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import nss-3.79.0-14.el9_0

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CentOS Sources 2022-09-20 07:46:47 -04:00 committed by root
parent 55ade7bfbf
commit de2abf3fa9
21 changed files with 6387 additions and 1778 deletions
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5
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
SOURCES/PayPalEE.cert
SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
SOURCES/blank-key4.db
SOURCES/nspr-4.32.tar.gz
SOURCES/nss-3.71.tar.gz
SOURCES/nspr-4.34.tar.gz
SOURCES/nss-3.79.tar.gz

5
.nss.metadata
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@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
5c92efcd23ae5dc57c4f0a3903d662365bca008c SOURCES/PayPalEE.cert
b5570125fbf6bfb410705706af48217a0817c03a SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
28e05ef5cbe6e7cde239d3cdcccabf571ec73f69 SOURCES/nspr-4.32.tar.gz
b60e3e0a2765d4009347e08dc9792a4dc4aded03 SOURCES/nss-3.71.tar.gz
efea1385dc83c55018183257036206b5f2c77c59 SOURCES/nspr-4.34.tar.gz
3719dd97c8ec9cb04aa61e6aca41b129b4adc004 SOURCES/nss-3.79.tar.gz

173
SOURCES/fips_algorithms.h Normal file
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
/*
* Vendors should replace this header file with the file containing those
* algorithms which have NIST algorithm Certificates.
*/
/* handle special cases. Classes require existing code to already be
* in place for that class */
typedef enum {
SFTKFIPSNone = 0,
SFTKFIPSDH, /* allow only specific primes */
SFTKFIPSECC, /* not just keys but specific curves */
SFTKFIPSAEAD /* single shot AEAD functions not allowed in FIPS mode */
} SFTKFIPSSpecialClass;
typedef struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList;
struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr {
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type;
CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
CK_ULONG step;
SFTKFIPSSpecialClass special;
};
SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
/* A sample set of algorithms to allow basic testing in our continous
* testing infrastructure. The vendor version should replace this with
* a version that matches their algorithm testing and security policy */
/* NOTE, This looks a lot like the PKCS #11 mechanism list in pkcs11.c, it
* differs in the following ways:
* 1) the addition of step and class elements to help restrict
* the supported key sizes and types.
* 2) The mechanism flags are restricted to only those that map to
* fips approved operations.
* 3) All key sizes are in bits, independent of mechanism.
* 4) You can add more then one entry for the same mechanism to handle
* multiple descrete keys where the MIN/MAX/STEP semantics doesn't apply
* or where different operations have different key requirements.
* This table does not encode all the modules legal FIPS semantics, only
* those semantics that might possibly change due to algorithms dropping
* of the security policy late in the process. */
/* handy common flag types */
#define CKF_KPG CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR
#define CKF_GEN CKF_GENERATE
#define CKF_SGN (CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY)
#define CKF_ENC (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT | CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
#define CKF_KEK (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
#define CKF_KEA CKF_DERIVE
#define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
#define CKF_HSH CKF_DIGEST
#define CK_MAX 0xffffffffUL
/* mechanisms using the same key types share the same key type
* limits */
#define RSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
#define RSA_FB_STEP 1
#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY 1024, 1792 /* min, max */
#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP 256
#define DSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
#define DSA_FB_STEP 1024
#define DH_FB_KEY 2048, 8192 /* min, max */
#define DH_FB_STEP 1024
#define EC_FB_KEY 256, 521 /* min, max */
#define EC_FB_STEP 1 /* key limits handled by special operation */
#define AES_FB_KEY 128, 256
#define AES_FB_STEP 64
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* -------------- RSA Multipart Signing Operations -------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- DSA Operations --------------------------- */
{ CKM_DSA_SHA224, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA_SHA256, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA_SHA384, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA_SHA512, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* -------------------- Diffie Hellman Operations --------------------- */
/* no diffie hellman yet */
{ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
{ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
/* -------------------- Elliptic Curve Operations --------------------- */
{ CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA224, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
/* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */
/* ------------------------- AES Operations --------------------------- */
{ CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_GEN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_ECB, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CBC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CMAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CTS, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CTR, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* --------------------- Secret Key Operations ------------------------ */
{ CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ---------------------- SSL/TLS operations ------------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 224, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 256, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 284, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 512, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* sigh, is this algorithm really tested. ssl doesn't seem to have a
* way of turning the extension off */
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- HKDF Operations -------------------------- */
{ CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 160, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 256, 512, CKF_GEN }, 128, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------ NIST 800-108 Key Derivations ------------------- */
{ CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
{ CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------ PBE Key Derivations ------------------- */
{ CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA224_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 224, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA256_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 256, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA384_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA512_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 512, 512, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone }
};
const int SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_fips_mechs);

51
SOURCES/nspr-4.34-fix-coverity-loop-issue.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
diff --git a/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c b/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
--- a/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
+++ b/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
@@ -2209,28 +2209,38 @@ PR_GetPrefLoopbackAddrInfo(PRNetAddr *re
PRBool result_still_empty = PR_TRUE;
PRADDRINFO *ai = res;
do {
PRNetAddr aNetAddr;
while (ai && ai->ai_addrlen > sizeof(PRNetAddr))
ai = ai->ai_next;
- if (ai) {
- /* copy sockaddr to PRNetAddr */
- memcpy(&aNetAddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
- aNetAddr.raw.family = ai->ai_addr->sa_family;
+ if (!ai) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* copy sockaddr to PRNetAddr */
+ memcpy(&aNetAddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+ aNetAddr.raw.family = ai->ai_addr->sa_family;
#ifdef _PR_INET6
- if (AF_INET6 == aNetAddr.raw.family)
- aNetAddr.raw.family = PR_AF_INET6;
+ if (AF_INET6 == aNetAddr.raw.family)
+ aNetAddr.raw.family = PR_AF_INET6;
#endif
- if (ai->ai_addrlen < sizeof(PRNetAddr))
- memset(((char*)result)+ai->ai_addrlen, 0,
- sizeof(PRNetAddr) - ai->ai_addrlen);
+ if (ai->ai_addrlen < sizeof(PRNetAddr))
+ memset(((char*)&aNetAddr)+ai->ai_addrlen, 0,
+ sizeof(PRNetAddr) - ai->ai_addrlen);
+
+ if (result->raw.family == PR_AF_INET) {
+ aNetAddr.inet.port = htons(port);
}
+ else {
+ aNetAddr.ipv6.port = htons(port);
+ }
+
/* If we obtain more than one result, prefer IPv6. */
if (result_still_empty || aNetAddr.raw.family == PR_AF_INET6) {
memcpy(result, &aNetAddr, sizeof(PRNetAddr));
}
result_still_empty = PR_FALSE;
ai = ai->ai_next;
}

12
SOURCES/nspr-4.34-server-passive.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff -r c75b4e36b7e8 pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
--- a/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c Wed May 25 23:39:48 2022 +0200
+++ b/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c Tue Jun 14 18:48:03 2022 -0400
@@ -2204,6 +2204,7 @@
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
rv = GETADDRINFO(NULL, tmpBuf, &hints, &res);
if (rv == 0) {
PRBool result_still_empty = PR_TRUE;

325
SOURCES/nss-3.67-cve-2021-43527-test.patch
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@ -1,325 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-dsa.crt b/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-dsa.crt
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-dsa.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIaZzCCCkWgAwIBAgIBATALBgcqhkjOOAQDBQAwMTEvMC0GA1UEAxMmZGVjb2Rl
+RUNvckRTQVNpZ25hdHVyZS10ZXN0Q2FzZS90YXZpc28wHhcNMjEwMTAxMDAwMDAw
+WhcNNDEwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZkZWNvZGVFQ29yRFNBU2lnbmF0
+dXJlLXRlc3RDYXNlL3RhdmlzbzCCCaYwggkaBgcqhkjOOAQBMIIJDQKBgQCqqqqq
+qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq
+qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq
+qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqgKCCAEAu7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7u7
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diff --git a/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-rsa-pss.crt b/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-rsa-pss.crt
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/cert/Leaf-bogus-rsa-pss.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
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+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
+VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVU=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/tests/cert/cert.sh b/tests/cert/cert.sh
--- a/tests/cert/cert.sh
+++ b/tests/cert/cert.sh
@@ -114,16 +114,28 @@ certu()
cert_log "ERROR: ${CU_ACTION} failed $RET"
else
html_passed "${CU_ACTION}"
fi
return $RET
}
+cert_test_vfy()
+{
+ echo "$SCRIPTNAME: Verify large rsa pss signature --------------"
+ echo " vfychain -a Leaf-bogus-dsa.crt"
+ vfychain -a ${QADIR}/cert/Leaf-bogus-dsa.crt
+ html_msg $? 1 "Verify large dsa signature"
+ echo "$SCRIPTNAME: Verify large rsa pss signature --------------"
+ echo " vfychain -a Leaf-bogus-rsa-pss.crt"
+ vfychain -a ${QADIR}/cert/Leaf-bogus-rsa-pss.crt
+ html_msg $? 1 "Verify large rsa pss signature"
+}
+
################################ crlu #################################
# local shell function to call crlutil, also: writes action and options to
# stdout, sets variable RET and writes results to the html file results
########################################################################
crlu()
{
echo "$SCRIPTNAME: ${CU_ACTION} --------------------------"
@@ -2640,11 +2652,13 @@ if [ -z "$NSS_TEST_DISABLE_CRL" ] ; then
else
echo "$SCRIPTNAME: Skipping CRL Tests"
fi
if [ -n "$DO_DIST_ST" -a "$DO_DIST_ST" = "TRUE" ] ; then
cert_stresscerts
fi
+cert_test_vfy
+
cert_iopr_setup
cert_cleanup

279
SOURCES/nss-3.67-cve-2021-43527.patch
View File

@ -1,279 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c b/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
--- a/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
+++ b/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
@@ -164,6 +164,37 @@
PR_FALSE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
}
+static unsigned int
+checkedSignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk)
+{
+ unsigned int sigLen = SECKEY_SignatureLen(pubk);
+ if (sigLen == 0) {
+ /* Error set by SECKEY_SignatureLen */
+ return sigLen;
+ }
+ unsigned int maxSigLen;
+ switch (pubk->keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ maxSigLen = (RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8;
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ maxSigLen = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ maxSigLen = 2 * MAX_ECKEY_LEN;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (sigLen > maxSigLen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return sigLen;
+}
+
/*
* decode the ECDSA or DSA signature from it's DER wrapping.
