.gitignore

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-SOURCES/PayPalEE.cert
+SOURCES/NameConstraints_Certs.tar
 SOURCES/blank-cert8.db
 SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
 SOURCES/blank-key3.db
 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
 SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
-SOURCES/nss-3.67.tar.gz
+SOURCES/nss-3.90.tar.gz

.nss.metadata

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-bc5c03643bfa1a5ea8519b8e7e2d7d5e30abea30 SOURCES/PayPalEE.cert
+39ad4988f85b50fdc3569d21b6c885cf9eb390b0 SOURCES/NameConstraints_Certs.tar
 d272a7b58364862613d44261c5744f7a336bf177 SOURCES/blank-cert8.db
 b5570125fbf6bfb410705706af48217a0817c03a SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
 7f78b5bcecdb5005e7b803604b2ec9d1a9df2fb5 SOURCES/blank-key3.db
 f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
 bd748cf6e1465a1bbe6e751b72ffc0076aff0b50 SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
-9cccf98f0476905c0d863a6b2cb08a1955482241 SOURCES/nss-3.67.tar.gz
+1e7d2f16655281cfb2972688af1605e0de302481 SOURCES/nss-3.90.tar.gz

SOURCES/blinding_ct.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,949 @@
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
+--- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
++++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
+@@ -199,16 +199,19 @@ void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d(const mp_d
+ void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len,
+                                   mp_digit b, mp_digit *c);
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+ void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add_prop(const mp_digit *a,
+                                        mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
+                                        mp_digit *c);
++void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(const mp_digit *a,
++                                       mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
++                                       mp_digit *c, mp_size c_len);
+ void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_sqr_add_prop(const mp_digit *a,
+                                      mp_size a_len,
+                                      mp_digit *sqrs);
+ 
+ mp_err MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_div_2dx1d(mp_digit Nhi, mp_digit Nlo,
+                                     mp_digit divisor, mp_digit *quot, mp_digit *rem);
+ 
+ /* c += a * b * (MP_RADIX ** offset);  */
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
+--- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
++++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
+@@ -5,16 +5,18 @@
+  *
+  * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+ 
+ #include "mpi-priv.h"
+ #include "mplogic.h"
+ 
++#include <assert.h>
++
+ #if defined(__arm__) && \
+     ((defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__)) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_3__))
+ /* 16-bit thumb or ARM v3 doesn't work inlined assember version */
+ #undef MP_ASSEMBLY_MULTIPLY
+ #undef MP_ASSEMBLY_SQUARE
+ #endif
+ 
+ #if MP_LOGTAB
+@@ -797,25 +799,28 @@ mp_sub(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b,
+ 
+ CLEANUP:
+     return res;
+ 
+ } /* end mp_sub() */
+ 
+ /* }}} */
+ 
+-/* {{{ mp_mul(a, b, c) */
++/* {{{ s_mp_mulg(a, b, c) */
+ 
+ /*
+-  mp_mul(a, b, c)
+-
+-  Compute c = a * b.  All parameters may be identical.
++  s_mp_mulg(a, b, c)
++
++  Compute c = a * b.  All parameters may be identical. if constantTime is set,
++  then the operations are done in constant time. The original is mostly
++  constant time as long as s_mpv_mul_d_add() is constant time. This is true
++  of the x86 assembler, as well as the current c code.
+  */
+ mp_err
+-mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c)
++s_mp_mulg(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c, int constantTime)
+ {
+     mp_digit *pb;
+     mp_int tmp;
+     mp_err res;
+     mp_size ib;
+     mp_size useda, usedb;
+ 
+     ARGCHK(a != NULL && b != NULL && c != NULL, MP_BADARG);
+@@ -841,17 +846,24 @@ mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b,
+     }
+ 
+     MP_USED(c) = 1;
+     MP_DIGIT(c, 0) = 0;
+     if ((res = s_mp_pad(c, USED(a) + USED(b))) != MP_OKAY)
+         goto CLEANUP;
+ 
+ #ifdef NSS_USE_COMBA
+-    if ((MP_USED(a) == MP_USED(b)) && IS_POWER_OF_2(MP_USED(b))) {
++    /* comba isn't constant time because it clamps! If we cared
++     * (we needed a constant time version of multiply that was 'faster'
++     * we could easily pass constantTime down to the comba code and
++     * get it to skip the clamp... but here are assembler versions
++     * which add comba to platforms that can't compile the normal
++     * comba's imbedded assembler which would also need to change, so
++     * for now we just skip comba when we are running constant time. */
++    if (!constantTime && (MP_USED(a) == MP_USED(b)) && IS_POWER_OF_2(MP_USED(b))) {
+         if (MP_USED(a) == 4) {
+             s_mp_mul_comba_4(a, b, c);
+             goto CLEANUP;
+         }
+         if (MP_USED(a) == 8) {
+             s_mp_mul_comba_8(a, b, c);
+             goto CLEANUP;
+         }
+@@ -871,36 +883,82 @@ mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b,
+ 
+     /* Outer loop:  Digits of b */
+     useda = MP_USED(a);
+     usedb = MP_USED(b);
+     for (ib = 1; ib < usedb; ib++) {
+         mp_digit b_i = *pb++;
+ 
+         /* Inner product:  Digits of a */
+-        if (b_i)
++        if (constantTime || b_i)
+             s_mpv_mul_d_add(MP_DIGITS(a), useda, b_i, MP_DIGITS(c) + ib);
+         else
+             MP_DIGIT(c, ib + useda) = b_i;
+     }
+ 
+-    s_mp_clamp(c);
++    if (!constantTime) {
++        s_mp_clamp(c);
++    }
+ 
+     if (SIGN(a) == SIGN(b) || s_mp_cmp_d(c, 0) == MP_EQ)
+         SIGN(c) = ZPOS;
+     else
+         SIGN(c) = NEG;
+ 
+ CLEANUP:
+     mp_clear(&tmp);
+     return res;
++} /* end smp_mulg() */
++
++/* }}} */
++
++/* {{{ mp_mul(a, b, c) */
++
++/*
++  mp_mul(a, b, c)
++
++  Compute c = a * b.  All parameters may be identical.
++ */
++
++mp_err
++mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c)
++{
++    return s_mp_mulg(a, b, c, 0);
+ } /* end mp_mul() */
+ 
+ /* }}} */
+ 
++/* {{{ mp_mulCT(a, b, c) */
++
++/*
++  mp_mulCT(a, b, c)
++
++  Compute c = a * b. In constant time. Parameters may not be identical.
++  NOTE: a and b may be modified.
++ */
++
++mp_err
++mp_mulCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_size setSize)
++{
++    mp_err res;
++
++    /* make the multiply values fixed length so multiply
++     * doesn't leak the length. at this point all the
++     * values are blinded, but once we finish we want the
++     * output size to be hidden (so no clamping the out put) */
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(a, setSize));
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(b, setSize));
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(c, 2*setSize));
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_mulg(a, b, c, 1));
++CLEANUP:
++    return res;
++} /* end mp_mulCT() */
++
++/* }}} */
++
+ /* {{{ mp_sqr(a, sqr) */
+ 
+ #if MP_SQUARE
+ /*
+   Computes the square of a.  This can be done more
+   efficiently than a general multiplication, because many of the
+   computation steps are redundant when squaring.  The inner product
+   step is a bit more complicated, but we save a fair number of
+@@ -1263,16 +1321,174 @@ mp_mod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m,
+     }
+ 
+     return MP_OKAY;
+ 
+ } /* end mp_mod() */
+ 
+ /* }}} */
+ 
++/* {{{ s_mp_subCT_d(a, b, borrow, c) */
++
++/*
++  s_mp_subCT_d(a, b, borrow, c)
++
++  Compute c = (a -b) - subtract in constant time. returns borrow
++ */
++mp_digit
++s_mp_subCT_d(mp_digit a, mp_digit b, mp_digit borrow, mp_digit *ret) {
++    mp_digit borrow1, borrow2, t;
++#ifdef MP_COMPILER_USES_CARRY
++    /* while it doesn't look constant-time, this is idiomatic code
++     * to tell compilers to use the carry bit from subtraction */
++    t = a - borrow;
++    if (t > a) {
++        borrow1 = 1;
++    } else {
++        borrow1 = 0;
++    }
++    *ret = t - b;
++    if (*ret > t) {
++        borrow2 = 1;
++    } else {
++        borrow2 = 0;
++    }
++#else
++    mp_digit bitr, bitb, nbitt;
++    /* this is constant time independent of compilier */
++    t = a - borrow;
++    borrow1 = ((~a) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1)) & ((t) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1));
++    *ret = t - b;
++    bitb = b >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1);
++    bitr = *ret >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1);
++    nbitt = (~t) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1);
++    borrow2  = (nbitt & bitb) | (bitb & bitr) | (nbitt & bitr);
++#endif
++    /* only borrow 1 or borrow 2 should be 1, we want to guarrentee
++     * the overall borrow is 1, so use | here */
++    return borrow1 | borrow2;
++} /*  s_mp_subCT_d() */
++
++/* }}} */
++
++/* {{{ mp_subCT(a, b, ret, borrow) */
++
++/* return ret= a - b and borrow in borrow. done in constant time.
++ * b could be modified.
++ */
++mp_err
++mp_subCT(const mp_int *a,  mp_int *b, mp_int *ret, mp_digit *borrow)
++{
++    mp_size used_a = MP_USED(a);
++    mp_size i;
++    mp_err res;
++
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(b, used_a));
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(ret, used_a));
++    *borrow = 0;
++    for (i=0; i < used_a; i++) {
++        *borrow = s_mp_subCT_d(MP_DIGIT(a,i), MP_DIGIT(b,i), *borrow,
++                               &MP_DIGIT(ret,i));
++    }
++
++    res = MP_OKAY;
++CLEANUP:
++    return res;
++} /*  end mp_subCT() */
++
++/* }}} */
++
++/* {{{ mp_selectCT(cond, a, b, ret) */
++
++/*
++ * return ret= cond ? a : b; cond should be either 0 or 1
++ */
++mp_err
++mp_selectCT(mp_digit cond, const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *ret)
++{
++    mp_size used_a = MP_USED(a);
++    mp_err res;
++    mp_size i;
++
++    cond *= MP_DIGIT_MAX;
++
++    /* we currently require these to be equal on input,
++     * we could use pad to extend one of them, but that might
++     * leak data as it wouldn't be constant time */
++    assert(used_a == MP_USED(b));
++
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(ret, used_a));
++    for (i=0; i < used_a; i++) {
++        MP_DIGIT(ret,i) = (MP_DIGIT(a,i)&cond) | (MP_DIGIT(b,i)&~cond);
++    }
++    res = MP_OKAY;
++CLEANUP:
++    return res;
++} /* end mp_selectCT() */
++
++
++/* {{{ mp_reduceCT(a, m, c) */
++
++/*
++  mp_reduceCT(a, m, c)
++
++  Compute c = aR^-1 (mod m) in constant time.
++   input should be in montgomery form. If input is the
++   result of a montgomery multiply then out put will be
++   in mongomery form.
++   Result will be reduced to MP_USED(m), but not be
++   clamped.
++ */
++
++mp_err
++mp_reduceCT(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *c)
++{
++    mp_size used_m = MP_USED(m);
++    mp_size used_c = used_m*2+1;
++    mp_digit *m_digits, *c_digits;
++    mp_size i;
++    mp_digit borrow, carry;
++    mp_err res;
++    mp_int sub;
++
++    MP_DIGITS(&sub) = 0;
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&sub,used_m));
++
++    if (a != c) {
++        MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(a, c));
++    }
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(c, used_c));
++    m_digits = MP_DIGITS(m);
++    c_digits = MP_DIGITS(c);
++    for (i=0; i < used_m; i++) {
++        mp_digit m_i = MP_DIGIT(c,i)*n0i;
++        s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(m_digits, used_m,  m_i, c_digits++, used_c--);
++    }
++    s_mp_rshd(c, used_m);
++    /* MP_USED(c) should be used_m+1 with the high word being any carry
++     * from the previous multiply, save that carry and drop the high
++     * word for the substraction below */
++    carry = MP_DIGIT(c,used_m);
++    MP_DIGIT(c,used_m) = 0;
++    MP_USED(c) = used_m;
++    /* mp_subCT wants c and m to be the same size, we've already
++     * guarrenteed that in the previous statement, so mp_subCT won't actually
++     * modify m, so it's safe to recast */
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_subCT(c, (mp_int *)m, &sub, &borrow));
++
++    /* we return c-m if c >= m no borrow or there was a borrow and a carry */
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_selectCT(borrow ^ carry, c, &sub, c));
++    res = MP_OKAY;
++CLEANUP:
++    mp_clear(&sub);
++    return res;
++}  /* end mp_reduceCT() */
++
++/* }}} */
++
+ /* {{{ mp_mod_d(a, d, c) */
+ 
+ /*
+   mp_mod_d(a, d, c)
+ 
+   Compute c = a (mod d).  Result will always be 0 <= c < d
+  */
+ mp_err
+@@ -1379,16 +1595,47 @@ mp_mulmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int 
+     if ((res = mp_mod(c, m, c)) != MP_OKAY)
+         return res;
+ 
+     return MP_OKAY;
+ }
+ 
+ /* }}} */
+ 
++/* {{{ mp_mulmontmodCT(a, b, m, c) */
++
++/*
++  mp_mulmontmodCT(a, b, m, c)
++
++  Compute c = (a * b) mod m in constant time wrt a and b. either a or b
++  should be in montgomery form and the output is native. If both a and b
++  are in montgomery form, then the output will also be in montgomery form
++  and can be recovered with an mp_reduceCT call.
++  NOTE: a and b may be modified.
++ */
++
++mp_err
++mp_mulmontmodCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i,
++                mp_int *c)
++{
++    mp_err res;
++
++    ARGCHK(a != NULL && b != NULL && m != NULL && c != NULL, MP_BADARG);
++
++    if ((res = mp_mulCT(a, b, c, MP_USED(m))) != MP_OKAY)
++        return res;
++
++    if ((res = mp_reduceCT(c, m, n0i, c)) != MP_OKAY)
++        return res;
++
++    return MP_OKAY;
++}
++
++/* }}} */
++
+ /* {{{ mp_sqrmod(a, m, c) */
+ 
+ #if MP_SQUARE
+ mp_err
+ mp_sqrmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c)
+ {
+     mp_err res;
+ 
+@@ -3936,25 +4183,73 @@ s_mp_mul(mp_int *a, const mp_int *b)
+     {                                                              \
+         mp_digit a0b1, a1b0;                                       \
+         Plo = (a & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX) * (b & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX);   \
+         Phi = (a >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT) * (b >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT); \
+         a0b1 = (a & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX) * (b >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT); \
+         a1b0 = (a >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT) * (b & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX); \
+         a1b0 += a0b1;                                              \
+         Phi += a1b0 >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT;                          \
+-        if (a1b0 < a0b1)                                           \
+-            Phi += MP_HALF_RADIX;                                  \
++        Phi += (MP_CT_LTU(a1b0, a0b1)) << MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT;     \
+         a1b0 <<= MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT;                                \
+         Plo += a1b0;                                               \
+-        if (Plo < a1b0)                                            \
+-            ++Phi;                                                 \
++        Phi += MP_CT_LTU(Plo, a1b0);                                          \
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
++/* Constant time version of s_mpv_mul_d_add_prop.
++ * Presently, this is only used by the Constant time Montgomery arithmetic code. */
++/* c += a * b */
++void
++s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
++                       mp_digit *c, mp_size c_len)
++{
++#if !defined(MP_NO_MP_WORD) && !defined(MP_NO_MUL_WORD)
++    mp_digit d = 0;
++
++    c_len -= a_len;
++    /* Inner product:  Digits of a */
++    while (a_len--) {
++        mp_word w = ((mp_word)b * *a++) + *c + d;
++        *c++ = ACCUM(w);
++        d = CARRYOUT(w);
++    }
++
++    /* propagate the carry to the end, even if carry is zero */
++    while (c_len--) {
++        mp_word w = (mp_word)*c + d;
++        *c++ = ACCUM(w);
++        d = CARRYOUT(w);
++    }
++#else
++    mp_digit carry = 0;
++    c_len -= a_len;
++    while (a_len--) {
++        mp_digit a_i = *a++;
++        mp_digit a0b0, a1b1;
++        MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
++
++        a0b0 += carry;
++        a1b1 += MP_CT_LTU(a0b0, carry);
++        a0b0 += a_i = *c;
++        a1b1 += MP_CT_LTU(a0b0, a_i);
++
++        *c++ = a0b0;
++        carry = a1b1;
++    }
++    /* propagate the carry to the end, even if carry is zero */
++    while (c_len--) {
++        mp_digit c_i = *c;
++        carry += c_i;
++        *c++ = carry;
++        carry = MP_CT_LTU(carry, c_i);
++    }
++#endif
++}
++
+ #if !defined(MP_ASSEMBLY_MULTIPLY)
+ /* c = a * b */
+ void
+ s_mpv_mul_d(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len, mp_digit b, mp_digit *c)
+ {
+ #if !defined(MP_NO_MP_WORD) && !defined(MP_NO_MUL_WORD)
+     mp_digit d = 0;
+ 
+@@ -3969,18 +4264,17 @@ s_mpv_mul_d(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a
+     mp_digit carry = 0;
+     while (a_len--) {
+         mp_digit a_i = *a++;
+         mp_digit a0b0, a1b1;
+ 
+         MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
+ 
+         a0b0 += carry;
+-        if (a0b0 < carry)
+-            ++a1b1;
++        a1b1 += a0b0 < carry;
+         *c++ = a0b0;
+         carry = a1b1;
+     }
+     *c = carry;
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+ /* c += a * b */
+@@ -4002,21 +4296,19 @@ s_mpv_mul_d_add(const mp_digit *a, mp_si
+     mp_digit carry = 0;
+     while (a_len--) {
+         mp_digit a_i = *a++;
+         mp_digit a0b0, a1b1;
+ 
+         MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
+ 
+         a0b0 += carry;
+-        if (a0b0 < carry)
+-            ++a1b1;
++        a1b1 += (a0b0 < carry);
+         a0b0 += a_i = *c;
+-        if (a0b0 < a_i)
+-            ++a1b1;
++        a1b1 += (a0b0 < a_i);
+         *c++ = a0b0;
+         carry = a1b1;
+     }
+     *c = carry;
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+ /* Presently, this is only used by the Montgomery arithmetic code. */
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
+--- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
++++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
+@@ -145,16 +145,54 @@ typedef int mp_sword;
+ #define MP_USED(MP) ((MP)->used)
+ #define MP_ALLOC(MP) ((MP)->alloc)
+ #define MP_DIGITS(MP) ((MP)->dp)
+ #define MP_DIGIT(MP, N) (MP)->dp[(N)]
+ 
+ /* This defines the maximum I/O base (minimum is 2)   */
+ #define MP_MAX_RADIX 64
+ 
++/* Constant Time Macros on mp_digits */
++#define MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(x) ((mp_digit)((mp_digit)(x) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT - 1)))
++
++/* basic zero and non zero tests */
++#define MP_CT_NOT_ZERO(x) (MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(((x) | (((mp_digit)0) - (x)))))
++#define MP_CT_ZERO(x) (~MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(((x) | (((mp_digit)0) - (x)))))
++
++
++/* basic constant-time helper macro for equalities and inequalities.
++ * The inequalities will produce incorrect results if
++ * abs(a-b) >= MP_DIGIT_SIZE/2. This can be avoided if unsigned values stay
++ * within the range 0-MP_DIGIT_MAX/2. */
++#define MP_CT_EQ(a, b) MP_CT_ZERO(((a) - (b)))
++#define MP_CT_NE(a, b) MP_CT_NOT_ZERO(((a) - (b)))
++#define MP_CT_GT(a, b) MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((b) - (a))
++#define MP_CT_LT(a, b) MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((a) - (b))
++#define MP_CT_GE(a, b) (1^MP_CT_LT(a, b))
++#define MP_CT_LE(a, b) (1^MP_CT_GT(a, b))
++#define MP_CT_TRUE ((mp_digit)1)
++#define MP_CT_FALSE ((mp_digit)0)
++
++/* use constant time result to select a boolean value */
++#define MP_CT_SELB(m, l, r) (((m) & (l)) | (~(m) & (r)))
++
++/* full inequalities that work with full mp_digit values */
++#define MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,c,d) \
++        MP_CT_SELB(MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((a)^(b)), \
++                  (MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(d)),c)
++#define MP_CT_GTU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GT(a,b),a)
++#define MP_CT_LTU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LT(a,b),b)
++#define MP_CT_GEU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GE(a,b),a)
++#define MP_CT_LEU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LE(a,b),b)
++#define MP_CT_GTS(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GT(a,b),b)
++#define MP_CT_LTS(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LT(a,b),a)
++#define MP_CT_GES(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GE(a,b),b)
++#define MP_CT_LES(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LE(a,b),a)
++
++
+ typedef struct {
+     mp_sign sign;  /* sign of this quantity      */
+     mp_size alloc; /* how many digits allocated  */
+     mp_size used;  /* how many digits used       */
+     mp_digit *dp;  /* the digits themselves      */
+ } mp_int;
+ 
+ /* Default precision       */
+@@ -185,17 +223,19 @@ mp_err mp_expt_d(const mp_int *a, mp_dig
+ 
+ /* Sign manipulations      */
+ mp_err mp_abs(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b);
+ mp_err mp_neg(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b);
+ 
+ /* Full arithmetic         */
+ mp_err mp_add(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
+ mp_err mp_sub(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
++mp_err mp_subCT(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_digit *borrow);
+ mp_err mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
++mp_err mp_mulCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_size setSize);
+ #if MP_SQUARE
+ mp_err mp_sqr(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b);
+ #else
+ #define mp_sqr(a, b) mp_mul(a, a, b)
+ #endif
+ mp_err mp_div(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *q, mp_int *r);
+ mp_err mp_div_2d(const mp_int *a, mp_digit d, mp_int *q, mp_int *r);
+ mp_err mp_expt(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
+@@ -212,23 +252,30 @@ mp_err mp_mulmod(const mp_int *a, const 
+ mp_err mp_sqrmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
+ #else
+ #define mp_sqrmod(a, m, c) mp_mulmod(a, a, m, c)
+ #endif
+ mp_err mp_exptmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
+ mp_err mp_exptmod_d(const mp_int *a, mp_digit d, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
+ #endif /* MP_MODARITH */
+ 
++/* montgomery math */
++mp_err mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, const mp_int *N, mp_int *xMont);
++mp_digit mp_calculate_mont_n0i(const mp_int *N);
++mp_err mp_reduceCT(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *ct);
++mp_err mp_mulmontmodCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *c);
++
+ /* Comparisons             */
+ int mp_cmp_z(const mp_int *a);
+ int mp_cmp_d(const mp_int *a, mp_digit d);
+ int mp_cmp(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b);
+ int mp_cmp_mag(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b);
+ int mp_isodd(const mp_int *a);
+ int mp_iseven(const mp_int *a);
++mp_err mp_selectCT(mp_digit cond, const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *ret);
+ 
+ /* Number theoretic        */
+ mp_err mp_gcd(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
+ mp_err mp_lcm(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
+ mp_err mp_xgcd(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *g, mp_int *x, mp_int *y);
+ mp_err mp_invmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
+ mp_err mp_invmod_xgcd(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
+--- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
++++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
+@@ -124,30 +124,37 @@ s_mp_mul_mont(const mp_int *a, const mp_
+     }
+     res = MP_OKAY;
+ 
+ CLEANUP:
+     return res;
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-STATIC
+ mp_err
+-s_mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, mp_mont_modulus *mmm, mp_int *xMont)
++mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, const mp_int *N, mp_int *xMont)
+ {
+     mp_err res;
+ 
+     /* xMont = x * R mod N   where  N is modulus */
+-    MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(x, xMont));
+-    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_lshd(xMont, MP_USED(&mmm->N))); /* xMont = x << b */
+-    MP_CHECKOK(mp_div(xMont, &mmm->N, 0, xMont));   /*         mod N */
++    if (x != xMont) {
++        MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(x, xMont));
++    }
++    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_lshd(xMont, MP_USED(N))); /* xMont = x << b */
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_div(xMont, N, 0, xMont));   /*         mod N */
+ CLEANUP:
+     return res;
+ }
+ 
++mp_digit
++mp_calculate_mont_n0i(const mp_int *N)
++{
++    return 0 - s_mp_invmod_radix(MP_DIGIT(N,0));
++}
++
+ #ifdef MP_USING_MONT_MULF
+ 
+ /* the floating point multiply is already cache safe,
+  * don't turn on cache safe unless we specifically
+  * force it */
+ #ifndef MP_FORCE_CACHE_SAFE
+ #undef MP_USING_CACHE_SAFE_MOD_EXP
+ #endif
+@@ -193,17 +200,17 @@ mp_exptmod_f(const mp_int *montBase,
+     MP_DIGITS(&accum1) = 0;
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < MAX_ODD_INTS; ++i)
+         oddPowers[i] = 0;
+ 
+     MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum1, 3 * nLen + 2));
+ 
+     mp_set(&accum1, 1);
+-    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
+     MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(&accum1, nLen));
+ 
+     oddPowSize = 2 * nLen + 1;
+     dTmpSize = 2 * oddPowSize;
+     dSize = sizeof(double) * (nLen * 4 + 1 +
+                               ((odd_ints + 1) * oddPowSize) + dTmpSize);
+     dBuf = malloc(dSize);
+     if (!dBuf) {
+@@ -473,17 +480,17 @@ mp_exptmod_i(const mp_int *montBase,
+     for (i = 1; i < odd_ints; ++i) {
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(oddPowers + i, nLen + 2 * MP_USED(&power2) + 2));
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_mul(oddPowers + (i - 1), &power2, oddPowers + i));
+         MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_redc(oddPowers + i, mmm));
+     }
+ 
+     /* set accumulator to montgomery residue of 1 */
+     mp_set(&accum1, 1);
+-    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
+     pa1 = &accum1;
+     pa2 = &accum2;
+ 
+     for (expOff = bits_in_exponent - window_bits; expOff >= 0; expOff -= window_bits) {
+         mp_size smallExp;
+         MP_CHECKOK(mpl_get_bits(exponent, expOff, window_bits));
+         smallExp = (mp_size)res;
+ 
+@@ -862,17 +869,17 @@ mp_exptmod_safe_i(const mp_int *montBase
+     /* build the first WEAVE_WORD powers inline */
+     /* if WEAVE_WORD_SIZE is not 4, this code will have to change */
+     if (num_powers > 2) {
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[0], 3 * nLen + 2));
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[1], 3 * nLen + 2));
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[2], 3 * nLen + 2));
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[3], 3 * nLen + 2));
+         mp_set(&accum[0], 1);
+-        MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum[0], mmm, &accum[0]));
++        MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum[0], &(mmm->N), &accum[0]));
+         MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(montBase, &accum[1]));
+         SQR(montBase, &accum[2]);
+         MUL_NOWEAVE(montBase, &accum[2], &accum[3]);
+         powersArray = (mp_digit *)malloc(num_powers * (nLen * sizeof(mp_digit) + 1));
+         if (!powersArray) {
+             res = MP_MEM;
+             goto CLEANUP;
+         }
+@@ -881,17 +888,17 @@ mp_exptmod_safe_i(const mp_int *montBase
+         MP_CHECKOK(mpi_to_weave(accum, powers, nLen, num_powers));
+         if (first_window < 4) {
+             MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(&accum[first_window], &accum1));
+             first_window = num_powers;
+         }
+     } else {
+         if (first_window == 0) {
+             mp_set(&accum1, 1);
+-            MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
++            MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
+         } else {
+             /* assert first_window == 1? */
+             MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(montBase, &accum1));
+         }
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+      * calculate all the powers in the powers array.
+@@ -1054,19 +1061,19 @@ mp_exptmod(const mp_int *inBase, const m
+     nLen = MP_USED(modulus);
+     MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&montBase, 2 * nLen + 2));
+ 
+     mmm.N = *modulus; /* a copy of the mp_int struct */
+ 
+     /* compute n0', given n0, n0' = -(n0 ** -1) mod MP_RADIX
+     **        where n0 = least significant mp_digit of N, the modulus.
+     */
+-    mmm.n0prime = 0 - s_mp_invmod_radix(MP_DIGIT(modulus, 0));
++    mmm.n0prime = mp_calculate_mont_n0i(modulus);
+ 
+-    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(base, &mmm, &montBase));
++    MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(base, modulus, &montBase));
+ 
+     bits_in_exponent = mpl_significant_bits(exponent);
+ #ifdef MP_USING_CACHE_SAFE_MOD_EXP
+     if (mp_using_cache_safe_exp) {
+         if (bits_in_exponent > 780)
+             window_bits = 6;
+         else if (bits_in_exponent > 256)
+             window_bits = 5;
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/rsa.c b/lib/freebl/rsa.c
+--- a/lib/freebl/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/freebl/rsa.c
+@@ -65,16 +65,18 @@ struct blindingParamsStr {
+ ** the Handbook of Applied Cryptography, 11.118-11.119.
+ */
+ struct RSABlindingParamsStr {
+     /* Blinding-specific parameters */
+     PRCList link;              /* link to list of structs            */
+     SECItem modulus;           /* list element "key"                 */
+     blindingParams *free, *bp; /* Blinding parameters queue          */
+     blindingParams array[RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_CACHE_SIZE];
++    /* precalculate montegomery reduction value */
++    mp_digit n0i; /* n0i = -( n & MP_DIGIT) ** -1 mod mp_RADIX */
+ };
+ typedef struct RSABlindingParamsStr RSABlindingParams;
+ 
+ /*
+ ** RSABlindingParamsListStr
+ **
+ ** List of key-specific blinding params.  The arena holds the volatile pool
+ ** of memory for each entry and the list itself.  The lock is for list
+@@ -1210,16 +1212,18 @@ generate_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *
+     CHECK_SEC_OK(RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(kb, modLen));
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, kb, modLen));
+     /* k < n */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&k, n, &k));
+     /* f = k**e mod n */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&k, &e, n, f));
+     /* g = k**-1 mod n */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, n, g));
++    /* g in montgomery form.. */
++    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_mont(g, n, g));
+ cleanup:
+     if (kb)
+         PORT_ZFree(kb, modLen);
+     mp_clear(&k);
+     mp_clear(&e);
+     if (err) {
+         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+         rv = SECFailure;
+@@ -1246,23 +1250,26 @@ init_blinding_params(RSABlindingParams *
+      * of rsabp->array pointer and must be set to NULL
+      */
+     rsabp->array[RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_CACHE_SIZE - 1].next = NULL;
+ 
+     bp = rsabp->array;
+     rsabp->bp = NULL;
+     rsabp->free = bp;
+ 
++    /* precalculate montgomery reduction parameter */
++    rsabp->n0i = mp_calculate_mont_n0i(n);
++
+     /* List elements are keyed using the modulus */
+     return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &rsabp->modulus, &key->modulus);
+ }
+ 
+ static SECStatus
+ get_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *n, unsigned int modLen,
+-                    mp_int *f, mp_int *g)
++                    mp_int *f, mp_int *g, mp_digit *n0i)
+ {
+     RSABlindingParams *rsabp = NULL;
+     blindingParams *bpUnlinked = NULL;
+     blindingParams *bp;
+     PRCList *el;
+     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+     mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
+     int cmp = -1;
+@@ -1312,16 +1319,17 @@ get_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *key, 
+             ** head (since el would have looped back to the head).
+             */
+             PR_INSERT_BEFORE(&rsabp->link, el);
+         }
+ 
+         /* We've found (or created) the RSAblindingParams struct for this key.
+          * Now, search its list of ready blinding params for a usable one.
+          */
++        *n0i = rsabp->n0i;
+         while (0 != (bp = rsabp->bp)) {
+ #ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+             /* Found a match and there are still remaining uses left */
+             /* Return the parameters */
+             CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&bp->f, f));
+             CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&bp->g, g));
+ 
+             PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock);
+@@ -1426,16 +1434,17 @@ cleanup:
+         rsabp->free = bp;
+     }
+     if (holdingLock) {
+         PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock);
+     }
+     if (err) {
+         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+     }
++    *n0i = 0;
+     return SECFailure;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+ ** Perform a raw private-key operation
+ **  Length of input and output buffers are equal to key's modulus len.
+ */
+ static SECStatus
+@@ -1445,16 +1454,17 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
+                  PRBool check)
+ {
+     unsigned int modLen;
+     unsigned int offset;
+     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+     mp_err err;
+     mp_int n, c, m;
+     mp_int f, g;
++    mp_digit n0i;
+     if (!key || !output || !input) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+     /* check input out of range (needs to be in range [0..n-1]) */
+     modLen = rsa_modulusLen(&key->modulus);
+     if (modLen == 0) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+@@ -1476,17 +1486,17 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&f));
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&g));
+     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->modulus, &n);
+     OCTETS_TO_MPINT(input, &c, modLen);
+     /* If blinding, compute pre-image of ciphertext by multiplying by
+     ** blinding factor
+     */
+     if (nssRSAUseBlinding) {
+-        CHECK_SEC_OK(get_blinding_params(key, &n, modLen, &f, &g));
++        CHECK_SEC_OK(get_blinding_params(key, &n, modLen, &f, &g, &n0i));
+         /* c' = c*f mod n */
+         CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&c, &f, &n, &c));
+     }
+     /* Do the private key operation m = c**d mod n */
+     if (key->prime1.len == 0 ||
+         key->prime2.len == 0 ||
+         key->exponent1.len == 0 ||
+         key->exponent2.len == 0 ||
+@@ -1497,17 +1507,17 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
+     } else {
+         CHECK_SEC_OK(rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTNoCheck(key, &m, &c));
+     }
+     /* If blinding, compute post-image of plaintext by multiplying by
+     ** blinding factor
+     */
+     if (nssRSAUseBlinding) {
+         /* m = m'*g mod n */
+-        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&m, &g, &n, &m));
++        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmontmodCT(&m, &g, &n, n0i, &m));
+     }
+     err = mp_to_fixlen_octets(&m, output, modLen);
+     if (err >= 0)
+         err = MP_OKAY;
+ cleanup:
+     mp_clear(&n);
+     mp_clear(&c);
+     mp_clear(&m);

