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c8
...
imports/c8
10
.gitignore
vendored
10
.gitignore
vendored
@ -3,4 +3,12 @@ SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
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SOURCES/blank-key3.db
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SOURCES/blank-key4.db
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SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
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SOURCES/nss-3.101.tar.gz
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SOURCES/cert8.db.xml
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SOURCES/cert9.db.xml
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SOURCES/key3.db.xml
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SOURCES/key4.db.xml
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SOURCES/nss-3.44.tar.gz
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SOURCES/nss-config.xml
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SOURCES/nss-softokn-cavs-1.0.tar.gz
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SOURCES/secmod.db.xml
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SOURCES/setup-nsssysinit.xml
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@ -3,4 +3,12 @@ b5570125fbf6bfb410705706af48217a0817c03a SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
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7f78b5bcecdb5005e7b803604b2ec9d1a9df2fb5 SOURCES/blank-key3.db
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f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
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bd748cf6e1465a1bbe6e751b72ffc0076aff0b50 SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
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90f6f1d5440e7cc72cd27f2ecf2e8f3f680a00aa SOURCES/nss-3.101.tar.gz
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6a43a6788fff0f2a967051209adbd354fad4c346 SOURCES/cert8.db.xml
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ea6705e15999bdc6365f05b3d66f9c1d49677f84 SOURCES/cert9.db.xml
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24c123810543ff0f6848647d6d910744e275fb01 SOURCES/key3.db.xml
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af51b16a56fda1f7525a0eed3ecbdcbb4133be0c SOURCES/key4.db.xml
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44a83b1bf4efd27605177ecdbf217e579ae8c8ae SOURCES/nss-3.44.tar.gz
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2905c9b06e7e686c9e3c0b5736a218766d4ae4c2 SOURCES/nss-config.xml
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d8a7f044570732caf4ed06fd44a63b3e86ea2a16 SOURCES/nss-softokn-cavs-1.0.tar.gz
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ca9ebf79c1437169a02527c18b1e3909943c4be9 SOURCES/secmod.db.xml
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bcbe05281b38d843273f91ae3f9f19f70c7d97b3 SOURCES/setup-nsssysinit.xml
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@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
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<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
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<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
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"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
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<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
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<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
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]>
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<refentry id="cert8.db">
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<refentryinfo>
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<date>&date;</date>
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<title>Network Security Services</title>
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<productname>nss</productname>
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<productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
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</refentryinfo>
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<refmeta>
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<refentrytitle>cert8.db</refentrytitle>
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<manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
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</refmeta>
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<refnamediv>
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<refname>cert8.db</refname>
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<refpurpose>Legacy NSS certificate database</refpurpose>
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</refnamediv>
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<refsection id="description">
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<title>Description</title>
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<para><emphasis>cert8.db</emphasis> is an NSS certificate database.</para>
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<para>This certificate database is in the legacy database format. Consider migrating to cert9.db and key4.db which are the new sqlite-based shared database format with support for concurrent access.
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</para>
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</refsection>
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<refsection>
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<title>Files</title>
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<para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/cert8.db</filename></para>
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</refsection>
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<refsection>
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<title>See also</title>
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<para>cert9.db(5), key4.db(5), pkcs11.txt(5), </para>
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</refsection>
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<refsection id="authors">
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<title>Authors</title>
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<para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat, Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
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<para>Authors: Elio Maldonado <emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
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</refsection>
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<!-- don't change -->
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<refsection id="license">
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<title>LICENSE</title>
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<para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
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</para>
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</refsection>
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</refentry>
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@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
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<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
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<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
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"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
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<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
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<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
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]>
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<refentry id="cert9.db">
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<refentryinfo>
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<date>&date;</date>
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<title>Network Security Services</title>
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<productname>nss</productname>
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<productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
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</refentryinfo>
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<refmeta>
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<refentrytitle>cert9.db</refentrytitle>
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<manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
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</refmeta>
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<refnamediv>
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<refname>cert9.db</refname>
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<refpurpose>NSS certificate database</refpurpose>
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</refnamediv>
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<refsection id="description">
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<title>Description</title>
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<para><emphasis>cert9.db</emphasis> is an NSS certificate database.</para>
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<para>This certificate database is the sqlite-based shared database with support for concurrent access.
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</para>
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</refsection>
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<refsection>
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<title>Files</title>
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<para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/cert9.db</filename></para>
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</refsection>
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<refsection>
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<title>See also</title>
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<para>pkcs11.txt(5)</para>
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</refsection>
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<refsection id="authors">
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<title>Authors</title>
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<para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat, Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
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<para>Authors: Elio Maldonado <emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
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</refsection>
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<!-- don't change -->
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<refsection id="license">
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<title>LICENSE</title>
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<para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
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</para>
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</refsection>
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</refentry>
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@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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/*
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* Vendors should replace this header file with the file containing those
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* algorithms which have NIST algorithm Certificates.
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*/
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/* handle special cases. Classes require existing code to already be
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* in place for that class */
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typedef enum {
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SFTKFIPSNone = 0,
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SFTKFIPSDH, /* allow only specific primes */
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SFTKFIPSECC, /* not just keys but specific curves */
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SFTKFIPSAEAD, /* single shot AEAD functions not allowed in FIPS mode */
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SFTKFIPSRSAPSS, /* make sure salt isn't too big */
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SFTKFIPSPBKDF2, /* handle pbkdf2 FIPS restrictions */
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SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck, /* check the output of TLS prf functions */
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SFTKFIPSChkHash, /* make sure the base hash of KDF functions is FIPS */
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SFTKFIPSChkHashTls, /* make sure the base hash of TLS KDF functions is FIPS */
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SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800, /* make sure the base hash of SP-800-108 KDF functions is FIPS */
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} SFTKFIPSSpecialClass;
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/* set according to your security policy */
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#define SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN 8
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typedef struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList;
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struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr {
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CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type;
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CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
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CK_ULONG step;
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SFTKFIPSSpecialClass special;
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size_t offset;
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};
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SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
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/* A sample set of algorithms to allow basic testing in our continous
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* testing infrastructure. The vendor version should replace this with
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* a version that matches their algorithm testing and security policy */
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/* NOTE, This looks a lot like the PKCS #11 mechanism list in pkcs11.c, it
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* differs in the following ways:
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* 1) the addition of step and class elements to help restrict
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* the supported key sizes and types.
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* 2) The mechanism flags are restricted to only those that map to
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* fips approved operations.
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* 3) All key sizes are in bits, independent of mechanism.
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* 4) You can add more then one entry for the same mechanism to handle
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* multiple descrete keys where the MIN/MAX/STEP semantics doesn't apply
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* or where different operations have different key requirements.
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* This table does not encode all the modules legal FIPS semantics, only
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* those semantics that might possibly change due to algorithms dropping
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* of the security policy late in the process. */
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/* handy common flag types */
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#define CKF_KPG CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR
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#define CKF_GEN CKF_GENERATE
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#define CKF_SGN (CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY)
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#define CKF_ENC (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT )
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#define CKF_ECW (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT | CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
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#define CKF_WRP (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
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#define CKF_KEK (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
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#define CKF_KEA CKF_DERIVE
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#define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
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#define CKF_HSH CKF_DIGEST
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#define CK_MAX 0xffffffffUL
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/* mechanisms using the same key types share the same key type
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* limits */
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#define RSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
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#define RSA_FB_STEP 1
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#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY 1024, 1792 /* min, max */
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#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP 256
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#define DSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
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#define DSA_FB_STEP 1024
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#define DH_FB_KEY 2048, 8192 /* min, max */
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#define DH_FB_STEP 1024
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#define EC_FB_KEY 256, 521 /* min, max */
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#define EC_FB_STEP 1 /* key limits handled by special operation */
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#define AES_FB_KEY 128, 256
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#define AES_FB_STEP 64
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{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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/* -------------- RSA Multipart Signing Operations -------------------- */
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{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
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/* -------------------- Diffie Hellman Operations --------------------- */
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{ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
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{ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
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/* -------------------- Elliptic Curve Operations --------------------- */
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{ CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA224, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
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/* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */
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/* ------------------------- AES Operations --------------------------- */
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{ CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_GEN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_ECB, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CBC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CMAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CTS, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_CTR, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
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{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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||||
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
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||||
/* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */
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{ CKM_SHA224, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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||||
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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{ CKM_SHA256, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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||||
{ CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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||||
{ CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
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||||
{ CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
/* --------------------- Secret Key Operations ------------------------ */
|
||||
{ CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
/* ---------------------- SSL/TLS operations ------------------------- */
|
||||
{ CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck, offsetof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
|
||||
{ CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
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||||
offsetof(CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
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||||
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
|
||||
|
||||
/* ------------------------- HKDF Operations -------------------------- */
|
||||
{ CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_HKDF_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
|
||||
{ CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_HKDF_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
|
||||
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 160, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 256, 512, CKF_GEN }, 128, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
/* ------------------ NIST 800-108 Key Derivations ------------------- */
|
||||
{ CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
|
||||
{ CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
|
||||
{ CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
|
||||
/* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfMechanism) },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfMechanism) },
|
||||
/* ------------------ PBE Key Derivations ------------------- */
|
||||
{ CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSPBKDF2 },
|
||||
/* the deprecated mechanisms, don't use for some reason we are supposed
|
||||
* to set the FIPS indicators on these (sigh) */
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256, { 384, 384, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
|
||||
offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
|
||||
};
|
||||
const int SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_fips_mechs);
|
||||
@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
|
||||
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
|
||||
<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
|
||||
"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
|
||||
<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
|
||||
<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
|
||||
]>
|
||||
|
||||
<refentry id="key3.db">
|
||||
|
||||
<refentryinfo>
|
||||
<date>&date;</date>
|
||||
<title>Network Security Services</title>
|
||||
<productname>nss</productname>
|
||||
<productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
|
||||
</refentryinfo>
|
||||
|
||||
<refmeta>
|
||||
<refentrytitle>key3.db</refentrytitle>
|
||||
<manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
|
||||
</refmeta>
|
||||
|
||||
<refnamediv>
|
||||
<refname>key3.db</refname>
|
||||
<refpurpose>Legacy NSS certificate database</refpurpose>
|
||||
</refnamediv>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection id="description">
|
||||
<title>Description</title>
|
||||
<para><emphasis>key3.db</emphasis> is an NSS certificate database.</para>
|
||||
<para>This is a key database in the legacy database format. Consider migrating to cert9.db and key4.db which which are the new sqlite-based shared database format with support for concurrent access.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>Files</title>
|
||||
<para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/key3.db</filename></para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>See also</title>
|
||||
<para>cert9.db(5), key4.db(5), pkcs11.txt(5), </para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection id="authors">
|
||||
<title>Authors</title>
|
||||
<para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat, Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
|
||||
<para>Authors: Elio Maldonado <emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- don't change -->
|
||||
<refsection id="license">
|
||||
<title>LICENSE</title>
|
||||
<para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</refentry>
|
||||
@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
|
||||
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
|
||||
<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
|
||||
"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
|
||||
<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
|
||||
<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
|
||||
]>
|
||||
|
||||
<refentry id="key4.db">
|
||||
|
||||
<refentryinfo>
|
||||
<date>&date;</date>
|
||||
<title>Network Security Services</title>
|
||||
<productname>nss</productname>
|
||||
<productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
|
||||
</refentryinfo>
|
||||
|
||||
<refmeta>
|
||||
<refentrytitle>key4.db</refentrytitle>
|
||||
<manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
|
||||
</refmeta>
|
||||
|
||||
<refnamediv>
|
||||
<refname>key4.db</refname>
|
||||
<refpurpose>NSS certificate database</refpurpose>
|
||||
</refnamediv>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection id="description">
|
||||
<title>Description</title>
|
||||
<para><emphasis>key4.db</emphasis> is an NSS key database.</para>
|
||||
<para>This key database is the sqlite-based shared database format with support for concurrent access.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>Files</title>
|
||||
<para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/key4.db</filename></para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>See also</title>
|
||||
<para>pkcs11.txt(5)</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection id="authors">
|
||||
<title>Authors</title>
|
||||
<para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat, Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
|
||||
<para>Authors: Elio Maldonado <emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- don't change -->
|
||||
<refsection id="license">
|
||||
<title>LICENSE</title>
|
||||
<para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</refentry>
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.ems ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.ems 2024-06-11 13:09:25.956760476 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2024-06-11 13:09:52.837067481 -0700
|
||||
@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ static const oidValDef kxOptList[] = {
|
||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDHE-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
|
||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-ECDSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
|
||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
|
||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("TLS-REQUIRE-EMS"), SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
|
||||
+
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static const oidValDef smimeKxOptList[] = {
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h 2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
|
||||
@@ -202,4 +202,10 @@ struct PK11GenericObjectStr {
|
||||
/* This mask includes all CK_FLAGs with an equivalent CKA_ attribute. */
|
||||
#define CKF_KEY_OPERATION_FLAGS 0x000e7b00UL
|
||||
|
||||
+/* this oid value could change values if it's added after other new
|
||||
+ * upstream oids. We protect applications by hiding the define in a private
|
||||
+ * header file that only NSS sees. Currently it's only available through
|
||||
+ * the policy code */
|
||||
+#define SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1
|
||||
+
|
||||
#endif /* _SECMODTI_H_ */
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2023-06-12 17:18:35.130938525 -0700
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
|
||||
#include "pk11func.h"
|
||||
#include "secmod.h"
|
||||
#include "blapi.h"
|
||||
+#include "secmodti.h" /* until SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS is upstream */
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3480,6 +3481,29 @@ ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *s
|
||||
CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
|
||||
unsigned int master_params_len;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* if we are using TLS and we aren't using the extended master secret,
|
||||
+ * and SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS policy is true, fail. The caller will
|
||||
+ * send and alert (eventually). In the RSA Server case, the alert
|
||||
+ * won't happen until Finish time because the upper level code
|
||||
+ * can't tell a difference between this failure and an RSA decrypt
|
||||
+ * failure, so it will proceed with a faux key */
|
||||
+ if (isTLS) {
|
||||
+ PRUint32 policy;
|
||||
+ SECStatus rv;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* first fetch the policy for this algorithm */
|
||||
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, &policy);
|
||||
+ /* we only look at the policy if we can fetch it. */
|
||||
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ if (policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX) {
|
||||
+ /* just set the error, we don't want to map any errors
|
||||
+ * set by NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy here */
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
|
||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (isTLS12) {
|
||||
if (isDH)
|
||||
master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.ems ./lib/util/secoid.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/util/secoid.c.ems 2024-06-11 13:11:28.078155282 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/util/secoid.c 2024-06-11 13:12:58.511188172 -0700
|
||||
@@ -1890,6 +1890,12 @@ const static SECOidData oids[SEC_OID_TOT
|
||||
ODE(SEC_OID_RC2_64_CBC, "RC2-64-CBC", CKM_RC2_CBC, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
|
||||
ODE(SEC_OID_RC2_128_CBC, "RC2-128-CBC", CKM_RC2_CBC, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
|
||||
ODE(SEC_OID_ECDH_KEA, "ECDH", CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
|
||||
+ /* we need it for the policy code. */
|
||||
+ ODE(SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1,
|
||||
+ "TLS Require EMS", CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
|
||||
+
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/* PRIVATE EXTENDED SECOID Table
|
||||
@@ -2198,6 +2204,10 @@ SECOID_Init(void)
|
||||
|
||||
/* turn off NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL by default */
|
||||
xOids[SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY].notPolicyFlags = NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL;
|
||||
+ /* turn off TLS REQUIRE EMS by default */
|
||||
+ xOids[SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1].notPolicyFlags = ~0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
|
||||
envVal = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_HASH_ALG_SUPPORT");
|
||||
if (envVal)
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/util/secoidt.h.ems ./lib/util/secoidt.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/util/secoidt.h.ems 2024-06-11 13:16:13.212411967 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/util/secoidt.h 2024-06-11 13:16:48.098810434 -0700
|
||||
@@ -530,6 +530,9 @@ typedef enum {
|
||||
SEC_OID_RC2_64_CBC = 385,
|
||||
SEC_OID_RC2_128_CBC = 386,
|
||||
SEC_OID_ECDH_KEA = 387,
|
||||
+ /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
|
||||
+ /* give it an obscure name here */
|
||||
+ SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1 = 388,
|
||||
|
||||
SEC_OID_TOTAL
|
||||
} SECOidTag;
|
||||
@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c b/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
|
||||
@@ -213,27 +213,31 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef NSS_X64
|
||||
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_AVX2
|
||||
if (avx2_support()) {
|
||||
Hacl_Chacha20_Vec256_chacha20_encrypt_256(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_SSE3
|
||||
if (ssse3_support() && sse4_1_support() && avx_support()) {
|
||||
Hacl_Chacha20_Vec128_chacha20_encrypt_128(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#elif defined(__powerpc64__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \
|
||||
!defined(NSS_DISABLE_ALTIVEC) && !defined(NSS_DISABLE_CRYPTO_VSX)
|
||||
if (ppc_crypto_support()) {
|
||||
chacha20vsx(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
|
||||
- } else
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
{
|
||||
Hacl_Chacha20_chacha20_encrypt(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY */
|
||||
|
||||
SECStatus
|
||||
@@ -449,20 +453,18 @@
|
||||
(uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
|
||||
(uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
|
||||
goto finish;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-
|
||||
- else
|
||||
#elif defined(__powerpc64__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \
|
||||
!defined(NSS_DISABLE_ALTIVEC) && !defined(NSS_DISABLE_CRYPTO_VSX)
|
||||
if (ppc_crypto_support()) {
|
||||
Chacha20Poly1305_vsx_aead_encrypt(
|
||||
(uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
|
||||
(uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
|
||||
goto finish;
|
||||
- } else
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
{
|
||||
Hacl_Chacha20Poly1305_32_aead_encrypt(
|
||||
(uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
|
||||
(uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c b/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
|
||||
@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@
|
||||
pkix_pl_lifecycle_ObjectTableUpdate(int *objCountTable);
|
||||
|
||||
PRInt32 parallelFnInvocationCount;
|
||||
#endif /* PKIX_OBJECT_LEAK_TEST */
|
||||
|
||||
-static PRBool usePKIXValidationEngine = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+static PRBool usePKIXValidationEngine = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* FUNCTION: CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation
|
||||
* DESCRIPTION:
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/nss/nssinit.c b/lib/nss/nssinit.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/nss/nssinit.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/nss/nssinit.c
|
||||
@@ -762,13 +762,13 @@
|
||||
PKIX_MINOR_VERSION, &actualMinorVersion, &plContext);
|
||||
|
||||
if (pkixError != NULL) {
|
||||
goto loser;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
- char *ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY");
|
||||
+ char *ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY");
|
||||
if (ev && ev[0]) {
|
||||
- CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation(PR_TRUE);
|
||||
+ CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation(PR_FALSE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/tests/all.sh b/tests/all.sh
|
||||
--- a/tests/all.sh
|
||||
+++ b/tests/all.sh
|
||||
@@ -141,17 +141,22 @@
|
||||
########################################################################
|
||||
run_cycle_standard()
|
||||
{
|
||||
TEST_MODE=STANDARD
|
||||
|
||||
+ NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY="1"
|
||||
+ export NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
|
||||
+
|
||||
TESTS="${ALL_TESTS}"
|
||||
TESTS_SKIP="libpkix pkits"
|
||||
|
||||
NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE=${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE:-"sql"}
|
||||
export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE
|
||||
|
||||
run_tests
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ unset NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
############################ run_cycle_pkix ############################
|
||||
# run test suites with PKIX enabled
|
||||
########################################################################
|
||||
@@ -165,13 +170,10 @@
|
||||
|
||||
HOSTDIR="${HOSTDIR}/pkix"
|
||||
mkdir -p "${HOSTDIR}"
|
||||
init_directories
|
||||
|
||||
- NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY="1"
|
||||
- export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
|
||||
-
|
||||
TESTS="${ALL_TESTS}"
|
||||
TESTS_SKIP="cipher dbtests sdr crmf smime merge multinit"
|
||||
|
||||
export -n NSS_SSL_RUN
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/tests/common/init.sh b/tests/common/init.sh
|
||||
--- a/tests/common/init.sh
|
||||
+++ b/tests/common/init.sh
|
||||
@@ -138,12 +138,12 @@
|
||||
echo "NSS_TEST_DISABLE_CRL=${NSS_TEST_DISABLE_CRL}"
|
||||
echo "NSS_SSL_TESTS=\"${NSS_SSL_TESTS}\""
|
||||
echo "NSS_SSL_RUN=\"${NSS_SSL_RUN}\""
|
||||
echo "NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE=${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE}"
|
||||
echo "export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE"
|
||||
- echo "NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY}"
|
||||
- echo "export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY"
|
||||
+ echo "NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY}"
|
||||
+ echo "export NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY"
|
||||
echo "init_directories"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Exit shellfunction to clean up at exit (error, regular or signal)
|
||||
Exit()
|
||||
diff --git a/tests/ssl/ssl.sh b/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
|
||||
--- a/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
|
||||
+++ b/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
|
||||
@@ -960,13 +960,12 @@
|
||||
ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp()
|
||||
{
|
||||
#verbose="-v"
|
||||
html_head "Check that OCSP doesn't break if we disable sha1 $NORM_EXT - server $SERVER_MODE/client $CLIENT_MODE"
|
||||
|
||||
- PKIX_SAVE=${NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY-"unset"}
|
||||
- NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY="1"
|
||||
- export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
|
||||
+ PKIX_SAVE=${NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY-"unset"}
|
||||
+ unset NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
|
||||
|
||||
testname=""
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ! -f "${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt" ] ; then
|
||||
html_failed "${SCRIPTNAME}: ${P_R_SERVERDIR} is not initialized"
|
||||
@@ -987,16 +986,14 @@
|
||||
grep 12276 ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/vfy.out
|
||||
RET=$?
|
||||
html_msg $RET $RET_EXP "${testname}" \
|
||||
"produced a returncode of $RET, expected is $RET_EXP"
|
||||
|
||||
- if [ "${PKIX_SAVE}" = "unset" ]; then
|
||||
- unset NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
|
||||
- else
|
||||
- NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${PKIX_SAVE}
|
||||
- export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
|
||||
+ if [ "{PKIX_SAVE}" != "unset" ]; then
|
||||
+ export NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY=${PKIX_SAVE}
|
||||
fi
|
||||
+
|
||||
cp ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt.sav ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt
|
||||
|
||||
html "</TABLE><BR>"
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
|
||||
--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech 2024-06-12 13:29:17.162207862 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn 2024-06-12 13:30:25.699047788 -0700
|
||||
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ CPPSRCS = \
|
||||
tls_protect.cc \
|
||||
tls_psk_unittest.cc \
|
||||
tls_subcerts_unittest.cc \
|
||||
- tls_ech_unittest.cc \
|
||||
tls_xyber_unittest.cc \
|
||||
$(SSLKEYLOGFILE_FILES) \
|
||||
$(NULL)
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.disable_ech ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.disable_ech 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c 2024-06-12 13:29:17.162207862 -0700
|
||||
@@ -4415,17 +4415,23 @@ ssl_ClearPRCList(PRCList *list, void (*f
|
||||
SECStatus
|
||||
SSLExp_EnableTls13GreaseEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
||||
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
||||
if (!ss) {
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ss->opt.enableTls13GreaseEch = enabled;
|
||||
return SECSuccess;
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
SECStatus
|
||||
SSLExp_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint8 size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
||||
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
||||
if (!ss || size == 0) {
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
@@ -4439,28 +4445,42 @@ SSLExp_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(PRFileDesc
|
||||
ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
|
||||
|
||||
return SECSuccess;
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
SECStatus
|
||||
SSLExp_EnableTls13BackendEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
||||
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
||||
if (!ss) {
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch = enabled;
|
||||
return SECSuccess;
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
SECStatus
|
||||
SSLExp_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
||||
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
||||
if (!ss) {
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ss->opt.callExtensionWriterOnEchInner = enabled;
|
||||
return SECSuccess;
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
SECStatus
|
||||
@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_md ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_md 2024-06-11 12:41:35.054654990 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2024-06-11 12:46:25.347979894 -0700
|
||||
@@ -329,14 +329,11 @@ static const oidValDef curveOptList[] =
|
||||
static const oidValDef hashOptList[] = {
|
||||
/* Hashes */
|
||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("MD2"), SEC_OID_MD2,
|
||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
|
||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
|
||||
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
|
||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("MD4"), SEC_OID_MD4,
|
||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
|
||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
|
||||
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
|
||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("MD5"), SEC_OID_MD5,
|
||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
|
||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
|
||||
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
|
||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("SHA1"), SEC_OID_SHA1,
|
||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
|
||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.no_md ./lib/util/secoid.c
|
||||
diff -r 699541a7793b lib/util/secoid.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/util/secoid.c Tue Jun 16 23:03:22 2020 +0000
|
||||
+++ b/lib/util/secoid.c Thu Jun 25 14:33:09 2020 +0200
|
||||
@@ -2042,6 +2042,19 @@
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 1; i < SEC_OID_TOTAL; i++) {
|
||||
+ switch (i) {
|
||||
+ case SEC_OID_MD2:
|
||||
+ case SEC_OID_MD4:
|
||||
+ case SEC_OID_MD5:
|
||||
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
|
||||
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
|
||||
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
|
||||
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD2_AND_DES_CBC:
|
||||
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC:
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if (oids[i].desc && strstr(arg, oids[i].desc)) {
|
||||
xOids[i].notPolicyFlags = notEnable |
|
||||
(xOids[i].notPolicyFlags & ~(DEF_FLAGS));
|
||||
diff -up ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5_test ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt
|
||||
--- ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5_test 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt 2024-06-19 11:15:46.666728170 -0700
|
||||
@@ -91,21 +91,21 @@
|
||||
0 18 allow_all disallow=rc2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC4 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC SHA-1 disallow rc2 (read), RC4 and RC2
|
||||
# integrity policy check the various has based controls.
|
||||
# NOTE: md4, md2, and md5 are turned off by policy by default for encrypting
|
||||
-# (decrypting is fine). To be enabled, you must allow=all or allow=mdX on the
|
||||
+# (decrypting is fine). To be enabled, you must allow=mdX/pkcs12 on the
|
||||
# encryption side. These tests purposefully tests that the default fails to encrypt
|
||||
# but succeeds when decrypting.
|
||||
27 x allow=tls allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Use default policy with multiple hashes
|
||||
- 0 0 allow=all allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all encrypt, use default decrypt with multiple hashes
|
||||
- 0 0 allow=all allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all with multiple hashes
|
||||
- 28 x disallow=sha1_allow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on write
|
||||
+ 0 0 allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all encrypt, use default decrypt with multiple hashes
|
||||
+ 0 0 allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all with multiple hashes
|
||||
+ 28 x disallow=sha1_allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on write
|
||||
27 x disallow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on write
|
||||
- 29 x disallow=sha256_allow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on write
|
||||
- 0 19 allow=all disallow=sha1 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
|
||||
- 0 18 allow=all disallow=md2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
|
||||
- 0 17 allow=all disallow=sha256 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
|
||||
- 0 0 allow=all disallow=md2/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
|
||||
- 0 0 allow=all disallow=sha1/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
|
||||
- 0 0 allow=all disallow=sha256/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
|
||||
+ 29 x disallow=sha256_allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on write
|
||||
+ 0 19 allow=all:md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha1 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
|
||||
+ 0 18 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=md2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
|
||||
+ 0 17 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha256 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
|
||||
+ 0 0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=md2/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
|
||||
+ 0 0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha1/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
|
||||
+ 0 0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha256/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
|
||||
0 0 allow=all allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
|
||||
29 x disallow=hmac-sha256 allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
|
||||
0 18 allow=all disallow=hmac-sha256 AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
|
||||
@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy 2023-06-21 08:54:54.802785229 +0200
|
||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2023-06-21 08:58:24.748282499 +0200
|
||||
@@ -395,12 +395,9 @@ static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
|
||||
/* Signatures */
|
||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("DSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE,
|
||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
||||
- { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PKCS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
|
||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
||||
- { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PSS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE,
|
||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
||||
- { CIPHER_NAME("ECDSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY,
|
||||
- NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PKCS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, 0},
|
||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PSS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE, 0},
|
||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECDSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY, 0},
|
||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("ED25519"), SEC_OID_ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY,
|
||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
@@ -416,7 +413,7 @@ static const algListsDef algOptLists[] =
|
||||
{ macOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(macOptList), "MAC", PR_FALSE },
|
||||
{ cipherOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherOptList), "CIPHER", PR_FALSE },
|
||||
{ kxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kxOptList), "OTHER-KX", PR_FALSE },
|
||||
{ smimeKxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(smimeKxOptList), "SMIME-KX", PR_TRUE },
|
||||
- { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_FALSE },
|
||||
+ { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_TRUE },
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[] = {
|
||||
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
|
||||
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy 2023-06-21 09:00:17.720181306 +0200
|
||||
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2023-06-21 09:00:55.637501208 +0200
|
||||
@@ -193,7 +193,9 @@
|
||||
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=all_allow=hmac-sha1:sha256:rsa-pkcs:rsa:des-ede3-cbc:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly Narrow
|
||||
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=all_allow=md2/all:md4/all:md5/all:sha1/all:sha256/all:sha384/all:sha512/all:rsa-pkcs/all:rsa-pss/all:ecdsa/all:dsa/all:hmac-sha1/all:hmac-sha224/all:hmac-sha256/all:hmac-sha384/all:hmac-sha512/all:hmac-md5/all:camellia128-cbc/all:camellia192-cbc/all:camellia256-cbc/all:seed-cbc/all:des-ede3-cbc/all:des-40-cbc/all:des-cbc/all:null-cipher/all:rc2/all:rc4/all:idea/all:rsa/all:rsa-export/all:dhe-rsa/all:dhe-dss/all:ecdhe-ecdsa/all:ecdhe-rsa/all:ecdh-ecdsa/all:ecdh-rsa/all:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly
|
||||
0 noECC SSL3 d disallow=dsa Disallow DSA Signatures Explicitly
|
||||
- 1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
|
||||
+# rsa-pkcs, rsa-pss, and ecdsa policy checking reverted in rhel8 for binary
|
||||
+# compatibility reasons
|
||||
+# 1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
|
||||
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
|
||||
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
|
||||
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
|
||||
@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.dbm ./tests/ec/ectest.sh
|
||||
--- ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.dbm 2024-06-18 14:53:51.201438651 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./tests/ec/ectest.sh 2024-06-18 14:56:09.993993637 -0700
|
||||
@@ -45,12 +45,20 @@ ectest_genkeydb_test()
|
||||
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
||||
return $?
|
||||
fi
|
||||
+ if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
|
||||
curves=( \
|
||||
"curve25519" \
|
||||
"secp256r1" \
|
||||
"secp384r1" \
|
||||
"secp521r1" \
|
||||
)
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ curves=( \
|
||||
+ "secp256r1" \
|
||||
+ "secp384r1" \
|
||||
+ "secp521r1" \
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ fi
|
||||
for curve in "${curves[@]}"; do
|
||||
echo "Test $curve key generation using certutil ..."
|
||||
certutil -G -d "${HOSTDIR}" -k ec -q $curve -f "${R_PWFILE}" -z ${NOISE_FILE}
|
||||
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.rsa_disable_test ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
|
||||
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.rsa_disable_test 2024-06-19 11:17:10.261637015 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2024-06-19 11:18:22.797425628 -0700
|
||||
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@
|
||||
# compatibility reasons
|
||||
# 1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
|
||||
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
|
||||
- 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
|
||||
+ 0 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
|
||||
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
|
||||
0 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=1023 Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
|
||||
# test default settings
|
||||
@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c.no_p12_smime_policy ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c.no_p12_smime_policy 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c 2024-07-17 11:26:00.334836451 -0700
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ static pkcs12SuiteMap pkcs12SuiteMaps[]
|
||||
static PRBool
|
||||
sec_PKCS12Allowed(SECOidTag alg, PRUint32 needed)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
||||
PRUint32 policy;
|
||||
SECStatus rv;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ sec_PKCS12Allowed(SECOidTag alg, PRUint3
|
||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
PRBool
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c.no_p12_smime_policy ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c.no_p12_smime_policy 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c 2024-07-17 11:27:04.716617111 -0700
|
||||
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ smime_get_policy_tag_from_key_length(SEC
|
||||
PRBool
|
||||
smime_allowed_by_policy(SECOidTag algtag, PRUint32 neededPolicy)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
||||
PRUint32 policyFlags;
|
||||
|
||||
/* some S/MIME algs map to the same underlying KEA mechanism,
|
||||
@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ smime_allowed_by_policy(SECOidTag algtag
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_EXPORT_ALGORITHM);
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -485,6 +487,7 @@ smime_init_once(void *arg)
|
||||
return PR_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef notdef
|
||||
/* At initialization time, we need to set up the defaults. We first
|
||||
* look to see if the system or application has set up certain algorithms
|
||||
* by policy. If they have set up values by policy we'll only allow those
|
||||
@@ -497,6 +500,11 @@ smime_init_once(void *arg)
|
||||
PORT_Free(tags);
|
||||
tags = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ /* just initialize the old maps */
|
||||
+ rv = SECSuccess;
|
||||
+ tagCount = 0;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (tagCount == 0)) {
|
||||
/* No algorithms have been enabled by policy (either by the system
|
||||
* or by the application, we then will use the traditional default
|
||||
diff -up ./smime/smime.sh.no_p12_smime_policy ./smime/smime.sh
|
||||
--- ./tests/smime/smime.sh.no_p12_smime_policy 2024-07-17 12:27:36.262106070 -0
|
||||
700
|
||||
+++ ./tests/smime/smime.sh 2024-07-17 12:29:08.251207306 -0700
|
||||
@@ -872,8 +872,8 @@ smime_init
|
||||
smime_main
|
||||
smime_data_tb
|
||||
smime_p7
|
||||
-if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
|
||||
- smime_policy
|
||||
-fi
|
||||
+#if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
|
||||
+# smime_policy
|
||||
+#fi
|
||||
smime_cleanup
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up ./tools/tools.sh.no_p12_smime_policy ./tools/tools.sh
|
||||
--- ./tests/tools/tools.sh.no_p12_smime_policy 2024-07-17 12:27:36.262106070 -0
|
||||
700
|
||||
+++ ./tests/tools/tools.sh 2024-07-17 12:28:32.418778346 -0700
|
||||
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ tools_p12()
|
||||
tools_p12_import_pbmac1_samples
|
||||
if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
|
||||
tools_p12_import_rsa_pss_private_key
|
||||
- tools_p12_policy
|
||||
+#tools_p12_policy
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.orig ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
|
||||
--- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.orig 2021-05-28 02:50:43.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c 2021-06-15 17:05:37.200262345 -0700
|
||||
@@ -1031,9 +1031,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
char *export_file = NULL;
|
||||
char *dbprefix = "";
|
||||
SECStatus rv;
|
||||
- SECOidTag cipher = SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC;
|
||||
- SECOidTag hash = SEC_OID_SHA256;
|
||||
- SECOidTag certCipher = SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC;
|
||||
+ SECOidTag cipher =
|
||||
+ SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_3KEY_TRIPLE_DES_CBC;
|
||||
+ SECOidTag hash = SEC_OID_SHA1;
|
||||
+ SECOidTag certCipher =
|
||||
+ SEC_OID_PKCS12_V2_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_40_BIT_RC2_CBC;
|
||||
int keyLen = 0;
|
||||
int certKeyLen = 0;
|
||||
secuCommand pk12util;
|
||||
@@ -1147,6 +1149,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
|
||||
+ certCipher = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if (pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].activated) {
|
||||
char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].arg;
|
||||
|
||||
--- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.no_pkcs12_macpbe_default 2024-07-18 08:26:35.7732
|
||||
48450 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c 2024-07-18 08:27:05.796595554 -0700
|
||||
@@ -1165,10 +1165,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
- /* in FIPS mode default to encoding with pkcs5v2 for the MAC */
|
||||
- if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
|
||||
- hash = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
if (pk12util.options[opt_Mac].activated) {
|
||||
char *hashString = pk12util.options[opt_Mac].arg;
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig ./tests/tools/tools.sh
|
||||
--- ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig 2021-06-15 17:06:27.650564449 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./tests/tools/tools.sh 2021-06-15 17:07:59.934117192 -0700
|
||||
@@ -47,9 +47,9 @@
|
||||
"PKCS #5 Password Based Encryption with SHA-1 and DES-CBC"
|
||||
|
||||
# if we change the defaults in pk12util, update these variables
|
||||
- export CERT_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT="AES-128-CBC"
|
||||
- export KEY_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT="AES-256-CBC"
|
||||
- export HASH_DEFAULT="SHA-256"
|
||||
+ export CERT_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT=${pkcs12v2pbeWithSha1And40BitRc2Cbc}
|
||||
+ export KEY_ENCRYPTION_DEFAULT=${pkcs12v2pbeWithSha1AndTripleDESCBC}
|
||||
+ export HASH_DEFAULT="SHA-1"
|
||||
|
||||
export PKCS5v1_PBE_CIPHERS="${pkcs5pbeWithMD2AndDEScbc},\
|
||||
${pkcs5pbeWithMD5AndDEScbc},\
|
||||
@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.enable_kyber_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.enable_kyber_policy 2024-06-12 14:44:24.680338868 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2024-06-12 14:44:48.368609356 -0700
|
||||
@@ -245,7 +245,8 @@ static const oidValDef curveOptList[] =
|
||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
|
||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("CURVE25519"), SEC_OID_CURVE25519,
|
||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
|
||||
- { CIPHER_NAME("XYBER768D00"), SEC_OID_XYBER768D00, 0 },
|
||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("XYBER768D00"), SEC_OID_XYBER768D00,
|
||||
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
|
||||
/* ANSI X9.62 named elliptic curves (characteristic two field) */
|
||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB163V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V1,
|
||||
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
|
||||
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh.extend ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh
|
||||
--- ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh.extend 2023-11-15 13:17:50.651020458 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh 2023-11-15 13:18:57.091608850 -0800
|
||||
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ dbtest_main()
|
||||
RARRAY=($dtime)
|
||||
TIMEARRAY=(${RARRAY[1]//./ })
|
||||
echo "${TIMEARRAY[0]} seconds"
|
||||
- test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt 5
|
||||
+ test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt ${NSS_DB_DUMP_TIME-5}
|
||||
ret=$?