* The unwrapped/raw signature is placed in the buffer pointed
@@ -174,38 +205,38 @@
unsigned int len)
{
SECItem *dsasig = NULL; /* also used for ECDSA */
- SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
- if ((algid != SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE) &&
- (algid != SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY)) {
- if (sig->len != len) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
- return SECFailure;
+ /* Safety: Ensure algId is as expected and that signature size is within maxmimums */
+ if (algid == SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE) {
+ if (len > DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN) {
+ goto loser;
}
-
- PORT_Memcpy(dsig, sig->data, sig->len);
- return SECSuccess;
+ } else if (algid == SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) {
+ if (len > MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ goto loser;
}
- if (algid == SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) {
- if (len > MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
- return SECFailure;
- }
+ /* Decode and pad to length */
+ dsasig = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen((SECItem *)sig, len);
+ if (dsasig == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
}
- dsasig = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen((SECItem *)sig, len);
-
- if ((dsasig == NULL) || (dsasig->len != len)) {
- rv = SECFailure;
- } else {
- PORT_Memcpy(dsig, dsasig->data, dsasig->len);
+ if (dsasig->len != len) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(dsasig, PR_TRUE);
+ goto loser;
}
- if (dsasig != NULL)
- SECITEM_FreeItem(dsasig, PR_TRUE);
- if (rv == SECFailure)
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
- return rv;
+ PORT_Memcpy(dsig, dsasig->data, len);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(dsasig, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
+ return SECFailure;
}
const SEC_ASN1Template hashParameterTemplate[] =
@@ -281,7 +312,7 @@
sec_DecodeSigAlg(const SECKEYPublicKey *key, SECOidTag sigAlg,
const SECItem *param, SECOidTag *encalgp, SECOidTag *hashalg)
{
- int len;
+ unsigned int len;
PLArenaPool *arena;
SECStatus rv;
SECItem oid;
@@ -466,48 +497,52 @@
cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo = NULL;
rv = SECSuccess;
if (sig) {
- switch (type) {
- case rsaKey:
- rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(hashAlg, &cx->hashAlg,
- &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo,
- &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen,
- cx->key,
- sig, wincx);
- break;
- case rsaPssKey:
- sigLen = SECKEY_SignatureLen(key);
- if (sigLen == 0) {
- /* error set by SECKEY_SignatureLen */
- rv = SECFailure;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ if (type == rsaKey) {
+ rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(hashAlg, &cx->hashAlg,
+ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo,
+ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen,
+ cx->key,
+ sig, wincx);
+ } else {
+ sigLen = checkedSignatureLen(key);
+ /* Check signature length is within limits */
+ if (sigLen == 0) {
+ /* error set by checkedSignatureLen */
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ if (sigLen > sizeof(cx->u)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ switch (type) {
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ if (sig->len != sigLen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(cx->u.buffer, sig->data, sigLen);
+ rv = SECSuccess;
break;
- }
- if (sig->len != sigLen) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ case ecKey:
+ case dsaKey:
+ /* decodeECorDSASignature will check sigLen == sig->len after padding */
+ rv = decodeECorDSASignature(encAlg, sig, cx->u.buffer, sigLen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Unreachable */
rv = SECFailure;
- break;
- }
- PORT_Memcpy(cx->u.buffer, sig->data, sigLen);
- break;
- case dsaKey:
- case ecKey:
- sigLen = SECKEY_SignatureLen(key);
- if (sigLen == 0) {
- /* error set by SECKEY_SignatureLen */
- rv = SECFailure;
- break;
- }
- rv = decodeECorDSASignature(encAlg, sig, cx->u.buffer, sigLen);
- break;
- default:
- rv = SECFailure;
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
- break;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
}
}
- if (rv)
- goto loser;
-
/* check hash alg again, RSA may have changed it.*/
if (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(cx->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) {
/* error set by HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag */
@@ -650,11 +685,16 @@
switch (cx->key->keyType) {
case ecKey:
case dsaKey:
- dsasig.data = cx->u.buffer;
- dsasig.len = SECKEY_SignatureLen(cx->key);
+ dsasig.len = checkedSignatureLen(cx->key);
if (dsasig.len == 0) {
return SECFailure;
}
+ if (dsasig.len > sizeof(cx->u)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ dsasig.data = cx->u.buffer;
+
if (sig) {
rv = decodeECorDSASignature(cx->encAlg, sig, dsasig.data,
dsasig.len);
@@ -686,8 +726,13 @@
}
rsasig.data = cx->u.buffer;
- rsasig.len = SECKEY_SignatureLen(cx->key);
+ rsasig.len = checkedSignatureLen(cx->key);
if (rsasig.len == 0) {
+ /* Error set by checkedSignatureLen */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (rsasig.len > sizeof(cx->u)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (sig) {
@@ -749,7 +794,6 @@
SECStatus rv;
VFYContext *cx;
SECItem dsasig; /* also used for ECDSA */
-
rv = SECFailure;
cx = vfy_CreateContext(key, sig, encAlg, hashAlg, NULL, wincx);
@@ -757,19 +801,25 @@
switch (key->keyType) {
case rsaKey:
rv = verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(cx, digest);
+ /* Error (if any) set by verifyPKCS1DigestInfo */
break;
- case dsaKey:
case ecKey:
+ case dsaKey:
dsasig.data = cx->u.buffer;
- dsasig.len = SECKEY_SignatureLen(cx->key);
+ dsasig.len = checkedSignatureLen(cx->key);
if (dsasig.len == 0) {
+ /* Error set by checkedSignatureLen */
+ rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
- if (PK11_Verify(cx->key, &dsasig, (SECItem *)digest, cx->wincx) !=
- SECSuccess) {
+ if (dsasig.len > sizeof(cx->u)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- } else {
- rv = SECSuccess;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_Verify(cx->key, &dsasig, (SECItem *)digest, cx->wincx);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
}
break;
default:

825
SOURCES/nss-3.71-fips-module-name.patch
View File

@ -1,825 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/cmd/manifest.mn b/cmd/manifest.mn
--- a/cmd/manifest.mn
+++ b/cmd/manifest.mn
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
symkeyutil \
tests \
tstclnt \
+ validation \
vfychain \
vfyserv \
modutil \
diff --git a/cmd/validation/Makefile b/cmd/validation/Makefile
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/validation/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#! gmake
+#
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+#######################################################################
+# (1) Include initial platform-independent assignments (MANDATORY). #
+#######################################################################
+
+include manifest.mn
+
+#######################################################################
+# (2) Include "global" configuration information. (OPTIONAL) #
+#######################################################################
+
+include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/config.mk
+
+#######################################################################
+# (3) Include "component" configuration information. (OPTIONAL) #
+#######################################################################
+
+#######################################################################
+# (4) Include "local" platform-dependent assignments (OPTIONAL). #
+#######################################################################
+
+include ../platlibs.mk
+
+
+#######################################################################
+# (5) Execute "global" rules. (OPTIONAL) #
+#######################################################################
+
+include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/rules.mk
+
+#######################################################################
+# (6) Execute "component" rules. (OPTIONAL) #
+#######################################################################
+
+
+
+#######################################################################
+# (7) Execute "local" rules. (OPTIONAL). #
+#######################################################################
+
+
+include ../platrules.mk
+
diff --git a/cmd/validation/manifest.mn b/cmd/validation/manifest.mn
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/validation/manifest.mn
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+CORE_DEPTH = ../..
+
+DEFINES += -DNSPR20
+
+# MODULE public and private header directories are implicitly REQUIRED.
+MODULE = nss
+
+CSRCS = \
+ validation.c \
+ $(NULL)
+
+# The MODULE is always implicitly required.
+# Listing it here in REQUIRES makes it appear twice in the cc command line.