SOURCES/fips_algorithms.h

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/*
+ * Vendors should replace this header file with the file containing those
+ * algorithms which have NIST algorithm Certificates.
+ */
+
+/* handle special cases. Classes require existing code to already be
+ * in place for that class */
+typedef enum {
+    SFTKFIPSNone = 0,
+    SFTKFIPSDH,  /* allow only specific primes */
+    SFTKFIPSECC, /* not just keys but specific curves */
+    SFTKFIPSAEAD, /* single shot AEAD functions not allowed in FIPS mode */
+    SFTKFIPSRSAPSS, /* make sure salt isn't too big */
+    SFTKFIPSPBKDF2,  /* handle pbkdf2 FIPS restrictions */
+    SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck,  /* check the output of TLS prf functions */
+    SFTKFIPSChkHash,  /* make sure the base hash of KDF functions is FIPS */
+    SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,  /* make sure the base hash of TLS KDF functions is FIPS */
+    SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,  /* make sure the base hash of SP-800-108 KDF functions is FIPS */
+} SFTKFIPSSpecialClass;
+
+/* set according to your security policy */
+#define SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN  8
+
+typedef struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList;
+struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr {
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type;
+    CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
+    CK_ULONG step;
+    SFTKFIPSSpecialClass special;
+    size_t offset;
+};
+
+SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
+/* A sample set of algorithms to allow basic testing in our continous
+ * testing infrastructure. The vendor version should replace this with
+ * a version that matches their algorithm testing and security policy */
+/* NOTE, This looks a lot like the PKCS #11 mechanism list in pkcs11.c, it
+ * differs in the following ways:
+ *    1) the addition of step and class elements to help restrict
+ *       the supported key sizes and types.
+ *    2) The mechanism flags are restricted to only those that map to
+ *       fips approved operations.
+ *    3) All key sizes are in bits, independent of mechanism.
+ *    4) You can add more then one entry for the same mechanism to handle
+ *       multiple descrete keys where the MIN/MAX/STEP semantics doesn't apply
+ *       or where different operations have different key requirements.
+ * This table does not encode all the modules legal FIPS semantics, only
+ * those semantics that might possibly change due to algorithms dropping
+ * of the security policy late in the process. */
+/* handy common flag types */
+#define CKF_KPG CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR
+#define CKF_GEN CKF_GENERATE
+#define CKF_SGN (CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY)
+#define CKF_ENC (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT )
+#define CKF_ECW (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT | CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
+#define CKF_WRP (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
+#define CKF_KEK (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
+#define CKF_KEA CKF_DERIVE
+#define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
+#define CKF_HSH CKF_DIGEST
+#define CK_MAX 0xffffffffUL
+/* mechanisms using the same key types share the same key type
+ * limits */
+#define RSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
+#define RSA_FB_STEP 1
+#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY 1024, 1792 /* min, max */
+#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP 256
+
+#define DSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
+#define DSA_FB_STEP 1024
+#define DH_FB_KEY 2048, 8192 /* min, max */
+#define DH_FB_STEP 1024
+#define EC_FB_KEY 256, 521 /* min, max */
+#define EC_FB_STEP 1       /* key limits handled by special operation */
+#define AES_FB_KEY 128, 256
+#define AES_FB_STEP 64
+    { CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+
+    /* -------------- RSA Multipart Signing Operations -------------------- */
+    { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
+    { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
+    { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
+    { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
+    { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
+    { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
+    { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
+    { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
+    /* -------------------- Diffie Hellman Operations --------------------- */
+    { CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
+    { CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
+    /* -------------------- Elliptic Curve Operations --------------------- */
+    { CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
+    { CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
+    { CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
+    { CKM_ECDSA_SHA224, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
+    { CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
+    { CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
+    { CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
+    /* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */
+    /* ------------------------- AES Operations --------------------------- */
+    { CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_GEN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_ECB, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_CBC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_CMAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_CTS, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_CTR, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
+    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    /* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */
+    { CKM_SHA224, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA224_HMAC, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA256, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    /* --------------------- Secret Key Operations ------------------------ */
+    { CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    /* ---------------------- SSL/TLS operations ------------------------- */
+    { CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck, offsetof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
+    { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
+        offsetof(CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
+    { CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
+        offsetof(CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
+    { CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
+        offsetof(CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
+
+    /* ------------------------- HKDF Operations -------------------------- */
+    { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
+        offsetof(CK_HKDF_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
+    { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
+        offsetof(CK_HKDF_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
+    { CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 160, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 256, 512, CKF_GEN }, 128, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    /* ------------------ NIST 800-108 Key Derivations  ------------------- */
+    { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
+    { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
+    { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
+    /* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
+    { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
+        offsetof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfMechanism) },
+    { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
+        offsetof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfMechanism) },
+    /* ------------------ PBE Key Derivations  ------------------- */
+    { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSPBKDF2 },
+    /* the deprecated mechanisms, don't use for some reason we are supposed
+     * to set the FIPS indicators on these (sigh) */
+    { CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256, { 384, 384, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck },
+    { CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
+    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
+    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1,  SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
+        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
+};
+const int SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_fips_mechs);

SOURCES/nss-3.44-kbkdf-coverity.patch

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c.coverity ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c
---- ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c.coverity	2019-12-03 15:33:43.047732312 -0800
-+++ ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c	2019-12-03 15:39:40.982578357 -0800
-@@ -534,6 +534,10 @@ CK_RV kbkdf_CreateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE
-     PR_ASSERT(derived_key != NULL);
-     PR_ASSERT(derived_key->phKey != NULL);
- 
-+    if (slot == NULL) {
-+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
-+    }
-+
-     /* Create the new key object for this additional derived key. */
-     key = sftk_NewObject(slot);
-     if (key == NULL) {
-@@ -589,7 +593,9 @@ done:
-     sftk_FreeObject(key);
- 
-     /* Doesn't do anything. */
--    sftk_FreeSession(session);
-+    if (session) {
-+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
-+    }
- 
-     return ret;
- }
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c.coverity ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c
---- ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c.coverity	2019-12-03 15:40:06.108848341 -0800
-+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c	2019-12-03 15:41:04.919480267 -0800
-@@ -232,7 +232,9 @@ sftk_MAC_Init(sftk_MACCtx *ctx, CK_MECHA
-                            keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS);
- 
- done:
--    sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
-+    if (keyval) {
-+        sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
-+    }
-     return ret;
- }
- 

SOURCES/nss-3.53.1-measure-fix.patch

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./coreconf/config.gypi.orig ./coreconf/config.gypi
---- ./coreconf/config.gypi.orig	2020-06-16 15:50:59.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./coreconf/config.gypi	2020-10-15 16:05:37.542761192 -0700
-@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@
-               '_DEFAULT_SOURCE', # for <endian.h> functions, strdup, realpath, and getentropy
-               '_BSD_SOURCE', # for the above in glibc <= 2.19
-               '_POSIX_SOURCE', # for <signal.h>
--              'SQL_MEASURE_USE_TEMP_DIR', # use tmpdir for the access calls
-+              'SDB_MEASURE_USE_TEMP_DIR', # use tmpdir for the access calls
-             ],
-           }],
-           [ 'OS=="dragonfly" or OS=="freebsd"', {
-diff -up ./coreconf/Linux.mk.orig ./coreconf/Linux.mk
---- ./coreconf/Linux.mk.orig	2020-10-15 16:05:04.794591674 -0700
-+++ ./coreconf/Linux.mk	2020-10-15 16:05:37.543761197 -0700
-@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ ifeq ($(USE_PTHREADS),1)
- endif
- 
- DEFAULT_COMPILER = gcc
--DEFINES += -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DSQL_MEASURE_USE_TEMP_DIR
-+DEFINES += -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DSDB_MEASURE_USE_TEMP_DIR
- 
- ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Android)
- ifndef ANDROID_NDK

SOURCES/nss-3.66-disable-signature-policies.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
---- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy	2021-06-03 10:08:49.988118880 -0700
-+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2021-06-03 10:16:26.059935708 -0700
-@@ -391,12 +391,9 @@ static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
+--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy	2023-06-21 08:54:54.802785229 +0200
++++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2023-06-21 08:58:24.748282499 +0200
+@@ -395,12 +395,9 @@ static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
      /* Signatures */
      { CIPHER_NAME("DSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE,
        NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
  };
  
  typedef struct {
-@@ -412,7 +409,7 @@ static const algListsDef algOptLists[] =
+@@ -416,7 +413,7 @@ static const algListsDef algOptLists[] =
      { macOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(macOptList), "MAC", PR_FALSE },
      { cipherOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherOptList), "CIPHER", PR_FALSE },
      { kxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kxOptList), "OTHER-KX", PR_FALSE },
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
  };
  
  static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[] = {
-diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.policy_revert ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
---- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.policy_revert	2020-11-04 10:31:20.837715397 -0800
-+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt	2020-11-04 10:33:19.598357223 -0800
+diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
+--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy	2023-06-21 09:00:17.720181306 +0200
++++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt	2023-06-21 09:00:55.637501208 +0200
 @@ -193,7 +193,9 @@
    1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=all_allow=hmac-sha1:sha256:rsa-pkcs:rsa:des-ede3-cbc:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly Narrow
    1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=all_allow=md2/all:md4/all:md5/all:sha1/all:sha256/all:sha384/all:sha512/all:rsa-pkcs/all:rsa-pss/all:ecdsa/all:dsa/all:hmac-sha1/all:hmac-sha224/all:hmac-sha256/all:hmac-sha384/all:hmac-sha512/all:hmac-md5/all:camellia128-cbc/all:camellia192-cbc/all:camellia256-cbc/all:seed-cbc/all:des-ede3-cbc/all:des-40-cbc/all:des-cbc/all:null-cipher/all:rc2/all:rc4/all:idea/all:rsa/all:rsa-export/all:dhe-rsa/all:dhe-dss/all:ecdhe-ecdsa/all:ecdhe-rsa/all:ecdh-ecdsa/all:ecdh-rsa/all:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly
@@ -37,6 +37,6 @@ diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.policy_revert ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
 +# rsa-pkcs, rsa-pss, and ecdsa policy checking reverted in rhel8 for binary
 +# compatibility reasons
 +#  1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
- # test default settings
- # NOTE: tstclient will attempt to overide the defaults, so we detect we
- # were successful by locking in our settings
+   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
+   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
+   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL

SOURCES/nss-3.66-fix-gtest-parsing.patch

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./tests/common/parsegtestreport.sed.new_gtest ./tests/common/parsegtestreport.sed
---- ./tests/common/parsegtestreport.sed.new_gtest	2021-06-17 16:26:49.361035662 -0700
-+++ ./tests/common/parsegtestreport.sed	2021-06-17 16:49:08.512261136 -0700
-@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
- /\<testcase/{
--  s/^.* name="\([^"]*\)" value_param="\([^"]*\)" status="\([^"]*\)" time="[^"]*" classname="\([^"]*\)".*$/\3 '\4: \1 \2'/
-+  s/^.* name="\([^"]*\)" value_param="\([^"]*\)" status="\([^"]*\)" time="[^"]*" classname="\([^"]*\).*$/\3 '\4: \1 \2'/
-   t end
-   s/^.* name="\([^"]*\)" status="\([^"]*\)" time="[^"]*" classname="\([^"]*\)".*$/\2 '\3: \1'/
-   t end
-+  s/^.* name="\([^"]*\)" value_param="\([^"]*\)" status="\([^"]*\)" result="[^"]*" time="[^"]*" timestamp="[^"]*" classname="\([^"]*\)".*$/\3 '\4: \1 \2'/
-+  t end
-+  s/^.* name="\([^"]*\)" status="\([^"]*\)" result="[^"]*" time="[^"]*" timestamp="[^"]*" classname="\([^"]*\)".*$/\2 '\3: \1'/
- }
- d
- : end

SOURCES/nss-3.66-no-small-primes.patch

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./gtests/softoken_gtest/softoken_dh_vectors.h.orig ./gtests/softoken_gtest/softoken_dh_vectors.h
---- ./gtests/softoken_gtest/softoken_dh_vectors.h.orig	2021-06-02 16:57:50.557008790 -0700
-+++ ./gtests/softoken_gtest/softoken_dh_vectors.h	2021-06-02 16:59:52.781735096 -0700
-@@ -2872,7 +2872,7 @@ static const DhTestVector DH_TEST_VECTOR
-      {siBuffer, (unsigned char *)g2, sizeof(g2)},
-      {siBuffer, NULL, 0},
-      {siBuffer, NULL, 0},
--     IKE_APPROVED,
-+     SAFE_PRIME,
-      CLASS_1536},
-     {"IKE 2048",
-      {siBuffer, (unsigned char *)prime_ike_2048, sizeof(prime_ike_2048)},
-@@ -2952,7 +2952,7 @@ static const DhTestVector DH_TEST_VECTOR
-      {siBuffer, (unsigned char *)sub2_prime_ike_1536,
-       sizeof(sub2_prime_ike_1536)},
-      {siBuffer, NULL, 0},
--     IKE_APPROVED,
-+     SAFE_PRIME,
-      CLASS_1536},
-     {"IKE 2048 with subprime",
-      {siBuffer, (unsigned char *)prime_ike_2048, sizeof(prime_ike_2048)},
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.orig ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.orig	2021-05-28 02:50:43.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2021-06-02 16:52:01.196932757 -0700
-@@ -5193,7 +5193,7 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
-                 /* subprime not supplied, In this case look it up.
-                  * This only works with approved primes, but in FIPS mode
-                  * that's the only kine of prime that will get here */
--                subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime);
-+                subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime,isFIPS);
-                 if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
-                     crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-                     goto done;
-@@ -8351,7 +8351,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
- 
-             /* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
-              * checks. */
--            subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime);
-+            subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime,isFIPS);
-             if (subPrime == NULL) {
-                 SECItem dhSubPrime;
-                 /* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.orig ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.orig	2021-06-02 16:52:01.196932757 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2021-06-02 16:52:54.281248207 -0700
-@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
- /* dh verify functions */
- /* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes, and if so return
-  * it's subprime value */
--const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime);
-+const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS);
- /* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
- SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
- /* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.orig ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
---- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.orig	2021-06-02 16:54:23.387777705 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2021-06-02 16:54:51.012941866 -0700
-@@ -2312,7 +2312,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
-             if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-                 return PR_FALSE;
-             }
--            dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime);
-+            dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, PR_TRUE);
-             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
-             return (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
-         }
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.orig ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
---- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.orig	2021-05-28 02:50:43.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c	2021-06-02 16:52:01.196932757 -0700
-@@ -1171,11 +1171,15 @@ static const SECItem subprime_tls_8192 =
-  * verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes
-  */
- const SECItem *
--sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime)
-+sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS)
- {
-     /* use the length to decide which primes to check */
-     switch (dhPrime->len) {
-         case 1536 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
-+            /* don't accept 1536 bit primes in FIPS mode */
-+            if (isFIPS) {
-+                break;
-+            }
-             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_1536,
-                             sizeof(prime_ike_1536)) == 0) {
-                 return &subprime_ike_1536;

SOURCES/nss-3.67-fix-coverity-issues.patch

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c.coverity ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
---- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c.coverity	2021-06-18 09:36:19.499203028 -0700
-+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c	2021-06-18 09:37:57.993765299 -0700
-@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(CK_MECHANISM
-      * of the connection.*/
-     context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
-     if (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64) {
--        if (symKey->origin == PK11_OriginFortezzaHack) {
-+        if (symKey && (symKey->origin == PK11_OriginFortezzaHack)) {
-             context->fortezzaHack = PR_TRUE;
-         }
-     }
-diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11hpke.c.coverity ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11hpke.c
---- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11hpke.c.coverity	2021-06-18 13:40:05.410644464 -0700
-+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11hpke.c	2021-06-18 13:42:40.627606469 -0700
-@@ -1164,8 +1164,6 @@ PK11_HPKE_Seal(HpkeContext *cx, const SE
-     unsigned char tagBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
-     size_t tagLen;
-     unsigned int fixedBits;
--    PORT_Assert(cx->baseNonce->len == sizeof(ivOut));
--    PORT_Memcpy(ivOut, cx->baseNonce->data, cx->baseNonce->len);
- 
-     /* aad may be NULL, PT may be zero-length but not NULL. */
-     if (!cx || !cx->aeadContext ||
-@@ -1176,6 +1174,9 @@ PK11_HPKE_Seal(HpkeContext *cx, const SE
-         return SECFailure;
-     }
- 
-+    PORT_Assert(cx->baseNonce->len == sizeof(ivOut));
-+    PORT_Memcpy(ivOut, cx->baseNonce->data, cx->baseNonce->len);
-+
-     tagLen = cx->aeadParams->tagLen;
-     maxOut = pt->len + tagLen;
-     fixedBits = (cx->baseNonce->len - 8) * 8;
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.coverity ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
---- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.coverity	2021-06-18 09:33:59.633405513 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c	2021-06-18 09:34:20.305523382 -0700
-@@ -1411,7 +1411,6 @@ sftk_fips_IKE_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
-         (outKeySize != sizeof(ike_known_sha256_prf_plus)) ||
-         (PORT_Memcmp(outKeyData, ike_known_sha256_prf_plus,
-                      sizeof(ike_known_sha256_prf_plus)) != 0)) {
--        PORT_ZFree(outKeyData, outKeySize);
-         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
-         return SECFailure;
-     }