|
||||
html_msg ${ret} 0 "certutil dump keys with explicit default trust flags"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators 2024-06-12 13:38:15.995811284 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2024-06-12 13:41:30.008188930 -0700
|
||||
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, C
|
||||
context->blockSize = 0;
|
||||
context->maxLen = 0;
|
||||
context->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(session->slot, pMechanism,
|
||||
- operation, key);
|
||||
+ operation, key, 0);
|
||||
*contextPtr = context;
|
||||
return CKR_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -4885,7 +4885,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
|
||||
crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
|
||||
/* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
|
||||
* key length against fips requirements */
|
||||
- key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
|
||||
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key, 0);
|
||||
session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
|
||||
sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
||||
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
|
||||
@@ -6020,7 +6020,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
|
||||
return crv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
|
||||
- privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
|
||||
+ privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey, 0);
|
||||
publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
|
||||
session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
|
||||
sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
||||
@@ -7220,6 +7220,10 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
||||
return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (!params->bExpand) {
|
||||
+ keySize = hashLen;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* sourceKey is NULL if we are called from the POST, skip the
|
||||
* sensitiveCheck */
|
||||
if (sourceKey != NULL) {
|
||||
@@ -7269,7 +7273,8 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
||||
mech.pParameter = params;
|
||||
mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
|
||||
key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
|
||||
- CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
|
||||
+ CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
|
||||
+ keySize);
|
||||
}
|
||||
saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
|
||||
saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
|
||||
@@ -7336,7 +7341,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
||||
/* HKDF-Expand */
|
||||
if (!params->bExpand) {
|
||||
okm = prk;
|
||||
- keySize = genLen = hashLen;
|
||||
+ genLen = hashLen;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
|
||||
* T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
|
||||
@@ -7583,7 +7588,8 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
||||
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
- key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey);
|
||||
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
|
||||
+ keySize);
|
||||
|
||||
switch (mechanism) {
|
||||
/* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators 2024-06-12 13:38:15.988811198 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h 2024-06-12 13:38:15.996811296 -0700
|
||||
@@ -979,7 +979,8 @@ CK_FLAGS sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIB
|
||||
/* check the FIPS table to determine if this current operation is allowed by
|
||||
* FIPS security policy */
|
||||
PRBool sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
|
||||
- CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source);
|
||||
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source,
|
||||
+ CK_ULONG targetKeySize);
|
||||
/* add validation objects to the slot */
|
||||
CK_RV sftk_CreateValidationObjects(SFTKSlot *slot);
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators 2024-06-12 13:38:15.990811223 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2024-06-12 13:38:15.996811296 -0700
|
||||
@@ -2336,7 +2336,7 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
|
||||
static CK_ULONG
|
||||
sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
||||
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
|
||||
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
|
||||
CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
|
||||
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
|
||||
@@ -2398,13 +2398,29 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
|
||||
return keyLength;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+PRBool
|
||||
+sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ switch (hash) {
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA256:
|
||||
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA384:
|
||||
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA512:
|
||||
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
|
||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
|
||||
* handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
|
||||
* would have to be coded here before they can be added to the table */
|
||||
static PRBool
|
||||
sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
|
||||
- SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source)
|
||||
+ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
|
||||
+ CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (mechInfo->special) {
|
||||
case SFTKFIPSDH: {
|
||||
@@ -2464,10 +2480,15 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
||||
if (hashObj == NULL) {
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ /* cap the salt for legacy keys */
|
||||
+ if ((keyLength <= 1024) && (pss->sLen > 63)) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* cap the salt for based on the hash */
|
||||
if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+ return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
|
||||
/* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
|
||||
@@ -2492,6 +2513,13 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
||||
}
|
||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
|
||||
+ case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
|
||||
+ if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
|
||||
+ + mechInfo->offset));
|
||||
default:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2502,7 +2530,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
||||
|
||||
PRBool
|
||||
sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op,
|
||||
- SFTKObject *source)
|
||||
+ SFTKObject *source, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifndef NSS_HAS_FIPS_INDICATORS
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
@@ -2534,13 +2562,17 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
|
||||
SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechs = &sftk_fips_mechs[i];
|
||||
/* if we match the number of records exactly, then we are an
|
||||
* approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
|
||||
- if (((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
|
||||
- (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
|
||||
- (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
|
||||
- (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
|
||||
- ((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
|
||||
+ if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
|
||||
+ (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
|
||||
+ (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
|
||||
+ (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
|
||||
+ (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
|
||||
+ ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
|
||||
+ ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
|
||||
+ (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
|
||||
+ ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
|
||||
((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
|
||||
- sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source))) {
|
||||
+ sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
|
||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1,490 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review ./lib/freebl/dh.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/dh.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.639360404 -0700
|
||||
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ cleanup:
|
||||
PRBool
|
||||
KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, SECItem *subPrime)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- mp_int p, q, y, r;
|
||||
+ mp_int p, q, y, r, psub1;
|
||||
mp_err err;
|
||||
int cmp = 1; /* default is false */
|
||||
if (!Y || !prime || !subPrime) {
|
||||
@@ -456,13 +456,30 @@ KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, S
|
||||
MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
|
||||
MP_DIGITS(&y) = 0;
|
||||
MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
|
||||
+ MP_DIGITS(&psub1) = 0;
|
||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p));
|
||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
|
||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&y));
|
||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
|
||||
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&psub1));
|
||||
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*prime, &p);
|
||||
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*subPrime, &q);
|
||||
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*Y, &y);
|
||||
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&p, 1, &psub1));
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * We check that the public value isn't zero (which isn't in the
|
||||
+ * group), one (subgroup of order one) or p-1 (subgroup of order 2). We
|
||||
+ * also check that the public value is less than p, to avoid being fooled
|
||||
+ * by values like p+1 or 2*p-1.
|
||||
+ * This check is required by SP-800-56Ar3. It's also done in derive,
|
||||
+ * but this is only called in various FIPS cases, so put it here to help
|
||||
+ * reviewers find it.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (mp_cmp_d(&y, 1) <= 0 ||
|
||||
+ mp_cmp(&y, &psub1) >= 0) {
|
||||
+ err = MP_BADARG;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
/* compute r = y**q mod p */
|
||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&y, &q, &p, &r));
|
||||
/* compare to 1 */
|
||||
@@ -472,6 +489,7 @@ cleanup:
|
||||
mp_clear(&q);
|
||||
mp_clear(&y);
|
||||
mp_clear(&r);
|
||||
+ mp_clear(&psub1);
|
||||
if (err) {
|
||||
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review 2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2024-06-12 13:06:35.410551333 -0700
|
||||
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#include "prprf.h"
|
||||
#include "prenv.h"
|
||||
+#include "prerror.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#define __PASTE(x, y) x##y
|
||||
#define BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMech, typeSize) (!pMech->pParameter || pMech->ulParameterLen < typeSize)
|
||||
@@ -4882,6 +4883,10 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
|
||||
* handle the base object stuff
|
||||
*/
|
||||
crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
|
||||
+ /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
|
||||
+ * key length against fips requirements */
|
||||
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
|
||||
+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
|
||||
sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
||||
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
|
||||
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
||||
@@ -4889,9 +4894,6 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
|
||||
if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
|
||||
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
||||
}
|
||||
- /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
|
||||
- * fips requirements */
|
||||
- key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
|
||||
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
|
||||
*phKey = key->handle;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -5199,60 +5201,68 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
|
||||
|
||||
if (isDerivable) {
|
||||
SFTKAttribute *pubAttribute = NULL;
|
||||
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKey;
|
||||
PRBool isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
|
||||
- CK_RV crv2;
|
||||
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
|
||||
- CK_KEY_TYPE generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
|
||||
- CK_ULONG keyLen = 128;
|
||||
- CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
- CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
|
||||
- { CKA_CLASS, &secret, sizeof(secret) },
|
||||
- { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &generic, sizeof(generic) },
|
||||
- { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) },
|
||||
- { CKA_DERIVE, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue) }
|
||||
- };
|
||||
- CK_ULONG templateCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template);
|
||||
- CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS ecParams;
|
||||
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lowPrivKey = NULL;
|
||||
+ ECPrivateKey *ecPriv;
|
||||
+ SECItem *lowPubValue = NULL;
|
||||
+ SECItem item;
|
||||
+ SECStatus rv;
|
||||
|
||||
crv = CKR_OK; /*paranoia, already get's set before we drop to the end */
|
||||
- /* FIPS 140-2 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key.
|
||||
- * The easiest way to do this is to do a derive operation, which checks
|
||||
- * the validity of the key */
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ /* FIPS 140-3 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key
|
||||
+ * by recalculating the public can an compare it to our own public
|
||||
+ * key. */
|
||||
+ lowPrivKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(privateKey, keyType, &crv);
|
||||
+ if (lowPrivKey == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* recalculate the public key from the private key */
|
||||
switch (keyType) {
|
||||
- case CKK_DH:
|
||||
- mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
|
||||
- pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
|
||||
- if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
|
||||
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- mech.pParameter = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
|
||||
- mech.ulParameterLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- case CKK_EC:
|
||||
- mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
|
||||
- pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
|
||||
- if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
|
||||
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- ecParams.kdf = CKD_NULL;
|
||||
- ecParams.ulSharedDataLen = 0;
|
||||
- ecParams.pSharedData = NULL;
|
||||
- ecParams.ulPublicDataLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
||||
- ecParams.pPublicData = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
|
||||
- mech.pParameter = &ecParams;
|
||||
- mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ecParams);
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- default:
|
||||
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ case CKK_DH:
|
||||
+ rv = DH_Derive(&lowPrivKey->u.dh.base, &lowPrivKey->u.dh.prime,
|
||||
+ &lowPrivKey->u.dh.privateValue, &item, 0);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&item);
|
||||
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&item, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
+ pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKK_EC:
|
||||
+ rv = EC_NewKeyFromSeed(&lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPriv,
|
||||
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.data,
|
||||
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.len);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* make sure it has the same encoding */
|
||||
+ if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
|
||||
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named) {
|
||||
+ lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
|
||||
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
|
||||
+ /* clear out our generated private key */
|
||||
+ PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- crv = NSC_DeriveKey(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle, template, templateCount, &newKey);
|
||||
- if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
- sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
|
||||
- return crv;
|
||||
+ /* now compare new public key with our already generated key */
|
||||
+ if ((pubAttribute == NULL) || (lowPubValue == NULL) ||
|
||||
+ (pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen != lowPubValue->len) ||
|
||||
+ (PORT_Memcmp(pubAttribute->attrib.pValue, lowPubValue->data,
|
||||
+ lowPubValue->len) != 0)) {
|
||||
+ if (pubAttribute) sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
|
||||
+ if (lowPubValue) SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
|
||||
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* FIPS requires full validation, but in fipx mode NSC_Derive
|
||||
* only does partial validation with approved primes, now handle
|
||||
* full validation */
|
||||
@@ -5260,44 +5270,78 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
|
||||
SECItem pubKey;
|
||||
SECItem prime;
|
||||
SECItem subPrime;
|
||||
+ SECItem base;
|
||||
+ SECItem generator;
|
||||
const SECItem *subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
|
||||
|
||||
pubKey.data = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
|
||||
pubKey.len = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
||||
- prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
|
||||
- prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
|
||||
+ base.data = prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
|
||||
+ base.len = prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
|
||||
crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
|
||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &base, privateKey, CKA_BASE);
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
/* we ignore the return code an only look at the length */
|
||||
- if (subPrime.len == 0) {
|
||||
- /* subprime not supplied, In this case look it up.
|
||||
- * This only works with approved primes, but in FIPS mode
|
||||
- * that's the only kine of prime that will get here */
|
||||
- subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, isFIPS);
|
||||
- if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
|
||||
- crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
||||
+ /* do we have a known prime ? */
|
||||
+ subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, &generator, isFIPS);
|
||||
+ if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
|
||||
+ if (subPrime.len == 0) {
|
||||
+ /* if not a known prime, subprime must be supplied */
|
||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ /* not a known prime, check for primality of prime
|
||||
+ * and subPrime */
|
||||
+ if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&prime)) {
|
||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&subPrime)) {
|
||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* if we aren't using a defined group, make sure base is in the
|
||||
+ * subgroup. If it's not, then our key could fail or succeed sometimes.
|
||||
+ * This makes the failure reliable */
|
||||
+ if (!KEA_Verify(&base, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
|
||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ /* we're using a known group, make sure we are using the known generator for that group */
|
||||
+ if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&generator, &base) != 0) {
|
||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ if (subPrime.len != 0) {
|
||||
+ /* we have a known prime and a supplied subPrime,
|
||||
+ * make sure the subPrime matches the subPrime for
|
||||
+ * the known Prime */
|
||||
+ if (SECITEM_CompareItem(subPrimePtr, &subPrime) != 0) {
|
||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!KEA_Verify(&pubKey, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
|
||||
- crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
||||
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
||||
}
|
||||
done:
|
||||
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&base, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&subPrime, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&prime, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* clean up before we return */
|
||||
sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
|
||||
- crv2 = NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, newKey);
|
||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
return crv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (crv2 != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
- return crv2;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return CKR_OK;
|
||||
@@ -5925,8 +5969,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
|
||||
* created and linked.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
|
||||
- sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
||||
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
||||
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
|
||||
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
|
||||
@@ -5968,6 +6012,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
||||
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
|
||||
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
||||
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
|
||||
@@ -5977,6 +6022,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
|
||||
/* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
|
||||
privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
|
||||
publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
|
||||
+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
|
||||
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
||||
|
||||
*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
|
||||
*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
|
||||
@@ -8610,7 +8657,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
||||
|
||||
/* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
|
||||
* checks. */
|
||||
- subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, isFIPS);
|
||||
+ subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, NULL, isFIPS);
|
||||
if (subPrime == NULL) {
|
||||
SECItem dhSubPrime;
|
||||
/* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
|
||||
@@ -8792,6 +8839,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
||||
secretlen = tmp.len;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
secretlen = keySize;
|
||||
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
|
||||
&tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
|
||||
mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review 2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h 2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
|
||||
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
|
||||
/* dh verify functions */
|
||||
/* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes, and if so return
|
||||
* it's subprime value */
|
||||
-const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS);
|
||||
+const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *generator, PRBool isFIPS);
|
||||
/* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
|
||||
SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
|
||||
/* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review 2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
|
||||
@@ -2409,15 +2409,27 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
||||
switch (mechInfo->special) {
|
||||
case SFTKFIPSDH: {
|
||||
SECItem dhPrime;
|
||||
+ SECItem dhBase;
|
||||
+ SECItem dhGenerator;
|
||||
+ PRBool val = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
const SECItem *dhSubPrime;
|
||||
CK_RV crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime,
|
||||
source, CKA_PRIME);
|
||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhBase, source, CKA_BASE);
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, &dhGenerator, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
+ val = (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ if (val && (SECITEM_CompareItem(&dhBase, &dhGenerator) != 0)) {
|
||||
+ val = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
- return (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhBase, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
+ return val;
|
||||
}
|
||||
case SFTKFIPSNone:
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
|
||||
@@ -6726,11 +6726,20 @@ static const SECItem subprime_tls_8192 =
|
||||
(unsigned char *)subprime_tls_8192_data,
|
||||
sizeof(subprime_tls_8192_data) };
|
||||
|
||||
+/* generator for all the groups is 2 */
|
||||
+static const unsigned char generator_2_data[] = { 2 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static const SECItem generator_2 =
|
||||
+ { siBuffer,
|
||||
+ (unsigned char *)generator_2_data,
|
||||
+ sizeof(generator_2_data) };
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const SECItem *
|
||||
-sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS)
|
||||
+sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *g, PRBool isFIPS)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* use the length to decide which primes to check */
|
||||
switch (dhPrime->len) {
|
||||
@@ -6741,56 +6750,67 @@ sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PR
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_1536,
|
||||
sizeof(prime_ike_1536)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
||||
return &subprime_ike_1536;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case 2048 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_2048,
|
||||
sizeof(prime_tls_2048)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
||||
return &subprime_tls_2048;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_2048,
|
||||
sizeof(prime_ike_2048)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
||||
return &subprime_ike_2048;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case 3072 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_3072,
|
||||
sizeof(prime_tls_3072)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
||||
return &subprime_tls_3072;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_3072,
|
||||
sizeof(prime_ike_3072)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
||||
return &subprime_ike_3072;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case 4096 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_4096,
|
||||
sizeof(prime_tls_4096)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
||||
return &subprime_tls_4096;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_4096,
|
||||
sizeof(prime_ike_4096)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
||||
return &subprime_ike_4096;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case 6144 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_6144,
|
||||
sizeof(prime_tls_6144)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
||||
return &subprime_tls_6144;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_6144,
|
||||
sizeof(prime_ike_6144)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
||||
return &subprime_ike_6144;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case 8192 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_8192,
|
||||
sizeof(prime_tls_8192)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
||||
return &subprime_tls_8192;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_8192,
|
||||
sizeof(prime_ike_8192)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
||||
return &subprime_ike_8192;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
|
||||
@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
+ /* ikev1 isn't validated, if we use this function in ikev1 mode,
|
||||
+ * mark the resulting key as not FIPS */
|
||||
+ if (!params->bRekey) {
|
||||
+ outKey->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
|
||||
inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c.restore_abi 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c 2024-09-06 18:05:27.808338289 -0700
|
||||
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static const SEC_ASN1Template NSSCMSKeyA
|
||||
{ SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_EXPLICIT |
|
||||
SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 1,
|
||||
offsetof(NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfo, ukm),
|
||||
- SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_OctetStringTemplate) },
|
||||
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_PointerToOctetStringTemplate) },
|
||||
{ SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
|
||||
offsetof(NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfo, keyEncAlg),
|
||||
SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h.restore_abi 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h 2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
|
||||
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_DecryptSymKey_RSA_OAEP(SECKE
|
||||
|
||||
extern SECStatus
|
||||
NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArenaPool *poolp, CERTCertificate *cert, PK11SymKey *key,
|
||||
- SECItem *encKey, PRBool genUkm, SECItem *ukm,
|
||||
+ SECItem *encKey, PRBool genUkm, SECItem **ukm,
|
||||
SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg, SECItem *originatorPubKey, void *wincx);
|
||||
|
||||
PK11SymKey *
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c.restore_abi 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c 2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
|
||||
@@ -292,9 +292,15 @@ Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(PLArenaPool *p
|
||||
unsigned char suppPubInfo[4] = { 0 };
|
||||
|
||||
SI.keyInfo = keyInfo;
|
||||
- SI.entityUInfo.type = ukm->type;
|
||||
- SI.entityUInfo.data = ukm->data;
|
||||
- SI.entityUInfo.len = ukm->len;
|
||||
+ if (ukm) {
|
||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.type = ukm->type;
|
||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.data = ukm->data;
|
||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.len = ukm->len;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.type = siBuffer;
|
||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.data = NULL;
|
||||
+ SI.entityUInfo.len = 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
SI.suppPubInfo.type = siBuffer;
|
||||
SI.suppPubInfo.data = suppPubInfo;
|
||||
@@ -322,7 +328,7 @@ Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(PLArenaPool *p
|
||||
SECStatus
|
||||
NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArenaPool *poolp, CERTCertificate *cert,
|
||||
PK11SymKey *bulkkey, SECItem *encKey,
|
||||
- PRBool genUkm, SECItem *ukm,
|
||||
+ PRBool genUkm, SECItem **ukmp,
|
||||
SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg, SECItem *pubKey,
|
||||
void *wincx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -337,10 +343,11 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArena
|
||||
SECAlgorithmID keyWrapAlg;
|
||||
SECOidTag keyEncAlgtag;
|
||||
SECItem keyWrapAlg_params, *keyEncAlg_params, *SharedInfo;
|
||||
+ SECItem *ukm = *ukmp;
|
||||
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyDerivationType, keyWrapMech;
|
||||
CK_ULONG kdf;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (genUkm && (ukm->len != 0 || ukm->data != NULL)) {
|
||||
+ if (genUkm && (ukm != NULL)) {
|
||||
PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -427,17 +434,17 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArena
|
||||
* contain 512 bits for Diffie-Hellman key agreement. */
|
||||
|
||||
if (genUkm) {
|
||||
- ukm->type = siBuffer;
|
||||
- ukm->len = 64;
|
||||
- ukm->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, ukm->len);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (ukm->data == NULL) {
|
||||
+ ukm = SECITEM_AllocItem(poolp, NULL, 64);
|
||||
+ if (ukm == NULL) {
|
||||
goto loser;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ ukm->type = siBuffer;
|
||||
+
|
||||
rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(ukm->data, ukm->len);
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
goto loser;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ *ukmp = ukm; /* return it */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
SharedInfo = Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(poolp, &keyWrapAlg,
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c.restore_abi 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c 2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
|
||||
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_UnwrapBulkKey(NSSCM
|
||||
parameters = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg.parameters);
|
||||
enckey = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[subIndex]->encKey);
|
||||
oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey);
|
||||
- ukm = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm);
|
||||
+ ukm = ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KEK:
|
||||
algid = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg);
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/smime/cmst.h.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmst.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/smime/cmst.h.restore_abi 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/smime/cmst.h 2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
|
||||
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ typedef struct NSSCMSRecipientEncryptedK
|
||||
struct NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfoStr {
|
||||
SECItem version;
|
||||
NSSCMSOriginatorIdentifierOrKey originatorIdentifierOrKey;
|
||||
- SECItem ukm; /* optional */
|
||||
+ SECItem *ukm; /* optional */
|
||||
SECAlgorithmID keyEncAlg;
|
||||
NSSCMSRecipientEncryptedKey **recipientEncryptedKeys;
|
||||
};
|
||||
@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
||||
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
||||
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
||||
@@ -371,16 +371,21 @@ static void GenerateWeakRsaKey(ScopedSEC
|
||||
// Fail to connect with a weak RSA key.
|
||||
TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
|
||||
Reset(kPssDelegatorId);
|
||||
EnsureTlsSetup();
|
||||
static const SSLSignatureScheme kSchemes[] = {ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
|
||||
ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256};
|
||||
client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
|
||||
server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
|
||||
+ PRInt32 keySizeFlags;
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &keySizeFlags));
|
||||
+ // turn off the signing key sizes so we actually test the ssl tests
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
|
||||
+ NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG ));
|
||||
#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
|
||||
// save the MIN POLICY length.
|
||||
PRInt32 minRsa;
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minRsa));
|
||||
#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS >= 2048
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
|
||||
NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1024));
|
||||
@@ -408,16 +413,17 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
|
||||
client_->EnableDelegatedCredentials();
|
||||
|
||||
auto cfilter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionCapture>(
|
||||
client_, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn);
|
||||
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertInsufficientSecurity);
|
||||
#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, minRsa));
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, keySizeFlags));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
class ReplaceDCSigScheme : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
|
||||
public:
|
||||
ReplaceDCSigScheme(const std::shared_ptr<TlsAgent>& a)
|
||||
: TlsHandshakeFilter(a, {ssl_hs_certificate_verify}) {}
|
||||
|
||||
protected:
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
||||
@@ -1134,22 +1134,31 @@ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SE
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* interpret modulus length as key strength */
|
||||
switch (privk->keyType) {
|
||||
case rsaKey:
|
||||
case rsaPssKey:
|
||||
case rsaOaepKey:
|
||||
- /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
|
||||
- * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary */
|
||||
- bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
|
||||
- if (bitSize == -1) {
|
||||
- bitSize = 0;
|
||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
|
||||
+ CKA_MODULUS, NULL, ¶ms);
|
||||
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
|
||||
+ /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
|
||||
+ * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary. This
|
||||
+ * method is less percise because it returns bytes instead
|
||||
+ * bits, so we only do it if we can't get the modulus */
|
||||
+ bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
|
||||
+ if (bitSize == -1) {
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return bitSize;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ bitSize = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(¶ms);
|
||||
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
|
||||
return bitSize;
|
||||
case dsaKey:
|
||||
case fortezzaKey:
|
||||
case dhKey:
|
||||
case keaKey:
|
||||
rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
|
||||
CKA_PRIME, NULL, ¶ms);
|
||||
if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||
@@ -1277,27 +1277,39 @@ ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(SSL3Hashes *h
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
|
||||
|
||||
if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
|
||||
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType);
|
||||
int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key);
|
||||
+ PRInt32 optval;
|
||||
|
||||
SECItem *params = NULL;
|
||||
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams;
|
||||
SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer,
|
||||
(unsigned char *)&pssParams,
|
||||
sizeof(pssParams) };
|
||||
|
||||
if (signatureLen <= 0) {
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ /* since we are calling PK11_SignWithMechanism directly, we need to check the
|
||||
+ * key policy ourselves (which is already checked in SGN_Digest */
|
||||
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
|
||||
+ if ((rv == SECSuccess) &&
|
||||
+ ((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG)) {
|
||||
+ rv = SECKEY_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType, SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(key),
|
||||
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ goto done; /* error code already set */
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen;
|
||||
buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
|
||||
if (!buf->data)
|
||||
goto done; /* error code was set. */
|
||||
|
||||
if (useRsaPss) {
|
||||
pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
|
||||
@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/util/nsshash.c b/lib/util/nsshash.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/util/nsshash.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/util/nsshash.c
|
||||
@@ -102,16 +102,19 @@ HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashTy
|
||||
SECOidTag
|
||||
HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(SECOidTag hmacOid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
SECOidTag hashOid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
|
||||
switch (hmacOid) {
|
||||
/* no oid exists for HMAC_MD2 */
|
||||
/* NSS does not define a oid for HMAC_MD4 */
|
||||
+ case SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5:
|
||||
+ hashOid = SEC_OID_MD5;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1:
|
||||
hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224:
|
||||
hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA224;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256:
|
||||
hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA256;
|
||||
@@ -145,16 +148,19 @@ HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(SECOidTag
|
||||
SECOidTag
|
||||
HASH_GetHMACOidTagByHashOidTag(SECOidTag hashOid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
SECOidTag hmacOid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
|
||||
switch (hashOid) {
|
||||
/* no oid exists for HMAC_MD2 */
|
||||
/* NSS does not define a oid for HMAC_MD4 */
|
||||
+ case SEC_OID_MD5:
|
||||
+ hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
case SEC_OID_SHA1:
|
||||
hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SEC_OID_SHA224:
|
||||
hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SEC_OID_SHA256:
|
||||
hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;
|
||||
@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
|
||||
@@ -1710,20 +1710,26 @@ PK11_ParamToAlgid(SECOidTag algTag, SECI
|
||||
case CKM_BATON_ECB96:
|
||||
case CKM_BATON_CBC128:
|
||||
case CKM_BATON_COUNTER:
|
||||
case CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE:
|
||||
case CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128:
|
||||
case CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128:
|
||||
case CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER:
|
||||
case CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE:
|
||||
- newParams = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, param,
|
||||
- SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
|
||||
- if (newParams == NULL)
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
+ /* if no parameters have been supplied, then encode a NULL params
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (param && param->len > 0) {
|
||||