+REQUIRES = dbm seccmd
+
+PROGRAM = validation
+
+# USE_STATIC_LIBS = 1
diff --git a/cmd/validation/validation.c b/cmd/validation/validation.c
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/validation/validation.c
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifdef _CRTDBG_MAP_ALLOC
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <crtdbg.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "nspr.h"
+#include "secutil.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "nss.h"
+#include "secport.h"
+#include "secpkcs5.h"
+#include "sechash.h"
+#include "certdb.h"
+#include "secmod.h"
+
+#define PKCS12_IN_BUFFER_SIZE 200
+
+static char *progName;
+PRBool debug = PR_FALSE;
+
+#define ERR_USAGE 2
+#define ERR_PK11GETSLOT 13
+
+static void
+Usage()
+{
+#define FPS PR_fprintf(PR_STDERR,
+ FPS "Usage: %s [-d certdir] [-P dbprefix] [-h tokenname]\n",
+ progName);
+ FPS "\t\t [-k slotpwfile | -K slotpw] [-v]\n");
+
+ exit(ERR_USAGE);
+}
+
+typedef enum {
+ tagULong,
+ tagVersion,
+ tagUtf8
+} tagType;
+
+typedef struct {
+ const char *attributeName;
+ tagType attributeStorageType;
+} attributeTag;
+
+enum {
+ opt_CertDir = 0,
+ opt_TokenName,
+ opt_SlotPWFile,
+ opt_SlotPW,
+ opt_DBPrefix,
+ opt_Debug
+};
+
+static secuCommandFlag validation_options[] =
+ {
+ { /* opt_CertDir */ 'd', PR_TRUE, 0, PR_FALSE },
+ { /* opt_TokenName */ 'h', PR_TRUE, 0, PR_FALSE },
+ { /* opt_SlotPWFile */ 'k', PR_TRUE, 0, PR_FALSE },
+ { /* opt_SlotPW */ 'K', PR_TRUE, 0, PR_FALSE },
+ { /* opt_DBPrefix */ 'P', PR_TRUE, 0, PR_FALSE },
+ { /* opt_Debug */ 'v', PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE }
+ };
+
+void
+dump_Raw(char *label, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned char *value = (unsigned char *)attr->pValue;
+ printf("0x");
+ for (i = 0; i < attr->ulValueLen; i++) {
+ printf("%02x", value[i]);
+ }
+ printf("<%s>\n", label);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+dump_validations(CK_OBJECT_CLASS objc, CK_ATTRIBUTE *template, int count,
+ attributeTag *tags, PK11SlotInfo *slot)
+{
+ PK11GenericObject *objs, *obj;
+
+ objs = PK11_FindGenericObjects(slot, objc);
+
+ for (obj = objs; obj != NULL; obj = PK11_GetNextGenericObject(obj)) {
+ int i;
+ printf("Validation Object:\n");
+ PK11_ReadRawAttributes(NULL, PK11_TypeGeneric, obj, template, count);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ CK_ULONG ulong;
+ CK_VERSION version;
+ int len = template[i].ulValueLen;
+ printf(" %s: ", tags[i].attributeName);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ printf("<failed>\n");
+ } else if (len == 0) {
+ printf("<empty>\n");
+ } else
+ switch (tags[i].attributeStorageType) {
+ case tagULong:
+ if (len != sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
+ dump_Raw("bad ulong", &template[i]);
+ break;
+ }
+ ulong = *(CK_ULONG *)template[i].pValue;
+ printf("%ld\n", ulong);
+ break;
+ case tagVersion:
+ if (len != sizeof(CK_VERSION)) {
+ dump_Raw("bad version", &template[i]);
+ break;
+ }
+ version = *(CK_VERSION *)template[i].pValue;
+ printf("%d.%d\n", version.major, version.minor);
+ break;
+ case tagUtf8:
+ printf("%.*s\n", len, (char *)template[i].pValue);
+ break;
+ default:
+ dump_Raw("unknown tag", &template[i]);
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_Free(template[i].pValue);
+ template[i].pValue = NULL;
+ template[i].ulValueLen = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ PK11_DestroyGenericObjects(objs);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ secuPWData slotPw = { PW_NONE, NULL };
+ secuPWData p12FilePw = { PW_NONE, NULL };
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ char *slotname = NULL;
+ char *dbprefix = "";
+ char *nssdir = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ secuCommand validation;
+ int local_errno = 0;
+
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE validation_template[] = {
+ { CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_TYPE, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_VERSION, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_LEVEL, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_MODULE_ID, NULL, 0 }
+ };
+ attributeTag validation_tags[] = {
+ { "Validation Type", tagULong },
+ { "Validation Version", tagVersion },
+ { "Validation Level", tagULong },
+ { "Validation Module ID", tagUtf8 },
+ };
+
+#ifdef _CRTDBG_MAP_ALLOC
+ _CrtSetDbgFlag(_CRTDBG_ALLOC_MEM_DF | _CRTDBG_LEAK_CHECK_DF);
+#endif
+
+ validation.numCommands = 0;
+ validation.commands = 0;
+ validation.numOptions = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(validation_options);
+ validation.options = validation_options;
+
+ progName = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
+ progName = progName ? progName + 1 : argv[0];
+
+ rv = SECU_ParseCommandLine(argc, argv, progName, &validation);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ Usage();
+
+ debug = validation.options[opt_Debug].activated;
+
+ slotname = SECU_GetOptionArg(&validation, opt_TokenName);
+
+ if (validation.options[opt_SlotPWFile].activated) {
+ slotPw.source = PW_FROMFILE;
+ slotPw.data = PORT_Strdup(validation.options[opt_SlotPWFile].arg);
+ }
+
+ if (validation.options[opt_SlotPW].activated) {
+ slotPw.source = PW_PLAINTEXT;
+ slotPw.data = PORT_Strdup(validation.options[opt_SlotPW].arg);
+ }
+
+ if (validation.options[opt_CertDir].activated) {
+ nssdir = validation.options[opt_CertDir].arg;
+ }
+ if (validation.options[opt_DBPrefix].activated) {
+ dbprefix = validation.options[opt_DBPrefix].arg;
+ }
+
+ PR_Init(PR_SYSTEM_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 1);
+ if (nssdir == NULL && NSS_NoDB_Init("") == SECSuccess) {
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ /* if the system isn't already in FIPS mode, we need
+ * to switch to FIPS mode */
+ if (!PK11_IsFIPS()) {
+ /* flip to FIPS mode */
+ SECMODModule *module = SECMOD_GetInternalModule();
+ rv = SECMOD_DeleteInternalModule(module->commonName);
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = NSS_Initialize(nssdir, dbprefix, dbprefix,
+ "secmod.db", 0);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SECU_PrintPRandOSError(progName);
+ exit(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!slotname || PL_strcmp(slotname, "internal") == 0)
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalKeySlot();
+ else
+ slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(slotname);
+
