.gitignore

@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
+SOURCES/NameConstraints_Certs.tar
+SOURCES/blank-cert8.db
 SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
+SOURCES/blank-key3.db
 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
-SOURCES/nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
 SOURCES/nss-3.90.tar.gz

.nss.metadata

@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
+39ad4988f85b50fdc3569d21b6c885cf9eb390b0 SOURCES/NameConstraints_Certs.tar
+d272a7b58364862613d44261c5744f7a336bf177 SOURCES/blank-cert8.db
 b5570125fbf6bfb410705706af48217a0817c03a SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
+7f78b5bcecdb5005e7b803604b2ec9d1a9df2fb5 SOURCES/blank-key3.db
 f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
-71267859a581d61fea8d7d36c25f716750271cac SOURCES/nspr-4.35.tar.gz
+bd748cf6e1465a1bbe6e751b72ffc0076aff0b50 SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
 1e7d2f16655281cfb2972688af1605e0de302481 SOURCES/nss-3.90.tar.gz

SOURCES/blinding_ct.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,949 @@
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
+--- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
++++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
+@@ -199,16 +199,19 @@ void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d(const mp_d
+ void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len,
+                                   mp_digit b, mp_digit *c);
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+ void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add_prop(const mp_digit *a,
+                                        mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
+                                        mp_digit *c);
++void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(const mp_digit *a,
++                                       mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
++                                       mp_digit *c, mp_size c_len);
+ void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_sqr_add_prop(const mp_digit *a,
+                                      mp_size a_len,
+                                      mp_digit *sqrs);
+ 
+ mp_err MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_div_2dx1d(mp_digit Nhi, mp_digit Nlo,
+                                     mp_digit divisor, mp_digit *quot, mp_digit *rem);
+ 
+ /* c += a * b * (MP_RADIX ** offset);  */
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
+--- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
++++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
+@@ -5,16 +5,18 @@
+  *
+  * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+ 
+ #include "mpi-priv.h"
+ #include "mplogic.h"
+ 
++#include <assert.h>
++
+ #if defined(__arm__) && \
+     ((defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__)) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_3__))
+ /* 16-bit thumb or ARM v3 doesn't work inlined assember version */
+ #undef MP_ASSEMBLY_MULTIPLY
+ #undef MP_ASSEMBLY_SQUARE
+ #endif
+ 
+ #if MP_LOGTAB
+@@ -797,25 +799,28 @@ mp_sub(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b,
+ 
+ CLEANUP:
+     return res;
+ 
+ } /* end mp_sub() */
+ 
+ /* }}} */
+ 
+-/* {{{ mp_mul(a, b, c) */
++/* {{{ s_mp_mulg(a, b, c) */
+ 
+ /*
+-  mp_mul(a, b, c)
+-
+-  Compute c = a * b.  All parameters may be identical.
++  s_mp_mulg(a, b, c)
++
++  Compute c = a * b.  All parameters may be identical. if constantTime is set,
++  then the operations are done in constant time. The original is mostly
++  constant time as long as s_mpv_mul_d_add() is constant time. This is true
++  of the x86 assembler, as well as the current c code.
+  */
+ mp_err
+-mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c)
++s_mp_mulg(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c, int constantTime)
+ {
+     mp_digit *pb;
+     mp_int tmp;
+     mp_err res;
+     mp_size ib;
+     mp_size useda, usedb;
+ 
+     ARGCHK(a != NULL && b != NULL && c != NULL, MP_BADARG);
+@@ -841,17 +846,24 @@ mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b,
+     }
+ 
+     MP_USED(c) = 1;
+     MP_DIGIT(c, 0) = 0;
+     if ((res = s_mp_pad(c, USED(a) + USED(b))) != MP_OKAY)
+         goto CLEANUP;
+ 
+ #ifdef NSS_USE_COMBA
+-    if ((MP_USED(a) == MP_USED(b)) && IS_POWER_OF_2(MP_USED(b))) {
++    /* comba isn't constant time because it clamps! If we cared
++     * (we needed a constant time version of multiply that was 'faster'
++     * we could easily pass constantTime down to the comba code and
++     * get it to skip the clamp... but here are assembler versions
++     * which add comba to platforms that can't compile the normal
++     * comba's imbedded assembler which would also need to change, so
++     * for now we just skip comba when we are running constant time. */
++    if (!constantTime && (MP_USED(a) == MP_USED(b)) && IS_POWER_OF_2(MP_USED(b))) {
+         if (MP_USED(a) == 4) {
+             s_mp_mul_comba_4(a, b, c);
+             goto CLEANUP;
+         }
+         if (MP_USED(a) == 8) {
+             s_mp_mul_comba_8(a, b, c);
+             goto CLEANUP;
+         }
+@@ -871,36 +883,82 @@ mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b,
+ 
+     /* Outer loop:  Digits of b */
+     useda = MP_USED(a);
+     usedb = MP_USED(b);
+     for (ib = 1; ib < usedb; ib++) {
+         mp_digit b_i = *pb++;
+ 
+         /* Inner product:  Digits of a */
+-        if (b_i)
++        if (constantTime || b_i)
+             s_mpv_mul_d_add(MP_DIGITS(a), useda, b_i, MP_DIGITS(c) + ib);
+         else
+             MP_DIGIT(c, ib + useda) = b_i;
+     }
+ 
+-    s_mp_clamp(c);
++    if (!constantTime) {
++        s_mp_clamp(c);
++    }
+ 
+     if (SIGN(a) == SIGN(b) || s_mp_cmp_d(c, 0) == MP_EQ)
+         SIGN(c) = ZPOS;
+     else
+         SIGN(c) = NEG;
+ 
+ CLEANUP:
+     mp_clear(&tmp);
+     return res;
++} /* end smp_mulg() */
++
++/* }}} */
++
++/* {{{ mp_mul(a, b, c) */
++
++/*
++  mp_mul(a, b, c)
++
++  Compute c = a * b.  All parameters may be identical.
++ */
++
++mp_err
++mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c)
++{
++    return s_mp_mulg(a, b, c, 0);
+ } /* end mp_mul() */
+ 
+ /* }}} */
+ 
++/* {{{ mp_mulCT(a, b, c) */
++
++/*
++  mp_mulCT(a, b, c)
++
++  Compute c = a * b. In constant time. Parameters may not be identical.
++  NOTE: a and b may be modified.
++ */
++
++mp_err
++mp_mulCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_size setSize)
++{
++    mp_err res;
++
++    /* make the multiply values fixed length so multiply
++     * doesn't leak the length. at this point all the
++     * values are blinded, but once we finish we want the
++     * output size to be hidden (so no clamping the out put) */
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(a, setSize));
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(b, setSize));
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(c, 2*setSize));
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_mulg(a, b, c, 1));
++CLEANUP:
++    return res;
++} /* end mp_mulCT() */
++
++/* }}} */
++
+ /* {{{ mp_sqr(a, sqr) */
+ 
+ #if MP_SQUARE
+ /*
+   Computes the square of a.  This can be done more
+   efficiently than a general multiplication, because many of the
+   computation steps are redundant when squaring.  The inner product
+   step is a bit more complicated, but we save a fair number of
+@@ -1263,16 +1321,174 @@ mp_mod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m,
+     }
+ 
+     return MP_OKAY;
+ 
+ } /* end mp_mod() */
+ 
+ /* }}} */
+ 
++/* {{{ s_mp_subCT_d(a, b, borrow, c) */
++
++/*
++  s_mp_subCT_d(a, b, borrow, c)
++
++  Compute c = (a -b) - subtract in constant time. returns borrow
++ */
++mp_digit
++s_mp_subCT_d(mp_digit a, mp_digit b, mp_digit borrow, mp_digit *ret) {
++    mp_digit borrow1, borrow2, t;
++#ifdef MP_COMPILER_USES_CARRY
++    /* while it doesn't look constant-time, this is idiomatic code
++     * to tell compilers to use the carry bit from subtraction */
++    t = a - borrow;
++    if (t > a) {
++        borrow1 = 1;
++    } else {
++        borrow1 = 0;
++    }
++    *ret = t - b;
++    if (*ret > t) {
++        borrow2 = 1;
++    } else {
++        borrow2 = 0;
++    }
++#else
++    mp_digit bitr, bitb, nbitt;
++    /* this is constant time independent of compilier */
++    t = a - borrow;
++    borrow1 = ((~a) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1)) & ((t) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1));
++    *ret = t - b;
++    bitb = b >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1);
++    bitr = *ret >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1);
++    nbitt = (~t) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1);
++    borrow2  = (nbitt & bitb) | (bitb & bitr) | (nbitt & bitr);
++#endif
++    /* only borrow 1 or borrow 2 should be 1, we want to guarrentee
++     * the overall borrow is 1, so use | here */
++    return borrow1 | borrow2;
++} /*  s_mp_subCT_d() */
++
++/* }}} */
++
++/* {{{ mp_subCT(a, b, ret, borrow) */
++
++/* return ret= a - b and borrow in borrow. done in constant time.
++ * b could be modified.
++ */
++mp_err
++mp_subCT(const mp_int *a,  mp_int *b, mp_int *ret, mp_digit *borrow)
++{
++    mp_size used_a = MP_USED(a);
++    mp_size i;
++    mp_err res;
++
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(b, used_a));
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(ret, used_a));
++    *borrow = 0;
++    for (i=0; i < used_a; i++) {
++        *borrow = s_mp_subCT_d(MP_DIGIT(a,i), MP_DIGIT(b,i), *borrow,
++                               &MP_DIGIT(ret,i));
++    }
++
++    res = MP_OKAY;
++CLEANUP:
++    return res;
++} /*  end mp_subCT() */
++
++/* }}} */
++
++/* {{{ mp_selectCT(cond, a, b, ret) */
++
++/*
++ * return ret= cond ? a : b; cond should be either 0 or 1
++ */
++mp_err
++mp_selectCT(mp_digit cond, const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *ret)
++{
++    mp_size used_a = MP_USED(a);
++    mp_err res;
++    mp_size i;
++
++    cond *= MP_DIGIT_MAX;
++
++    /* we currently require these to be equal on input,
++     * we could use pad to extend one of them, but that might
++     * leak data as it wouldn't be constant time */
++    assert(used_a == MP_USED(b));
++
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(ret, used_a));
++    for (i=0; i < used_a; i++) {
++        MP_DIGIT(ret,i) = (MP_DIGIT(a,i)&cond) | (MP_DIGIT(b,i)&~cond);
++    }
++    res = MP_OKAY;
++CLEANUP:
++    return res;
++} /* end mp_selectCT() */
++
++
++/* {{{ mp_reduceCT(a, m, c) */
++
++/*
++  mp_reduceCT(a, m, c)
++
++  Compute c = aR^-1 (mod m) in constant time.
++   input should be in montgomery form. If input is the
++   result of a montgomery multiply then out put will be
++   in mongomery form.
++   Result will be reduced to MP_USED(m), but not be
++   clamped.
++ */
++
++mp_err
++mp_reduceCT(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *c)
++{
++    mp_size used_m = MP_USED(m);
++    mp_size used_c = used_m*2+1;
++    mp_digit *m_digits, *c_digits;
++    mp_size i;
++    mp_digit borrow, carry;
++    mp_err res;
++    mp_int sub;
++
++    MP_DIGITS(&sub) = 0;
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&sub,used_m));
++
++    if (a != c) {
++        MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(a, c));
++    }
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(c, used_c));
++    m_digits = MP_DIGITS(m);
++    c_digits = MP_DIGITS(c);
++    for (i=0; i < used_m; i++) {
++        mp_digit m_i = MP_DIGIT(c,i)*n0i;
++        s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(m_digits, used_m,  m_i, c_digits++, used_c--);
++    }
++    s_mp_rshd(c, used_m);
++    /* MP_USED(c) should be used_m+1 with the high word being any carry
++     * from the previous multiply, save that carry and drop the high
++     * word for the substraction below */
++    carry = MP_DIGIT(c,used_m);
++    MP_DIGIT(c,used_m) = 0;
++    MP_USED(c) = used_m;
++    /* mp_subCT wants c and m to be the same size, we've already
++     * guarrenteed that in the previous statement, so mp_subCT won't actually
++     * modify m, so it's safe to recast */
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_subCT(c, (mp_int *)m, &sub, &borrow));
++
++    /* we return c-m if c >= m no borrow or there was a borrow and a carry */
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_selectCT(borrow ^ carry, c, &sub, c));
++    res = MP_OKAY;
++CLEANUP:
++    mp_clear(&sub);
++    return res;
++}  /* end mp_reduceCT() */
++
++/* }}} */
++
+ /* {{{ mp_mod_d(a, d, c) */
+ 
+ /*
+   mp_mod_d(a, d, c)
+ 
+   Compute c = a (mod d).  Result will always be 0 <= c < d
+  */
+ mp_err
+@@ -1379,16 +1595,47 @@ mp_mulmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int 
+     if ((res = mp_mod(c, m, c)) != MP_OKAY)
+         return res;
+ 
+     return MP_OKAY;
+ }
+ 
+ /* }}} */
+ 
++/* {{{ mp_mulmontmodCT(a, b, m, c) */
++
++/*
++  mp_mulmontmodCT(a, b, m, c)
++
++  Compute c = (a * b) mod m in constant time wrt a and b. either a or b
++  should be in montgomery form and the output is native. If both a and b
++  are in montgomery form, then the output will also be in montgomery form
++  and can be recovered with an mp_reduceCT call.
++  NOTE: a and b may be modified.
++ */
++
++mp_err
++mp_mulmontmodCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i,
++                mp_int *c)
++{
++    mp_err res;
++
++    ARGCHK(a != NULL && b != NULL && m != NULL && c != NULL, MP_BADARG);
++
++    if ((res = mp_mulCT(a, b, c, MP_USED(m))) != MP_OKAY)
++        return res;
++
++    if ((res = mp_reduceCT(c, m, n0i, c)) != MP_OKAY)
++        return res;
++
++    return MP_OKAY;
++}
++
++/* }}} */
++
+ /* {{{ mp_sqrmod(a, m, c) */
+ 
+ #if MP_SQUARE
+ mp_err
+ mp_sqrmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c)
+ {
+     mp_err res;
+ 
+@@ -3936,25 +4183,73 @@ s_mp_mul(mp_int *a, const mp_int *b)
+     {                                                              \
+         mp_digit a0b1, a1b0;                                       \
+         Plo = (a & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX) * (b & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX);   \
+         Phi = (a >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT) * (b >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT); \
+         a0b1 = (a & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX) * (b >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT); \
+         a1b0 = (a >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT) * (b & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX); \
+         a1b0 += a0b1;                                              \
+         Phi += a1b0 >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT;                          \
+-        if (a1b0 < a0b1)                                           \
+-            Phi += MP_HALF_RADIX;                                  \
++        Phi += (MP_CT_LTU(a1b0, a0b1)) << MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT;     \
+         a1b0 <<= MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT;                                \
+         Plo += a1b0;                                               \
+-        if (Plo < a1b0)                                            \
+-            ++Phi;                                                 \
++        Phi += MP_CT_LTU(Plo, a1b0);                                          \
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
++/* Constant time version of s_mpv_mul_d_add_prop.
++ * Presently, this is only used by the Constant time Montgomery arithmetic code. */
++/* c += a * b */
++void
++s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
++                       mp_digit *c, mp_size c_len)
++{
++#if !defined(MP_NO_MP_WORD) && !defined(MP_NO_MUL_WORD)
++    mp_digit d = 0;
++
++    c_len -= a_len;
++    /* Inner product:  Digits of a */
++    while (a_len--) {
++        mp_word w = ((mp_word)b * *a++) + *c + d;
++        *c++ = ACCUM(w);
++        d = CARRYOUT(w);
++    }
++
++    /* propagate the carry to the end, even if carry is zero */
++    while (c_len--) {
++        mp_word w = (mp_word)*c + d;
++        *c++ = ACCUM(w);
++        d = CARRYOUT(w);
++    }
++#else
++    mp_digit carry = 0;
++    c_len -= a_len;
++    while (a_len--) {
++        mp_digit a_i = *a++;
++        mp_digit a0b0, a1b1;
++        MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
++
++        a0b0 += carry;
++        a1b1 += MP_CT_LTU(a0b0, carry);
++        a0b0 += a_i = *c;
++        a1b1 += MP_CT_LTU(a0b0, a_i);
++
++        *c++ = a0b0;
++        carry = a1b1;
++    }
++    /* propagate the carry to the end, even if carry is zero */
++    while (c_len--) {
++        mp_digit c_i = *c;
++        carry += c_i;
++        *c++ = carry;
++        carry = MP_CT_LTU(carry, c_i);
++    }
++#endif
++}
++
+ #if !defined(MP_ASSEMBLY_MULTIPLY)
+ /* c = a * b */
+ void
+ s_mpv_mul_d(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len, mp_digit b, mp_digit *c)
+ {
+ #if !defined(MP_NO_MP_WORD) && !defined(MP_NO_MUL_WORD)
+     mp_digit d = 0;
+ 
+@@ -3969,18 +4264,17 @@ s_mpv_mul_d(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a
+     mp_digit carry = 0;
+     while (a_len--) {
+         mp_digit a_i = *a++;
+         mp_digit a0b0, a1b1;
+ 
+         MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
+ 
+         a0b0 += carry;
+-        if (a0b0 < carry)
+-            ++a1b1;
++        a1b1 += a0b0 < carry;
+         *c++ = a0b0;
+         carry = a1b1;
+     }
+     *c = carry;
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+ /* c += a * b */
+@@ -4002,21 +4296,19 @@ s_mpv_mul_d_add(const mp_digit *a, mp_si
+     mp_digit carry = 0;
+     while (a_len--) {
+         mp_digit a_i = *a++;
+         mp_digit a0b0, a1b1;
+ 
+         MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
+ 
+         a0b0 += carry;
+-        if (a0b0 < carry)
+-            ++a1b1;
++        a1b1 += (a0b0 < carry);
+         a0b0 += a_i = *c;
+-        if (a0b0 < a_i)
+-            ++a1b1;
++        a1b1 += (a0b0 < a_i);
+         *c++ = a0b0;
+         carry = a1b1;
+     }
+     *c = carry;
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+ /* Presently, this is only used by the Montgomery arithmetic code. */
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
+--- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
++++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
+@@ -145,16 +145,54 @@ typedef int mp_sword;
+ #define MP_USED(MP) ((MP)->used)
+ #define MP_ALLOC(MP) ((MP)->alloc)
+ #define MP_DIGITS(MP) ((MP)->dp)
+ #define MP_DIGIT(MP, N) (MP)->dp[(N)]
+ 
+ /* This defines the maximum I/O base (minimum is 2)   */
+ #define MP_MAX_RADIX 64
+ 
++/* Constant Time Macros on mp_digits */
++#define MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(x) ((mp_digit)((mp_digit)(x) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT - 1)))
++
++/* basic zero and non zero tests */
++#define MP_CT_NOT_ZERO(x) (MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(((x) | (((mp_digit)0) - (x)))))
++#define MP_CT_ZERO(x) (~MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(((x) | (((mp_digit)0) - (x)))))
++
++
++/* basic constant-time helper macro for equalities and inequalities.
++ * The inequalities will produce incorrect results if
++ * abs(a-b) >= MP_DIGIT_SIZE/2. This can be avoided if unsigned values stay
++ * within the range 0-MP_DIGIT_MAX/2. */
++#define MP_CT_EQ(a, b) MP_CT_ZERO(((a) - (b)))
++#define MP_CT_NE(a, b) MP_CT_NOT_ZERO(((a) - (b)))
++#define MP_CT_GT(a, b) MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((b) - (a))
++#define MP_CT_LT(a, b) MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((a) - (b))
++#define MP_CT_GE(a, b) (1^MP_CT_LT(a, b))
++#define MP_CT_LE(a, b) (1^MP_CT_GT(a, b))
++#define MP_CT_TRUE ((mp_digit)1)
++#define MP_CT_FALSE ((mp_digit)0)
++
++/* use constant time result to select a boolean value */
++#define MP_CT_SELB(m, l, r) (((m) & (l)) | (~(m) & (r)))
++
++/* full inequalities that work with full mp_digit values */
++#define MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,c,d) \
++        MP_CT_SELB(MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((a)^(b)), \
++                  (MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(d)),c)
++#define MP_CT_GTU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GT(a,b),a)
++#define MP_CT_LTU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LT(a,b),b)
++#define MP_CT_GEU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GE(a,b),a)
++#define MP_CT_LEU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LE(a,b),b)
++#define MP_CT_GTS(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GT(a,b),b)
++#define MP_CT_LTS(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LT(a,b),a)
++#define MP_CT_GES(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GE(a,b),b)
++#define MP_CT_LES(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LE(a,b),a)
++
++
+ typedef struct {
+     mp_sign sign;  /* sign of this quantity      */
+     mp_size alloc; /* how many digits allocated  */
+     mp_size used;  /* how many digits used       */
+     mp_digit *dp;  /* the digits themselves      */
+ } mp_int;
+ 
+ /* Default precision       */
+@@ -185,17 +223,19 @@ mp_err mp_expt_d(const mp_int *a, mp_dig
+ 
+ /* Sign manipulations      */
+ mp_err mp_abs(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b);
+ mp_err mp_neg(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b);
+ 
+ /* Full arithmetic         */
+ mp_err mp_add(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
+ mp_err mp_sub(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
++mp_err mp_subCT(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_digit *borrow);
+ mp_err mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
++mp_err mp_mulCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_size setSize);
+ #if MP_SQUARE
+ mp_err mp_sqr(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b);
+ #else
+ #define mp_sqr(a, b) mp_mul(a, a, b)
+ #endif
+ mp_err mp_div(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *q, mp_int *r);
+ mp_err mp_div_2d(const mp_int *a, mp_digit d, mp_int *q, mp_int *r);
+ mp_err mp_expt(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
+@@ -212,23 +252,30 @@ mp_err mp_mulmod(const mp_int *a, const 
+ mp_err mp_sqrmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
+ #else
+ #define mp_sqrmod(a, m, c) mp_mulmod(a, a, m, c)
+ #endif
+ mp_err mp_exptmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
+ mp_err mp_exptmod_d(const mp_int *a, mp_digit d, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
+ #endif /* MP_MODARITH */
+ 
++/* montgomery math */
++mp_err mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, const mp_int *N, mp_int *xMont);
++mp_digit mp_calculate_mont_n0i(const mp_int *N);
++mp_err mp_reduceCT(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *ct);
++mp_err mp_mulmontmodCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *c);
++
+ /* Comparisons             */
+ int mp_cmp_z(const mp_int *a);
+ int mp_cmp_d(const mp_int *a, mp_digit d);
+ int mp_cmp(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b);
+ int mp_cmp_mag(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b);
+ int mp_isodd(const mp_int *a);
+ int mp_iseven(const mp_int *a);
++mp_err mp_selectCT(mp_digit cond, const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *ret);
+ 
+ /* Number theoretic        */
+ mp_err mp_gcd(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
+ mp_err mp_lcm(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
+ mp_err mp_xgcd(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *g, mp_int *x, mp_int *y);
+ mp_err mp_invmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
+ mp_err mp_invmod_xgcd(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
+--- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
++++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
+@@ -124,30 +124,37 @@ s_mp_mul_mont(const mp_int *a, const mp_
+     }
+     res = MP_OKAY;
+ 
+ CLEANUP:
+     return res;
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-STATIC
+ mp_err
+-s_mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, mp_mont_modulus *mmm, mp_int *xMont)
++mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, const mp_int *N, mp_int *xMont)
+ {
+     mp_err res;
+ 
+     /* xMont = x * R mod N   where  N is modulus */
+-    MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(x, xMont));
+-    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_lshd(xMont, MP_USED(&mmm->N))); /* xMont = x << b */
+-    MP_CHECKOK(mp_div(xMont, &mmm->N, 0, xMont));   /*         mod N */
++    if (x != xMont) {
++        MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(x, xMont));
++    }
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_lshd(xMont, MP_USED(N))); /* xMont = x << b */
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_div(xMont, N, 0, xMont));   /*         mod N */
+ CLEANUP:
+     return res;
+ }
+ 
++mp_digit
++mp_calculate_mont_n0i(const mp_int *N)
++{
++    return 0 - s_mp_invmod_radix(MP_DIGIT(N,0));
++}
++
+ #ifdef MP_USING_MONT_MULF
+ 
+ /* the floating point multiply is already cache safe,
+  * don't turn on cache safe unless we specifically
+  * force it */
+ #ifndef MP_FORCE_CACHE_SAFE
+ #undef MP_USING_CACHE_SAFE_MOD_EXP
+ #endif
+@@ -193,17 +200,17 @@ mp_exptmod_f(const mp_int *montBase,
+     MP_DIGITS(&accum1) = 0;
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < MAX_ODD_INTS; ++i)
+         oddPowers[i] = 0;
+ 
+     MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum1, 3 * nLen + 2));
+ 
+     mp_set(&accum1, 1);
+-    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
+     MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(&accum1, nLen));
+ 
+     oddPowSize = 2 * nLen + 1;
+     dTmpSize = 2 * oddPowSize;
+     dSize = sizeof(double) * (nLen * 4 + 1 +
+                               ((odd_ints + 1) * oddPowSize) + dTmpSize);
+     dBuf = malloc(dSize);
+     if (!dBuf) {
+@@ -473,17 +480,17 @@ mp_exptmod_i(const mp_int *montBase,
+     for (i = 1; i < odd_ints; ++i) {
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(oddPowers + i, nLen + 2 * MP_USED(&power2) + 2));
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_mul(oddPowers + (i - 1), &power2, oddPowers + i));
+         MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_redc(oddPowers + i, mmm));
+     }
+ 
+     /* set accumulator to montgomery residue of 1 */
+     mp_set(&accum1, 1);
+-    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
+     pa1 = &accum1;
+     pa2 = &accum2;
+ 
+     for (expOff = bits_in_exponent - window_bits; expOff >= 0; expOff -= window_bits) {
+         mp_size smallExp;
+         MP_CHECKOK(mpl_get_bits(exponent, expOff, window_bits));
+         smallExp = (mp_size)res;
+ 
+@@ -862,17 +869,17 @@ mp_exptmod_safe_i(const mp_int *montBase
+     /* build the first WEAVE_WORD powers inline */
+     /* if WEAVE_WORD_SIZE is not 4, this code will have to change */
+     if (num_powers > 2) {
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[0], 3 * nLen + 2));
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[1], 3 * nLen + 2));
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[2], 3 * nLen + 2));
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[3], 3 * nLen + 2));
+         mp_set(&accum[0], 1);
+-        MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum[0], mmm, &accum[0]));
++        MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum[0], &(mmm->N), &accum[0]));
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(montBase, &accum[1]));
+         SQR(montBase, &accum[2]);
+         MUL_NOWEAVE(montBase, &accum[2], &accum[3]);
+         powersArray = (mp_digit *)malloc(num_powers * (nLen * sizeof(mp_digit) + 1));
+         if (!powersArray) {
+             res = MP_MEM;
+             goto CLEANUP;
+         }
+@@ -881,17 +888,17 @@ mp_exptmod_safe_i(const mp_int *montBase
+         MP_CHECKOK(mpi_to_weave(accum, powers, nLen, num_powers));
+         if (first_window < 4) {
+             MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(&accum[first_window], &accum1));
+             first_window = num_powers;
+         }
+     } else {
+         if (first_window == 0) {
+             mp_set(&accum1, 1);
+-            MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
++            MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
+         } else {
+             /* assert first_window == 1? */
+             MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(montBase, &accum1));
+         }
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+      * calculate all the powers in the powers array.
+@@ -1054,19 +1061,19 @@ mp_exptmod(const mp_int *inBase, const m
+     nLen = MP_USED(modulus);
+     MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&montBase, 2 * nLen + 2));
+ 
+     mmm.N = *modulus; /* a copy of the mp_int struct */
+ 
+     /* compute n0', given n0, n0' = -(n0 ** -1) mod MP_RADIX
+     **        where n0 = least significant mp_digit of N, the modulus.
+     */
+-    mmm.n0prime = 0 - s_mp_invmod_radix(MP_DIGIT(modulus, 0));
++    mmm.n0prime = mp_calculate_mont_n0i(modulus);
+ 
+-    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(base, &mmm, &montBase));
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(base, modulus, &montBase));
+ 
+     bits_in_exponent = mpl_significant_bits(exponent);
+ #ifdef MP_USING_CACHE_SAFE_MOD_EXP
+     if (mp_using_cache_safe_exp) {
+         if (bits_in_exponent > 780)
+             window_bits = 6;
+         else if (bits_in_exponent > 256)
+             window_bits = 5;
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/rsa.c b/lib/freebl/rsa.c
+--- a/lib/freebl/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/freebl/rsa.c
+@@ -65,16 +65,18 @@ struct blindingParamsStr {
+ ** the Handbook of Applied Cryptography, 11.118-11.119.
+ */
+ struct RSABlindingParamsStr {
+     /* Blinding-specific parameters */
+     PRCList link;              /* link to list of structs            */
+     SECItem modulus;           /* list element "key"                 */
+     blindingParams *free, *bp; /* Blinding parameters queue          */
+     blindingParams array[RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_CACHE_SIZE];
++    /* precalculate montegomery reduction value */
++    mp_digit n0i; /* n0i = -( n & MP_DIGIT) ** -1 mod mp_RADIX */
+ };
+ typedef struct RSABlindingParamsStr RSABlindingParams;
+ 
+ /*
+ ** RSABlindingParamsListStr
+ **
+ ** List of key-specific blinding params.  The arena holds the volatile pool
+ ** of memory for each entry and the list itself.  The lock is for list
+@@ -1210,16 +1212,18 @@ generate_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *
+     CHECK_SEC_OK(RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(kb, modLen));
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, kb, modLen));
+     /* k < n */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&k, n, &k));
+     /* f = k**e mod n */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&k, &e, n, f));
+     /* g = k**-1 mod n */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, n, g));
++    /* g in montgomery form.. */
++    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_mont(g, n, g));
+ cleanup:
+     if (kb)
+         PORT_ZFree(kb, modLen);
+     mp_clear(&k);
+     mp_clear(&e);
+     if (err) {
+         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+         rv = SECFailure;
+@@ -1246,23 +1250,26 @@ init_blinding_params(RSABlindingParams *
+      * of rsabp->array pointer and must be set to NULL
+      */
+     rsabp->array[RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_CACHE_SIZE - 1].next = NULL;
+ 
+     bp = rsabp->array;
+     rsabp->bp = NULL;
+     rsabp->free = bp;
+ 
++    /* precalculate montgomery reduction parameter */
++    rsabp->n0i = mp_calculate_mont_n0i(n);
++
+     /* List elements are keyed using the modulus */
+     return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &rsabp->modulus, &key->modulus);
+ }
+ 
+ static SECStatus
+ get_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *n, unsigned int modLen,
+-                    mp_int *f, mp_int *g)
++                    mp_int *f, mp_int *g, mp_digit *n0i)
+ {
+     RSABlindingParams *rsabp = NULL;
+     blindingParams *bpUnlinked = NULL;
+     blindingParams *bp;
+     PRCList *el;
+     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+     mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
+     int cmp = -1;
+@@ -1312,16 +1319,17 @@ get_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *key, 
+             ** head (since el would have looped back to the head).
+             */
+             PR_INSERT_BEFORE(&rsabp->link, el);
+         }
+ 
+         /* We've found (or created) the RSAblindingParams struct for this key.
+          * Now, search its list of ready blinding params for a usable one.
+          */
++        *n0i = rsabp->n0i;
+         while (0 != (bp = rsabp->bp)) {
+ #ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+             /* Found a match and there are still remaining uses left */
+             /* Return the parameters */
+             CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&bp->f, f));
+             CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&bp->g, g));
+ 
+             PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock);
+@@ -1426,16 +1434,17 @@ cleanup:
+         rsabp->free = bp;
+     }
+     if (holdingLock) {
+         PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock);
+     }
+     if (err) {
+         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+     }
++    *n0i = 0;
+     return SECFailure;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+ ** Perform a raw private-key operation
+ **  Length of input and output buffers are equal to key's modulus len.
+ */
+ static SECStatus
+@@ -1445,16 +1454,17 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
+                  PRBool check)
+ {
+     unsigned int modLen;
+     unsigned int offset;
+     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+     mp_err err;
+     mp_int n, c, m;
+     mp_int f, g;
++    mp_digit n0i;
+     if (!key || !output || !input) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+     /* check input out of range (needs to be in range [0..n-1]) */
+     modLen = rsa_modulusLen(&key->modulus);
+     if (modLen == 0) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+@@ -1476,17 +1486,17 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&f));
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&g));
+     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->modulus, &n);
+     OCTETS_TO_MPINT(input, &c, modLen);
+     /* If blinding, compute pre-image of ciphertext by multiplying by
+     ** blinding factor
+     */
+     if (nssRSAUseBlinding) {
+-        CHECK_SEC_OK(get_blinding_params(key, &n, modLen, &f, &g));
++        CHECK_SEC_OK(get_blinding_params(key, &n, modLen, &f, &g, &n0i));
+         /* c' = c*f mod n */
+         CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&c, &f, &n, &c));
+     }
+     /* Do the private key operation m = c**d mod n */
+     if (key->prime1.len == 0 ||
+         key->prime2.len == 0 ||
+         key->exponent1.len == 0 ||
+         key->exponent2.len == 0 ||
+@@ -1497,17 +1507,17 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
+     } else {
+         CHECK_SEC_OK(rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTNoCheck(key, &m, &c));
+     }
+     /* If blinding, compute post-image of plaintext by multiplying by
+     ** blinding factor
+     */
+     if (nssRSAUseBlinding) {
+         /* m = m'*g mod n */
+-        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&m, &g, &n, &m));
++        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmontmodCT(&m, &g, &n, n0i, &m));
+     }
+     err = mp_to_fixlen_octets(&m, output, modLen);
+     if (err >= 0)
+         err = MP_OKAY;
+ cleanup:
+     mp_clear(&n);
+     mp_clear(&c);
+     mp_clear(&m);