+ newParams = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, param,
|
||||
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
|
||||
+ if (newParams == NULL)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ newParams = NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
rv = SECSuccess;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
if (newParams)
|
||||
SECITEM_FreeItem(newParams, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
|
||||
@@ -765,45 +765,53 @@ sec_pkcs5CreateAlgorithmID(SECOidTag alg
|
||||
* algorithm is). We use choose this algorithm oid based on the
|
||||
* cipherAlgorithm to determine what this should be (MAC1 or PBES2).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (algorithm == SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2) {
|
||||
/* choose mac or pbes */
|
||||
algorithm = sec_pkcs5v2_get_pbe(cipherAlgorithm);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ SECOidTag hashAlg = HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(cipherAlgorithm);
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* set the PKCS5v2 specific parameters */
|
||||
if (keyLength == 0) {
|
||||
- SECOidTag hashAlg = HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(cipherAlgorithm);
|
||||
if (hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
|
||||
keyLength = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
keyLength = sec_pkcs5v2_default_key_length(cipherAlgorithm);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (keyLength <= 0) {
|
||||
goto loser;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* currently SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 is the default */
|
||||
if (prfAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
|
||||
prfAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- /* build the PKCS5v2 cipher algorithm id */
|
||||
- cipherParams = pk11_GenerateNewParamWithKeyLen(
|
||||
- PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(cipherAlgorithm), keyLength);
|
||||
- if (!cipherParams) {
|
||||
- goto loser;
|
||||
+ /* build the PKCS5v2 cipher algorithm id, if cipher
|
||||
+ * is an HMAC, the cipherParams should be NULL */
|
||||
+ if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
|
||||
+ cipherParams = pk11_GenerateNewParamWithKeyLen(
|
||||
+ PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(cipherAlgorithm), keyLength);
|
||||
+ if (!cipherParams) {
|
||||
+ goto loser;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ cipherParams = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
PORT_Memset(&pbeV2_param, 0, sizeof(pbeV2_param));
|
||||
|
||||
rv = PK11_ParamToAlgid(cipherAlgorithm, cipherParams,
|
||||
poolp, &pbeV2_param.cipherAlgId);
|
||||
- SECITEM_FreeItem(cipherParams, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
+ if (cipherParams) {
|
||||
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(cipherParams, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
goto loser;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* generate the parameter */
|
||||
pbe_param = sec_pkcs5_create_pbe_parameter(pbeAlgorithm, salt, iteration,
|
||||
keyLength, prfAlg);
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/util/secalgid.c b/lib/util/secalgid.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/util/secalgid.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/util/secalgid.c
|
||||
@@ -50,17 +50,18 @@ SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(PLArenaPool *arena
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &id->algorithm, &oiddata->oid))
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((secoid_IsRSAPKCS1(which)) ||
|
||||
- (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(which) != HASH_AlgNULL)) {
|
||||
+ (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(which) != HASH_AlgNULL) /* ||
|
||||
+ (HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(which) != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) */) {
|
||||
add_null_param = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
add_null_param = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* I am specifically *not* enforcing the following assertion
|
||||
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.long_pw_fix ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.long_pw_fix 2024-09-06 17:58:39.905517185 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c 2024-09-06 17:59:19.568985976 -0700
|
||||
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ sec_pkcs12_integrity_key(PK11SlotInfo *s
|
||||
*hmacMech = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hmacAlg);
|
||||
/* pkcs12v2 hmac uses UTF8 rather than unicode */
|
||||
if (!sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(NULL, &utf8Pw, pwitem,
|
||||
- PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
|
||||
+ PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
symKey = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, prfAlgid, &utf8Pw, PR_FALSE, pwarg);
|
||||
1114
SOURCES/nss-3.44-cmac.patch
Normal file
1114
SOURCES/nss-3.44-cmac.patch
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
21
SOURCES/nss-3.44-encrypt-update.patch
Normal file
21
SOURCES/nss-3.44-encrypt-update.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Craig Disselkoen <cdisselk@cs.ucsd.edu>
|
||||
# Date 1574189697 25200
|
||||
# Tue Nov 19 11:54:57 2019 -0700
|
||||
# Branch NSS_3_44_BRANCH
|
||||
# Node ID 60bca7c6dc6dc44579b9b3e0fb62ca3b82d92eec
|
||||
# Parent 64e55c9f658e2a75f0835d00a8a1cdc2f25c74d6
|
||||
Bug 1586176 - EncryptUpdate should use maxout not block size. r=franziskus
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* encrypt the current padded data */
|
||||
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart,
|
||||
- &padoutlen, context->blockSize, context->padBuf,
|
||||
+ &padoutlen, maxout, context->padBuf,
|
||||
context->blockSize);
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
||||
39
SOURCES/nss-3.44-kbkdf-coverity.patch
Normal file
39
SOURCES/nss-3.44-kbkdf-coverity.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c.coverity ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c.coverity 2019-12-03 15:33:43.047732312 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c 2019-12-03 15:39:40.982578357 -0800
|
||||
@@ -534,6 +534,10 @@ CK_RV kbkdf_CreateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE
|
||||
PR_ASSERT(derived_key != NULL);
|
||||
PR_ASSERT(derived_key->phKey != NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (slot == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Create the new key object for this additional derived key. */
|
||||
key = sftk_NewObject(slot);
|
||||
if (key == NULL) {
|
||||
@@ -589,7 +593,9 @@ done:
|
||||
sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Doesn't do anything. */
|
||||
- sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
||||
+ if (session) {
|
||||
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c.coverity ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c.coverity 2019-12-03 15:40:06.108848341 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c 2019-12-03 15:41:04.919480267 -0800
|
||||
@@ -232,7 +232,9 @@ sftk_MAC_Init(sftk_MACCtx *ctx, CK_MECHA
|
||||
keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS);
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
- sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
|
||||
+ if (keyval) {
|
||||
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
62
SOURCES/nss-3.44-kbkdf-update.patch
Normal file
62
SOURCES/nss-3.44-kbkdf-update.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c.kdf_update ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c.kdf_update 2019-11-27 16:48:01.864135431 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/kbkdf.c 2019-11-27 16:48:51.779661708 -0800
|
||||
@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static CK_RV kbkdf_ValidateParameter(CK_
|
||||
/* There is no additional data to validate for byte arrays; we can
|
||||
* only assume the context is of the correct size. */
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ /* don't allow unknown types */
|
||||
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return CKR_OK;
|
||||
@@ -250,14 +253,16 @@ static CK_RV kbkdf_ValidateParameters(CK
|
||||
return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- /* Count that we have a parameter of this type. */
|
||||
- param_type_count[params->pDataParams[offset].type] += 1;
|
||||
-
|
||||
/* Validate this parameter has acceptable values. */
|
||||
ret = kbkdf_ValidateParameter(mech, params->pDataParams + offset);
|
||||
if (ret != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
- return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ /* Count that we have a parameter of this type. */
|
||||
+ /* Do this after we've validated the param to make sure we don't
|
||||
+ * overflow our array */
|
||||
+ PORT_Assert(params->pDataParams[offset].type < sizeof(param_type_count)/sizeof(param_type_count[0]));
|
||||
+ param_type_count[params->pDataParams[offset].type] += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (mech == CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF || mech == CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA) {
|
||||
@@ -306,18 +311,20 @@ static CK_RV kbkdf_ValidateParameters(CK
|
||||
/* [ section: parameter helpers ] */
|
||||
|
||||
static void kbkdf_EncodeInteger(uint64_t integer, CK_ULONG num_bits, CK_BBOOL littleEndian, CK_BYTE_PTR output, CK_ULONG_PTR output_len) {
|
||||
- uint64_t reordered;
|
||||
+ CK_ULONG num_bytes = num_bits/8;
|
||||
+ CK_ULONG i;
|
||||
if (output_len) {
|
||||
- *output_len = (num_bits / 8);
|
||||
+ *output_len = num_bytes;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (littleEndian == CK_TRUE) {
|
||||
- reordered = htole64(integer);
|
||||
- memcpy(output, &reordered, num_bits/8);
|
||||
+ for (i=0; i < num_bytes; i++) {
|
||||
+ output[i] = (integer >> i*8) & 0xff;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
- reordered = htobe64(integer);
|
||||
- reordered = reordered >> (64 - num_bits);
|
||||
- memcpy(output, &reordered, (num_bits/8));
|
||||
+ for (i=num_bytes; i > 0; i--) {
|
||||
+ output[num_bytes-i] = (integer >> (i-1)*8) & 0xff;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
74471
SOURCES/nss-3.44-kbkdf.patch
Normal file
74471
SOURCES/nss-3.44-kbkdf.patch
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
560
SOURCES/nss-3.44-missing-softokn-kdf.patch
Normal file
560
SOURCES/nss-3.44-missing-softokn-kdf.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,560 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/manifest.mn.missing_kdf ./gtests/pk11_gtest/manifest.mn
|
||||
--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/manifest.mn.missing_kdf 2019-08-08 10:22:53.072100034 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/manifest.mn 2019-08-08 10:23:33.424061237 -0700
|
||||
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ CPPSRCS = \
|
||||
pk11_encrypt_derive_unittest.cc \
|
||||
pk11_export_unittest.cc \
|
||||
pk11_import_unittest.cc \
|
||||
+ pk11_kdf_unittest.cc \
|
||||
pk11_pbkdf2_unittest.cc \
|
||||
pk11_prf_unittest.cc \
|
||||
pk11_prng_unittest.cc \
|
||||
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_gtest.gyp.missing_kdf ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_gtest.gyp
|
||||
--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_gtest.gyp.missing_kdf 2019-08-08 10:23:13.298080588 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_gtest.gyp 2019-08-08 10:23:49.728045561 -0700
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
|
||||
'pk11_ecdsa_unittest.cc',
|
||||
'pk11_encrypt_derive_unittest.cc',
|
||||
'pk11_import_unittest.cc',
|
||||
+ 'pk11_kdf_unittest.cc',
|
||||
'pk11_pbkdf2_unittest.cc',
|
||||
'pk11_prf_unittest.cc',
|
||||
'pk11_prng_unittest.cc',
|
||||
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_kdf_unittest.cc.missing_kdf ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_kdf_unittest.cc
|
||||
--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_kdf_unittest.cc.missing_kdf 2019-08-07 14:23:28.657960569 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_kdf_unittest.cc 2019-08-08 10:22:38.015114511 -0700
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,509 @@
|
||||
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
|
||||
+/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
|
||||
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
|
||||
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
|
||||
+ * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include <memory>
|
||||
+#include "nss.h"
|
||||
+#include "pk11pub.h"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include "cpputil.h"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include "gtest/gtest.h"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+namespace nss_test {
|
||||
+
|
||||
+const size_t kGxySize = 256;
|
||||
+const size_t kSeedSize = 8;
|
||||
+const size_t kKeySize = 64;
|
||||
+const size_t kLongKeySize = 1056;
|
||||
+const size_t kAesXcbcLen = 16;
|
||||
+const size_t kSha1Len = 20;
|
||||
+const size_t kSha224Len = 28;
|
||||
+const size_t kSha256Len = 32;
|
||||
+const size_t kSha384Len = 48;
|
||||
+const size_t kSha512Len = 64;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// This is not the right size for anything
|
||||
+const size_t kIncorrectSize = 17;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+const uint8_t kGxyData[] = {
|
||||
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b,
|
||||
+ 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
|
||||
+ 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23,
|
||||
+ 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f,
|
||||
+ 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b,
|
||||
+ 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f, 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47,
|
||||
+ 0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53,
|
||||
+ 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x5c, 0x5d, 0x5e, 0x5f,
|
||||
+ 0x60, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b,
|
||||
+ 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77,
|
||||
+ 0x78, 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x80, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23,
|
||||
+ 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, 0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f,
|
||||
+ 0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97, 0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b,
|
||||
+ 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f, 0xa0, 0xa1, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, 0xa7,
|
||||
+ 0xa8, 0xa9, 0xaa, 0xab, 0xac, 0xad, 0xae, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xb3,
|
||||
+ 0xb4, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xba, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0xbe, 0xbf,
|
||||
+ 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb,
|
||||
+ 0xcc, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7,
|
||||
+ 0xd8, 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe2, 0xe3,
|
||||
+ 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xec, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef,
|
||||
+ 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb,
|
||||
+ 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+const uint8_t kKeyData[] = {
|
||||
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b,
|
||||
+ 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
|
||||
+ 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23,
|
||||
+ 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f,
|
||||
+ 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b,
|
||||
+ 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+const uint8_t kSeed[] = {
|
||||
+ 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb,
|
||||
+ 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7,
|
||||
+ 0xe8, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xec, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+const uint8_t kExpectedOutputIkeSha256[] = {
|
||||
+ 0xd3, 0x9d, 0xb2, 0x77, 0x4b, 0x7f, 0xea, 0x81, 0xfc, 0xe5, 0x22, 0xb7,
|
||||
+ 0xdf, 0xa5, 0x65, 0x15, 0xc9, 0x8f, 0x89, 0x45, 0xda, 0xd9, 0x5d, 0x12,
|
||||
+ 0xbb, 0x52, 0xb6, 0x3b, 0xf4, 0x4d, 0xaf, 0x16};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+const uint8_t kExpectedOutputIke1Sha256[] = {
|
||||
+ 0x25, 0x45, 0x68, 0xd2, 0x98, 0x96, 0xa3, 0xda, 0x89, 0x76, 0x06, 0x01,
|
||||
+ 0xd0, 0xce, 0xf8, 0x05, 0x26, 0x3f, 0xaf, 0x95, 0x92, 0x48, 0x02, 0x0e,
|
||||
+ 0x39, 0x75, 0x94, 0x00, 0x22, 0xd8, 0x5a, 0x50};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+const uint8_t kExpectedOutputIkePlusSha256[] = {
|
||||
+ 0x03, 0x1e, 0xe7, 0x13, 0x6e, 0x58, 0x11, 0xc4, 0x81, 0x56, 0x42, 0x3c,
|
||||
+ 0x3c, 0xaa, 0xdb, 0xad, 0x8a, 0x84, 0xdc, 0xa3, 0x0f, 0xe7, 0x67, 0x55,
|
||||
+ 0x9c, 0x9f, 0xb8, 0x57, 0xa9, 0x5b, 0x41, 0x53, 0x86, 0xe0, 0xb3, 0x21,
|
||||
+ 0x08, 0x1b, 0x38, 0x24, 0xce, 0xef, 0x7c, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xa7, 0xae, 0x14,
|
||||
+ 0x58, 0xbd, 0x79, 0x9c, 0x32, 0x25, 0x7f, 0x3e, 0xbd, 0xe1, 0xfb, 0x3a,
|
||||
+ 0x38, 0x51, 0x05, 0xaa, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0x9b, 0x70, 0xb8, 0xe2,
|
||||
+ 0x21, 0xe7, 0x12, 0xb3, 0xf7, 0x64, 0x21, 0x9d, 0x52, 0x38, 0x41, 0xfb,
|
||||
+ 0x54, 0xaf, 0x59, 0xc3, 0xab, 0xf3, 0x7f, 0x64, 0xee, 0x17, 0xf5, 0xa8,
|
||||
+ 0x2b, 0xdf, 0x2d, 0xd3, 0x29, 0x0e, 0x4f, 0x31, 0x54, 0x25, 0x4e, 0x65,
|
||||
+ 0x52, 0xdf, 0x66, 0xfd, 0x49, 0x85, 0x1f, 0x87, 0x71, 0xa1, 0x5c, 0xfa,
|
||||
+ 0x99, 0xf5, 0x21, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0x55, 0x5b, 0x1c, 0x19, 0xd9, 0x4b, 0x42,
|
||||
+ 0xc5, 0xa0, 0xed, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, 0xd0, 0x0f, 0x48,
|
||||
+ 0x45, 0x00, 0xdc, 0x94, 0xae, 0xd8, 0x70, 0x2e, 0xdd, 0x12, 0xe1, 0x66,
|
||||
+ 0x72, 0xc2, 0x39, 0xd2, 0xc6, 0xfa, 0xdd, 0x8c, 0x11, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x60,
|
||||
+ 0xd1, 0x08, 0x79, 0x62, 0xbb, 0x97, 0x45, 0x38, 0x2d, 0x83, 0x9c, 0x2e,
|
||||
+ 0x8f, 0x88, 0xa3, 0xad, 0x5b, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0x0e, 0xdb, 0xee, 0xaf, 0x1d,
|
||||
+ 0xf6, 0xe7, 0x7e, 0x28, 0xc5, 0xcf, 0x0c, 0xd9, 0xee, 0xde, 0xc8, 0x87,
|
||||
+ 0x00, 0xfe, 0x02, 0xd8, 0x30, 0xa6, 0x68, 0xec, 0x51, 0x22, 0xac, 0x4c,
|
||||
+ 0x38, 0x0f, 0xbb, 0x5c, 0xcb, 0xd5, 0x93, 0xda, 0xea, 0xd0, 0x1b, 0x41,
|
||||
+ 0x85, 0x8d, 0x12, 0x56, 0xbb, 0x90, 0x62, 0xc9, 0x91, 0x62, 0xf8, 0x29,
|
||||
+ 0x9a, 0x4f, 0xd8, 0x5e, 0x7d, 0x1f, 0x69, 0xe8, 0x23, 0x53, 0x26, 0x98,
|
||||
+ 0x98, 0x88, 0xfa, 0x14, 0xdc, 0xa3, 0x0f, 0xc7, 0x58, 0xb2, 0x6d, 0xa5,
|
||||
+ 0x34, 0x53, 0xb5, 0xc3, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xd7, 0xd4, 0x80, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x79,
|
||||
+ 0xd2, 0xac, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0x99, 0xe7, 0x1b, 0x46, 0x16, 0x02, 0x6a,
|
||||
+ 0xa3, 0xc5, 0x20, 0xb5, 0x5a, 0x55, 0xbd, 0xac, 0x70, 0xf1, 0x5b, 0xe4,
|
||||
+ 0x45, 0x12, 0x7e, 0xcf, 0x12, 0xbf, 0x53, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0xbe, 0x53, 0x77,
|
||||
+ 0xc4, 0x2c, 0x17, 0x5f, 0xe5, 0xb9, 0x73, 0x01, 0x5d, 0x9b, 0x34, 0x3c,
|
||||
+ 0x45, 0xf0, 0xa4, 0x91, 0xaf, 0x34, 0xa2, 0xd6, 0x0a, 0x14, 0x98, 0x2c,
|
||||
+ 0x91, 0xd5, 0x8f, 0x12, 0xde, 0x7c, 0x61, 0xd8, 0x42, 0x07, 0x42, 0x1a,
|
||||
+ 0x01, 0x2b, 0xf6, 0x54, 0xd1, 0xde, 0x6d, 0x9c, 0x8b, 0x51, 0x81, 0x3e,
|
||||
+ 0x01, 0xd1, 0xfb, 0x5a, 0xcd, 0xf0, 0xeb, 0xcc, 0x03, 0xe2, 0xc1, 0x31,
|
||||
+ 0x92, 0x11, 0x88, 0x1f, 0xec, 0x81, 0x07, 0x78, 0x89, 0x89, 0x29, 0x19,
|
||||
+ 0x3f, 0x75, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x73, 0xbc, 0x1e, 0x76, 0x23, 0x80, 0x36, 0xaa,
|
||||
+ 0x2a, 0xd0, 0x77, 0x57, 0x6a, 0xea, 0xe2, 0xdb, 0xed, 0x17, 0x79, 0x3d,
|
||||
+ 0x8b, 0x8a, 0xbe, 0x32, 0x90, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0x00, 0xc2, 0x27, 0xb5, 0x64,
|
||||
+ 0x7c, 0xc3, 0xca, 0xb8, 0xaf, 0xcb, 0x17, 0x29, 0xec, 0x00, 0x5b, 0x83,
|
||||
+ 0x9f, 0xfe, 0x8b, 0xb6, 0x6f, 0x01, 0x23, 0x6b, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x34, 0x3f,
|
||||
+ 0x5c, 0x66, 0x7c, 0xec, 0x15, 0x5a, 0xa9, 0x3c, 0xe2, 0xef, 0xcb, 0xe5,
|
||||
+ 0x79, 0xfa, 0xf2, 0x7c, 0x4e, 0x0f, 0x70, 0x41, 0xa4, 0x09, 0x07, 0x30,
|
||||
+ 0xbd, 0x28, 0x3f, 0x30, 0xd3, 0xc2, 0xbd, 0x06, 0x5e, 0x21, 0xbd, 0x20,
|
||||
+ 0xae, 0xa4, 0xa9, 0x7d, 0x91, 0xe8, 0x9d, 0x0a, 0x81, 0x02, 0xf7, 0xd6,
|
||||
+ 0x7c, 0x1f, 0xb6, 0xa5, 0x40, 0xb6, 0x25, 0xac, 0xce, 0x77, 0x20, 0xfa,
|
||||
+ 0x71, 0x79, 0x21, 0x94, 0xcd, 0x63, 0xcf, 0x62, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xc6, 0xe8,
|
||||
+ 0x3c, 0xdb, 0x86, 0x1e, 0x8d, 0x2d, 0x12, 0xf6, 0xea, 0xb0, 0xed, 0xf8,
|
||||
+ 0xfa, 0xc6, 0x37, 0xee, 0xca, 0x11, 0x1a, 0xac, 0x95, 0xf6, 0xe3, 0x02,
|
||||
+ 0x97, 0xba, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x02, 0x82, 0xbe, 0x32, 0xa3, 0xe8, 0xf4, 0xae,
|
||||
+ 0x4e, 0xaf, 0x47, 0xb9, 0xe7, 0x91, 0x18, 0x90, 0xd8, 0xcb, 0x59, 0xed,
|
||||
+ 0xc2, 0x47, 0x6d, 0xe1, 0x9d, 0x74, 0xe6, 0xc7, 0xc0, 0xdc, 0x82, 0x5b,
|
||||
+ 0x6a, 0x7d, 0x1c, 0x58, 0xc8, 0x3d, 0x7d, 0xed, 0xdd, 0x60, 0x91, 0x9e,
|
||||
+ 0x68, 0x6e, 0x56, 0x33, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x35, 0xf8, 0x96, 0x67, 0x22, 0x3a,
|
||||
+ 0xb9, 0x02, 0xe9, 0x7c, 0xb1, 0xca, 0x25, 0xc2, 0xc8, 0xc7, 0xd8, 0x71,
|
||||
+ 0xfa, 0xfa, 0x76, 0xeb, 0x1d, 0x52, 0x75, 0xc6, 0x56, 0xf3, 0x1a, 0xd3,
|
||||
+ 0xda, 0xe4, 0x49, 0x7b, 0xd0, 0x77, 0x72, 0x06, 0xe7, 0xb9, 0xd9, 0x06,
|
||||
+ 0x87, 0x43, 0x6a, 0x52, 0xee, 0x3a, 0x71, 0x6e, 0x51, 0x8d, 0x55, 0x7a,
|
||||
+ 0xb1, 0x62, 0x75, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x89, 0x77, 0x93, 0x40, 0xef, 0x66, 0x44,
|
||||
+ 0x08, 0x49, 0xbb, 0xdb, 0x85, 0x0b, 0xd3, 0xfa, 0x37, 0x27, 0x41, 0xd1,
|
||||
+ 0x57, 0xc3, 0x95, 0xaa, 0x85, 0x5a, 0x43, 0x74, 0x39, 0x72, 0x08, 0xdf,
|
||||
+ 0x58, 0xe1, 0xf7, 0x95, 0x6c, 0xc1, 0xb1, 0x9b, 0x21, 0x53, 0xc1, 0xf9,
|
||||
+ 0xcc, 0x74, 0xf9, 0x62, 0xa4, 0xa0, 0x34, 0x22, 0xaa, 0x84, 0x78, 0x49,
|
||||
+ 0x50, 0xa9, 0x8e, 0x7b, 0xfa, 0xaa, 0xc2, 0xe8, 0xae, 0x34, 0x3d, 0xa7,
|
||||
+ 0xe1, 0x5a, 0x14, 0xa6, 0xd7, 0x6c, 0x67, 0xc7, 0x5e, 0xda, 0x79, 0x36,
|
||||
+ 0x57, 0x85, 0x5e, 0x09, 0xa2, 0x1f, 0x96, 0x5a, 0x71, 0xc2, 0xfe, 0x57,
|
||||
+ 0x5c, 0x4c, 0xe8, 0xbf, 0x9b, 0x5c, 0xd7, 0x06, 0x09, 0xb5, 0x63, 0x93,
|
||||
+ 0x7e, 0xee, 0x65, 0xef, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x60, 0x3e, 0x50, 0x84, 0x39, 0xb9,
|
||||
+ 0xae, 0xab, 0xad, 0xee, 0x31, 0x04, 0x7f, 0xed, 0x78, 0x35, 0xc0, 0x14,
|
||||
+ 0xa6, 0xc3, 0xeb, 0x3c, 0xd7, 0xc3, 0xb3, 0x6b, 0x58, 0x63, 0x7e, 0xa8,
|
||||
+ 0xc9, 0xb9, 0x23, 0xd3, 0xe5, 0xe7, 0xcc, 0x84, 0x63, 0xc8, 0xbd, 0x31,
|
||||
+ 0x9f, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x74, 0x98, 0xba, 0x8a, 0x0c, 0x80, 0xab, 0x10, 0xc4,
|
||||
+ 0xb2, 0x61, 0xad, 0x3d, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xdc, 0x76, 0xe5, 0x0e, 0x2e, 0x4b,
|
||||
+ 0x81, 0x3b, 0x1f, 0xd3, 0x54, 0xc0, 0x2a, 0xde, 0x0e, 0x1d, 0x59, 0x31,
|
||||
+ 0x5c, 0x28, 0xf8, 0x75, 0xfc, 0x71, 0x2e, 0xc1, 0x85, 0x90, 0x23, 0xfd,
|
||||
+ 0x2e, 0x8b, 0xb9, 0x52, 0x1a, 0xdf, 0x61, 0x54, 0x9b, 0x43, 0xa6, 0x8d,
|
||||
+ 0x5f, 0xd0, 0x52, 0x0b, 0x66, 0xbc, 0xf5, 0x1a, 0xce, 0x58, 0xef, 0xb3,
|
||||
+ 0x1d, 0x8d, 0x4b, 0x1b, 0xf3, 0x8e, 0xe6, 0x68, 0xc3, 0xd5, 0x95, 0x42,
|
||||
+ 0xf5, 0xb0, 0x73, 0x2c, 0x31, 0x71, 0x20, 0xf5, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x56, 0x72,
|
||||
+ 0x53, 0xf9, 0xfe, 0xfa, 0x19, 0xdc, 0x46, 0xd1, 0x2b, 0xe3, 0xdb, 0x50,
|
||||
+ 0xec, 0x14, 0xee, 0x70, 0xcc, 0xe6, 0x11, 0x75, 0xb4, 0x63, 0xfc, 0xd1,
|
||||
+ 0x8f, 0x54, 0xfa, 0xcc, 0x99, 0xcc, 0xb8, 0x61, 0xa7, 0x33, 0x18, 0xa2,
|
||||
+ 0x17, 0xee, 0xb1, 0x82, 0x3d, 0x6a, 0x8d, 0x63, 0xe0, 0x15, 0x1b, 0x5c,
|
||||
+ 0x20, 0x53, 0x33, 0xa7, 0x85, 0x17, 0x81, 0xba, 0x18, 0x2a, 0x73, 0x00,
|
||||
+ 0x1e, 0x3e, 0x2c, 0xb5, 0x5f, 0x4e, 0x82, 0xa8, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x22, 0xdc,
|
||||
+ 0xc4, 0x76, 0x7c, 0x66, 0xf4, 0x78, 0xa1, 0x0a, 0xf7, 0x39, 0x06, 0x0a,
|
||||
+ 0xd7, 0x43, 0x72, 0x12, 0x3b, 0x8e, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x4f, 0x5a, 0x03, 0xe5,
|
||||
+ 0x22, 0x97, 0xdc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0xa2, 0xc0, 0x03, 0x8e, 0x60, 0xd1, 0x61,
|
||||
+ 0xc7, 0xef, 0x0f, 0x54, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x38, 0xda, 0xb6, 0xe2, 0x5b, 0x0e,
|
||||
+ 0x45, 0xae, 0x39, 0x86, 0x85, 0x25, 0x30, 0xb1, 0x9d, 0xda, 0xdb, 0x70,
|
||||
+ 0xa7, 0xe5, 0x77, 0xb8, 0x47, 0xaa, 0xe7, 0x3e, 0xe8, 0x5a, 0x96, 0xc6,
|
||||
+ 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x07, 0x8d, 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x80, 0x0c, 0xd9, 0x80, 0x2d, 0x4d};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+const uint8_t kExpectedOutputIkeAppBSha256[] = {
|
||||
+ 0xe7, 0x11, 0x54, 0x6e, 0x3f, 0xaa, 0xd4, 0xc7, 0xc4, 0xaa, 0x75, 0x6b,
|
||||
+ 0xc2, 0x6c, 0xad, 0x6a, 0xbe, 0xa8, 0x24, 0x19, 0x84, 0xa0, 0xf6, 0xb0,
|
||||
+ 0x83, 0x9c, 0x70, 0xca, 0x61, 0xc4, 0xef, 0x88, 0xd7, 0xd5, 0xb7, 0x2e,
|
||||
+ 0x45, 0x32, 0xe1, 0x1d, 0x12, 0x38, 0xfb, 0xcb, 0x08, 0x54, 0xc7, 0xdb,
|
||||
+ 0xc4, 0x80, 0x2d, 0xd4, 0xf3, 0xbf, 0x51, 0x80, 0xf3, 0xa6, 0xdf, 0x77,
|
||||
+ 0x51, 0x61, 0xd8, 0xdb, 0x98, 0x2c, 0xc2, 0xe6, 0x72, 0x36, 0x90, 0xf9,
|
||||
+ 0xd2, 0x2a, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x3f, 0xa0, 0xa3, 0xff, 0xe4, 0x8b,
|
||||
+ 0x5a, 0x4a, 0x1b, 0xec, 0xb0, 0x48, 0xb0, 0xed, 0x16, 0x8a, 0x89, 0x31,
|
||||
+ 0x96, 0x5e, 0xa9, 0x11, 0x1f, 0x28, 0x68, 0x07, 0xf1, 0xa3, 0x2b, 0x01,
|
||||
+ 0x4f, 0x0b, 0x73, 0x78, 0x3b, 0xca, 0x4f, 0x8f, 0x34, 0xc0, 0x21, 0x14,
|
||||
+ 0xe3, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xf7, 0x05, 0x63, 0xcb, 0x74, 0x7a, 0x90, 0x59, 0x19,
|
||||
+ 0xc9, 0xa9, 0x47, 0xcf, 0xe7, 0xbe, 0x04, 0xa7, 0x0c, 0x32, 0xdd, 0x34,
|
||||
+ 0x07, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0xb5, 0x75, 0xfb, 0xb9, 0x06, 0xd2, 0x55, 0x08, 0xce,
|
||||
+ 0x0a, 0x47, 0xc2, 0x64, 0x5f, 0xd5, 0xab, 0x55, 0x2a, 0x1a, 0x7e, 0xbd,
|
||||
+ 0xd5, 0x6d, 0x43, 0x89, 0x3c, 0x53, 0xde, 0x01, 0xfe, 0x19, 0x19, 0xc3,
|
||||
+ 0xaf, 0xa0, 0x64, 0x2d, 0x7e, 0xe1, 0x7e, 0x31, 0x61, 0xf9, 0xe6, 0x4f,
|
||||
+ 0x56, 0xc3, 0xc9, 0x7e, 0x92, 0xd7, 0x88, 0x58, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x3c, 0x3e,
|
||||
+ 0xae, 0x3f, 0x86, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xaa, 0x8b, 0xaf, 0x22, 0x49, 0xa5, 0x3d,
|
||||
+ 0xc2, 0xb1, 0x94, 0x0f, 0x5b, 0x08, 0x49, 0xac, 0x23, 0xa4, 0x79, 0x33,
|
||||
+ 0xde, 0xfb, 0x8b, 0xd3, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x83, 0xce, 0x01, 0xc7, 0xb4, 0x23,
|
||||
+ 0x5c, 0x6d, 0x81, 0xda, 0x70, 0x71, 0x43, 0x9c, 0x94, 0x6a, 0x9e, 0x03,
|
||||
+ 0x6d, 0xc3, 0x71, 0x69, 0x53, 0x83, 0x89, 0x08, 0x1b, 0x2b, 0x4b, 0xa8,
|
||||
+ 0x4a, 0x2a, 0xdf, 0x26, 0xaf, 0xc3, 0x8e, 0x59, 0x15, 0xa7, 0x24, 0x8f,
|
||||
+ 0x3c, 0xad, 0x08, 0xf2, 0x12, 0xe1, 0x42, 0x41, 0x0c, 0xcb, 0x3e, 0xf4,
|
||||
+ 0x71, 0xab, 0xb1, 0x16, 0x2c, 0xb7, 0xe1, 0x3f, 0x94, 0x03, 0x01, 0x78,
|
||||
+ 0xd7, 0x84, 0x1d, 0x63, 0x03, 0xfe, 0x4b, 0x3f, 0x40, 0xce, 0x30, 0x75,
|
||||
+ 0x10, 0xd1, 0xa4, 0xd3, 0x3c, 0x68, 0x9b, 0xc0, 0x6b, 0xdc, 0xe1, 0xda,
|
||||
+ 0x06, 0x41, 0x71, 0x20, 0x88, 0x82, 0x60, 0x2e, 0x48, 0x93, 0x78, 0x30,
|
||||
+ 0xb4, 0xb9, 0xe3, 0x88, 0x79, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0xae, 0x2e, 0x7b,
|
||||
+ 0x00, 0x82, 0x49, 0xbf, 0xe8, 0x07, 0xb4, 0x51, 0xd9, 0xa0, 0xf7, 0x8f,
|
||||
+ 0xe6, 0x24, 0x17, 0xd0, 0xa5, 0x58, 0xcc, 0x37, 0xf2, 0x86, 0x6e, 0xc2,
|
||||
+ 0xf0, 0xf0, 0x87, 0x64, 0xfa, 0x6e, 0x94, 0x99, 0x1a, 0xbc, 0xd9, 0xea,
|
||||
+ 0x48, 0x07, 0x38, 0x2e, 0x79, 0x61, 0x82, 0x69, 0x09, 0x6f, 0xbc, 0x8e,
|
||||
+ 0x44, 0x38, 0x0e, 0xc9, 0x6f, 0xcd, 0xb7, 0x39, 0x92, 0x02, 0x27, 0x23,
|
||||
+ 0x35, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0xf7, 0x52, 0x7b, 0x33, 0x93, 0xbd, 0x6c, 0x7c, 0xef,
|
||||
+ 0x39, 0x4b, 0x1a, 0x9f, 0xdf, 0x8f, 0x5c, 0x5b, 0x7b, 0xdb, 0x6b, 0xfd,
|
||||
+ 0x72, 0xe0, 0xb0, 0xc5, 0x97, 0x5b, 0x08, 0x6b, 0x17, 0x2f, 0x38, 0xd7,
|
||||
+ 0xbe, 0xf8, 0xd7, 0x20, 0xf5, 0x33, 0x68, 0x69, 0x16, 0xe5, 0x08, 0x05,
|
||||
+ 0x6c, 0x1b, 0xfa, 0xa8, 0x63, 0x55, 0xb4, 0x03, 0xb9, 0x89, 0xd7, 0x61,
|
||||
+ 0xf3, 0x9a, 0xf6, 0x45, 0xb4, 0xb2, 0x16, 0x5d, 0xf3, 0x09, 0x7b, 0x09,
|
||||
+ 0x09, 0x75, 0x0a, 0xbd, 0xdf, 0x7d, 0xe6, 0x1e, 0x07, 0xec, 0x7c, 0x14,
|
||||
+ 0xac, 0x4b, 0x68, 0xa8, 0x44, 0x5f, 0x77, 0x36, 0xb8, 0x1d, 0x7c, 0x73,
|
||||
+ 0x82, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x52, 0x55, 0x2c, 0x5d, 0xba, 0x53, 0x79, 0x45, 0xad,
|
||||
+ 0x51, 0x98, 0xbb, 0x8a, 0xea, 0x4f, 0x19, 0x22, 0x22, 0x69, 0xd3, 0x3a,
|
||||
+ 0x72, 0xd8, 0xe3, 0x37, 0xf4, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0xf1, 0x52, 0x48, 0x4d, 0xbf,
|
||||
+ 0xa5, 0x7a, 0xef, 0x44, 0x53, 0x7b, 0x6e, 0x6c, 0xb7, 0x1a, 0xa8, 0x75,
|
||||
+ 0xaf, 0xdb, 0x15, 0x05, 0x53, 0xc8, 0xb9, 0x9c, 0xea, 0x1a, 0xf7, 0x9d,
|
||||
+ 0x9b, 0xb6, 0xa6, 0x5e, 0x0f, 0xf7, 0x49, 0x7e, 0xc9, 0x12, 0x38, 0x3d,
|
||||
+ 0x78, 0xaf, 0x80, 0x3d, 0x76, 0x6d, 0x96, 0x4f, 0x06, 0xff, 0xdf, 0xc5,
|
||||
+ 0x9c, 0x47, 0xbe, 0x3e, 0x3d, 0xc2, 0x2a, 0x41, 0x15, 0x7e, 0xbd, 0xab,
|
||||
+ 0x12, 0x02, 0xfe, 0xa5, 0x4f, 0xb4, 0x1a, 0xf5, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xff, 0x50,
|
||||
+ 0x5a, 0x56, 0x7b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0xff, 0x29, 0xb5, 0x77, 0xf4, 0x38, 0xb3,
|
||||
+ 0x40, 0xd9, 0x17, 0x89, 0x43, 0x3f, 0x86, 0x29, 0x50, 0xce, 0x72, 0xde,
|
||||
+ 0x55, 0x63, 0x06, 0x14, 0x50, 0xae, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x10, 0x55, 0x21, 0xeb,
|
||||
+ 0x68, 0xe7, 0xfc, 0xc7, 0xf5, 0x92, 0xc5, 0xf2, 0xe2, 0xc9, 0xdb, 0x42,
|
||||
+ 0x59, 0x44, 0x0e, 0xda, 0x23, 0x50, 0x62, 0xef, 0x6e, 0xae, 0x1c, 0x0e,
|
||||
+ 0x93, 0x74, 0xa6, 0xdb, 0x4c, 0xc7, 0x4b, 0xa6, 0xe2, 0x3a, 0xe3, 0x03,
|
||||
+ 0x22, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0x21, 0x13, 0x98, 0x6a, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x8a,
|
||||
+ 0xfb, 0x28, 0x15, 0x47, 0x7e, 0xaa, 0x12, 0x60, 0x08, 0x23, 0xc6, 0x59,
|
||||
+ 0xeb, 0xc1, 0x71, 0x18, 0x03, 0x16, 0x7f, 0x75, 0x5f, 0x65, 0x8a, 0x7f,
|
||||
+ 0x1d, 0xae, 0x98, 0x94, 0xa4, 0xb1, 0xf5, 0xcc, 0x0a, 0x6f, 0x62, 0x79,
|
||||
+ 0x27, 0x38, 0x32, 0x73, 0x90, 0xc8, 0x3f, 0x70, 0xf7, 0x44, 0xcf, 0xfd,
|
||||
+ 0xc8, 0xfa, 0xcb, 0x3e, 0x73, 0x5f, 0x1d, 0xde, 0xb5, 0x73, 0x4d, 0x00,
|
||||
+ 0x2a, 0xce, 0x77, 0x92, 0x17, 0x0f, 0xcf, 0xbf, 0x87, 0x78, 0xdc, 0xbc,
|
||||
+ 0x83, 0xb3, 0x86, 0xd5, 0x32, 0xf5, 0x17, 0x73, 0xba, 0x90, 0xae, 0xc4,
|
||||
+ 0x40, 0x25, 0x26, 0xde, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0xbb, 0x83, 0x0e, 0x27, 0xd5, 0x0a,
|
||||
+ 0x4d, 0x89, 0xf0, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xb5, 0x7d, 0xe3, 0x04, 0x6b, 0x5a, 0x59,
|
||||
+ 0xf4, 0x0a, 0x23, 0xc9, 0xe9, 0xe5, 0x1c, 0x20, 0x43, 0xac, 0xe2, 0x61,
|
||||
+ 0x10, 0x8d, 0x20, 0x83, 0xe7, 0x60, 0x28, 0x32, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x67, 0xf1,
|
||||
+ 0xaf, 0xd4, 0xcb, 0x2a, 0xec, 0xc5, 0xe2, 0xe7, 0xa2, 0x57, 0x18, 0x3d,
|
||||
+ 0x5e, 0xdd, 0x14, 0x88, 0x39, 0x59, 0x10, 0x9c, 0xa9, 0xf9, 0xd9, 0xb9,
|
||||
+ 0xdd, 0x09, 0xb0, 0x2f, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x0f, 0xbf, 0x34, 0x8a, 0xf1, 0x62,
|
||||
+ 0x40, 0x15, 0x4e, 0xe9, 0x69, 0x2f, 0x94, 0x87, 0x07, 0xf0, 0x01, 0xa2,
|
||||
+ 0x8f, 0x11, 0xb9, 0x31, 0x4c, 0x2b, 0x7d, 0x7f, 0x6c, 0x04, 0xd6, 0x91,
|
||||
+ 0x4d, 0x71, 0x6b, 0x8c, 0xa7, 0x47, 0xb1, 0x34, 0x34, 0x08, 0xda, 0x5b,
|
||||
+ 0xcb, 0x82, 0xbb, 0x5b, 0x14, 0x27, 0x2a, 0x20, 0x25, 0xda, 0xbe, 0x1d,
|
||||
+ 0x21, 0xa8, 0x68, 0x77, 0xf4, 0x17, 0xaf, 0x7f, 0x22, 0xda, 0xd4, 0xc6,
|
||||
+ 0x38, 0x0c, 0xbe, 0xf1, 0xa5, 0x0b, 0x17, 0x83, 0x22, 0xb3, 0x5b, 0x12,
|
||||
+ 0x1f, 0x0a, 0x18, 0x14, 0x46, 0xbf, 0x9b, 0xc0, 0x53, 0x7a, 0x83, 0x40,
|
||||
+ 0xde, 0x1a, 0x9d, 0xf0, 0x3b, 0x66, 0x74, 0x01, 0xa1, 0xfc, 0x29, 0xde,
|
||||
+ 0x08, 0x66, 0x85, 0x56, 0x2c, 0xc8, 0x30, 0xb7, 0x42, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x32,
|
||||
+ 0x28, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xfe, 0xea, 0xb0, 0x4e, 0x81, 0x59, 0x74, 0x90, 0x93,
|
||||
+ 0xb1, 0x1c, 0x5c, 0x4f, 0x54, 0x5e, 0xcc, 0xd7, 0x1d, 0x75, 0xd2, 0x3d,
|
||||
+ 0x77, 0xff, 0x72, 0xa8, 0x74, 0x31, 0xec, 0x74, 0xe8, 0xcc, 0x69, 0xce,
|
||||
+ 0xde, 0xe5, 0x05, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x99, 0x90, 0x22, 0xe5, 0x10, 0xd4, 0xaf,
|
||||
+ 0x52, 0xe3, 0x47, 0xf4, 0x38, 0xeb, 0xa3, 0xd2, 0x72, 0x64, 0xb2, 0xd3,
|
||||
+ 0x0c, 0x0c, 0xaa, 0xae, 0x29, 0xb5, 0x38, 0xd4, 0x52, 0xfa, 0x96, 0x17,
|
||||
+ 0x7a, 0x18, 0xe8, 0x89, 0xd2, 0xd5, 0xd9, 0xae, 0x5a, 0x0e, 0x25, 0x8d};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+class IkeKdfTest : public ::testing::Test {
|
||||
+ public:
|
||||
+ IkeKdfTest()
|
||||
+ : params_({siBuffer, nullptr, 0}),
|
||||
+ gxy_item_({siBuffer, toUcharPtr(kGxyData), kGxySize}),
|
||||
+ skey_item_({siBuffer, toUcharPtr(kKeyData), kKeySize}),
|
||||
+ key_mech_(0),
|
||||
+ slot_(nullptr),
|
||||
+ gxy_(nullptr),
|
||||
+ skey_(nullptr),
|
||||
+ okey_(nullptr) {}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ~IkeKdfTest() {
|
||||
+ if (slot_) {
|
||||
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot_);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (gxy_) {
|
||||
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(gxy_);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ ClearTempVars();
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ void ClearTempVars() {
|
||||
+ if (skey_) {
|
||||
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(skey_);
|
||||
+ skey_ = nullptr;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (okey_) {
|
||||
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(okey_);
|
||||
+ okey_ = nullptr;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ void Init() {
|
||||
+ params_.type = siBuffer;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ gxy_item_.type = siBuffer;
|
||||
+ gxy_item_.data =
|
||||
+ const_cast<unsigned char*>(static_cast<const unsigned char*>(kGxyData));
|
||||
+ gxy_item_.len = sizeof(kGxyData);
|
||||
+ skey_item_.type = siBuffer;
|
||||
+ skey_item_.data =
|
||||
+ const_cast<unsigned char*>(static_cast<const unsigned char*>(kKeyData));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ slot_ = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
|
||||
+ ASSERT_NE(nullptr, slot_);
|
||||
+ gxy_ = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot_, CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
|
||||
+ CKA_DERIVE, &gxy_item_, NULL);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_NE(nullptr, gxy_);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ void ComputeAndVerifyKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive_mech,
|
||||
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash_mech, const uint8_t* expected) {
|
||||
+ // Infer prf length from mechanism
|
||||
+ int prf_len = 0;
|
||||
+ std::string mac = "unknown";
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ switch (hash_mech) {
|
||||
+ case CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC:
|
||||
+ prf_len = kAesXcbcLen;
|
||||
+ mac = "CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
|
||||
+ prf_len = kSha1Len;
|
||||
+ mac = "CKM_SHA_1_HMAC";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
|
||||
+ prf_len = kSha224Len;
|
||||
+ mac = "CKM_SHA224_HMAC";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
|
||||
+ prf_len = kSha256Len;
|
||||
+ mac = "CKM_SHA256_HMAC";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
|
||||
+ prf_len = kSha384Len;
|
||||
+ mac = "CKM_SHA384_HMAC";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
|
||||
+ prf_len = kSha512Len;
|
||||
+ mac = "CKM_SHA512_HMAC";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ ASSERT_TRUE(false) << "Invalid PRF Mechanism";
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Inner(derive_mech, hash_mech, mac, prf_len, expected);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Set output == nullptr to test when errors occur
|
||||
+ void Inner(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive_mech, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash_mech,
|
||||
+ std::string mac, size_t prf_len, const uint8_t* expected) {
|
||||
+ PRBool use_skey = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ size_t output_len = 0;
|
||||
+ PK11SymKey *derive_key = nullptr;
|
||||
+ std::stringstream s;
|
||||
+ s << "Derive:";
|
||||
+ std::string msg;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ClearTempVars();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Import the params
|
||||
+ CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike_prf;
|
||||
+ CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ike1_prf;
|
||||
+ CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS ikep_prf;
|
||||
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ike1_app_b;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ switch (derive_mech) {
|
||||
+ case CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE:
|
||||
+ ike_prf.prfMechanism = hash_mech;
|
||||
+ ike_prf.bDataAsKey = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+ ike_prf.bRekey = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ ike_prf.pNi = toUcharPtr(kSeed);
|
||||
+ ike_prf.ulNiLen = kSeedSize;
|
||||
+ ike_prf.pNr = toUcharPtr(kSeed);
|
||||
+ ike_prf.ulNrLen = kSeedSize;
|
||||
+ ike_prf.hNewKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
||||
+ output_len = 0;
|
||||
+ use_skey = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ params_.data = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(&ike_prf);
|
||||
+ params_.len = sizeof(ike_prf);
|
||||
+ s << "CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE:
|
||||
+ ikep_prf.prfMechanism = hash_mech;
|
||||
+ ikep_prf.bHasSeedKey = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ ikep_prf.pSeedData= toUcharPtr(kSeed);
|
||||
+ ikep_prf.ulSeedDataLen = kSeedSize*4;
|
||||
+ output_len = kLongKeySize;
|
||||
+ use_skey = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+ params_.data = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(&ikep_prf);
|
||||
+ params_.len = sizeof(ikep_prf);
|
||||
+ s << "CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE:
|
||||
+ ike1_prf.prfMechanism = hash_mech;
|
||||
+ ike1_prf.bHasPrevKey = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ ike1_prf.hKeygxy = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(gxy_);
|
||||
+ ike1_prf.hPrevKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
||||
+ ike1_prf.pCKYi = toUcharPtr(kSeed);
|
||||
+ ike1_prf.ulCKYiLen = kSeedSize;
|
||||
+ ike1_prf.pCKYr = toUcharPtr(kSeed);
|
||||
+ ike1_prf.ulCKYrLen = kSeedSize;
|
||||
+ ike1_prf.keyNumber = 0;
|
||||
+ output_len = prf_len;
|
||||
+ use_skey = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+ params_.data = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(&ike1_prf);
|
||||
+ params_.len = sizeof(ike1_prf);
|
||||
+ s << "CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE:
|
||||
+ ike1_app_b = hash_mech;
|
||||
+ output_len = kLongKeySize;
|
||||
+ use_skey = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+ params_.data = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(&ike1_app_b);
|
||||
+ params_.len = sizeof(ike1_app_b);
|
||||
+ s << "CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_DERIVE";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ ASSERT_TRUE(false) << "Invalid IKE DERIVE mechanism";
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ s << " Mac/Prf:" << mac;
|
||||
+ msg = s.str();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Import the PMS
|
||||
+ derive_key = gxy_;
|
||||
+ if (use_skey) {
|
||||
+ skey_item_.len = prf_len;
|
||||
+ skey_ = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot_, derive_mech, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
|
||||
+ CKA_DERIVE, &skey_item_, NULL);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_NE(nullptr, skey_) << msg;
|
||||
+ derive_key = skey_;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Compute the result key
|
||||
+ okey_ = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(derive_key, derive_mech, ¶ms_, key_mech_,
|
||||
+ CKA_DERIVE, output_len, CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Verify the result has the expected value (null or otherwise)
|
||||
+ int error = PORT_GetError();
|
||||
+ s << " Error=" << error;
|
||||
+ msg = s.str();
|
||||
+ if (!expected) {
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, okey_) << msg;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ ASSERT_NE(nullptr, okey_) << msg;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ SECStatus rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(okey_);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv) << "PK11_ExtractKeyValue";
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ SECItem* oData = PK11_GetKeyData(okey_);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_NE(nullptr, oData) << "PK11_GetKeyData";
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (output_len == 0) {
|
||||
+ output_len = prf_len;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ s << "\n" << "output_len=" << output_len << " oData->len=" << oData->len << ".\n";
|
||||
+ for (unsigned int i=0; i < oData->len; i++) {
|
||||
+ if (i % 12 == 0) s << "\n ";
|
||||
+ s << " 0x" << std::setfill('0')
|
||||
+ << std::setw(2) << std::hex << (int) oData->data[i] << ",";
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ s << "};\n";
|
||||
+ msg = s.str();
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(output_len, oData->len) << msg ;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(oData->data, expected, output_len)) << msg;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ protected:
|
||||
+ SECItem params_;
|
||||
+ SECItem gxy_item_;
|
||||
+ SECItem skey_item_;
|
||||
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_mech_;
|
||||
+ PK11SlotInfo* slot_;
|
||||
+ PK11SymKey* gxy_;
|
||||
+ PK11SymKey* skey_;
|
||||
+ PK11SymKey* okey_;
|
||||
+};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// The full range is tested with the FIPS vectors in the cavs tests.