+ if (!slot) {
+ SECU_PrintError(progName, "Invalid slot \"%s\"", slotname);
+ local_errno = ERR_PK11GETSLOT;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rv = dump_validations(CKO_NSS_VALIDATION,
+ validation_template,
+ PR_ARRAY_SIZE(validation_template),
+ validation_tags,
+ slot);
+
+done:
+ if (slotPw.data != NULL)
+ PORT_ZFree(slotPw.data, PL_strlen(slotPw.data));
+ if (p12FilePw.data != NULL)
+ PORT_ZFree(p12FilePw.data, PL_strlen(p12FilePw.data));
+ if (slot)
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (NSS_Shutdown() != SECSuccess) {
+ local_errno = 1;
+ }
+ PL_ArenaFinish();
+ PR_Cleanup();
+ return local_errno;
+}
diff --git a/cmd/validation/validation.gyp b/cmd/validation/validation.gyp
new file mode 100644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/validation/validation.gyp
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+{
+ 'includes': [
+ '../../coreconf/config.gypi',
+ '../../cmd/platlibs.gypi'
+ ],
+ 'targets': [
+ {
+ 'target_name': 'validation',
+ 'type': 'executable',
+ 'sources': [
+ 'validation.c'
+ ],
+ 'dependencies': [
+ '<(DEPTH)/exports.gyp:dbm_exports',
+ '<(DEPTH)/exports.gyp:nss_exports'
+ ]
+ }
+ ],
+ 'target_defaults': {
+ 'defines': [
+ 'NSPR20'
+ ]
+ },
+ 'variables': {
+ 'module': 'nss'
+ }
+}
diff --git a/lib/softoken/config.mk b/lib/softoken/config.mk
--- a/lib/softoken/config.mk
+++ b/lib/softoken/config.mk
@@ -59,3 +59,7 @@
DEFINES += -DNSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
endif
+ifdef NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID=\"${NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID}\"
+endif
+
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@
* failure so that there are at most 60 login attempts per minute.
*/
static PRIntervalTime loginWaitTime;
-static PRUint32 minSessionObjectHandle = 1U;
#define __PASTE(x, y) x##y
@@ -1672,8 +1671,6 @@
{
SFTKSlot *slot = session->slot;
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
- SFTKObject *duplicateObject = NULL;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_RV crv;
@@ -1711,30 +1708,13 @@
* token objects and will have a token object handle assigned to
* them by a call to sftk_mkHandle in the handler for each object
* class, invoked below.
- *
+ *
* It may be helpful to note/remember that
* sftk_narrowToXxxObject uses sftk_isToken,
* sftk_isToken examines the sign bit of the object's handle, but
* sftk_isTrue(...,CKA_TOKEN) examines the CKA_TOKEN attribute.
*/
- do {
- PRUint32 wrappedAround;
-
- duplicateObject = NULL;
- PZ_Lock(slot->objectLock);
- wrappedAround = slot->sessionObjectHandleCount & SFTK_TOKEN_MASK;
- handle = slot->sessionObjectHandleCount & ~SFTK_TOKEN_MASK;
- if (!handle) /* don't allow zero handle */
- handle = minSessionObjectHandle;
- slot->sessionObjectHandleCount = (handle + 1U) | wrappedAround;
- /* Is there already a session object with this handle? */
- if (wrappedAround) {
- sftkqueue_find(duplicateObject, handle, slot->sessObjHashTable,
- slot->sessObjHashSize);
- }
- PZ_Unlock(slot->objectLock);
- } while (duplicateObject != NULL);
- object->handle = handle;
+ object->handle = sftk_getNextHandle(slot);
/* get the object class */
attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(object, CKA_CLASS);
@@ -2875,10 +2855,15 @@
goto mem_loser;
slot->sessionIDCount = 0;
- slot->sessionObjectHandleCount = minSessionObjectHandle;
+ slot->sessionObjectHandleCount = NSC_MIN_SESSION_OBJECT_HANDLE;
slot->slotID = slotID;
sftk_setStringName(params->slotdes ? params->slotdes : sftk_getDefSlotName(slotID), slot->slotDescription,
sizeof(slot->slotDescription), PR_TRUE);
+ crv = sftk_InitSession(&slot->moduleObjects, slot, slotID, NULL, NULL,
+ CKF_SERIAL_SESSION);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
/* call the reinit code to set everything that changes between token
* init calls */
@@ -2887,6 +2872,12 @@
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto loser;
}
+ if (sftk_isFIPS(slotID)) {
+ crv = sftk_CreateValidationObjects(slot);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
crv = sftk_RegisterSlot(slot, moduleIndex);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto loser;
@@ -3032,6 +3023,8 @@
SFTK_ShutdownSlot(slot);
+ sftk_ClearSession(&slot->moduleObjects);
+
if (slot->tokObjHashTable) {
PL_HashTableDestroy(slot->tokObjHashTable);
slot->tokObjHashTable = NULL;
@@ -3262,6 +3255,7 @@
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
SECStatus rv;
CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *init_args = (CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *)pReserved;
+ PRBool destroy_freelist_on_error = PR_TRUE;
int i;
unsigned int moduleIndex = isFIPS ? NSC_FIPS_MODULE : NSC_NON_FIPS_MODULE;
@@ -3341,7 +3335,14 @@
"disabled FIPS mode");
}
}
+ /* if we have a peer open, we don't want to destroy the freelist
+ * from under the peer if we fail, the free list will be
+ * destroyed in that case when the C_Finalize is called for
+ * the peer */
+ destroy_freelist_on_error = PR_FALSE;
}
+ /* allow us to create objects in SFTK_SlotInit */
+ sftk_InitFreeLists();
for (i = 0; i < paramStrings.token_count; i++) {
crv = SFTK_SlotInit(paramStrings.configdir,
@@ -3355,8 +3356,9 @@
loser:
sftk_freeParams(&paramStrings);
}
- if (CKR_OK == crv) {
- sftk_InitFreeLists();
+ if (destroy_freelist_on_error && (CKR_OK != crv)) {
+ /* idempotent. If the list are already freed, this is a noop */
+ sftk_CleanupFreeLists();
}
#ifndef NO_FORK_CHECK
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@
#define NSC_SEARCH_BLOCK_SIZE 5
#define NSC_SLOT_LIST_BLOCK_SIZE 10
+#define NSC_MIN_SESSION_OBJECT_HANDLE 1U
+
#define NSC_FIPS_MODULE 1
#define NSC_NON_FIPS_MODULE 0
@@ -375,6 +377,9 @@
char tokDescription[33]; /* per load */
char updateTokDescription[33]; /* per load */
char slotDescription[65]; /* invariant */
+ SFTKSession moduleObjects; /* global session to hang module specific
+ * objects like profile objects or
+ * validation objects */
};
/*
@@ -766,6 +771,7 @@
extern void sftk_ReferenceObject(SFTKObject *object);
extern SFTKObject *sftk_ObjectFromHandle(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle,
SFTKSession *session);
+extern CK_OBJECT_HANDLE sftk_getNextHandle(SFTKSlot *slot);
extern void sftk_AddSlotObject(SFTKSlot *slot, SFTKObject *object);
extern void sftk_AddObject(SFTKSession *session, SFTKObject *object);
/* clear out all the existing object ID to database key mappings.