SOURCES/nss-3.67-fix-private-key-mac.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c.orig ./lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c
---- ./lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c.orig	2021-06-10 05:33:12.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c	2021-07-01 14:04:34.068596942 -0700
-@@ -287,9 +287,12 @@ sftkdb_DecryptAttribute(SFTKDBHandle *ha
-     }
- 
-     /* If we are using aes 256, we need to check authentication as well.*/
--    if ((type != CKT_INVALID_TYPE) && (cipherValue.alg == SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC)) {
-+    if ((type != CKT_INVALID_TYPE) && 
-+	(cipherValue.alg == SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBES2) &&
-+        (cipherValue.param->encAlg == SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC)) {
-         SECItem signature;
-         unsigned char signData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
-+        CK_RV crv;
- 
-         /* if we get here from the old legacy db, there is clearly an
-          * error, don't return the plaintext */
-@@ -301,15 +304,28 @@ sftkdb_DecryptAttribute(SFTKDBHandle *ha
- 
-         signature.data = signData;
-         signature.len = sizeof(signData);
--        rv = sftkdb_GetAttributeSignature(handle, handle, id, type,
-+        rv = SECFailure;
-+        /* sign sftkdb_GetAttriibuteSignature returns a crv, not an rv */
-+        crv = sftkdb_GetAttributeSignature(handle, handle, id, type,
-                                           &signature);
--        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
--            goto loser;
-+        if (crv == CKR_OK) {
-+            rv = sftkdb_VerifyAttribute(handle, passKey, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
-+                                        type, *plain, &signature);
-         }
--        rv = sftkdb_VerifyAttribute(handle, passKey, CK_INVALID_HANDLE, type,
--                                    *plain, &signature);
-         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
--            goto loser;
-+            /*  handle a bug where old versions of NSS misfiled the signature
-+             *  attribute on password update */
-+            id |= SFTK_KEYDB_TYPE|SFTK_TOKEN_TYPE;
-+            signature.len = sizeof(signData);
-+            crv = sftkdb_GetAttributeSignature(handle, handle, id, type,
-+                                              &signature);
-+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-+                rv = SECFailure;
-+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-+                goto loser;
-+            }
-+            rv = sftkdb_VerifyAttribute(handle, passKey, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
-+                                        type, *plain, &signature);
-         }
-     }
- 
-@@ -1198,6 +1214,7 @@ sftk_updateEncrypted(PLArenaPool *arena,
-     unsigned int i;
-     for (i = 0; i < privAttrCount; i++) {
-         // Read the old attribute in the clear.
-+        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE sdbId = id & SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
-         CK_ATTRIBUTE privAttr = { privAttrTypes[i], NULL, 0 };
-         CK_RV crv = sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(keydb, id, &privAttr, 1);
-         if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-@@ -1222,7 +1239,7 @@ sftk_updateEncrypted(PLArenaPool *arena,
-         plainText.data = privAttr.pValue;
-         plainText.len = privAttr.ulValueLen;
-         if (sftkdb_EncryptAttribute(arena, keydb, keydb->db, newKey,
--                                    iterationCount, id, privAttr.type,
-+                                    iterationCount, sdbId, privAttr.type,
-                                     &plainText, &result) != SECSuccess) {
-             return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-         }
-@@ -1232,10 +1249,9 @@ sftk_updateEncrypted(PLArenaPool *arena,
-         PORT_Memset(plainText.data, 0, plainText.len);
- 
-         // Write the newly encrypted attributes out directly.
--        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newId = id & SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
-         keydb->newKey = newKey;
-         keydb->newDefaultIterationCount = iterationCount;
--        crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_SetAttributeValue)(keydb->db, newId, &privAttr, 1);
-+        crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_SetAttributeValue)(keydb->db, sdbId, &privAttr, 1);
-         keydb->newKey = NULL;
-         if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-             return crv;

SOURCES/nss-3.67-fix-sdb-timeout.patch

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/lib/softoken/sdb.c b/lib/softoken/sdb.c
---- a/lib/softoken/sdb.c
-+++ b/lib/softoken/sdb.c
-@@ -1519,16 +1519,18 @@ sdb_Begin(SDB *sdb)
- 
-     sqlerr = sqlite3_prepare_v2(sqlDB, BEGIN_CMD, -1, &stmt, NULL);
- 
-     do {
-         sqlerr = sqlite3_step(stmt);
-         if (sqlerr == SQLITE_BUSY) {
-             PR_Sleep(SDB_BUSY_RETRY_TIME);
-         }
-+        /* don't retry BEGIN transaction*/
-+        retry = 0;
-     } while (!sdb_done(sqlerr, &retry));
- 
-     if (stmt) {
-         sqlite3_reset(stmt);
-         sqlite3_finalize(stmt);
-     }
- 
- loser:
-diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
---- a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
-+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
-@@ -1521,17 +1521,17 @@ sftkdb_DestroyObject(SFTKDBHandle *handl
-     if (handle == NULL) {
-         return CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED;
-     }
-     db = SFTK_GET_SDB(handle);
-     objectID &= SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
- 
-     crv = (*db->sdb_Begin)(db);
-     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
--        goto loser;
-+        return crv;
-     }
-     crv = (*db->sdb_DestroyObject)(db, objectID);
-     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-         goto loser;
-     }
-     /* if the database supports meta data, delete any old signatures
-      * that we may have added */
-     if ((db->sdb_flags & SDB_HAS_META) == SDB_HAS_META) {
-@@ -2456,17 +2456,17 @@ sftkdb_Update(SFTKDBHandle *handle, SECI
-         return CKR_OK;
-     }
-     /*
-      * put the whole update under a transaction. This allows us to handle
-      * any possible race conditions between with the updateID check.
-      */
-     crv = (*handle->db->sdb_Begin)(handle->db);
-     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
--        goto loser;
-+        return crv;
-     }
-     inTransaction = PR_TRUE;
- 
-     /* some one else has already updated this db */
-     if (sftkdb_hasUpdate(sftkdb_TypeString(handle),
-                          handle->db, handle->updateID)) {
-         crv = CKR_OK;
-         goto done;

SOURCES/nss-3.67-fix-ssl-alerts.patch

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.alert-fix ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
---- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.alert-fix	2021-06-10 05:33:12.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c	2021-07-06 17:08:25.894018521 -0700
-@@ -4319,7 +4319,11 @@ ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(SSLSignatureSch
-     if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(scheme)) {
-         return PR_FALSE;
-     }
--    if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeMatchesSpkiOid(scheme, spkiOid)) {
-+    /* if we are purposefully passed SEC_OID_UNKOWN, it means
-+     * we not checking the scheme against a potential key, so skip
-+     * the call */
-+    if ((spkiOid != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) &&
-+        !ssl_SignatureSchemeMatchesSpkiOid(scheme, spkiOid)) {
-         return PR_FALSE;
-     }
-     if (isTls13) {
-@@ -4517,7 +4521,8 @@ ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(sslS
-     }
- 
-     /* Verify that the signature scheme matches the signing key. */
--    if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(scheme, spkiOid, isTLS13)) {
-+    if ((spkiOid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) || 
-+         !ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(scheme, spkiOid, isTLS13)) {
-         PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
-         return SECFailure;
-     }
-@@ -4533,6 +4538,7 @@ ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(sslS
- PRBool
- ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
- {
-+    PRBool isSupported = PR_FALSE;
-     switch (scheme) {
-         case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
-         case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
-@@ -4552,7 +4558,8 @@ ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignat
-         case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384:
-         case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512:
-         case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1:
--            return PR_TRUE;
-+            isSupported = PR_TRUE;
-+            break;
- 
-         case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
-         case ssl_sig_none:
-@@ -4560,7 +4567,19 @@ ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignat
-         case ssl_sig_ed448:
-             return PR_FALSE;
-     }
--    return PR_FALSE;
-+    if (isSupported) {
-+        SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme));
-+        PRUint32 policy;
-+        const PRUint32 sigSchemePolicy=
-+                NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX|NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE;
-+        /* check hash policy */
-+        if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) == SECSuccess) &&
-+            ((policy & sigSchemePolicy) != sigSchemePolicy)) {
-+            return PR_FALSE;
-+        }
-+        /* check algorithm policy */
-+    }
-+    return isSupported;
- }
- 
- PRBool
-@@ -6533,6 +6552,9 @@ ssl_PickSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss,
-     }
- 
-     spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm);
-+    if (spkiOid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
-+        goto loser;
-+    }
- 
-     /* Now we have to search based on the key type. Go through our preferred
-      * schemes in order and find the first that can be used. */
-@@ -6547,6 +6569,7 @@ ssl_PickSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss,
-         }
-     }
- 
-+loser:
-     PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
-     return SECFailure;
- }
-@@ -7700,7 +7723,8 @@ ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(const sslSocke
-             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
-             return SECFailure;
-         }
--        if (ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp)) {
-+        if (ssl_SignatureSchemeValid((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN,
-+            (PRBool)ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {;
-             schemes[numSupported++] = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp;
-         }
-     }
-@@ -10286,7 +10310,12 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *
-         PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record);
-         rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme);
-         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
--            goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */
-+            errCode = PORT_GetError();
-+            /* unsupported == illegal_parameter, others == handshake_failure. */
-+            if (errCode  == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM) {
-+                desc = illegal_parameter;
-+            }
-+            goto alert_loser;
-         }
-         rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(
-             ss, sigScheme, &ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo);
-diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc.alert-fix ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc
---- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc.alert-fix	2021-07-07 11:32:11.634376932 -0700
-+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc	2021-07-07 11:33:30.595841110 -0700
-@@ -428,7 +428,10 @@ TEST_P(TlsExtensionTest12Plus, Signature
- }
- 
- TEST_P(TlsExtensionTest12Plus, SignatureAlgorithmsTrailingData) {
--  const uint8_t val[] = {0x00, 0x02, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00};  // sha-256, rsa
-+  // make sure the test uses an algorithm that is legal for
-+  // tls 1.3 (or tls 1.3 will through and illegalParameter
-+  // instead of a decode error)
-+  const uint8_t val[] = {0x00, 0x02, 0x08, 0x09, 0x00};  // sha-256, rsa-pss-pss
-   DataBuffer extension(val, sizeof(val));
-   ClientHelloErrorTest(std::make_shared<TlsExtensionReplacer>(
-       client_, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, extension));

SOURCES/nss-3.71-camellia-pkcs12-doc.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff -up ./doc/pk12util.xml.camellia ./doc/pk12util.xml
+--- ./doc/pk12util.xml.camellia	2022-01-26 09:46:39.794919455 -0800
++++ ./doc/pk12util.xml	2022-01-26 09:54:58.277019760 -0800
+@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ Certificate    Friendly Name: Thawte Fre
+ 
+   <refsection id="encryption">
+     <title>Password Encryption</title>
+-    <para>PKCS #12 provides for not only the protection of the private keys but also the certificate and meta-data associated with the keys. Password-based encryption is used to protect private keys on export to a PKCS #12 file and, optionally, the associated certificates. If no algorithm is specified, the tool defaults to using PKCS #12 SHA-1 and 3-key triple DES for private key encryption. When not in FIPS mode, PKCS #12 SHA-1 and 40-bit RC4 is used for certificate encryption. When in FIPS mode, there is no certificate encryption. If certificate encryption is not wanted, specify <userinput>"NONE"</userinput> as the argument of the <option>-C</option> option.</para>
++    <para>PKCS #12 provides for not only the protection of the private keys but also the certificate and meta-data associated with the keys. Password-based encryption is used to protect private keys on export to a PKCS #12 file and, optionally, the associated certificates. If no algorithm is specified, the tool defaults to using AES-256-CBC for private key encryption and AES-128-CBC for certificate encryption. If certificate encryption is not wanted, specify <userinput>"NONE"</userinput> as the argument of the <option>-C</option> option.</para>
+     <para>The private key is always protected with strong encryption by default.</para>
+     <para>Several types of ciphers are supported.</para>
+     <variablelist>
+@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ Certificate    Friendly Name: Thawte Fre
+         <listitem>
+ 	  <itemizedlist>
+ 	    <listitem><para>PBES2 with AES-CBC-Pad as underlying encryption scheme (<userinput>"AES-128-CBC"</userinput>, <userinput>"AES-192-CBC"</userinput>, and <userinput>"AES-256-CBC"</userinput>)</para></listitem>
++	    <listitem><para>PBES2 with CAMELLIA-CBC-Pad as underlying encryption scheme (<userinput>"CAMELLIA-128-CBC"</userinput>, <userinput>"CAMELLIA-192-CBC"</userinput>, and <userinput>"CAMELLIA-256-CBC"</userinput>)</para></listitem>
+ 	  </itemizedlist>
+         </listitem>
+       </varlistentry>

SOURCES/nss-3.71-fix-lto-gtests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
+--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
++++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
+@@ -15,13 +15,22 @@
+ #include "gtest_utils.h"
+ #include "tls_agent.h"
+ #include "tls_connect.h"
++#define LTO
+
+ namespace nss_test {
+
++#ifndef LTO
++// sigh this construction breaks LTO
+ const std::string kEcdsaDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorEcdsa256;
+ const std::string kRsaeDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsae2048;
+ const std::string kPssDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsaPss2048;
+ const std::string kDCId = TlsAgent::kServerEcdsa256;
++#else
++#define kEcdsaDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorEcdsa256
++#define kRsaeDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsae2048
++#define kPssDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsaPss2048
++#define kDCId  TlsAgent::kServerEcdsa256
++#endif
+ const SSLSignatureScheme kDCScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256;
+ const PRUint32 kDCValidFor = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 /* 1 week (seconds) */;
+

SOURCES/nss-3.79-fips-review.patches

@@ -0,0 +1,497 @@
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review ./lib/freebl/dh.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/dh.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.453233170 -0700
+@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ cleanup:
+ PRBool
+ KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, SECItem *subPrime)
+ {
+-    mp_int p, q, y, r;
++    mp_int p, q, y, r, psub1;
+     mp_err err;
+     int cmp = 1; /* default is false */
+     if (!Y || !prime || !subPrime) {
+@@ -456,13 +456,30 @@ KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, S
+     MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
+     MP_DIGITS(&y) = 0;
+     MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
++    MP_DIGITS(&psub1) = 0;
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p));
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&y));
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
++    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&psub1));
+     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*prime, &p);
+     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*subPrime, &q);
+     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*Y, &y);
++    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&p, 1, &psub1));
++    /*
++     * We check that the public value isn't zero (which isn't in the
++     * group), one (subgroup of order one) or p-1 (subgroup of order 2). We
++     * also check that the public value is less than p, to avoid being fooled
++     * by values like p+1 or 2*p-1.
++     * This check is required by SP-800-56Ar3. It's also done in derive,
++     * but this is only called in various FIPS cases, so put it here to help
++     * reviewers find it.
++     */
++    if (mp_cmp_d(&y, 1) <= 0 ||
++        mp_cmp(&y, &psub1) >= 0) {
++        err = MP_BADARG;
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
+     /* compute r = y**q mod p */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&y, &q, &p, &r));
+     /* compare to 1 */
+@@ -472,6 +489,7 @@ cleanup:
+     mp_clear(&q);
+     mp_clear(&y);
+     mp_clear(&r);
++    mp_clear(&psub1);
+     if (err) {
+         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+         return PR_FALSE;
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review	2023-06-12 15:29:04.096403884 -0700
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
+@@ -4785,6 +4785,10 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
+      * handle the base object stuff
+      */
+     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
++    /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated 
++     * key length against fips requirements */
++    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
++    session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
+     sftk_FreeSession(session);
+     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+@@ -4792,9 +4796,6 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
+     if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+     }
+-    /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
+-     * fips requirements */
+-    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
+     if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+         *phKey = key->handle;
+     }
+@@ -5098,60 +5099,67 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
+ 
+     if (isDerivable) {
+         SFTKAttribute *pubAttribute = NULL;
+-        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKey;
+         PRBool isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
+-        CK_RV crv2;
+-        CK_OBJECT_CLASS secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+-        CK_KEY_TYPE generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+-        CK_ULONG keyLen = 128;
+-        CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
+-        CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
+-            { CKA_CLASS, &secret, sizeof(secret) },
+-            { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &generic, sizeof(generic) },
+-            { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) },
+-            { CKA_DERIVE, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue) }
+-        };
+-        CK_ULONG templateCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template);
+-        CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS ecParams;
++        NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lowPrivKey = NULL;
++        ECPrivateKey *ecPriv;
++        SECItem *lowPubValue = NULL;
++        SECItem item;
++        SECStatus rv;
+ 
+         crv = CKR_OK; /*paranoia, already get's set before we drop to the end */
+-        /* FIPS 140-2 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key.
+-         * The easiest way to do this is to do a derive operation, which checks
+-         * the validity of the key */
+-
++        /* FIPS 140-3 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key
++         * by recalculating the public can an compare it to our own public
++         * key. */
++        lowPrivKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(privateKey, keyType, &crv);
++        if (lowPrivKey == NULL) {
++            return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
++        }
++        /* recalculate the public key from the private key */
+         switch (keyType) {
+-            case CKK_DH:
+-                mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
+-                pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
+-                if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
+-                    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+-                }
+-                mech.pParameter = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
+-                mech.ulParameterLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+-                break;
+-            case CKK_EC:
+-                mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
+-                pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
+-                if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
+-                    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+-                }
+-                ecParams.kdf = CKD_NULL;
+-                ecParams.ulSharedDataLen = 0;
+-                ecParams.pSharedData = NULL;
+-                ecParams.ulPublicDataLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+-                ecParams.pPublicData = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
+-                mech.pParameter = &ecParams;
+-                mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ecParams);
+-                break;
+-            default:
+-                return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
++        case CKK_DH:
++            rv = DH_Derive(&lowPrivKey->u.dh.base, &lowPrivKey->u.dh.prime,
++                           &lowPrivKey->u.dh.privateValue, &item, 0);
++            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++                return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++            }
++            lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&item);
++            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&item, PR_FALSE);
++            pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
++            break;
++        case CKK_EC:
++            rv = EC_NewKeyFromSeed(&lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPriv,
++                                   lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.data,
++                                   lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.len);
++            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++                return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++            }
++            /* make sure it has the same encoding */
++            if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
++                lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
++              lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
++            } else {
++              lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
++                                               SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));;
++            }
++            pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
++            /* clear out our generated private key */
++            PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
++            break;
++        default:
++            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+         }
+-
+-        crv = NSC_DeriveKey(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle, template, templateCount, &newKey);
+-        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+-            sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
+-            return crv;
++        /* now compare new public key with our already generated key */
++        if ((pubAttribute == NULL) || (lowPubValue == NULL) ||
++            (pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen != lowPubValue->len) ||
++            (PORT_Memcmp(pubAttribute->attrib.pValue, lowPubValue->data,
++                        lowPubValue->len) != 0)) {
++            if (pubAttribute) sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
++            if (lowPubValue) SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
++            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
++            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+         }
++        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
++
+         /* FIPS requires full validation, but in fipx mode NSC_Derive
+          * only does partial validation with approved primes, now handle
+          * full validation */
+@@ -5159,44 +5167,78 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
+             SECItem pubKey;
+             SECItem prime;
+             SECItem subPrime;
++            SECItem base;
++            SECItem generator;
+             const SECItem *subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
+ 
+             pubKey.data = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
+             pubKey.len = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+-            prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
+-            prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
++            base.data = prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
++            base.len = prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
+             crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
+             if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                 goto done;
+             }
+-            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
++            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &base, privateKey, CKA_BASE);
++            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
++                goto done;
++            }
+             /* we ignore the return code an only look at the length */
+-            if (subPrime.len == 0) {
+-                /* subprime not supplied, In this case look it up.
+-                 * This only works with approved primes, but in FIPS mode
+-                 * that's the only kine of prime that will get here */
+-                subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, isFIPS);
+-                if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
+-                    crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++            /* do we have a known prime ? */
++            subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, &generator, isFIPS);
++            if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
++                if (subPrime.len == 0) {
++                    /* if not a known prime, subprime must be supplied */
++                    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++                    goto done;
++                } else {
++                    /* not a known prime, check for primality of prime
++                     * and subPrime */
++                    if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&prime)) {
++                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++                        goto done;
++                    }
++                    if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&subPrime)) {
++                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++                        goto done;
++                    }
++                    /* if we aren't using a defined group, make sure base is in the
++                     * subgroup. If it's not, then our key could fail or succeed sometimes.
++                     * This makes the failure reliable */
++                    if (!KEA_Verify(&base, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
++                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++                    }
++                }
++                subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
++            } else {
++                /* we're using a known group, make sure we are using the known generator for that group */
++                if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&generator, &base) != 0) {
++                    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+                     goto done;
+                 }
++                if (subPrime.len != 0) {
++                    /* we have a known prime and a supplied subPrime,
++                     * make sure the subPrime matches the subPrime for
++                     * the known Prime */
++                     if (SECITEM_CompareItem(subPrimePtr, &subPrime) != 0) {
++                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++                        goto done;
++                     }
++                 }
+             }
+             if (!KEA_Verify(&pubKey, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
+-                crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++                crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+             }
+         done:
++            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&base, PR_FALSE);
+             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&subPrime, PR_FALSE);
+             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&prime, PR_FALSE);
+         }
+         /* clean up before we return */
+         sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
+-        crv2 = NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, newKey);
+         if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+             return crv;
+         }
+-        if (crv2 != CKR_OK) {
+-            return crv2;
+-        }
+     }
+ 
+     return CKR_OK;
+@@ -5714,8 +5756,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+      * created and linked.
+      */
+     crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
+-    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
++        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
+         sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+@@ -5757,6 +5799,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+     }
+ 
+     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
++        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
+         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
+@@ -5766,6 +5809,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+     /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
+     privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
+     publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
++    session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
++    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ 
+     *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
+     *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
+@@ -8386,7 +8431,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+ 
+             /* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
+              * checks. */
+-            subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, isFIPS);
++            subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, NULL, isFIPS);
+             if (subPrime == NULL) {
+                 SECItem dhSubPrime;
+                 /* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
+@@ -8568,6 +8613,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+                 secretlen = tmp.len;
+             } else {
+                 secretlen = keySize;
++                key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+                 crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
+                                           &tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
+                                           mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.fips-review	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
+@@ -4625,7 +4625,10 @@ NSC_CreateObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSess
+     if (object == NULL) {
+         return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+     }
+-    object->isFIPS = PR_FALSE; /* if we created the object on the fly,
++    /* object types that we aren't allowed to create in FIPS mode are
++     * already rejected explicitly. If we get here, then the object is
++     * FIPS OK (most notably public key objects )*/
++    /* object->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;  if we created the object on the fly,
+                                 * it's not a FIPS object */
+ 
+     /*
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review	2023-06-12 15:29:04.097403894 -0700
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
+@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
+ /* dh verify functions */
+ /* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes, and if so return
+  * it's subprime value */
+-const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS);
++const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *generator, PRBool isFIPS);
+ /* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
+ SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
+ /* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review	2023-06-12 15:29:04.097403894 -0700
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
+@@ -2403,15 +2403,27 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+     switch (mechInfo->special) {
+         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
+             SECItem dhPrime;
++            SECItem dhBase;
++            SECItem dhGenerator;
++            PRBool val = PR_FALSE;
+             const SECItem *dhSubPrime;
+             CK_RV crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime,
+                                                source, CKA_PRIME);
+             if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                 return PR_FALSE;
+             }
+-            dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, PR_TRUE);
++            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhBase, source, CKA_BASE);
++            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
++                return PR_FALSE;
++            }
++            dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, &dhGenerator, PR_TRUE);
++            val = (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
++            if (val && (SECITEM_CompareItem(&dhBase, &dhGenerator) != 0)) {
++                val = PR_FALSE;
++            }
+             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
+-            return (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
++            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhBase, PR_FALSE);
++            return val;
+         }
+         case SFTKFIPSNone:
+             return PR_FALSE;
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.455233191 -0700
+@@ -6726,11 +6726,20 @@ static const SECItem subprime_tls_8192 =
+                                            (unsigned char *)subprime_tls_8192_data,
+                                            sizeof(subprime_tls_8192_data) };
+ 
++/* generator for all the groups is 2 */
++static const unsigned char generator_2_data[] = { 2 };
++
++
++static const SECItem generator_2 =
++    { siBuffer,
++      (unsigned char *)generator_2_data,
++      sizeof(generator_2_data) };
++
+ /*
+  * verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes
+  */
+ const SECItem *
+-sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS)
++sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *g, PRBool isFIPS)
+ {
+     /* use the length to decide which primes to check */
+     switch (dhPrime->len) {
+@@ -6741,56 +6750,67 @@ sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PR
+             }
+             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_1536,
+                             sizeof(prime_ike_1536)) == 0) {
++                if (g) *g = generator_2;
+                 return &subprime_ike_1536;
+             }
+             break;
+         case 2048 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
+             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_2048,
+                             sizeof(prime_tls_2048)) == 0) {
++                if (g) *g = generator_2;
+                 return &subprime_tls_2048;
+             }
+             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_2048,
+                             sizeof(prime_ike_2048)) == 0) {
++                if (g) *g = generator_2;
+                 return &subprime_ike_2048;
+             }
+             break;
+         case 3072 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
+             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_3072,
+                             sizeof(prime_tls_3072)) == 0) {
++                if (g) *g = generator_2;
+                 return &subprime_tls_3072;
+             }
+             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_3072,
+                             sizeof(prime_ike_3072)) == 0) {
++                if (g) *g = generator_2;
+                 return &subprime_ike_3072;
+             }
+             break;
+         case 4096 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
+             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_4096,
+                             sizeof(prime_tls_4096)) == 0) {
++                if (g) *g = generator_2;
+                 return &subprime_tls_4096;
+             }
+             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_4096,
+                             sizeof(prime_ike_4096)) == 0) {
++                if (g) *g = generator_2;
+                 return &subprime_ike_4096;
+             }
+             break;
+         case 6144 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
+             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_6144,
+                             sizeof(prime_tls_6144)) == 0) {
++                if (g) *g = generator_2;
+                 return &subprime_tls_6144;
+             }
+             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_6144,
+                             sizeof(prime_ike_6144)) == 0) {
++                if (g) *g = generator_2;
+                 return &subprime_ike_6144;
+             }
+             break;
+         case 8192 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
+             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_8192,
+                             sizeof(prime_tls_8192)) == 0) {
++                if (g) *g = generator_2;
+                 return &subprime_tls_8192;
+             }
+             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_8192,
+                             sizeof(prime_ike_8192)) == 0) {
++                if (g) *g = generator_2;
+                 return &subprime_ike_8192;
+             }
+             break;
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.455233191 -0700
+@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+             goto fail;
+         }
+     } else {
++        /* ikev1 isn't validated, if we use this function in ikev1 mode,
++         * mark the resulting key as not FIPS */
++        if (!params->bRekey) {
++            outKey->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++        }
+         crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
+                        inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
+         if (crv != CKR_OK) {