|
||||
+// just make sure the NSS Derive iterfaces are working for everything.
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+TEST_F(IkeKdfTest, IkePrfSha256) {
|
||||
+ Init();
|
||||
+ ComputeAndVerifyKey(CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, CKM_SHA256_HMAC,
|
||||
+ kExpectedOutputIkeSha256);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_F(IkeKdfTest, Ike1PrfSha256) {
|
||||
+ Init();
|
||||
+ ComputeAndVerifyKey(CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, CKM_SHA256_HMAC,
|
||||
+ kExpectedOutputIke1Sha256);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_F(IkeKdfTest, IkePlusPrfSha256) {
|
||||
+ Init();
|
||||
+ ComputeAndVerifyKey(CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, CKM_SHA256_HMAC,
|
||||
+ kExpectedOutputIkePlusSha256);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_F(IkeKdfTest, Ike1AppBPrfSha256) {
|
||||
+ Init();
|
||||
+ ComputeAndVerifyKey(CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE, CKM_SHA256_HMAC,
|
||||
+ kExpectedOutputIkeAppBSha256);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+} // namespace nss_test
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.missing_kdf ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.missing_kdf 2019-08-07 14:18:55.039435109 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c 2019-08-08 10:28:12.449792962 -0700
|
||||
@@ -516,7 +516,8 @@ static const struct mechanismList mechan
|
||||
/* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE },
|
||||
{ CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE },
|
||||
- { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE }
|
||||
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE },
|
||||
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64, CKF_DERIVE }, PR_TRUE }
|
||||
};
|
||||
static const CK_ULONG mechanismCount = sizeof(mechanisms) / sizeof(mechanisms[0]);
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.missing_kdf ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.missing_kdf 2019-08-08 10:24:27.872008887 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c 2019-08-08 10:27:34.416829530 -0700
|
||||
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ sftk_ike1_appendix_b_prf(CK_SESSION_HAND
|
||||
* key is inKey
|
||||
*/
|
||||
thisKey = outKeyData;
|
||||
- for (genKeySize = 0; genKeySize <= keySize; genKeySize += macSize) {
|
||||
+ for (genKeySize = 0; genKeySize < keySize; genKeySize += macSize) {
|
||||
crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue, inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
248
SOURCES/nss-3.44-ske-policy.patch
Normal file
248
SOURCES/nss-3.44-ske-policy.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
|
||||
# Date 1573203603 -3600
|
||||
# Fri Nov 08 10:00:03 2019 +0100
|
||||
# Node ID c08947c6af5789510641ad17373e2612361e4ec6
|
||||
# Parent e766899c72a517976f5f4abfec2a56712841e411
|
||||
Bug 1566131, check policy against hash algorithms used for ServerKeyExchange, r=mt
|
||||
|
||||
Summary: This adds necessary policy checks in `ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash()`, right before calculating hashes. Note that it currently doesn't check MD5 as it still needs to be allowed in TLS 1.1 or earlier and many tests fail if we change that.
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewers: mt
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed By: mt
|
||||
|
||||
Bug #: 1566131
|
||||
|
||||
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D45867
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_dhe_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_dhe_unittest.cc
|
||||
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_dhe_unittest.cc
|
||||
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_dhe_unittest.cc
|
||||
@@ -682,4 +682,100 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls12, ConnectInconsist
|
||||
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertIllegalParameter);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static void CheckSkeSigScheme(
|
||||
+ std::shared_ptr<TlsHandshakeRecorder>& capture_ske,
|
||||
+ uint16_t expected_scheme) {
|
||||
+ TlsParser parser(capture_ske->buffer());
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE(parser.SkipVariable(2)) << " read dh_p";
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE(parser.SkipVariable(2)) << " read dh_q";
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE(parser.SkipVariable(2)) << " read dh_Ys";
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ uint32_t tmp;
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE(parser.Read(&tmp, 2)) << " read sig_scheme";
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_scheme, static_cast<uint16_t>(tmp));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_P(TlsConnectTls12, ConnectSigAlgEnabledByPolicyDhe) {
|
||||
+ EnableOnlyDheCiphers();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ const std::vector<SSLSignatureScheme> schemes = {ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
|
||||
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EnsureTlsSetup();
|
||||
+ client_->SetSignatureSchemes(schemes.data(), schemes.size());
|
||||
+ server_->SetSignatureSchemes(schemes.data(), schemes.size());
|
||||
+ auto capture_ske = MakeTlsFilter<TlsHandshakeRecorder>(
|
||||
+ server_, kTlsHandshakeServerKeyExchange);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ StartConnect();
|
||||
+ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Enable SHA-1 by policy.
|
||||
+ SECStatus rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_SHA1, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX, 0);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+ rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL,
|
||||
+ 0);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Handshake(); // Remainder of handshake
|
||||
+ // The server should now report that it is connected
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(TlsAgent::STATE_CONNECTED, server_->state());
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CheckSkeSigScheme(capture_ske, ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_P(TlsConnectTls12, ConnectSigAlgDisabledByPolicyDhe) {
|
||||
+ EnableOnlyDheCiphers();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ const std::vector<SSLSignatureScheme> schemes = {ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
|
||||
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EnsureTlsSetup();
|
||||
+ client_->SetSignatureSchemes(schemes.data(), schemes.size());
|
||||
+ server_->SetSignatureSchemes(schemes.data(), schemes.size());
|
||||
+ auto capture_ske = MakeTlsFilter<TlsHandshakeRecorder>(
|
||||
+ server_, kTlsHandshakeServerKeyExchange);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ StartConnect();
|
||||
+ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Disable SHA-1 by policy after sending ClientHello so that CH
|
||||
+ // includes SHA-1 signature scheme.
|
||||
+ SECStatus rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_SHA1, 0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+ rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL,
|
||||
+ 0);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Handshake(); // Remainder of handshake
|
||||
+ // The server should now report that it is connected
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(TlsAgent::STATE_CONNECTED, server_->state());
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CheckSkeSigScheme(capture_ske, ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_P(TlsConnectPre12, ConnectSigAlgDisabledByPolicyDhePre12) {
|
||||
+ EnableOnlyDheCiphers();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EnsureTlsSetup();
|
||||
+ StartConnect();
|
||||
+ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Disable SHA-1 by policy. This will cause the connection fail as
|
||||
+ // TLS 1.1 or earlier uses combined SHA-1 + MD5 signature.
|
||||
+ SECStatus rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_SHA1, 0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+ rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL,
|
||||
+ 0);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ server_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertHandshakeFailure);
|
||||
+ client_->ExpectReceiveAlert(kTlsAlertHandshakeFailure);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Remainder of handshake
|
||||
+ Handshake();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
} // namespace nss_test
|
||||
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_ecdh_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_ecdh_unittest.cc
|
||||
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_ecdh_unittest.cc
|
||||
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_ecdh_unittest.cc
|
||||
@@ -666,6 +666,80 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls12, ConnectIncorrect
|
||||
client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static void CheckSkeSigScheme(
|
||||
+ std::shared_ptr<TlsHandshakeRecorder> &capture_ske,
|
||||
+ uint16_t expected_scheme) {
|
||||
+ TlsParser parser(capture_ske->buffer());
|
||||
+ uint32_t tmp = 0;
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE(parser.Read(&tmp, 1)) << " read curve_type";
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(3U, tmp) << "curve type has to be 3";
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE(parser.Skip(2)) << " read namedcurve";
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE(parser.SkipVariable(1)) << " read public";
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE(parser.Read(&tmp, 2)) << " read sig_scheme";
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_scheme, static_cast<uint16_t>(tmp));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_P(TlsConnectTls12, ConnectSigAlgEnabledByPolicy) {
|
||||
+ EnsureTlsSetup();
|
||||
+ client_->DisableAllCiphers();
|
||||
+ client_->EnableCiphersByKeyExchange(ssl_kea_ecdh);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ const std::vector<SSLSignatureScheme> schemes = {ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
|
||||
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ client_->SetSignatureSchemes(schemes.data(), schemes.size());
|
||||
+ server_->SetSignatureSchemes(schemes.data(), schemes.size());
|
||||
+ auto capture_ske = MakeTlsFilter<TlsHandshakeRecorder>(
|
||||
+ server_, kTlsHandshakeServerKeyExchange);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ StartConnect();
|
||||
+ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Enable SHA-1 by policy.
|
||||
+ SECStatus rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_SHA1, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX, 0);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+ rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL,
|
||||
+ 0);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Handshake(); // Remainder of handshake
|
||||
+ // The server should now report that it is connected
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(TlsAgent::STATE_CONNECTED, server_->state());
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CheckSkeSigScheme(capture_ske, ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_P(TlsConnectTls12, ConnectSigAlgDisabledByPolicy) {
|
||||
+ EnsureTlsSetup();
|
||||
+ client_->DisableAllCiphers();
|
||||
+ client_->EnableCiphersByKeyExchange(ssl_kea_ecdh);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ const std::vector<SSLSignatureScheme> schemes = {ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
|
||||
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ client_->SetSignatureSchemes(schemes.data(), schemes.size());
|
||||
+ server_->SetSignatureSchemes(schemes.data(), schemes.size());
|
||||
+ auto capture_ske = MakeTlsFilter<TlsHandshakeRecorder>(
|
||||
+ server_, kTlsHandshakeServerKeyExchange);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ StartConnect();
|
||||
+ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Disable SHA-1 by policy.
|
||||
+ SECStatus rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_SHA1, 0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+ rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL,
|
||||
+ 0);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Handshake(); // Remainder of handshake
|
||||
+ // The server should now report that it is connected
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(TlsAgent::STATE_CONNECTED, server_->state());
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CheckSkeSigScheme(capture_ske, ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(KeyExchangeTest, TlsKeyExchangeTest,
|
||||
::testing::Combine(TlsConnectTestBase::kTlsVariantsAll,
|
||||
TlsConnectTestBase::kTlsV11Plus));
|
||||
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_connect.h b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_connect.h
|
||||
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_connect.h
|
||||
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_connect.h
|
||||
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ class TlsConnectTestBase : public ::test
|
||||
// ssl_extension_unittest.cc.
|
||||
const std::vector<SECOidTag> algorithms_ = {SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY,
|
||||
SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE,
|
||||
- SEC_OID_CURVE25519};
|
||||
+ SEC_OID_CURVE25519, SEC_OID_SHA1};
|
||||
std::vector<std::tuple<SECOidTag, uint32_t>> saved_policies_;
|
||||
|
||||
private:
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||
@@ -1454,8 +1454,14 @@ ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(SSLHashType ha
|
||||
{
|
||||
SECStatus rv;
|
||||
SECOidTag hashOID;
|
||||
+ PRUint32 policy;
|
||||
|
||||
if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
|
||||
+ if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_SHA1, &policy) == SECSuccess) &&
|
||||
+ !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) {
|
||||
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
|
||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_MD5, hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen);
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
|
||||
@@ -1469,6 +1475,11 @@ ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(SSLHashType ha
|
||||
hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg);
|
||||
+ if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) == SECSuccess) &&
|
||||
+ !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) {
|
||||
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
|
||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
hashes->len = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashOID);
|
||||
if (hashes->len == 0 || hashes->len > sizeof(hashes->u.raw)) {
|
||||
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
|
||||
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.brew ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh
|
||||
--- ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.brew 2021-06-12 11:37:46.153265942 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh 2021-06-12 11:39:43.069925034 -0700
|
||||
@@ -1641,7 +1641,9 @@ ssl_run_tests()
|
||||
if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
|
||||
ssl_policy_listsuites
|
||||
ssl_policy_selfserv
|
||||
- ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp
|
||||
+ # requires access to external servers, which fails
|
||||
+ # when running in brew
|
||||
+ #ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp
|
||||
ssl_policy
|
||||
fi
|
||||
;;
|
||||
@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./doc/pk12util.xml.camellia ./doc/pk12util.xml
|
||||
--- ./doc/pk12util.xml.camellia 2022-01-26 09:46:39.794919455 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./doc/pk12util.xml 2022-01-26 09:54:58.277019760 -0800
|
||||
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ Certificate Friendly Name: Thawte Fre
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection id="encryption">
|
||||
<title>Password Encryption</title>
|
||||
- <para>PKCS #12 provides for not only the protection of the private keys but also the certificate and meta-data associated with the keys. Password-based encryption is used to protect private keys on export to a PKCS #12 file and, optionally, the associated certificates. If no algorithm is specified, the tool defaults to using PKCS #12 SHA-1 and 3-key triple DES for private key encryption. When not in FIPS mode, PKCS #12 SHA-1 and 40-bit RC4 is used for certificate encryption. When in FIPS mode, there is no certificate encryption. If certificate encryption is not wanted, specify <userinput>"NONE"</userinput> as the argument of the <option>-C</option> option.</para>
|
||||
+ <para>PKCS #12 provides for not only the protection of the private keys but also the certificate and meta-data associated with the keys. Password-based encryption is used to protect private keys on export to a PKCS #12 file and, optionally, the associated certificates. If no algorithm is specified, the tool defaults to using AES-256-CBC for private key encryption and AES-128-CBC for certificate encryption. If certificate encryption is not wanted, specify <userinput>"NONE"</userinput> as the argument of the <option>-C</option> option.</para>
|
||||
<para>The private key is always protected with strong encryption by default.</para>
|
||||
<para>Several types of ciphers are supported.</para>
|
||||
<variablelist>
|
||||
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ Certificate Friendly Name: Thawte Fre
|
||||
<listitem>
|
||||
<itemizedlist>
|
||||
<listitem><para>PBES2 with AES-CBC-Pad as underlying encryption scheme (<userinput>"AES-128-CBC"</userinput>, <userinput>"AES-192-CBC"</userinput>, and <userinput>"AES-256-CBC"</userinput>)</para></listitem>
|
||||
+ <listitem><para>PBES2 with CAMELLIA-CBC-Pad as underlying encryption scheme (<userinput>"CAMELLIA-128-CBC"</userinput>, <userinput>"CAMELLIA-192-CBC"</userinput>, and <userinput>"CAMELLIA-256-CBC"</userinput>)</para></listitem>
|
||||
</itemizedlist>
|
||||
</listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
||||
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
||||
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
||||
@@ -15,13 +15,22 @@
|
||||
#include "gtest_utils.h"
|
||||
#include "tls_agent.h"
|
||||
#include "tls_connect.h"
|
||||
+#define LTO
|
||||
|
||||
namespace nss_test {
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef LTO
|
||||
+// sigh this construction breaks LTO
|
||||
const std::string kEcdsaDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorEcdsa256;
|
||||
const std::string kRsaeDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsae2048;
|
||||
const std::string kPssDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsaPss2048;
|
||||
const std::string kDCId = TlsAgent::kServerEcdsa256;
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+#define kEcdsaDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorEcdsa256
|
||||
+#define kRsaeDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsae2048
|
||||
+#define kPssDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsaPss2048
|
||||
+#define kDCId TlsAgent::kServerEcdsa256
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
const SSLSignatureScheme kDCScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256;
|
||||
const PRUint32 kDCValidFor = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 /* 1 week (seconds) */;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,578 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/config.mk b/lib/freebl/config.mk
|
||||
--- a/lib/freebl/config.mk
|
||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/config.mk
|
||||
@@ -85,9 +85,13 @@ EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += \
|
||||
$(NULL)
|
||||
endif
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
ifeq ($(OS_ARCH), Darwin)
|
||||
EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += -dylib_file @executable_path/libplc4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplc4.dylib -dylib_file @executable_path/libplds4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplds4.dylib
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
+ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
|
||||
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
|
||||
endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+endif
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
|
||||
@@ -20,53 +20,110 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
|
||||
if (!numBytes) {
|
||||
/* error is set */
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
|
||||
PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
|
||||
+#include <sys/random.h>
|
||||
+#include "prinit.h"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static int rng_grndFlags= 0;
|
||||
+static PRCallOnceType rng_KernelFips;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static PRStatus
|
||||
+rng_getKernelFips()
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+#ifdef LINUX
|
||||
+ FILE *f;
|
||||
+ char d;
|
||||
+ size_t size;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ f = fopen("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", "r");
|
||||
+ if (!f)
|
||||
+ return PR_FAILURE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ size = fread(&d, 1, 1, f);
|
||||
+ fclose(f);
|
||||
+ if (size != 1)
|
||||
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+ if (d != '1')
|
||||
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+ /* if the kernel is in FIPS mode, set the GRND_RANDOM flag */
|
||||
+ rng_grndFlags = GRND_RANDOM;
|
||||
+#endif /* LINUX */
|
||||
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
size_t
|
||||
RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ size_t fileBytes = 0;
|
||||
+ unsigned char *buffer = dest;
|
||||
+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
|
||||
int fd;
|
||||
int bytes;
|
||||
- size_t fileBytes = 0;
|
||||
- unsigned char *buffer = dest;
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ PR_CallOnce(&rng_KernelFips, rng_getKernelFips);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || (defined(LINUX) && defined(__GLIBC__) && ((__GLIBC__ > 2) || ((__GLIBC__ == 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25))))
|
||||
int result;
|
||||
-
|
||||
while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
|
||||
size_t getBytes = maxLen - fileBytes;
|
||||
if (getBytes > GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES) {
|
||||
getBytes = GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
|
||||
+ /* FIP 140-3 requires full kernel reseeding for chained entropy sources
|
||||
+ * so we need to use getrandom with GRND_RANDOM.
|
||||
+ * getrandom returns -1 on failure, otherwise returns
|
||||
+ * the number of bytes, which can be less than getBytes */
|
||||
+ result = getrandom(buffer, getBytes, rng_grndFlags);
|
||||
+ if (result < 0) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ fileBytes += result;
|
||||
+ buffer += result;
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ /* get entropy returns 0 on success and always return
|
||||
+ * getBytes on success */
|
||||
result = getentropy(buffer, getBytes);
|
||||
if (result == 0) { /* success */
|
||||
fileBytes += getBytes;
|
||||
buffer += getBytes;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (fileBytes == maxLen) { /* success */
|
||||
return maxLen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
|
||||
+ /* in FIPS 104-3 we don't fallback, just fail */
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
/* If we failed with an error other than ENOSYS, it means the destination
|
||||
* buffer is not writeable. We don't need to try writing to it again. */
|
||||
if (errno != ENOSYS) {
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /*!NSS_FIPS_140_3 */
|
||||
+#endif /* platorm has getentropy */
|
||||
+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
|
||||
/* ENOSYS means the kernel doesn't support getentropy()/getrandom().