@@ -787,7 +793,11 @@
extern CK_SLOT_ID sftk_SlotIDFromSessionHandle(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle);
extern SFTKSession *sftk_SessionFromHandle(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle);
extern void sftk_FreeSession(SFTKSession *session);
+extern void sftk_ClearSession(SFTKSession *session);
extern void sftk_DestroySession(SFTKSession *session);
+extern CK_RV sftk_InitSession(SFTKSession *session, SFTKSlot *slot,
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_NOTIFY notify,
+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, CK_FLAGS flags);
extern SFTKSession *sftk_NewSession(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_NOTIFY notify,
CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, CK_FLAGS flags);
extern void sftk_update_state(SFTKSlot *slot, SFTKSession *session);
@@ -955,6 +965,9 @@
* FIPS security policy */
PRBool sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source);
+/* add validation objects to the slot */
+CK_RV sftk_CreateValidationObjects(SFTKSlot *slot);
+
SEC_END_PROTOS
#endif /* _PKCS11I_H_ */
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include "sftkdb.h"
#include "softoken.h"
#include "secoid.h"
+#include "softkver.h"
#if !defined(NSS_FIPS_DISABLED) && defined(NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS)
/* this file should be supplied by the vendor and include all the
@@ -1243,6 +1244,32 @@
return SFTK_Busy;
}
+/* find the next available object handle that isn't currently in use */
+CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+sftk_getNextHandle(SFTKSlot *slot)
+{
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
+ SFTKObject *duplicateObject = NULL;
+ do {
+ PRUint32 wrappedAround;
+
+ duplicateObject = NULL;
+ PZ_Lock(slot->objectLock);
+ wrappedAround = slot->sessionObjectHandleCount & SFTK_TOKEN_MASK;
+ handle = slot->sessionObjectHandleCount & ~SFTK_TOKEN_MASK;
+ if (!handle) /* don't allow zero handle */
+ handle = NSC_MIN_SESSION_OBJECT_HANDLE;
+ slot->sessionObjectHandleCount = (handle + 1U) | wrappedAround;
+ /* Is there already a session object with this handle? */
+ if (wrappedAround) {
+ sftkqueue_find(duplicateObject, handle, slot->sessObjHashTable,
+ slot->sessObjHashSize);
+ }
+ PZ_Unlock(slot->objectLock);
+ } while (duplicateObject != NULL);
+ return handle;
+}
+
/*
* add an object to a slot and session queue. These two functions
* adopt the object.
@@ -1848,23 +1875,13 @@
}
/*
- * create a new nession. NOTE: The session handle is not set, and the
+ * Init a new session. NOTE: The session handle is not set, and the
* session is not added to the slot's session queue.
*/
-SFTKSession *
-sftk_NewSession(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_NOTIFY notify, CK_VOID_PTR pApplication,
- CK_FLAGS flags)
+CK_RV
+sftk_InitSession(SFTKSession *session, SFTKSlot *slot, CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
+ CK_NOTIFY notify, CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, CK_FLAGS flags)
{
- SFTKSession *session;
- SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromID(slotID, PR_FALSE);
-
- if (slot == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- session = (SFTKSession *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSession));
- if (session == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
session->next = session->prev = NULL;
session->enc_context = NULL;
session->hash_context = NULL;
@@ -1873,8 +1890,7 @@
session->objectIDCount = 1;
session->objectLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockObject);
if (session->objectLock == NULL) {
- PORT_Free(session);
- return NULL;
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
session->objects[0] = NULL;
@@ -1887,12 +1903,38 @@
sftk_update_state(slot, session);
/* no ops completed yet, so the last one couldn't be a FIPS op */
session->lastOpWasFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a new session and init it.
+ */
+SFTKSession *
+sftk_NewSession(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_NOTIFY notify, CK_VOID_PTR pApplication,
+ CK_FLAGS flags)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromID(slotID, PR_FALSE);
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ if (slot == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ session = (SFTKSession *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSession));
+ if (session == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ crv = sftk_InitSession(session, slot, slotID, notify, pApplication, flags);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(session);
+ return NULL;
+ }
return session;
}
/* free all the data associated with a session. */
void
-sftk_DestroySession(SFTKSession *session)
+sftk_ClearSession(SFTKSession *session)
{
SFTKObjectList *op, *next;
@@ -1918,6 +1960,13 @@
if (session->search) {
sftk_FreeSearch(session->search);
}
+}
+
+/* free the data associated with the session, and the session */
+void
+sftk_DestroySession(SFTKSession *session)
+{
+ sftk_ClearSession(session);
PORT_Free(session);
}
@@ -2386,3 +2435,70 @@
return PR_FALSE;
#endif
}
+
+/*
+ * create the FIPS Validation objects. If the vendor
+ * doesn't supply an NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID, at compile time,
+ * then we assumethis is an unvalidated module.