SOURCES/cert8.db.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
+  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
+<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
+<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
+]>
+
+<refentry id="cert8.db">
+
+  <refentryinfo>
+    <date>&date;</date>
+    <title>Network Security Services</title>
+    <productname>nss</productname>
+    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
+  </refentryinfo>
+
+  <refmeta>
+    <refentrytitle>cert8.db</refentrytitle>
+    <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+  </refmeta>
+
+  <refnamediv>
+    <refname>cert8.db</refname>
+    <refpurpose>Legacy NSS certificate database</refpurpose>
+  </refnamediv>
+
+<refsection id="description">
+    <title>Description</title>
+    <para><emphasis>cert8.db</emphasis> is an NSS certificate database.</para>
+  <para>This certificate database is in the legacy database format. Consider migrating to cert9.db and key4.db which are the new sqlite-based shared database format with support for concurrent access.
+  </para>
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection>
+    <title>Files</title>
+    <para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/cert8.db</filename></para>
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection>
+    <title>See also</title>
+    <para>cert9.db(5), key4.db(5), pkcs11.txt(5), </para>
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection id="authors">
+    <title>Authors</title>
+    <para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
+    <para>Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
+  </refsection>
+
+<!-- don't change -->
+  <refsection id="license">
+    <title>LICENSE</title>
+    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+    </para>
+
+  </refsection>
+
+
+</refentry>

SOURCES/fips_algorithms.h

@@ -15,11 +15,15 @@ typedef enum {
     SFTKFIPSECC, /* not just keys but specific curves */
     SFTKFIPSAEAD, /* single shot AEAD functions not allowed in FIPS mode */
     SFTKFIPSRSAPSS, /* make sure salt isn't too big */
-    SFTKFIPSPBKDF2  /* handle pbkdf2 FIPS restrictions */
+    SFTKFIPSPBKDF2,  /* handle pbkdf2 FIPS restrictions */
+    SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck,  /* check the output of TLS prf functions */
+    SFTKFIPSChkHash,  /* make sure the base hash of KDF functions is FIPS */
+    SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,  /* make sure the base hash of TLS KDF functions is FIPS */
+    SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,  /* make sure the base hash of SP-800-108 KDF functions is FIPS */
 } SFTKFIPSSpecialClass;
 
 /* set according to your security policy */
-#define SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN  7
+#define SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN  8
 
 typedef struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList;
 struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr {
@@ -27,6 +31,7 @@ struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr {
     CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
     CK_ULONG step;
     SFTKFIPSSpecialClass special;
+    size_t offset;
 };
 
 SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
@@ -50,7 +55,9 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
 #define CKF_KPG CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR
 #define CKF_GEN CKF_GENERATE
 #define CKF_SGN (CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY)
-#define CKF_ENC (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT | CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
+#define CKF_ENC (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT )
+#define CKF_ECW (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT | CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
+#define CKF_WRP (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
 #define CKF_KEK (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
 #define CKF_KEA CKF_DERIVE
 #define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
@@ -90,17 +97,13 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
     { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
     { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
     { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
-    /* ------------------------- DSA Operations --------------------------- */
-    { CKM_DSA_SHA224, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_DSA_SHA256, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_DSA_SHA384, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_DSA_SHA512, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
     /* -------------------- Diffie Hellman Operations --------------------- */
     { CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
     { CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
     /* -------------------- Elliptic Curve Operations --------------------- */
     { CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
     { CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
+    { CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
     { CKM_ECDSA_SHA224, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
     { CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
     { CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
@@ -115,10 +118,10 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
     { CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
     { CKM_AES_CTS, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
     { CKM_AES_CTR, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
-    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
+    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
     /* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */
     { CKM_SHA224, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
     { CKM_SHA224_HMAC, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
@@ -136,37 +139,50 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
     { CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
     /* ---------------------- SSL/TLS operations ------------------------- */
     { CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck, offsetof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
+    { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
+        offsetof(CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
+    { CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
+        offsetof(CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
+    { CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
+        offsetof(CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
 
     /* ------------------------- HKDF Operations -------------------------- */
-    { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
+        offsetof(CK_HKDF_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
+    { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
+        offsetof(CK_HKDF_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
     { CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 160, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
     { CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 256, 512, CKF_GEN }, 128, SFTKFIPSNone },
     /* ------------------ NIST 800-108 Key Derivations  ------------------- */
-    { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
+    { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
+    { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
     /* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
-    { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
-    { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
+        offsetof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfMechanism) },
+    { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
+        offsetof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfMechanism) },
     /* ------------------ PBE Key Derivations  ------------------- */
     { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSPBKDF2 },
+    /* the deprecated mechanisms, don't use for some reason we are supposed
+     * to set the FIPS indicators on these (sigh) */
+    { CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256, { 384, 384, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck },
+    { CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
+    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
+    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1,  SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
 };
 const int SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_fips_mechs);

SOURCES/key3.db.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
+  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
+<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
+<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
+]>
+
+<refentry id="key3.db">
+
+  <refentryinfo>
+    <date>&date;</date>
+    <title>Network Security Services</title>
+    <productname>nss</productname>
+    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
+  </refentryinfo>
+
+  <refmeta>
+    <refentrytitle>key3.db</refentrytitle>
+    <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+  </refmeta>
+
+  <refnamediv>
+    <refname>key3.db</refname>
+    <refpurpose>Legacy NSS certificate database</refpurpose>
+  </refnamediv>
+
+<refsection id="description">
+    <title>Description</title>
+    <para><emphasis>key3.db</emphasis> is an NSS certificate database.</para>
+  <para>This is a key database in the legacy database format. Consider migrating to cert9.db and key4.db which  which are the new sqlite-based shared database format with support for concurrent access.
+  </para>
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection>
+    <title>Files</title>
+    <para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/key3.db</filename></para>
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection>
+    <title>See also</title>
+    <para>cert9.db(5), key4.db(5), pkcs11.txt(5), </para>
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection id="authors">
+    <title>Authors</title>
+    <para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
+    <para>Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
+  </refsection>
+
+<!-- don't change -->
+  <refsection id="license">
+    <title>LICENSE</title>
+    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+    </para>
+
+  </refsection>
+
+
+</refentry>

SOURCES/nspr-4.34-fix-coverity-loop-issue.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c b/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
---- a/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
-+++ b/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
-@@ -2209,28 +2209,38 @@ PR_GetPrefLoopbackAddrInfo(PRNetAddr *re
-         PRBool result_still_empty = PR_TRUE;
-         PRADDRINFO *ai = res;
-         do {
-             PRNetAddr aNetAddr;
- 
-             while (ai && ai->ai_addrlen > sizeof(PRNetAddr))
-                 ai = ai->ai_next;
- 
--            if (ai) {
--                /* copy sockaddr to PRNetAddr */
--                memcpy(&aNetAddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
--                aNetAddr.raw.family = ai->ai_addr->sa_family;
-+            if (!ai) {
-+                break;
-+            }
-+
-+            /* copy sockaddr to PRNetAddr */
-+            memcpy(&aNetAddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
-+            aNetAddr.raw.family = ai->ai_addr->sa_family;
- #ifdef _PR_INET6
--                if (AF_INET6 == aNetAddr.raw.family)
--                    aNetAddr.raw.family = PR_AF_INET6;
-+            if (AF_INET6 == aNetAddr.raw.family)
-+                aNetAddr.raw.family = PR_AF_INET6;
- #endif
--                if (ai->ai_addrlen < sizeof(PRNetAddr))
--                    memset(((char*)result)+ai->ai_addrlen, 0,
--                           sizeof(PRNetAddr) - ai->ai_addrlen);
-+            if (ai->ai_addrlen < sizeof(PRNetAddr))
-+                memset(((char*)&aNetAddr)+ai->ai_addrlen, 0,
-+                       sizeof(PRNetAddr) - ai->ai_addrlen);
-+
-+            if (result->raw.family == PR_AF_INET) {
-+                aNetAddr.inet.port = htons(port);
-             }
-+            else {
-+                aNetAddr.ipv6.port = htons(port);
-+            }
-+
- 
-             /* If we obtain more than one result, prefer IPv6. */
-             if (result_still_empty || aNetAddr.raw.family == PR_AF_INET6) {
-                 memcpy(result, &aNetAddr, sizeof(PRNetAddr));
-             }
-             result_still_empty = PR_FALSE;
-             ai = ai->ai_next;
-         }