|
||||
* Reset the number of bytes to get and fall back to /dev/urandom. */
|
||||
fileBytes = 0;
|
||||
-#endif
|
||||
fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
|
||||
if (fd < 0) {
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
|
||||
bytes = read(fd, buffer, maxLen - fileBytes);
|
||||
if (bytes <= 0) {
|
||||
@@ -76,9 +133,10 @@ RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
|
||||
buffer += bytes;
|
||||
}
|
||||
(void)close(fd);
|
||||
if (fileBytes != maxLen) {
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fileBytes;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/config.mk b/lib/softoken/config.mk
|
||||
--- a/lib/softoken/config.mk
|
||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/config.mk
|
||||
@@ -58,8 +58,12 @@ endif
|
||||
ifdef NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
|
||||
DEFINES += -DNSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID
|
||||
DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID=\"${NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID}\"
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
+ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
|
||||
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
|
||||
+endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
||||
@@ -1766,16 +1766,20 @@ sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
|
||||
unsigned char iteration_count = 5;
|
||||
unsigned char keyLen = 64;
|
||||
char *inKeyData = TEST_KEY;
|
||||
- static const unsigned char saltData[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
|
||||
+ static const unsigned char saltData[] = {
|
||||
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
|
||||
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
|
||||
+ };
|
||||
+
|
||||
static const unsigned char pbkdf_known_answer[] = {
|
||||
- 0x31, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x39, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x29,
|
||||
- 0x68, 0xac, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x9c,
|
||||
- 0x28, 0x59, 0x8b, 0x5c, 0xd8, 0xd4, 0x02, 0x37,
|
||||
- 0x18, 0x22, 0xc1, 0x92, 0xd0, 0xfa, 0x72, 0x90,
|
||||
- 0x2c, 0x8d, 0x19, 0xd4, 0x56, 0xfb, 0x16, 0xfa,
|
||||
- 0x8d, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x5f, 0x17, 0xb1,
|
||||
- 0x22, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0xaf, 0x5e, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0x66,
|
||||
- 0xc6, 0x14, 0xfe, 0x83, 0xfa, 0x1a, 0x2a, 0xc5
|
||||
+ 0x73, 0x8c, 0xfa, 0x02, 0xe8, 0xdb, 0x43, 0xe4,
|
||||
+ 0x99, 0xc5, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0x7b,
|
||||
+ 0xc4, 0xda, 0x22, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0xae, 0x23, 0x7a,
|
||||
+ 0x21, 0x27, 0xbd, 0xcc, 0x78, 0xc4, 0xe6, 0xc5,
|
||||
+ 0x33, 0x38, 0x35, 0xe0, 0x68, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x06,
|
||||
+ 0xad, 0xaf, 0x7f, 0xd7, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x90,
|
||||
+ 0x17, 0x97, 0x73, 0x75, 0x7b, 0x88, 0x49, 0xd8,
|
||||
+ 0x6f, 0x78, 0x5a, 0xde, 0x50, 0x20, 0x55, 0x33
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
sftk_PBELockInit();
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
@@ -4609,16 +4609,17 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
|
||||
goto loser;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
|
||||
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
|
||||
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
|
||||
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
|
||||
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
|
||||
key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
|
||||
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
|
||||
case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
|
||||
case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
|
||||
case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
|
||||
case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
|
||||
checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
@@ -4812,16 +4813,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
|
||||
crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
|
||||
sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
||||
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
|
||||
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
|
||||
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
|
||||
+ * fips requirements */
|
||||
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
|
||||
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
|
||||
*phKey = key->handle;
|
||||
}
|
||||
loser:
|
||||
PORT_Memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf);
|
||||
sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
||||
return crv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -5780,16 +5784,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
|
||||
|
||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
|
||||
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
||||
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
|
||||
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
|
||||
return crv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
|
||||
+ privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
|
||||
+ publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
|
||||
|
||||
*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
|
||||
*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
|
||||
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
||||
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
|
||||
|
||||
return CKR_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -6990,16 +6997,17 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
|
||||
if (params->bExtract) {
|
||||
CK_BYTE *salt;
|
||||
CK_ULONG saltLen;
|
||||
HMACContext *hmac;
|
||||
unsigned int bufLen;
|
||||
+ SFTKSource saltKeySource = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
|
||||
|
||||
switch (params->ulSaltType) {
|
||||
case CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL:
|
||||
saltLen = hashLen;
|
||||
salt = hashbuf;
|
||||
memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA:
|
||||
@@ -7026,29 +7034,54 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
||||
if (isFIPS && (key->isFIPS == 0) && (saltKey->isFIPS == 1)) {
|
||||
CK_MECHANISM mech;
|
||||
mech.mechanism = CKM_HKDF_DERIVE;
|
||||
mech.pParameter = params;
|
||||
mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
|
||||
key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
|
||||
CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
|
||||
saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
|
||||
if (saltKey_att == NULL) {
|
||||
sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
|
||||
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* save the resulting salt */
|
||||
salt = saltKey_att->attrib.pValue;
|
||||
saltLen = saltKey_att->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
|
||||
+ * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
|
||||
+ if (isFIPS && key && sourceKey) {
|
||||
+ PRBool fipsOK = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ /* case one: mix the kea with a previous or default
|
||||
+ * salt */
|
||||
+ if ((sourceKey->source == SFTK_SOURCE_KEA) &&
|
||||
+ (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
|
||||
+ (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
|
||||
+ fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* case two: restart, remix the previous secret as a salt */
|
||||
+ if ((sourceKey->objclass == CKO_DATA) &&
|
||||
+ (NSS_SecureMemcmpZero(sourceKeyBytes, sourceKeyLen) == 0) &&
|
||||
+ (sourceKeyLen == rawHash->length) &&
|
||||
+ (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
|
||||
+ (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
|
||||
+ fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (!fipsOK) {
|
||||
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT;
|
||||
|
||||
hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
|
||||
if (saltKey_att) {
|
||||
sftk_FreeAttribute(saltKey_att);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (saltKey) {
|
||||
sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -7076,16 +7109,40 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
||||
/* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
|
||||
* T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
|
||||
* key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
HMACContext *hmac;
|
||||
CK_BYTE bi;
|
||||
unsigned iterations;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
|
||||
+ * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
|
||||
+ if (isFIPS && key && key->isFIPS && sourceKey) {
|
||||
+ unsigned char *info=¶ms->pInfo[3];
|
||||
+ /* only one case,
|
||||
+ * 1) Expand only
|
||||
+ * 2) with a key whose source was
|
||||
+ * SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND or SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
|
||||
+ * 3) source key length == rawHash->length
|
||||
+ * 4) Info has tls or dtls
|
||||
+ * If any of those conditions aren't met, then we turn
|
||||
+ * off the fips indicator */
|
||||
+ if (params->bExtract ||
|
||||
+ ((sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT) &&
|
||||
+ (sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND)) ||
|
||||
+ (sourceKeyLen != rawHash->length) ||
|
||||
+ (params->ulInfoLen < 7) ||
|
||||
+ ((PORT_Memcmp(info,"tls",3) != 0) &&
|
||||
+ (PORT_Memcmp(info,"dtls",4) != 0))) {
|
||||
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND;
|
||||
+
|
||||
genLen = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen);
|
||||
iterations = genLen / hashLen;
|
||||
|
||||
if (genLen > sizeof(keyBlock)) {
|
||||
keyBlockAlloc = PORT_Alloc(genLen);
|
||||
if (keyBlockAlloc == NULL) {
|
||||
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -8434,16 +8491,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate private value - oct */
|
||||
rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
|
||||
|
||||
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhValue, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
|
||||
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
|
||||
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
|
||||
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&derived, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
crv = CKR_OK;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
||||
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -8564,16 +8622,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
||||
}
|
||||
PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize - secretlen], secret, secretlen);
|
||||
secret = keyData;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
secret += (secretlen - keySize);
|
||||
}
|
||||
secretlen = keySize;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
|
||||
|
||||
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
|
||||
PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
|
||||
if (keyData) {
|
||||
PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
||||
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
||||
@@ -147,16 +147,26 @@ typedef enum {
|
||||
*/
|
||||
typedef enum {
|
||||
SFTK_DestroyFailure,
|
||||
SFTK_Destroyed,
|
||||
SFTK_Busy
|
||||
} SFTKFreeStatus;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
+ * Source of various objects
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+typedef enum {
|
||||
+ SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT=0,
|
||||
+ SFTK_SOURCE_KEA,
|
||||
+ SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND,
|
||||
+ SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
|
||||
+} SFTKSource;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
* attribute values of an object.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
struct SFTKAttributeStr {
|
||||
SFTKAttribute *next;
|
||||
SFTKAttribute *prev;
|
||||
PRBool freeAttr;
|
||||
PRBool freeData;
|
||||
/*must be called handle to make sftkqueue_find work */
|
||||
@@ -189,16 +199,17 @@ struct SFTKObjectStr {
|
||||
CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass;
|
||||
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
|
||||
int refCount;
|
||||
PZLock *refLock;
|
||||
SFTKSlot *slot;
|
||||
void *objectInfo;
|
||||
SFTKFree infoFree;
|
||||
PRBool isFIPS;
|
||||
+ SFTKSource source;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct SFTKTokenObjectStr {
|
||||
SFTKObject obj;
|
||||
SECItem dbKey;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct SFTKSessionObjectStr {
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
||||
@@ -1090,16 +1090,17 @@ sftk_NewObject(SFTKSlot *slot)
|
||||
sessObject->attrList[i].freeData = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
sessObject->optimizeSpace = slot->optimizeSpace;
|
||||
|
||||
object->handle = 0;
|
||||
object->next = object->prev = NULL;
|
||||
object->slot = slot;
|
||||
object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
|
||||
+ object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
|
||||
|
||||
object->refCount = 1;
|
||||
sessObject->sessionList.next = NULL;
|
||||
sessObject->sessionList.prev = NULL;
|
||||
sessObject->sessionList.parent = object;
|
||||
sessObject->session = NULL;
|
||||
sessObject->wasDerived = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
if (!hasLocks)
|
||||
@@ -1674,16 +1675,17 @@ fail:
|
||||
CK_RV
|
||||
sftk_CopyObject(SFTKObject *destObject, SFTKObject *srcObject)
|
||||
{
|
||||
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
|
||||
SFTKSessionObject *src_so = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(srcObject);
|
||||
unsigned int i;
|
||||
|
||||
destObject->isFIPS = srcObject->isFIPS;
|
||||
+ destObject->source = srcObject->source;
|
||||
if (src_so == NULL) {
|
||||
return sftk_CopyTokenObject(destObject, srcObject);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
PZ_Lock(src_so->attributeLock);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < src_so->hashSize; i++) {
|
||||
attribute = src_so->head[i];
|
||||
do {
|
||||
@@ -2059,16 +2061,17 @@ sftk_NewTokenObject(SFTKSlot *slot, SECI
|
||||
/* every object must have a class, if we can't get it, the object
|
||||
* doesn't exist */
|
||||
crv = handleToClass(slot, handle, &object->objclass);
|
||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
goto loser;
|
||||
}
|
||||
object->slot = slot;
|
||||
object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
|
||||
+ object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
|
||||
object->objectInfo = NULL;
|
||||
object->infoFree = NULL;
|
||||
if (!hasLocks) {
|
||||
object->refLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockRefLock);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (object->refLock == NULL) {
|
||||
goto loser;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2225,16 +2228,25 @@ sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case CKA_DERIVE:
|
||||
flags = CKF_DERIVE;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
/* fake attribute to select digesting */
|
||||
case CKA_DIGEST:
|
||||
flags = CKF_DIGEST;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ /* fake attribute to select key gen */
|
||||
+ case CKA_NSS_GENERATE:
|
||||
+ flags = CKF_GENERATE;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ /* fake attribute to select key pair gen */
|
||||
+ case CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR:
|
||||
+ flags = CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ /* fake attributes to to handle MESSAGE* flags */
|
||||
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
|
||||
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
|
||||
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
|
||||
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN;
|
||||
@@ -2278,17 +2290,17 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* This function currently only returns valid lengths for
|
||||
* FIPS approved ECC curves. If we want to make this generic
|
||||
* in the future, that Curve determination can be done in
|
||||
* the sftk_handleSpecial. Since it's currently only used
|
||||
* in FIPS indicators, it's currently only compiled with
|
||||
* the FIPS indicator code */
|
||||
-static int
|
||||
+static CK_ULONG
|
||||
sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
||||
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
|
||||
CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
|
||||
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
|
||||
CK_RV crv;
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
|
||||
--- a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
|
||||
+++ b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
|
||||
@@ -58,16 +58,18 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* NSS-defined certificate types
|
||||
*
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
|
||||
|
||||
/* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
|
||||
#define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L
|
||||
+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE 0x81000001L
|
||||
+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x81000002L
|
||||
#define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE 0x82000000L
|
||||
#define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK 0xff000000L
|
||||
#define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* NSS-defined object attributes
|
||||
*
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.pkcs12_fips_defaults ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
|
||||
--- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.pkcs12_fips_defaults 2022-07-20 13:40:24.152212683 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c 2022-07-20 13:42:40.031094190 -0700
|
||||
@@ -1146,6 +1146,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
|
||||
+ cipher = SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC;
|
||||
+ certCipher = SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (pk12util.options[opt_Cipher].activated) {
|
||||
char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_Cipher].arg;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1160,9 +1165,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
|
||||
- certCipher = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
if (pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].activated) {
|
||||
char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].arg;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,335 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt.revert-distrusted ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
|
||||
--- ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt.revert-distrusted 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt 2022-06-24 10:51:32.035207662 -0700
|
||||
@@ -7668,6 +7668,187 @@ CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_
|
||||
CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
+# Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
|
||||
+#
|
||||
+# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
|
||||
+# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
|
||||
+# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
|
||||
+# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
|
||||
+# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
|
||||
+# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
|
||||
+# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
|
||||
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_CERTIFICATE
|
||||
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
|
||||
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
|
||||
+CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CKC_X_509
|
||||
+CKA_SUBJECT MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
|
||||
+\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
|
||||
+\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
|
||||
+\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
|
||||
+\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
|
||||
+\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_ID UTF8 "0"
|
||||
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
|
||||
+\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
|
||||
+\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
|
||||
+\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
|
||||
+\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
|
||||
+\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\002\004\017\377\377\377
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_VALUE MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\060\202\006\225\060\202\004\175\240\003\002\001\002\002\004\017
|
||||
+\377\377\377\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\013
|
||||
+\005\000\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116
|
||||
+\114\061\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151
|
||||
+\116\157\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003
|
||||
+\125\004\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120
|
||||
+\113\111\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162
|
||||
+\147\141\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\036
|
||||
+\027\015\061\060\060\065\061\062\060\070\065\061\063\071\132\027
|
||||
+\015\062\060\060\063\062\063\060\071\065\060\060\065\132\060\132
|
||||
+\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\027\060
|
||||
+\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141
|
||||
+\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004\003\014
|
||||
+\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111\157\166
|
||||
+\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141\156\151
|
||||
+\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\202\002\042\060\015
|
||||
+\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\001\005\000\003\202\002
|
||||
+\017\000\060\202\002\012\002\202\002\001\000\261\023\031\017\047
|
||||
+\346\154\324\125\206\113\320\354\211\212\105\221\170\254\107\275
|
||||
+\107\053\344\374\105\353\117\264\046\163\133\067\323\303\177\366
|
||||
+\343\336\327\243\370\055\150\305\010\076\113\224\326\344\207\045
|
||||
+\066\153\204\265\030\164\363\050\130\163\057\233\152\317\274\004
|
||||
+\036\366\336\335\257\374\113\252\365\333\146\142\045\001\045\202
|
||||
+\336\362\227\132\020\156\335\135\251\042\261\004\251\043\163\072
|
||||
+\370\161\255\035\317\204\104\353\107\321\257\155\310\174\050\253
|
||||
+\307\362\067\172\164\137\137\305\002\024\212\243\132\343\033\154
|
||||
+\001\343\135\216\331\150\326\364\011\033\062\334\221\265\054\365
|
||||
+\040\353\214\003\155\046\111\270\223\304\205\135\330\322\233\257
|
||||
+\126\152\314\005\063\314\240\102\236\064\125\104\234\153\240\324
|
||||
+\022\320\053\124\315\267\211\015\345\366\353\350\373\205\001\063
|
||||
+\117\172\153\361\235\162\063\226\016\367\262\204\245\245\047\304
|
||||
+\047\361\121\163\051\167\272\147\156\376\114\334\264\342\241\241
|
||||
+\201\057\071\111\215\103\070\023\316\320\245\134\302\207\072\000
|
||||
+\147\145\102\043\361\066\131\012\035\243\121\310\274\243\224\052
|
||||
+\061\337\343\074\362\235\032\074\004\260\357\261\012\060\023\163
|
||||
+\266\327\363\243\114\001\165\024\205\170\300\327\212\071\130\205
|
||||
+\120\372\056\346\305\276\317\213\077\257\217\066\324\045\011\055
|
||||
+\322\017\254\162\223\362\277\213\324\120\263\371\025\120\233\231
|
||||
+\365\024\331\373\213\221\243\062\046\046\240\370\337\073\140\201
|
||||
+\206\203\171\133\053\353\023\075\051\072\301\155\335\275\236\216
|
||||
+\207\326\112\256\064\227\005\356\024\246\366\334\070\176\112\351
|
||||
+\044\124\007\075\227\150\067\106\153\015\307\250\041\257\023\124
|
||||
+\344\011\152\361\115\106\012\311\135\373\233\117\275\336\373\267
|
||||
+\124\313\270\070\234\247\071\373\152\055\300\173\215\253\245\247
|
||||
+\127\354\112\222\212\063\305\341\040\134\163\330\220\222\053\200
|
||||
+\325\017\206\030\151\174\071\117\204\206\274\367\114\133\363\325
|
||||
+\264\312\240\302\360\067\042\312\171\122\037\123\346\252\363\220
|
||||
+\260\073\335\362\050\375\254\353\305\006\044\240\311\324\057\017
|
||||
+\130\375\265\236\354\017\317\262\131\320\242\004\172\070\152\256
|
||||
+\162\373\275\360\045\142\224\011\247\005\013\002\003\001\000\001
|
||||
+\243\202\001\141\060\202\001\135\060\110\006\003\125\035\040\004
|
||||
+\101\060\077\060\075\006\004\125\035\040\000\060\065\060\063\006
|
||||
+\010\053\006\001\005\005\007\002\001\026\047\150\164\164\160\072
|
||||
+\057\057\167\167\167\056\144\151\147\151\156\157\164\141\162\056
|
||||
+\156\154\057\143\160\163\057\160\153\151\157\166\145\162\150\145
|
||||
+\151\144\060\017\006\003\125\035\023\001\001\377\004\005\060\003
|
||||
+\001\001\377\060\016\006\003\125\035\017\001\001\377\004\004\003
|
||||
+\002\001\006\060\201\205\006\003\125\035\043\004\176\060\174\200
|
||||
+\024\071\020\213\111\222\134\333\141\022\040\315\111\235\032\216
|
||||
+\332\234\147\100\271\241\136\244\134\060\132\061\013\060\011\006
|
||||
+\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\036\060\034\006\003\125\004
|
||||
+\012\014\025\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
|
||||
+\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\061\053\060\051\006\003\125\004
|
||||
+\003\014\042\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
|
||||
+\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\040\122\157\157\164\040\103\101
|
||||
+\040\055\040\107\062\202\004\000\230\226\364\060\111\006\003\125
|
||||
+\035\037\004\102\060\100\060\076\240\074\240\072\206\070\150\164
|
||||
+\164\160\072\057\057\143\162\154\056\160\153\151\157\166\145\162
|
||||
+\150\145\151\144\056\156\154\057\104\157\155\117\162\147\141\156
|
||||
+\151\163\141\164\151\145\114\141\164\145\163\164\103\122\114\055
|
||||
+\107\062\056\143\162\154\060\035\006\003\125\035\016\004\026\004
|
||||
+\024\274\135\224\073\331\253\173\003\045\163\141\302\333\055\356
|
||||
+\374\253\217\145\241\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001
|
||||
+\001\013\005\000\003\202\002\001\000\217\374\055\114\267\331\055
|
||||
+\325\037\275\357\313\364\267\150\027\165\235\116\325\367\335\234
|
||||
+\361\052\046\355\237\242\266\034\003\325\123\263\354\010\317\064
|
||||
+\342\343\303\364\265\026\057\310\303\276\327\323\163\253\000\066
|
||||
+\371\032\112\176\326\143\351\136\106\272\245\266\216\025\267\243
|
||||
+\052\330\103\035\357\135\310\037\201\205\263\213\367\377\074\364
|
||||
+\331\364\106\010\077\234\274\035\240\331\250\114\315\045\122\116
|
||||
+\012\261\040\367\037\351\103\331\124\106\201\023\232\300\136\164
|
||||
+\154\052\230\062\352\374\167\273\015\245\242\061\230\042\176\174
|
||||
+\174\347\332\244\255\354\267\056\032\031\161\370\110\120\332\103
|
||||
+\217\054\204\335\301\100\047\343\265\360\025\116\226\324\370\134
|
||||
+\343\206\051\106\053\327\073\007\353\070\177\310\206\127\227\323
|
||||
+\357\052\063\304\027\120\325\144\151\153\053\153\105\136\135\057
|
||||
+\027\312\132\116\317\303\327\071\074\365\073\237\106\271\233\347
|
||||
+\016\111\227\235\326\325\343\033\017\352\217\001\116\232\023\224
|
||||
+\131\012\002\007\110\113\032\140\253\177\117\355\013\330\125\015
|
||||
+\150\157\125\234\151\145\025\102\354\300\334\335\154\254\303\026
|
||||
+\316\013\035\126\233\244\304\304\322\056\340\017\342\104\047\053
|
||||
+\120\151\244\334\142\350\212\041\051\102\154\314\000\072\226\166
|
||||
+\233\357\100\300\244\136\167\204\062\154\046\052\071\146\256\135
|
||||
+\343\271\271\262\054\150\037\036\232\220\003\071\360\252\263\244
|
||||
+\314\111\213\030\064\351\067\311\173\051\307\204\174\157\104\025
|
||||
+\057\354\141\131\004\311\105\313\242\326\122\242\174\177\051\222
|
||||
+\326\112\305\213\102\250\324\376\352\330\307\207\043\030\344\235
|
||||
+\172\175\163\100\122\230\240\256\156\343\005\077\005\017\340\245
|
||||
+\306\155\115\355\203\067\210\234\307\363\334\102\232\152\266\327
|
||||
+\041\111\066\167\362\357\030\117\305\160\331\236\351\336\267\053
|
||||
+\213\364\274\176\050\337\015\100\311\205\134\256\235\305\061\377
|
||||
+\320\134\016\265\250\176\360\351\057\272\257\210\256\345\265\321
|
||||
+\130\245\257\234\161\247\051\001\220\203\151\067\202\005\272\374
|
||||
+\011\301\010\156\214\170\073\303\063\002\200\077\104\205\010\035
|
||||
+\337\125\126\010\255\054\205\055\135\261\003\341\256\252\164\305
|
||||
+\244\363\116\272\067\230\173\202\271
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+
|
||||
+# Trust for Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
|
||||
+# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
|
||||
+# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
|
||||
+# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
|
||||
+# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
|
||||
+# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
|
||||
+# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
|
||||
+# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
|
||||
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
|
||||
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
|
||||
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
|
||||
+CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\325\362\127\251\277\055\320\077\213\106\127\371\053\311\244\306
|
||||
+\222\341\102\102
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\056\141\242\321\170\316\356\277\131\063\260\043\024\017\224\034
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
|
||||
+\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
|
||||
+\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
|
||||
+\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
|
||||
+\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
|
||||
+\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\002\004\017\377\377\377
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#
|
||||
# Certificate "Security Communication RootCA2"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Issuer: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
|
||||
@@ -8161,6 +8342,68 @@ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_
|
||||
CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
|
||||
CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
|
||||
+# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
|
||||
+# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
|
||||
+# Serial Number: 1800000005 (0x6b49d205)
|
||||
+# Not Before: Apr 7 15:37:15 2011 GMT
|
||||
+# Not After : Apr 4 15:37:15 2021 GMT
|
||||
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
|
||||
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
|
||||
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave"
|
||||
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
|
||||
+\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
|
||||
+\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
|
||||
+\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
|
||||
+\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
|
||||
+\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
|
||||
+\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
|
||||
+\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
|
||||
+\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
|
||||
+\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
|
||||
+\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\002\004\153\111\322\005
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+
|
||||
+# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
|
||||
+# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
|
||||
+# Serial Number: 1800000006 (0x6b49d206)
|
||||
+# Not Before: Apr 18 21:09:30 2011 GMT
|
||||
+# Not After : Apr 15 21:09:30 2021 GMT
|
||||
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
|
||||
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
|
||||
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave"
|
||||
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
|
||||
+\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
|
||||
+\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
|
||||
+\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
|
||||
+\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
|
||||
+\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
|
||||
+\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
|
||||
+\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
|
||||
+\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
|
||||
+\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
|
||||
+\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\002\004\153\111\322\006
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Certificate "Actalis Authentication Root CA"
|
||||
#
|
||||
@@ -8804,6 +9047,74 @@ CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_
|
||||
CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
|
||||
CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
|
||||
+# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1", Bug 825022
|
||||
+# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
|
||||
+# Serial Number: 2087 (0x827)
|
||||
+# Subject: CN=*.EGO.GOV.TR,OU=EGO BILGI ISLEM,O=EGO,L=ANKARA,ST=ANKARA,C=TR
|
||||
+# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
|
||||
+# Not Valid After : Tue Jul 06 07:07:51 2021
|
||||
+# Fingerprint (MD5): F8:F5:25:FF:0C:31:CF:85:E1:0C:86:17:C1:CE:1F:8E
|
||||
+# Fingerprint (SHA1): C6:9F:28:C8:25:13:9E:65:A6:46:C4:34:AC:A5:A1:D2:00:29:5D:B1
|
||||
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
|
||||
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
|
||||
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1"
|
||||
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
|
||||
+\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
|
||||
+\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
|
||||
+\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
|
||||
+\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
|
||||
+\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
|
||||
+\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
|
||||
+\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
|
||||
+\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
|
||||
+\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
|
||||
+\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\002\002\010\047
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+
|
||||
+# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2", Bug 825022
|
||||
+# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
|
||||
+# Serial Number: 2148 (0x864)
|
||||
+# Subject: E=ileti@kktcmerkezbankasi.org,CN=e-islem.kktcmerkezbankasi.org,O=KKTC Merkez Bankasi,L=Lefkosa,ST=Lefkosa,C=TR
|
||||
+# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
|
||||
+# Not Valid After : Thu Aug 05 07:07:51 2021
|
||||
+# Fingerprint (MD5): BF:C3:EC:AD:0F:42:4F:B4:B5:38:DB:35:BF:AD:84:A2
|
||||
+# Fingerprint (SHA1): F9:2B:E5:26:6C:C0:5D:B2:DC:0D:C3:F2:DC:74:E0:2D:EF:D9:49:CB
|
||||
+CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
|
||||
+CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
|
||||
+CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2"
|
||||
+CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
|
||||
+\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
|
||||
+\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
|
||||
+\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
|
||||
+\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
|
||||
+\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
|
||||
+\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
|
||||
+\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
|
||||
+\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
|
||||
+\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
|
||||
+\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
|
||||
+\002\002\010\144
|
||||
+END
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
||||
+CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
|
||||
+
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Certificate "D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009"
|
||||
#
|
||||
@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
|
||||
@@ -146,16 +146,38 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
|
||||
|
||||
CHECK_FORK();
|
||||
|
||||
/* make sure we're legal */
|
||||
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, contextType, PR_TRUE, NULL);
|
||||
if (crv != CKR_OK)
|
||||
return crv;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (context->isFIPS && (contextType == SFTK_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT)) {
|
||||
+ if ((pParameter == NULL) || (ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS))) {
|
||||
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
|
||||
+ switch (p->ivGenerator) {
|
||||
+ case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
|
||||
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
|
||||
+ if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
|
||||
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
|
||||
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (!pOuttext) {
|
||||
*pulOuttextLen = ulIntextLen;
|
||||
return CKR_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rv = (*context->aeadUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pOuttext, &outlen,
|
||||
maxout, pIntext, ulIntextLen,
|
||||
pParameter, ulParameterLen,
|
||||
pAssociatedData, ulAssociatedDataLen);
|
||||
@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c.dh_test ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c.dh_test 2024-01-18 08:34:45.936944401 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c 2024-01-18 09:20:57.555980326 -0800
|
||||
@@ -1816,38 +1816,39 @@ freebl_fips_DH_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* DH Known P (2048-bits) */
|
||||
static const PRUint8 dh_known_P[] = {
|
||||
- 0xc2, 0x79, 0xbb, 0x76, 0x32, 0x0d, 0x43, 0xfd,
|
||||
- 0x1b, 0x8c, 0xa2, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xdd, 0x6d, 0xef,
|
||||
- 0xf8, 0x1a, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xa2, 0xf5, 0x73, 0x2b,
|
||||
- 0xdb, 0x1a, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x90, 0xeb, 0xe7, 0x8e,
|
||||
- 0x5f, 0x5c, 0x6b, 0xb6, 0x61, 0x89, 0xd1, 0x03,
|
||||
- 0xb0, 0x5f, 0x91, 0xe4, 0xd2, 0x82, 0x90, 0xfc,
|
||||
- 0x3c, 0x49, 0x69, 0x59, 0xc1, 0x51, 0x6a, 0x85,
|
||||
- 0x71, 0xe7, 0x5d, 0x72, 0x5a, 0x45, 0xad, 0x01,
|
||||
- 0x6f, 0x82, 0xae, 0xec, 0x91, 0x08, 0x2e, 0x7c,
|
||||
- 0x64, 0x93, 0x46, 0x1c, 0x68, 0xef, 0xc2, 0x03,
|
||||
- 0x28, 0x1d, 0x75, 0x3a, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x46, 0xf0,
|
||||
- 0xc9, 0xdb, 0x99, 0x95, 0x13, 0x66, 0x4d, 0xd5,
|
||||
- 0x1a, 0x78, 0x92, 0x51, 0x89, 0x72, 0x28, 0x7f,
|
||||
- 0x20, 0x70, 0x41, 0x49, 0xa2, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xf9,
|
||||
- 0x78, 0x5f, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x5d, 0xfa, 0xdb, 0x57,
|
||||
- 0xd4, 0x71, 0xdf, 0x66, 0xe3, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x70,
|
||||
- 0xa4, 0x21, 0x44, 0x6a, 0xc7, 0xae, 0x30, 0x2c,
|
||||
- 0x9c, 0x1f, 0x91, 0x57, 0xc8, 0x24, 0x34, 0x2d,
|
||||
- 0x7a, 0x4a, 0x43, 0xc2, 0x5f, 0xab, 0x64, 0x2e,
|
||||
- 0xaa, 0x28, 0x32, 0x95, 0x42, 0x7b, 0xa0, 0xcc,
|
||||
- 0xdf, 0xfd, 0x22, 0xc8, 0x56, 0x84, 0xc1, 0x62,
|
||||
- 0x15, 0xb2, 0x77, 0x86, 0x81, 0xfc, 0xa5, 0x12,
|
||||
- 0x3c, 0xca, 0x28, 0x17, 0x8f, 0x03, 0x16, 0x6e,
|
||||
- 0xb8, 0x24, 0xfa, 0x1b, 0x15, 0x02, 0xfd, 0x8b,
|
||||
- 0xb6, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0xf7, 0x47, 0x41, 0xc5, 0x2b,
|
||||
- 0x37, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0x68, 0xda, 0x1c, 0x55,
|
||||
- 0x44, 0xc3, 0xee, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x07, 0x11, 0x3b,
|
||||
- 0x5f, 0x00, 0x84, 0xb4, 0xc4, 0xe4, 0xa7, 0x97,
|
||||
- 0x29, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xab, 0xfc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x34,
|
||||
- 0xe4, 0xc7, 0x81, 0x52, 0x32, 0x0e, 0x27, 0x3c,
|
||||
- 0xa6, 0x70, 0x3f, 0x4a, 0x54, 0xda, 0xdd, 0x60,
|
||||
- 0x26, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x45, 0x26, 0x19, 0x41, 0x6f
|
||||
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
||||
+ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A,
|
||||
+ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1,
|
||||
+ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95,
|
||||
+ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB,
|
||||
+ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9,
|
||||
+ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8,
|
||||
+ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A,
|
||||
+ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61,
|
||||
+ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0,
|
||||
+ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3,
|
||||
+ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35,
|
||||
+ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77,
|
||||
+ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72,
|
||||
+ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35,
|
||||
+ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A,
|
||||
+ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61,
|
||||
+ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB,
|
||||
+ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68,
|
||||
+ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4,
|
||||
+ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19,
|
||||
+ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70,
|
||||
+ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC,
|
||||
+ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61,
|
||||
+ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF,
|
||||
+ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83,
|
||||
+ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73,
|
||||
+ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05,
|
||||
+ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2,
|
||||
+ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA,
|
||||
+ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x97,
|
||||
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
|
||||
+
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static const PRUint8 dh_known_Y_1[] = {
|
||||
@@ -1893,10 +1894,10 @@ freebl_fips_DH_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static const PRUint8 dh_known_hash_result[] = {
|
||||
- 0x93, 0xa2, 0x89, 0x1c, 0x8a, 0xc3, 0x70, 0xbf,
|
||||
- 0xa7, 0xdf, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x82, 0xfb, 0x87, 0x81,
|
||||
- 0x09, 0x47, 0xf3, 0x9f, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x3f,
|
||||
- 0x8e, 0x5e, 0x06, 0xca, 0x30, 0xa7, 0xaf, 0x10
|
||||
+ 0x40, 0xe3, 0x7a, 0x34, 0x83, 0x2d, 0x94, 0x57,
|
||||
+ 0x99, 0x3d, 0x66, 0xec, 0x54, 0xdf, 0x82, 0x4a,
|
||||
+ 0x37, 0x0d, 0xf9, 0x01, 0xb3, 0xbc, 0x54, 0xe5,
|
||||
+ 0x5e, 0x63, 0xd3, 0x46, 0x4e, 0xa3, 0xe2, 0x8a
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/* DH variables. */
|
||||
@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2 2024-01-19 09:21:19.632889660 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
|
||||
@@ -7090,7 +7090,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
||||
mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
|
||||
key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
|
||||
CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
|
||||
- keySize);
|
||||
+ keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
|
||||
saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
|
||||
@@ -7404,7 +7404,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
|
||||
- keySize);
|
||||
+ keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
|
||||
|
||||
switch (mechanism) {
|
||||
/* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2 2024-01-19 09:21:19.633889670 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2024-01-19 09:28:00.082843565 -0800
|
||||
@@ -2393,20 +2393,43 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
PRBool
|
||||
-sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
|
||||
+sftk_checkFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash, PRBool allowSmall, PRBool allowCMAC)
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (hash) {
|
||||
+ case CKM_AES_CMAC:
|
||||
+ return allowCMAC;
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA_1:
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA224:
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
|
||||
+ return allowSmall;
|
||||
case CKM_SHA256:
|
||||
- case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
|
||||
case CKM_SHA384:
|
||||
- case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
|
||||
case CKM_SHA512:
|
||||
- case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
|
||||
+ case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
|
||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+PRBool
|
||||
+sftk_checkKeyLength(CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG min,
|
||||
+ CK_ULONG max, CK_ULONG step)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ if (keyLength > max) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (keyLength < min ) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (((keyLength - min) % step) != 0) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
|
||||
* handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
|
||||
@@ -2416,6 +2439,8 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
||||
SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
|
||||
CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ PRBool allowSmall = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ PRBool allowCMAC = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
switch (mechInfo->special) {
|
||||
case SFTKFIPSDH: {
|
||||
SECItem dhPrime;
|
||||
@@ -2482,7 +2507,11 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
||||
if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
|
||||
+ /* Our code makes sure pss->hashAlg matches the explicit
|
||||
+ * hash in the mechanism, and only mechanisms with approved
|
||||
+ * hashes are included, so no need to check pss->hashAlg
|
||||
+ * here */
|
||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
|
||||
/* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
|
||||
@@ -2508,12 +2537,28 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
|
||||
+ case SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800:
|
||||
+ allowCMAC = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
|
||||
+ allowSmall = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+ case SFTKFIPSChkHashTls:
|
||||
if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
|
||||
- + mechInfo->offset));
|
||||
+ return sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
|
||||
+ + mechInfo->offset), allowSmall, allowCMAC);
|
||||
+ case SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck:
|
||||
+ if (mech->mechanism != CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
|
||||
+ /* unless the mechnism has a built-in hash, check the hash */
|
||||
+ if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (!sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
|
||||
+ + mechInfo->offset), PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, 112, 512, 1);
|
||||
default:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2558,13 +2603,11 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
|
||||
* approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
|
||||
if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
|
||||
(opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
|
||||
- (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
|
||||
- (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
|
||||
- (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
|
||||
- ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
|
||||
- ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
|
||||
- (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
|
||||
- ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
|
||||
+ sftk_checkKeyLength(keyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
|
||||
+ mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step) &&
|
||||
+ ((targetKeyLength == 0) || (mechs->special == SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck)
|
||||
+ || sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
|
||||
+ mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step)) &&
|
||||
((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
|
||||
sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
|
||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2 2024-01-19 09:21:19.634889680 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c 2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
|
||||
@@ -157,16 +157,25 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
|
||||
switch (p->ivGenerator) {
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
|
||||
context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
|
||||
- if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
|
||||
+ if ((p->ulIvLen < 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
|
||||
+ (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
|
||||
context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
- default:
|
||||
- if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
|
||||
+ case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR:
|
||||
+ if ((p->ulIvLen != 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
|
||||
+ (p->ulIvFixedBits != 32)) {
|
||||
+ context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER:
|
||||
+ if ((p->ulIvFixedBits < 32) ||
|
||||
+ ((p->ulIvLen*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - p->ulIvFixedBits) < 32)) {
|
||||
context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
||||
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
|
||||
PORT_Memcpy(iv + AES_KEY_WRAP_BLOCK_SIZE, input, inputLen);
|
||||
rv = AES_Encrypt(&cx->aescx, output, pOutputLen, maxOutputLen, iv,
|
||||
outLen);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
|
||||
PORT_ZFree(newBuf, paddedInputLen);
|
||||
/* a little overkill, we only need to clear out the length, but this
|
||||
* is easier to verify we got it all */
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -631,12 +631,12 @@ AESKeyWrap_DecryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
|
||||
loser:
|
||||
/* if we failed, make sure we don't return any data to the user */
|
||||
if ((rv != SECSuccess) && (output == newBuf)) {
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(newBuf, 0, paddedLen);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(newBuf, paddedLen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* clear out CSP sensitive data from the heap and stack */
|
||||
if (allocBuf) {
|
||||
PORT_ZFree(allocBuf, paddedLen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/blapii.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/blapii.h 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
||||
@@ -101,10 +101,10 @@ PRBool ppc_crypto_support();
|
||||
#ifdef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
|
||||
#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)
|
||||
#else
|
||||
-#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size) \
|
||||
- { \
|
||||
- volatile char _stkclr[stack_size]; \
|
||||
- PORT_Memset((void *)&_stkclr[0], 0, stack_size); \
|
||||
+#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size) \
|
||||
+ { \
|
||||
+ volatile char _stkclr[stack_size]; \
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero((void *)&_stkclr[0], stack_size); \
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/drbg.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/drbg.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
||||
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ prng_initEntropy(void)
|
||||
SHA256_Update(&ctx, block, sizeof(block));
|
||||
SHA256_End(&ctx, globalrng->previousEntropyHash, NULL,
|
||||
sizeof(globalrng->previousEntropyHash));
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof(block));
|
||||
SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
return PR_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -246,8 +246,8 @@ prng_getEntropy(PRUint8 *buffer, size_t
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(hash, 0, sizeof hash);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof block);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(hash, sizeof hash);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof block);
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *r
|
||||
PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data) - 1, carry);
|
||||
SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(thisHash, 0, sizeof thisHash);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof data);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(thisHash, sizeof thisHash);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng,
|
||||
PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter, (sizeof rng->reseed_counter) - 1, carry);
|
||||
|
||||
/* if the prng failed, don't return any output, signal softoken */
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(H, 0, sizeof H);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(H, sizeof H);
|
||||
if (!rng->isValid) {
|
||||
PORT_Memset(returned_bytes, 0, no_of_returned_bytes);
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/dsa.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/dsa.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
||||
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
|
||||
err = MP_OKAY;
|
||||
signature->len = dsa_signature_len;
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
|
||||
mp_clear(&p);
|
||||
mp_clear(&q);
|
||||
mp_clear(&g);
|
||||
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ DSA_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
|
||||
rv = dsa_SignDigest(key, signature, digest, kSeed);
|
||||
} while (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM &&
|
||||
--retries > 0);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(kSeed, 0, sizeof kSeed);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(kSeed, sizeof kSeed);
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ DSA_VerifyDigest(DSAPublicKey *key, cons
|
||||
verified = SECSuccess; /* Signature verified. */
|
||||
}
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, sizeof localDigestData);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, sizeof localDigestData);
|
||||
mp_clear(&p);
|
||||
mp_clear(&q);
|
||||
mp_clear(&g);
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/gcm.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/gcm.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
||||
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ gcmHash_Final(gcmHashContext *ghash, uns
|
||||
rv = SECSuccess;
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(T, 0, sizeof(T));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(T, sizeof(T));
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -596,15 +596,15 @@ GCM_CreateContext(void *context, freeblC
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
goto loser;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
gcm->ctr_context_init = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
return gcm;
|
||||
|
||||
loser:
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
if (ghash && ghash->mem) {
|
||||
void *mem = ghash->mem;
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(ghash, 0, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(ghash, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
|
||||
PORT_Free(mem);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (gcm) {
|
||||
@@ -682,11 +682,11 @@ gcm_InitCounter(GCMContext *gcm, const u
|
||||
goto loser;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
|
||||
return SECSuccess;
|
||||
|
||||
loser:
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
|
||||
if (freeCtr) {
|
||||
CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -866,10 +866,10 @@ GCM_DecryptUpdate(GCMContext *gcm, unsig
|
||||
if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(tag, intag, tagBytes) != 0) {
|
||||
/* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
|
||||
/* finish the decryption */
|
||||
return CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
|
||||
inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
@@ -1159,10 +1159,10 @@ GCM_DecryptAEAD(GCMContext *gcm, unsigne
|
||||
/* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
|
||||
CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
|
||||
/* finish the decryption */
|
||||
rv = CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
|
||||
inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
||||
@@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ MAC(unsigned char *mdOut,
|
||||
hashObj->end(mdState, mdOut, mdOutLen, mdOutMax);
|
||||
hashObj->destroy(mdState, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(lengthBytes, 0, sizeof lengthBytes);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(hmacPad, 0, sizeof hmacPad);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(firstBlock, 0, sizeof firstBlock);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(macOut, 0, sizeof macOut);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(lengthBytes, sizeof lengthBytes);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(hmacPad, sizeof hmacPad);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(firstBlock, sizeof firstBlock);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(macOut, sizeof macOut);
|
||||
|
||||
return SECSuccess;
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
||||
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ intel_aes_gcmInitCounter(intel_AES_GCMCo
|
||||
void
|
||||
intel_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
|
||||
if (freeit) {
|
||||
PORT_Free(gcm);
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
||||
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ ppc_aes_gcmInitCounter(ppc_AES_GCMContex
|
||||
void
|
||||
ppc_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(ppc_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
|
||||
if (freeit) {
|
||||
PORT_Free(gcm);
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/pqg.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/pqg.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
|
||||
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ cleanup:
|
||||
mp_clear(&a);
|
||||
mp_clear(&z);
|
||||
mp_clear(&two_length_minus_1);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
|
||||
if (err) {
|
||||
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
|
||||
rv = SECFailure;
|
||||
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ cleanup:
|
||||
mp_clear(&c);
|
||||
mp_clear(&c0);
|
||||
mp_clear(&one);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
|
||||
if (err) {
|
||||
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
|
||||
rv = SECFailure;
|
||||
@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ makePfromQandSeed(
|
||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&c, 1, &c)); /* c -= 1 */
|
||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub(&X, &c, P)); /* P = X - c */
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(V_j, 0, sizeof V_j);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(V_j, sizeof V_j);
|
||||
mp_clear(&W);
|
||||
mp_clear(&X);
|
||||
mp_clear(&c);
|
||||
@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ makeGfromIndex(HASH_HashType hashtype,
|
||||
/* step 11.