+ */
+CK_RV
+sftk_CreateValidationObjects(SFTKSlot *slot)
+{
+ const char *module_id;
+ int module_id_len;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ /* we currently use vendor specific values until the validation
+ * objects are approved for PKCS #11 v3.2. */
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS cko_validation = CKO_NSS_VALIDATION;
+ CK_NSS_VALIDATION_TYPE ckv_fips = CKV_NSS_FIPS_140;
+ CK_VERSION fips_version = { 3, 0 }; /* FIPS-140-3 */
+ CK_ULONG fips_level = 1; /* or 2 if you validated at level 2 */
+
+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID
+#define NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID "Generic NSS " SOFTOKEN_VERSION " Unvalidated"
+#endif
+ module_id = NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID;
+ module_id_len = sizeof(NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID) - 1;
+ SFTKObject *object;
+
+ object = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+ if (object == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+ object->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(object, CKA_CLASS,
+ &cko_validation, sizeof(cko_validation));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(object, CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_TYPE,
+ &ckv_fips, sizeof(ckv_fips));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(object, CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_VERSION,
+ &fips_version, sizeof(fips_version));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(object, CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_LEVEL,
+ &fips_level, sizeof(fips_level));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(object, CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_MODULE_ID,
+ module_id, module_id_len);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* future, fill in validation certificate information from a supplied
+ * pointer to a config file */
+ object->handle = sftk_getNextHandle(slot);
+ object->slot = slot;
+ sftk_AddObject(&slot->moduleObjects, object);
+loser:
+ sftk_FreeObject(object);
+ return crv;
+}
diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
--- a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+++ b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
#define CKO_NSS_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST (CKO_NSS + 4)
#define CKO_NSS_NEWSLOT (CKO_NSS + 5)
#define CKO_NSS_DELSLOT (CKO_NSS + 6)
+#define CKO_NSS_VALIDATION (CKO_NSS + 7)
+
+#define CKV_NSS_FIPS_140 (CKO_NSS + 1)
/*
* NSS-defined key types
@@ -99,6 +102,11 @@
#define CKA_NSS_SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER (CKA_NSS + 35)
#define CKA_NSS_EMAIL_DISTRUST_AFTER (CKA_NSS + 36)
+#define CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_TYPE (CKA_NSS + 36)
+#define CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_VERSION (CKA_NSS + 37)
+#define CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_LEVEL (CKA_NSS + 38)
+#define CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_MODULE_ID (CKA_NSS + 39)
+
/*
* Trust attributes:
*
@@ -344,6 +352,9 @@
#define CKR_NSS_CERTDB_FAILED (CKR_NSS + 1)
#define CKR_NSS_KEYDB_FAILED (CKR_NSS + 2)
+/* NSS specific types */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NSS_VALIDATION_TYPE;
+
/* Mandatory parameter for the CKM_NSS_HKDF_* key deriviation mechanisms.
See RFC 5869.
diff --git a/nss.gyp b/nss.gyp
--- a/nss.gyp
+++ b/nss.gyp
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@
'cmd/smimetools/smimetools.gyp:cmsutil',
'cmd/ssltap/ssltap.gyp:ssltap',
'cmd/symkeyutil/symkeyutil.gyp:symkeyutil',
+ 'cmd/validation/validation.gyp:validation',
'nss-tool/nss_tool.gyp:nss',
'nss-tool/nss_tool.gyp:hw-support',
],

36
SOURCES/nss-3.71-ipv6-fix.patch
View File

@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./cmd/selfserv/selfserv.c.ipv6_fix ./cmd/selfserv/selfserv.c
--- ./cmd/selfserv/selfserv.c.ipv6_fix 2021-09-14 11:40:06.176408531 -0700
+++ ./cmd/selfserv/selfserv.c 2021-09-14 11:49:46.361907308 -0700
@@ -1717,14 +1717,28 @@ getBoundListenSocket(unsigned short port
PRNetAddr addr;
PRSocketOptionData opt;
- addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
- addr.inet.ip = PR_INADDR_ANY;
- addr.inet.port = PR_htons(port);
+ if (PR_SetNetAddr(PR_IpAddrAny, PR_AF_INET6, port, &addr) != PR_SUCCESS) {
+ errExit("PR_SetNetAddr");
+ }
- listen_sock = PR_NewTCPSocket();
+ listen_sock = PR_OpenTCPSocket(PR_AF_INET6);
if (listen_sock == NULL) {
errExit("PR_NewTCPSocket");
}
+ /* NSPR has a bug where set inheritable doesn't work unless it's a pure
+ * NSPR socket. If we have an IPV6 emulator on an IPV4 socket, it will fail.
+ * In that case just open an IPV4 socket instead */
+ if (PR_NSPR_IO_LAYER != PR_GetLayersIdentity(listen_sock)) {
+ PR_Close(listen_sock);
+ addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
+ addr.inet.ip = PR_INADDR_ANY;
+ addr.inet.port = PR_htons(port);
+
+ listen_sock = PR_NewTCPSocket();
+ if (listen_sock == NULL) {
+ errExit("PR_NewTCPSocket");
+ }
+ }
opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
opt.value.non_blocking = PR_FALSE;

257
SOURCES/nss-3.75-fix-pkcs12-passwords.patch
View File

@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c b/cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
--- a/cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
+++ b/cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
@@ -660,16 +660,27 @@ P12U_ExportPKCS12Object(char *nn, char *
}
/* Password to use for PKCS12 file. */
pwitem = P12U_GetP12FilePassword(PR_TRUE, p12FilePw);
if (!pwitem) {
goto loser;
}
+ /* we are passing UTF8, drop the NULL in the normal password value.