SOURCES/nspr-4.34-server-passive.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -r c75b4e36b7e8 pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
---- a/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c     Wed May 25 23:39:48 2022 +0200
-+++ b/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c     Tue Jun 14 18:48:03 2022 -0400
-@@ -2204,6 +2204,7 @@
- 
-     memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 
-+    hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
-     rv = GETADDRINFO(NULL, tmpBuf, &hints, &res);
-     if (rv == 0) {
-         PRBool result_still_empty = PR_TRUE;
-

SOURCES/nspr-config-pc.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-diff -up nspr/config/nspr-config.in.flags nspr/config/nspr-config.in
---- nspr/config/nspr-config.in.flags	2013-05-29 13:46:34.147971410 -0700
-+++ nspr/config/nspr-config.in	2013-05-29 14:17:10.990838914 -0700
-@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ if test -z "$includedir"; then
-     includedir=@includedir@
- fi
- if test -z "$libdir"; then
--    libdir=@libdir@
-+    libdir=`pkg-config --variable=libdir nspr`
- fi
- 
- if test "$echo_prefix" = "yes"; then
-@@ -136,12 +136,12 @@ if test "$echo_libs" = "yes"; then
-       if test -n "$lib_nspr"; then
- 	libdirs="$libdirs -lnspr${major_version}"
-       fi
--      os_ldflags="@LDFLAGS@"
-+      os_ldflags=`pkg-config --variable=ldflags nspr`
-       for i in $os_ldflags ; do
- 	if echo $i | grep \^-L >/dev/null; then
- 	  libdirs="$libdirs $i"
-         fi
-       done
--      echo $libdirs @OS_LIBS@
-+      echo $libdirs `pkg-config --variable=os_libs nspr`
- fi      
- 
-diff -up nspr/config/nspr.pc.in.flags nspr/config/nspr.pc.in
---- nspr/config/nspr.pc.in.flags	2013-05-29 13:48:15.026643570 -0700
-+++ nspr/config/nspr.pc.in	2013-05-29 13:49:47.795202949 -0700
-@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ includedir=@includedir@
- Name: NSPR
- Description: The Netscape Portable Runtime
- Version: @MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@.@MOD_MINOR_VERSION@.@MOD_PATCH_VERSION@
--Libs: -L@libdir@ -lplds@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lplc@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lnspr@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@
-+Libs: -L@libdir@ -lplds@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lplc@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lnspr@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ @OS_LIBS@
- Cflags: -I@includedir@

SOURCES/nspr-config.xml

@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
-<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
-  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
-<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
-<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
-]>
-
-<refentry id="nspr-config">
-
-  <refentryinfo>
-    <date>&date;</date>
-    <title>Netscape Portable Runtime</title>
-    <productname>nspr</productname>
-    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
-  </refentryinfo>
-
-  <refmeta>
-    <refentrytitle>nspr-config</refentrytitle>
-    <manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
-  </refmeta>
-
-  <refnamediv>
-    <refname>nspr-config</refname>
-    <refpurpose>Return meta information about nspr libraries</refpurpose>
-  </refnamediv>
-
-  <refsynopsisdiv>
-    <cmdsynopsis>
-      <command>nspr-config</command>
-      <arg><option>--prefix</option></arg>
-      <arg><option>--exec-prefix</option></arg>
-      <arg><option>--includedir</option></arg>
-      <arg><option>--libs</option></arg>
-      <arg><option>--cflags</option></arg>
-      <arg><option>--libdir</option></arg>
-      <arg><option>--version</option></arg>
-    </cmdsynopsis>
-  </refsynopsisdiv>
-
-<refsection id="description">
-    <title>Description</title>
-    <para><command>nspr-config</command> is a shell script which can be used to obtain gcc options for building client pacakges of nspr.</para>
-  </refsection>
-  
-  <refsection>
-    <title>Options</title>
-    
-    <variablelist>
-      <varlistentry>
-        <term><option>--prefix</option></term>
-        <listitem><simpara>Returns the top level system directory under which the nspr libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
-      </varlistentry>
-
-      <varlistentry>
-        <term><option>--exec-prefix</option></term>
-        <listitem><simpara>Returns the top level system directory under which any nspr binaries would be installed.</simpara></listitem>
-      </varlistentry>
-
-      <varlistentry>
-        <term><option>--includedir</option> <replaceable>count</replaceable></term>
-        <listitem><simpara>Returns the path to the directory were the nspr headers are installed.</simpara></listitem>
-      </varlistentry>
-
-      <varlistentry>
-        <term><option>--version</option></term>
-        <listitem><simpara>Returns the upstream version of nspr in the form major_version-minor_version-patch_version.</simpara></listitem>
-      </varlistentry>
-
-      <varlistentry>
-        <term><option>--libs</option></term>
-        <listitem><simpara>Returns the compiler linking flags.</simpara></listitem>
-      </varlistentry>
-
-      <varlistentry>
-        <term><option>--cflags</option></term>
-        <listitem><simpara>Returns the compiler include flags.</simpara></listitem>
-      </varlistentry>
-
-      <varlistentry>
-        <term><option>--libdir</option></term>
-        <listitem><simpara>Returns the path to the directory were the nspr libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
-      </varlistentry>
-
-    </variablelist>
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection>
-    <title>Examples</title>
-
-    <para>The following example will query for both include path and linkage flags:
-      <programlisting>
-        /usr/bin/nspr-config --cflags --libs
-      </programlisting>
-    </para>
-
-   
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection>
-    <title>Files</title>
-
-    <para><filename>/usr/bin/nspr-config</filename></para>
-
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection>
-    <title>See also</title>
-    <para>pkg-config(1)</para>
-  </refsection>
-
-  <refsection id="authors">
-    <title>Authors</title>
-    <para>The NSPR liraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
-    <para>
-	Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.
-    </para>
-  </refsection>
-
-<!-- don't change -->
-  <refsection id="license">
-    <title>LICENSE</title>
-    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-    </para>
-  </refsection>
-
-</refentry>
-

SOURCES/nspr-gcc-atomics.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./pr/include/md/_linux.h.gcc-atomics ./pr/include/md/_linux.h
---- ./pr/include/md/_linux.h.gcc-atomics	2022-09-20 11:23:22.008942926 -0700
-+++ ./pr/include/md/_linux.h	2022-09-20 11:34:45.536751340 -0700
-@@ -105,6 +105,15 @@
- #endif
- 
- #if defined(__i386__)
-+#if defined(__GNUC__)
-+/* Use GCC built-in functions */
-+#define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
-+#define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
-+#define _MD_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(ptr) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
-+#define _MD_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(ptr) __sync_sub_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
-+#define _MD_ATOMIC_ADD(ptr, i) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, i)
-+#define _MD_ATOMIC_SET(ptr, nv) __sync_lock_test_and_set(ptr, nv)
-+#else
- #define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
- #define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
- extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_AtomicIncrement(PRInt32 *val);
-@@ -116,6 +125,7 @@ extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_AtomicAdd(PRInt32
- extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_AtomicSet(PRInt32 *val, PRInt32 newval);
- #define _MD_ATOMIC_SET                _PR_x86_AtomicSet
- #endif
-+#endif
- 
- #if defined(__ia64__)
- #define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
-@@ -131,6 +141,15 @@ extern PRInt32 _PR_ia64_AtomicSet(PRInt3
- #endif
- 
- #if defined(__x86_64__)
-+#if defined(__GNUC__)
-+/* Use GCC built-in functions */
-+#define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
-+#define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
-+#define _MD_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(ptr) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
-+#define _MD_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(ptr) __sync_sub_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
-+#define _MD_ATOMIC_ADD(ptr, i) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, i)
-+#define _MD_ATOMIC_SET(ptr, nv) __sync_lock_test_and_set(ptr, nv)
-+#else
- #define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
- #define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
- extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_64_AtomicIncrement(PRInt32 *val);
-@@ -142,6 +161,7 @@ extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_64_AtomicAdd(PRIn
- extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_64_AtomicSet(PRInt32 *val, PRInt32 newval);
- #define _MD_ATOMIC_SET                _PR_x86_64_AtomicSet
- #endif
-+#endif
- 
- #if defined(__loongarch__)
- #if defined(__GNUC__)

SOURCES/nss-3.66-disable-external-host-test.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -up ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.brew ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh
+--- ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.brew	2021-06-12 11:37:46.153265942 -0700
++++ ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh	2021-06-12 11:39:43.069925034 -0700
+@@ -1641,7 +1641,9 @@ ssl_run_tests()
+             if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
+                 ssl_policy_listsuites
+                 ssl_policy_selfserv
+-                ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp
++                # requires access to external servers, which fails
++                # when running in brew
++                #ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp
+                 ssl_policy
+             fi
+             ;;

SOURCES/nss-3.66-disable-signature-policies.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
+--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy	2023-06-21 08:54:54.802785229 +0200
++++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2023-06-21 08:58:24.748282499 +0200
+@@ -395,12 +395,9 @@ static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
+     /* Signatures */
+     { CIPHER_NAME("DSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE,
+       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+-    { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PKCS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
+-      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+-    { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PSS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE,
+-      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+-    { CIPHER_NAME("ECDSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY,
+-      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
++    { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PKCS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, 0},
++    { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PSS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE, 0},
++    { CIPHER_NAME("ECDSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY, 0},
+ };
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -416,7 +413,7 @@ static const algListsDef algOptLists[] =
+     { macOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(macOptList), "MAC", PR_FALSE },
+     { cipherOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherOptList), "CIPHER", PR_FALSE },
+     { kxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kxOptList), "OTHER-KX", PR_FALSE },
+-    { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_FALSE },
++    { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_TRUE },
+ };
+ 
+ static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[] = {
+diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
+--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy	2023-06-21 09:00:17.720181306 +0200
++++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt	2023-06-21 09:00:55.637501208 +0200
+@@ -193,7 +193,9 @@
+   1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=all_allow=hmac-sha1:sha256:rsa-pkcs:rsa:des-ede3-cbc:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly Narrow
+   1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=all_allow=md2/all:md4/all:md5/all:sha1/all:sha256/all:sha384/all:sha512/all:rsa-pkcs/all:rsa-pss/all:ecdsa/all:dsa/all:hmac-sha1/all:hmac-sha224/all:hmac-sha256/all:hmac-sha384/all:hmac-sha512/all:hmac-md5/all:camellia128-cbc/all:camellia192-cbc/all:camellia256-cbc/all:seed-cbc/all:des-ede3-cbc/all:des-40-cbc/all:des-cbc/all:null-cipher/all:rc2/all:rc4/all:idea/all:rsa/all:rsa-export/all:dhe-rsa/all:dhe-dss/all:ecdhe-ecdsa/all:ecdhe-rsa/all:ecdh-ecdsa/all:ecdh-rsa/all:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly
+   0 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=dsa Disallow DSA Signatures Explicitly
+-  1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
++# rsa-pkcs, rsa-pss, and ecdsa policy checking reverted in rhel8 for binary
++# compatibility reasons
++#  1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
+   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
+   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
+   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL

SOURCES/nss-3.66-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+diff -up ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.orig ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
+--- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.orig	2021-05-28 02:50:43.000000000 -0700
++++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c	2021-06-15 17:05:37.200262345 -0700
+@@ -1031,9 +1031,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+     char *export_file = NULL;
+     char *dbprefix = "";
+     SECStatus rv;
+-    SECOidTag cipher = SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC;
+-    SECOidTag hash = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+-    SECOidTag certCipher = SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC;
++    SECOidTag cipher = 
++        SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_3KEY_TRIPLE_DES_CBC;
++    SECOidTag hash = SEC_OID_SHA1;
++    SECOidTag certCipher = 
++        SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_40_BIT_RC2_CBC;
+     int keyLen = 0;
+     int certKeyLen = 0;
+     secuCommand pk12util;
+@@ -1147,6 +1149,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
++        certCipher =  SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
++    }
+     if (pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].activated) {
+         char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].arg;
+ 
+diff -up ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig ./tests/tools/tools.sh
+--- ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig	2021-06-15 17:06:27.650564449 -0700
++++ ./tests/tools/tools.sh	2021-06-15 17:07:59.934117192 -0700
+@@ -47,9 +47,9 @@
+ "PKCS #5 Password Based Encryption with SHA-1 and DES-CBC"
+ 
+   # if we change the defaults in pk12util, update these variables
+-  export CERT_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT="AES-128-CBC"
+-  export KEY_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT="AES-256-CBC"
+-  export HASH_DEFAULT="SHA-256"
++  export CERT_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT=${pkcs12v2pbeWithSha1And40BitRc2Cbc}
++  export KEY_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT=${pkcs12v2pbeWithSha1AndTripleDESCBC}
++  export HASH_DEFAULT="SHA-1"
+ 
+   export PKCS5v1_PBE_CIPHERS="${pkcs5pbeWithMD2AndDEScbc},\
+ ${pkcs5pbeWithMD5AndDEScbc},\

SOURCES/nss-3.79-distrusted-certs.patch

@@ -1,375 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# User John M. Schanck <jschanck@mozilla.com>
-# Date 1648094761 0
-#      Thu Mar 24 04:06:01 2022 +0000
-# Node ID b722e523d66297fe4bc1fac0ebb06203138eccbb
-# Parent  853b64626b19a46f41f4ba9c684490dc15923c94
-Bug 1751305 - Remove expired explicitly distrusted certificates from certdata.txt. r=KathleenWilson
-
-Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D141919
-
-diff --git a/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt b/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
---- a/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
-+++ b/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
-@@ -7663,197 +7663,16 @@ CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
- \377\377
- END
- CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
- CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
- CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
- CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
- 
- #
--# Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
--#
--# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
--# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
--# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
--# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
--# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
--# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
--# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
--CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_CERTIFICATE
--CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
--CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
--CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CKC_X_509
--CKA_SUBJECT MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
--\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
--\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
--\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
--\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
--\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
--END
--CKA_ID UTF8 "0"
--CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
--\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
--\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
--\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
--\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
--\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
--END
--CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\002\004\017\377\377\377
--END
--CKA_VALUE MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\060\202\006\225\060\202\004\175\240\003\002\001\002\002\004\017
--\377\377\377\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\013
--\005\000\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116
--\114\061\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151
--\116\157\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003
--\125\004\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120
--\113\111\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162
--\147\141\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\036
--\027\015\061\060\060\065\061\062\060\070\065\061\063\071\132\027
--\015\062\060\060\063\062\063\060\071\065\060\060\065\132\060\132
--\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\027\060
--\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141
--\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004\003\014
--\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111\157\166
--\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141\156\151
--\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\202\002\042\060\015
--\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\001\005\000\003\202\002
--\017\000\060\202\002\012\002\202\002\001\000\261\023\031\017\047
--\346\154\324\125\206\113\320\354\211\212\105\221\170\254\107\275
--\107\053\344\374\105\353\117\264\046\163\133\067\323\303\177\366
--\343\336\327\243\370\055\150\305\010\076\113\224\326\344\207\045
--\066\153\204\265\030\164\363\050\130\163\057\233\152\317\274\004
--\036\366\336\335\257\374\113\252\365\333\146\142\045\001\045\202
--\336\362\227\132\020\156\335\135\251\042\261\004\251\043\163\072
--\370\161\255\035\317\204\104\353\107\321\257\155\310\174\050\253
--\307\362\067\172\164\137\137\305\002\024\212\243\132\343\033\154
--\001\343\135\216\331\150\326\364\011\033\062\334\221\265\054\365
--\040\353\214\003\155\046\111\270\223\304\205\135\330\322\233\257
--\126\152\314\005\063\314\240\102\236\064\125\104\234\153\240\324
--\022\320\053\124\315\267\211\015\345\366\353\350\373\205\001\063
--\117\172\153\361\235\162\063\226\016\367\262\204\245\245\047\304
--\047\361\121\163\051\167\272\147\156\376\114\334\264\342\241\241
--\201\057\071\111\215\103\070\023\316\320\245\134\302\207\072\000
--\147\145\102\043\361\066\131\012\035\243\121\310\274\243\224\052
--\061\337\343\074\362\235\032\074\004\260\357\261\012\060\023\163
--\266\327\363\243\114\001\165\024\205\170\300\327\212\071\130\205
--\120\372\056\346\305\276\317\213\077\257\217\066\324\045\011\055
--\322\017\254\162\223\362\277\213\324\120\263\371\025\120\233\231
--\365\024\331\373\213\221\243\062\046\046\240\370\337\073\140\201
--\206\203\171\133\053\353\023\075\051\072\301\155\335\275\236\216
--\207\326\112\256\064\227\005\356\024\246\366\334\070\176\112\351
--\044\124\007\075\227\150\067\106\153\015\307\250\041\257\023\124
--\344\011\152\361\115\106\012\311\135\373\233\117\275\336\373\267
--\124\313\270\070\234\247\071\373\152\055\300\173\215\253\245\247
--\127\354\112\222\212\063\305\341\040\134\163\330\220\222\053\200
--\325\017\206\030\151\174\071\117\204\206\274\367\114\133\363\325
--\264\312\240\302\360\067\042\312\171\122\037\123\346\252\363\220
--\260\073\335\362\050\375\254\353\305\006\044\240\311\324\057\017
--\130\375\265\236\354\017\317\262\131\320\242\004\172\070\152\256
--\162\373\275\360\045\142\224\011\247\005\013\002\003\001\000\001
--\243\202\001\141\060\202\001\135\060\110\006\003\125\035\040\004
--\101\060\077\060\075\006\004\125\035\040\000\060\065\060\063\006
--\010\053\006\001\005\005\007\002\001\026\047\150\164\164\160\072
--\057\057\167\167\167\056\144\151\147\151\156\157\164\141\162\056
--\156\154\057\143\160\163\057\160\153\151\157\166\145\162\150\145
--\151\144\060\017\006\003\125\035\023\001\001\377\004\005\060\003
--\001\001\377\060\016\006\003\125\035\017\001\001\377\004\004\003
--\002\001\006\060\201\205\006\003\125\035\043\004\176\060\174\200
--\024\071\020\213\111\222\134\333\141\022\040\315\111\235\032\216
--\332\234\147\100\271\241\136\244\134\060\132\061\013\060\011\006
--\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\036\060\034\006\003\125\004
--\012\014\025\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
--\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\061\053\060\051\006\003\125\004
--\003\014\042\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
--\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\040\122\157\157\164\040\103\101
--\040\055\040\107\062\202\004\000\230\226\364\060\111\006\003\125
--\035\037\004\102\060\100\060\076\240\074\240\072\206\070\150\164
--\164\160\072\057\057\143\162\154\056\160\153\151\157\166\145\162
--\150\145\151\144\056\156\154\057\104\157\155\117\162\147\141\156
--\151\163\141\164\151\145\114\141\164\145\163\164\103\122\114\055
--\107\062\056\143\162\154\060\035\006\003\125\035\016\004\026\004
--\024\274\135\224\073\331\253\173\003\045\163\141\302\333\055\356
--\374\253\217\145\241\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001
--\001\013\005\000\003\202\002\001\000\217\374\055\114\267\331\055
--\325\037\275\357\313\364\267\150\027\165\235\116\325\367\335\234
--\361\052\046\355\237\242\266\034\003\325\123\263\354\010\317\064
--\342\343\303\364\265\026\057\310\303\276\327\323\163\253\000\066
--\371\032\112\176\326\143\351\136\106\272\245\266\216\025\267\243
--\052\330\103\035\357\135\310\037\201\205\263\213\367\377\074\364
--\331\364\106\010\077\234\274\035\240\331\250\114\315\045\122\116
--\012\261\040\367\037\351\103\331\124\106\201\023\232\300\136\164
--\154\052\230\062\352\374\167\273\015\245\242\061\230\042\176\174
--\174\347\332\244\255\354\267\056\032\031\161\370\110\120\332\103
--\217\054\204\335\301\100\047\343\265\360\025\116\226\324\370\134
--\343\206\051\106\053\327\073\007\353\070\177\310\206\127\227\323
--\357\052\063\304\027\120\325\144\151\153\053\153\105\136\135\057
--\027\312\132\116\317\303\327\071\074\365\073\237\106\271\233\347
--\016\111\227\235\326\325\343\033\017\352\217\001\116\232\023\224
--\131\012\002\007\110\113\032\140\253\177\117\355\013\330\125\015
--\150\157\125\234\151\145\025\102\354\300\334\335\154\254\303\026
--\316\013\035\126\233\244\304\304\322\056\340\017\342\104\047\053
--\120\151\244\334\142\350\212\041\051\102\154\314\000\072\226\166
--\233\357\100\300\244\136\167\204\062\154\046\052\071\146\256\135
--\343\271\271\262\054\150\037\036\232\220\003\071\360\252\263\244
--\314\111\213\030\064\351\067\311\173\051\307\204\174\157\104\025
--\057\354\141\131\004\311\105\313\242\326\122\242\174\177\051\222
--\326\112\305\213\102\250\324\376\352\330\307\207\043\030\344\235
--\172\175\163\100\122\230\240\256\156\343\005\077\005\017\340\245
--\306\155\115\355\203\067\210\234\307\363\334\102\232\152\266\327
--\041\111\066\167\362\357\030\117\305\160\331\236\351\336\267\053
--\213\364\274\176\050\337\015\100\311\205\134\256\235\305\061\377
--\320\134\016\265\250\176\360\351\057\272\257\210\256\345\265\321
--\130\245\257\234\161\247\051\001\220\203\151\067\202\005\272\374
--\011\301\010\156\214\170\073\303\063\002\200\077\104\205\010\035
--\337\125\126\010\255\054\205\055\135\261\003\341\256\252\164\305
--\244\363\116\272\067\230\173\202\271
--END
--
--# Trust for Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
--# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
--# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
--# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
--# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
--# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
--# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
--# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
--CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
--CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
--CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
--CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\325\362\127\251\277\055\320\077\213\106\127\371\053\311\244\306
--\222\341\102\102
--END
--CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\056\141\242\321\170\316\356\277\131\063\260\043\024\017\224\034
--END
--CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
--\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
--\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
--\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
--\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
--\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
--END
--CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\002\004\017\377\377\377
--END
--CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--
--#
- # Certificate "Security Communication RootCA2"
- #
- # Issuer: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
- # Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
- # Subject: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
- # Not Valid Before: Fri May 29 05:00:39 2009
- # Not Valid After : Tue May 29 05:00:39 2029
- # Fingerprint (SHA-256): 51:3B:2C:EC:B8:10:D4:CD:E5:DD:85:39:1A:DF:C6:C2:DD:60:D8:7B:B7:36:D2:B5:21:48:4A:A4:7A:0E:BE:F6
-@@ -8337,78 +8156,16 @@ END
- CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
- \002\001\000
- END
- CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
- CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
- CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
- CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
- 
--# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
--# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
--# Serial Number: 1800000005 (0x6b49d205)
--# Not Before: Apr  7 15:37:15 2011 GMT
--# Not After : Apr  4 15:37:15 2021 GMT
--CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
--CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
--CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave"
--CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
--\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
--\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
--\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
--\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
--\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
--\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
--\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
--\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
--\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
--\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
--END
--CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\002\004\153\111\322\005
--END
--CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--
--# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
--# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
--# Serial Number: 1800000006 (0x6b49d206)
--# Not Before: Apr 18 21:09:30 2011 GMT
--# Not After : Apr 15 21:09:30 2021 GMT
--CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
--CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
--CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave"
--CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
--\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
--\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
--\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
--\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
--\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
--\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
--\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
--\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
--\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
--\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
--END
--CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\002\004\153\111\322\006
--END
--CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--
- #
- # Certificate "Actalis Authentication Root CA"
- #
- # Issuer: CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA,O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967,L=Milan,C=IT
- # Serial Number:57:0a:11:97:42:c4:e3:cc
- # Subject: CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA,O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967,L=Milan,C=IT
- # Not Valid Before: Thu Sep 22 11:22:02 2011
- # Not Valid After : Sun Sep 22 11:22:02 2030
-@@ -9042,84 +8799,16 @@ END
- CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
- \002\001\001
- END
- CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
- CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
- CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
- CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
- 
--# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1", Bug 825022
--# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
--# Serial Number: 2087 (0x827)
--# Subject: CN=*.EGO.GOV.TR,OU=EGO BILGI ISLEM,O=EGO,L=ANKARA,ST=ANKARA,C=TR
--# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
--# Not Valid After : Tue Jul 06 07:07:51 2021
--# Fingerprint (MD5): F8:F5:25:FF:0C:31:CF:85:E1:0C:86:17:C1:CE:1F:8E
--# Fingerprint (SHA1): C6:9F:28:C8:25:13:9E:65:A6:46:C4:34:AC:A5:A1:D2:00:29:5D:B1
--CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
--CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
--CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1"
--CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
--\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
--\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
--\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
--\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
--\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
--\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
--\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
--\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
--\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
--\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
--END
--CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\002\002\010\047
--END
--CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--
--# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2", Bug 825022
--# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
--# Serial Number: 2148 (0x864)
--# Subject: E=ileti@kktcmerkezbankasi.org,CN=e-islem.kktcmerkezbankasi.org,O=KKTC Merkez Bankasi,L=Lefkosa,ST=Lefkosa,C=TR
--# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
--# Not Valid After : Thu Aug 05 07:07:51 2021
--# Fingerprint (MD5): BF:C3:EC:AD:0F:42:4F:B4:B5:38:DB:35:BF:AD:84:A2
--# Fingerprint (SHA1): F9:2B:E5:26:6C:C0:5D:B2:DC:0D:C3:F2:DC:74:E0:2D:EF:D9:49:CB
--CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
--CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
--CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2"
--CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
--\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
--\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
--\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
--\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
--\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
--\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
--\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
--\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
--\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
--\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
--END
--CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
--\002\002\010\144
--END
--CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
--CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
--
- #
- # Certificate "D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009"
- #
- # Issuer: CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009,O=D-Trust GmbH,C=DE
- # Serial Number: 623603 (0x983f3)
- # Subject: CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009,O=D-Trust GmbH,C=DE
- # Not Valid Before: Thu Nov 05 08:35:58 2009
- # Not Valid After : Mon Nov 05 08:35:58 2029