|
||||
* return valid G */
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof(data));
|
||||
if (hashcx) {
|
||||
hashobj->destroy(hashcx, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
||||
@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ AES_DestroyContext(AESContext *cx, PRBoo
|
||||
cx->worker_cx = NULL;
|
||||
cx->destroy = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(cx, 0, sizeof(AESContext));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(cx, sizeof(AESContext));
|
||||
if (freeit) {
|
||||
PORT_Free(mem);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsa.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero 2023-11-22 14:41:24.066840894 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/rsa.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
||||
@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
|
||||
/* 2. Compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1) */
|
||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(p, 1, &psub1));
|
||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(q, 1, &qsub1));
|
||||
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
|
||||
if (needPublicExponent || needPrivateExponent) {
|
||||
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
|
||||
/* 3. Compute d = e**-1 mod(phi) */
|
||||
/* or e = d**-1 mod(phi) as necessary */
|
||||
if (needPublicExponent) {
|
||||
@@ -165,6 +165,15 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* make sure we weren't passed in a d or e = 1 mod phi */
|
||||
+ /* just need to check d, because if one is = 1 mod phi, they both are */
|
||||
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &phi, &tmp));
|
||||
+ if (mp_cmp_d(&tmp, 2) <= 0) {
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
||||
+ rv = SECFailure;
|
||||
+ goto cleanup;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* 4. Compute exponent1 = d mod (p-1) */
|
||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &psub1, &tmp));
|
||||
MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->exponent1, key->arena);
|
||||
@@ -1152,6 +1161,8 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTCheckedPubKey(RSAPriv
|
||||
/* Perform a public key operation v = m ** e mod n */
|
||||
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(m, &e, &n, &v));
|
||||
if (mp_cmp(&v, c) != 0) {
|
||||
+ /* this error triggers a fips fatal error lock */
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
|
||||
rv = SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
||||
@@ -977,14 +977,14 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
|
||||
/* now create the hmac key */
|
||||
hmac = HMAC_Create(hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
if (hmac == NULL) {
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
HMAC_Begin(hmac);
|
||||
HMAC_Update(hmac, input, inputLen);
|
||||
rv = HMAC_Finish(hmac, keyHash, &keyLen, sizeof(keyHash));
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
|
||||
HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
|
||||
* reuse the original context allocated above so we don't
|
||||
* need to allocate and free another one */
|
||||
rv = HMAC_ReInit(hmac, hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ rsa_HMACPrf(HMACContext *hmac, const cha
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
PORT_Memcpy(output, hmacLast, left);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(hmacLast, 0, sizeof(hmacLast));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(hmacLast, sizeof(hmacLast));
|
||||
}
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ rsa_GetErrorLength(HMACContext *hmac, in
|
||||
outLength = PORT_CT_SEL(PORT_CT_LT(candidate, maxLegalLen),
|
||||
candidate, outLength);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(out, sizeof(out));
|
||||
return outLength;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
||||
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyDSACheck(PRFileDesc *shFD,
|
||||
|
||||
/* verify the hash against the check file */
|
||||
rv = DSA_VerifyDigest(key, signature, &hash);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
|
||||
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyHMACCheck(PRFileDesc *shFD
|
||||
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
||||
result = SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(signature, &hash);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
|
||||
#ifndef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
|
||||
DSAPublicKey key;
|
||||
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(&key, sizeof(key));
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
|
||||
@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
|
||||
shFD = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
loser:
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(&header, 0, sizeof header);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(&header, sizeof header);
|
||||
if (checkName != NULL) {
|
||||
PORT_Free(checkName);
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
||||
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ loser:
|
||||
/* clear out state so it's not left on the stack */
|
||||
if (cx)
|
||||
HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_TRUE);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(state, sizeof(state));
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(outbuf, sizeof(outbuf));
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero 2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c 2023-11-22 14:44:15.519400684 -0800
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
|
||||
- PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
|
||||
+ PORT_SafeZero(bytes, sizeof bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero 2023-11-22 14:41:24.069840921 -0800
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
|
||||
@@ -5092,7 +5092,7 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
|
||||
if ((signature_length >= pairwise_digest_length) &&
|
||||
(PORT_Memcmp(known_digest, signature + (signature_length - pairwise_digest_length), pairwise_digest_length) == 0)) {
|
||||
PORT_Free(signature);
|
||||
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero ./lib/util/secport.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/util/secport.h 2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
|
||||
#include <sys/types.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <ctype.h>
|
||||
+/* ask for Annex K for memset_s. will set the appropriate #define
|
||||
+ * if Annex K is supported */
|
||||
+#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
@@ -182,6 +185,39 @@ SEC_END_PROTOS
|
||||
#endif /*SUNOS4*/
|
||||
#define PORT_Memset memset
|
||||
|
||||
+/* there are cases where the compiler optimizes away our attempt to clear
|
||||
+ * out our stack variables. There are multiple solutions for this problem,
|
||||
+ * but they aren't universally accepted on all platforms. This attempts
|
||||
+ * to select the best solution available given our os, compilier, and libc */
|
||||
+#ifdef __STDC_LIB_EXT1__
|
||||
+/* if the os implements C11 annex K, use memset_s */
|
||||
+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) memset_s(p, n, 0, n)
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+#ifdef XP_WIN
|
||||
+/* windows has a secure zero funtion */
|
||||
+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) SecureZeroMemory(p, n)
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+/* _DEFAULT_SORUCE == BSD source in GCC based environments
|
||||
+ * if other environmens support explicit_bzero, their defines
|
||||
+ * should be added here */
|
||||
+#if defined(_DEFAULT_SOURCE) || defined(_BSD_SOURCE)
|
||||
+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) explicit_bzero(p, n)
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+/* if the os doesn't support one of the above, but does support
|
||||
+ * memset_explicit, you can add the definition for memset with the
|
||||
+ * appropriate define check here */
|
||||
+/* define an explicitly implementated Safe zero if the OS
|
||||
+ * doesn't provide one */
|
||||
+#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) \
|
||||
+ if (p != NULL) { \
|
||||
+ volatile unsigned char *__vl = (unsigned char *)p; \
|
||||
+ size_t __nl = n; \
|
||||
+ while (__nl--) *__vl++ = 0; \
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+#endif /* no explicit_bzero */
|
||||
+#endif /* no windows SecureZeroMemory */
|
||||
+#endif /* no memset_s */
|
||||
+
|
||||
#define PORT_Strcasecmp PL_strcasecmp
|
||||
#define PORT_Strcat strcat
|
||||
#define PORT_Strchr strchr
|
||||
@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator 2023-08-03 10:50:37.067109367 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2023-08-03 11:41:55.641541953 -0700
|
||||
@@ -2429,7 +2429,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
case SFTKFIPSECC:
|
||||
/* we've already handled the curve selection in the 'getlength'
|
||||
- * function */
|
||||
+ * function */
|
||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
case SFTKFIPSAEAD: {
|
||||
if (mech->ulParameterLen == 0) {
|
||||
@@ -2463,6 +2463,29 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
||||
}
|
||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
|
||||
+ /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
|
||||
+ * (independent of keysize).
|
||||
+ * 1. iteration count must be at least 1000.
|
||||
+ * 2. salt must be at least 128 bits (16 bytes).
|
||||
+ * 3. password must match the length specified in the SP
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkdf2 = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)
|
||||
+ mech->pParameter;
|
||||
+ if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(*pbkdf2)) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (pbkdf2->iterations < 1000) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (pbkdf2->ulSaltSourceDataLen < 16) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (*(pbkdf2->ulPasswordLen) < SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
default:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/Makefile.ppc_no_init ./lib/freebl/Makefile
|
||||
--- ./lib/freebl/Makefile.ppc_no_init 2024-06-03 14:12:24.216755903 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/Makefile 2024-06-03 14:11:36.464234903 -0700
|
||||
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ endif
|
||||
ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
|
||||
EXTRA_SRCS += gcm-ppc.c
|
||||
ifdef USE_64
|
||||
- DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
||||
+# DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
||||
PPC_ABI := $(shell $(CC) -dM -E - < /dev/null | awk '$$2 == "_CALL_ELF" {print $$3}')
|
||||
ifeq ($(PPC_ABI),2)
|
||||
ASFILES += sha512-p8.s
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/Makefile.ppc_no_init ./lib/softoken/Makefile
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/Makefile.ppc_no_init 2024-06-03 14:12:44.664979003 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/Makefile 2024-06-03 14:10:26.703473806 -0700
|
||||
@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/config.mk
|
||||
ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
||||
DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
||||
endif
|
||||
-ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Linux)
|
||||
-ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
|
||||
-ifdef USE_64
|
||||
- DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
||||
-endif # USE_64
|
||||
-endif # ppc
|
||||
-endif # Linux
|
||||
+#ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Linux)
|
||||
+#ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
|
||||
+#ifdef USE_64
|
||||
+# DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
||||
+#endif # USE_64
|
||||
+#endif # ppc
|
||||
+#endif # Linux
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#######################################################################
|
||||
62
SOURCES/nss-539183.patch
Normal file
62
SOURCES/nss-539183.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
||||
--- nss/cmd/httpserv/httpserv.c.539183 2016-05-21 18:31:39.879585420 -0700
|
||||
+++ nss/cmd/httpserv/httpserv.c 2016-05-21 18:37:22.374464057 -0700
|
||||
@@ -953,23 +953,23 @@
|
||||
getBoundListenSocket(unsigned short port)
|
||||
{
|
||||
PRFileDesc *listen_sock;
|
||||
int listenQueueDepth = 5 + (2 * maxThreads);
|
||||
PRStatus prStatus;
|
||||
PRNetAddr addr;
|
||||
PRSocketOptionData opt;
|
||||
|
||||
- addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
|
||||
- addr.inet.ip = PR_INADDR_ANY;
|
||||
- addr.inet.port = PR_htons(port);
|
||||
+ if (PR_SetNetAddr(PR_IpAddrAny, PR_AF_INET6, port, &addr) != PR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
+ errExit("PR_SetNetAddr");
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
- listen_sock = PR_NewTCPSocket();
|
||||
+ listen_sock = PR_OpenTCPSocket(PR_AF_INET6);
|
||||
if (listen_sock == NULL) {
|
||||
- errExit("PR_NewTCPSocket");
|
||||
+ errExit("PR_OpenTCPSockett");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
|
||||
opt.value.non_blocking = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
prStatus = PR_SetSocketOption(listen_sock, &opt);
|
||||
if (prStatus < 0) {
|
||||
PR_Close(listen_sock);
|
||||
errExit("PR_SetSocketOption(PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking)");
|
||||
--- nss/cmd/selfserv/selfserv.c.539183 2016-05-21 18:31:39.882585367 -0700
|
||||
+++ nss/cmd/selfserv/selfserv.c 2016-05-21 18:41:43.092801174 -0700
|
||||
@@ -1711,23 +1711,23 @@
|
||||
getBoundListenSocket(unsigned short port)
|
||||
{
|
||||
PRFileDesc *listen_sock;
|
||||
int listenQueueDepth = 5 + (2 * maxThreads);
|
||||
PRStatus prStatus;
|
||||
PRNetAddr addr;
|
||||
PRSocketOptionData opt;
|
||||
|
||||
- addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
|
||||
- addr.inet.ip = PR_INADDR_ANY;
|
||||
- addr.inet.port = PR_htons(port);
|
||||
+ if (PR_SetNetAddr(PR_IpAddrAny, PR_AF_INET6, port, &addr) != PR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
+ errExit("PR_SetNetAddr");
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
- listen_sock = PR_NewTCPSocket();
|
||||
+ listen_sock = PR_OpenTCPSocket(PR_AF_INET6);
|
||||
if (listen_sock == NULL) {
|
||||
- errExit("PR_NewTCPSocket");
|
||||
+ errExit("PR_OpenTCPSocket error");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
|
||||
opt.value.non_blocking = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
prStatus = PR_SetSocketOption(listen_sock, &opt);
|
||||
if (prStatus < 0) {
|
||||
PR_Close(listen_sock);
|
||||
errExit("PR_SetSocketOption(PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking)");
|
||||
13
SOURCES/nss-8-add-ipsec-usage-to-manpage.patch
Normal file
13
SOURCES/nss-8-add-ipsec-usage-to-manpage.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./doc/certutil.xml.ipsec_doc ./doc/certutil.xml
|
||||
--- ./doc/certutil.xml.ipsec_doc 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./doc/certutil.xml 2019-06-05 16:49:44.229301383 -0700
|
||||
@@ -428,6 +428,9 @@ of the attribute codes:
|
||||
<listitem>
|
||||
<para><command>J</command> (as an object signer)</para>
|
||||
</listitem>
|
||||
+ <listitem>
|
||||
+<para><command>I</command> (as an IPSEC user)</para>
|
||||
+ </listitem>
|
||||
</itemizedlist></listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
|
||||
571
SOURCES/nss-8-fix-public-key-from-priv.patch
Normal file
571
SOURCES/nss-8-fix-public-key-from-priv.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,571 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_import_unittest.cc.pub-priv-mech ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_import_unittest.cc
|
||||
--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_import_unittest.cc.pub-priv-mech 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_import_unittest.cc 2019-06-05 16:43:42.276498676 -0700
|
||||
@@ -78,17 +78,40 @@ class Pk11KeyImportTestBase : public ::t
|
||||
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_;
|
||||
|
||||
private:
|
||||
+ SECItem GetPublicComponent(ScopedSECKEYPublicKey& pub_key) {
|
||||
+ SECItem null = { siBuffer, NULL, 0};
|
||||
+ switch(SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pub_key.get())) {
|
||||
+ case rsaKey:
|
||||
+ case rsaPssKey:
|
||||
+ case rsaOaepKey:
|
||||
+ return pub_key->u.rsa.modulus;
|
||||
+ case keaKey:
|
||||
+ return pub_key->u.kea.publicValue;
|
||||
+ case dsaKey:
|
||||
+ return pub_key->u.dsa.publicValue;
|
||||
+ case dhKey:
|
||||
+ return pub_key->u.dh.publicValue;
|
||||
+ case ecKey:
|
||||
+ return pub_key->u.ec.publicValue;
|
||||
+ case fortezzaKey: /* depricated */
|
||||
+ case nullKey:
|
||||
+ /* didn't use default here so we can catch new key types at compile time */
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return null;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
void CheckForPublicKey(const ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey& priv_key,
|
||||
const SECItem* expected_public) {
|
||||
// Verify the public key exists.
|
||||
StackSECItem priv_id;
|
||||
+ KeyType type = SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(priv_key.get());
|
||||
SECStatus rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePrivKey, priv_key.get(),
|
||||
CKA_ID, &priv_id);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv) << "Couldn't read CKA_ID from private key: "
|
||||
<< PORT_ErrorToName(PORT_GetError());
|
||||
|
||||
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE value_type = CKA_VALUE;
|
||||
- switch (SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(priv_key.get())) {
|
||||
+ switch (type) {
|
||||
case rsaKey:
|
||||
value_type = CKA_MODULUS;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@@ -106,6 +129,8 @@ class Pk11KeyImportTestBase : public ::t
|
||||
FAIL() << "unknown key type";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ // Scan public key objects until we find one with the same CKA_ID as
|
||||
+ // priv_key
|
||||
std::unique_ptr<PK11GenericObject, PK11GenericObjectsDeleter> objs(
|
||||
PK11_FindGenericObjects(slot_.get(), CKO_PUBLIC_KEY));
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, objs);
|
||||
@@ -128,20 +153,46 @@ class Pk11KeyImportTestBase : public ::t
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(1U, token.len);
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(0, token.data[0]);
|
||||
|
||||
- StackSECItem value;
|
||||
- rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypeGeneric, obj, value_type, &value);
|
||||
+ StackSECItem raw_value;
|
||||
+ SECItem decoded_value;
|
||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypeGeneric, obj, value_type, &raw_value);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+ SECItem value = raw_value;
|
||||
|
||||
+ // Decode the EC_POINT and check the output against expected.
|
||||
// CKA_EC_POINT isn't stable, see Bug 1520649.
|
||||
+ ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
|
||||
+ ASSERT_TRUE(arena);
|
||||
if (value_type == CKA_EC_POINT) {
|
||||
- continue;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
|
||||
+ // If this fails due to the noted inconsistency, we may need to
|
||||
+ // check the whole raw_value, or remove a leading UNCOMPRESSED_POINT tag
|
||||
+ rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena.get(), &decoded_value,
|
||||
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate),
|
||||
+ &raw_value);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
||||
+ value = decoded_value;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(expected_public, &value))
|
||||
<< "expected: "
|
||||
<< DataBuffer(expected_public->data, expected_public->len)
|
||||
<< std::endl
|
||||
<< "actual: " << DataBuffer(value.data, value.len) << std::endl;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Finally, convert the private to public and ensure it matches.
|
||||
+ ScopedSECKEYPublicKey pub_key(
|
||||
+ SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(priv_key.get()));
|
||||
+ ASSERT_TRUE(pub_key);
|
||||
+ SECItem converted_public = GetPublicComponent(pub_key);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_TRUE(converted_public.len != 0);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ASSERT_TRUE(SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(expected_public, &converted_public))
|
||||
+ << "expected: "
|
||||
+ << DataBuffer(expected_public->data, expected_public->len)
|
||||
+ << std::endl
|
||||
+ << "actual: "
|
||||
+ << DataBuffer(converted_public.data, converted_public.len)
|
||||
+ << std::endl;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.pub-priv-mech ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.pub-priv-mech 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c 2019-06-05 16:43:42.277498676 -0700
|
||||
@@ -1206,6 +1206,37 @@ SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(const SECKEYPublicK
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
+ * Use the private key to find a public key handle. The handle will be on
|
||||
+ * the same slot as the private key.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
|
||||
+seckey_FindPublicKeyHandle(SECKEYPrivateKey *privk, SECKEYPublicKey *pubk)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyID;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* this helper function is only used below. If we want to make this more
|
||||
+ * general, we would need to free up any already cached handles if the
|
||||
+ * slot doesn't match up with the private key slot */
|
||||
+ PORT_Assert(pubk->pkcs11ID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* first look for a matching public key */
|
||||
+ keyID = PK11_MatchItem(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID, CKO_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
||||
+ if (keyID != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
|
||||
+ return keyID;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* none found, create a temp one, make the pubk the owner */
|
||||
+ pubk->pkcs11ID = PK11_DerivePubKeyFromPrivKey(privk);
|
||||
+ if (pubk->pkcs11ID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
|
||||
+ /* end of the road. Token doesn't have matching public key, nor can
|
||||
+ * token regenerate a new public key from and existing private key. */
|
||||
+ return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ pubk->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(privk->pkcs11Slot);
|
||||
+ return pubk->pkcs11ID;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
SECKEYPublicKey *
|
||||
SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privk)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -1213,6 +1244,8 @@ SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(SECKEYPrivateK
|
||||
PLArenaPool *arena;
|
||||
CERTCertificate *cert;
|
||||
SECStatus rv;
|
||||
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKeyHandle;
|
||||
+ SECItem decodedPoint;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* First try to look up the cert.
|
||||
@@ -1243,11 +1276,47 @@ SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(SECKEYPrivateK
|
||||
|
||||
switch (privk->keyType) {
|
||||
case nullKey:
|
||||
- case dhKey:
|
||||
- case dsaKey:
|
||||
/* Nothing to query, if the cert isn't there, we're done -- no way
|
||||
* to get the public key */
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ case dsaKey:
|
||||
+ pubKeyHandle = seckey_FindPublicKeyHandle(privk, pubk);
|
||||
+ if (pubKeyHandle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, pubKeyHandle,
|
||||
+ CKA_BASE, arena, &pubk->u.dsa.params.base);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, pubKeyHandle,
|
||||
+ CKA_PRIME, arena, &pubk->u.dsa.params.prime);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, pubKeyHandle,
|
||||
+ CKA_SUBPRIME, arena, &pubk->u.dsa.params.subPrime);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, pubKeyHandle,
|
||||
+ CKA_VALUE, arena, &pubk->u.dsa.publicValue);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ return pubk;
|
||||
+ case dhKey:
|
||||
+ pubKeyHandle = seckey_FindPublicKeyHandle(privk, pubk);
|
||||
+ if (pubKeyHandle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, pubKeyHandle,
|
||||
+ CKA_BASE, arena, &pubk->u.dh.base);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, pubKeyHandle,
|
||||
+ CKA_PRIME, arena, &pubk->u.dh.prime);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, pubKeyHandle,
|
||||
+ CKA_VALUE, arena, &pubk->u.dh.publicValue);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ return pubk;
|
||||
case rsaKey:
|
||||
rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
|
||||
CKA_MODULUS, arena, &pubk->u.rsa.modulus);
|
||||
@@ -1258,7 +1327,6 @@ SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(SECKEYPrivateK
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
return pubk;
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
case ecKey:
|
||||
rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
|
||||
CKA_EC_PARAMS, arena, &pubk->u.ec.DEREncodedParams);
|
||||
@@ -1268,7 +1336,23 @@ SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(SECKEYPrivateK
|
||||
rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
|
||||
CKA_EC_POINT, arena, &pubk->u.ec.publicValue);
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess || pubk->u.ec.publicValue.len == 0) {
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
+ pubKeyHandle = seckey_FindPublicKeyHandle(privk, pubk);
|
||||
+ if (pubKeyHandle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, pubKeyHandle,
|
||||
+ CKA_EC_POINT, arena, &pubk->u.ec.publicValue);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* ec.publicValue should be decoded, PKCS #11 defines CKA_EC_POINT
|
||||
+ * as encoded, but it's not always. try do decoded it and if it
|
||||
+ * succeeds store the decoded value */
|
||||
+ rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &decodedPoint,
|
||||
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate), &pubk->u.ec.publicValue);
|
||||
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ /* both values are in the public key arena, so it's safe to
|
||||
+ * overwrite the old value */
|
||||
+ pubk->u.ec.publicValue = decodedPoint;
|
||||
}
|
||||
pubk->u.ec.encoding = ECPoint_Undefined;
|
||||
return pubk;
|
||||
@@ -1276,7 +1360,9 @@ SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(SECKEYPrivateK
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
+ /* must use Destroy public key here, because some paths create temporary
|
||||
+ * PKCS #11 objects which need to be freed */
|
||||
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubk);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11priv.h.pub-priv-mech ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11priv.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11priv.h.pub-priv-mech 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11priv.h 2019-06-05 16:43:42.277498676 -0700
|
||||
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE PK11_FindObjectForCert(
|
||||
PK11SymKey *pk11_CopyToSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
|
||||
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, PK11SymKey *symKey);
|
||||
unsigned int pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType);
|
||||
+CK_OBJECT_HANDLE PK11_DerivePubKeyFromPrivKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey);
|
||||
|
||||
/**********************************************************************
|
||||
* Certs
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c.pub-priv-mech ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c.pub-priv-mech 2019-06-05 16:37:38.726685789 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c 2019-06-05 16:43:42.278498675 -0700
|
||||
@@ -1841,6 +1841,35 @@ loser:
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
+ * This regenerate a public key from a private key. This function is currently
|
||||
+ * NSS private. If we want to make it public, we need to add and optional
|
||||
+ * template or at least flags (a.la. PK11_DeriveWithFlags).
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
|
||||
+PK11_DerivePubKeyFromPrivKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
|
||||
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
|
||||
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
||||
+ CK_RV crv;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ mechanism.mechanism = CKM_NSS_PUB_FROM_PRIV;
|
||||
+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
|
||||
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
|
||||
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(slot->session, &mechanism,
|
||||
+ privKey->pkcs11ID, NULL, 0,
|
||||
+ &objectID);
|
||||
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
|
||||
+ return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return objectID;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
* This Generates a wrapping key based on a privateKey, publicKey, and two
|
||||
* random numbers. For Mail usage RandomB should be NULL. In the Sender's
|
||||
* case RandomA is generate, outherwize it is passed.
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/lowkey.c.pub-priv-mech ./lib/softoken/lowkey.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/lowkey.c.pub-priv-mech 2019-05-10 14:14:18.000000000 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/lowkey.c 2019-06-05 16:44:20.469479019 -0700
|
||||
@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *
|
||||
nsslowkey_ConvertToPublicKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privk)
|
||||
{
|
||||
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubk;
|
||||
+ SECItem publicValue;
|
||||
PLArenaPool *arena;
|
||||
|
||||
arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
|
||||
@@ -301,6 +302,19 @@ nsslowkey_ConvertToPublicKey(NSSLOWKEYPr
|
||||
|
||||
pubk->arena = arena;
|
||||
pubk->keyType = privk->keyType;
|
||||
+ /* if the public key value doesn't exist, calculate it */
|
||||
+ if (privk->u.dsa.publicValue.len == 0) {
|
||||
+ rv = DH_Derive(&privk->u.dsa.params.base, &privk->u.dsa.params.prime,
|
||||
+ &privk->u.dsa.privateValue, &publicValue, 0);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(privk->arena, &privk->u.dsa.publicValue, &publicValue);
|
||||
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&publicValue, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.dsa.publicValue,
|
||||
&privk->u.dsa.publicValue);
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||||
@@ -327,6 +341,19 @@ nsslowkey_ConvertToPublicKey(NSSLOWKEYPr
|
||||
|
||||
pubk->arena = arena;
|
||||
pubk->keyType = privk->keyType;
|
||||
+ /* if the public key value doesn't exist, calculate it */
|
||||
+ if (privk->u.dh.publicValue.len == 0) {
|
||||
+ rv = DH_Derive(&privk->u.dh.base, &privk->u.dh.prime,
|
||||
+ &privk->u.dh.privateValue, &publicValue, 0);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(privk->arena, &privk->u.dh.publicValue, &publicValue);
|
||||
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&publicValue, PR_FALSE);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.dh.publicValue,
|
||||
&privk->u.dh.publicValue);
|
||||
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.pub-priv-mech ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.pub-priv-mech 2019-06-05 16:37:38.743685780 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2019-06-05 16:44:20.472479017 -0700
|
||||
@@ -6569,6 +6569,10 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
||||
extractValue = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
classType = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ case CKM_NSS_PUB_FROM_PRIV:
|
||||
+ extractValue = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ classType = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1: /* fall through */
|
||||
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: /* fall through */
|
||||
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: /* fall through */
|
||||
@@ -6610,6 +6614,35 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch (mechanism) {
|
||||
+ /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
|
||||
+ * will generate the public portion if it doesn't already exist. */
|
||||
+ case CKM_NSS_PUB_FROM_PRIV: {
|
||||
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
|
||||
+ NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
|
||||
+ int error;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_GetULongAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType);
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* privKey is stored in sourceKey and will be destroyed when
|
||||
+ * the sourceKey is freed. */
|
||||
+ privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, keyType, &crv);
|
||||
+ if (privKey == NULL) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ pubKey = nsslowkey_ConvertToPublicKey(privKey);
|
||||
+ if (pubKey == NULL) {
|
||||
+ error = PORT_GetError();
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(error);
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_PutPubKey(key, sourceKey, keyType, pubKey);
|
||||
+ nsslowkey_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
case CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE:
|
||||
if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
|
||||
sizeof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS)) {
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.pub-priv-mech ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.pub-priv-mech 2019-06-05 16:37:38.728685788 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c 2019-06-05 16:44:20.473479017 -0700
|
||||
@@ -2206,6 +2206,123 @@ sftk_GetPrivKey(SFTKObject *object, CK_K
|
||||
return priv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/* populate a public key object from a lowpublic keys structure */
|
||||
+CK_RV
|
||||
+sftk_PutPubKey(SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
||||
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
|
||||
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_CLASS);
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ switch (keyType) {
|
||||
+ case CKK_RSA:
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_MODULUS);
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
|
||||
+ /* format the keys */
|
||||
+ /* fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the public key */
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_MODULUS,
|
||||
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubKey->u.rsa.modulus));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
|
||||
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent));
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case CKK_DSA:
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_PRIME);
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_SUBPRIME);
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_BASE);
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_PRIME,
|
||||
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_SUBPRIME,
|
||||
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_BASE,
|
||||
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubKey->u.dsa.params.base));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE,
|
||||
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue));
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ case CKK_DH:
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_PRIME);
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_BASE);
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_PRIME,
|
||||
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubKey->u.dh.prime));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_BASE,
|
||||
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubKey->u.dh.base));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE,
|
||||
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubKey->u.dh.publicValue));
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ case CKK_EC:
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS);
|
||||
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
|
||||
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubKey->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
|
||||
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubKey->u.ec.publicValue));
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_CLASS, &classType,
|
||||
+ sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ return crv;
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
|
||||
+ sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
|
||||
+ return crv;
|
||||
+ /* now handle the operator attributes */
|
||||
+ if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DECRYPT)) {
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey, CKA_ENCRYPT, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ return crv;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SIGN)) {
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ return crv;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER)) {
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ return crv;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DERIVE)) {
|
||||
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
||||
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
+ return crv;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return crv;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
**************************** Symetric Key utils ************************
|
||||
*/
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.pub-priv-mech ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.pub-priv-mech 2019-06-05 16:37:38.730685787 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h 2019-06-05 16:44:20.473479017 -0700
|
||||
@@ -695,6 +695,9 @@ extern NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *sftk_GetPubKe
|
||||
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, CK_RV *crvp);
|
||||
extern NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *sftk_GetPrivKey(SFTKObject *object,
|
||||
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, CK_RV *crvp);
|
||||
+extern CK_RV sftk_PutPubKey(SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privKey,
|
||||
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType,
|
||||
+ NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey);
|
||||
extern void sftk_FormatDESKey(unsigned char *key, int length);
|
||||
extern PRBool sftk_CheckDESKey(unsigned char *key);
|
||||
extern PRBool sftk_IsWeakKey(unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type);
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h.pub-priv-mech ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h.pub-priv-mech 2019-06-05 16:37:38.733685785 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h 2019-06-05 16:44:54.389461561 -0700
|
||||
@@ -152,11 +152,6 @@
|
||||
#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 5)
|
||||
#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 6)
|
||||
|
||||
-/* IKE mechanism (to be proposed to PKCS #11 */
|
||||
-#define CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 7)
|
||||
-#define CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 8)
|
||||
-#define CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 9)
|
||||
-#define CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 10)
|
||||
|
||||
/* J-PAKE round 1 key generation mechanisms.