SOURCES/nss-3.79-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,578 @@
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/config.mk b/lib/freebl/config.mk
+--- a/lib/freebl/config.mk
++++ b/lib/freebl/config.mk
+@@ -85,9 +85,13 @@ EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += \
+ 	$(NULL)
+ endif
+ endif
+ 
+ ifeq ($(OS_ARCH), Darwin)
+ EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += -dylib_file @executable_path/libplc4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplc4.dylib -dylib_file @executable_path/libplds4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplds4.dylib
+ endif
+ 
++ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
++DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
+ endif
++
++endif
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
+--- a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
++++ b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
+@@ -20,53 +20,110 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
+     if (!numBytes) {
+         /* error is set */
+         return;
+     }
+     RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
+     PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
++#include <sys/random.h>
++#include "prinit.h"
++
++static int rng_grndFlags= 0;
++static PRCallOnceType rng_KernelFips;
++
++static PRStatus
++rng_getKernelFips()
++{
++#ifdef LINUX
++    FILE *f;
++    char d;
++    size_t size;
++
++    f = fopen("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", "r");
++    if (!f)
++        return PR_FAILURE;
++
++    size = fread(&d, 1, 1, f);
++    fclose(f);
++    if (size != 1)
++        return PR_SUCCESS;
++    if (d != '1')
++        return PR_SUCCESS;
++    /* if the kernel is in FIPS mode, set the GRND_RANDOM flag */
++    rng_grndFlags = GRND_RANDOM;
++#endif /* LINUX */
++    return PR_SUCCESS;
++}
++#endif
++
+ size_t
+ RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
+ {
++    size_t fileBytes = 0;
++    unsigned char *buffer = dest;
++#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+     int fd;
+     int bytes;
+-    size_t fileBytes = 0;
+-    unsigned char *buffer = dest;
++#else
++    PR_CallOnce(&rng_KernelFips, rng_getKernelFips);
++#endif
+ 
+ #if defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || (defined(LINUX) && defined(__GLIBC__) && ((__GLIBC__ > 2) || ((__GLIBC__ == 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25))))
+     int result;
+-
+     while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
+         size_t getBytes = maxLen - fileBytes;
+         if (getBytes > GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES) {
+             getBytes = GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES;
+         }
++#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
++        /* FIP 140-3 requires full kernel reseeding for chained entropy sources
++         * so we need to use getrandom with GRND_RANDOM.
++         * getrandom returns -1 on failure, otherwise returns
++         * the number of bytes, which can be less than getBytes */
++        result = getrandom(buffer, getBytes, rng_grndFlags);
++        if (result < 0) {
++            break;
++        }
++        fileBytes += result;
++        buffer += result;
++#else
++        /* get entropy returns 0 on success and always return
++         * getBytes on success */
+         result = getentropy(buffer, getBytes);
+         if (result == 0) { /* success */
+             fileBytes += getBytes;
+             buffer += getBytes;
+         } else {
+             break;
+         }
++#endif
+     }
+     if (fileBytes == maxLen) { /* success */
+         return maxLen;
+     }
++#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
++    /* in FIPS 104-3 we don't fallback, just fail */
++    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
++    return 0;
++#else
+     /* If we failed with an error other than ENOSYS, it means the destination
+      * buffer is not writeable. We don't need to try writing to it again. */
+     if (errno != ENOSYS) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+         return 0;
+     }
++#endif /*!NSS_FIPS_140_3 */
++#endif /* platorm has getentropy */
++#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+     /* ENOSYS means the kernel doesn't support getentropy()/getrandom().
+      * Reset the number of bytes to get and fall back to /dev/urandom. */
+     fileBytes = 0;
+-#endif
+     fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+     if (fd < 0) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+         return 0;
+     }
+     while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
+         bytes = read(fd, buffer, maxLen - fileBytes);
+         if (bytes <= 0) {
+@@ -76,9 +133,10 @@ RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
+         buffer += bytes;
+     }
+     (void)close(fd);
+     if (fileBytes != maxLen) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+         return 0;
+     }
+     return fileBytes;
++#endif
+ }
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/config.mk b/lib/softoken/config.mk
+--- a/lib/softoken/config.mk
++++ b/lib/softoken/config.mk
+@@ -58,8 +58,12 @@ endif
+ ifdef NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
+ DEFINES += -DNSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
+ endif
+ 
+ ifdef NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID
+ DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID=\"${NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID}\"
+ endif
+ 
++ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
++DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
++endif
++
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
+--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
++++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
+@@ -1766,16 +1766,20 @@ sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
+     unsigned char iteration_count = 5;
+     unsigned char keyLen = 64;
+     char *inKeyData = TEST_KEY;
+-    static const unsigned char saltData[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
++    static const unsigned char saltData[] = {
++        0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
++        0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
++    };
++
+     static const unsigned char pbkdf_known_answer[] = {
+-        0x31, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x39, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x29,
+-        0x68, 0xac, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x9c,
+-        0x28, 0x59, 0x8b, 0x5c, 0xd8, 0xd4, 0x02, 0x37,
+-        0x18, 0x22, 0xc1, 0x92, 0xd0, 0xfa, 0x72, 0x90,
+-        0x2c, 0x8d, 0x19, 0xd4, 0x56, 0xfb, 0x16, 0xfa,
+-        0x8d, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x5f, 0x17, 0xb1,
+-        0x22, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0xaf, 0x5e, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0x66,
+-        0xc6, 0x14, 0xfe, 0x83, 0xfa, 0x1a, 0x2a, 0xc5
++        0x73, 0x8c, 0xfa, 0x02, 0xe8, 0xdb, 0x43, 0xe4,
++        0x99, 0xc5, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0x7b,
++        0xc4, 0xda, 0x22, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0xae, 0x23, 0x7a,
++        0x21, 0x27, 0xbd, 0xcc, 0x78, 0xc4, 0xe6, 0xc5,
++        0x33, 0x38, 0x35, 0xe0, 0x68, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x06,
++        0xad, 0xaf, 0x7f, 0xd7, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x90,
++        0x17, 0x97, 0x73, 0x75, 0x7b, 0x88, 0x49, 0xd8,
++        0x6f, 0x78, 0x5a, 0xde, 0x50, 0x20, 0x55, 0x33
+     };
+
+     sftk_PBELockInit();
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
++++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+@@ -4609,16 +4609,17 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
+         goto loser;
+     }
+ 
+     /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
+     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
+     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ 
++
+     /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
+     key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
+     switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+         case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
+         case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
+         case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
+         case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
+             checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
+@@ -4812,16 +4813,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
+     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+     sftk_FreeSession(session);
+     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+     }
+     if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+     }
++    /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
++     * fips requirements */
++    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
+     if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+         *phKey = key->handle;
+     }
+ loser:
+     PORT_Memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf);
+     sftk_FreeObject(key);
+     return crv;
+ }
+@@ -5780,16 +5784,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+ 
+     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
+         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
+         sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+         return crv;
+     }
++    /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
++    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
++    publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
+ 
+     *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
+     *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
+     sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+     sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+ 
+     return CKR_OK;
+ }
+@@ -6990,16 +6997,17 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+     }
+ 
+     /* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
+     if (params->bExtract) {
+         CK_BYTE *salt;
+         CK_ULONG saltLen;
+         HMACContext *hmac;
+         unsigned int bufLen;
++        SFTKSource saltKeySource = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
+ 
+         switch (params->ulSaltType) {
+             case CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL:
+                 saltLen = hashLen;
+                 salt = hashbuf;
+                 memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
+                 break;
+             case CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA:
+@@ -7026,29 +7034,54 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+                 if (isFIPS && (key->isFIPS == 0) && (saltKey->isFIPS == 1)) {
+                     CK_MECHANISM mech;
+                     mech.mechanism = CKM_HKDF_DERIVE;
+                     mech.pParameter = params;
+                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
+                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
+                                                        CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
+                 }
++                saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
+                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
+                 if (saltKey_att == NULL) {
+                     sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
+                     return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                 }
+                 /* save the resulting salt */
+                 salt = saltKey_att->attrib.pValue;
+                 saltLen = saltKey_att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+                 break;
+             default:
+                 return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                 break;
+         }
++        /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
++         * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
++        if (isFIPS && key && sourceKey) {
++            PRBool fipsOK = PR_FALSE;
++            /* case one: mix the kea with a previous or default
++             * salt */
++            if ((sourceKey->source == SFTK_SOURCE_KEA) &&
++                (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
++                (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
++                fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
++            }
++            /* case two: restart, remix the previous secret as a salt */
++            if ((sourceKey->objclass == CKO_DATA) &&
++                (NSS_SecureMemcmpZero(sourceKeyBytes, sourceKeyLen) == 0) &&
++                (sourceKeyLen == rawHash->length) &&
++                (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
++                (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
++                fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
++            }
++            if (!fipsOK) {
++                key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++            }
++        }
++        if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT;
+ 
+         hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
+         if (saltKey_att) {
+             sftk_FreeAttribute(saltKey_att);
+         }
+         if (saltKey) {
+             sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
+         }
+@@ -7076,16 +7109,40 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+         /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
+          * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
+          * key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
+          */
+         HMACContext *hmac;
+         CK_BYTE bi;
+         unsigned iterations;
+ 
++        /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
++         * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
++        if (isFIPS && key && key->isFIPS && sourceKey) {
++            unsigned char *info=&params->pInfo[3];
++            /* only one case,
++             *  1) Expand only
++             *  2) with a key whose source was
++             *  SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND or SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
++             *  3) source key length == rawHash->length
++             *  4) Info has tls or dtls
++             * If any of those conditions aren't met, then we turn
++             * off the fips indicator */
++            if (params->bExtract ||
++               ((sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT) &&
++                (sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND)) ||
++               (sourceKeyLen != rawHash->length) ||
++               (params->ulInfoLen < 7) ||
++               ((PORT_Memcmp(info,"tls",3) != 0) &&
++               (PORT_Memcmp(info,"dtls",4) != 0))) {
++               key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++            }
++        }
++        if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND;
++
+         genLen = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen);
+         iterations = genLen / hashLen;
+ 
+         if (genLen > sizeof(keyBlock)) {
+             keyBlockAlloc = PORT_Alloc(genLen);
+             if (keyBlockAlloc == NULL) {
+                 return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+             }
+@@ -8434,16 +8491,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+ 
+             /* calculate private value - oct */
+             rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
+ 
+             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
+             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhValue, PR_FALSE);
+ 
+             if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++                key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
+                 sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
+                 SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&derived, PR_FALSE);
+                 crv = CKR_OK;
+             } else
+                 crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ 
+             break;
+         }
+@@ -8564,16 +8622,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+                     }
+                     PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize - secretlen], secret, secretlen);
+                     secret = keyData;
+                 } else {
+                     secret += (secretlen - keySize);
+                 }
+                 secretlen = keySize;
+             }
++            key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
+ 
+             sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
+             PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+             if (keyData) {
+                 PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
+             }
+             break;
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
++++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+@@ -147,16 +147,26 @@ typedef enum {
+  */
+ typedef enum {
+     SFTK_DestroyFailure,
+     SFTK_Destroyed,
+     SFTK_Busy
+ } SFTKFreeStatus;
+ 
+ /*
++ * Source of various objects
++ */
++typedef enum {
++    SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT=0,
++    SFTK_SOURCE_KEA,
++    SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND,
++    SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
++} SFTKSource;
++
++/*
+  * attribute values of an object.
+  */
+ struct SFTKAttributeStr {
+     SFTKAttribute *next;
+     SFTKAttribute *prev;
+     PRBool freeAttr;
+     PRBool freeData;
+     /*must be called handle to make sftkqueue_find work */
+@@ -189,16 +199,17 @@ struct SFTKObjectStr {
+     CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass;
+     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
+     int refCount;
+     PZLock *refLock;
+     SFTKSlot *slot;
+     void *objectInfo;
+     SFTKFree infoFree;
+     PRBool isFIPS;
++    SFTKSource source;
+ };
+ 
+ struct SFTKTokenObjectStr {
+     SFTKObject obj;
+     SECItem dbKey;
+ };
+ 
+ struct SFTKSessionObjectStr {
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
++++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+@@ -1090,16 +1090,17 @@ sftk_NewObject(SFTKSlot *slot)
+         sessObject->attrList[i].freeData = PR_FALSE;
+     }
+     sessObject->optimizeSpace = slot->optimizeSpace;
+ 
+     object->handle = 0;
+     object->next = object->prev = NULL;
+     object->slot = slot;
+     object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
++    object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
+ 
+     object->refCount = 1;
+     sessObject->sessionList.next = NULL;
+     sessObject->sessionList.prev = NULL;
+     sessObject->sessionList.parent = object;
+     sessObject->session = NULL;
+     sessObject->wasDerived = PR_FALSE;
+     if (!hasLocks)
+@@ -1674,16 +1675,17 @@ fail:
+ CK_RV
+ sftk_CopyObject(SFTKObject *destObject, SFTKObject *srcObject)
+ {
+     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+     SFTKSessionObject *src_so = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(srcObject);
+     unsigned int i;
+ 
+     destObject->isFIPS = srcObject->isFIPS;
++    destObject->source = srcObject->source;
+     if (src_so == NULL) {
+         return sftk_CopyTokenObject(destObject, srcObject);
+     }
+ 
+     PZ_Lock(src_so->attributeLock);
+     for (i = 0; i < src_so->hashSize; i++) {
+         attribute = src_so->head[i];
+         do {
+@@ -2059,16 +2061,17 @@ sftk_NewTokenObject(SFTKSlot *slot, SECI
+     /* every object must have a class, if we can't get it, the object
+      * doesn't exist */
+     crv = handleToClass(slot, handle, &object->objclass);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+         goto loser;
+     }
+     object->slot = slot;
+     object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
++    object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
+     object->objectInfo = NULL;
+     object->infoFree = NULL;
+     if (!hasLocks) {
+         object->refLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockRefLock);
+     }
+     if (object->refLock == NULL) {
+         goto loser;
+     }
+@@ -2225,16 +2228,25 @@ sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE 
+             break;
+         case CKA_DERIVE:
+             flags = CKF_DERIVE;
+             break;
+         /* fake attribute to select digesting */
+         case CKA_DIGEST:
+             flags = CKF_DIGEST;
+             break;
++        /* fake attribute to select key gen */
++         case CKA_NSS_GENERATE:
++            flags = CKF_GENERATE;
++            break;
++        /* fake attribute to select key pair gen */
++        case CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR:
++            flags = CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR;
++            break;
++        /* fake attributes to to handle MESSAGE* flags */
+         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT;
+             break;
+         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT;
+             break;
+         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
+             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN;
+@@ -2278,17 +2290,17 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
+ }
+ 
+ /* This function currently only returns valid lengths for
+  * FIPS approved ECC curves. If we want to make this generic
+  * in the future, that Curve determination can be done in
+  * the sftk_handleSpecial. Since it's currently only used
+  * in FIPS indicators, it's currently only compiled with
+  * the FIPS indicator code */
+-static int
++static CK_ULONG
+ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
+ {
+     CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
+     CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
+     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+     CK_RV crv;
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+--- a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
++++ b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+@@ -58,16 +58,18 @@
+ /*
+  * NSS-defined certificate types
+  *
+  */
+ #define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
+ 
+ /* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
+ #define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L
++#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE 0x81000001L
++#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x81000002L
+ #define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE 0x82000000L
+ #define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK 0xff000000L
+ #define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */
+ 
+ /*
+  * NSS-defined object attributes
+  *
+  */

SOURCES/nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -up ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.pkcs12_fips_defaults ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
+--- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.pkcs12_fips_defaults	2022-07-20 13:40:24.152212683 -0700
++++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c	2022-07-20 13:42:40.031094190 -0700
+@@ -1146,6 +1146,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+         goto done;
+     }
+ 
++    if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
++        cipher =  SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC;
++        certCipher =  SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC;
++    }
++
+     if (pk12util.options[opt_Cipher].activated) {
+         char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_Cipher].arg;
+ 
+@@ -1160,9 +1165,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
+-        certCipher =  SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+-    }
+     if (pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].activated) {
+         char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].arg;
+ 

SOURCES/nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+diff -up ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt.revert-distrusted ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
+--- ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt.revert-distrusted	2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt	2022-06-24 10:51:32.035207662 -0700
+@@ -7668,6 +7668,187 @@ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_
+ CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+ 
+ #
++# Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
++#
++# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
++# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
++# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
++# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
++# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
++# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
++# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_CERTIFICATE
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
++CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CKC_X_509
++CKA_SUBJECT MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
++\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
++\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
++\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
++\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
++\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
++END
++CKA_ID UTF8 "0"
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
++\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
++\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
++\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
++\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
++\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\004\017\377\377\377
++END
++CKA_VALUE MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\202\006\225\060\202\004\175\240\003\002\001\002\002\004\017
++\377\377\377\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\013
++\005\000\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116
++\114\061\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151
++\116\157\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003
++\125\004\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120
++\113\111\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162
++\147\141\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\036
++\027\015\061\060\060\065\061\062\060\070\065\061\063\071\132\027
++\015\062\060\060\063\062\063\060\071\065\060\060\065\132\060\132
++\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\027\060
++\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141
++\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004\003\014
++\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111\157\166
++\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141\156\151
++\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\202\002\042\060\015
++\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\001\005\000\003\202\002
++\017\000\060\202\002\012\002\202\002\001\000\261\023\031\017\047
++\346\154\324\125\206\113\320\354\211\212\105\221\170\254\107\275
++\107\053\344\374\105\353\117\264\046\163\133\067\323\303\177\366
++\343\336\327\243\370\055\150\305\010\076\113\224\326\344\207\045
++\066\153\204\265\030\164\363\050\130\163\057\233\152\317\274\004
++\036\366\336\335\257\374\113\252\365\333\146\142\045\001\045\202
++\336\362\227\132\020\156\335\135\251\042\261\004\251\043\163\072
++\370\161\255\035\317\204\104\353\107\321\257\155\310\174\050\253
++\307\362\067\172\164\137\137\305\002\024\212\243\132\343\033\154
++\001\343\135\216\331\150\326\364\011\033\062\334\221\265\054\365
++\040\353\214\003\155\046\111\270\223\304\205\135\330\322\233\257
++\126\152\314\005\063\314\240\102\236\064\125\104\234\153\240\324
++\022\320\053\124\315\267\211\015\345\366\353\350\373\205\001\063
++\117\172\153\361\235\162\063\226\016\367\262\204\245\245\047\304
++\047\361\121\163\051\167\272\147\156\376\114\334\264\342\241\241
++\201\057\071\111\215\103\070\023\316\320\245\134\302\207\072\000
++\147\145\102\043\361\066\131\012\035\243\121\310\274\243\224\052
++\061\337\343\074\362\235\032\074\004\260\357\261\012\060\023\163
++\266\327\363\243\114\001\165\024\205\170\300\327\212\071\130\205
++\120\372\056\346\305\276\317\213\077\257\217\066\324\045\011\055
++\322\017\254\162\223\362\277\213\324\120\263\371\025\120\233\231
++\365\024\331\373\213\221\243\062\046\046\240\370\337\073\140\201
++\206\203\171\133\053\353\023\075\051\072\301\155\335\275\236\216
++\207\326\112\256\064\227\005\356\024\246\366\334\070\176\112\351
++\044\124\007\075\227\150\067\106\153\015\307\250\041\257\023\124
++\344\011\152\361\115\106\012\311\135\373\233\117\275\336\373\267
++\124\313\270\070\234\247\071\373\152\055\300\173\215\253\245\247
++\127\354\112\222\212\063\305\341\040\134\163\330\220\222\053\200
++\325\017\206\030\151\174\071\117\204\206\274\367\114\133\363\325
++\264\312\240\302\360\067\042\312\171\122\037\123\346\252\363\220
++\260\073\335\362\050\375\254\353\305\006\044\240\311\324\057\017
++\130\375\265\236\354\017\317\262\131\320\242\004\172\070\152\256
++\162\373\275\360\045\142\224\011\247\005\013\002\003\001\000\001
++\243\202\001\141\060\202\001\135\060\110\006\003\125\035\040\004
++\101\060\077\060\075\006\004\125\035\040\000\060\065\060\063\006
++\010\053\006\001\005\005\007\002\001\026\047\150\164\164\160\072
++\057\057\167\167\167\056\144\151\147\151\156\157\164\141\162\056
++\156\154\057\143\160\163\057\160\153\151\157\166\145\162\150\145
++\151\144\060\017\006\003\125\035\023\001\001\377\004\005\060\003
++\001\001\377\060\016\006\003\125\035\017\001\001\377\004\004\003
++\002\001\006\060\201\205\006\003\125\035\043\004\176\060\174\200
++\024\071\020\213\111\222\134\333\141\022\040\315\111\235\032\216
++\332\234\147\100\271\241\136\244\134\060\132\061\013\060\011\006
++\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\036\060\034\006\003\125\004
++\012\014\025\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
++\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\061\053\060\051\006\003\125\004
++\003\014\042\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
++\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\040\122\157\157\164\040\103\101
++\040\055\040\107\062\202\004\000\230\226\364\060\111\006\003\125
++\035\037\004\102\060\100\060\076\240\074\240\072\206\070\150\164
++\164\160\072\057\057\143\162\154\056\160\153\151\157\166\145\162
++\150\145\151\144\056\156\154\057\104\157\155\117\162\147\141\156
++\151\163\141\164\151\145\114\141\164\145\163\164\103\122\114\055
++\107\062\056\143\162\154\060\035\006\003\125\035\016\004\026\004
++\024\274\135\224\073\331\253\173\003\045\163\141\302\333\055\356
++\374\253\217\145\241\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001
++\001\013\005\000\003\202\002\001\000\217\374\055\114\267\331\055
++\325\037\275\357\313\364\267\150\027\165\235\116\325\367\335\234
++\361\052\046\355\237\242\266\034\003\325\123\263\354\010\317\064
++\342\343\303\364\265\026\057\310\303\276\327\323\163\253\000\066
++\371\032\112\176\326\143\351\136\106\272\245\266\216\025\267\243
++\052\330\103\035\357\135\310\037\201\205\263\213\367\377\074\364
++\331\364\106\010\077\234\274\035\240\331\250\114\315\045\122\116
++\012\261\040\367\037\351\103\331\124\106\201\023\232\300\136\164
++\154\052\230\062\352\374\167\273\015\245\242\061\230\042\176\174
++\174\347\332\244\255\354\267\056\032\031\161\370\110\120\332\103
++\217\054\204\335\301\100\047\343\265\360\025\116\226\324\370\134
++\343\206\051\106\053\327\073\007\353\070\177\310\206\127\227\323
++\357\052\063\304\027\120\325\144\151\153\053\153\105\136\135\057
++\027\312\132\116\317\303\327\071\074\365\073\237\106\271\233\347
++\016\111\227\235\326\325\343\033\017\352\217\001\116\232\023\224
++\131\012\002\007\110\113\032\140\253\177\117\355\013\330\125\015
++\150\157\125\234\151\145\025\102\354\300\334\335\154\254\303\026
++\316\013\035\126\233\244\304\304\322\056\340\017\342\104\047\053
++\120\151\244\334\142\350\212\041\051\102\154\314\000\072\226\166
++\233\357\100\300\244\136\167\204\062\154\046\052\071\146\256\135
++\343\271\271\262\054\150\037\036\232\220\003\071\360\252\263\244
++\314\111\213\030\064\351\067\311\173\051\307\204\174\157\104\025
++\057\354\141\131\004\311\105\313\242\326\122\242\174\177\051\222
++\326\112\305\213\102\250\324\376\352\330\307\207\043\030\344\235
++\172\175\163\100\122\230\240\256\156\343\005\077\005\017\340\245
++\306\155\115\355\203\067\210\234\307\363\334\102\232\152\266\327
++\041\111\066\167\362\357\030\117\305\160\331\236\351\336\267\053
++\213\364\274\176\050\337\015\100\311\205\134\256\235\305\061\377
++\320\134\016\265\250\176\360\351\057\272\257\210\256\345\265\321
++\130\245\257\234\161\247\051\001\220\203\151\067\202\005\272\374
++\011\301\010\156\214\170\073\303\063\002\200\077\104\205\010\035
++\337\125\126\010\255\054\205\055\135\261\003\341\256\252\164\305
++\244\363\116\272\067\230\173\202\271
++END
++
++# Trust for Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
++# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
++# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
++# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
++# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
++# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
++# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
++# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
++CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\325\362\127\251\277\055\320\077\213\106\127\371\053\311\244\306
++\222\341\102\102
++END
++CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\056\141\242\321\170\316\356\277\131\063\260\043\024\017\224\034
++END
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
++\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
++\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
++\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
++\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
++\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\004\017\377\377\377
++END
++CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++
++#
+ # Certificate "Security Communication RootCA2"
+ #
+ # Issuer: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
+@@ -8161,6 +8342,68 @@ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_
+ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
+ CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+ 
++# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
++# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
++# Serial Number: 1800000005 (0x6b49d205)
++# Not Before: Apr  7 15:37:15 2011 GMT
++# Not After : Apr  4 15:37:15 2021 GMT
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave"
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
++\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
++\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
++\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
++\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
++\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
++\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
++\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
++\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
++\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
++\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\004\153\111\322\005
++END
++CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++
++# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
++# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
++# Serial Number: 1800000006 (0x6b49d206)
++# Not Before: Apr 18 21:09:30 2011 GMT
++# Not After : Apr 15 21:09:30 2021 GMT
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave"
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
++\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
++\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
++\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
++\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
++\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
++\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
++\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
++\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
++\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
++\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\004\153\111\322\006
++END
++CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++
+ #
+ # Certificate "Actalis Authentication Root CA"
+ #
+@@ -8804,6 +9047,74 @@ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_
+ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
+ CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
+ 
++# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1", Bug 825022
++# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
++# Serial Number: 2087 (0x827)
++# Subject: CN=*.EGO.GOV.TR,OU=EGO BILGI ISLEM,O=EGO,L=ANKARA,ST=ANKARA,C=TR
++# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
++# Not Valid After : Tue Jul 06 07:07:51 2021
++# Fingerprint (MD5): F8:F5:25:FF:0C:31:CF:85:E1:0C:86:17:C1:CE:1F:8E
++# Fingerprint (SHA1): C6:9F:28:C8:25:13:9E:65:A6:46:C4:34:AC:A5:A1:D2:00:29:5D:B1
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1"
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
++\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
++\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
++\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
++\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
++\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
++\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
++\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
++\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
++\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
++\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\002\010\047
++END
++CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++
++# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2", Bug 825022
++# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
++# Serial Number: 2148 (0x864)
++# Subject: E=ileti@kktcmerkezbankasi.org,CN=e-islem.kktcmerkezbankasi.org,O=KKTC Merkez Bankasi,L=Lefkosa,ST=Lefkosa,C=TR
++# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
++# Not Valid After : Thu Aug 05 07:07:51 2021
++# Fingerprint (MD5): BF:C3:EC:AD:0F:42:4F:B4:B5:38:DB:35:BF:AD:84:A2
++# Fingerprint (SHA1): F9:2B:E5:26:6C:C0:5D:B2:DC:0D:C3:F2:DC:74:E0:2D:EF:D9:49:CB
++CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
++CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
++CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2"
++CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
++\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
++\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
++\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
++\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
++\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
++\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
++\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
++\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
++\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
++\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
++END
++CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
++\002\002\010\144
++END
++CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
++CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
++
+ #
+ # Certificate "D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009"
+ #