SOURCES/nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -up ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.pkcs12_fips_defaults ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
+--- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.pkcs12_fips_defaults	2022-07-20 13:40:24.152212683 -0700
++++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c	2022-07-20 13:42:40.031094190 -0700
+@@ -1146,6 +1146,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+         goto done;
+     }
+ 
++    if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
++        cipher =  SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC;
++        certCipher =  SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC;
++    }
++
+     if (pk12util.options[opt_Cipher].activated) {
+         char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_Cipher].arg;
+ 
+@@ -1160,9 +1165,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
+-        certCipher =  SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+-    }
+     if (pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].activated) {
+         char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].arg;
+ 

SOURCES/nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+diff -up ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt.revert-distrusted ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
+--- ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt.revert-distrusted	2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt	2022-06-24 10:51:32.035207662 -0700
+@@ -7668,6 +7668,187 @@ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_
+ CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+ 
+ #
++# Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
++#
++# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
++# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
++# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
++# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
++# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
++# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
++# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_CERTIFICATE
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
++CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CKC_X_509
++CKA_SUBJECT MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
++\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
++\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
++\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
++\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
++\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
++END
++CKA_ID UTF8 "0"
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
++\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
++\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
++\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
++\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
++\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\004\017\377\377\377
++END
++CKA_VALUE MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\202\006\225\060\202\004\175\240\003\002\001\002\002\004\017
++\377\377\377\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\013
++\005\000\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116
++\114\061\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151
++\116\157\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003
++\125\004\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120
++\113\111\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162
++\147\141\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\036
++\027\015\061\060\060\065\061\062\060\070\065\061\063\071\132\027
++\015\062\060\060\063\062\063\060\071\065\060\060\065\132\060\132
++\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\027\060
++\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141
++\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004\003\014
++\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111\157\166
++\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141\156\151
++\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\202\002\042\060\015
++\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\001\005\000\003\202\002
++\017\000\060\202\002\012\002\202\002\001\000\261\023\031\017\047
++\346\154\324\125\206\113\320\354\211\212\105\221\170\254\107\275
++\107\053\344\374\105\353\117\264\046\163\133\067\323\303\177\366
++\343\336\327\243\370\055\150\305\010\076\113\224\326\344\207\045
++\066\153\204\265\030\164\363\050\130\163\057\233\152\317\274\004
++\036\366\336\335\257\374\113\252\365\333\146\142\045\001\045\202
++\336\362\227\132\020\156\335\135\251\042\261\004\251\043\163\072
++\370\161\255\035\317\204\104\353\107\321\257\155\310\174\050\253
++\307\362\067\172\164\137\137\305\002\024\212\243\132\343\033\154
++\001\343\135\216\331\150\326\364\011\033\062\334\221\265\054\365
++\040\353\214\003\155\046\111\270\223\304\205\135\330\322\233\257
++\126\152\314\005\063\314\240\102\236\064\125\104\234\153\240\324
++\022\320\053\124\315\267\211\015\345\366\353\350\373\205\001\063
++\117\172\153\361\235\162\063\226\016\367\262\204\245\245\047\304
++\047\361\121\163\051\167\272\147\156\376\114\334\264\342\241\241
++\201\057\071\111\215\103\070\023\316\320\245\134\302\207\072\000
++\147\145\102\043\361\066\131\012\035\243\121\310\274\243\224\052
++\061\337\343\074\362\235\032\074\004\260\357\261\012\060\023\163
++\266\327\363\243\114\001\165\024\205\170\300\327\212\071\130\205
++\120\372\056\346\305\276\317\213\077\257\217\066\324\045\011\055
++\322\017\254\162\223\362\277\213\324\120\263\371\025\120\233\231
++\365\024\331\373\213\221\243\062\046\046\240\370\337\073\140\201
++\206\203\171\133\053\353\023\075\051\072\301\155\335\275\236\216
++\207\326\112\256\064\227\005\356\024\246\366\334\070\176\112\351
++\044\124\007\075\227\150\067\106\153\015\307\250\041\257\023\124
++\344\011\152\361\115\106\012\311\135\373\233\117\275\336\373\267
++\124\313\270\070\234\247\071\373\152\055\300\173\215\253\245\247
++\127\354\112\222\212\063\305\341\040\134\163\330\220\222\053\200
++\325\017\206\030\151\174\071\117\204\206\274\367\114\133\363\325
++\264\312\240\302\360\067\042\312\171\122\037\123\346\252\363\220
++\260\073\335\362\050\375\254\353\305\006\044\240\311\324\057\017
++\130\375\265\236\354\017\317\262\131\320\242\004\172\070\152\256
++\162\373\275\360\045\142\224\011\247\005\013\002\003\001\000\001
++\243\202\001\141\060\202\001\135\060\110\006\003\125\035\040\004
++\101\060\077\060\075\006\004\125\035\040\000\060\065\060\063\006
++\010\053\006\001\005\005\007\002\001\026\047\150\164\164\160\072
++\057\057\167\167\167\056\144\151\147\151\156\157\164\141\162\056
++\156\154\057\143\160\163\057\160\153\151\157\166\145\162\150\145
++\151\144\060\017\006\003\125\035\023\001\001\377\004\005\060\003
++\001\001\377\060\016\006\003\125\035\017\001\001\377\004\004\003
++\002\001\006\060\201\205\006\003\125\035\043\004\176\060\174\200
++\024\071\020\213\111\222\134\333\141\022\040\315\111\235\032\216
++\332\234\147\100\271\241\136\244\134\060\132\061\013\060\011\006
++\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\036\060\034\006\003\125\004
++\012\014\025\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
++\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\061\053\060\051\006\003\125\004
++\003\014\042\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
++\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\040\122\157\157\164\040\103\101
++\040\055\040\107\062\202\004\000\230\226\364\060\111\006\003\125
++\035\037\004\102\060\100\060\076\240\074\240\072\206\070\150\164
++\164\160\072\057\057\143\162\154\056\160\153\151\157\166\145\162
++\150\145\151\144\056\156\154\057\104\157\155\117\162\147\141\156
++\151\163\141\164\151\145\114\141\164\145\163\164\103\122\114\055
++\107\062\056\143\162\154\060\035\006\003\125\035\016\004\026\004
++\024\274\135\224\073\331\253\173\003\045\163\141\302\333\055\356
++\374\253\217\145\241\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001
++\001\013\005\000\003\202\002\001\000\217\374\055\114\267\331\055
++\325\037\275\357\313\364\267\150\027\165\235\116\325\367\335\234
++\361\052\046\355\237\242\266\034\003\325\123\263\354\010\317\064
++\342\343\303\364\265\026\057\310\303\276\327\323\163\253\000\066
++\371\032\112\176\326\143\351\136\106\272\245\266\216\025\267\243
++\052\330\103\035\357\135\310\037\201\205\263\213\367\377\074\364
++\331\364\106\010\077\234\274\035\240\331\250\114\315\045\122\116
++\012\261\040\367\037\351\103\331\124\106\201\023\232\300\136\164
++\154\052\230\062\352\374\167\273\015\245\242\061\230\042\176\174
++\174\347\332\244\255\354\267\056\032\031\161\370\110\120\332\103
++\217\054\204\335\301\100\047\343\265\360\025\116\226\324\370\134
++\343\206\051\106\053\327\073\007\353\070\177\310\206\127\227\323
++\357\052\063\304\027\120\325\144\151\153\053\153\105\136\135\057
++\027\312\132\116\317\303\327\071\074\365\073\237\106\271\233\347
++\016\111\227\235\326\325\343\033\017\352\217\001\116\232\023\224
++\131\012\002\007\110\113\032\140\253\177\117\355\013\330\125\015
++\150\157\125\234\151\145\025\102\354\300\334\335\154\254\303\026
++\316\013\035\126\233\244\304\304\322\056\340\017\342\104\047\053
++\120\151\244\334\142\350\212\041\051\102\154\314\000\072\226\166
++\233\357\100\300\244\136\167\204\062\154\046\052\071\146\256\135
++\343\271\271\262\054\150\037\036\232\220\003\071\360\252\263\244
++\314\111\213\030\064\351\067\311\173\051\307\204\174\157\104\025
++\057\354\141\131\004\311\105\313\242\326\122\242\174\177\051\222
++\326\112\305\213\102\250\324\376\352\330\307\207\043\030\344\235
++\172\175\163\100\122\230\240\256\156\343\005\077\005\017\340\245
++\306\155\115\355\203\067\210\234\307\363\334\102\232\152\266\327
++\041\111\066\167\362\357\030\117\305\160\331\236\351\336\267\053
++\213\364\274\176\050\337\015\100\311\205\134\256\235\305\061\377
++\320\134\016\265\250\176\360\351\057\272\257\210\256\345\265\321
++\130\245\257\234\161\247\051\001\220\203\151\067\202\005\272\374
++\011\301\010\156\214\170\073\303\063\002\200\077\104\205\010\035
++\337\125\126\010\255\054\205\055\135\261\003\341\256\252\164\305
++\244\363\116\272\067\230\173\202\271
++END
++
++# Trust for Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
++# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
++# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
++# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
++# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
++# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
++# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
++# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
++CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\325\362\127\251\277\055\320\077\213\106\127\371\053\311\244\306
++\222\341\102\102
++END
++CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\056\141\242\321\170\316\356\277\131\063\260\043\024\017\224\034
++END
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
++\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
++\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
++\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
++\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
++\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\004\017\377\377\377
++END
++CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++
++#
+ # Certificate "Security Communication RootCA2"
+ #
+ # Issuer: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
+@@ -8161,6 +8342,68 @@ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_
+ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
+ CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+ 
++# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
++# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
++# Serial Number: 1800000005 (0x6b49d205)
++# Not Before: Apr  7 15:37:15 2011 GMT
++# Not After : Apr  4 15:37:15 2021 GMT
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave"
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
++\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
++\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
++\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
++\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
++\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
++\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
++\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
++\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
++\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
++\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\004\153\111\322\005
++END
++CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++
++# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
++# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
++# Serial Number: 1800000006 (0x6b49d206)
++# Not Before: Apr 18 21:09:30 2011 GMT
++# Not After : Apr 15 21:09:30 2021 GMT
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave"
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
++\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
++\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
++\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
++\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
++\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
++\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
++\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
++\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
++\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
++\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\004\153\111\322\006
++END
++CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++
+ #
+ # Certificate "Actalis Authentication Root CA"
+ #
+@@ -8804,6 +9047,74 @@ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_
+ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
+ CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+ 
++# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1", Bug 825022
++# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
++# Serial Number: 2087 (0x827)
++# Subject: CN=*.EGO.GOV.TR,OU=EGO BILGI ISLEM,O=EGO,L=ANKARA,ST=ANKARA,C=TR
++# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
++# Not Valid After : Tue Jul 06 07:07:51 2021
++# Fingerprint (MD5): F8:F5:25:FF:0C:31:CF:85:E1:0C:86:17:C1:CE:1F:8E
++# Fingerprint (SHA1): C6:9F:28:C8:25:13:9E:65:A6:46:C4:34:AC:A5:A1:D2:00:29:5D:B1
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1"
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
++\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
++\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
++\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
++\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
++\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
++\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
++\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
++\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
++\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
++\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\002\010\047
++END
++CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++
++# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2", Bug 825022
++# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
++# Serial Number: 2148 (0x864)
++# Subject: E=ileti@kktcmerkezbankasi.org,CN=e-islem.kktcmerkezbankasi.org,O=KKTC Merkez Bankasi,L=Lefkosa,ST=Lefkosa,C=TR
++# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
++# Not Valid After : Thu Aug 05 07:07:51 2021
++# Fingerprint (MD5): BF:C3:EC:AD:0F:42:4F:B4:B5:38:DB:35:BF:AD:84:A2
++# Fingerprint (SHA1): F9:2B:E5:26:6C:C0:5D:B2:DC:0D:C3:F2:DC:74:E0:2D:EF:D9:49:CB
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2"
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
++\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
++\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
++\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
++\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
++\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
++\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
++\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
++\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
++\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
++\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\002\010\144
++END
++CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++
+ #
+ # Certificate "D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009"
+ #

SOURCES/nss-3.90-aes-gmc-indicator.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
+--- a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
++++ b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
+@@ -146,16 +146,38 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
+ 
+     CHECK_FORK();
+ 
+     /* make sure we're legal */
+     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, contextType, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK)
+         return crv;
+ 
++    if (context->isFIPS && (contextType == SFTK_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT)) {
++        if ((pParameter == NULL) || (ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS))) {
++            context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++        } else {
++            CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
++            switch (p->ivGenerator) {
++                case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
++                    context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    break;
++                case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
++                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
++                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    }
++                    break;
++                default:
++                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
++                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    }
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
+     if (!pOuttext) {
+         *pulOuttextLen = ulIntextLen;
+         return CKR_OK;
+     }
+     rv = (*context->aeadUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pOuttext, &outlen,
+                                 maxout, pIntext, ulIntextLen,
+                                 pParameter, ulParameterLen,
+                                 pAssociatedData, ulAssociatedDataLen);

SOURCES/nss-3.90-dh-test-update.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c.dh_test ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c.dh_test	2024-01-18 08:34:45.936944401 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c	2024-01-18 09:20:57.555980326 -0800
+@@ -1816,38 +1816,39 @@ freebl_fips_DH_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
+ {
+     /* DH Known P (2048-bits) */
+     static const PRUint8 dh_known_P[] = {
+-        0xc2, 0x79, 0xbb, 0x76, 0x32, 0x0d, 0x43, 0xfd,
+-        0x1b, 0x8c, 0xa2, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xdd, 0x6d, 0xef,
+-        0xf8, 0x1a, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xa2, 0xf5, 0x73, 0x2b,
+-        0xdb, 0x1a, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x90, 0xeb, 0xe7, 0x8e,
+-        0x5f, 0x5c, 0x6b, 0xb6, 0x61, 0x89, 0xd1, 0x03,
+-        0xb0, 0x5f, 0x91, 0xe4, 0xd2, 0x82, 0x90, 0xfc,
+-        0x3c, 0x49, 0x69, 0x59, 0xc1, 0x51, 0x6a, 0x85,
+-        0x71, 0xe7, 0x5d, 0x72, 0x5a, 0x45, 0xad, 0x01,
+-        0x6f, 0x82, 0xae, 0xec, 0x91, 0x08, 0x2e, 0x7c,
+-        0x64, 0x93, 0x46, 0x1c, 0x68, 0xef, 0xc2, 0x03,
+-        0x28, 0x1d, 0x75, 0x3a, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x46, 0xf0,
+-        0xc9, 0xdb, 0x99, 0x95, 0x13, 0x66, 0x4d, 0xd5,
+-        0x1a, 0x78, 0x92, 0x51, 0x89, 0x72, 0x28, 0x7f,
+-        0x20, 0x70, 0x41, 0x49, 0xa2, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xf9,
+-        0x78, 0x5f, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x5d, 0xfa, 0xdb, 0x57,
+-        0xd4, 0x71, 0xdf, 0x66, 0xe3, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x70,
+-        0xa4, 0x21, 0x44, 0x6a, 0xc7, 0xae, 0x30, 0x2c,
+-        0x9c, 0x1f, 0x91, 0x57, 0xc8, 0x24, 0x34, 0x2d,
+-        0x7a, 0x4a, 0x43, 0xc2, 0x5f, 0xab, 0x64, 0x2e,
+-        0xaa, 0x28, 0x32, 0x95, 0x42, 0x7b, 0xa0, 0xcc,
+-        0xdf, 0xfd, 0x22, 0xc8, 0x56, 0x84, 0xc1, 0x62,
+-        0x15, 0xb2, 0x77, 0x86, 0x81, 0xfc, 0xa5, 0x12,
+-        0x3c, 0xca, 0x28, 0x17, 0x8f, 0x03, 0x16, 0x6e,
+-        0xb8, 0x24, 0xfa, 0x1b, 0x15, 0x02, 0xfd, 0x8b,
+-        0xb6, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0xf7, 0x47, 0x41, 0xc5, 0x2b,
+-        0x37, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0x68, 0xda, 0x1c, 0x55,
+-        0x44, 0xc3, 0xee, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x07, 0x11, 0x3b,
+-        0x5f, 0x00, 0x84, 0xb4, 0xc4, 0xe4, 0xa7, 0x97,
+-        0x29, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xab, 0xfc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x34,
+-        0xe4, 0xc7, 0x81, 0x52, 0x32, 0x0e, 0x27, 0x3c,
+-        0xa6, 0x70, 0x3f, 0x4a, 0x54, 0xda, 0xdd, 0x60,
+-        0x26, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x45, 0x26, 0x19, 0x41, 0x6f
++        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
++        0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A,
++        0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1,
++        0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95,
++        0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB,
++        0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9,
++        0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8,
++        0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A,
++        0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61,
++        0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0,
++        0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3,
++        0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35,
++        0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77,
++        0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72,
++        0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35,
++        0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A,
++        0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61,
++        0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB,
++        0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68,
++        0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4,
++        0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19,
++        0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70,
++        0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC,
++        0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61,
++        0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF,
++        0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83,
++        0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73,
++        0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05,
++        0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2,
++        0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA,
++        0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x97,
++        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
++
+     };
+ 
+     static const PRUint8 dh_known_Y_1[] = {
+@@ -1893,10 +1894,10 @@ freebl_fips_DH_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
+     };
+ 
+     static const PRUint8 dh_known_hash_result[] = {
+-        0x93, 0xa2, 0x89, 0x1c, 0x8a, 0xc3, 0x70, 0xbf,
+-        0xa7, 0xdf, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x82, 0xfb, 0x87, 0x81,
+-        0x09, 0x47, 0xf3, 0x9f, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x3f,
+-        0x8e, 0x5e, 0x06, 0xca, 0x30, 0xa7, 0xaf, 0x10
++        0x40, 0xe3, 0x7a, 0x34, 0x83, 0x2d, 0x94, 0x57,
++        0x99, 0x3d, 0x66, 0xec, 0x54, 0xdf, 0x82, 0x4a,
++        0x37, 0x0d, 0xf9, 0x01, 0xb3, 0xbc, 0x54, 0xe5,
++        0x5e, 0x63, 0xd3, 0x46, 0x4e, 0xa3, 0xe2, 0x8a
+     };
+ 
+     /* DH variables. */