|
||||
*
|
||||
@@ -238,6 +233,15 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#define CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_CTR (CKM_NSS + 33)
|
||||
|
||||
+/* IKE mechanism (to be proposed to PKCS #11 */
|
||||
+#define CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 34)
|
||||
+#define CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 35)
|
||||
+#define CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 36)
|
||||
+#define CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 37)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/* Derive a public key from a bare private key */
|
||||
+#define CKM_NSS_PUB_FROM_PRIV (CKM_NSS + 40)
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* HISTORICAL:
|
||||
* Do not attempt to use these. They are only used by NETSCAPE's internal
|
||||
@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
|
||||
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
|
||||
<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
|
||||
"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
|
||||
<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
|
||||
<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
|
||||
]>
|
||||
|
||||
<refentry id="nss-config">
|
||||
|
||||
<refentryinfo>
|
||||
<date>&date;</date>
|
||||
<title>Network Security Services</title>
|
||||
<productname>nss</productname>
|
||||
<productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
|
||||
</refentryinfo>
|
||||
|
||||
<refmeta>
|
||||
<refentrytitle>nss-config</refentrytitle>
|
||||
<manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
|
||||
</refmeta>
|
||||
|
||||
<refnamediv>
|
||||
<refname>nss-config</refname>
|
||||
<refpurpose>Return meta information about nss libraries</refpurpose>
|
||||
</refnamediv>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsynopsisdiv>
|
||||
<cmdsynopsis>
|
||||
<command>nss-config</command>
|
||||
<arg><option>--prefix</option></arg>
|
||||
<arg><option>--exec-prefix</option></arg>
|
||||
<arg><option>--includedir</option></arg>
|
||||
<arg><option>--libs</option></arg>
|
||||
<arg><option>--cflags</option></arg>
|
||||
<arg><option>--libdir</option></arg>
|
||||
<arg><option>--version</option></arg>
|
||||
</cmdsynopsis>
|
||||
</refsynopsisdiv>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection id="description">
|
||||
<title>Description</title>
|
||||
|
||||
<para><command>nss-config</command> is a shell scrip
|
||||
tool which can be used to obtain gcc options for building client pacakges of nspt. </para>
|
||||
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>Options</title>
|
||||
|
||||
<variablelist>
|
||||
<varlistentry>
|
||||
<term><option>--prefix</option></term>
|
||||
<listitem><simpara>Returns the top level system directory under which the nss libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
|
||||
<varlistentry>
|
||||
<term><option>--exec-prefix</option></term>
|
||||
<listitem><simpara>returns the top level system directory under which any nss binaries would be installed.</simpara></listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
|
||||
<varlistentry>
|
||||
<term><option>--includedir</option> <replaceable>count</replaceable></term>
|
||||
<listitem><simpara>returns the path to the directory were the nss libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
|
||||
<varlistentry>
|
||||
<term><option>--version</option></term>
|
||||
<listitem><simpara>returns the upstream version of nss in the form major_version-minor_version-patch_version.</simpara></listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
|
||||
<varlistentry>
|
||||
<term><option>--libs</option></term>
|
||||
<listitem><simpara>returns the compiler linking flags.</simpara></listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
|
||||
<varlistentry>
|
||||
<term><option>--cflags</option></term>
|
||||
<listitem><simpara>returns the compiler include flags.</simpara></listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
|
||||
<varlistentry>
|
||||
<term><option>--libdir</option></term>
|
||||
<listitem><simpara>returns the path to the directory were the nss libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
|
||||
</variablelist>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>Examples</title>
|
||||
|
||||
<para>The following example will query for both include path and linkage flags:
|
||||
|
||||
<programlisting>
|
||||
/usr/bin/nss-config --cflags --libs
|
||||
</programlisting>
|
||||
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>Files</title>
|
||||
|
||||
<para><filename>/usr/bin/nss-config</filename></para>
|
||||
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>See also</title>
|
||||
<para>pkg-config(1)</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection id="authors">
|
||||
<title>Authors</title>
|
||||
<para>The nss liraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat, Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
|
||||
<para>
|
||||
Authors: Elio Maldonado <emaldona@redhat.com>.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- don't change -->
|
||||
<refsection id="license">
|
||||
<title>LICENSE</title>
|
||||
<para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
</refentry>
|
||||
|
||||
202
SOURCES/nss-disable-pkcs1-sigalgs-tls13.patch
Normal file
202
SOURCES/nss-disable-pkcs1-sigalgs-tls13.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
|
||||
# Date 1559031046 -7200
|
||||
# Tue May 28 10:10:46 2019 +0200
|
||||
# Node ID 0a4e8b72a92e144663c2f35d3836f7828cfc97f2
|
||||
# Parent 370a9e85f216f5f4ff277995a997c5c9b23a819f
|
||||
Bug 1552208, prohibit use of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms in TLS 1.3, r=mt
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewers: mt
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed By: mt
|
||||
|
||||
Subscribers: mt, jcj, ueno, rrelyea, HubertKario, KevinJacobs
|
||||
|
||||
Tags: #secure-revision, #bmo-crypto-core-security
|
||||
|
||||
Bug #: 1552208
|
||||
|
||||
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D32454
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_auth_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_auth_unittest.cc
|
||||
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_auth_unittest.cc
|
||||
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_auth_unittest.cc
|
||||
@@ -701,6 +701,44 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls12, ClientAuthIncons
|
||||
ConnectExpectAlert(server_, kTlsAlertIllegalParameter);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, ClientAuthPkcs1SignatureScheme) {
|
||||
+ static const SSLSignatureScheme kSignatureScheme[] = {
|
||||
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Reset(TlsAgent::kServerRsa, "rsa");
|
||||
+ client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSignatureScheme,
|
||||
+ PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSignatureScheme));
|
||||
+ server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSignatureScheme,
|
||||
+ PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSignatureScheme));
|
||||
+ client_->SetupClientAuth();
|
||||
+ server_->RequestClientAuth(true);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ auto capture_cert_verify = MakeTlsFilter<TlsHandshakeRecorder>(
|
||||
+ client_, kTlsHandshakeCertificateVerify);
|
||||
+ capture_cert_verify->EnableDecryption();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Connect();
|
||||
+ CheckSigScheme(capture_cert_verify, 0, server_, ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
|
||||
+ 1024);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, ClientAuthPkcs1SignatureSchemeOnly) {
|
||||
+ static const SSLSignatureScheme kSignatureScheme[] = {
|
||||
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Reset(TlsAgent::kServerRsa, "rsa");
|
||||
+ client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSignatureScheme,
|
||||
+ PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSignatureScheme));
|
||||
+ server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSignatureScheme,
|
||||
+ PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSignatureScheme));
|
||||
+ client_->SetupClientAuth();
|
||||
+ server_->RequestClientAuth(true);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ConnectExpectAlert(server_, kTlsAlertHandshakeFailure);
|
||||
+ server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
|
||||
+ client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
class TlsZeroCertificateRequestSigAlgsFilter : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
|
||||
public:
|
||||
TlsZeroCertificateRequestSigAlgsFilter(const std::shared_ptr<TlsAgent>& a)
|
||||
@@ -933,7 +971,7 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, InconsistentSign
|
||||
client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-TEST_P(TlsConnectTls12Plus, RequestClientAuthWithSha384) {
|
||||
+TEST_P(TlsConnectTls12, RequestClientAuthWithSha384) {
|
||||
server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSignatureSchemeRsaSha384,
|
||||
PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSignatureSchemeRsaSha384));
|
||||
server_->RequestClientAuth(false);
|
||||
@@ -1395,12 +1433,21 @@ TEST_P(TlsSignatureSchemeConfiguration,
|
||||
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(
|
||||
SignatureSchemeRsa, TlsSignatureSchemeConfiguration,
|
||||
::testing::Combine(
|
||||
- TlsConnectTestBase::kTlsVariantsAll, TlsConnectTestBase::kTlsV12Plus,
|
||||
+ TlsConnectTestBase::kTlsVariantsAll, TlsConnectTestBase::kTlsV12,
|
||||
::testing::Values(TlsAgent::kServerRsaSign),
|
||||
::testing::Values(ssl_auth_rsa_sign),
|
||||
::testing::Values(ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
|
||||
ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
|
||||
ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384)));
|
||||
+// RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is not allowed to be used in TLS 1.3
|
||||
+INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(
|
||||
+ SignatureSchemeRsaTls13, TlsSignatureSchemeConfiguration,
|
||||
+ ::testing::Combine(TlsConnectTestBase::kTlsVariantsAll,
|
||||
+ TlsConnectTestBase::kTlsV13,
|
||||
+ ::testing::Values(TlsAgent::kServerRsaSign),
|
||||
+ ::testing::Values(ssl_auth_rsa_sign),
|
||||
+ ::testing::Values(ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
|
||||
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384)));
|
||||
// PSS with SHA-512 needs a bigger key to work.
|
||||
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(
|
||||
SignatureSchemeBigRsa, TlsSignatureSchemeConfiguration,
|
||||
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_ciphersuite_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_ciphersuite_unittest.cc
|
||||
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_ciphersuite_unittest.cc
|
||||
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_ciphersuite_unittest.cc
|
||||
@@ -68,12 +68,6 @@ class TlsCipherSuiteTestBase : public Tl
|
||||
virtual void SetupCertificate() {
|
||||
if (version_ >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
|
||||
switch (sig_scheme_) {
|
||||
- case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
|
||||
- case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
|
||||
- case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
|
||||
- Reset(TlsAgent::kServerRsaSign);
|
||||
- auth_type_ = ssl_auth_rsa_sign;
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256:
|
||||
case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:
|
||||
Reset(TlsAgent::kServerRsaSign);
|
||||
@@ -330,6 +324,12 @@ static SSLSignatureScheme kSignatureSche
|
||||
ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256, ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
|
||||
ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512};
|
||||
|
||||
+static SSLSignatureScheme kSignatureSchemesParamsArrTls13[] = {
|
||||
+ ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
|
||||
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
|
||||
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
|
||||
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384, ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512};
|
||||
+
|
||||
INSTANTIATE_CIPHER_TEST_P(RC4, Stream, V10ToV12, kDummyNamedGroupParams,
|
||||
kDummySignatureSchemesParams,
|
||||
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
|
||||
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ INSTANTIATE_CIPHER_TEST_P(
|
||||
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_TLS_1_3
|
||||
INSTANTIATE_CIPHER_TEST_P(TLS13, All, V13,
|
||||
::testing::ValuesIn(kFasterDHEGroups),
|
||||
- ::testing::ValuesIn(kSignatureSchemesParamsArr),
|
||||
+ ::testing::ValuesIn(kSignatureSchemesParamsArrTls13),
|
||||
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
|
||||
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384);
|
||||
INSTANTIATE_CIPHER_TEST_P(TLS13AllGroups, All, V13,
|
||||
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc
|
||||
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc
|
||||
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_extension_unittest.cc
|
||||
@@ -436,14 +436,14 @@ TEST_P(TlsExtensionTest12Plus, Signature
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(TlsExtensionTest13Stream, SignatureAlgorithmsPrecedingGarbage) {
|
||||
- // 31 unknown signature algorithms followed by sha-256, rsa
|
||||
+ // 31 unknown signature algorithms followed by sha-256, rsa-pss
|
||||
const uint8_t val[] = {
|
||||
0x00, 0x40, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
|
||||
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
|
||||
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
|
||||
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
|
||||
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
|
||||
- 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x04, 0x01};
|
||||
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x08, 0x04};
|
||||
DataBuffer extension(val, sizeof(val));
|
||||
MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionReplacer>(client_, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn,
|
||||
extension);
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshakeMess
|
||||
static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType);
|
||||
static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash);
|
||||
PRBool ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme);
|
||||
+PRBool ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme);
|
||||
PRBool ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme);
|
||||
|
||||
const PRUint8 ssl_hello_retry_random[] = {
|
||||
@@ -4101,6 +4102,9 @@ ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(SSLSignatureSch
|
||||
if (ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme) == ssl_hash_sha1) {
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ if (ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(scheme)) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
/* With TLS 1.3, EC keys should have been selected based on calling
|
||||
* ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(), reject them otherwise. */
|
||||
return spkiOid != SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
||||
@@ -4351,6 +4355,22 @@ ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignature
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
PRBool
|
||||
+ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ switch (scheme) {
|
||||
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
|
||||
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
|
||||
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
|
||||
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
|
||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+PRBool
|
||||
ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (scheme) {
|
||||
169
SOURCES/nss-drbg-continuous.patch
Normal file
169
SOURCES/nss-drbg-continuous.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
|
||||
# Date 1561465415 -7200
|
||||
# Tue Jun 25 14:23:35 2019 +0200
|
||||
# Node ID a0114e3d8b22d4c6ee77504c483a0fe0037f4c71
|
||||
# Parent 313dfef345bd93bc67982249bffa2cfdd5a9d1b5
|
||||
Bug 1560329, drbg: perform continuous test on entropy source
|
||||
|
||||
Summary: FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 requires a conditional self test to check that consecutive entropy blocks from the system are different. As neither getentropy() nor /dev/urandom provides that check on the output, this adds the self test at caller side.
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewers: rrelyea
|
||||
|
||||
Bug #: 1560329
|
||||
|
||||
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D35636
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/drbg.c b/lib/freebl/drbg.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/freebl/drbg.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/drbg.c
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
|
||||
#define PRNG_ADDITONAL_DATA_CACHE_SIZE (8 * 1024) /* must be less than \
|
||||
* PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES \
|
||||
*/
|
||||
+#define PRNG_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE SHA256_LENGTH
|
||||
|
||||
/* RESEED_COUNT is how many calls to the prng before we need to reseed
|
||||
* under normal NIST rules, you must return an error. In the NSS case, we
|
||||
@@ -96,6 +97,8 @@ struct RNGContextStr {
|
||||
PRUint32 additionalAvail;
|
||||
PRBool isValid; /* false if RNG reaches an invalid state */
|
||||
PRBool isKatTest; /* true if running NIST PRNG KAT tests */
|
||||
+ /* for continuous entropy check */
|
||||
+ PRUint8 previousEntropyHash[SHA256_LENGTH];
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct RNGContextStr RNGContext;
|
||||
@@ -169,6 +172,82 @@ prng_instantiate(RNGContext *rng, const
|
||||
return SECSuccess;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static PRCallOnceType coRNGInitEntropy;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static PRStatus
|
||||
+prng_initEntropy(void)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ size_t length;
|
||||
+ PRUint8 block[PRNG_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
||||
+ SHA256Context ctx;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* For FIPS 140-2 4.9.2 continuous random number generator test,
|
||||
+ * fetch the initial entropy from the system RNG and keep it for
|
||||
+ * later comparison. */
|
||||
+ length = RNG_SystemRNG(block, sizeof(block));
|
||||
+ if (length == 0) {
|
||||
+ return PR_FAILURE; /* error is already set */
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ PORT_Assert(length == sizeof(block));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Store the hash of the entropy block rather than the block
|
||||
+ * itself for backward secrecy. */
|
||||
+ SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
|
||||
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, block, sizeof(block));
|
||||
+ SHA256_End(&ctx, globalrng->previousEntropyHash, NULL,
|
||||
+ sizeof(globalrng->previousEntropyHash));
|
||||
+ PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
|
||||
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static SECStatus
|
||||
+prng_getEntropy(PRUint8 *buffer, size_t requestLength)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ size_t total = 0;
|
||||
+ PRUint8 block[PRNG_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
||||
+ PRUint8 hash[SHA256_LENGTH];
|
||||
+ SHA256Context ctx;
|
||||
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (PR_CallOnce(&coRNGInitEntropy, prng_initEntropy) != PR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
|
||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* For FIPS 140-2 4.9.2 continuous random generator test,
|
||||
+ * iteratively fetch fixed sized blocks from the system and
|
||||
+ * compare consecutive blocks. */
|
||||
+ while (total < requestLength) {
|
||||
+ size_t length = RNG_SystemRNG(block, sizeof(block));
|
||||
+ if (length == 0) {
|
||||
+ rv = SECFailure; /* error is already set */
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ PORT_Assert(length == sizeof(block));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Store the hash of the entropy block rather than the block
|
||||
+ * itself for backward secrecy. */
|
||||
+ SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
|
||||
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, block, sizeof(block));
|
||||
+ SHA256_End(&ctx, hash, NULL, sizeof(hash));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (PORT_Memcmp(globalrng->previousEntropyHash, hash, sizeof(hash)) == 0) {
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
|
||||
+ rv = SECFailure;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->previousEntropyHash, hash, sizeof(hash));
|
||||
+ length = PR_MIN(requestLength - total, sizeof(block));
|
||||
+ PORT_Memcpy(buffer, block, length);
|
||||
+ total += length;
|
||||
+ buffer += length;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ out:
|
||||
+ PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof block);
|
||||
+ return rv;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Update the global random number generator with more seeding
|
||||
* material. Use the Hash_DRBG reseed algorithm from NIST SP-800-90
|
||||
@@ -182,11 +261,15 @@ prng_reseed(RNGContext *rng, const PRUin
|
||||
{
|
||||
PRUint8 noiseData[(sizeof rng->V_Data) + PRNG_SEEDLEN];
|
||||
PRUint8 *noise = &noiseData[0];
|
||||
+ SECStatus rv;
|
||||
|
||||
/* if entropy wasn't supplied, fetch it. (normal operation case) */
|
||||
if (entropy == NULL) {
|
||||
- entropy_len = (unsigned int)RNG_SystemRNG(
|
||||
- &noiseData[sizeof rng->V_Data], PRNG_SEEDLEN);
|
||||
+ entropy_len = PRNG_SEEDLEN;
|
||||
+ rv = prng_getEntropy(&noiseData[sizeof rng->V_Data], entropy_len);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ return SECFailure; /* error is already set */
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* NOTE: this code is only available for testing, not to applications */
|
||||
/* if entropy was too big for the stack variable, get it from malloc */
|
||||
@@ -384,7 +467,6 @@ static PRStatus
|
||||
rng_init(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
PRUint8 bytes[PRNG_SEEDLEN * 2]; /* entropy + nonce */
|
||||
- unsigned int numBytes;
|
||||
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
|
||||
|
||||
if (globalrng == NULL) {
|
||||
@@ -403,18 +485,17 @@ rng_init(void)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Try to get some seed data for the RNG */
|
||||
- numBytes = (unsigned int)RNG_SystemRNG(bytes, sizeof bytes);
|
||||
- PORT_Assert(numBytes == 0 || numBytes == sizeof bytes);
|
||||
- if (numBytes != 0) {
|
||||
+ rv = prng_getEntropy(bytes, sizeof bytes);
|
||||
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
||||
/* if this is our first call, instantiate, otherwise reseed
|
||||
* prng_instantiate gets a new clean state, we want to mix
|
||||
* any previous entropy we may have collected */
|
||||
if (V(globalrng)[0] == 0) {
|
||||
- rv = prng_instantiate(globalrng, bytes, numBytes);
|
||||
+ rv = prng_instantiate(globalrng, bytes, sizeof bytes);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
- rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, bytes, numBytes, NULL, 0);
|
||||
+ rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, bytes, sizeof bytes, NULL, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- memset(bytes, 0, numBytes);
|
||||
+ memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
PZ_DestroyLock(globalrng->lock);
|
||||
globalrng->lock = NULL;
|
||||
30
SOURCES/nss-fips-disable-tls13.patch
Normal file
30
SOURCES/nss-fips-disable-tls13.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/ssl/sslsock.c b/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
|
||||
@@ -2382,16 +2382,26 @@ ssl3_CreateOverlapWithPolicy(SSLProtocol
|
||||
rv = ssl3_GetEffectiveVersionPolicy(protocolVariant,
|
||||
&effectivePolicyBoundary);
|
||||
if (rv == SECFailure) {
|
||||
/* SECFailure means internal failure or invalid configuration. */
|
||||
overlap->min = overlap->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_NONE;
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* TODO: TLSv1.3 doesn't work yet under FIPS mode */
|
||||
+ if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
|
||||
+ if (effectivePolicyBoundary.min >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
|
||||
+ effectivePolicyBoundary.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (effectivePolicyBoundary.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
|
||||
+ effectivePolicyBoundary.max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
vrange.min = PR_MAX(input->min, effectivePolicyBoundary.min);
|
||||
vrange.max = PR_MIN(input->max, effectivePolicyBoundary.max);
|
||||
|
||||
if (vrange.max < vrange.min) {
|
||||
/* there was no overlap, turn off range altogether */
|
||||
overlap->min = overlap->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_NONE;
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
81
SOURCES/nss-fipstest-tls12-prf.patch
Normal file
81
SOURCES/nss-fipstest-tls12-prf.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
# Date 1560861770 -7200
|
||||
# Tue Jun 18 14:42:50 2019 +0200
|
||||
# Node ID 6ef49fe67d6227a1d290da5537ec0dade379a15a
|
||||
# Parent ebc93d6daeaa9001d31fd18b5199779da99ae9aa
|
||||
Bug 1559906, fipstest: use CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE in TLS test, r=rrelyea
|
||||
|
||||
This also lets us CAVS tests more than just SHA256.
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/cmd/fipstest/fipstest.c b/cmd/fipstest/fipstest.c
|
||||
--- a/cmd/fipstest/fipstest.c
|
||||
+++ b/cmd/fipstest/fipstest.c
|
||||
@@ -6669,12 +6669,13 @@ tls(char *reqfn)
|
||||
|
||||
CK_MECHANISM master_mech = { CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, NULL, 0 };
|
||||
CK_MECHANISM key_block_mech = { CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, NULL, 0 };
|
||||
- CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
|
||||
- CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_block_params;
|
||||
+ CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
|
||||
+ CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_block_params;
|
||||
CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT key_material;
|
||||
CK_RV crv;
|
||||
|
||||
/* set up PKCS #11 parameters */
|
||||
+ master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA256;
|
||||
master_params.pVersion = NULL;
|
||||
master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = clientHello_random;
|
||||
master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = sizeof(clientHello_random);
|
||||
@@ -6682,6 +6683,7 @@ tls(char *reqfn)
|
||||
master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = sizeof(serverHello_random);
|
||||
master_mech.pParameter = (void *)&master_params;
|
||||
master_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(master_params);
|
||||
+ key_block_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA256;
|
||||
key_block_params.ulMacSizeInBits = 0;
|
||||
key_block_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0;
|
||||
key_block_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0;
|
||||
@@ -6724,13 +6726,39 @@ tls(char *reqfn)
|
||||
if (buf[0] == '[') {
|
||||
if (strncmp(buf, "[TLS", 4) == 0) {
|
||||
if (buf[7] == '0') {
|
||||
+ /* CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS is a subset of
|
||||
+ * CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS and
|
||||
+ * CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS is a subset of
|
||||
+ * CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS. The latter params have
|
||||
+ * an extra prfHashMechanism field at the end. */
|
||||
master_mech.mechanism = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
|
||||
key_block_mech.mechanism = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
|
||||
+ master_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS);
|
||||
+ key_block_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS);
|
||||
} else if (buf[7] == '2') {
|
||||
- master_mech.mechanism =
|
||||
- CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256;
|
||||
- key_block_mech.mechanism =
|
||||
- CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256;
|
||||
+ if (strncmp(&buf[10], "SHA-1", 5) == 0) {
|
||||
+ master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA_1;
|
||||
+ key_block_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA_1;
|
||||
+ } else if (strncmp(&buf[10], "SHA-224", 7) == 0) {
|
||||
+ master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA224;
|
||||
+ key_block_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA224;
|
||||
+ } else if (strncmp(&buf[10], "SHA-256", 7) == 0) {
|
||||
+ master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA256;
|
||||
+ key_block_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA256;
|
||||
+ } else if (strncmp(&buf[10], "SHA-384", 7) == 0) {
|
||||
+ master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA384;
|
||||
+ key_block_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA384;
|
||||
+ } else if (strncmp(&buf[10], "SHA-512", 7) == 0) {
|
||||
+ master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA512;
|
||||
+ key_block_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA512;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ fprintf(tlsresp, "ERROR: Unable to find prf Hash type");
|
||||
+ goto loser;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ master_mech.mechanism = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
|
||||
+ key_block_mech.mechanism = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
|
||||
+ master_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(master_params);
|
||||
+ key_block_mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(key_block_params);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown TLS type %x\n",
|
||||
(unsigned int)buf[0]);
|
||||
@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -up ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h.aes_gcm_pkcs11_v2 ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h
|
||||
--- ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h.aes_gcm_pkcs11_v2 2020-05-13 13:44:11.312405744 -0700
|
||||
+++ ./lib/util/pkcs11n.h 2020-05-13 13:45:23.951723660 -0700
|
||||
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ typedef struct CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS {
|
||||
typedef CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS_PTR;
|
||||
|
||||
/* deprecated #defines. Drop in future NSS releases */
|
||||
-#ifdef NSS_PKCS11_2_0_COMPAT
|
||||
+#ifndef NSS_PKCS11_3_0_STRICT
|
||||
|
||||
/* defines that were changed between NSS's PKCS #11 and the Oasis headers */
|
||||
#define CKF_EC_FP CKF_EC_F_P
|
||||
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ typedef CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_GCM_
|
||||
#define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID CKT_NSS_VALID
|
||||
#define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID_DELEGATOR CKT_NSS_VALID_DELEGATOR
|
||||
#else
|
||||
-/* use the new CK_GCM_PARAMS if NSS_PKCS11_2_0_COMPAT is not defined */
|
||||
+/* use the new CK_GCM_PARAMS if NSS_PKCS11_3_0_STRICT is defined */
|
||||
typedef struct CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 CK_GCM_PARAMS;
|
||||
typedef CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 CK_PTR CK_GCM_PARAMS_PTR;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
4513
SOURCES/nss-ike-patch.patch
Normal file
4513
SOURCES/nss-ike-patch.patch
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
127
SOURCES/nss-input-check.patch
Normal file
127
SOURCES/nss-input-check.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
|
||||
# Date 1560498951 0
|
||||
# Fri Jun 14 07:55:51 2019 +0000
|
||||
# Branch NSS_3_44_BRANCH
|
||||
# Node ID fb9932d6e083322e7b5dfcd3d6e67477e0bb075a
|
||||
# Parent 876bca2723a1f969422edc93e7504420d8331d3c
|
||||
Bug 1515342 - More thorough input checking, r=jcj
|
||||
|
||||
All part of applying better discipline throughout.
|
||||
|
||||
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D33736
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
||||
@@ -639,6 +639,11 @@ seckey_ExtractPublicKey(const CERTSubjec
|
||||
return pubk;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
|
||||
+ /* A basic sanity check on inputs. */
|
||||
+ if (spki->algorithm.parameters.len == 0 || newOs.len == 0) {
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
pubk->keyType = ecKey;
|
||||
pubk->u.ec.size = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/dh.c b/lib/freebl/dh.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/freebl/dh.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/dh.c
|
||||
@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ DH_Derive(SECItem *publicValue,
|
||||
unsigned int len = 0;
|
||||
unsigned int nb;
|
||||
unsigned char *secret = NULL;
|
||||
- if (!publicValue || !prime || !privateValue || !derivedSecret) {
|
||||
+ if (!publicValue || !publicValue->len || !prime || !prime->len ||
|
||||
+ !privateValue || !privateValue->len || !derivedSecret) {
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/ec.c b/lib/freebl/ec.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/freebl/ec.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/ec.c
|
||||
@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ ec_NewKey(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateK
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!ecParams || !privKey || !privKeyBytes || (privKeyLen < 0) ||
|
||||
- !ecParams->name) {
|
||||
+ if (!ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName ||
|
||||
+ !privKey || !privKeyBytes || privKeyLen <= 0) {
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ EC_NewKey(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateK
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
unsigned char *privKeyBytes = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!ecParams) {
|
||||
+ if (!ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName || !privKey) {
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -430,7 +430,8 @@ EC_ValidatePublicKey(ECParams *ecParams,
|
||||
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!ecParams || !publicValue || !ecParams->name) {
|
||||
+ if (!ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName ||
|
||||
+ !publicValue || !publicValue->len) {
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -536,8 +537,9 @@ ECDH_Derive(SECItem *publicValue,
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!publicValue || !ecParams || !privateValue || !derivedSecret ||
|
||||
- !ecParams->name) {
|
||||
+ if (!publicValue || !publicValue->len ||
|
||||
+ !ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName ||
|
||||
+ !privateValue || !privateValue->len || !derivedSecret) {
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/util/quickder.c b/lib/util/quickder.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/util/quickder.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/util/quickder.c
|
||||
@@ -757,6 +757,13 @@ DecodeItem(void* dest,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
case SEC_ASN1_BIT_STRING: {
|
||||
+ /* Can't be 8 or more spare bits, or any spare bits
|
||||
+ * if there are no octets. */
|
||||
+ if (temp.data[0] >= 8 || (temp.data[0] > 0 && temp.len == 1)) {
|
||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
|
||||
+ rv = SECFailure;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
/* change the length in the SECItem to be the number
|
||||
of bits */
|
||||
temp.len = (temp.len - 1) * 8 - (temp.data[0] & 0x7);
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Kevin Jacobs <kjacobs@mozilla.com>
|
||||
# Date 1561145635 0
|
||||
# Fri Jun 21 19:33:55 2019 +0000
|
||||
# Branch NSS_3_44_BRANCH
|
||||
# Node ID 416a8f7cf8986103b4d74694aac1198edbb08b3e
|
||||
# Parent fb9932d6e083322e7b5dfcd3d6e67477e0bb075a
|
||||
Bug 1515342 - Ignore spki decode failures on negative (expect_fail) tests. r=jcj
|
||||
|
||||
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D35565
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_curve25519_unittest.cc b/gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_curve25519_unittest.cc
|
||||
--- a/gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_curve25519_unittest.cc
|
||||
+++ b/gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_curve25519_unittest.cc
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ class Pkcs11Curve25519Test
|
||||
|
||||
ScopedCERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo certSpki(
|
||||
SECKEY_DecodeDERSubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spkiItem));
|
||||
+ if (!expect_success && !certSpki) {
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(certSpki);
|
||||
|
||||
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey pubKey(SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(certSpki.get()));
|
||||
143
SOURCES/nss-leading-zero.patch
Normal file
143
SOURCES/nss-leading-zero.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Kevin Jacobs <kjacobs@mozilla.com>
|
||||
# Date 1560499074 0
|
||||
# Fri Jun 14 07:57:54 2019 +0000
|
||||
# Branch NSS_3_44_BRANCH
|
||||
# Node ID 876bca2723a1f969422edc93e7504420d8331d3c
|
||||
# Parent 20671f860c2619dc27208d64a84a759fdffc5ed1
|
||||
Bug 1540541 - Don't unnecessarily strip leading 0's from key material during PKCS11 import. r=jcj,mt
|
||||
|
||||
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D31671
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_25519.c b/lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_25519.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_25519.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_25519.c
|
||||
@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ ec_Curve25519_pt_mul(SECItem *X, SECItem
|
||||
}
|
||||
px = P->data;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ if (k->len != 32) {
|
||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
SECStatus rv = ec_Curve25519_mul(X->data, k->data, px);
|
||||
if (NSS_SecureMemcmpZero(X->data, X->len) == 0) {
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c
|
||||
@@ -190,7 +190,6 @@ PK11_ImportPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,
|
||||
attrs++;
|
||||
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
||||
attrs++;
|
||||
- signedattr = attrs;
|
||||
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
|
||||
pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data,
|
||||
pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len);
|
||||
@@ -222,12 +221,14 @@ PK11_ImportPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,
|
||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
|
||||
return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
-
|
||||
templateCount = attrs - theTemplate;
|
||||
- signedcount = attrs - signedattr;
|
||||
PORT_Assert(templateCount <= (sizeof(theTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)));
|
||||
- for (attrs = signedattr; signedcount; attrs++, signedcount--) {
|
||||
- pk11_SignedToUnsigned(attrs);
|
||||
+ if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey) {
|
||||
+ PORT_Assert(signedattr);
|
||||
+ signedcount = attrs - signedattr;
|
||||
+ for (attrs = signedattr; signedcount; attrs++, signedcount--) {
|
||||
+ pk11_SignedToUnsigned(attrs);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_SESSION, theTemplate,
|
||||
templateCount, isToken, &objectID);
|
||||
@@ -1074,9 +1075,13 @@ pk11_loadPrivKeyWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *
|
||||
&cktrue, &ckfalse);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Not everyone can handle zero padded key values, give
|
||||
- * them the raw data as unsigned */
|
||||
- for (ap = attrs; extra_count; ap++, extra_count--) {
|
||||
- pk11_SignedToUnsigned(ap);
|
||||
+ * them the raw data as unsigned. The exception is EC,
|
||||
+ * where the values are encoded or zero-preserving
|
||||
+ * per-RFC5915 */
|
||||
+ if (privKey->keyType != ecKey) {
|
||||
+ for (ap = attrs; extra_count; ap++, extra_count--) {
|
||||
+ pk11_SignedToUnsigned(ap);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* now Store the puppies */
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c
|
||||
@@ -184,7 +184,9 @@ PK11_IsUserCert(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CERT
|
||||
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
|
||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- pk11_SignedToUnsigned(&theTemplate);
|
||||
+ if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey) {
|
||||
+ pk11_SignedToUnsigned(&theTemplate);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if (pk11_FindObjectByTemplate(slot, &theTemplate, 1) != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
|
||||
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
|
||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pk12.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pk12.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pk12.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pk12.c
|
||||
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ PK11_ImportAndReturnPrivateKey(PK11SlotI
|
||||
}
|
||||
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, ck_id->data, ck_id->len);
|
||||
attrs++;
|
||||
- signedattr = attrs;
|
||||
+ /* No signed attrs for EC */
|
||||
/* curveOID always is a copy of AlgorithmID.parameters. */
|
||||
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS, lpk->u.ec.curveOID.data,
|
||||
lpk->u.ec.curveOID.len);
|
||||
@@ -523,11 +523,12 @@ PK11_ImportAndReturnPrivateKey(PK11SlotI
|
||||
}
|
||||
templateCount = attrs - theTemplate;
|
||||
PORT_Assert(templateCount <= sizeof(theTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
|
||||
- PORT_Assert(signedattr != NULL);
|
||||
- signedcount = attrs - signedattr;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- for (ap = signedattr; signedcount; ap++, signedcount--) {
|
||||
- pk11_SignedToUnsigned(ap);
|
||||
+ if (lpk->keyType != ecKey) {
|
||||
+ PORT_Assert(signedattr);
|
||||
+ signedcount = attrs - signedattr;
|
||||
+ for (ap = signedattr; signedcount; ap++, signedcount--) {
|
||||
+ pk11_SignedToUnsigned(ap);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_SESSION,
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/legacydb/lgattr.c b/lib/softoken/legacydb/lgattr.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/softoken/legacydb/lgattr.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/legacydb/lgattr.c
|
||||
@@ -950,9 +950,9 @@ lg_FindECPrivateKeyAttribute(NSSLOWKEYPr
|
||||
case CKA_UNWRAP:
|
||||
return LG_CLONE_ATTR(attribute, type, lg_StaticFalseAttr);
|
||||
case CKA_VALUE:
|
||||
- return lg_CopyPrivAttrSigned(attribute, type,
|
||||
- key->u.ec.privateValue.data,
|
||||
- key->u.ec.privateValue.len, sdbpw);
|
||||
+ return lg_CopyPrivAttribute(attribute, type,
|
||||
+ key->u.ec.privateValue.data,
|
||||
+ key->u.ec.privateValue.len, sdbpw);
|
||||
case CKA_EC_PARAMS:
|
||||
return lg_CopyAttributeSigned(attribute, type,
|
||||
key->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding.data,
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
||||
@@ -7747,7 +7747,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
||||
|
||||
rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar,
|
||||
withCofactor, &tmp);
|
||||
- PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
|
||||
+ PORT_ZFree(ecScalar.data, ecScalar.len);
|
||||
ecScalar.data = NULL;
|
||||
if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) {
|
||||
nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
|
||||
35
SOURCES/nss-module-leak.patch
Normal file
35
SOURCES/nss-module-leak.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
|
||||
# Date 1557150127 -7200
|
||||
# Mon May 06 15:42:07 2019 +0200
|
||||
# Node ID 438ac983bda9ec7944990d22a37877e9111caa90
|
||||
# Parent b018f3e84d87cce99a1fd81feeecb31123058687
|
||||
pk11slot: reference module from slot for finalization
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c
|
||||
@@ -1439,6 +1439,11 @@ PK11_InitSlot(SECMODModule *mod, CK_SLOT
|
||||
slot->slotID = slotID;
|
||||
slot->isThreadSafe = mod->isThreadSafe;
|
||||
slot->hasRSAInfo = PR_FALSE;
|
||||
+ slot->module = mod; /* NOTE: we don't make a reference here because
|
||||
+ * modules have references to their slots. This
|
||||
+ * works because modules keep implicit references
|
||||
+ * from their slots, and won't unload and disappear
|
||||
+ * until all their slots have been freed */
|
||||
|
||||
if (PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetSlotInfo(slotID, &slotInfo) != CKR_OK) {
|
||||
slot->disabled = PR_TRUE;
|
||||
@@ -1448,11 +1453,6 @@ PK11_InitSlot(SECMODModule *mod, CK_SLOT
|
||||
|
||||
/* test to make sure claimed mechanism work */
|
||||
slot->needTest = mod->internal ? PR_FALSE : PR_TRUE;
|
||||
- slot->module = mod; /* NOTE: we don't make a reference here because
|
||||
- * modules have references to their slots. This
|
||||
- * works because modules keep implicit references
|
||||
- * from their slots, and won't unload and disappear
|
||||
- * until all their slots have been freed */
|
||||
(void)PK11_MakeString(NULL, slot->slot_name,
|
||||
(char *)slotInfo.slotDescription, sizeof(slotInfo.slotDescription));
|
||||
slot->isHW = (PRBool)((slotInfo.flags & CKF_HW_SLOT) == CKF_HW_SLOT);
|
||||
24
SOURCES/nss-mpi-loop.patch
Normal file
24
SOURCES/nss-mpi-loop.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Greg Rubin <rubin@amazon.com>
|
||||
# Date 1558464083 25200
|
||||
# Tue May 21 11:41:23 2019 -0700
|
||||
# Branch NSS_3_44_BRANCH
|
||||
# Node ID 1eac9016c021055018389a5cb117678ecc61782a
|
||||
# Parent 416a8f7cf8986103b4d74694aac1198edbb08b3e
|
||||
Bug 1554336 - Optimize away unneeded loop in mpi.c r=kevinjacobs,jcj
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
|
||||
@@ -2063,7 +2063,10 @@ s_mp_almost_inverse(const mp_int *a, con
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (res >= 0) {
|
||||
- while (MP_SIGN(c) != MP_ZPOS) {
|
||||
+ if (mp_cmp_mag(c, p) >= 0) {
|
||||
+ MP_CHECKOK(mp_div(c, p, NULL, c));
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (MP_SIGN(c) != MP_ZPOS) {
|
||||
MP_CHECKOK(mp_add(c, p, c));
|
||||
}
|
||||
res = k;
|
||||
96
SOURCES/nss-post-handshake-auth-with-tickets.patch
Normal file
96
SOURCES/nss-post-handshake-auth-with-tickets.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
|
||||
# Date 1559121620 -7200
|
||||
# Wed May 29 11:20:20 2019 +0200
|
||||
# Node ID 29a48b604602a523defd6f9322a5adeca7e284a5
|
||||
# Parent 43a7fb4f994a31222c308113b0fccdd5480d5b8e
|
||||
Bug 1553443, send session ticket only after handshake is marked as finished
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewers: mt
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed By: mt
|
||||
|
||||
Bug #: 1553443
|
||||
|
||||
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D32128
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_auth_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_auth_unittest.cc
|
||||
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_auth_unittest.cc
|
||||
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_auth_unittest.cc
|
||||
@@ -537,6 +537,40 @@ TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, PostHandsh
|
||||
capture_cert_req->buffer().len()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+// Check if post-handshake auth still works when session tickets are enabled:
|
||||
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1553443
|
||||
+TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, PostHandshakeAuthWithSessionTicketsEnabled) {
|
||||
+ EnsureTlsSetup();
|
||||
+ client_->SetupClientAuth();
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, SSL_OptionSet(client_->ssl_fd(),
|
||||
+ SSL_ENABLE_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, PR_TRUE));
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, SSL_OptionSet(client_->ssl_fd(),
|
||||
+ SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS, PR_TRUE));
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, SSL_OptionSet(server_->ssl_fd(),
|
||||
+ SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS, PR_TRUE));
|
||||
+ size_t called = 0;
|
||||
+ server_->SetAuthCertificateCallback(
|
||||
+ [&called](TlsAgent*, PRBool, PRBool) -> SECStatus {
|
||||
+ called++;
|
||||
+ return SECSuccess;
|
||||
+ });
|
||||
+ Connect();
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, called);
|
||||
+ // Send CertificateRequest.
