + // can't use Handshake() and CheckConnected(). + client_->Handshake(); } // The client rejects multiple ChangeCipherSpec in a row even if the diff -r 6f79a7695812 -r b03a4fc5b902 lib/ssl/ssl3con.c --- a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c Fri Oct 23 16:14:36 2020 -0700 +++ b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c Mon Oct 26 06:46:11 2020 +0100 @@ -6645,11 +6645,7 @@ /* TLS 1.3: We sent a session ID. The server's should match. */ if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && (sentRealSid || sentFakeSid)) { - if (sidMatch) { - ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_TRUE; - return PR_TRUE; - } - return PR_FALSE; + return sidMatch; } /* TLS 1.3 (no SID)/DTLS 1.3: The server shouldn't send a session ID. */ @@ -8696,7 +8692,6 @@ errCode = PORT_GetError(); goto alert_loser; } - ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_TRUE; } /* TLS 1.3 requires that compression include only null. */ @@ -13066,15 +13061,14 @@ ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake && cText->buf->len == 1 && cText->buf->buf[0] == change_cipher_spec_choice) { - if (ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs) { - /* Ignore the first CCS. */ - ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_FALSE; + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.rejectCcs) { + /* Allow only the first CCS. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.rejectCcs = PR_TRUE; return SECSuccess; - } - - /* Compatibility mode is not negotiated. */ - alert = unexpected_message; - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + } else { + alert = unexpected_message; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + } } if ((IS_DTLS(ss) && !dtls13_AeadLimitReached(spec)) || diff -r 6f79a7695812 -r b03a4fc5b902 lib/ssl/sslimpl.h --- a/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h Fri Oct 23 16:14:36 2020 -0700 +++ b/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h Mon Oct 26 06:46:11 2020 +0100 @@ -710,10 +710,7 @@ * or received. */ PRBool receivedCcs; /* A server received ChangeCipherSpec * before the handshake started. */ - PRBool allowCcs; /* A server allows ChangeCipherSpec - * as the middlebox compatibility mode - * is explicitly indicarted by - * legacy_session_id in TLS 1.3 ClientHello. */ + PRBool rejectCcs; /* Excessive ChangeCipherSpecs are rejected. */ PRBool clientCertRequested; /* True if CertificateRequest received. */ PRBool endOfFlight; /* Processed a full flight (DTLS 1.3). */ ssl3KEADef kea_def_mutable; /* Used to hold the writable kea_def