SOURCES/nss-3.90-DisablingASM.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/Makefile b/lib/freebl/Makefile
+index 74e8e65..8995752 100644
+--- a/lib/freebl/Makefile
++++ b/lib/freebl/Makefile
+@@ -568,7 +568,6 @@ ifneq ($(shell $(CC) -? 2>&1 >/dev/null </dev/null | sed -e 's/:.*//;1q'),lcc)
+             HAVE_INT128_SUPPORT = 1
+             DEFINES += -DHAVE_INT128_SUPPORT
+     else ifeq (1,$(CC_IS_GCC))
+-        SUPPORTS_VALE_CURVE25519 = 1
+         ifneq (,$(filter 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9,$(word 1,$(GCC_VERSION)).$(word 2,$(GCC_VERSION))))
+             HAVE_INT128_SUPPORT = 1
+             DEFINES += -DHAVE_INT128_SUPPORT
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp b/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
+index 65f9a80..23940ef 100644
+--- a/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
++++ b/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
+@@ -866,12 +866,6 @@
+           }],
+         ],
+       }],
+-      [ 'supports_vale_curve25519==1', {
+-        'defines': [
+-          # The Makefile does version-tests on GCC, but we're not doing that here.
+-          'HACL_CAN_COMPILE_INLINE_ASM',
+-        ],
+-      }],
+       [ 'OS=="linux" or OS=="android"', {
+         'conditions': [
+           [ 'target_arch=="x64"', {
+@@ -934,11 +928,6 @@
+   'variables': {
+     'module': 'nss',
+     'conditions': [
+-      [ 'target_arch=="x64" and cc_is_gcc==1', {
+-        'supports_vale_curve25519%': 1,
+-      }, {
+-        'supports_vale_curve25519%': 0,
+-      }],
+       [ 'target_arch=="x64" or target_arch=="arm64" or target_arch=="aarch64"', {
+         'have_int128_support%': 1,
+       }, {
+diff --git a/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi b/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
+index d198c44..34b6b3c 100644
+--- a/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
++++ b/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
+@@ -151,11 +151,6 @@
+         'ecl/curve25519_32.c',
+       ],
+     }],
+-    ['supports_vale_curve25519==1', {
+-      'sources': [
+-        'verified/Hacl_Curve25519_64.c',
+-      ],
+-    }],
+     ['(target_arch!="ppc64" and target_arch!="ppc64le") or disable_altivec==1', {
+       'sources': [
+         # Gyp does not support per-file cflags, so working around like this.

SOURCES/nss-3.90-add-ems-policy.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
+--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.add_ems_policy	2023-06-12 15:37:49.292905411 -0700
++++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
+@@ -389,6 +389,8 @@ static const oidValDef kxOptList[] = {
+     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDHE-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-ECDSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
++    /* not really a key exchange, but it's the closest fit */
++    { CIPHER_NAME("TLS-REQUIRE-EMS"), SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ };
+ 
+ static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
+diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h
+--- ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h	2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
+@@ -202,4 +202,10 @@ struct PK11GenericObjectStr {
+ /* This mask includes all CK_FLAGs with an equivalent CKA_ attribute. */
+ #define CKF_KEY_OPERATION_FLAGS 0x000e7b00UL
+ 
++/* this oid value could change values if it's added after other new
++ * upstream oids. We protect applications by hiding the define in a private
++ * header file that only NSS sees. Currently it's only available through
++ * the policy code */
++#define SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1
++
+ #endif /* _SECMODTI_H_ */
+diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c	2023-06-12 17:18:35.130938525 -0700
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include "pk11func.h"
+ #include "secmod.h"
+ #include "blapi.h"
++#include "secmodti.h" /* until SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS is upstream */
+ 
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ 
+@@ -3480,6 +3481,29 @@ ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *s
+     CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
+     unsigned int master_params_len;
+ 
++    /* if we are using TLS and we aren't using the extended master secret,
++     * and SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS policy is true, fail. The caller will
++     * send and alert (eventually). In the RSA Server case, the alert
++     * won't happen until Finish time because the upper level code
++     * can't tell a difference between this failure and an RSA decrypt
++     * failure, so it will proceed with a faux key */
++    if (isTLS) {
++        PRUint32 policy;
++        SECStatus rv;
++
++        /* first fetch the policy for this algorithm */
++        rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, &policy);
++        /* we only look at the policy if we can fetch it. */
++        if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++            if (policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX) {
++                /* just set the error, we don't want to map any errors
++                 * set by NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy here */
++                PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
++                return SECFailure;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
+     if (isTLS12) {
+         if (isDH)
+             master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/util/secoid.c
+--- ./lib/util/secoid.c.add_ems_policy	2023-06-12 15:37:49.293905422 -0700
++++ ./lib/util/secoid.c	2023-06-12 17:20:29.498142775 -0700
+@@ -1795,6 +1795,11 @@ const static SECOidData oids[SEC_OID_TOT
+        SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_USER,
+        "IPsec User",
+        CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
++
++    /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
++    /* we need it for the policy code.  */
++    ODE(SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1,
++        "TLS Require EMS", CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
+ };
+ 
+ /* PRIVATE EXTENDED SECOID Table
+@@ -2095,6 +2100,8 @@ SECOID_Init(void)
+ 
+     /* turn off NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL by default */
+     xOids[SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY].notPolicyFlags = NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL;
++    /* turn off TLS REQUIRE EMS by default */
++    xOids[SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1].notPolicyFlags = ~0;
+ 
+     envVal = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_HASH_ALG_SUPPORT");
+     if (envVal)
+diff -up ./lib/util/secoidt.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/util/secoidt.h
+--- ./lib/util/secoidt.h.add_ems_policy	2023-06-12 17:18:35.131938535 -0700
++++ ./lib/util/secoidt.h	2023-06-12 17:21:49.675987022 -0700
+@@ -501,6 +501,9 @@ typedef enum {
+     SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_END = 361,
+     SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_TUNNEL = 362,
+     SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_USER = 363,
++    /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
++    /* give it an obscure name here */
++    SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1 = 372,
+ 
+     SEC_OID_TOTAL
+ } SECOidTag;

SOURCES/nss-3.90-aes-gmc-indicator.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
+--- a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
++++ b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
+@@ -146,16 +146,38 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
+ 
+     CHECK_FORK();
+ 
+     /* make sure we're legal */
+     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, contextType, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK)
+         return crv;
+ 
++    if (context->isFIPS && (contextType == SFTK_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT)) {
++        if ((pParameter == NULL) || (ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS))) {
++            context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++        } else {
++            CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
++            switch (p->ivGenerator) {
++                case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
++                    context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    break;
++                case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
++                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
++                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    }
++                    break;
++                default:
++                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
++                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    }
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
+     if (!pOuttext) {
+         *pulOuttextLen = ulIntextLen;
+         return CKR_OK;
+     }
+     rv = (*context->aeadUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pOuttext, &outlen,
+                                 maxout, pIntext, ulIntextLen,
+                                 pParameter, ulParameterLen,
+                                 pAssociatedData, ulAssociatedDataLen);

SOURCES/nss-3.90-dh-test-update.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c.dh_test ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c.dh_test	2024-01-18 08:34:45.936944401 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c	2024-01-18 09:20:57.555980326 -0800
+@@ -1816,38 +1816,39 @@ freebl_fips_DH_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
+ {
+     /* DH Known P (2048-bits) */
+     static const PRUint8 dh_known_P[] = {
+-        0xc2, 0x79, 0xbb, 0x76, 0x32, 0x0d, 0x43, 0xfd,
+-        0x1b, 0x8c, 0xa2, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xdd, 0x6d, 0xef,
+-        0xf8, 0x1a, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xa2, 0xf5, 0x73, 0x2b,
+-        0xdb, 0x1a, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x90, 0xeb, 0xe7, 0x8e,
+-        0x5f, 0x5c, 0x6b, 0xb6, 0x61, 0x89, 0xd1, 0x03,
+-        0xb0, 0x5f, 0x91, 0xe4, 0xd2, 0x82, 0x90, 0xfc,
+-        0x3c, 0x49, 0x69, 0x59, 0xc1, 0x51, 0x6a, 0x85,
+-        0x71, 0xe7, 0x5d, 0x72, 0x5a, 0x45, 0xad, 0x01,
+-        0x6f, 0x82, 0xae, 0xec, 0x91, 0x08, 0x2e, 0x7c,
+-        0x64, 0x93, 0x46, 0x1c, 0x68, 0xef, 0xc2, 0x03,
+-        0x28, 0x1d, 0x75, 0x3a, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x46, 0xf0,
+-        0xc9, 0xdb, 0x99, 0x95, 0x13, 0x66, 0x4d, 0xd5,
+-        0x1a, 0x78, 0x92, 0x51, 0x89, 0x72, 0x28, 0x7f,
+-        0x20, 0x70, 0x41, 0x49, 0xa2, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xf9,
+-        0x78, 0x5f, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x5d, 0xfa, 0xdb, 0x57,
+-        0xd4, 0x71, 0xdf, 0x66, 0xe3, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x70,
+-        0xa4, 0x21, 0x44, 0x6a, 0xc7, 0xae, 0x30, 0x2c,
+-        0x9c, 0x1f, 0x91, 0x57, 0xc8, 0x24, 0x34, 0x2d,
+-        0x7a, 0x4a, 0x43, 0xc2, 0x5f, 0xab, 0x64, 0x2e,
+-        0xaa, 0x28, 0x32, 0x95, 0x42, 0x7b, 0xa0, 0xcc,
+-        0xdf, 0xfd, 0x22, 0xc8, 0x56, 0x84, 0xc1, 0x62,
+-        0x15, 0xb2, 0x77, 0x86, 0x81, 0xfc, 0xa5, 0x12,
+-        0x3c, 0xca, 0x28, 0x17, 0x8f, 0x03, 0x16, 0x6e,
+-        0xb8, 0x24, 0xfa, 0x1b, 0x15, 0x02, 0xfd, 0x8b,
+-        0xb6, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0xf7, 0x47, 0x41, 0xc5, 0x2b,
+-        0x37, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0x68, 0xda, 0x1c, 0x55,
+-        0x44, 0xc3, 0xee, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x07, 0x11, 0x3b,
+-        0x5f, 0x00, 0x84, 0xb4, 0xc4, 0xe4, 0xa7, 0x97,
+-        0x29, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xab, 0xfc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x34,
+-        0xe4, 0xc7, 0x81, 0x52, 0x32, 0x0e, 0x27, 0x3c,
+-        0xa6, 0x70, 0x3f, 0x4a, 0x54, 0xda, 0xdd, 0x60,
+-        0x26, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x45, 0x26, 0x19, 0x41, 0x6f
++        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
++        0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A,
++        0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1,
++        0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95,
++        0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB,
++        0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9,
++        0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8,
++        0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A,
++        0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61,
++        0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0,
++        0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3,
++        0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35,
++        0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77,
++        0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72,
++        0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35,
++        0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A,
++        0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61,
++        0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB,
++        0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68,
++        0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4,
++        0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19,
++        0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70,
++        0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC,
++        0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61,
++        0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF,
++        0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83,
++        0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73,
++        0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05,
++        0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2,
++        0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA,
++        0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x97,
++        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
++
+     };
+ 
+     static const PRUint8 dh_known_Y_1[] = {
+@@ -1893,10 +1894,10 @@ freebl_fips_DH_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
+     };
+ 
+     static const PRUint8 dh_known_hash_result[] = {
+-        0x93, 0xa2, 0x89, 0x1c, 0x8a, 0xc3, 0x70, 0xbf,
+-        0xa7, 0xdf, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x82, 0xfb, 0x87, 0x81,
+-        0x09, 0x47, 0xf3, 0x9f, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x3f,
+-        0x8e, 0x5e, 0x06, 0xca, 0x30, 0xa7, 0xaf, 0x10
++        0x40, 0xe3, 0x7a, 0x34, 0x83, 0x2d, 0x94, 0x57,
++        0x99, 0x3d, 0x66, 0xec, 0x54, 0xdf, 0x82, 0x4a,
++        0x37, 0x0d, 0xf9, 0x01, 0xb3, 0xbc, 0x54, 0xe5,
++        0x5e, 0x63, 0xd3, 0x46, 0x4e, 0xa3, 0xe2, 0x8a
+     };
+ 
+     /* DH variables. */

SOURCES/nss-3.90-disable-ech.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+diff --git a/lib/ssl/sslsock.c b/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
+--- a/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
++++ b/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
+@@ -4394,62 +4394,82 @@ ssl_ClearPRCList(PRCList *list, void (*f
+         }
+         PORT_Free(cursor);
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ SECStatus
+ SSLExp_EnableTls13GreaseEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
+ {
++#ifdef notdef
+     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+     if (!ss) {
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+     ss->opt.enableTls13GreaseEch = enabled;
+     return SECSuccess;
++#else
++    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
++    return SECFailure;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ SECStatus
+ SSLExp_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint8 size)
+ {
++#ifdef notdef
+     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+     if (!ss || size == 0) {
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+     ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
+     ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ 
+     ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchSize = size;
+ 
+     ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+     ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
+ 
+     return SECSuccess;
++#else
++    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
++    return SECFailure;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ SECStatus
+ SSLExp_EnableTls13BackendEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
+ {
++#ifdef notdef
+     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+     if (!ss) {
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+     ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch = enabled;
+     return SECSuccess;
++#else
++    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
++    return SECFailure;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ SECStatus
+ SSLExp_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
+ {
++#ifdef notdef
+     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+     if (!ss) {
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+     ss->opt.callExtensionWriterOnEchInner = enabled;
+     return SECSuccess;
++#else
++    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
++    return SECFailure;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ SECStatus
+ SSLExp_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
+ {
+     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+     if (!ss) {
+         return SECFailure;
+diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
+--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech	2023-06-21 19:02:02.160400997 +0200
++++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn	2023-06-21 19:02:18.226618324 +0200
+@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ CPPSRCS = \
+       tls_filter.cc \
+       tls_protect.cc \
+       tls_psk_unittest.cc \
+-      tls_ech_unittest.cc \
+       $(SSLKEYLOGFILE_FILES) \
+       $(NULL)

SOURCES/nss-3.90-ecc-wrap-fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+diff -up ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c.ecc_wrap ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c
+--- ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c.ecc_wrap	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c	2024-01-23 14:07:29.421036328 -0800
+@@ -10,6 +10,32 @@
+ #include "pk11pub.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ 
++typedef struct KeyLengthEntryStr {
++    SECOidTag tag;
++    unsigned int len;
++    PRBool encoded;
++} KeyLengthEntry;
++
++const KeyLengthEntry keyLengthTable[] = {
++    { SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1, 65, PR_TRUE },
++    { SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1, 97, PR_TRUE },
++    { SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1, 133, PR_TRUE },
++    { SEC_OID_CURVE25519, 32, PR_FALSE }
++};
++
++const KeyLengthEntry *
++getKeyLengthEntry(SECOidTag tag)
++{
++    int i;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(keyLengthTable); i++) {
++        if (keyLengthTable[i].tag == tag) {
++            return &keyLengthTable[i];
++        }
++    }
++    return NULL;
++}
++
+ void
+ printBuf(const SECItem *item)
+ {
+@@ -53,6 +79,10 @@ ectest_curve_pkcs11(SECOidTag oid)
+     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+     PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
+     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
++    const KeyLengthEntry *keyLengthEntry;
++    SECItem point = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
++    SECItem value = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
++    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ 
+     oidData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(oid);
+     if (oidData == NULL) {
+@@ -79,8 +109,63 @@ ectest_curve_pkcs11(SECOidTag oid)
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+     PrintKey(symKey);
+-    rv = SECSuccess;
+ 
++    keyLengthEntry = getKeyLengthEntry(oid);
++    /* this shouldn't happen unless new curves are added without adding them
++     * to the keyLengthTable */
++    PR_ASSERT(keyLengthEntry);
++
++    /* make sure we are returning CKA_EC_POINT according to the PKCS #11 standard.
++     * NSS itself can tolerate non-standard CKA_EC_POINT, so this is the only place
++     * our test will detect incorrect behavior */
++    rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePubKey, pubKey, CKA_EC_POINT, &point);
++    if (rv == SECFailure) {
++        printf(" >>> Couldn't get CKA_EC_POINT from the ec pubKey.\n");
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
++    rv = SECFailure;
++    if (keyLengthEntry->encoded) {
++        if (point.len == keyLengthEntry->len) {
++            printf(" >>> Expected encoded CKA_EC_POINT and got a decoded value.\n");
++            printBuf(&point);
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++        arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
++        if (arena == NULL) {
++            printf(" >>> arena alloc failed.\n");
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++
++        rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &value, SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate),
++                                    &point);
++        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++            printf(" >>> invalid endoded CKA_EC_POINT.\n");
++            printBuf(&point);
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++        rv = SECFailure;
++        if (value.len != keyLengthEntry->len) {
++            printf(" >>> invalid decoded CKA_EC_POINT len (%d) expected %d.\n",
++                   value.len, keyLengthEntry->len);
++            printBuf(&value);
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++        if (value.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) {
++            printf(" >>> invalid CKA_EC_POINT format (%02x) expected %02x.\n",
++                   value.data[0], EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED);
++            printBuf(&value);
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++    } else {
++        if (point.len != keyLengthEntry->len) {
++            printf(" >>> invalid CKA_EC_POINT len (%d) expected %d.\n",
++                   point.len, keyLengthEntry->len);
++            printBuf(&point);
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
++    }
++
++    rv = SECSuccess;
+ cleanup:
+     if (privKey) {
+         SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+@@ -91,7 +176,11 @@ cleanup:
+     if (symKey) {
+         PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+     }
++    if (arena) {
++        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
++    }
+     SECITEM_FreeItem(&pk_11_ecParams, PR_FALSE);
++    SECITEM_FreeItem(&point, PR_FALSE);
+ 
+     return rv;
+ }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.ecc_wrap ./lib/freebl/blapit.h
+--- ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.ecc_wrap	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/blapit.h	2024-01-23 14:07:29.421036328 -0800
+@@ -375,7 +375,9 @@ typedef struct DHPrivateKeyStr DHPrivate
+ */
+ 
+ typedef enum { ec_params_explicit,
+-               ec_params_named
++               ec_params_named,
++               ec_params_edwards_named,
++               ec_params_montgomery_named,
+ } ECParamsType;
+ 
+ typedef enum { ec_field_GFp = 1,
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c.ecc_wrap ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c.ecc_wrap	2024-01-23 14:07:14.533870602 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c	2024-01-23 14:07:29.422036340 -0800
+@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ EC_FillParams(PLArenaPool *arena, const
+ 
+         case SEC_OID_CURVE25519:
+             /* Populate params for Curve25519 */
++            params->type = ec_params_montgomery_named;
+             CHECK_SEC_OK(gf_populate_params_bytes(ECCurve25519,
+                                                   ec_field_plain,
+                                                   params));
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.ecc_wrap ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.ecc_wrap	2024-01-23 14:07:14.520870457 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-01-23 14:08:38.198801966 -0800
+@@ -5164,7 +5164,7 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
+             }
+             /* make sure it has the same encoding */
+             if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
+-                lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
++                lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named) {
+               lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
+             } else {
+               lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
+@@ -5694,7 +5694,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+             }
+ 
+             if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
+-                ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
++                ecParams->type != ec_params_named) {
+                 PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
+                 crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
+                                             sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.ecc_wrap ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.ecc_wrap	2024-01-23 14:07:14.505870290 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c	2024-01-23 14:07:29.423036351 -0800
+@@ -1897,8 +1897,8 @@ sftk_GetPubKey(SFTKObject *object, CK_KE
+                 /* Handle the non-DER encoded case.
+                  * Some curves are always pressumed to be non-DER.
+                  */
+-                if (pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len == keyLen &&
+-                    (pubKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type == ec_field_plain ||
++                if (pubKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named ||
++                    (pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len == keyLen &&
+                      pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data[0] == EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED)) {
+                     break; /* key was not DER encoded, no need to unwrap */
+                 }
+@@ -1918,8 +1918,7 @@ sftk_GetPubKey(SFTKObject *object, CK_KE
+                         break;
+                     }
+                     /* we don't handle compressed points except in the case of ECCurve25519 */
+-                    if ((pubKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type != ec_field_plain) &&
+-                        (publicValue.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED)) {
++                    if (publicValue.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+                         crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+                         break;
+                     }