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(
|
||||
+ client_->ssl_fd(), GetClientAuthDataHook, nullptr));
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, SSL_SendCertificateRequest(server_->ssl_fd()))
|
||||
+ << "Unexpected error: " << PORT_ErrorToName(PORT_GetError());
|
||||
+ server_->SendData(50);
|
||||
+ client_->ReadBytes(50);
|
||||
+ client_->SendData(50);
|
||||
+ server_->ReadBytes(50);
|
||||
+ EXPECT_EQ(1U, called);
|
||||
+ ScopedCERTCertificate cert1(SSL_PeerCertificate(server_->ssl_fd()));
|
||||
+ ScopedCERTCertificate cert2(SSL_LocalCertificate(client_->ssl_fd()));
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE(SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&cert1->derCert, &cert2->derCert));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
// In TLS 1.3, the client sends its cert rejection on the
|
||||
// second flight, and since it has already received the
|
||||
// server's Finished, it transitions to complete and
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/ssl/tls13con.c b/lib/ssl/tls13con.c
|
||||
--- a/lib/ssl/tls13con.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ssl/tls13con.c
|
||||
@@ -4561,6 +4561,11 @@ tls13_ServerHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss
|
||||
return SECFailure;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ rv = tls13_FinishHandshake(ss);
|
||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
|
||||
if (ss->opt.enableSessionTickets) {
|
||||
rv = tls13_SendNewSessionTicket(ss, NULL, 0);
|
||||
@@ -4573,8 +4578,7 @@ tls13_ServerHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- return tls13_FinishHandshake(ss);
|
||||
+ return SECSuccess;
|
||||
|
||||
loser:
|
||||
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
|
||||
diff --git a/tests/ssl/sslauth.txt b/tests/ssl/sslauth.txt
|
||||
--- a/tests/ssl/sslauth.txt
|
||||
+++ b/tests/ssl/sslauth.txt
|
||||
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
|
||||
noECC 0 -r_-r_-r_-r_-E -V_tls1.3:tls1.3_-E_-n_TestUser_-w_nss TLS 1.3 Require client auth on post hs (client auth)
|
||||
noECC 0 -r_-r_-r_-E -V_tls1.3:tls1.3_-E_-n_none_-w_nss TLS 1.3 Request don't require client auth on post hs (client does not provide auth)
|
||||
noECC 1 -r_-r_-r_-r_-E -V_tls1.3:tls1.3_-E_-n_none_-w_nss TLS 1.3 Require client auth on post hs (client does not provide auth)
|
||||
+ noECC 0 -r_-r_-r_-E_-u -V_tls1.3:tls1.3_-E_-n_TestUser_-w_nss TLS 1.3 Request don't require client auth on post hs with session ticket (client auth)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Use EC cert for client authentication
|
||||
#
|
||||
@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
|
||||
Index: nss/gtests/manifest.mn
|
||||
===================================================================
|
||||
--- nss.orig/gtests/manifest.mn
|
||||
+++ nss/gtests/manifest.mn
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ NSS_SRCDIRS = \
|
||||
diff -up nss/gtests/manifest.mn.skip-sysinit-gtests nss/gtests/manifest.mn
|
||||
--- nss/gtests/manifest.mn.skip-sysinit-gtests 2019-04-26 12:55:05.979302035 +0200
|
||||
+++ nss/gtests/manifest.mn 2019-04-26 12:55:09.507228984 +0200
|
||||
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ NSS_SRCDIRS = \
|
||||
smime_gtest \
|
||||
softoken_gtest \
|
||||
ssl_gtest \
|
||||
- $(SYSINIT_GTEST) \
|
||||
nss_bogo_shim \
|
||||
pkcs11testmodule \
|
||||
$(NULL)
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
27
SOURCES/nss-skip-tls13-fips.patch
Normal file
27
SOURCES/nss-skip-tls13-fips.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
||||
# HG changeset patch
|
||||
# User Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
|
||||
# Date 1558341826 -7200
|
||||
# Mon May 20 10:43:46 2019 +0200
|
||||
# Node ID b447f0046807b718d2928d0e33313620d38a287a
|
||||
# Parent 02ea5f29ac3c1f1c6e6eb4b655afd9b4fc075a9e
|
||||
tests: skip TLS 1.3 tests under FIPS mode
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/tests/ssl/ssl.sh b/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
|
||||
--- a/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
|
||||
+++ b/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
|
||||
@@ -393,6 +393,15 @@ ssl_auth()
|
||||
echo "${testname}" | grep "TLS 1.3" > /dev/null
|
||||
TLS13=$?
|
||||
|
||||
+ # Currently TLS 1.3 tests are known to fail under FIPS mode,
|
||||
+ # because HKDF is implemented using the PKCS #11 functions
|
||||
+ # prohibited under FIPS mode.
|
||||
+ if [ "${TLS13}" -eq 0 ] && \
|
||||
+ [ "$SERVER_MODE" = "fips" -o "$CLIENT_MODE" = "fips" ] ; then
|
||||
+ echo "$SCRIPTNAME: skipping $testname (non-FIPS only)"
|
||||
+ continue
|
||||
+ fi
|
||||
+
|
||||
if [ "${CLIENT_MODE}" = "fips" -a "${CAUTH}" -eq 0 ] ; then
|
||||
echo "$SCRIPTNAME: skipping $testname (non-FIPS only)"
|
||||
elif [ "$ectype" = "SNI" -a "$NORM_EXT" = "Extended Test" ] ; then
|
||||
1148
SOURCES/nss-softokn-fips-update.patch
Normal file
1148
SOURCES/nss-softokn-fips-update.patch
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
|
||||
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
|
||||
<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
|
||||
"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
|
||||
<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
|
||||
<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
|
||||
]>
|
||||
|
||||
<refentry id="secmod.db">
|
||||
|
||||
<refentryinfo>
|
||||
<date>&date;</date>
|
||||
<title>Network Security Services</title>
|
||||
<productname>nss</productname>
|
||||
<productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
|
||||
</refentryinfo>
|
||||
|
||||
<refmeta>
|
||||
<refentrytitle>secmod.db</refentrytitle>
|
||||
<manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
|
||||
</refmeta>
|
||||
|
||||
<refnamediv>
|
||||
<refname>secmod.db</refname>
|
||||
<refpurpose>Legacy NSS security modules database</refpurpose>
|
||||
</refnamediv>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection id="description">
|
||||
<title>Description</title>
|
||||
<para><emphasis>secmod.db</emphasis> is an NSS security modules database.</para>
|
||||
<para>The security modules database is used to keep track of the NSS security modules. The NSS security modules export their services via the PKCS #11 API which NSS uses as its Services Provider Interface.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
<para>The command line utility <emphasis>modutil</emphasis> is used for managing PKCS #11 module information both within secmod.db files and within hardware tokens.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
<para>For new applications the recommended way of tracking security modules is via the pkcs11.txt configuration file used in conjunction the new sqlite-based shared database format for certificate and key databases.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>Files</title>
|
||||
<para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/secmod.db</filename></para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>See also</title>
|
||||
<para>modutil(1), cert8.db(5), cert9.db(5), key3.db(5), key4.db(5), pkcs11.txt(5)</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection id="authors">
|
||||
<title>Authors</title>
|
||||
<para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat, Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
|
||||
<para>Authors: Elio Maldonado <emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- don't change -->
|
||||
<refsection id="license">
|
||||
<title>LICENSE</title>
|
||||
<para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</refentry>
|
||||
@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
|
||||
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
|
||||
<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
|
||||
"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
|
||||
<!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
|
||||
<!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
|
||||
]>
|
||||
|
||||
<refentry id="setup-nsssysinit">
|
||||
|
||||
<refentryinfo>
|
||||
<date>&date;</date>
|
||||
<title>Network Security Services</title>
|
||||
<productname>nss</productname>
|
||||
<productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
|
||||
</refentryinfo>
|
||||
|
||||
<refmeta>
|
||||
<refentrytitle>setup-nsssysinit</refentrytitle>
|
||||
<manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
|
||||
</refmeta>
|
||||
|
||||
<refnamediv>
|
||||
<refname>setup-nsssysinit</refname>
|
||||
<refpurpose>Query or enable the nss-sysinit module</refpurpose>
|
||||
</refnamediv>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsynopsisdiv>
|
||||
<cmdsynopsis>
|
||||
<command>setup-nsssysinit</command>
|
||||
<arg><option>on</option></arg>
|
||||
<arg><option>off</option></arg>
|
||||
<arg><option>status</option></arg>
|
||||
</cmdsynopsis>
|
||||
</refsynopsisdiv>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection id="description">
|
||||
<title>Description</title>
|
||||
<para><command>setup-nsssysinit</command> is a shell script to query the status of the nss-sysinit module and when run with root priviledge it can enable or disable it. </para>
|
||||
<para>Turns on or off the nss-sysinit module db by editing the global PKCS #11 configuration file. Displays the status. This script can be invoked by the user as super user. It is invoked at nss-sysinit post install time with argument on.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>Options</title>
|
||||
|
||||
<variablelist>
|
||||
<varlistentry>
|
||||
<term><option>on</option></term>
|
||||
<listitem><simpara>Turn on nss-sysinit.</simpara></listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
|
||||
<varlistentry>
|
||||
<term><option>off</option></term>
|
||||
<listitem><simpara>Turn on nss-sysinit.</simpara></listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
|
||||
<varlistentry>
|
||||
<term><option>status</option></term>
|
||||
<listitem><simpara>returns whether nss-syinit is enabled or not.</simpara></listitem>
|
||||
</varlistentry>
|
||||
|
||||
</variablelist>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>Examples</title>
|
||||
|
||||
<para>The following example will query for the status of nss-sysinit:
|
||||
<programlisting>
|
||||
/usr/bin/setup-nsssysinit status
|
||||
</programlisting>
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
|
||||
<para>The following example, when run as superuser, will turn on nss-sysinit:
|
||||
<programlisting>
|
||||
/usr/bin/setup-nsssysinit on
|
||||
</programlisting>
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>Files</title>
|
||||
<para><filename>/usr/bin/setup-nsssysinit</filename></para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection>
|
||||
<title>See also</title>
|
||||
<para>pkg-config(1)</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<refsection id="authors">
|
||||
<title>Authors</title>
|
||||
<para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat, Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
|
||||
<para>Authors: Elio Maldonado <emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- don't change -->
|
||||
<refsection id="license">
|
||||
<title>LICENSE</title>
|
||||
<para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
</refsection>
|
||||
|
||||
</refentry>
|
||||
|
||||
419
SPECS/nss.spec
419
SPECS/nss.spec
@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
|
||||
%global nspr_build_version 4.35.0-1
|
||||
%global nspr_release -1
|
||||
%global nspr_version 4.35.0
|
||||
%global nss_version 3.101.0
|
||||
%global nspr_version 4.21.0
|
||||
%global nss_version 3.44.0
|
||||
%global unsupported_tools_directory %{_libdir}/nss/unsupported-tools
|
||||
%global saved_files_dir %{_libdir}/nss/saved
|
||||
%global dracutlibdir %{_prefix}/lib/dracut
|
||||
@ -45,35 +43,20 @@ rpm.define(string.format("nss_release_tag NSS_%s_RTM",
|
||||
string.gsub(rpm.expand("%nss_archive_version"), "%.", "_")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# This is taken from gnutls.spec
|
||||
%define srpmhash() %{lua:
|
||||
local files = rpm.expand("%_specdir/nss.spec")
|
||||
for i, p in ipairs(patches) do
|
||||
files = files.." "..p
|
||||
end
|
||||
for i, p in ipairs(sources) do
|
||||
files = files.." "..p
|
||||
end
|
||||
local sha256sum = assert(io.popen("cat "..files.."| sha256sum"))
|
||||
local hash = sha256sum:read("*a")
|
||||
sha256sum:close()
|
||||
print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Summary: Network Security Services
|
||||
Name: nss
|
||||
Version: %{nss_version}
|
||||
Release: 7%{?dist}
|
||||
Release: 14%{?dist}
|
||||
License: MPLv2.0
|
||||
URL: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/
|
||||
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
|
||||
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}
|
||||
Requires: nss-util >= %{nss_version}
|
||||
# TODO: revert to same version as nss once we are done with the merge
|
||||
Requires: nss-softokn%{_isa} >= %{nss_version}
|
||||
Requires: nss-system-init
|
||||
Requires: p11-kit-trust
|
||||
Requires: /usr/bin/update-crypto-policies
|
||||
BuildRequires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_build_version}
|
||||
Requires: crypto-policies
|
||||
BuildRequires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}
|
||||
# for shlibsign
|
||||
BuildRequires: nss-softokn
|
||||
BuildRequires: sqlite-devel
|
||||
@ -109,14 +92,14 @@ Source25: key3.db.xml
|
||||
Source26: key4.db.xml
|
||||
Source27: secmod.db.xml
|
||||
Source28: nss-p11-kit.config
|
||||
# fips algorithms are tied to the red hat validation, others
|
||||
# will have their own validation
|
||||
Source30: fips_algorithms.h
|
||||
|
||||
#Source50: NameConstraints_Certs.tar
|
||||
Source29: nss-softokn-cavs-1.0.tar.gz
|
||||
|
||||
# To inject hardening flags for DSO
|
||||
Patch1: nss-dso-ldflags.patch
|
||||
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=617723
|
||||
Patch2: nss-539183.patch
|
||||
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1549382
|
||||
Patch3: nss-module-leak.patch
|
||||
# This patch uses the GCC -iquote option documented at
|
||||
# http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Directory-Options.html#Directory-Options
|
||||
# to give the in-tree headers a higher priority over the system headers,
|
||||
@ -129,81 +112,48 @@ Patch1: nss-dso-ldflags.patch
|
||||
# Once the buildroot aha been bootstrapped the patch may be removed
|
||||
# but it doesn't hurt to keep it.
|
||||
Patch4: iquote.patch
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# RHEL-8 specific patches not in RHEL-9
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1552767
|
||||
Patch5: nss-skip-tls13-fips.patch
|
||||
# TLS 1.3 currently doesn't work under FIPS mode:
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1710372
|
||||
Patch6: nss-fips-disable-tls13.patch
|
||||
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1552208
|
||||
Patch7: nss-disable-pkcs1-sigalgs-tls13.patch
|
||||
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1553443
|
||||
Patch8: nss-post-handshake-auth-with-tickets.patch
|
||||
# To revert the change in:
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=818686
|
||||
Patch10: nss-sysinit-userdb.patch
|
||||
# Disable nss-sysinit test which is solely to test the above change
|
||||
Patch11: nss-skip-sysinit-gtests.patch
|
||||
# For compatibility reasons, we stick with the old PKCS #11 2.40
|
||||
# definition of CK_GCM_PARAMS:
|
||||
%if 0%{?fedora} < 34
|
||||
%if 0%{?rhel} < 9
|
||||
Patch12: nss-gcm-param-default-pkcs11v2.patch
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
Patch9: nss-sysinit-userdb.patch
|
||||
# Disable nss-sysinit test which is sorely to test the above change
|
||||
Patch10: nss-skip-sysinit-gtests.patch
|
||||
# Upstream patch didn't make 3.44
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1546229
|
||||
Patch200: nss-ike-patch.patch
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1546477
|
||||
Patch201: nss-softokn-fips-update.patch
|
||||
# Local patch for TLS_ECDHE_{ECDSA|RSA}_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphers
|
||||
Patch13: rhbz1185708-enable-ecc-3des-ciphers-by-default.patch
|
||||
# Local patch: ignore rsa, rsa-pss, ecdsa policies until crypto-policies
|
||||
# is updated.
|
||||
Patch14: nss-3.101-disable-signature-policies.patch
|
||||
Patch15: nss-3.101-el8-fix-rsa-policy-test.patch
|
||||
# Local patch: disable tests that require external reference so brew completes
|
||||
Patch16: nss-3.66-disable-external-host-test.patch
|
||||
# Local patch: restore old pkcs 12 defaults on old version of rhel
|
||||
Patch17: nss-3.101-el8-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch
|
||||
# Local Patch: restore expired distrusted certs for now
|
||||
Patch18: nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch
|
||||
# Local Patch: update fipsdefaults to AES
|
||||
Patch19: nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch
|
||||
# Local Patch: curve25519 keys can't be stored in dbm databases,
|
||||
# only rhel-8 has dbm databases left, don't try to store
|
||||
# curve25519 keys in the dbm database.
|
||||
Patch20: nss-3.101-ec-dbm-test.patch
|
||||
# end of RHEL-8 specific patches
|
||||
|
||||
# RHEL-specific shared with RHEL-9
|
||||
Patch30: nss-3.101-extend-db-dump-time.patch
|
||||
# Local patch: disable MD5 (also MD2 and MD4) completely
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1849938
|
||||
Patch32: nss-3.101-disable-md5.patch
|
||||
Patch34: nss-3.71-fix-lto-gtests.patch
|
||||
Patch35: nss-3.71-camellia-pkcs12-doc.patch
|
||||
Patch36: nss-3.101-disable-ech.patch
|
||||
|
||||
# patches that expect to be upstreamed
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1767883
|
||||
Patch50: nss-3.79-fips.patch
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1836781
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1836925
|
||||
Patch51: nss-3.101-fips-review.patches
|
||||
Patch52: nss-3.90-pbkdf2-indicator.patch
|
||||
|
||||
# ems policy. needs to upstream
|
||||
Patch60: nss-3.101-add-ems-policy.patch
|
||||
Patch70: nss-3.90-fips-safe-memset.patch
|
||||
Patch71: nss-3.101-fips-indicators.patch
|
||||
Patch72: nss-3.90-aes-gmc-indicator.patch
|
||||
Patch73: nss-3.90-fips-indicators2.patch
|
||||
Patch74: nss-3.90-dh-test-update.patch
|
||||
Patch75: nss-3.90-ppc_no_init.patch
|
||||
Patch76: nss-3.101-enable-kyber-policy.patch
|
||||
Patch78: nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-md5-decode.patch
|
||||
Patch80: nss-3.101-el8-no-p12-smime-policy.patch
|
||||
Patch81: nss-3.101-fix-missing-size-checks.patch
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1905691
|
||||
Patch82: nss-3.101-chacha-timing-fix.patch
|
||||
Patch83: nss-3.101-add-certificate-compression-test.patch
|
||||
Patch84: nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-pbkdf1-encoding.patch
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=676100
|
||||
Patch85: nss-3.101-fix-cms-abi-break.patch
|
||||
Patch86: nss-3.101-long-pwd-fix.patch
|
||||
|
||||
#revert patches
|
||||
Patch300: nss-3.101-default-libpkix.patch
|
||||
Patch58: rhbz1185708-enable-ecc-3des-ciphers-by-default.patch
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1473806
|
||||
Patch202: nss-8-fix-public-key-from-priv.patch
|
||||
Patch204: nss-8-add-ipsec-usage-to-manpage.patch
|
||||
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1560329
|
||||
Patch205: nss-drbg-continuous.patch
|
||||
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1559906
|
||||
Patch206: nss-fipstest-tls12-prf.patch
|
||||
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1554336
|
||||
Patch210: nss-mpi-loop.patch
|
||||
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1540541
|
||||
Patch211: nss-leading-zero.patch
|
||||
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1515342
|
||||
Patch212: nss-input-check.patch
|
||||
Patch213: nss-3.44-missing-softokn-kdf.patch
|
||||
Patch214: nss-3.44-cmac.patch
|
||||
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1566131
|
||||
Patch215: nss-3.44-ske-policy.patch
|
||||
Patch216: nss-3.44-kbkdf.patch
|
||||
Patch217: nss-3.44-kbkdf-update.patch
|
||||
Patch218: nss-3.44-encrypt-update.patch
|
||||
Patch219: nss-3.44-kbkdf-coverity.patch
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%description
|
||||
@ -232,7 +182,7 @@ Summary: System NSS Initialization
|
||||
# providing nss-system-init without version so that it can
|
||||
# be replaced by a better one, e.g. supplied by the os vendor
|
||||
Provides: nss-system-init
|
||||
Requires: nss%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: nss = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires(post): coreutils, sed
|
||||
|
||||
%description sysinit
|
||||
@ -247,7 +197,7 @@ Provides: nss-static = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: nss%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: nss-util-devel
|
||||
Requires: nss-softokn-devel
|
||||
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
|
||||
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}
|
||||
Requires: pkgconfig
|
||||
BuildRequires: xmlto
|
||||
|
||||
@ -268,7 +218,7 @@ low level services.
|
||||
|
||||
%package util
|
||||
Summary: Network Security Services Utilities Library
|
||||
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
|
||||
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}
|
||||
|
||||
%description util
|
||||
Utilities for Network Security Services and the Softoken module
|
||||
@ -276,7 +226,7 @@ Utilities for Network Security Services and the Softoken module
|
||||
%package util-devel
|
||||
Summary: Development libraries for Network Security Services Utilities
|
||||
Requires: nss-util%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
|
||||
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}
|
||||
Requires: pkgconfig
|
||||
|
||||
%description util-devel
|
||||
@ -285,7 +235,7 @@ Header and library files for doing development with Network Security Services.
|
||||
|
||||
%package softokn
|
||||
Summary: Network Security Services Softoken Module
|
||||
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
|
||||
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}
|
||||
Requires: nss-util >= %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: nss-softokn-freebl%{_isa} >= %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -322,35 +272,26 @@ Developers should rely only on the officially supported NSS public API.
|
||||
Summary: Development libraries for Network Security Services
|
||||
Requires: nss-softokn%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: nss-softokn-freebl-devel%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
|
||||
Requires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}
|
||||
Requires: nss-util-devel >= %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
Requires: pkgconfig
|
||||
BuildRequires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_build_version}
|
||||
BuildRequires: nspr-devel >= %{nspr_version}
|
||||
|
||||
%description softokn-devel
|
||||
Header and library files for doing development with Network Security Services.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%prep
|
||||
%autosetup -N -n %{name}-%{nss_archive_version}
|
||||
#autosetup -N -S quilt -n %{name}-%{nss_archive_version}
|
||||
%autosetup -N -n %{name}-%{nss_archive_version} -a 29
|
||||
pushd nss
|
||||
%autopatch -M 299 -p1
|
||||
%patch -P 300 -p1 -R
|
||||
%autopatch -p1
|
||||
popd
|
||||
|
||||
# copy the fips_algorithms.h for this release
|
||||
# this file is release specific and matches what
|
||||
# each vendors claim in their own FIPS certification
|
||||
cp %{SOURCE30} nss/lib/softoken/
|
||||
|
||||
#update expired test certs
|
||||
#pushd nss
|
||||
#tar xvf %{SOURCE50}
|
||||
#popd
|
||||
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1247353
|
||||
find nss/lib/libpkix -perm /u+x -type f -exec chmod -x {} \;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%build
|
||||
|
||||
export FREEBL_NO_DEPEND=1
|
||||
@ -364,14 +305,7 @@ export FREEBL_LOWHASH=1
|
||||
# uncomment if the iquote patch is activated
|
||||
export IN_TREE_FREEBL_HEADERS_FIRST=1
|
||||
|
||||
# FIPS related defines
|
||||
export NSS_FORCE_FIPS=1
|
||||
export NSS_FIPS_VERSION="%{name}\ %{version}-%{srpmhash}"
|
||||
eval $(sed -n 's/^\(\(NAME\|VERSION_ID\)=.*\)/OS_\1/p' /etc/os-release | sed -e 's/ /\\ /g')
|
||||
export FIPS_MODULE_OS="$OS_NAME\ ${OS_VERSION_ID%%.*}"
|
||||
export NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID="${FIPS_MODULE_OS}\ ${NSS_FIPS_VERSION}"
|
||||
export NSS_FIPS_140_3=1
|
||||
export NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS=1
|
||||
|
||||
# Enable compiler optimizations and disable debugging code
|
||||
export BUILD_OPT=1
|
||||
@ -405,14 +339,17 @@ export USE_64=1
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
|
||||
##### phase 2: build the rest of nss
|
||||
make -C ./nss/coreconf
|
||||
make -C ./nss/lib/dbm
|
||||
|
||||
# Set the policy file location
|
||||
# if set NSS will always check for the policy file and load if it exists
|
||||
export POLICY_FILE="nss.config"
|
||||
# location of the policy file
|
||||
export POLICY_PATH="/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends"
|
||||
|
||||
%{__make} -C ./nss all
|
||||
%{__make} -C ./nss latest
|
||||
make -C ./nss
|
||||
|
||||
# build the man pages clean
|
||||
pushd ./nss/doc
|
||||
@ -547,10 +484,6 @@ export USE_64=1
|
||||
# disabled by the system policy.
|
||||
export NSS_IGNORE_SYSTEM_POLICY=1
|
||||
|
||||
%ifarch i686 ppcle64
|
||||
export NSS_DB_DUMP_TIME=10
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
|
||||
# enable the following line to force a test failure
|
||||
# find ./nss -name \*.chk | xargs rm -f
|
||||
|
||||
@ -590,9 +523,7 @@ pushd nss/tests
|
||||
# all.sh is the test suite script
|
||||
|
||||
# don't need to run all the tests when testing packaging
|
||||
export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE=dbm #in RHEL 8, the default db is sql, but we want
|
||||
# standard to test dbm, or upgradedb will fail
|
||||
%define nss_cycles "standard pkix upgradedb sharedb threadunsafe"
|
||||
# nss_cycles: standard pkix upgradedb sharedb
|
||||
# the full list from all.sh is:
|
||||
# "cipher lowhash libpkix cert dbtests tools fips sdr crmf smime ssl ocsp merge pkits chains ec gtests ssl_gtests"
|
||||
%define nss_tests "libpkix cert dbtests tools fips sdr crmf smime ssl ocsp merge pkits chains ec gtests ssl_gtests"
|
||||
@ -666,7 +597,7 @@ do
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# Copy the binaries we ship as unsupported
|
||||
for file in bltest dbtool ecperf fbectest fipstest shlibsign atob btoa derdump listsuites ocspclnt pp selfserv signtool strsclnt symkeyutil tstclnt validation vfyserv vfychain
|
||||
for file in bltest ecperf fbectest fipstest shlibsign atob btoa derdump listsuites ocspclnt pp selfserv signtool strsclnt symkeyutil tstclnt vfyserv vfychain
|
||||
do
|
||||
install -p -m 755 dist/*.OBJ/bin/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{unsupported_tools_directory}
|
||||
done
|
||||
@ -739,7 +670,10 @@ install -p -m 644 %{SOURCE28} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/crypto-policies/loc
|
||||
# from previous versions of nss.spec
|
||||
/usr/bin/setup-nsssysinit.sh on
|
||||
|
||||
%posttrans
|
||||
%post
|
||||
update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
|
||||
|
||||
%postun
|
||||
update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -791,7 +725,6 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
|
||||
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/strsclnt
|
||||
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/symkeyutil
|
||||
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/tstclnt
|
||||
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/validation
|
||||
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/vfyserv
|
||||
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/vfychain
|
||||
# instead of %%{_mandir}/man*/* let's list them explicitly
|
||||
@ -851,7 +784,6 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/p12plcy.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/p12t.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/pk11func.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/pk11hpke.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/pk11pqg.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/pk11priv.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/pk11pub.h
|
||||
@ -904,13 +836,11 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/ciferfam.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/eccutil.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/hasht.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/kyber.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssb64.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssb64t.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nsshash.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nsslocks.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssilock.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssilckt.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nsslocks.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssrwlk.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssrwlkt.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/nss3/nssutil.h
|
||||
@ -951,7 +881,6 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
|
||||
%dir %{saved_files_dir}
|
||||
%dir %{unsupported_tools_directory}
|
||||
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/bltest
|
||||
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/dbtool
|
||||
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/ecperf
|
||||
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/fbectest
|
||||
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/fipstest
|
||||
@ -999,208 +928,6 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Wed Sep 4 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-7
|
||||
- fix cms abi breakage
|
||||
- fix long password issue on pbmac encodings
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Aug 1 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-6
|
||||
- fix param encoding in pkcs12 pbamac encoding
|
||||
- add support for certificate compression in selfserv and tstclient
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jul 24 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-3
|
||||
- Fix missing and inaccurate key length checks
|
||||
- Fix chacha timing issue
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jul 17 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-2
|
||||
- Fix MD-5 decode issue in pkcs #12
|
||||
- turn off policy processing for pkcs12 and smime
|
||||
- update the restore defaults for pkcs12
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 18 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-1
|
||||
- Rebase to NSS 3.101
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Apr 10 2024 Frantisek Krenzelok <krenzelok.frantisek@gmail.com> - 3.90.0-7
|
||||
- Allow for shorter ecdsa signatures by padding them to full length
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jan 23 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-6
|
||||
- Fix ecc DER wrapping.
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jan 17 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-5
|
||||
- Pick up validated constant time implementations of p256, p384, and p521
|
||||
from upsream
|
||||
- More Fips indicator changes
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Dec 6 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-4
|
||||
- FIPS review changes
|
||||
- add PORT_SafeZero to avoid compiler optimizing a way zeroing memory.
|
||||
- update the indicators for this release
|
||||
- allow hashing of longer than int32 values in a single PKCS #11 call.
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Nov 21 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-3.1
|
||||
- Fix expired certs in tests
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2023-5388
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Aug 3 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-3
|
||||
- add indicators for pbkdf2
|
||||
- add camellia to pkcs12 doc files
|
||||
- fix ems policy bug
|
||||
- disable ech
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jul 27 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-2
|
||||
- fix the change log
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jul 27 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.90.0-1
|
||||
- rebase to NSS 3.90
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Mar 8 2023 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-11
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2023-0767
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Aug 11 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-10
|
||||
- Fix QA found failures:
|
||||
- remove extra '+' from sslpolicy.txt file causing test error values
|
||||
- only use GRND_RANDOM if the kernel is in FIPS mode.
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Aug 5 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-9
|
||||
- FIPS 140-3 changes
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jul 13 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-8
|
||||
- Update fips default for pk12util to AES rather than TDES
|
||||
- Fix bug in pkcs12 files with null passwords
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jul 6 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-7
|
||||
- Better fix for test regressions
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jun 27 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-6
|
||||
- fix nss.spec so it works in a rhel-8.1.0 buildroot
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jun 20 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-5
|
||||
- FIPS 140-3 changes
|
||||
- Reject Small RSA keys, 1024 bit keys are marked as FIP OK when verifying, reject
|
||||
signature keys by policy
|
||||
- Allow applications to retrigger selftests on demand.
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jun 17 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-4
|
||||
- Fix pkgconfig output
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jun 15 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-3
|
||||
- NSR Coverity fix changed selfserv from passive to active, change it back
|
||||
|
||||
* Sat Jun 11 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-2
|
||||
- Fix regressions found in test suites.
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jun 2 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-1
|
||||
- Rebase to NSS 3.79
|
||||
- Set FIPS Module ID
|
||||
- skip attribute verification on attributes with default values
|
||||
- don't export trust objects if they are default trust objects from dbm
|
||||
- add dbtool to nss-tools
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Nov 18 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.67.0-7
|
||||
- Fix CVE 2021 43527
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jul 6 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.67.0-6
|
||||
- Fix ssl alert issue
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jul 1 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.67.0-5
|
||||
- Fix issue with reading databases that were updated using
|
||||
unpatched versions of nss
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 29 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.67.0-4
|
||||
- Better fix for the sdb timeout. The issue wasn't a race, it was
|
||||
the sqlite timeout waiting to begin a transaction under heavy
|
||||
thread usage.
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jun 28 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.67.0-3
|
||||
- Fix sdb race condition
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jun 18 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.67.0-2
|
||||
- Fix coverity issues
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jun 17 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.67.0-1
|
||||
- Rebase to NSS 3.67
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 15 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.66.0-2
|
||||
- Restore old pkcs12 defaults.
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jun 14 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.66.0-1.1
|
||||
- build nss for older nspr so we can pass gating with
|
||||
the new nspr in the build root
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jun 2 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.66.0-1
|
||||
- Rebase to NSS 3.66
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Dec 3 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-17
|
||||
- Fix various corner cases with ike v1 app b support.
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Nov 19 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-16
|
||||
- Fix the following CVE
|
||||
- CVE-2020-12403 chacha-poly issues
|
||||
- CVE-2020-12400 constant time ECC.
|
||||
- CVE-2020-6829 constant time ECC.
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Nov 4 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-15
|
||||
- Revert some policy changes the generate ABI runtime issues.
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Oct 29 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-14
|
||||
- Add support for enable/disable in policy. Now if your policy
|
||||
file has disallow=x enable=y it will act just like our other
|
||||
libraries.
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Oct 26 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-13
|
||||
- Add OAEP interface so applications can wrap keys with RSA-OAEP
|
||||
rather than RSA-PKCS-1.
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Oct 19 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-12
|
||||
- fips need to reject small primes even if they are approved
|
||||
- code to autodetect whether or not to use the cache needs to do so
|
||||
in a way that doesn't mess with filesystem negative file caching.
|
||||
- add kdf selftests
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jul 30 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-11
|
||||
- Fix issue with upgradedb where upgradedb expects standard to
|
||||
generate dbm databases, not sql databases (default in RHEL8)
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jul 30 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-10
|
||||
- Disable dh timing test because it's unreliable on s390
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jul 30 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-9
|
||||
- Explicitly enable upgradedb/sharedb test cycles
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jul 29 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-8
|
||||
- Disable Delegated Credentials for TLS
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jul 24 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-7
|
||||
- Fix attribute decryption issue where the private key components
|
||||
integrity check on private attributes where not being checked.
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jul 13 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-6
|
||||
- Update nss-rsa-pkcs1-sigalgs.patch to the upstream version
|
||||
|
||||
* Sat Jul 11 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-5
|
||||
- Include required checks for dh and ecdh key generation in FIPS mode.
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jul 8 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-4
|
||||
- Add better checks for dh derive operations in FIPS mode.
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jun 25 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-3
|
||||
- Disable NSS_HASH_ALG_SUPPORT as well for MD5 (#1849938)
|
||||
- Adjust for update-crypto-policies packaging change (#1848649)
|
||||
- Fix compilation with -Werror=strict-prototypes (#1843417)
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jun 24 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-2
|
||||
- Fix regression in MD5 disablement (#1849938)
|
||||
- Include rsa_pkcs1_* in signature_algorithms extension (#1847945)
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jun 22 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-1
|
||||
- Update to NSS 3.53.1
|
||||
|
||||
* Sat Jun 6 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.53.0-1
|
||||
- Update to NSS 3.53
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jan 31 2020 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.44.0-15
|
||||
- Fix swapped CMAC PKCS #11 values.
|
||||
- Fix data alignment crash in CMAC.
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Dec 3 2019 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.44.0-14
|
||||
- Fix coverify scan issue
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user