SOURCES/nss-3.90-ecc-wrap-fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+diff -up ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c.ecc_wrap ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c
+--- ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c.ecc_wrap	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c	2024-01-23 14:07:29.421036328 -0800
+@@ -10,6 +10,32 @@
+ #include "pk11pub.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ 
++typedef struct KeyLengthEntryStr {
++    SECOidTag tag;
++    unsigned int len;
++    PRBool encoded;
++} KeyLengthEntry;
++
++const KeyLengthEntry keyLengthTable[] = {
++    { SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1, 65, PR_TRUE },
++    { SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1, 97, PR_TRUE },
++    { SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1, 133, PR_TRUE },
++    { SEC_OID_CURVE25519, 32, PR_FALSE }
++};
++
++const KeyLengthEntry *
++getKeyLengthEntry(SECOidTag tag)
++{
++    int i;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(keyLengthTable); i++) {
++        if (keyLengthTable[i].tag == tag) {
++            return &keyLengthTable[i];
++        }
++    }
++    return NULL;
++}
++
+ void
+ printBuf(const SECItem *item)
+ {
+@@ -53,6 +79,10 @@ ectest_curve_pkcs11(SECOidTag oid)
+     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+     PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
+     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
++    const KeyLengthEntry *keyLengthEntry;
++    SECItem point = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
++    SECItem value = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
++    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ 
+     oidData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(oid);
+     if (oidData == NULL) {
+@@ -79,8 +109,63 @@ ectest_curve_pkcs11(SECOidTag oid)
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+     PrintKey(symKey);
+-    rv = SECSuccess;
+ 
++    keyLengthEntry = getKeyLengthEntry(oid);
++    /* this shouldn't happen unless new curves are added without adding them
++     * to the keyLengthTable */
++    PR_ASSERT(keyLengthEntry);
++
++    /* make sure we are returning CKA_EC_POINT according to the PKCS #11 standard.
++     * NSS itself can tolerate non-standard CKA_EC_POINT, so this is the only place
++     * our test will detect incorrect behavior */
++    rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePubKey, pubKey, CKA_EC_POINT, &point);
++    if (rv == SECFailure) {
++        printf(" >>> Couldn't get CKA_EC_POINT from the ec pubKey.\n");
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
++    rv = SECFailure;
++    if (keyLengthEntry->encoded) {
++        if (point.len == keyLengthEntry->len) {
++            printf(" >>> Expected encoded CKA_EC_POINT and got a decoded value.\n");
++            printBuf(&point);
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++        arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
++        if (arena == NULL) {
++            printf(" >>> arena alloc failed.\n");
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++
++        rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &value, SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate),
++                                    &point);
++        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++            printf(" >>> invalid endoded CKA_EC_POINT.\n");
++            printBuf(&point);
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++        rv = SECFailure;
++        if (value.len != keyLengthEntry->len) {
++            printf(" >>> invalid decoded CKA_EC_POINT len (%d) expected %d.\n",
++                   value.len, keyLengthEntry->len);
++            printBuf(&value);
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++        if (value.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) {
++            printf(" >>> invalid CKA_EC_POINT format (%02x) expected %02x.\n",
++                   value.data[0], EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED);
++            printBuf(&value);
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++    } else {
++        if (point.len != keyLengthEntry->len) {
++            printf(" >>> invalid CKA_EC_POINT len (%d) expected %d.\n",
++                   point.len, keyLengthEntry->len);
++            printBuf(&point);
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++    }
++
++    rv = SECSuccess;
+ cleanup:
+     if (privKey) {
+         SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+@@ -91,7 +176,11 @@ cleanup:
+     if (symKey) {
+         PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+     }
++    if (arena) {
++        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
++    }
+     SECITEM_FreeItem(&pk_11_ecParams, PR_FALSE);
++    SECITEM_FreeItem(&point, PR_FALSE);
+ 
+     return rv;
+ }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.ecc_wrap ./lib/freebl/blapit.h
+--- ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.ecc_wrap	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/blapit.h	2024-01-23 14:07:29.421036328 -0800
+@@ -375,7 +375,9 @@ typedef struct DHPrivateKeyStr DHPrivate
+ */
+ 
+ typedef enum { ec_params_explicit,
+-               ec_params_named
++               ec_params_named,
++               ec_params_edwards_named,
++               ec_params_montgomery_named,
+ } ECParamsType;
+ 
+ typedef enum { ec_field_GFp = 1,
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c.ecc_wrap ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c.ecc_wrap	2024-01-23 14:07:14.533870602 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c	2024-01-23 14:07:29.422036340 -0800
+@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ EC_FillParams(PLArenaPool *arena, const
+ 
+         case SEC_OID_CURVE25519:
+             /* Populate params for Curve25519 */
++            params->type = ec_params_montgomery_named;
+             CHECK_SEC_OK(gf_populate_params_bytes(ECCurve25519,
+                                                   ec_field_plain,
+                                                   params));
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.ecc_wrap ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.ecc_wrap	2024-01-23 14:07:14.520870457 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-01-23 14:08:38.198801966 -0800
+@@ -5164,7 +5164,7 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
+             }
+             /* make sure it has the same encoding */
+             if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
+-                lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
++                lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named) {
+               lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
+             } else {
+               lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
+@@ -5694,7 +5694,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+             }
+ 
+             if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
+-                ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
++                ecParams->type != ec_params_named) {
+                 PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
+                 crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
+                                             sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.ecc_wrap ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.ecc_wrap	2024-01-23 14:07:14.505870290 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c	2024-01-23 14:07:29.423036351 -0800
+@@ -1897,8 +1897,8 @@ sftk_GetPubKey(SFTKObject *object, CK_KE
+                 /* Handle the non-DER encoded case.
+                  * Some curves are always pressumed to be non-DER.
+                  */
+-                if (pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len == keyLen &&
+-                    (pubKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type == ec_field_plain ||
++                if (pubKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named ||
++                    (pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len == keyLen &&
+                      pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data[0] == EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED)) {
+                     break; /* key was not DER encoded, no need to unwrap */
+                 }
+@@ -1918,8 +1918,7 @@ sftk_GetPubKey(SFTKObject *object, CK_KE
+                         break;
+                     }
+                     /* we don't handle compressed points except in the case of ECCurve25519 */
+-                    if ((pubKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type != ec_field_plain) &&
+-                        (publicValue.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED)) {
++                    if (publicValue.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+                         crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+                         break;
+                     }

SOURCES/nss-3.90-ecdsa-sign-padding-fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_vectors.h.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-04 21:20:23.166838534 +0200
++++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_vectors.h	2024-04-10 09:05:12.664050773 +0200
+@@ -280,4 +280,101 @@ const uint8_t kP256SpkiPointNotOnCurve[]
+     0x28, 0xbc, 0x64, 0xf2, 0xf1, 0xb2, 0x0c, 0x2d, 0x7e, 0x9f, 0x51, 0x77,
+     0xa3, 0xc2, 0x94, 0x00, 0x33, 0x11, 0x77};
+ 
++const uint8_t kP521DataUnpaddedSigLong[] = {'W', 'T', 'F', '6', '0', 'M', 'W', 'M', 'N', '3'};
++const uint8_t kP521DataUnpaddedSigShort[] = { 'M', 'I', '6', '3', 'V', 'N', 'G', 'L', 'F', 'R',};
++const uint8_t kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig[] = {
++    0x30, 0x81, 0x9b, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d,
++    0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x23, 0x03, 0x81, 0x86,
++    0x00, 0x04, 0x01, 0xd2, 0x37, 0xeb, 0x78, 0xc7, 0x9b, 0x86, 0xff, 0x29,
++    0x7b, 0x55, 0x4d, 0x11, 0xc7, 0x9c, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x67, 0x9f, 0xad, 0x2a,
++    0xa9, 0xb9, 0x51, 0x30, 0x6d, 0xde, 0x14, 0x16, 0xea, 0xb3, 0x9d, 0x18,
++    0xfc, 0xf0, 0x38, 0x6e, 0x7f, 0xa6, 0x82, 0xb9, 0x19, 0x01, 0xaf, 0xe7,
++    0xc3, 0xd8, 0xec, 0x9a, 0x62, 0x7b, 0xbf, 0x41, 0xc7, 0x86, 0x89, 0x52,
++    0x76, 0x8e, 0x01, 0x97, 0x1b, 0x16, 0x97, 0x69, 0x01, 0x2d, 0x07, 0x88,
++    0x6f, 0xe0, 0x17, 0xbe, 0x82, 0xc4, 0x12, 0xd6, 0x16, 0x72, 0xf8, 0x57,
++    0x75, 0x5c, 0x69, 0x79, 0xd0, 0x11, 0x05, 0x96, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x61, 0xcd,
++    0x8f, 0x54, 0x95, 0x58, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0x71, 0x84, 0x63, 0x18, 0xb8, 0x5b,
++    0xaa, 0x1b, 0xd2, 0xe9, 0x65, 0x63, 0x15, 0x34, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2f, 0x35,
++    0x27, 0x3a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x42, 0x8e, 0xfd, 0x15, 0xbe, 0x0c, 0x0c,
++    0xe2, 0x9f};
++const uint8_t kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigLong[] = {
++    0x01, 0xa7, 0x3a, 0x14, 0x79, 0x77, 0x9e, 0x48, 0xb0, 0xff, 0xb5, 0xbe,
++    0xfb, 0xfa, 0x7a, 0x84, 0x24, 0xb3, 0x5c, 0xf0, 0xfd, 0x77, 0x9d, 0xd4,
++    0x66, 0x49, 0xfd, 0xbf, 0x04, 0xbf, 0xbb, 0x75, 0x22, 0xbb, 0x35, 0x42,
++    0xdb, 0xe7, 0xed, 0x5a, 0x8f, 0x15, 0xf3, 0xa9, 0x0e, 0xb6, 0x5b, 0xde,
++    0x23, 0x79, 0x47, 0xa7, 0x1d, 0x25, 0x24, 0x68, 0x63, 0xf6, 0x9c, 0x2e,
++    0x21, 0xe0, 0x30, 0xfc, 0xd3, 0x65, 0x01, 0x12, 0x4e, 0xf0, 0xbb, 0x89,
++    0xec, 0xec, 0x4f, 0xef, 0xbe, 0xdc, 0xd6, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x16, 0x68, 0x2b,
++    0x78, 0xdf, 0x6c, 0x6e, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x5b, 0x45, 0x1b, 0xdd, 0x84, 0x40,
++    0x94, 0x07, 0xc7, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0x57, 0x92, 0xf1, 0x64, 0xb9, 0x2c, 0xcb,
++    0x1d, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x78, 0x97, 0x8b, 0x84, 0x4e, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x0b,
++    0xb0, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x84, 0x18, 0x82, 0x8d, 0x55, 0xdf, 0x36, 0x43, 0x8a};
++const uint8_t kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigShort[] = {
++    0x40, 0x12, 0xa7, 0x96, 0x5d, 0x77, 0xba, 0x8a, 0x90, 0x57, 0x52, 0x11,
++    0xad, 0x72, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x6c, 0x73, 0x81, 0x43, 0x5d, 0x09, 0xe4, 0xde,
++    0xee, 0xc2, 0xb5, 0x03, 0x1f, 0x0f, 0xd1, 0x6a, 0xfc, 0x26, 0x6d, 0x99,
++    0x6d, 0x84, 0x32, 0x05, 0x56, 0x66, 0xe3, 0x6b, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0x04, 0xc9,
++    0x44, 0x17, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0x24, 0xd8, 0x87, 0x4e, 0x53, 0x9d, 0x08, 0x65,
++    0x91, 0x95, 0xeb, 0xeb, 0x92, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0x34, 0x80, 0xe8, 0x9f, 0x38,
++    0x73, 0x00, 0x7c, 0xfc, 0x2b, 0xfa, 0xcf, 0xa6, 0x6c, 0x1c, 0xb0, 0x75,
++    0x76, 0x01, 0x22, 0xe7, 0x3c, 0xd8, 0xc4, 0x1f, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x0b, 0x95,
++    0x7a, 0x50, 0x2b, 0x8c, 0x87, 0xc4, 0x12, 0x8e, 0x00, 0x09, 0x29, 0x2c,
++    0x21, 0xd1, 0x96, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0x54, 0xdb, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0x90, 0xf5,
++    0x5c, 0x7a, 0x8d, 0x83, 0x9c, 0x39, 0x38, 0x58, 0x5a, 0x0e};
++const uint8_t kP384DataUnpaddedSigLong[] = {'L', 'T', 'N', '4', 'B', 'P', 'X', 'Y', '5', 'N'};
++const uint8_t kP384DataUnpaddedSigShort[] = {'3', 'U', 'S', 'N', 'N', 'U', '6', 'E', 'E', '0'};
++const uint8_t kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig[] = {
++    0x30, 0x76, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02,
++    0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04,
++    0x1e, 0x98, 0x4c, 0xcf, 0x05, 0xd4, 0x9b, 0x98, 0x11, 0xae, 0xa1, 0xaa,
++    0x72, 0x27, 0xac, 0xde, 0x7f, 0xe8, 0x4d, 0xda, 0xaa, 0x67, 0x51, 0x2e,
++    0x0b, 0x30, 0x31, 0xab, 0x05, 0xac, 0x95, 0xdf, 0x09, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xe3,
++    0xf5, 0xfa, 0x30, 0xad, 0x43, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0x7e, 0xd7, 0xd1, 0xee, 0x4e,
++    0x83, 0x53, 0xe3, 0x26, 0xeb, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0xe5, 0x35, 0x36, 0x1a, 0xbf,
++    0xbf, 0x99, 0xd6, 0xe2, 0x14, 0x43, 0xcb, 0x54, 0xde, 0x06, 0xb5, 0x7d,
++    0x27, 0xb7, 0xc2, 0x27, 0xaf, 0xb6, 0x12, 0x4f, 0x47, 0xa0, 0xdb, 0xb5,
++    0x6e, 0x7b, 0x44, 0x0d, 0xc8, 0xbd, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x27, 0x7c, 0xf2, 0x3a};
++const uint8_t kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigLong[] = {
++    0x19, 0x22, 0x21, 0x72, 0x8a, 0xa4, 0x22, 0x26, 0x75, 0x16, 0x9c, 0x58,
++    0x93, 0xd8, 0x43, 0xac, 0x28, 0x78, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0xf2, 0x5d, 0xa6, 0x59,
++    0x74, 0x6d, 0x55, 0x95, 0xe1, 0xa8, 0xc9, 0x18, 0x54, 0x5d, 0x03, 0xa0,
++    0xb0, 0x90, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x29, 0x1a, 0x50, 0x9d, 0xe3, 0xde,
++    0x4a, 0x69, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0x53, 0xd7, 0xe8, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0xfc,
++    0x07, 0x66, 0xbc, 0xa7, 0xb5, 0x47, 0x29, 0xbd, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x57, 0x6c,
++    0xde, 0x37, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xd4, 0x61, 0x79, 0x92, 0x67, 0x25, 0x2e, 0xbc,
++    0x8b, 0x88, 0x6a, 0xfa, 0xa5, 0x00, 0x19, 0x11, 0x64, 0x69, 0x7b, 0xf6};
++const uint8_t kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigShort[] = {
++    0x69, 0xe6, 0xc2, 0xd0, 0xb0, 0x59, 0xca, 0x1f, 0x07, 0x4c, 0x90, 0x13,
++    0x75, 0xe0, 0xc5, 0xb9, 0x38, 0xf2, 0xd8, 0x55, 0xf7, 0x08, 0xbd, 0x8e,
++    0x61, 0xbd, 0x50, 0x7e, 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xea, 0xbc, 0xa4, 0xa0, 0x18, 0x9b,
++    0x63, 0x6b, 0x8a, 0x91, 0x88, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xbe, 0x6a, 0xb6, 0x4b, 0xaf,
++    0xcb, 0x31, 0x89, 0xcf, 0x43, 0x28, 0x4b, 0x04, 0x6a, 0xe0, 0x8d, 0xbc,
++    0xbf, 0xa2, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x1c, 0x83, 0x82, 0x3e, 0x2b, 0xa3, 0xea, 0x50,
++    0x80, 0xec, 0x31, 0x48, 0x20, 0x30, 0x75, 0x94, 0xd9, 0x08, 0x9f, 0x6f,
++    0x53, 0x21, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x74, 0x0c, 0xc4, 0x21, 0x28, 0xc9};
++const uint8_t kP256DataUnpaddedSigLong[] = {'J', '5', 'C', 'N', 'Q', 'T', 'F', 'A', 'J', 'T'};
++const uint8_t kP256DataUnpaddedSigShort[] = {'K', 'O', 'S', '9', '4', 'F', 'V', 'C', 'Y', 'C'};
++const uint8_t kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig[] = {
++    0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02,
++    0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03,
++    0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30, 0x40, 0x9d, 0x57, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x70, 0x1d, 0x4b,
++    0x40, 0x84, 0xd4, 0x7a, 0xc0, 0x30, 0x68, 0x33, 0xf1, 0x1d, 0x47, 0xaa,
++    0x37, 0x4d, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xce, 0xdc, 0x82, 0x1d, 0xf7, 0xcf, 0xdd, 0x9e,
++    0xb6, 0x6c, 0x85, 0x87, 0x9d, 0x31, 0x79, 0x7e, 0xe4, 0xe9, 0xc7, 0x4f,
++    0xd6, 0x07, 0x1d, 0x2f, 0x54, 0x82, 0x5d, 0x22, 0xbf, 0xbc, 0xf0, 0x75,
++    0x01, 0x09, 0x43, 0xc6, 0x52, 0xcb, 0x45 };
++const uint8_t kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigLong[] = {
++    0xad, 0x6f, 0xcf, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x83, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0xe0, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0x56,
++    0xa5, 0x17, 0x60, 0xbf, 0x80, 0x71, 0x18, 0x54, 0x1d, 0x82, 0xdb, 0xe6,
++    0xc2, 0x4e, 0x60, 0x4a, 0xa6, 0x0c, 0xed, 0xcf, 0xe9, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x11,
++    0xc2, 0x0a, 0x9c, 0x02, 0x5f, 0xb6, 0xa0, 0xb8, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xbf, 0x80,
++    0xb4, 0xfb, 0x68, 0xab, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x07, 0xeb, 0x50, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0x47,
++    0xcf, 0x61, 0x91, 0x5f};
++const uint8_t kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigShort[] = {
++    0x3d, 0x99, 0x94, 0xa9, 0x80, 0x12, 0x43, 0x27, 0xde, 0x78, 0x9e, 0x61,
++    0xaf, 0x10, 0xee, 0xd2, 0x22, 0xc6, 0x6e, 0x1c, 0xdf, 0xe7, 0x75, 0x28,
++    0x84, 0xae, 0xb8, 0xdb, 0x7b, 0xf1, 0x91, 0x86, 0x5b, 0x5a, 0x28, 0x16,
++    0x15, 0xfe, 0xd9, 0x48, 0x33, 0x95, 0xa8, 0x8f, 0x92, 0xbb, 0xe3, 0x9c,
++    0xca, 0x04, 0xef, 0x56, 0x48, 0x16, 0x73, 0xa6, 0xb6, 0x6a, 0x38, 0xc9,
++    0x78, 0xc4};
+ }  // namespace nss_test
+--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_unittest.cc.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-04 21:19:59.583677319 +0200
++++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_unittest.cc	2024-04-10 17:03:24.202133898 +0200
+@@ -326,4 +326,47 @@ INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(Pkcs11EcdsaRoun
+                                            SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1,
+                                            SEC_OID_CURVE25519));
+ 
++class Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest
++    : public Pkcs11EcdsaTestBase,
++      public ::testing::WithParamInterface<Pkcs11EcdsaTestParams> {
++ public:
++  Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest() : Pkcs11EcdsaTestBase(GetParam().hash_oid_) {}
++};
++
++static const Pkcs11EcdsaTestParams kEcdsaUnpaddedSignaturesVectors[] = {
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP256DataUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP256DataUnpaddedSigLong)),
++      DataBuffer(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigLong))}},
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP256DataUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP256DataUnpaddedSigShort)),
++      DataBuffer(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigShort))}},
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP384DataUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP384DataUnpaddedSigLong)),
++      DataBuffer(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigLong))}},
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP384DataUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP384DataUnpaddedSigShort)),
++      DataBuffer(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigShort))}},
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP521DataUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP521DataUnpaddedSigLong)),
++      DataBuffer(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigLong))}},
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP521DataUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP521DataUnpaddedSigShort)),
++      DataBuffer(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigShort))}}
++};
++
++TEST_P(Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest, Verify) { Verify(GetParam().sig_params_); }
++INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(EcdsaVerifyUnpaddedSignatures, Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest,
++                         ::testing::ValuesIn(kEcdsaUnpaddedSignaturesVectors));
+ }  // namespace nss_test
+--- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp256r1.c.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-09 14:58:28.413482715 +0200
++++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp256r1.c	2024-04-09 21:15:23.717222679 +0200
+@@ -214,6 +214,9 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+ {
+     SECStatus res = SECSuccess;
+ 
++    unsigned char _padded_sig_data[64] = { 0 };
++    unsigned char *sig_r, *sig_s;
++
+     if (!key || !signature || !digest ||
+         !key->publicValue.data ||
+         !signature->data || !digest->data ||
+@@ -223,9 +226,10 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (key->publicValue.len != 65 ||
+-        digest->len == 0 ||
+-        signature->len != 64) {
++    unsigned int olen = key->ecParams.order.len;
++    if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len % 2 != 0 ||
++        signature->len > 2 * olen ||
++        digest->len == 0 || key->publicValue.len != 65) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+         res = SECFailure;
+         return res;
+@@ -237,6 +241,25 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
++    /* P-256 signature has to be 64 bytes long, pad it with 0s if it isn't */
++    if (signature->len != 64) {
++        unsigned split = signature->len / 2;
++        unsigned pad = 32 - split;
++
++        unsigned char *o_sig = signature->data;
++        unsigned char *p_sig = _padded_sig_data;
++
++        memcpy(p_sig + pad, o_sig, split);
++        memcpy(p_sig + 32 + pad, o_sig + split, split);
++
++        sig_r = p_sig;
++        sig_s = p_sig + 32;
++    } else {
++        sig_r = signature->data;
++        sig_s = signature->data + 32;
++    }
++
++
+     uint8_t hash[32] = { 0 };
+     if (digest->len < 32) {
+         memcpy(hash + 32 - digest->len, digest->data, digest->len);
+@@ -247,7 +270,7 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+     bool b = Hacl_P256_ecdsa_verif_without_hash(
+         32, hash,
+         key->publicValue.data + 1,
+-        signature->data, signature->data + 32);
++        sig_r, sig_s);
+     if (!b) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+         res = SECFailure;
+--- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp384r1.c.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-09 14:58:12.726377972 +0200
++++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp384r1.c	2024-04-09 14:50:47.932425779 +0200
+@@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+ {
+     SECStatus res = SECSuccess;
+ 
++    unsigned char _padded_sig_data[96] = { 0 };
++    unsigned char *sig_r, *sig_s;
++
+     if (!key || !signature || !digest ||
+         !key->publicValue.data ||
+         !signature->data || !digest->data ||
+@@ -194,9 +197,10 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (key->publicValue.len != 97 ||
+-        digest->len == 0 ||
+-        signature->len != 96) {
++    unsigned int olen = key->ecParams.order.len;
++    if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len % 2 != 0 ||
++        signature->len > 2 * olen ||
++        digest->len == 0 || key->publicValue.len != 97) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+         res = SECFailure;
+         return res;
+@@ -208,6 +212,24 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
++    /* P-384 signature has to be 96 bytes long, pad it with 0s if it isn't */
++    if (signature->len != 96) {
++        unsigned split = signature->len / 2;
++        unsigned pad = 48 - split;
++
++        unsigned char *o_sig = signature->data;
++        unsigned char *p_sig = _padded_sig_data;
++
++        memcpy(p_sig + pad, o_sig, split);
++        memcpy(p_sig + 48 + pad, o_sig + split, split);
++
++        sig_r = p_sig;
++        sig_s = p_sig + 48;
++    } else {
++        sig_r = signature->data;
++        sig_s = signature->data + 48;
++    }
++
+     uint8_t hash[48] = { 0 };
+     if (digest->len < 48) {
+         memcpy(hash + 48 - digest->len, digest->data, digest->len);
+@@ -218,7 +240,7 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+     bool b = Hacl_P384_ecdsa_verif_without_hash(
+         48, hash,
+         key->publicValue.data + 1,
+-        signature->data, signature->data + 48);
++        sig_r, sig_s);
+     if (!b) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+         res = SECFailure;
+--- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp521r1.c.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-05 22:42:26.553728340 +0200
++++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp521r1.c	2024-04-09 13:02:14.821865860 +0200
+@@ -189,6 +189,9 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+ {
+     SECStatus res = SECSuccess;
+ 
++    unsigned char _padded_sig_data[132] = { 0 };
++    unsigned char *sig_r, *sig_s;
++
+     if (!key || !signature || !digest ||
+         !key->publicValue.data ||
+         !signature->data || !digest->data ||
+@@ -198,9 +201,10 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (key->publicValue.len != 133 ||
+-        digest->len == 0 ||
+-        signature->len != 132) {
++    unsigned int olen = key->ecParams.order.len;
++    if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len % 2 != 0 ||
++        signature->len > 2 * olen ||
++        digest->len == 0 || key->publicValue.len != 133) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+         res = SECFailure;
+         return res;
+@@ -212,6 +216,24 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
++    /* P-521 signature has to be 132 bytes long, pad it with 0s if it isn't */
++    if (signature->len != 132) {
++        unsigned split = signature->len / 2;
++        unsigned pad = 66 - split;
++
++        unsigned char *o_sig = signature->data;
++        unsigned char *p_sig = _padded_sig_data;
++
++        memcpy(p_sig + pad, o_sig, split);
++        memcpy(p_sig + 66 + pad, o_sig + split, split);
++
++        sig_r = p_sig;
++        sig_s = p_sig + 66;
++    } else {
++        sig_r = signature->data;
++        sig_s = signature->data + 66;
++    }
++
+     uint8_t hash[66] = { 0 };
+     if (digest->len < 66) {
+         memcpy(hash + 66 - digest->len, digest->data, digest->len);
+@@ -227,7 +249,7 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+     bool b = Hacl_P521_ecdsa_verif_without_hash(
+         66, hash,
+         key->publicValue.data + 1,
+-        signature->data, signature->data + 66);
++        sig_r, sig_s);
+     if (!b) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+         res = SECFailure;