SOURCES/nss-3.90-ecdsa-sign-padding-fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_vectors.h.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-04 21:20:23.166838534 +0200
++++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_vectors.h	2024-04-10 09:05:12.664050773 +0200
+@@ -280,4 +280,101 @@ const uint8_t kP256SpkiPointNotOnCurve[]
+     0x28, 0xbc, 0x64, 0xf2, 0xf1, 0xb2, 0x0c, 0x2d, 0x7e, 0x9f, 0x51, 0x77,
+     0xa3, 0xc2, 0x94, 0x00, 0x33, 0x11, 0x77};
+ 
++const uint8_t kP521DataUnpaddedSigLong[] = {'W', 'T', 'F', '6', '0', 'M', 'W', 'M', 'N', '3'};
++const uint8_t kP521DataUnpaddedSigShort[] = { 'M', 'I', '6', '3', 'V', 'N', 'G', 'L', 'F', 'R',};
++const uint8_t kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig[] = {
++    0x30, 0x81, 0x9b, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d,
++    0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x23, 0x03, 0x81, 0x86,
++    0x00, 0x04, 0x01, 0xd2, 0x37, 0xeb, 0x78, 0xc7, 0x9b, 0x86, 0xff, 0x29,
++    0x7b, 0x55, 0x4d, 0x11, 0xc7, 0x9c, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x67, 0x9f, 0xad, 0x2a,
++    0xa9, 0xb9, 0x51, 0x30, 0x6d, 0xde, 0x14, 0x16, 0xea, 0xb3, 0x9d, 0x18,
++    0xfc, 0xf0, 0x38, 0x6e, 0x7f, 0xa6, 0x82, 0xb9, 0x19, 0x01, 0xaf, 0xe7,
++    0xc3, 0xd8, 0xec, 0x9a, 0x62, 0x7b, 0xbf, 0x41, 0xc7, 0x86, 0x89, 0x52,
++    0x76, 0x8e, 0x01, 0x97, 0x1b, 0x16, 0x97, 0x69, 0x01, 0x2d, 0x07, 0x88,
++    0x6f, 0xe0, 0x17, 0xbe, 0x82, 0xc4, 0x12, 0xd6, 0x16, 0x72, 0xf8, 0x57,
++    0x75, 0x5c, 0x69, 0x79, 0xd0, 0x11, 0x05, 0x96, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x61, 0xcd,
++    0x8f, 0x54, 0x95, 0x58, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0x71, 0x84, 0x63, 0x18, 0xb8, 0x5b,
++    0xaa, 0x1b, 0xd2, 0xe9, 0x65, 0x63, 0x15, 0x34, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2f, 0x35,
++    0x27, 0x3a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x42, 0x8e, 0xfd, 0x15, 0xbe, 0x0c, 0x0c,
++    0xe2, 0x9f};
++const uint8_t kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigLong[] = {
++    0x01, 0xa7, 0x3a, 0x14, 0x79, 0x77, 0x9e, 0x48, 0xb0, 0xff, 0xb5, 0xbe,
++    0xfb, 0xfa, 0x7a, 0x84, 0x24, 0xb3, 0x5c, 0xf0, 0xfd, 0x77, 0x9d, 0xd4,
++    0x66, 0x49, 0xfd, 0xbf, 0x04, 0xbf, 0xbb, 0x75, 0x22, 0xbb, 0x35, 0x42,
++    0xdb, 0xe7, 0xed, 0x5a, 0x8f, 0x15, 0xf3, 0xa9, 0x0e, 0xb6, 0x5b, 0xde,
++    0x23, 0x79, 0x47, 0xa7, 0x1d, 0x25, 0x24, 0x68, 0x63, 0xf6, 0x9c, 0x2e,
++    0x21, 0xe0, 0x30, 0xfc, 0xd3, 0x65, 0x01, 0x12, 0x4e, 0xf0, 0xbb, 0x89,
++    0xec, 0xec, 0x4f, 0xef, 0xbe, 0xdc, 0xd6, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x16, 0x68, 0x2b,
++    0x78, 0xdf, 0x6c, 0x6e, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x5b, 0x45, 0x1b, 0xdd, 0x84, 0x40,
++    0x94, 0x07, 0xc7, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0x57, 0x92, 0xf1, 0x64, 0xb9, 0x2c, 0xcb,
++    0x1d, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x78, 0x97, 0x8b, 0x84, 0x4e, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x0b,
++    0xb0, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x84, 0x18, 0x82, 0x8d, 0x55, 0xdf, 0x36, 0x43, 0x8a};
++const uint8_t kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigShort[] = {
++    0x40, 0x12, 0xa7, 0x96, 0x5d, 0x77, 0xba, 0x8a, 0x90, 0x57, 0x52, 0x11,
++    0xad, 0x72, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x6c, 0x73, 0x81, 0x43, 0x5d, 0x09, 0xe4, 0xde,
++    0xee, 0xc2, 0xb5, 0x03, 0x1f, 0x0f, 0xd1, 0x6a, 0xfc, 0x26, 0x6d, 0x99,
++    0x6d, 0x84, 0x32, 0x05, 0x56, 0x66, 0xe3, 0x6b, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0x04, 0xc9,
++    0x44, 0x17, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0x24, 0xd8, 0x87, 0x4e, 0x53, 0x9d, 0x08, 0x65,
++    0x91, 0x95, 0xeb, 0xeb, 0x92, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0x34, 0x80, 0xe8, 0x9f, 0x38,
++    0x73, 0x00, 0x7c, 0xfc, 0x2b, 0xfa, 0xcf, 0xa6, 0x6c, 0x1c, 0xb0, 0x75,
++    0x76, 0x01, 0x22, 0xe7, 0x3c, 0xd8, 0xc4, 0x1f, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x0b, 0x95,
++    0x7a, 0x50, 0x2b, 0x8c, 0x87, 0xc4, 0x12, 0x8e, 0x00, 0x09, 0x29, 0x2c,
++    0x21, 0xd1, 0x96, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0x54, 0xdb, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0x90, 0xf5,
++    0x5c, 0x7a, 0x8d, 0x83, 0x9c, 0x39, 0x38, 0x58, 0x5a, 0x0e};
++const uint8_t kP384DataUnpaddedSigLong[] = {'L', 'T', 'N', '4', 'B', 'P', 'X', 'Y', '5', 'N'};
++const uint8_t kP384DataUnpaddedSigShort[] = {'3', 'U', 'S', 'N', 'N', 'U', '6', 'E', 'E', '0'};
++const uint8_t kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig[] = {
++    0x30, 0x76, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02,
++    0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04,
++    0x1e, 0x98, 0x4c, 0xcf, 0x05, 0xd4, 0x9b, 0x98, 0x11, 0xae, 0xa1, 0xaa,
++    0x72, 0x27, 0xac, 0xde, 0x7f, 0xe8, 0x4d, 0xda, 0xaa, 0x67, 0x51, 0x2e,
++    0x0b, 0x30, 0x31, 0xab, 0x05, 0xac, 0x95, 0xdf, 0x09, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xe3,
++    0xf5, 0xfa, 0x30, 0xad, 0x43, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0x7e, 0xd7, 0xd1, 0xee, 0x4e,
++    0x83, 0x53, 0xe3, 0x26, 0xeb, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0xe5, 0x35, 0x36, 0x1a, 0xbf,
++    0xbf, 0x99, 0xd6, 0xe2, 0x14, 0x43, 0xcb, 0x54, 0xde, 0x06, 0xb5, 0x7d,
++    0x27, 0xb7, 0xc2, 0x27, 0xaf, 0xb6, 0x12, 0x4f, 0x47, 0xa0, 0xdb, 0xb5,
++    0x6e, 0x7b, 0x44, 0x0d, 0xc8, 0xbd, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x27, 0x7c, 0xf2, 0x3a};
++const uint8_t kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigLong[] = {
++    0x19, 0x22, 0x21, 0x72, 0x8a, 0xa4, 0x22, 0x26, 0x75, 0x16, 0x9c, 0x58,
++    0x93, 0xd8, 0x43, 0xac, 0x28, 0x78, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0xf2, 0x5d, 0xa6, 0x59,
++    0x74, 0x6d, 0x55, 0x95, 0xe1, 0xa8, 0xc9, 0x18, 0x54, 0x5d, 0x03, 0xa0,
++    0xb0, 0x90, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x29, 0x1a, 0x50, 0x9d, 0xe3, 0xde,
++    0x4a, 0x69, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0x53, 0xd7, 0xe8, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0xfc,
++    0x07, 0x66, 0xbc, 0xa7, 0xb5, 0x47, 0x29, 0xbd, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x57, 0x6c,
++    0xde, 0x37, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xd4, 0x61, 0x79, 0x92, 0x67, 0x25, 0x2e, 0xbc,
++    0x8b, 0x88, 0x6a, 0xfa, 0xa5, 0x00, 0x19, 0x11, 0x64, 0x69, 0x7b, 0xf6};
++const uint8_t kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigShort[] = {
++    0x69, 0xe6, 0xc2, 0xd0, 0xb0, 0x59, 0xca, 0x1f, 0x07, 0x4c, 0x90, 0x13,
++    0x75, 0xe0, 0xc5, 0xb9, 0x38, 0xf2, 0xd8, 0x55, 0xf7, 0x08, 0xbd, 0x8e,
++    0x61, 0xbd, 0x50, 0x7e, 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xea, 0xbc, 0xa4, 0xa0, 0x18, 0x9b,
++    0x63, 0x6b, 0x8a, 0x91, 0x88, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xbe, 0x6a, 0xb6, 0x4b, 0xaf,
++    0xcb, 0x31, 0x89, 0xcf, 0x43, 0x28, 0x4b, 0x04, 0x6a, 0xe0, 0x8d, 0xbc,
++    0xbf, 0xa2, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x1c, 0x83, 0x82, 0x3e, 0x2b, 0xa3, 0xea, 0x50,
++    0x80, 0xec, 0x31, 0x48, 0x20, 0x30, 0x75, 0x94, 0xd9, 0x08, 0x9f, 0x6f,
++    0x53, 0x21, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x74, 0x0c, 0xc4, 0x21, 0x28, 0xc9};
++const uint8_t kP256DataUnpaddedSigLong[] = {'J', '5', 'C', 'N', 'Q', 'T', 'F', 'A', 'J', 'T'};
++const uint8_t kP256DataUnpaddedSigShort[] = {'K', 'O', 'S', '9', '4', 'F', 'V', 'C', 'Y', 'C'};
++const uint8_t kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig[] = {
++    0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02,
++    0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03,
++    0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30, 0x40, 0x9d, 0x57, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x70, 0x1d, 0x4b,
++    0x40, 0x84, 0xd4, 0x7a, 0xc0, 0x30, 0x68, 0x33, 0xf1, 0x1d, 0x47, 0xaa,
++    0x37, 0x4d, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xce, 0xdc, 0x82, 0x1d, 0xf7, 0xcf, 0xdd, 0x9e,
++    0xb6, 0x6c, 0x85, 0x87, 0x9d, 0x31, 0x79, 0x7e, 0xe4, 0xe9, 0xc7, 0x4f,
++    0xd6, 0x07, 0x1d, 0x2f, 0x54, 0x82, 0x5d, 0x22, 0xbf, 0xbc, 0xf0, 0x75,
++    0x01, 0x09, 0x43, 0xc6, 0x52, 0xcb, 0x45 };
++const uint8_t kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigLong[] = {
++    0xad, 0x6f, 0xcf, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x83, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0xe0, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0x56,
++    0xa5, 0x17, 0x60, 0xbf, 0x80, 0x71, 0x18, 0x54, 0x1d, 0x82, 0xdb, 0xe6,
++    0xc2, 0x4e, 0x60, 0x4a, 0xa6, 0x0c, 0xed, 0xcf, 0xe9, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x11,
++    0xc2, 0x0a, 0x9c, 0x02, 0x5f, 0xb6, 0xa0, 0xb8, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xbf, 0x80,
++    0xb4, 0xfb, 0x68, 0xab, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x07, 0xeb, 0x50, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0x47,
++    0xcf, 0x61, 0x91, 0x5f};
++const uint8_t kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigShort[] = {
++    0x3d, 0x99, 0x94, 0xa9, 0x80, 0x12, 0x43, 0x27, 0xde, 0x78, 0x9e, 0x61,
++    0xaf, 0x10, 0xee, 0xd2, 0x22, 0xc6, 0x6e, 0x1c, 0xdf, 0xe7, 0x75, 0x28,
++    0x84, 0xae, 0xb8, 0xdb, 0x7b, 0xf1, 0x91, 0x86, 0x5b, 0x5a, 0x28, 0x16,
++    0x15, 0xfe, 0xd9, 0x48, 0x33, 0x95, 0xa8, 0x8f, 0x92, 0xbb, 0xe3, 0x9c,
++    0xca, 0x04, 0xef, 0x56, 0x48, 0x16, 0x73, 0xa6, 0xb6, 0x6a, 0x38, 0xc9,
++    0x78, 0xc4};
+ }  // namespace nss_test
+--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_unittest.cc.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-04 21:19:59.583677319 +0200
++++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_unittest.cc	2024-04-10 17:03:24.202133898 +0200
+@@ -326,4 +326,47 @@ INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(Pkcs11EcdsaRoun
+                                            SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1,
+                                            SEC_OID_CURVE25519));
+ 
++class Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest
++    : public Pkcs11EcdsaTestBase,
++      public ::testing::WithParamInterface<Pkcs11EcdsaTestParams> {
++ public:
++  Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest() : Pkcs11EcdsaTestBase(GetParam().hash_oid_) {}
++};
++
++static const Pkcs11EcdsaTestParams kEcdsaUnpaddedSignaturesVectors[] = {
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP256DataUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP256DataUnpaddedSigLong)),
++      DataBuffer(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigLong))}},
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP256DataUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP256DataUnpaddedSigShort)),
++      DataBuffer(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigShort))}},
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP384DataUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP384DataUnpaddedSigLong)),
++      DataBuffer(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigLong))}},
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP384DataUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP384DataUnpaddedSigShort)),
++      DataBuffer(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigShort))}},
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP521DataUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP521DataUnpaddedSigLong)),
++      DataBuffer(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigLong))}},
++    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
++     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
++      DataBuffer(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
++      DataBuffer(kP521DataUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP521DataUnpaddedSigShort)),
++      DataBuffer(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigShort))}}
++};
++
++TEST_P(Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest, Verify) { Verify(GetParam().sig_params_); }
++INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(EcdsaVerifyUnpaddedSignatures, Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest,
++                         ::testing::ValuesIn(kEcdsaUnpaddedSignaturesVectors));
+ }  // namespace nss_test
+--- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp256r1.c.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-09 14:58:28.413482715 +0200
++++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp256r1.c	2024-04-09 21:15:23.717222679 +0200
+@@ -214,6 +214,9 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+ {
+     SECStatus res = SECSuccess;
+ 
++    unsigned char _padded_sig_data[64] = { 0 };
++    unsigned char *sig_r, *sig_s;
++
+     if (!key || !signature || !digest ||
+         !key->publicValue.data ||
+         !signature->data || !digest->data ||
+@@ -223,9 +226,10 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (key->publicValue.len != 65 ||
+-        digest->len == 0 ||
+-        signature->len != 64) {
++    unsigned int olen = key->ecParams.order.len;
++    if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len % 2 != 0 ||
++        signature->len > 2 * olen ||
++        digest->len == 0 || key->publicValue.len != 65) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+         res = SECFailure;
+         return res;
+@@ -237,6 +241,25 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
++    /* P-256 signature has to be 64 bytes long, pad it with 0s if it isn't */
++    if (signature->len != 64) {
++        unsigned split = signature->len / 2;
++        unsigned pad = 32 - split;
++
++        unsigned char *o_sig = signature->data;
++        unsigned char *p_sig = _padded_sig_data;
++
++        memcpy(p_sig + pad, o_sig, split);
++        memcpy(p_sig + 32 + pad, o_sig + split, split);
++
++        sig_r = p_sig;
++        sig_s = p_sig + 32;
++    } else {
++        sig_r = signature->data;
++        sig_s = signature->data + 32;
++    }
++
++
+     uint8_t hash[32] = { 0 };
+     if (digest->len < 32) {
+         memcpy(hash + 32 - digest->len, digest->data, digest->len);
+@@ -247,7 +270,7 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+     bool b = Hacl_P256_ecdsa_verif_without_hash(
+         32, hash,
+         key->publicValue.data + 1,
+-        signature->data, signature->data + 32);
++        sig_r, sig_s);
+     if (!b) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+         res = SECFailure;
+--- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp384r1.c.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-09 14:58:12.726377972 +0200
++++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp384r1.c	2024-04-09 14:50:47.932425779 +0200
+@@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+ {
+     SECStatus res = SECSuccess;
+ 
++    unsigned char _padded_sig_data[96] = { 0 };
++    unsigned char *sig_r, *sig_s;
++
+     if (!key || !signature || !digest ||
+         !key->publicValue.data ||
+         !signature->data || !digest->data ||
+@@ -194,9 +197,10 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (key->publicValue.len != 97 ||
+-        digest->len == 0 ||
+-        signature->len != 96) {
++    unsigned int olen = key->ecParams.order.len;
++    if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len % 2 != 0 ||
++        signature->len > 2 * olen ||
++        digest->len == 0 || key->publicValue.len != 97) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+         res = SECFailure;
+         return res;
+@@ -208,6 +212,24 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
++    /* P-384 signature has to be 96 bytes long, pad it with 0s if it isn't */
++    if (signature->len != 96) {
++        unsigned split = signature->len / 2;
++        unsigned pad = 48 - split;
++
++        unsigned char *o_sig = signature->data;
++        unsigned char *p_sig = _padded_sig_data;
++
++        memcpy(p_sig + pad, o_sig, split);
++        memcpy(p_sig + 48 + pad, o_sig + split, split);
++
++        sig_r = p_sig;
++        sig_s = p_sig + 48;
++    } else {
++        sig_r = signature->data;
++        sig_s = signature->data + 48;
++    }
++
+     uint8_t hash[48] = { 0 };
+     if (digest->len < 48) {
+         memcpy(hash + 48 - digest->len, digest->data, digest->len);
+@@ -218,7 +240,7 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+     bool b = Hacl_P384_ecdsa_verif_without_hash(
+         48, hash,
+         key->publicValue.data + 1,
+-        signature->data, signature->data + 48);
++        sig_r, sig_s);
+     if (!b) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+         res = SECFailure;
+--- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp521r1.c.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-05 22:42:26.553728340 +0200
++++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp521r1.c	2024-04-09 13:02:14.821865860 +0200
+@@ -189,6 +189,9 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+ {
+     SECStatus res = SECSuccess;
+ 
++    unsigned char _padded_sig_data[132] = { 0 };
++    unsigned char *sig_r, *sig_s;
++
+     if (!key || !signature || !digest ||
+         !key->publicValue.data ||
+         !signature->data || !digest->data ||
+@@ -198,9 +201,10 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (key->publicValue.len != 133 ||
+-        digest->len == 0 ||
+-        signature->len != 132) {
++    unsigned int olen = key->ecParams.order.len;
++    if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len % 2 != 0 ||
++        signature->len > 2 * olen ||
++        digest->len == 0 || key->publicValue.len != 133) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+         res = SECFailure;
+         return res;
+@@ -212,6 +216,24 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+         return res;
+     }
+ 
++    /* P-521 signature has to be 132 bytes long, pad it with 0s if it isn't */
++    if (signature->len != 132) {
++        unsigned split = signature->len / 2;
++        unsigned pad = 66 - split;
++
++        unsigned char *o_sig = signature->data;
++        unsigned char *p_sig = _padded_sig_data;
++
++        memcpy(p_sig + pad, o_sig, split);
++        memcpy(p_sig + 66 + pad, o_sig + split, split);
++
++        sig_r = p_sig;
++        sig_s = p_sig + 66;
++    } else {
++        sig_r = signature->data;
++        sig_s = signature->data + 66;
++    }
++
+     uint8_t hash[66] = { 0 };
+     if (digest->len < 66) {
+         memcpy(hash + 66 - digest->len, digest->data, digest->len);
+@@ -227,7 +249,7 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
+     bool b = Hacl_P521_ecdsa_verif_without_hash(
+         66, hash,
+         key->publicValue.data + 1,
+-        signature->data, signature->data + 66);
++        sig_r, sig_s);
+     if (!b) {
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+         res = SECFailure;

SOURCES/nss-3.90-extend-db-dump-time.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh.extend ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh
+--- ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh.extend	2023-11-15 13:17:50.651020458 -0800
++++ ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh	2023-11-15 13:18:57.091608850 -0800
+@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ dbtest_main()
+       RARRAY=($dtime)
+       TIMEARRAY=(${RARRAY[1]//./ })
+       echo "${TIMEARRAY[0]} seconds"
+-      test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt 2
++      test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt ${NSS_DB_DUMP_TIME-3}
+       ret=$?
+       html_msg ${ret} 0 "certutil dump keys with explicit default trust flags"
+     fi

SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-indicators.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators	2023-11-27 11:21:42.459523398 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2023-11-27 11:22:56.821120920 -0800
+@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, C
+     context->blockSize = 0;
+     context->maxLen = 0;
+     context->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(session->slot, pMechanism,
+-                                           operation, key);
++                                           operation, key, 0);
+     *contextPtr = context;
+     return CKR_OK;
+ }
+@@ -4816,7 +4816,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
+     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+     /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated 
+      * key length against fips requirements */
+-    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
++    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key, 0);
+     session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
+     sftk_FreeSession(session);
+     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+@@ -5836,7 +5836,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+         return crv;
+     }
+     /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
+-    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
++    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey, 0);
+     publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
+     session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
+     sftk_FreeSession(session);
+@@ -7036,6 +7036,10 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+         return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+     }
+ 
++    if (!params->bExpand) {
++        keySize = hashLen;
++    }
++
+     /* sourceKey is NULL if we are called from the POST, skip the
+      * sensitiveCheck */
+     if (sourceKey != NULL) {
+@@ -7085,7 +7089,8 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+                     mech.pParameter = params;
+                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
+                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
+-                                                       CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
++                                                       CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
++                                                       keySize);
+                 }
+                 saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
+                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
+@@ -7152,7 +7157,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+     /* HKDF-Expand */
+     if (!params->bExpand) {
+         okm = prk;
+-        keySize = genLen = hashLen;
++        genLen = hashLen;
+     } else {
+         /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
+          * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
+@@ -7398,7 +7403,8 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+             return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+         }
+     }
+-    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey);
++    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
++                                       keySize);
+ 
+     switch (mechanism) {
+         /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators	2023-11-27 11:21:42.450523326 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2023-11-27 11:22:56.821120920 -0800
+@@ -979,7 +979,8 @@ CK_FLAGS sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIB
+ /* check the FIPS table to determine if this current operation is allowed by
+  * FIPS security policy */
+ PRBool sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
+-                            CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source);
++                            CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source,
++                            CK_ULONG targetKeySize);
+ /* add validation objects to the slot */
+ CK_RV sftk_CreateValidationObjects(SFTKSlot *slot);
+ 
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators	2023-11-27 11:21:42.451523334 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2023-11-27 11:31:51.812419789 -0800
+@@ -2330,7 +2330,7 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
+ static CK_ULONG
+ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
+ {
+-    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
+     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
+     CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
+     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+@@ -2392,13 +2392,29 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
+     return keyLength;
+ }
+ 
++PRBool
++sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
++{
++    switch (hash) {
++        case CKM_SHA256:
++        case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
++        case CKM_SHA384:
++        case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
++        case CKM_SHA512:
++        case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
++            return PR_TRUE;
++    }
++    return PR_FALSE;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
+  * handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
+  * would have to be coded here before they can be added to the table */
+ static PRBool
+ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
+-                   SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source)
++                   SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
++                   CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
+ {
+     switch (mechInfo->special) {
+         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
+@@ -2458,10 +2474,15 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+             if (hashObj == NULL) {
+                 return PR_FALSE;
+             }
++            /* cap the salt for legacy keys */
++            if ((keyLength <= 1024) && (pss->sLen > 63)) {
++                return PR_FALSE;
++            }
++            /* cap the salt for based on the hash */
+             if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
+                 return PR_FALSE;
+             }
+-            return PR_TRUE;
++            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
+         }
+         case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
+             /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
+@@ -2486,6 +2507,13 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+              }
+              return PR_TRUE;
+         }
++        /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
++        case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
++            if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
++                return PR_FALSE;
++            }
++            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
++                        + mechInfo->offset));
+         default:
+             break;
+     }
+@@ -2496,7 +2524,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+ 
+ PRBool
+ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op,
+-                     SFTKObject *source)
++                     SFTKObject *source, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
+ {
+ #ifndef NSS_HAS_FIPS_INDICATORS
+     return PR_FALSE;
+@@ -2528,13 +2556,17 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
+         SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechs = &sftk_fips_mechs[i];
+         /* if we match the number of records exactly, then we are an
+          * approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
+-        if (((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
+-             (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
+-             (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
+-             (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
+-             ((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
++        if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
++            (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
++            (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
++            (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
++            (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
++            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
++             ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
++             (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
++             ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
+             ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
+-             sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source))) {
++             sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
+             return PR_TRUE;
+         }
+     }

SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-indicators2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.632889660 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
+@@ -7090,7 +7090,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
+                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
+                                                        CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
+-                                                       keySize);
++                                                       keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
+                 }
+                 saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
+                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
+@@ -7404,7 +7404,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+         }
+     }
+     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
+-                                       keySize);
++                                       keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
+ 
+     switch (mechanism) {
+         /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.633889670 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-01-19 09:28:00.082843565 -0800
+@@ -2393,20 +2393,43 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
+ }
+ 
+ PRBool
+-sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
++sftk_checkFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash, PRBool allowSmall, PRBool allowCMAC)
+ {
+     switch (hash) {
++        case CKM_AES_CMAC:
++            return allowCMAC;
++        case CKM_SHA_1:
++        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
++        case CKM_SHA224:
++        case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
++            return allowSmall;
+         case CKM_SHA256:
+-        case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
++        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
+         case CKM_SHA384:
+-        case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
++        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
+         case CKM_SHA512:
+-        case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
++        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
+             return PR_TRUE;
+     }
+     return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ 
++PRBool
++sftk_checkKeyLength(CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG min,
++                    CK_ULONG max, CK_ULONG step)
++{
++     if (keyLength > max) {
++         return PR_FALSE;
++     }
++     if (keyLength < min ) {
++         return PR_FALSE;
++     }
++     if (((keyLength - min) % step) != 0) {
++         return PR_FALSE;
++     }
++     return PR_TRUE;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
+  * handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
+@@ -2416,6 +2439,8 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+                    SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
+                    CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
+ {
++    PRBool allowSmall = PR_FALSE;
++    PRBool allowCMAC = PR_FALSE;
+     switch (mechInfo->special) {
+         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
+             SECItem dhPrime;
+@@ -2482,7 +2507,11 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+             if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
+                 return PR_FALSE;
+             }
+-            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
++            /* Our code makes sure pss->hashAlg matches the explicit
++             * hash in the mechanism, and only mechanisms with approved
++             * hashes are included, so no need to check pss->hashAlg
++             * here */
++            return PR_TRUE;
+         }
+         case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
+             /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
+@@ -2508,12 +2537,28 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+              return PR_TRUE;
+         }
+         /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
++        case SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800:
++             allowCMAC = PR_TRUE;
+         case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
++             allowSmall = PR_TRUE;
++        case SFTKFIPSChkHashTls:
+             if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
+                 return PR_FALSE;
+             }
+-            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
+-                        + mechInfo->offset));
++            return sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
++                        + mechInfo->offset), allowSmall, allowCMAC);
++        case SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck:
++            if (mech->mechanism != CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
++                /* unless the mechnism has a built-in hash, check the hash */
++                if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
++                    return PR_FALSE;
++                }
++                if (!sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
++                        + mechInfo->offset), PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
++                    return PR_FALSE;
++                }
++            }
++            return sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, 112, 512, 1);
+         default:
+             break;
+     }
+@@ -2558,13 +2603,11 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
+          * approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
+         if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
+             (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
+-            (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
+-            (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
+-            (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
+-            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
+-             ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
+-             (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
+-             ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
++            sftk_checkKeyLength(keyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
++                                mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step) &&
++            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||  (mechs->special == SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck)
++             || sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
++                                mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step)) &&
+             ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
+              sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
+             return PR_TRUE;
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.634889680 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c	2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
+@@ -157,16 +157,25 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
+         } else {
+             CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
+             switch (p->ivGenerator) {
++                default:
+                 case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
+                     context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+                     break;
+                 case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
+-                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
++                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
++                        (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
+                         context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+                     }
+                     break;
+-                default:
+-                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
++                case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR:
++                    if ((p->ulIvLen != 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
++                        (p->ulIvFixedBits != 32)) {
++                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
++                    }
++                    break;
++                case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER:
++                    if ((p->ulIvFixedBits < 32) ||
++                       ((p->ulIvLen*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - p->ulIvFixedBits) < 32)) {
+                         context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+                     }
+             }

SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-pkcs11-long-hash.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
++++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+@@ -15,10 +15,13 @@
+  *   keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token.
+  *
+  *   In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session
+  *   that created or generated them.
+  */
++
++#include <limits.h> /* for UINT_MAX and ULONG_MAX */
++
+ #include "seccomon.h"
+ #include "secitem.h"
+ #include "secport.h"
+ #include "blapi.h"
+ #include "pkcs11.h"
+@@ -1954,12 +1957,21 @@
+     if (pDigest == NULL) {
+         *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
+         goto finish;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* do it: */
++#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
++    /* The context->hashUpdate function takes an unsigned int for its data
++     * length argument, but NSC_Digest takes an unsigned long. */
++    while (ulDataLen > UINT_MAX) {
++        (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, UINT_MAX);
++        pData += UINT_MAX;
++        ulDataLen -= UINT_MAX;
++    }
++#endif
+     (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen);
++
+     /*  NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */
+     (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
+     *pulDigestLen = digestLen;
+ 
+     sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
+@@ -1980,12 +1992,22 @@
+ 
+     /* make sure we're legal */
+     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK)
+         return crv;
+-    /* do it: */
++
++#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
++    /* The context->hashUpdate function takes an unsigned int for its data
++     * length argument, but NSC_DigestUpdate takes an unsigned long. */
++    while (ulPartLen > UINT_MAX) {
++        (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, UINT_MAX);
++        pPart += UINT_MAX;
++        ulPartLen -= UINT_MAX;
++    }
++#endif
+     (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
++
+     return CKR_OK;
+ }
+ 
+ /* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
+ CK_RV
+@@ -3166,10 +3188,17 @@
+     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, type, PR_TRUE, &session);
+     if (crv != CKR_OK)
+         return crv;
+ 
+     if (context->hashInfo) {
++#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
++        while (ulPartLen > UINT_MAX) {
++            (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, UINT_MAX);
++            pPart += UINT_MAX;
++            ulPartLen -= UINT_MAX;
++        }
++#endif
+         (*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
+     } else {
+         /* must be block cipher MACing */
+ 
+         unsigned int blkSize = context->blockSize;
+

SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-safe-memset.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
+         PORT_Memcpy(iv + AES_KEY_WRAP_BLOCK_SIZE, input, inputLen);
+         rv = AES_Encrypt(&cx->aescx, output, pOutputLen, maxOutputLen, iv,
+                          outLen);
+-        PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
++        PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
+         return rv;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
+     PORT_ZFree(newBuf, paddedInputLen);
+     /* a little overkill, we only need to clear out the length, but this
+      * is easier to verify we got it all */
+-    PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
++    PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -631,12 +631,12 @@ AESKeyWrap_DecryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
+ loser:
+     /* if we failed, make sure we don't return any data to the user */
+     if ((rv != SECSuccess) && (output == newBuf)) {
+-        PORT_Memset(newBuf, 0, paddedLen);
++        PORT_SafeZero(newBuf, paddedLen);
+     }
+     /* clear out CSP sensitive data from the heap and stack */
+     if (allocBuf) {
+         PORT_ZFree(allocBuf, paddedLen);
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
++    PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
+     return rv;
+ }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/blapii.h
+--- ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/blapii.h	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -101,10 +101,10 @@ PRBool ppc_crypto_support();
+ #ifdef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
+ #define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)
+ #else
+-#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)                    \
+-    {                                                    \
+-        volatile char _stkclr[stack_size];               \
+-        PORT_Memset((void *)&_stkclr[0], 0, stack_size); \
++#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)                   \
++    {                                                   \
++        volatile char _stkclr[stack_size];              \
++        PORT_SafeZero((void *)&_stkclr[0], stack_size); \
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/drbg.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/drbg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ prng_initEntropy(void)
+     SHA256_Update(&ctx, block, sizeof(block));
+     SHA256_End(&ctx, globalrng->previousEntropyHash, NULL,
+                sizeof(globalrng->previousEntropyHash));
+-    PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
++    PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof(block));
+     SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
+     return PR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+@@ -246,8 +246,8 @@ prng_getEntropy(PRUint8 *buffer, size_t
+     }
+ 
+ out:
+-    PORT_Memset(hash, 0, sizeof hash);
+-    PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof block);
++    PORT_SafeZero(hash, sizeof hash);
++    PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof block);
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *r
+         PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data) - 1, carry);
+         SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data);
+-    PORT_Memset(thisHash, 0, sizeof thisHash);
++    PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof data);
++    PORT_SafeZero(thisHash, sizeof thisHash);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng,
+     PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter, (sizeof rng->reseed_counter) - 1, carry);
+ 
+     /* if the prng failed, don't return any output, signal softoken */
+-    PORT_Memset(H, 0, sizeof H);
++    PORT_SafeZero(H, sizeof H);
+     if (!rng->isValid) {
+         PORT_Memset(returned_bytes, 0, no_of_returned_bytes);
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/dsa.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/dsa.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
+     err = MP_OKAY;
+     signature->len = dsa_signature_len;
+ cleanup:
+-    PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
++    PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
+     mp_clear(&p);
+     mp_clear(&q);
+     mp_clear(&g);
+@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ DSA_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
+         rv = dsa_SignDigest(key, signature, digest, kSeed);
+     } while (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM &&
+              --retries > 0);
+-    PORT_Memset(kSeed, 0, sizeof kSeed);
++    PORT_SafeZero(kSeed, sizeof kSeed);
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ DSA_VerifyDigest(DSAPublicKey *key, cons
+         verified = SECSuccess; /* Signature verified. */
+     }
+ cleanup:
+-    PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, sizeof localDigestData);
++    PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, sizeof localDigestData);
+     mp_clear(&p);
+     mp_clear(&q);
+     mp_clear(&g);
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/gcm.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/gcm.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ gcmHash_Final(gcmHashContext *ghash, uns
+     rv = SECSuccess;
+ 
+ cleanup:
+-    PORT_Memset(T, 0, sizeof(T));
++    PORT_SafeZero(T, sizeof(T));
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -596,15 +596,15 @@ GCM_CreateContext(void *context, freeblC
+     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+         goto loser;
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++    PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+     gcm->ctr_context_init = PR_TRUE;
+     return gcm;
+ 
+ loser:
+-    PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++    PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+     if (ghash && ghash->mem) {
+         void *mem = ghash->mem;
+-        PORT_Memset(ghash, 0, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
++        PORT_SafeZero(ghash, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
+         PORT_Free(mem);
+     }
+     if (gcm) {
+@@ -682,11 +682,11 @@ gcm_InitCounter(GCMContext *gcm, const u
+         goto loser;
+     }
+ 
+-    PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
++    PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
+     return SECSuccess;
+ 
+ loser:
+-    PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
++    PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
+     if (freeCtr) {
+         CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
+     }
+@@ -866,10 +866,10 @@ GCM_DecryptUpdate(GCMContext *gcm, unsig
+     if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(tag, intag, tagBytes) != 0) {
+         /* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+-        PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
++        PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
++    PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
+     /* finish the decryption */
+     return CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
+                       inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+@@ -1159,10 +1159,10 @@ GCM_DecryptAEAD(GCMContext *gcm, unsigne
+         /* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
+         CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
+         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+-        PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
++        PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
++    PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
+     /* finish the decryption */
+     rv = CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
+                     inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ MAC(unsigned char *mdOut,
+     hashObj->end(mdState, mdOut, mdOutLen, mdOutMax);
+     hashObj->destroy(mdState, PR_TRUE);
+ 
+-    PORT_Memset(lengthBytes, 0, sizeof lengthBytes);
+-    PORT_Memset(hmacPad, 0, sizeof hmacPad);
+-    PORT_Memset(firstBlock, 0, sizeof firstBlock);
+-    PORT_Memset(macOut, 0, sizeof macOut);
++    PORT_SafeZero(lengthBytes, sizeof lengthBytes);
++    PORT_SafeZero(hmacPad, sizeof hmacPad);
++    PORT_SafeZero(firstBlock, sizeof firstBlock);
++    PORT_SafeZero(macOut, sizeof macOut);
+ 
+     return SECSuccess;
+ }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ intel_aes_gcmInitCounter(intel_AES_GCMCo
+ void
+ intel_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
+ {
+-    PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
++    PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
+     if (freeit) {
+         PORT_Free(gcm);
+     }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ ppc_aes_gcmInitCounter(ppc_AES_GCMContex
+ void
+ ppc_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(ppc_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
+ {
+-    PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
++    PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
+     if (freeit) {
+         PORT_Free(gcm);
+     }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/pqg.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/pqg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
+@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ cleanup:
+     mp_clear(&a);
+     mp_clear(&z);
+     mp_clear(&two_length_minus_1);
+-    PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
++    PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
+     if (err) {
+         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+         rv = SECFailure;
+@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ cleanup:
+     mp_clear(&c);
+     mp_clear(&c0);
+     mp_clear(&one);
+-    PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
++    PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
+     if (err) {
+         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+         rv = SECFailure;
+@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ makePfromQandSeed(
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&c, 1, &c)); /* c -= 1       */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub(&X, &c, P));   /* P = X - c    */
+ cleanup:
+-    PORT_Memset(V_j, 0, sizeof V_j);
++    PORT_SafeZero(V_j, sizeof V_j);
+     mp_clear(&W);
+     mp_clear(&X);
+     mp_clear(&c);
+@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ makeGfromIndex(HASH_HashType hashtype,
+ /* step 11.
+      * return valid G */
+ cleanup:
+-    PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
++    PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof(data));
+     if (hashcx) {
+         hashobj->destroy(hashcx, PR_TRUE);
+     }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
+@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ AES_DestroyContext(AESContext *cx, PRBoo
+         cx->worker_cx = NULL;
+         cx->destroy = NULL;
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(cx, 0, sizeof(AESContext));
++    PORT_SafeZero(cx, sizeof(AESContext));
+     if (freeit) {
+         PORT_Free(mem);
+     } else {
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsa.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:41:24.066840894 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/rsa.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
+@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
+     /* 2.  Compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1) */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(p, 1, &psub1));
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(q, 1, &qsub1));
++    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
+     if (needPublicExponent || needPrivateExponent) {
+-        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
+         /* 3.  Compute d = e**-1 mod(phi) */
+         /*     or      e = d**-1 mod(phi) as necessary */
+         if (needPublicExponent) {
+@@ -165,6 +165,15 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
++    /* make sure we weren't passed in a d or e = 1 mod phi */
++    /* just need to check d, because if one is = 1 mod phi, they both are */
++    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &phi, &tmp));
++    if (mp_cmp_d(&tmp, 2) <= 0) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++        rv = SECFailure;
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
++
+     /* 4.  Compute exponent1 = d mod (p-1) */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &psub1, &tmp));
+     MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->exponent1, key->arena);
+@@ -1152,6 +1161,8 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTCheckedPubKey(RSAPriv
+     /* Perform a public key operation v = m ** e mod n */
+     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(m, &e, &n, &v));
+     if (mp_cmp(&v, c) != 0) {
++        /* this error triggers a fips fatal error lock */
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+         rv = SECFailure;
+     }
+ cleanup:
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
+@@ -977,14 +977,14 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
+     /* now create the hmac key */
+     hmac = HMAC_Create(hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
+     if (hmac == NULL) {
+-        PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
++        PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
+         return NULL;
+     }
+     HMAC_Begin(hmac);
+     HMAC_Update(hmac, input, inputLen);
+     rv = HMAC_Finish(hmac, keyHash, &keyLen, sizeof(keyHash));
+     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+-        PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
++        PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
+         HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
+         return NULL;
+     }
+@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
+      * reuse the original context allocated above so we don't
+      * need to allocate and free another one */
+     rv = HMAC_ReInit(hmac, hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
+-    PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
++    PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
+     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+         HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
+         return NULL;
+@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ rsa_HMACPrf(HMACContext *hmac, const cha
+             return rv;
+         }
+         PORT_Memcpy(output, hmacLast, left);
+-        PORT_Memset(hmacLast, 0, sizeof(hmacLast));
++        PORT_SafeZero(hmacLast, sizeof(hmacLast));
+     }
+     return rv;
+ }
+@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ rsa_GetErrorLength(HMACContext *hmac, in
+         outLength = PORT_CT_SEL(PORT_CT_LT(candidate, maxLegalLen),
+                                 candidate, outLength);
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
++    PORT_SafeZero(out, sizeof(out));
+     return outLength;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
+@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyDSACheck(PRFileDesc *shFD,
+ 
+     /* verify the hash against the check file */
+     rv = DSA_VerifyDigest(key, signature, &hash);
+-    PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
++    PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
+     return (rv == SECSuccess) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyHMACCheck(PRFileDesc *shFD
+     if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+         result = SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(signature, &hash);
+     }
+-    PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
++    PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
+     return result;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
+ #ifndef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
+     DSAPublicKey key;
+ 
+-    PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
++    PORT_SafeZero(&key, sizeof(key));
+ #endif
+ 
+     /* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
+@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
+     shFD = NULL;
+ 
+ loser:
+-    PORT_Memset(&header, 0, sizeof header);
++    PORT_SafeZero(&header, sizeof header);
+     if (checkName != NULL) {
+         PORT_Free(checkName);
+     }
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
+@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ loser:
+     /* clear out state so it's not left on the stack */
+     if (cx)
+         HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_TRUE);
+-    PORT_Memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
+-    PORT_Memset(outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf));
++    PORT_SafeZero(state, sizeof(state));
++    PORT_SafeZero(outbuf, sizeof(outbuf));
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c	2023-11-22 14:44:15.519400684 -0800
+@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
+         return;
+     }
+     RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
+-    PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
++    PORT_SafeZero(bytes, sizeof bytes);
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:41:24.069840921 -0800
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
+@@ -5092,7 +5092,7 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
+         if ((signature_length >= pairwise_digest_length) &&
+             (PORT_Memcmp(known_digest, signature + (signature_length - pairwise_digest_length), pairwise_digest_length) == 0)) {
+             PORT_Free(signature);
+-            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
++            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+         }
+ 
+         /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
+diff -up ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero ./lib/util/secport.h
+--- ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./lib/util/secport.h	2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
+@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <ctype.h>
++/* ask for Annex K for memset_s. will set the appropriate #define
++ * if Annex K is supported */
++#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stddef.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -182,6 +185,39 @@ SEC_END_PROTOS
+ #endif /*SUNOS4*/
+ #define PORT_Memset memset
+ 
++/* there are cases where the compiler optimizes away our attempt to clear
++ * out our stack variables. There are multiple solutions for this problem,
++ * but they aren't universally accepted on all platforms. This attempts
++ * to select the best solution available given our os, compilier, and libc */
++#ifdef __STDC_LIB_EXT1__
++/* if the os implements C11 annex K, use memset_s */
++#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) memset_s(p, n, 0, n)
++#else
++#ifdef XP_WIN
++/* windows has a secure zero funtion */
++#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) SecureZeroMemory(p, n)
++#else
++/* _DEFAULT_SORUCE  == BSD source in GCC based environments
++ * if other environmens support explicit_bzero, their defines
++ * should be added here */
++#if defined(_DEFAULT_SOURCE) || defined(_BSD_SOURCE)
++#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) explicit_bzero(p, n)
++#else
++/* if the os doesn't support one of the above, but does support
++ * memset_explicit, you can add the definition for memset with the
++ * appropriate define check here */
++/* define an explicitly implementated Safe zero if the OS
++ * doesn't provide one */
++#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n)                                \
++    if (p != NULL) {                                       \
++        volatile unsigned char *__vl = (unsigned char *)p; \
++        size_t __nl = n;                                   \
++        while (__nl--) *__vl++ = 0;                        \
++    }
++#endif /* no explicit_bzero */
++#endif /* no windows SecureZeroMemory */
++#endif /* no memset_s */
++
+ #define PORT_Strcasecmp PL_strcasecmp
+ #define PORT_Strcat strcat
+ #define PORT_Strchr strchr

SOURCES/nss-3.90-no-dbm-25519.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.no_dbm_25519 ./tests/ec/ectest.sh
+--- ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.no_dbm_25519	2023-07-26 10:12:29.531147406 -0700
++++ ./tests/ec/ectest.sh	2023-07-26 10:12:39.547245445 -0700
+@@ -46,11 +46,13 @@ ectest_genkeydb_test()
+     return $?
+   fi
+   curves=( \
+-    "curve25519" \
+     "secp256r1" \
+     "secp384r1" \
+     "secp521r1" \
+   )
++  if [ "${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE}" = "sql" ] ; then
++      curves=( "curve25519"  "${curves[@]}" )
++  fi
+   for curve in "${curves[@]}"; do
+     echo "Test $curve key generation using certutil ..."
+     certutil -G -d "${HOSTDIR}" -k ec -q $curve -f "${R_PWFILE}" -z ${NOISE_FILE}

SOURCES/nss-3.90-pbkdf2-indicator.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator	2023-08-03 10:50:37.067109367 -0700
++++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2023-08-03 11:41:55.641541953 -0700
+@@ -2429,7 +2429,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+             return PR_FALSE;
+         case SFTKFIPSECC:
+             /* we've already handled the curve selection in the 'getlength'
+-          * function */
++             * function */
+             return PR_TRUE;
+         case SFTKFIPSAEAD: {
+             if (mech->ulParameterLen == 0) {
+@@ -2463,6 +2463,29 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+             }
+             return PR_TRUE;
+         }
++        case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
++            /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
++             * (independent of keysize).
++             *    1. iteration count must be at least 1000.
++             *    2. salt must be at least 128 bits (16 bytes).
++             *    3. password must match the length specified in the SP
++             */
++             CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkdf2 = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)
++                                                    mech->pParameter;
++             if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(*pbkdf2)) {
++                 return PR_FALSE;
++             }
++             if (pbkdf2->iterations < 1000) {
++                 return PR_FALSE;
++             }
++             if (pbkdf2->ulSaltSourceDataLen < 16) {
++                 return PR_FALSE;
++             }
++             if (*(pbkdf2->ulPasswordLen) < SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN) {
++                 return PR_FALSE;
++             }
++             return PR_TRUE;
++        }
+         default:
+             break;
+     }

SOURCES/nss-539183.patch

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
---- nss/cmd/httpserv/httpserv.c.539183	2016-05-21 18:31:39.879585420 -0700
-+++ nss/cmd/httpserv/httpserv.c	2016-05-21 18:37:22.374464057 -0700
-@@ -953,23 +953,23 @@
- getBoundListenSocket(unsigned short port)
- {
-     PRFileDesc *listen_sock;
-     int listenQueueDepth = 5 + (2 * maxThreads);
-     PRStatus prStatus;
-     PRNetAddr addr;
-     PRSocketOptionData opt;
- 
--    addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
--    addr.inet.ip = PR_INADDR_ANY;
--    addr.inet.port = PR_htons(port);
-+    if (PR_SetNetAddr(PR_IpAddrAny, PR_AF_INET6, port, &addr) != PR_SUCCESS) {
-+        errExit("PR_SetNetAddr");
-+    }
- 
--    listen_sock = PR_NewTCPSocket();
-+    listen_sock = PR_OpenTCPSocket(PR_AF_INET6);
-     if (listen_sock == NULL) {
--        errExit("PR_NewTCPSocket");
-+        errExit("PR_OpenTCPSockett");
-     }
- 
-     opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
-     opt.value.non_blocking = PR_FALSE;
-     prStatus = PR_SetSocketOption(listen_sock, &opt);
-     if (prStatus < 0) {
-         PR_Close(listen_sock);
-         errExit("PR_SetSocketOption(PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking)");
---- nss/cmd/selfserv/selfserv.c.539183	2016-05-21 18:31:39.882585367 -0700
-+++ nss/cmd/selfserv/selfserv.c	2016-05-21 18:41:43.092801174 -0700
-@@ -1711,23 +1711,23 @@
- getBoundListenSocket(unsigned short port)
- {
-     PRFileDesc *listen_sock;
-     int listenQueueDepth = 5 + (2 * maxThreads);
-     PRStatus prStatus;
-     PRNetAddr addr;
-     PRSocketOptionData opt;
- 
--    addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
--    addr.inet.ip = PR_INADDR_ANY;
--    addr.inet.port = PR_htons(port);
-+    if (PR_SetNetAddr(PR_IpAddrAny, PR_AF_INET6, port, &addr) != PR_SUCCESS) {
-+        errExit("PR_SetNetAddr");
-+    }
- 
--    listen_sock = PR_NewTCPSocket();
-+    listen_sock = PR_OpenTCPSocket(PR_AF_INET6);
-     if (listen_sock == NULL) {
--        errExit("PR_NewTCPSocket");
-+        errExit("PR_OpenTCPSocket error");
-     }
- 
-     opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
-     opt.value.non_blocking = PR_FALSE;
-     prStatus = PR_SetSocketOption(listen_sock, &opt);
-     if (prStatus < 0) {
-         PR_Close(listen_sock);
-         errExit("PR_SetSocketOption(PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking)");