SOURCES/nss-3.90-extend-db-dump-time.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh.extend ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh
+--- ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh.extend	2023-11-15 13:17:50.651020458 -0800
++++ ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh	2023-11-15 13:18:57.091608850 -0800
+@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ dbtest_main()
+       RARRAY=($dtime)
+       TIMEARRAY=(${RARRAY[1]//./ })
+       echo "${TIMEARRAY[0]} seconds"
+-      test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt 2
++      test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt ${NSS_DB_DUMP_TIME-3}
+       ret=$?
+       html_msg ${ret} 0 "certutil dump keys with explicit default trust flags"
+     fi

SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-indicators.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators	2023-11-27 11:21:42.459523398 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2023-11-27 11:22:56.821120920 -0800
+@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, C
+     context->blockSize = 0;
+     context->maxLen = 0;
+     context->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(session->slot, pMechanism,
+-                                           operation, key);
++                                           operation, key, 0);
+     *contextPtr = context;
+     return CKR_OK;
+ }
+@@ -4816,7 +4816,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
+     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+     /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated 
+      * key length against fips requirements */
+-    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
++    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key, 0);
+     session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
+     sftk_FreeSession(session);
+     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+@@ -5836,7 +5836,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+         return crv;
+     }
+     /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
+-    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
++    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey, 0);
+     publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
+     session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
+     sftk_FreeSession(session);
+@@ -7036,6 +7036,10 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+         return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+     }
+ 
++    if (!params->bExpand) {
++        keySize = hashLen;
++    }
++
+     /* sourceKey is NULL if we are called from the POST, skip the
+      * sensitiveCheck */
+     if (sourceKey != NULL) {
+@@ -7085,7 +7089,8 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+                     mech.pParameter = params;
+                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
+                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
+-                                                       CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
++                                                       CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
++                                                       keySize);
+                 }
+                 saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
+                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
+@@ -7152,7 +7157,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+     /* HKDF-Expand */
+     if (!params->bExpand) {
+         okm = prk;
+-        keySize = genLen = hashLen;
++        genLen = hashLen;
+     } else {
+         /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
+          * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
+@@ -7398,7 +7403,8 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+             return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+         }
+     }
+-    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey);
++    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
++                                       keySize);
+ 
+     switch (mechanism) {
+         /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators	2023-11-27 11:21:42.450523326 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2023-11-27 11:22:56.821120920 -0800
+@@ -979,7 +979,8 @@ CK_FLAGS sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIB
+ /* check the FIPS table to determine if this current operation is allowed by
+  * FIPS security policy */
+ PRBool sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
+-                            CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source);
++                            CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source,
++                            CK_ULONG targetKeySize);
+ /* add validation objects to the slot */
+ CK_RV sftk_CreateValidationObjects(SFTKSlot *slot);
+ 
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators	2023-11-27 11:21:42.451523334 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2023-11-27 11:31:51.812419789 -0800
+@@ -2330,7 +2330,7 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
+ static CK_ULONG
+ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
+ {
+-    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
+     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
+     CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
+     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+@@ -2392,13 +2392,29 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
+     return keyLength;
+ }
+ 
++PRBool
++sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
++{
++    switch (hash) {
++        case CKM_SHA256:
++        case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
++        case CKM_SHA384:
++        case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
++        case CKM_SHA512:
++        case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
++            return PR_TRUE;
++    }
++    return PR_FALSE;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
+  * handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
+  * would have to be coded here before they can be added to the table */
+ static PRBool
+ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
+-                   SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source)
++                   SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
++                   CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
+ {
+     switch (mechInfo->special) {
+         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
+@@ -2458,10 +2474,15 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+             if (hashObj == NULL) {
+                 return PR_FALSE;
+             }
++            /* cap the salt for legacy keys */
++            if ((keyLength <= 1024) && (pss->sLen > 63)) {
++                return PR_FALSE;
++            }
++            /* cap the salt for based on the hash */
+             if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
+                 return PR_FALSE;
+             }
+-            return PR_TRUE;
++            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
+         }
+         case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
+             /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
+@@ -2486,6 +2507,13 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+              }
+              return PR_TRUE;
+         }
++        /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
++        case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
++            if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
++                return PR_FALSE;
++            }
++            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
++                        + mechInfo->offset));
+         default:
+             break;
+     }
+@@ -2496,7 +2524,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+ 
+ PRBool
+ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op,
+-                     SFTKObject *source)
++                     SFTKObject *source, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
+ {
+ #ifndef NSS_HAS_FIPS_INDICATORS
+     return PR_FALSE;
+@@ -2528,13 +2556,17 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
+         SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechs = &sftk_fips_mechs[i];
+         /* if we match the number of records exactly, then we are an
+          * approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
+-        if (((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
+-             (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
+-             (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
+-             (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
+-             ((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
++        if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
++            (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
++            (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
++            (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
++            (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
++            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
++             ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
++             (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
++             ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
+             ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
+-             sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source))) {
++             sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
+             return PR_TRUE;
+         }
+     }

SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-indicators2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.632889660 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
+@@ -7090,7 +7090,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
+                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
+                                                        CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
+-                                                       keySize);
++                                                       keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
+                 }
+                 saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
+                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
+@@ -7404,7 +7404,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+         }
+     }
+     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
+-                                       keySize);
++                                       keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
+ 
+     switch (mechanism) {
+         /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.633889670 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-01-19 09:28:00.082843565 -0800
+@@ -2393,20 +2393,43 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
+ }
+ 
+ PRBool
+-sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
++sftk_checkFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash, PRBool allowSmall, PRBool allowCMAC)
+ {
+     switch (hash) {
++        case CKM_AES_CMAC:
++            return allowCMAC;
++        case CKM_SHA_1:
++        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
++        case CKM_SHA224:
++        case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
++            return allowSmall;
+         case CKM_SHA256:
+-        case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
++        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
+         case CKM_SHA384:
+-        case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
++        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
+         case CKM_SHA512:
+-        case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
++        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
+             return PR_TRUE;
+     }
+     return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ 
++PRBool
++sftk_checkKeyLength(CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG min,
++                    CK_ULONG max, CK_ULONG step)
++{
++     if (keyLength > max) {
++         return PR_FALSE;
++     }
++     if (keyLength < min ) {
++         return PR_FALSE;
++     }
++     if (((keyLength - min) % step) != 0) {
++         return PR_FALSE;
++     }
++     return PR_TRUE;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
+  * handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
+@@ -2416,6 +2439,8 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+                    SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
+                    CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
+ {
++    PRBool allowSmall = PR_FALSE;
++    PRBool allowCMAC = PR_FALSE;
+     switch (mechInfo->special) {
+         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
+             SECItem dhPrime;
+@@ -2482,7 +2507,11 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+             if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
+                 return PR_FALSE;
+             }
+-            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
++            /* Our code makes sure pss->hashAlg matches the explicit
++             * hash in the mechanism, and only mechanisms with approved
++             * hashes are included, so no need to check pss->hashAlg
++             * here */
++            return PR_TRUE;
+         }
+         case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
+             /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
+@@ -2508,12 +2537,28 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+              return PR_TRUE;
+         }
+         /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
++        case SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800:
++             allowCMAC = PR_TRUE;
+         case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
++             allowSmall = PR_TRUE;
++        case SFTKFIPSChkHashTls:
+             if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
+                 return PR_FALSE;
+             }
+-            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
+-                        + mechInfo->offset));
++            return sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
++                        + mechInfo->offset), allowSmall, allowCMAC);
++        case SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck:
++            if (mech->mechanism != CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
++                /* unless the mechnism has a built-in hash, check the hash */
++                if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
++                    return PR_FALSE;
++                }
++                if (!sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
++                        + mechInfo->offset), PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
++                    return PR_FALSE;
++                }
++            }
++            return sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, 112, 512, 1);
+         default:
+             break;
+     }
+@@ -2558,13 +2603,11 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
+          * approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
+         if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
+             (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
+-            (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
+-            (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
+-            (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
+-            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
+-             ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
+-             (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
+-             ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
++            sftk_checkKeyLength(keyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
++                                mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step) &&
++            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||  (mechs->special == SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck)
++             || sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
++                                mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step)) &&
+             ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
+              sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
+             return PR_TRUE;
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.634889680 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c	2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
+@@ -157,16 +157,25 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
+         } else {
+             CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
+             switch (p->ivGenerator) {
++                default:
+                 case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
+                     context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+                     break;
+                 case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
+-                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
++                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
++                        (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
+                         context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+                     }
+                     break;
+-                default:
+-                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
++                case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR:
++                    if ((p->ulIvLen != 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
++                        (p->ulIvFixedBits != 32)) {
++                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    }
++                    break;
++                case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER:
++                    if ((p->ulIvFixedBits < 32) ||
++                       ((p->ulIvLen*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - p->ulIvFixedBits) < 32)) {
+                         context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+                     }
+             }

SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-pkcs11-long-hash.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
++++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+@@ -15,10 +15,13 @@
+  *   keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token.
+  *
+  *   In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session
+  *   that created or generated them.
+  */
++
++#include <limits.h> /* for UINT_MAX and ULONG_MAX */
++
+ #include "seccomon.h"
+ #include "secitem.h"
+ #include "secport.h"
+ #include "blapi.h"
+ #include "pkcs11.h"
+@@ -1954,12 +1957,21 @@
+     if (pDigest == NULL) {
+         *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
+         goto finish;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* do it: */
++#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
++    /* The context->hashUpdate function takes an unsigned int for its data
++     * length argument, but NSC_Digest takes an unsigned long. */
++    while (ulDataLen > UINT_MAX) {
++        (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, UINT_MAX);
++        pData += UINT_MAX;
++        ulDataLen -= UINT_MAX;
++    }
++#endif
+     (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen);
++
+     /*  NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */
+     (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
+     *pulDigestLen = digestLen;
+ 
+     sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
+@@ -1980,12 +1992,22 @@
+ 
+     /* make sure we're legal */
+     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK)
+         return crv;
+-    /* do it: */
++
++#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
++    /* The context->hashUpdate function takes an unsigned int for its data
++     * length argument, but NSC_DigestUpdate takes an unsigned long. */
++    while (ulPartLen > UINT_MAX) {
++        (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, UINT_MAX);
++        pPart += UINT_MAX;
++        ulPartLen -= UINT_MAX;
++    }
++#endif
+     (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
++
+     return CKR_OK;
+ }
+ 
+ /* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
+ CK_RV
+@@ -3166,10 +3188,17 @@
+     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, type, PR_TRUE, &session);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK)
+         return crv;
+ 
+     if (context->hashInfo) {
++#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
++        while (ulPartLen > UINT_MAX) {
++            (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, UINT_MAX);
++            pPart += UINT_MAX;
++            ulPartLen -= UINT_MAX;
++        }
++#endif
+         (*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
+     } else {
+         /* must be block cipher MACing */
+ 
+         unsigned int blkSize = context->blockSize;
+

SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-safe-memset.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
+         PORT_Memcpy(iv + AES_KEY_WRAP_BLOCK_SIZE, input, inputLen);
+         rv = AES_Encrypt(&cx->aescx, output, pOutputLen, maxOutputLen, iv,
+                          outLen);
+-        PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
++        PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
+         return rv;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
+     PORT_ZFree(newBuf, paddedInputLen);
+     /* a little overkill, we only need to clear out the length, but this
+      * is easier to verify we got it all */
+-    PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
++    PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -631,12 +631,12 @@ AESKeyWrap_DecryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
+ loser:
+     /* if we failed, make sure we don't return any data to the user */
+     if ((rv != SECSuccess) && (output == newBuf)) {
+-        PORT_Memset(newBuf, 0, paddedLen);
++        PORT_SafeZero(newBuf, paddedLen);
+     }
+     /* clear out CSP sensitive data from the heap and stack */
+     if (allocBuf) {
+         PORT_ZFree(allocBuf, paddedLen);
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
++    PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
+     return rv;
+ }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/blapii.h
+--- ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/blapii.h	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -101,10 +101,10 @@ PRBool ppc_crypto_support();
+ #ifdef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
+ #define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)
+ #else
+-#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)                    \
+-    {                                                    \
+-        volatile char _stkclr[stack_size];               \
+-        PORT_Memset((void *)&_stkclr[0], 0, stack_size); \
++#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)                   \
++    {                                                   \
++        volatile char _stkclr[stack_size];              \
++        PORT_SafeZero((void *)&_stkclr[0], stack_size); \
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/drbg.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/drbg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ prng_initEntropy(void)
+     SHA256_Update(&ctx, block, sizeof(block));
+     SHA256_End(&ctx, globalrng->previousEntropyHash, NULL,
+                sizeof(globalrng->previousEntropyHash));
+-    PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
++    PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof(block));
+     SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
+     return PR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+@@ -246,8 +246,8 @@ prng_getEntropy(PRUint8 *buffer, size_t
+     }
+ 
+ out:
+-    PORT_Memset(hash, 0, sizeof hash);
+-    PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof block);
++    PORT_SafeZero(hash, sizeof hash);
++    PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof block);
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *r
+         PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data) - 1, carry);
+         SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data);
+-    PORT_Memset(thisHash, 0, sizeof thisHash);
++    PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof data);
++    PORT_SafeZero(thisHash, sizeof thisHash);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng,
+     PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter, (sizeof rng->reseed_counter) - 1, carry);
+ 
+     /* if the prng failed, don't return any output, signal softoken */
+-    PORT_Memset(H, 0, sizeof H);
++    PORT_SafeZero(H, sizeof H);
+     if (!rng->isValid) {
+         PORT_Memset(returned_bytes, 0, no_of_returned_bytes);
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/dsa.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/dsa.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
+     err = MP_OKAY;
+     signature->len = dsa_signature_len;
+ cleanup:
+-    PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
++    PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
+     mp_clear(&p);
+     mp_clear(&q);
+     mp_clear(&g);
+@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ DSA_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
+         rv = dsa_SignDigest(key, signature, digest, kSeed);
+     } while (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM &&
+              --retries > 0);
+-    PORT_Memset(kSeed, 0, sizeof kSeed);
++    PORT_SafeZero(kSeed, sizeof kSeed);
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ DSA_VerifyDigest(DSAPublicKey *key, cons
+         verified = SECSuccess; /* Signature verified. */
+     }
+ cleanup:
+-    PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, sizeof localDigestData);
++    PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, sizeof localDigestData);
+     mp_clear(&p);
+     mp_clear(&q);
+     mp_clear(&g);
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/gcm.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/gcm.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ gcmHash_Final(gcmHashContext *ghash, uns
+     rv = SECSuccess;
+ 
+ cleanup:
+-    PORT_Memset(T, 0, sizeof(T));
++    PORT_SafeZero(T, sizeof(T));
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -596,15 +596,15 @@ GCM_CreateContext(void *context, freeblC
+     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+         goto loser;
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++    PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+     gcm->ctr_context_init = PR_TRUE;
+     return gcm;
+ 
+ loser:
+-    PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++    PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+     if (ghash && ghash->mem) {
+         void *mem = ghash->mem;
+-        PORT_Memset(ghash, 0, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
++        PORT_SafeZero(ghash, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
+         PORT_Free(mem);
+     }
+     if (gcm) {
+@@ -682,11 +682,11 @@ gcm_InitCounter(GCMContext *gcm, const u
+         goto loser;
+     }
+ 
+-    PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
++    PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
+     return SECSuccess;
+ 
+ loser:
+-    PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
++    PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
+     if (freeCtr) {
+         CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
+     }
+@@ -866,10 +866,10 @@ GCM_DecryptUpdate(GCMContext *gcm, unsig
+     if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(tag, intag, tagBytes) != 0) {
+         /* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+-        PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
++        PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
++    PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
+     /* finish the decryption */
+     return CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
+                       inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+@@ -1159,10 +1159,10 @@ GCM_DecryptAEAD(GCMContext *gcm, unsigne
+         /* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
+         CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+-        PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
++        PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
++    PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
+     /* finish the decryption */
+     rv = CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
+                     inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ MAC(unsigned char *mdOut,
+     hashObj->end(mdState, mdOut, mdOutLen, mdOutMax);
+     hashObj->destroy(mdState, PR_TRUE);
+ 
+-    PORT_Memset(lengthBytes, 0, sizeof lengthBytes);
+-    PORT_Memset(hmacPad, 0, sizeof hmacPad);
+-    PORT_Memset(firstBlock, 0, sizeof firstBlock);
+-    PORT_Memset(macOut, 0, sizeof macOut);
++    PORT_SafeZero(lengthBytes, sizeof lengthBytes);
++    PORT_SafeZero(hmacPad, sizeof hmacPad);
++    PORT_SafeZero(firstBlock, sizeof firstBlock);
++    PORT_SafeZero(macOut, sizeof macOut);
+ 
+     return SECSuccess;
+ }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ intel_aes_gcmInitCounter(intel_AES_GCMCo
+ void
+ intel_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
+ {
+-    PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
++    PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
+     if (freeit) {
+         PORT_Free(gcm);
+     }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ ppc_aes_gcmInitCounter(ppc_AES_GCMContex
+ void
+ ppc_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(ppc_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
+ {
+-    PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
++    PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
+     if (freeit) {
+         PORT_Free(gcm);
+     }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/pqg.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/pqg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ cleanup:
+     mp_clear(&a);
+     mp_clear(&z);
+     mp_clear(&two_length_minus_1);
+-    PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
++    PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
+     if (err) {
+         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+         rv = SECFailure;
+@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ cleanup:
+     mp_clear(&c);
+     mp_clear(&c0);
+     mp_clear(&one);
+-    PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
++    PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
+     if (err) {
+         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+         rv = SECFailure;
+@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ makePfromQandSeed(
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&c, 1, &c)); /* c -= 1       */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub(&X, &c, P));   /* P = X - c    */
+ cleanup:
+-    PORT_Memset(V_j, 0, sizeof V_j);
++    PORT_SafeZero(V_j, sizeof V_j);
+     mp_clear(&W);
+     mp_clear(&X);
+     mp_clear(&c);
+@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ makeGfromIndex(HASH_HashType hashtype,
+ /* step 11.
+      * return valid G */
+ cleanup:
+-    PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
++    PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof(data));
+     if (hashcx) {
+         hashobj->destroy(hashcx, PR_TRUE);
+     }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
+@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ AES_DestroyContext(AESContext *cx, PRBoo
+         cx->worker_cx = NULL;
+         cx->destroy = NULL;
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(cx, 0, sizeof(AESContext));
++    PORT_SafeZero(cx, sizeof(AESContext));
+     if (freeit) {
+         PORT_Free(mem);
+     } else {
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsa.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:41:24.066840894 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/rsa.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
+@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
+     /* 2.  Compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1) */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(p, 1, &psub1));
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(q, 1, &qsub1));
++    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
+     if (needPublicExponent || needPrivateExponent) {
+-        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
+         /* 3.  Compute d = e**-1 mod(phi) */
+         /*     or      e = d**-1 mod(phi) as necessary */
+         if (needPublicExponent) {
+@@ -165,6 +165,15 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
++    /* make sure we weren't passed in a d or e = 1 mod phi */
++    /* just need to check d, because if one is = 1 mod phi, they both are */
++    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &phi, &tmp));
++    if (mp_cmp_d(&tmp, 2) <= 0) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++        rv = SECFailure;
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
++
+     /* 4.  Compute exponent1 = d mod (p-1) */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &psub1, &tmp));
+     MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->exponent1, key->arena);
+@@ -1152,6 +1161,8 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTCheckedPubKey(RSAPriv
+     /* Perform a public key operation v = m ** e mod n */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(m, &e, &n, &v));
+     if (mp_cmp(&v, c) != 0) {
++        /* this error triggers a fips fatal error lock */
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+         rv = SECFailure;
+     }
+ cleanup:
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
+@@ -977,14 +977,14 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
+     /* now create the hmac key */
+     hmac = HMAC_Create(hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
+     if (hmac == NULL) {
+-        PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
++        PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
+         return NULL;
+     }
+     HMAC_Begin(hmac);
+     HMAC_Update(hmac, input, inputLen);
+     rv = HMAC_Finish(hmac, keyHash, &keyLen, sizeof(keyHash));
+     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+-        PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
++        PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
+         HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
+         return NULL;
+     }
+@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
+      * reuse the original context allocated above so we don't
+      * need to allocate and free another one */
+     rv = HMAC_ReInit(hmac, hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
+-    PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
++    PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
+     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+         HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
+         return NULL;
+@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ rsa_HMACPrf(HMACContext *hmac, const cha
+             return rv;
+         }
+         PORT_Memcpy(output, hmacLast, left);
+-        PORT_Memset(hmacLast, 0, sizeof(hmacLast));
++        PORT_SafeZero(hmacLast, sizeof(hmacLast));
+     }
+     return rv;
+ }
+@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ rsa_GetErrorLength(HMACContext *hmac, in
+         outLength = PORT_CT_SEL(PORT_CT_LT(candidate, maxLegalLen),
+                                 candidate, outLength);
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
++    PORT_SafeZero(out, sizeof(out));
+     return outLength;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
+@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyDSACheck(PRFileDesc *shFD,
+ 
+     /* verify the hash against the check file */
+     rv = DSA_VerifyDigest(key, signature, &hash);
+-    PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
++    PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
+     return (rv == SECSuccess) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyHMACCheck(PRFileDesc *shFD
+     if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+         result = SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(signature, &hash);
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
++    PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
+     return result;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
+ #ifndef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
+     DSAPublicKey key;
+ 
+-    PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
++    PORT_SafeZero(&key, sizeof(key));
+ #endif
+ 
+     /* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
+@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
+     shFD = NULL;
+ 
+ loser:
+-    PORT_Memset(&header, 0, sizeof header);
++    PORT_SafeZero(&header, sizeof header);
+     if (checkName != NULL) {
+         PORT_Free(checkName);
+     }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
+@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ loser:
+     /* clear out state so it's not left on the stack */
+     if (cx)
+         HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_TRUE);
+-    PORT_Memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
+-    PORT_Memset(outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf));
++    PORT_SafeZero(state, sizeof(state));
++    PORT_SafeZero(outbuf, sizeof(outbuf));
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c	2023-11-22 14:44:15.519400684 -0800
+@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
+         return;
+     }
+     RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
+-    PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
++    PORT_SafeZero(bytes, sizeof bytes);
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:41:24.069840921 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
+@@ -5092,7 +5092,7 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
+         if ((signature_length >= pairwise_digest_length) &&
+             (PORT_Memcmp(known_digest, signature + (signature_length - pairwise_digest_length), pairwise_digest_length) == 0)) {
+             PORT_Free(signature);
+-            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
++            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+         }
+ 
+         /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
+diff -up ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero ./lib/util/secport.h
+--- ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/util/secport.h	2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
+@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <ctype.h>
++/* ask for Annex K for memset_s. will set the appropriate #define
++ * if Annex K is supported */
++#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stddef.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -182,6 +185,39 @@ SEC_END_PROTOS
+ #endif /*SUNOS4*/
+ #define PORT_Memset memset
+ 
++/* there are cases where the compiler optimizes away our attempt to clear
++ * out our stack variables. There are multiple solutions for this problem,
++ * but they aren't universally accepted on all platforms. This attempts
++ * to select the best solution available given our os, compilier, and libc */
++#ifdef __STDC_LIB_EXT1__
++/* if the os implements C11 annex K, use memset_s */
++#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) memset_s(p, n, 0, n)
++#else
++#ifdef XP_WIN
++/* windows has a secure zero funtion */
++#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) SecureZeroMemory(p, n)
++#else
++/* _DEFAULT_SORUCE  == BSD source in GCC based environments
++ * if other environmens support explicit_bzero, their defines
++ * should be added here */
++#if defined(_DEFAULT_SOURCE) || defined(_BSD_SOURCE)
++#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) explicit_bzero(p, n)
++#else
++/* if the os doesn't support one of the above, but does support
++ * memset_explicit, you can add the definition for memset with the
++ * appropriate define check here */
++/* define an explicitly implementated Safe zero if the OS
++ * doesn't provide one */
++#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n)                                \
++    if (p != NULL) {                                       \
++        volatile unsigned char *__vl = (unsigned char *)p; \
++        size_t __nl = n;                                   \
++        while (__nl--) *__vl++ = 0;                        \
++    }
++#endif /* no explicit_bzero */
++#endif /* no windows SecureZeroMemory */
++#endif /* no memset_s */
++
+ #define PORT_Strcasecmp PL_strcasecmp
+ #define PORT_Strcat strcat
+ #define PORT_Strchr strchr

SOURCES/nss-3.90-no-dbm-25519.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.no_dbm_25519 ./tests/ec/ectest.sh
+--- ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.no_dbm_25519	2023-07-26 10:12:29.531147406 -0700
++++ ./tests/ec/ectest.sh	2023-07-26 10:12:39.547245445 -0700
+@@ -46,11 +46,13 @@ ectest_genkeydb_test()
+     return $?
+   fi
+   curves=( \
+-    "curve25519" \
+     "secp256r1" \
+     "secp384r1" \
+     "secp521r1" \
+   )
++  if [ "${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE}" = "sql" ] ; then
++      curves=( "curve25519"  "${curves[@]}" )
++  fi
+   for curve in "${curves[@]}"; do
+     echo "Test $curve key generation using certutil ..."
+     certutil -G -d "${HOSTDIR}" -k ec -q $curve -f "${R_PWFILE}" -z ${NOISE_FILE}

SOURCES/nss-gcm-param-default-pkcs11v2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff -up ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h.aes_gcm_pkcs11_v2 ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+--- ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h.aes_gcm_pkcs11_v2	2020-05-13 13:44:11.312405744 -0700
++++ ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h	2020-05-13 13:45:23.951723660 -0700
+@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ typedef struct CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS {
+ typedef CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS_PTR;
+ 
+ /* deprecated #defines. Drop in future NSS releases */
+-#ifdef NSS_PKCS11_2_0_COMPAT
++#ifndef NSS_PKCS11_3_0_STRICT
+ 
+ /* defines that were changed between NSS's PKCS #11 and the Oasis headers */
+ #define CKF_EC_FP CKF_EC_F_P
+@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ typedef CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_GCM_
+ #define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID CKT_NSS_VALID
+ #define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID_DELEGATOR CKT_NSS_VALID_DELEGATOR
+ #else
+-/* use the new CK_GCM_PARAMS if NSS_PKCS11_2_0_COMPAT is not defined */
++/* use the new CK_GCM_PARAMS if NSS_PKCS11_3_0_STRICT is defined */
+ typedef struct CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 CK_GCM_PARAMS;
+ typedef CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 CK_PTR CK_GCM_PARAMS_PTR;
+ #endif

SOURCES/nss-no-dbm-man-page.patch

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./doc/certutil.xml.no-dbm ./doc/certutil.xml
---- ./doc/certutil.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.853386165 -0700
-+++ ./doc/certutil.xml	2021-05-29 10:31:15.057058619 -0700
-@@ -205,8 +205,7 @@ If this option is not used, the validity
-           <para><command>certutil</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and new SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para>
-           <para>NSS recognizes the following prefixes:</para>
-           <itemizedlist>
--            <listitem><para><command>sql:</command> requests the newer database</para></listitem>
--	    <listitem><para><command>dbm:</command> requests the legacy database</para></listitem>
-+            <listitem><para><command>sql:</command> requests the sql-lite database</para></listitem>
-           </itemizedlist>
-           <para>If no prefix is specified the default type is retrieved from NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE. If NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE is not set then <command>sql:</command> is the default.</para>
-         </listitem>
-@@ -1205,17 +1204,9 @@ BerkeleyDB. These new databases provide
- 	</listitem>
- </itemizedlist>
- 
--<para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
-+<para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. </para>
- 
--<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.
--Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
--
--<programlisting>$ certutil -L -d dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
--
--<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
--<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
--
--<para>This line can be set added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent.</para>
-+<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.</para>
- 
- <itemizedlist>
- 	<listitem>
-diff -up ./doc/modutil.xml.no-dbm ./doc/modutil.xml
---- ./doc/modutil.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.854386171 -0700
-+++ ./doc/modutil.xml	2021-05-29 10:28:23.293078869 -0700
-@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
-       <varlistentry>
-         <term>-dbdir directory</term>
- 	  <listitem><para>Specify the database directory in which to access or create security module database files.</para>
--	<para><command>modutil</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). If the prefix <command>dbm:</command> is not used, then the tool assumes that the given databases are in SQLite format.</para></listitem>
-+	<para><command>modutil</command> supports SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para></listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
- 
-       <varlistentry>
-@@ -689,15 +689,7 @@ BerkleyDB. These new databases provide m
- 
- <para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
- 
--<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.
--Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
--
--<programlisting>modutil -create -dbdir dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
--
--<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
--<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
--
--<para>This line can be added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent for the user.</para>
-+<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.  </para> 
- 
- <itemizedlist>
- 	<listitem>
-diff -up ./doc/pk12util.xml.no-dbm ./doc/pk12util.xml
---- ./doc/pk12util.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.854386171 -0700
-+++ ./doc/pk12util.xml	2021-05-29 10:28:23.293078869 -0700
-@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
-       <varlistentry>
-         <term>-d directory</term>
-         <listitem><para>Specify the database directory into which to import to or export from certificates and keys.</para>
--	<para><command>pk12util</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and new SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). If the prefix <command>dbm:</command> is not used, then the tool assumes that the given databases are in the SQLite format.</para></listitem>
-+	<para><command>pk12util</command> supports SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para></listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
- 
-       <varlistentry>
-@@ -394,15 +394,7 @@ BerkleyDB. These new databases provide m
- 
- <para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
- 
--<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type
--Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
--
--<programlisting># pk12util -i /tmp/cert-files/users.p12 -d dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
--
--<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
--<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
--
--<para>This line can be set added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent.</para>
-+<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.  </para>
- 
- <itemizedlist>
- 	<listitem>
-diff -up ./doc/signver.xml.no-dbm ./doc/signver.xml
---- ./doc/signver.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.854386171 -0700
-+++ ./doc/signver.xml	2021-05-29 10:28:23.293078869 -0700
-@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
-       <varlistentry>
-         <term>-d <emphasis>directory</emphasis></term>
-         <listitem><para>Specify the database directory which contains the certificates and keys.</para>
--	<para><command>signver</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and new SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). If the prefix <command>dbm:</command> is not used, then the tool assumes that the given databases are in the SQLite format.</para></listitem>
-+	<para><command>signver</command> supports SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para></listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
-       <varlistentry>
-         <term>-a</term>
-@@ -155,15 +155,7 @@ BerkleyDB. These new databases provide m
- 
- <para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
- 
--<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type
--Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
--
--<programlisting># signver -A -s <replaceable>signature</replaceable> -d dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
--
--<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
--<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
--
--<para>This line can be added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent for the user.</para>
-+<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.</para>
- 
- <itemizedlist>
- 	<listitem>

SOURCES/nss-signtool-format.patch

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/cmd/modutil/install.c b/cmd/modutil/install.c
---- a/cmd/modutil/install.c
-+++ b/cmd/modutil/install.c
-@@ -825,17 +825,20 @@ rm_dash_r(char *path)
- 
-         dir = PR_OpenDir(path);
-         if (!dir) {
-             return -1;
-         }
- 
-         /* Recursively delete all entries in the directory */
-         while ((entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH)) != NULL) {
--            snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name);
-+            if (snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name) >= sizeof(filename)) {
-+                PR_CloseDir(dir);
-+                return -1;
-+            }
-             if (rm_dash_r(filename)) {
-                 PR_CloseDir(dir);
-                 return -1;
-             }
-         }
- 
-         if (PR_CloseDir(dir) != PR_SUCCESS) {
-             return -1;
-diff --git a/cmd/signtool/util.c b/cmd/signtool/util.c
---- a/cmd/signtool/util.c
-+++ b/cmd/signtool/util.c
-@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ rm_dash_r(char *path)
-         /* Recursively delete all entries in the directory */
-         while ((entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH)) != NULL) {
-             snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name);
-+            if (snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name
-+) >= sizeof(filename)) {
-+                errorCount++;
-+                PR_CloseDir(dir);
-+                return -1;
-+            }
-             if (rm_dash_r(filename)) {
-                 PR_CloseDir(dir);
-                 return -1;
-diff --git a/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c b/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c
---- a/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c
-+++ b/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c
-@@ -1530,17 +1530,17 @@ cleanup:
-  */
- PKIX_Error *
- PKIX_List_SetItem(
-         PKIX_List *list,
-         PKIX_UInt32 index,
-         PKIX_PL_Object *item,
-         void *plContext)
- {
--        PKIX_List *element;
-+        PKIX_List *element = NULL;
- 
-         PKIX_ENTER(LIST, "PKIX_List_SetItem");
-         PKIX_NULLCHECK_ONE(list);
- 
-         if (list->immutable){
-                 PKIX_ERROR(PKIX_OPERATIONNOTPERMITTEDONIMMUTABLELIST);
-         }
- 
-diff --git a/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c b/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c
---- a/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c
-+++ b/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c
-@@ -102,17 +102,17 @@ cleanup:
-  */
- static PKIX_Error *
- pkix_pl_OID_Equals(
-         PKIX_PL_Object *first,
-         PKIX_PL_Object *second,
-         PKIX_Boolean *pResult,
-         void *plContext)
- {
--        PKIX_Int32 cmpResult;
-+        PKIX_Int32 cmpResult = 0;
- 
-         PKIX_ENTER(OID, "pkix_pl_OID_Equals");
-         PKIX_NULLCHECK_THREE(first, second, pResult);
- 
-         PKIX_CHECK(pkix_pl_OID_Comparator
-                     (first, second, &cmpResult, plContext),
-                     PKIX_OIDCOMPARATORFAILED);
- 

SOURCES/nss-skip-sysinit-gtests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+Index: nss/gtests/manifest.mn
+===================================================================
+--- nss.orig/gtests/manifest.mn
++++ nss/gtests/manifest.mn
+@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ NSS_SRCDIRS = \
+ 	smime_gtest \
+ 	softoken_gtest \
+ 	ssl_gtest \
+-	$(SYSINIT_GTEST) \
+ 	nss_bogo_shim \
+ 	pkcs11testmodule \
+ 	$(NULL)

SOURCES/nss-sysinit-userdb.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+Index: nss/lib/sysinit/nsssysinit.c
+===================================================================
+--- nss.orig/lib/sysinit/nsssysinit.c
++++ nss/lib/sysinit/nsssysinit.c
+@@ -36,41 +36,9 @@ testdir(char *dir)
+     return S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode);
+ }
+ 
+-/**
+- * Append given @dir to @path and creates the directory with mode @mode.
+- * Returns 0 if successful, -1 otherwise.
+- * Assumes that the allocation for @path has sufficient space for @dir
+- * to be added.
+- */
+-static int
+-appendDirAndCreate(char *path, char *dir, mode_t mode)
+-{
+-    PORT_Strcat(path, dir);
+-    if (!testdir(path)) {
+-        if (mkdir(path, mode)) {
+-            return -1;
+-        }
+-    }
+-    return 0;
+-}
+-
+-#define XDG_NSS_USER_PATH1 "/.local"
+-#define XDG_NSS_USER_PATH2 "/share"
+-#define XDG_NSS_USER_PATH3 "/pki"
+-
+ #define NSS_USER_PATH1 "/.pki"
+ #define NSS_USER_PATH2 "/nssdb"
+-
+-/**
+- * Return the path to user's NSS database.
+- * We search in the following dirs in order:
+- * (1) $HOME/.pki/nssdb;
+- * (2) $XDG_DATA_HOME/pki/nssdb if XDG_DATA_HOME is set;
+- * (3) $HOME/.local/share/pki/nssdb (default XDG_DATA_HOME value).
+- * If (1) does not exist, then the returned dir will be set to either
+- * (2) or (3), depending if XDG_DATA_HOME is set.
+- */
+-char *
++static char *
+ getUserDB(void)
+ {
+     char *userdir = PR_GetEnvSecure("HOME");
+@@ -81,47 +49,22 @@ getUserDB(void)
+     }
+ 
+     nssdir = PORT_Alloc(strlen(userdir) + sizeof(NSS_USER_PATH1) + sizeof(NSS_USER_PATH2));
++    if (nssdir == NULL) {
++        return NULL;
++    }
+     PORT_Strcpy(nssdir, userdir);
+-    PORT_Strcat(nssdir, NSS_USER_PATH1 NSS_USER_PATH2);
+-    if (testdir(nssdir)) {
+-        /* $HOME/.pki/nssdb exists */
+-        return nssdir;
+-    } else {
+-        /* either $HOME/.pki or $HOME/.pki/nssdb does not exist */
++    /* verify it exists */
++    if (!testdir(nssdir)) {
+         PORT_Free(nssdir);
+-    }
+-    int size = 0;
+-    char *xdguserdatadir = PR_GetEnvSecure("XDG_DATA_HOME");
+-    if (xdguserdatadir) {
+-        size = strlen(xdguserdatadir);
+-    } else {
+-        size = strlen(userdir) + sizeof(XDG_NSS_USER_PATH1) + sizeof(XDG_NSS_USER_PATH2);
+-    }
+-    size += sizeof(XDG_NSS_USER_PATH3) + sizeof(NSS_USER_PATH2);
+-
+-    nssdir = PORT_Alloc(size);
+-    if (nssdir == NULL) {
+         return NULL;
+     }
+-
+-    if (xdguserdatadir) {
+-        PORT_Strcpy(nssdir, xdguserdatadir);
+-        if (!testdir(nssdir)) {
+-            PORT_Free(nssdir);
+-            return NULL;
+-        }
+-
+-    } else {
+-        PORT_Strcpy(nssdir, userdir);
+-        if (appendDirAndCreate(nssdir, XDG_NSS_USER_PATH1, 0755) ||
+-            appendDirAndCreate(nssdir, XDG_NSS_USER_PATH2, 0755)) {
+-            PORT_Free(nssdir);
+-            return NULL;
+-        }
++    PORT_Strcat(nssdir, NSS_USER_PATH1);
++    if (!testdir(nssdir) && mkdir(nssdir, 0760)) {
++        PORT_Free(nssdir);
++        return NULL;
+     }
+-    /* ${XDG_DATA_HOME:-$HOME/.local/share}/pki/nssdb */
+-    if (appendDirAndCreate(nssdir, XDG_NSS_USER_PATH3, 0760) ||
+-        appendDirAndCreate(nssdir, NSS_USER_PATH2, 0760)) {
++    PORT_Strcat(nssdir, NSS_USER_PATH2);
++    if (!testdir(nssdir) && mkdir(nssdir, 0760)) {
+         PORT_Free(nssdir);
+         return NULL;
+     }

SOURCES/nss_p384_scalar_validated.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,644 @@
+diff -up ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh.p384 ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh
+--- ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh.p384	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh	2024-01-09 11:49:58.650418434 -0800
+@@ -40,5 +40,14 @@ files=($(find ~/nss/lib/freebl/verified/
+ for f in "${files[@]}"; do
+     file_name=$(basename "$f")
+     hacl_file=($(find ~/hacl-star/dist/mozilla/ ~/hacl-star/dist/karamel/ -type f -name $file_name -not -path "*/hacl-star/dist/mozilla/internal/*"))
++    # TODO(Bug 1854438): Remove P384 exception.
++    # TODO(Bug 1854439): Remove P521 exception.
++    if [ $file_name == "Hacl_P384.c"  \
++        -o $file_name == "Hacl_P384.h" \
++        -o $file_name == "Hacl_P521.c" \
++        -o $file_name == "Hacl_P521.h" ]
++    then
++        continue;
++    fi
+     diff $hacl_file $f
+ done
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/ec.c.p384 ./lib/freebl/ec.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/ec.c.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:14.118980084 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/ec.c	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -15,15 +15,62 @@
+ #include "mplogic.h"
+ #include "ec.h"
+ #include "ecl.h"
++#include "verified/Hacl_P384.h"
++#include "verified/Hacl_P521.h"
+ 
+ #define EC_DOUBLECHECK PR_FALSE
+ 
++SECStatus
++ec_secp384r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar)
++{
++    if (!scalar || !scalar->data) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++
++    if (scalar->len != 48) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++
++    bool b = Hacl_P384_validate_private_key(scalar->data);
++
++    if (!b) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++    return SECSuccess;
++}
++
++SECStatus
++ec_secp521r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar)
++{
++    if (!scalar || !scalar->data) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++
++    if (scalar->len != 66) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++
++    bool b = Hacl_P521_validate_private_key(scalar->data);
++
++    if (!b) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++    return SECSuccess;
++}
++
+ static const ECMethod kMethods[] = {
+     { ECCurve25519,
+       ec_Curve25519_pt_mul,
+       ec_Curve25519_pt_validate,
+       ec_Curve25519_scalar_validate,
+-      NULL, NULL },
++      NULL,
++      NULL },
+     {
+         ECCurve_NIST_P256,
+         ec_secp256r1_pt_mul,
+@@ -352,8 +415,7 @@ EC_NewKeyFromSeed(ECParams *ecParams, EC
+ SECStatus
+ ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(ECParams *ecParams, SECItem *privKey)
+ {
+-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+-    mp_err err;
++    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ 
+     unsigned int len = EC_GetScalarSize(ecParams);
+ 
+@@ -362,82 +424,43 @@ ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(ECParams *ec
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* For known curves, use rejection sampling A.4.2 */
+-    if (ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
+-        const ECMethod *method = ec_get_method_from_name(ecParams->name);
+-        rv = SECFailure;
+-        if (method == NULL || method->scalar_validate == NULL) {
+-            /* unknown curve */
+-            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+-            goto done;
+-        }
+-        int count = 100;
+-        while (rv != SECSuccess && count >= 0) {
+-            rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKey->data, len);
+-            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+-                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+-                goto done;
+-            }
+-            rv = method->scalar_validate(privKey);
+-            count--;
+-        }
+-        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+-            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+-        }
+-        goto done;
++    const ECMethod *method = ec_get_method_from_name(ecParams->name);
++    if (method == NULL || method->scalar_validate == NULL) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
++        return SECFailure;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* For unknown curves, use algotithm A.4.1 */
+-
+-    unsigned char *order = ecParams->order.data;
+-    mp_int privKeyVal, order_1, one;
+-    unsigned char *privKeyBytes = NULL;
+-
+-    MP_DIGITS(&privKeyVal) = 0;
+-    MP_DIGITS(&order_1) = 0;
+-    MP_DIGITS(&one) = 0;
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&privKeyVal));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&order_1));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&one));
+-
+-    /* Generates 2*len random bytes using the global random bit generator
+-     * (which implements Algorithm 1 of FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1) then
+-     * reduces modulo the group order.
+-     */
+-
+-    if ((privKeyBytes = PORT_Alloc(2 * len)) == NULL) {
+-        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+-        rv = SECFailure;
+-        goto cleanup;
++    uint8_t leading_coeff_mask;
++    switch (ecParams->name) {
++        case ECCurve25519:
++        case ECCurve_NIST_P256:
++        case ECCurve_NIST_P384:
++            leading_coeff_mask = 0xff;
++            break;
++        case ECCurve_NIST_P521:
++            leading_coeff_mask = 0x01;
++            break;
++        default:
++            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
++            return SECFailure;
+     }
+ 
+-    CHECK_SEC_OK(RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKeyBytes, 2 * len));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, 2 * len));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&order_1, order, len));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_set_int(&one, 1));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub(&order_1, &one, &order_1));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&privKeyVal, &order_1, &privKeyVal));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&privKeyVal, &one, &privKeyVal));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_fixlen_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, len));
+-    memcpy(privKey->data, privKeyBytes, len);
++    /* The rejection sampling method from FIPS 186-5 A.4.2 */
++    int count = 100;
++    do {
++        rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKey->data, len);
++        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
++            return SECFailure;
++        }
++        privKey->data[0] &= leading_coeff_mask;
++        rv = method->scalar_validate(privKey);
++    } while (rv != SECSuccess && --count > 0);
+ 
+-cleanup:
+-    mp_clear(&privKeyVal);
+-    mp_clear(&order_1);
+-    mp_clear(&one);
+-    if (privKeyBytes) {
+-        PORT_ZFree(privKeyBytes, 2 * len);
+-    }
+-    if (err < MP_OKAY) {
+-        MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+-        rv = SECFailure;
++    if (rv != SECSuccess) { // implies count == 0
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+     }
+ 
+-done:
+-    if (rv != SECSuccess && privKey->data) {
+-        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(privKey, PR_FALSE);
+-        return rv;
+-    }
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h.p384 ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h
+--- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:14.118980084 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -57,4 +57,8 @@ SECStatus ec_secp256r1_sign_digest(ECPri
+ SECStatus ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *key, const SECItem *signature,
+                                      const SECItem *digest);
+ 
++SECStatus ec_secp384r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar);
++
++SECStatus ec_secp521r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar);
++
+ #endif /* __ecl_h_ */
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi.p384 ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
+--- ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:14.118980084 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
+     'ecl/ecp_secp384r1.c',
+     'ecl/ecp_secp521r1.c',
+     'verified/Hacl_P256.c',
++    'verified/Hacl_P384.c',
++    'verified/Hacl_P521.c',
+     'fipsfreebl.c',
+     'blinit.c',
+     'freeblver.c',
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/Makefile.p384 ./lib/freebl/Makefile
+--- ./lib/freebl/Makefile.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.650418434 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/Makefile	2024-01-09 11:51:20.500224176 -0800
+@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ ifndef NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY
+     VERIFIED_SRCS += Hacl_Poly1305_32.c Hacl_Chacha20.c Hacl_Chacha20Poly1305_32.c
+ endif # NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY
+ 
+-VERIFIED_SRCS += Hacl_P256.c
++VERIFIED_SRCS += Hacl_P256.c Hacl_P384.c Hacl_P521.c
+ 
+ ifeq (,$(filter-out x86_64 aarch64,$(CPU_ARCH)))
+     # All 64-bit architectures get the 64 bit version.
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++/* MIT License
++ *
++ * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
++ * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
++ *
++ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++ *
++ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
++ * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
++ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
++ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
++ * SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++#include "Hacl_P384.h"
++
++#include "internal/Hacl_Krmllib.h"
++#include "internal/Hacl_Bignum_Base.h"
++
++static inline uint64_t
++bn_is_eq_mask(uint64_t *x, uint64_t *y)
++{
++    uint64_t mask = (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR6(i,
++                    (uint32_t)0U,
++                    (uint32_t)6U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t uu____0 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(x[i], y[i]);
++                    mask = uu____0 & mask;);
++    uint64_t mask1 = mask;
++    return mask1;
++}
++
++static inline uint64_t
++bn_sub(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t *c)
++{
++    uint64_t c1 = (uint64_t)0U;
++    {
++        uint64_t t1 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U];
++        uint64_t t20 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U];
++        uint64_t *res_i0 = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U;
++        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t20, res_i0);
++        uint64_t t10 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)1U];
++        uint64_t t21 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)1U];
++        uint64_t *res_i1 = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)1U;
++        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t10, t21, res_i1);
++        uint64_t t11 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)2U];
++        uint64_t t22 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)2U];
++        uint64_t *res_i2 = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)2U;
++        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t11, t22, res_i2);
++        uint64_t t12 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)3U];
++        uint64_t t2 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)3U];
++        uint64_t *res_i = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)3U;
++        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t12, t2, res_i);
++    }
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR2(i,
++                    (uint32_t)4U,
++                    (uint32_t)6U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t t1 = b[i];
++                    uint64_t t2 = c[i];
++                    uint64_t *res_i = a + i;
++                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t2, res_i););
++    uint64_t c10 = c1;
++    return c10;
++}
++
++static inline void
++bn_from_bytes_be(uint64_t *a, uint8_t *b)
++{
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR6(i,
++                    (uint32_t)0U,
++                    (uint32_t)6U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t *os = a;
++                    uint64_t u = load64_be(b + ((uint32_t)6U - i - (uint32_t)1U) * (uint32_t)8U);
++                    uint64_t x = u;
++                    os[i] = x;);
++}
++
++static inline void
++p384_make_order(uint64_t *n)
++{
++    n[0U] = (uint64_t)0xecec196accc52973U;
++    n[1U] = (uint64_t)0x581a0db248b0a77aU;
++    n[2U] = (uint64_t)0xc7634d81f4372ddfU;
++    n[3U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++    n[4U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++    n[5U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++}
++
++/**
++Private key validation.
++
++  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
++
++  The argument `private_key` points to 48 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[48].
++
++  The private key is valid:
++    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
++*/
++bool
++Hacl_P384_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key)
++{
++    uint64_t bn_sk[6U] = { 0U };
++    bn_from_bytes_be(bn_sk, private_key);
++    uint64_t tmp[6U] = { 0U };
++    p384_make_order(tmp);
++    uint64_t c = bn_sub(tmp, bn_sk, tmp);
++    uint64_t is_lt_order = (uint64_t)0U - c;
++    uint64_t bn_zero[6U] = { 0U };
++    uint64_t res = bn_is_eq_mask(bn_sk, bn_zero);
++    uint64_t is_eq_zero = res;
++    uint64_t res0 = is_lt_order & ~is_eq_zero;
++    return res0 == (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
++}
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h
+--- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
++/* MIT License
++ *
++ * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
++ * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
++ *
++ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++ *
++ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
++ * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
++ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
++ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
++ * SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __Hacl_P384_H
++#define __Hacl_P384_H
++
++#if defined(__cplusplus)
++extern "C" {
++#endif
++
++#include <string.h>
++#include "krml/internal/types.h"
++#include "krml/lowstar_endianness.h"
++
++#include "lib_intrinsics.h"
++
++/*******************************************************************************
++
++ Verified C library for ECDSA and ECDH functions over the P-384 NIST curve.
++
++ This module implements signing and verification, key validation, conversions
++ between various point representations, and ECDH key agreement.
++
++*******************************************************************************/
++
++/******************/
++/* Key validation */
++/******************/
++
++/**
++Private key validation.
++
++  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
++
++  The argument `private_key` points to 32 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[32].
++
++  The private key is valid:
++    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
++*/
++bool Hacl_P384_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key);
++
++#if defined(__cplusplus)
++}
++#endif
++
++#define __Hacl_P384_H_DEFINED
++#endif
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
++/* MIT License
++ *
++ * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
++ * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
++ *
++ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++ *
++ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
++ * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
++ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
++ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
++ * SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++#include "Hacl_P521.h"
++
++#include "internal/Hacl_Krmllib.h"
++#include "internal/Hacl_Bignum_Base.h"
++
++static inline uint64_t
++bn_is_eq_mask(uint64_t *x, uint64_t *y)
++{
++    uint64_t mask = (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR9(i,
++                    (uint32_t)0U,
++                    (uint32_t)9U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t uu____0 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(x[i], y[i]);
++                    mask = uu____0 & mask;);
++    uint64_t mask1 = mask;
++    return mask1;
++}
++
++static inline uint64_t
++bn_sub(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t *c)
++{
++    uint64_t c1 = (uint64_t)0U;
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR2(i,
++                    (uint32_t)0U,
++                    (uint32_t)2U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t t1 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i];
++                    uint64_t t20 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i];
++                    uint64_t *res_i0 = a + (uint32_t)4U * i;
++                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t20, res_i0);
++                    uint64_t t10 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)1U];
++                    uint64_t t21 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)1U];
++                    uint64_t *res_i1 = a + (uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)1U;
++                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t10, t21, res_i1);
++                    uint64_t t11 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)2U];
++                    uint64_t t22 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)2U];
++                    uint64_t *res_i2 = a + (uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)2U;
++                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t11, t22, res_i2);
++                    uint64_t t12 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)3U];
++                    uint64_t t2 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)3U];
++                    uint64_t *res_i = a + (uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)3U;
++                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t12, t2, res_i););
++    {
++        uint64_t t1 = b[8U];
++        uint64_t t2 = c[8U];
++        uint64_t *res_i = a + (uint32_t)8U;
++        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t2, res_i);
++    }
++    uint64_t c10 = c1;
++    return c10;
++}
++
++static inline void
++bn_from_bytes_be(uint64_t *a, uint8_t *b)
++{
++    uint8_t tmp[72U] = { 0U };
++    memcpy(tmp + (uint32_t)6U, b, (uint32_t)66U * sizeof(uint8_t));
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR9(i,
++                    (uint32_t)0U,
++                    (uint32_t)9U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t *os = a;
++                    uint64_t u = load64_be(tmp + ((uint32_t)9U - i - (uint32_t)1U) * (uint32_t)8U);
++                    uint64_t x = u;
++                    os[i] = x;);
++}
++
++static inline void
++p521_make_order(uint64_t *n)
++{
++    n[0U] = (uint64_t)0xbb6fb71e91386409U;
++    n[1U] = (uint64_t)0x3bb5c9b8899c47aeU;
++    n[2U] = (uint64_t)0x7fcc0148f709a5d0U;
++    n[3U] = (uint64_t)0x51868783bf2f966bU;
++    n[4U] = (uint64_t)0xfffffffffffffffaU;
++    n[5U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++    n[6U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++    n[7U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++    n[8U] = (uint64_t)0x1ffU;
++}
++
++/**
++Private key validation.
++
++  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
++
++  The argument `private_key` points to 66 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[66].
++
++  The private key is valid:
++    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
++*/
++bool
++Hacl_P521_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key)
++{
++    uint64_t bn_sk[9U] = { 0U };
++    bn_from_bytes_be(bn_sk, private_key);
++    uint64_t tmp[9U] = { 0U };
++    p521_make_order(tmp);
++    uint64_t c = bn_sub(tmp, bn_sk, tmp);
++    uint64_t is_lt_order = (uint64_t)0U - c;
++    uint64_t bn_zero[9U] = { 0U };
++    uint64_t res = bn_is_eq_mask(bn_sk, bn_zero);
++    uint64_t is_eq_zero = res;
++    uint64_t res0 = is_lt_order & ~is_eq_zero;
++    return res0 == (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
++}
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h
+--- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
++/* MIT License
++ *
++ * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
++ * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
++ *
++ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++ *
++ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
++ * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
++ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
++ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
++ * SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __Hacl_P521_H
++#define __Hacl_P521_H
++
++#if defined(__cplusplus)
++extern "C" {
++#endif
++
++#include <string.h>
++#include "krml/internal/types.h"
++#include "krml/lowstar_endianness.h"
++
++#include "lib_intrinsics.h"
++
++/******************/
++/* Key validation */
++/******************/
++
++/**
++Private key validation.
++
++  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
++
++  The argument `private_key` points to 66 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[66].
++
++  The private key is valid:
++    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
++*/
++bool Hacl_P521_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key);
++
++#if defined(__cplusplus)
++}
++#endif
++
++#define __Hacl_P521_H_DEFINED
++#endif

SOURCES/rhbz1185708-enable-ecc-3des-ciphers-by-default.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -up nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.1185708_3des nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+--- nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.1185708_3des	2018-12-11 18:28:06.736592552 +0100
++++ nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c	2018-12-11 18:29:06.273314692 +0100
+@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[s
+  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,      SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+  { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+- { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+- { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,     SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
++ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
++ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,     SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
+  { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,        SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,          SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ 

SOURCES/secmod.db.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
+  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
+<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
+<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
+]>
+
+<refentry id="secmod.db">
+
+  <refentryinfo>
+    <date>&date;</date>
+    <title>Network Security Services</title>
+    <productname>nss</productname>
+    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
+  </refentryinfo>
+
+  <refmeta>
+    <refentrytitle>secmod.db</refentrytitle>
+    <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+  </refmeta>
+
+  <refnamediv>
+    <refname>secmod.db</refname>
+    <refpurpose>Legacy NSS security modules database</refpurpose>
+  </refnamediv>
+
+<refsection id="description">
+    <title>Description</title>
+    <para><emphasis>secmod.db</emphasis> is an NSS security modules database.</para>
+  <para>The security modules database is used to keep track of the NSS security modules. The NSS security modules export their services via the PKCS #11 API which NSS uses as its Services Provider Interface.
+  </para>
+  <para>The command line utility <emphasis>modutil</emphasis> is used for managing PKCS #11 module information both within secmod.db files and within hardware tokens.
+  </para>
+  <para>For new applications the recommended way of tracking security modules is via the pkcs11.txt configuration file used in conjunction the new sqlite-based shared database format for certificate and key databases.
+  </para>
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection>
+    <title>Files</title>
+    <para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/secmod.db</filename></para>
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection>
+    <title>See also</title>
+    <para>modutil(1), cert8.db(5), cert9.db(5), key3.db(5), key4.db(5), pkcs11.txt(5)</para>
+  </refsection>
+
+  <refsection id="authors">
+    <title>Authors</title>
+    <para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat, Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
+    <para>Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
+  </refsection>
+
+<!-- don't change -->
+  <refsection id="license">
+    <title>LICENSE</title>
+    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+    </para>
+
+  </refsection>
+
+
+</refentry>