SOURCES/nss_p384_scalar_validated.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,644 @@
+diff -up ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh.p384 ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh
+--- ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh.p384	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
++++ ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh	2024-01-09 11:49:58.650418434 -0800
+@@ -40,5 +40,14 @@ files=($(find ~/nss/lib/freebl/verified/
+ for f in "${files[@]}"; do
+     file_name=$(basename "$f")
+     hacl_file=($(find ~/hacl-star/dist/mozilla/ ~/hacl-star/dist/karamel/ -type f -name $file_name -not -path "*/hacl-star/dist/mozilla/internal/*"))
++    # TODO(Bug 1854438): Remove P384 exception.
++    # TODO(Bug 1854439): Remove P521 exception.
++    if [ $file_name == "Hacl_P384.c"  \
++        -o $file_name == "Hacl_P384.h" \
++        -o $file_name == "Hacl_P521.c" \
++        -o $file_name == "Hacl_P521.h" ]
++    then
++        continue;
++    fi
+     diff $hacl_file $f
+ done
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/ec.c.p384 ./lib/freebl/ec.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/ec.c.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:14.118980084 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/ec.c	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -15,15 +15,62 @@
+ #include "mplogic.h"
+ #include "ec.h"
+ #include "ecl.h"
++#include "verified/Hacl_P384.h"
++#include "verified/Hacl_P521.h"
+ 
+ #define EC_DOUBLECHECK PR_FALSE
+ 
++SECStatus
++ec_secp384r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar)
++{
++    if (!scalar || !scalar->data) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++
++    if (scalar->len != 48) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++
++    bool b = Hacl_P384_validate_private_key(scalar->data);
++
++    if (!b) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++    return SECSuccess;
++}
++
++SECStatus
++ec_secp521r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar)
++{
++    if (!scalar || !scalar->data) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++
++    if (scalar->len != 66) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++
++    bool b = Hacl_P521_validate_private_key(scalar->data);
++
++    if (!b) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
++        return SECFailure;
++    }
++    return SECSuccess;
++}
++
+ static const ECMethod kMethods[] = {
+     { ECCurve25519,
+       ec_Curve25519_pt_mul,
+       ec_Curve25519_pt_validate,
+       ec_Curve25519_scalar_validate,
+-      NULL, NULL },
++      NULL,
++      NULL },
+     {
+         ECCurve_NIST_P256,
+         ec_secp256r1_pt_mul,
+@@ -352,8 +415,7 @@ EC_NewKeyFromSeed(ECParams *ecParams, EC
+ SECStatus
+ ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(ECParams *ecParams, SECItem *privKey)
+ {
+-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+-    mp_err err;
++    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ 
+     unsigned int len = EC_GetScalarSize(ecParams);
+ 
+@@ -362,82 +424,43 @@ ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(ECParams *ec
+         return SECFailure;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* For known curves, use rejection sampling A.4.2 */
+-    if (ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
+-        const ECMethod *method = ec_get_method_from_name(ecParams->name);
+-        rv = SECFailure;
+-        if (method == NULL || method->scalar_validate == NULL) {
+-            /* unknown curve */
+-            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+-            goto done;
+-        }
+-        int count = 100;
+-        while (rv != SECSuccess && count >= 0) {
+-            rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKey->data, len);
+-            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+-                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+-                goto done;
+-            }
+-            rv = method->scalar_validate(privKey);
+-            count--;
+-        }
+-        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+-            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+-        }
+-        goto done;
++    const ECMethod *method = ec_get_method_from_name(ecParams->name);
++    if (method == NULL || method->scalar_validate == NULL) {
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
++        return SECFailure;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* For unknown curves, use algotithm A.4.1 */
+-
+-    unsigned char *order = ecParams->order.data;
+-    mp_int privKeyVal, order_1, one;
+-    unsigned char *privKeyBytes = NULL;
+-
+-    MP_DIGITS(&privKeyVal) = 0;
+-    MP_DIGITS(&order_1) = 0;
+-    MP_DIGITS(&one) = 0;
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&privKeyVal));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&order_1));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&one));
+-
+-    /* Generates 2*len random bytes using the global random bit generator
+-     * (which implements Algorithm 1 of FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1) then
+-     * reduces modulo the group order.
+-     */
+-
+-    if ((privKeyBytes = PORT_Alloc(2 * len)) == NULL) {
+-        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+-        rv = SECFailure;
+-        goto cleanup;
++    uint8_t leading_coeff_mask;
++    switch (ecParams->name) {
++        case ECCurve25519:
++        case ECCurve_NIST_P256:
++        case ECCurve_NIST_P384:
++            leading_coeff_mask = 0xff;
++            break;
++        case ECCurve_NIST_P521:
++            leading_coeff_mask = 0x01;
++            break;
++        default:
++            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
++            return SECFailure;
+     }
+ 
+-    CHECK_SEC_OK(RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKeyBytes, 2 * len));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, 2 * len));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&order_1, order, len));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_set_int(&one, 1));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub(&order_1, &one, &order_1));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&privKeyVal, &order_1, &privKeyVal));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&privKeyVal, &one, &privKeyVal));
+-    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_fixlen_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, len));
+-    memcpy(privKey->data, privKeyBytes, len);
++    /* The rejection sampling method from FIPS 186-5 A.4.2 */
++    int count = 100;
++    do {
++        rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKey->data, len);
++        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
++            return SECFailure;
++        }
++        privKey->data[0] &= leading_coeff_mask;
++        rv = method->scalar_validate(privKey);
++    } while (rv != SECSuccess && --count > 0);
+ 
+-cleanup:
+-    mp_clear(&privKeyVal);
+-    mp_clear(&order_1);
+-    mp_clear(&one);
+-    if (privKeyBytes) {
+-        PORT_ZFree(privKeyBytes, 2 * len);
+-    }
+-    if (err < MP_OKAY) {
+-        MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
+-        rv = SECFailure;
++    if (rv != SECSuccess) { // implies count == 0
++        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+     }
+ 
+-done:
+-    if (rv != SECSuccess && privKey->data) {
+-        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(privKey, PR_FALSE);
+-        return rv;
+-    }
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h.p384 ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h
+--- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:14.118980084 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -57,4 +57,8 @@ SECStatus ec_secp256r1_sign_digest(ECPri
+ SECStatus ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *key, const SECItem *signature,
+                                      const SECItem *digest);
+ 
++SECStatus ec_secp384r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar);
++
++SECStatus ec_secp521r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar);
++
+ #endif /* __ecl_h_ */
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi.p384 ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
+--- ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:14.118980084 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
+     'ecl/ecp_secp384r1.c',
+     'ecl/ecp_secp521r1.c',
+     'verified/Hacl_P256.c',
++    'verified/Hacl_P384.c',
++    'verified/Hacl_P521.c',
+     'fipsfreebl.c',
+     'blinit.c',
+     'freeblver.c',
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/Makefile.p384 ./lib/freebl/Makefile
+--- ./lib/freebl/Makefile.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.650418434 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/Makefile	2024-01-09 11:51:20.500224176 -0800
+@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ ifndef NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY
+     VERIFIED_SRCS += Hacl_Poly1305_32.c Hacl_Chacha20.c Hacl_Chacha20Poly1305_32.c
+ endif # NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY
+ 
+-VERIFIED_SRCS += Hacl_P256.c
++VERIFIED_SRCS += Hacl_P256.c Hacl_P384.c Hacl_P521.c
+ 
+ ifeq (,$(filter-out x86_64 aarch64,$(CPU_ARCH)))
+     # All 64-bit architectures get the 64 bit version.
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++/* MIT License
++ *
++ * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
++ * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
++ *
++ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++ *
++ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
++ * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
++ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
++ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
++ * SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++#include "Hacl_P384.h"
++
++#include "internal/Hacl_Krmllib.h"
++#include "internal/Hacl_Bignum_Base.h"
++
++static inline uint64_t
++bn_is_eq_mask(uint64_t *x, uint64_t *y)
++{
++    uint64_t mask = (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR6(i,
++                    (uint32_t)0U,
++                    (uint32_t)6U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t uu____0 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(x[i], y[i]);
++                    mask = uu____0 & mask;);
++    uint64_t mask1 = mask;
++    return mask1;
++}
++
++static inline uint64_t
++bn_sub(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t *c)
++{
++    uint64_t c1 = (uint64_t)0U;
++    {
++        uint64_t t1 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U];
++        uint64_t t20 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U];
++        uint64_t *res_i0 = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U;
++        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t20, res_i0);
++        uint64_t t10 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)1U];
++        uint64_t t21 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)1U];
++        uint64_t *res_i1 = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)1U;
++        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t10, t21, res_i1);
++        uint64_t t11 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)2U];
++        uint64_t t22 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)2U];
++        uint64_t *res_i2 = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)2U;
++        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t11, t22, res_i2);
++        uint64_t t12 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)3U];
++        uint64_t t2 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)3U];
++        uint64_t *res_i = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)3U;
++        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t12, t2, res_i);
++    }
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR2(i,
++                    (uint32_t)4U,
++                    (uint32_t)6U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t t1 = b[i];
++                    uint64_t t2 = c[i];
++                    uint64_t *res_i = a + i;
++                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t2, res_i););
++    uint64_t c10 = c1;
++    return c10;
++}
++
++static inline void
++bn_from_bytes_be(uint64_t *a, uint8_t *b)
++{
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR6(i,
++                    (uint32_t)0U,
++                    (uint32_t)6U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t *os = a;
++                    uint64_t u = load64_be(b + ((uint32_t)6U - i - (uint32_t)1U) * (uint32_t)8U);
++                    uint64_t x = u;
++                    os[i] = x;);
++}
++
++static inline void
++p384_make_order(uint64_t *n)
++{
++    n[0U] = (uint64_t)0xecec196accc52973U;
++    n[1U] = (uint64_t)0x581a0db248b0a77aU;
++    n[2U] = (uint64_t)0xc7634d81f4372ddfU;
++    n[3U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++    n[4U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++    n[5U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++}
++
++/**
++Private key validation.
++
++  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
++
++  The argument `private_key` points to 48 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[48].
++
++  The private key is valid:
++    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
++*/
++bool
++Hacl_P384_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key)
++{
++    uint64_t bn_sk[6U] = { 0U };
++    bn_from_bytes_be(bn_sk, private_key);
++    uint64_t tmp[6U] = { 0U };
++    p384_make_order(tmp);
++    uint64_t c = bn_sub(tmp, bn_sk, tmp);
++    uint64_t is_lt_order = (uint64_t)0U - c;
++    uint64_t bn_zero[6U] = { 0U };
++    uint64_t res = bn_is_eq_mask(bn_sk, bn_zero);
++    uint64_t is_eq_zero = res;
++    uint64_t res0 = is_lt_order & ~is_eq_zero;
++    return res0 == (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
++}
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h
+--- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
++/* MIT License
++ *
++ * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
++ * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
++ *
++ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++ *
++ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
++ * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
++ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
++ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
++ * SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __Hacl_P384_H
++#define __Hacl_P384_H
++
++#if defined(__cplusplus)
++extern "C" {
++#endif
++
++#include <string.h>
++#include "krml/internal/types.h"
++#include "krml/lowstar_endianness.h"
++
++#include "lib_intrinsics.h"
++
++/*******************************************************************************
++
++ Verified C library for ECDSA and ECDH functions over the P-384 NIST curve.
++
++ This module implements signing and verification, key validation, conversions
++ between various point representations, and ECDH key agreement.
++
++*******************************************************************************/
++
++/******************/
++/* Key validation */
++/******************/
++
++/**
++Private key validation.
++
++  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
++
++  The argument `private_key` points to 32 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[32].
++
++  The private key is valid:
++    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
++*/
++bool Hacl_P384_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key);
++
++#if defined(__cplusplus)
++}
++#endif
++
++#define __Hacl_P384_H_DEFINED
++#endif
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c
+--- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
++/* MIT License
++ *
++ * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
++ * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
++ *
++ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++ *
++ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
++ * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
++ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
++ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
++ * SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++#include "Hacl_P521.h"
++
++#include "internal/Hacl_Krmllib.h"
++#include "internal/Hacl_Bignum_Base.h"
++
++static inline uint64_t
++bn_is_eq_mask(uint64_t *x, uint64_t *y)
++{
++    uint64_t mask = (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR9(i,
++                    (uint32_t)0U,
++                    (uint32_t)9U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t uu____0 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(x[i], y[i]);
++                    mask = uu____0 & mask;);
++    uint64_t mask1 = mask;
++    return mask1;
++}
++
++static inline uint64_t
++bn_sub(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t *c)
++{
++    uint64_t c1 = (uint64_t)0U;
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR2(i,
++                    (uint32_t)0U,
++                    (uint32_t)2U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t t1 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i];
++                    uint64_t t20 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i];
++                    uint64_t *res_i0 = a + (uint32_t)4U * i;
++                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t20, res_i0);
++                    uint64_t t10 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)1U];
++                    uint64_t t21 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)1U];
++                    uint64_t *res_i1 = a + (uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)1U;
++                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t10, t21, res_i1);
++                    uint64_t t11 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)2U];
++                    uint64_t t22 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)2U];
++                    uint64_t *res_i2 = a + (uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)2U;
++                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t11, t22, res_i2);
++                    uint64_t t12 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)3U];
++                    uint64_t t2 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)3U];
++                    uint64_t *res_i = a + (uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)3U;
++                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t12, t2, res_i););
++    {
++        uint64_t t1 = b[8U];
++        uint64_t t2 = c[8U];
++        uint64_t *res_i = a + (uint32_t)8U;
++        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t2, res_i);
++    }
++    uint64_t c10 = c1;
++    return c10;
++}
++
++static inline void
++bn_from_bytes_be(uint64_t *a, uint8_t *b)
++{
++    uint8_t tmp[72U] = { 0U };
++    memcpy(tmp + (uint32_t)6U, b, (uint32_t)66U * sizeof(uint8_t));
++    KRML_MAYBE_FOR9(i,
++                    (uint32_t)0U,
++                    (uint32_t)9U,
++                    (uint32_t)1U,
++                    uint64_t *os = a;
++                    uint64_t u = load64_be(tmp + ((uint32_t)9U - i - (uint32_t)1U) * (uint32_t)8U);
++                    uint64_t x = u;
++                    os[i] = x;);
++}
++
++static inline void
++p521_make_order(uint64_t *n)
++{
++    n[0U] = (uint64_t)0xbb6fb71e91386409U;
++    n[1U] = (uint64_t)0x3bb5c9b8899c47aeU;
++    n[2U] = (uint64_t)0x7fcc0148f709a5d0U;
++    n[3U] = (uint64_t)0x51868783bf2f966bU;
++    n[4U] = (uint64_t)0xfffffffffffffffaU;
++    n[5U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++    n[6U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++    n[7U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
++    n[8U] = (uint64_t)0x1ffU;
++}
++
++/**
++Private key validation.
++
++  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
++
++  The argument `private_key` points to 66 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[66].
++
++  The private key is valid:
++    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
++*/
++bool
++Hacl_P521_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key)
++{
++    uint64_t bn_sk[9U] = { 0U };
++    bn_from_bytes_be(bn_sk, private_key);
++    uint64_t tmp[9U] = { 0U };
++    p521_make_order(tmp);
++    uint64_t c = bn_sub(tmp, bn_sk, tmp);
++    uint64_t is_lt_order = (uint64_t)0U - c;
++    uint64_t bn_zero[9U] = { 0U };
++    uint64_t res = bn_is_eq_mask(bn_sk, bn_zero);
++    uint64_t is_eq_zero = res;
++    uint64_t res0 = is_lt_order & ~is_eq_zero;
++    return res0 == (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
++}
+diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h
+--- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
++++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
++/* MIT License
++ *
++ * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
++ * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
++ *
++ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++ *
++ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
++ * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
++ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
++ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
++ * SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++#ifndef __Hacl_P521_H
++#define __Hacl_P521_H
++
++#if defined(__cplusplus)
++extern "C" {
++#endif
++
++#include <string.h>
++#include "krml/internal/types.h"
++#include "krml/lowstar_endianness.h"
++
++#include "lib_intrinsics.h"
++
++/******************/
++/* Key validation */
++/******************/
++
++/**
++Private key validation.
++
++  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
++
++  The argument `private_key` points to 66 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[66].
++
++  The private key is valid:
++    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
++*/
++bool Hacl_P521_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key);
++
++#if defined(__cplusplus)
++}
++#endif
++
++#define __Hacl_P521_H_DEFINED
++#endif

SPECS/nss.spec

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-%global nspr_build_version 4.25.0
-%global nspr_version 4.25.0
-%global nss_version 3.67.0
+%global nspr_build_version 4.35.0-1
+%global nspr_release -1
+%global nspr_version 4.35.0
+%global nss_version 3.90.0
 %global unsupported_tools_directory %{_libdir}/nss/unsupported-tools
 %global saved_files_dir %{_libdir}/nss/saved
 %global dracutlibdir %{_prefix}/lib/dracut
@@ -44,13 +45,28 @@ rpm.define(string.format("nss_release_tag NSS_%s_RTM",
            string.gsub(rpm.expand("%nss_archive_version"), "%.", "_")))
 }
 
+# This is taken from gnutls.spec
+%define srpmhash() %{lua:
+local files = rpm.expand("%_specdir/nss.spec")
+for i, p in ipairs(patches) do
+   files = files.." "..p
+end
+for i, p in ipairs(sources) do
+   files = files.." "..p
+end
+local sha256sum = assert(io.popen("cat "..files.."| sha256sum"))
+local hash = sha256sum:read("*a")
+sha256sum:close()
+print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
+}
+
 Summary:          Network Security Services
 Name:             nss
 Version:          %{nss_version}
-Release:          6%{?dist}
+Release:          7%{?dist}
 License:          MPLv2.0
 URL:              http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/
-Requires:         nspr >= %{nspr_version}
+Requires:         nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
 Requires:         nss-util >= %{nss_version}
 # TODO: revert to same version as nss once we are done with the merge
 Requires:         nss-softokn%{_isa} >= %{nss_version}
@@ -93,12 +109,14 @@ Source25:         key3.db.xml
 Source26:         key4.db.xml
 Source27:         secmod.db.xml
 Source28:         nss-p11-kit.config
-Source30:         PayPalEE.cert
+# fips algorithms are tied to the red hat validation, others
+# will have their own validation
+Source30:         fips_algorithms.h
+
+Source50:         NameConstraints_Certs.tar
 
 # To inject hardening flags for DSO
 Patch1:           nss-dso-ldflags.patch
-# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=617723
-Patch2:           nss-539183.patch
 # This patch uses the GCC -iquote option documented at
 # http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Directory-Options.html#Directory-Options
 # to give the in-tree headers a higher priority over the system headers,
@@ -115,8 +133,8 @@ Patch4:           iquote.patch
 # https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=818686
 Patch9:		  nss-sysinit-userdb.patch
 # Disable nss-sysinit test which is solely to test the above change
-Patch10:	  nss-skip-sysinit-gtests.patch
-
+Patch10:          nss-skip-sysinit-gtests.patch
+Patch15:          nss-3.90-extend-db-dump-time.patch
 # For compatibility reasons, we stick with the old PKCS #11 2.40
 # definition of CK_GCM_PARAMS:
 %if 0%{?fedora} < 34
@@ -126,9 +144,10 @@ Patch20:          nss-gcm-param-default-pkcs11v2.patch
 %endif
 # Local patch: disable MD5 (also MD2 and MD4) completely
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1849938
-Patch25:         nss-disable-md5.patch
+Patch25:          nss-disable-md5.patch
 # Local patch for TLS_ECDHE_{ECDSA|RSA}_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphers
 Patch30:          rhbz1185708-enable-ecc-3des-ciphers-by-default.patch
+Patch34:          nss-3.71-fix-lto-gtests.patch
 # Local patch: disable Delegated Credentials
 Patch35:	  nss-disable-dc.patch
 # Local patch: ignore rsa, rsa-pss, ecdsa policies until crypto-policies
@@ -138,25 +157,39 @@ Patch40:          nss-3.66-disable-signature-policies.patch
 Patch45:          nss-3.66-disable-external-host-test.patch
 # Local patch: restore old pkcs 12 defaults on old version of rhel
 Patch50:          nss-3.66-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch
+# Local Patch: restore expired distrusted certs for now
+Patch51:          nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch
+# Local Patch: update fipsdefaults to AES
+Patch52:          nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch
+Patch53:          nss-3.71-camellia-pkcs12-doc.patch
+Patch54:          nss-3.90-disable-ech.patch
 
-# Patches that should be upstreamed, and (hopefully) will disappear next
-# rebase
-# Need upstream bug
-Patch219:         nss-3.44-kbkdf-coverity.patch
-# no upsteam bug yet
-Patch225:         nss-3.67-fix-private-key-mac.patch
-# no upstream bug yet
-Patch229:         nss-3.53.1-measure-fix.patch
-# no upstream bug yet
-Patch230:         nss-3.66-no-small-primes.patch
-# no upstream bug yet
-Patch232:         nss-3.66-fix-gtest-parsing.patch
-# no upstream bug yet
-Patch233:         nss-3.67-fix-coverity-issues.patch
-# no upstream bug yet
-Patch234:         nss-3.67-fix-sdb-timeout.patch
-# no upstream bug yet
-Patch235:         nss-3.67-fix-ssl-alerts.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1774659
+Patch57:          nss-3.79-dbtool.patch
+Patch58:          nss-3.79-fips.patch
+# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1836781
+# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1836925
+Patch60:          nss-3.90-DisablingASM.patch
+Patch61:          nss-3.79-fips-review.patches
+Patch62:          nss-3.90-no-dbm-25519.patch
+Patch63:          nss-3.90-pbkdf2-indicator.patch
+
+#ems policy. needs to upstream
+Patch70:          nss-3.90-add-ems-policy.patch
+
+Patch80:         blinding_ct.patch
+Patch81:         nss-3.90-fips-pkcs11-long-hash.patch
+Patch82:         nss-3.90-fips-safe-memset.patch
+Patch83:         nss-3.90-fips-indicators.patch
+Patch84:         nss-3.90-aes-gmc-indicator.patch
+Patch85:         nss-3.90-fips-indicators2.patch
+Patch86:         nss-3.90-dh-test-update.patch
+Patch90:         nss_p256_scalar_validated.patch
+Patch91:         nss_p384_scalar_validated.patch
+Patch92:         nss_p384_hacl.patch
+Patch93:         nss_p521_hacl.patch
+Patch94:         nss-3.90-ecc-wrap-fix.patch
+Patch95:         nss-3.90-ecdsa-sign-padding-fix.patch
 
 %description
 Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to
@@ -199,7 +232,7 @@ Provides:         nss-static = %{version}-%{release}
 Requires:         nss%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
 Requires:         nss-util-devel
 Requires:         nss-softokn-devel
-Requires:         nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}
+Requires:         nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
 Requires:         pkgconfig
 BuildRequires:    xmlto
 
@@ -220,7 +253,7 @@ low level services.
 
 %package util
 Summary:          Network Security Services Utilities Library
-Requires:         nspr >= %{nspr_version}
+Requires:         nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
 
 %description util
 Utilities for Network Security Services and the Softoken module
@@ -228,7 +261,7 @@ Utilities for Network Security Services and the Softoken module
 %package util-devel
 Summary:          Development libraries for Network Security Services Utilities
 Requires:         nss-util%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
-Requires:         nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}
+Requires:         nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
 Requires:         pkgconfig
 
 %description util-devel
@@ -237,7 +270,7 @@ Header and library files for doing development with Network Security Services.
 
 %package softokn
 Summary:          Network Security Services Softoken Module
-Requires:         nspr >= %{nspr_version}
+Requires:         nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
 Requires:         nss-util >= %{version}-%{release}
 Requires:         nss-softokn-freebl%{_isa} >= %{version}-%{release}
 
@@ -274,7 +307,7 @@ Developers should rely only on the officially supported NSS public API.
 Summary:          Development libraries for Network Security Services
 Requires:         nss-softokn%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
 Requires:         nss-softokn-freebl-devel%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
-Requires:         nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}
+Requires:         nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
 Requires:         nss-util-devel >= %{version}-%{release}
 Requires:         pkgconfig
 BuildRequires:    nspr-devel >= %{nspr_build_version}
@@ -286,15 +319,22 @@ Header and library files for doing development with Network Security Services.
 %prep
 %autosetup -N -n %{name}-%{nss_archive_version}
 pushd nss
-%autopatch -p1
+%autopatch -p1 
+popd
+
+# copy the fips_algorithms.h for this release
+# this file is release specific and matches what
+# each vendors claim in their own FIPS certification
+cp %{SOURCE30} nss/lib/softoken/
+
+#update expired test certs
+pushd nss
+tar xvf %{SOURCE50}
 popd
 
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1247353
 find nss/lib/libpkix -perm /u+x -type f -exec chmod -x {} \;
 
-#update paypal cert (git binary patches don't work with autopatch)
-cp %{SOURCE30} nss/tests/libpkix/certs/
-
 %build
 
 export FREEBL_NO_DEPEND=1
@@ -308,7 +348,14 @@ export FREEBL_LOWHASH=1
 # uncomment if the iquote patch is activated
 export IN_TREE_FREEBL_HEADERS_FIRST=1
 
+# FIPS related defines
 export NSS_FORCE_FIPS=1
+export NSS_FIPS_VERSION="%{name}\ %{version}-%{srpmhash}"
+eval $(sed -n 's/^\(\(NAME\|VERSION_ID\)=.*\)/OS_\1/p' /etc/os-release | sed -e 's/ /\\ /g')
+export FIPS_MODULE_OS="$OS_NAME\ ${OS_VERSION_ID%%.*}"
+export NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID="${FIPS_MODULE_OS}\ ${NSS_FIPS_VERSION}"
+export NSS_FIPS_140_3=1
+export NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS=1
 
 # Enable compiler optimizations and disable debugging code
 export BUILD_OPT=1
@@ -484,6 +531,10 @@ export USE_64=1
 # disabled by the system policy.
 export NSS_IGNORE_SYSTEM_POLICY=1
 
+%ifarch i686 ppcle64
+export NSS_DB_DUMP_TIME=10
+%endif
+
 # enable the following line to force a test failure
 # find ./nss -name \*.chk | xargs rm -f
 
@@ -599,7 +650,7 @@ do
 done
 
 # Copy the binaries we ship as unsupported
-for file in bltest ecperf fbectest fipstest shlibsign atob btoa derdump listsuites ocspclnt pp selfserv signtool strsclnt symkeyutil tstclnt vfyserv vfychain
+for file in bltest dbtool ecperf fbectest fipstest shlibsign atob btoa derdump listsuites ocspclnt pp selfserv signtool strsclnt symkeyutil tstclnt validation vfyserv vfychain
 do
   install -p -m 755 dist/*.OBJ/bin/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{unsupported_tools_directory}
 done
@@ -724,6 +775,7 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
 %{unsupported_tools_directory}/strsclnt
 %{unsupported_tools_directory}/symkeyutil
 %{unsupported_tools_directory}/tstclnt
+%{unsupported_tools_directory}/validation
 %{unsupported_tools_directory}/vfyserv
 %{unsupported_tools_directory}/vfychain
 # instead of %%{_mandir}/man*/* let's list them explicitly
@@ -881,6 +933,7 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
 %dir %{saved_files_dir}
 %dir %{unsupported_tools_directory}
 %{unsupported_tools_directory}/bltest
+%{unsupported_tools_directory}/dbtool
 %{unsupported_tools_directory}/ecperf
 %{unsupported_tools_directory}/fbectest
 %{unsupported_tools_directory}/fipstest
@@ -928,6 +981,85 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
 
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Apr 10 2024 Frantisek Krenzelok <krenzelok.frantisek@gmail.com> - 3.90.0-7
+- Allow for shorter ecdsa signatures by padding them to full length
+
+* Tue Jan 23 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-6
+- Fix ecc DER wrapping.
+
+* Wed Jan 17 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-5
+- Pick up validated constant time implementations of p256, p384, and p521
+  from upsream
+- More Fips indicator changes
+
+* Wed Dec 6 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-4
+- FIPS review changes
+-   add PORT_SafeZero to avoid compiler optimizing a way zeroing memory.
+-   update the indicators for this release
+-   allow hashing of longer than int32 values in a single PKCS #11 call.
+
+* Tue Nov 21 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-3.1
+- Fix expired certs in tests
+- Fix CVE-2023-5388
+
+* Thu Aug 3 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-3
+- add indicators for pbkdf2
+- add camellia to pkcs12 doc files
+- fix ems policy bug
+- disable ech
+
+* Thu Jul 27 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-2
+- fix the change log
+
+* Thu Jul 27 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-1
+- rebase to NSS 3.90
+
+* Wed Mar 8 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-11
+- Fix CVE-2023-0767
+
+* Thu Aug 11 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-10
+- Fix QA found failures:
+-  remove extra '+' from sslpolicy.txt file causing test error values
+-  only use GRND_RANDOM if the kernel is in FIPS mode.
+
+* Fri Aug 5 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-9
+- FIPS 140-3 changes
+
+* Wed Jul 13 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-8
+- Update fips default for pk12util to AES rather than TDES
+- Fix bug in pkcs12 files with null passwords
+
+* Wed Jul 6 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-7
+- Better fix for test regressions
+
+* Mon Jun 27 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-6
+- fix nss.spec so it works in a rhel-8.1.0 buildroot
+
+* Mon Jun 20 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-5
+- FIPS 140-3 changes
+-  Reject Small RSA keys, 1024 bit keys are marked as FIP OK when verifying, reject
+   signature keys by policy
+-  Allow applications to retrigger selftests on demand.
+
+* Fri Jun 17 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-4
+- Fix pkgconfig output
+
+* Wed Jun 15 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-3
+- NSR Coverity fix changed selfserv from passive to active, change it back
+
+* Sat Jun 11 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-2
+- Fix regressions found in test suites.
+
+* Thu Jun 2 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-1
+- Rebase to NSS 3.79
+- Set FIPS Module ID
+- skip attribute verification on attributes with default values
+- don't export trust objects if they are default trust objects from dbm
+- add dbtool to nss-tools
+
+* Thu Nov 18 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.67.0-7
+- Fix CVE 2021 43527
+
 * Tue Jul 6 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.67.0-6
 - Fix ssl alert issue