+ * UCS2 conversion will add it back if necessary. This only affects
+ * password > Blocksize of the Hash function and pkcs5v2 pbe (if password
+ * <=Blocksize then the password is zero padded anyway, so an extra NULL
+ * at the end has not effect). This is allows us to work with openssl and
+ * gnutls. Older versions of NSS already fail to decrypt long passwords
+ * in this case, so we aren't breaking anyone with this code */
+ if ((pwitem->len > 1) && (!pwitem->data[pwitem->len-1])) {
+ pwitem->len--;
+ }
+
p12cxt = p12u_InitContext(PR_FALSE, outfile);
if (!p12cxt) {
SECU_PrintError(progName, "Initialization failed: %s", outfile);
pk12uErrno = PK12UERR_INIT_FILE;
goto loser;
}
if (certlist) {
diff --git a/lib/pkcs12/p12local.c b/lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
--- a/lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
+++ b/lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
@@ -903,31 +903,35 @@ sec_pkcs12_find_object(SEC_PKCS12SafeCon
i++;
}
}
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS12_UNABLE_TO_LOCATE_OBJECT_BY_NAME);
return NULL;
}
-/* this function converts a password to unicode and encures that the
- * required double 0 byte be placed at the end of the string
+/* this function converts a password to unicode and ensures that the
+ * required double 0 byte be placed at the end of the string (if zeroTerm
+ * is set), or the 0 bytes at the end are dropped (if zeroTerm is not set).
*/
PRBool
sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(PLArenaPool *arena, SECItem *dest,
SECItem *src, PRBool zeroTerm,
PRBool asciiConvert, PRBool toUnicode)
{
PRBool success = PR_FALSE;
+ int bufferSize;
+
if (!src || !dest) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return PR_FALSE;
}
- dest->len = src->len * 3 + 2;
+ bufferSize = src->len * 3 + 2;
+ dest->len = bufferSize;
if (arena) {
dest->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, dest->len);
} else {
dest->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(dest->len);
}
if (!dest->data) {
dest->len = 0;
@@ -951,34 +955,44 @@ sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(PLAre
if (!arena) {
PORT_Free(dest->data);
dest->data = NULL;
dest->len = 0;
}
return PR_FALSE;
}
- if ((dest->len >= 2) &&
- (dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2]) && zeroTerm) {
- if (dest->len + 2 > 3 * src->len) {
- if (arena) {
- dest->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaGrow(arena,
- dest->data, dest->len,
- dest->len + 2);
- } else {
- dest->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Realloc(dest->data,
- dest->len + 2);
+ /* in some cases we need to add NULL terminations and in others
+ * we need to drop null terminations */
+ if (zeroTerm) {
+ /* unicode adds two nulls a the end */
+ if (toUnicode) {
+ if ((dest->len >= 2) &&
+ (dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2])) {
+ /* we've already allocated space for these new NULLs */
+ PORT_Assert(dest->len + 2 <= bufferSize);
+ dest->len += 2;
+ dest->data[dest->len - 1] = dest->data[dest->len - 2] = 0;
}
-
- if (!dest->data) {
- return PR_FALSE;
+ /* ascii/utf-8 adds just 1 */
+ } else if ((dest->len >= 1) && dest->data[dest->len-1]) {
+ PORT_Assert(dest->len + 1 <= bufferSize);
+ dest->len ++;
+ dest->data[dest->len-1] = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* handle the drop case, no need to do any allocations here. */
+ if (toUnicode) {
+ while ((dest->len >=2) && !dest->data[dest->len - 1] &&
+ !dest->data[dest->len - 2]) {
+ dest->len -= 2;
}
+ } else while (dest->len && !dest->data[dest->len-1]) {
+ dest->len--;
}
- dest->len += 2;
- dest->data[dest->len - 1] = dest->data[dest->len - 2] = 0;
}
return PR_TRUE;
}
PRBool
sec_pkcs12_is_pkcs12_pbe_algorithm(SECOidTag algorithm)
{
@@ -1006,27 +1020,28 @@ sec_pkcs12_is_pkcs12_pbe_algorithm(SECOi
}
}
/* this function decodes a password from Unicode if necessary,
* according to the PBE algorithm.
*
* we assume that the pwitem is already encoded in Unicode by the
* caller. if the encryption scheme is not the one defined in PKCS
- * #12, decode the pwitem back into UTF-8. */
+ * #12, decode the pwitem back into UTF-8. NOTE: UTF-8 strings are
+ * used in the PRF without the trailing NULL */
PRBool
sec_pkcs12_decode_password(PLArenaPool *arena,
SECItem *result,
SECOidTag algorithm,
const SECItem *pwitem)
{
if (!sec_pkcs12_is_pkcs12_pbe_algorithm(algorithm))
return sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(arena, result,
(SECItem *)pwitem,
- PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE);
+ PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE);
return SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, result, pwitem) == SECSuccess;
}
/* this function encodes a password into Unicode if necessary,
* according to the PBE algorithm.
*
* we assume that the pwitem holds a raw password. if the encryption
diff --git a/tests/common/init.sh b/tests/common/init.sh
--- a/tests/common/init.sh
+++ b/tests/common/init.sh
@@ -78,25 +78,27 @@ if [ -z "${INIT_SOURCED}" -o "${INIT_SOU
CERT_EXTENSIONS_DIR=${HOSTDIR}/cert_extensions
STAPLINGDIR=${HOSTDIR}/stapling
NOLOGINDIR=${HOSTDIR}/nologin
SSLGTESTDIR=${HOSTDIR}/ssl_gtests
GTESTDIR=${HOSTDIR}/gtests
PWFILE=${HOSTDIR}/tests.pw
+ LONGPWFILE=${HOSTDIR}/tests.longpw
EMPTY_FILE=${HOSTDIR}/tests_empty
NOISE_FILE=${HOSTDIR}/tests_noise
CORELIST_FILE=${HOSTDIR}/clist
FIPSPWFILE=${HOSTDIR}/tests.fipspw
FIPSBADPWFILE=${HOSTDIR}/tests.fipsbadpw
FIPSP12PWFILE=${HOSTDIR}/tests.fipsp12pw
echo nss > ${PWFILE}
+ echo "nss123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890_" > ${LONGPWFILE}
echo > ${EMPTY_FILE}
echo "fIps140" > ${FIPSPWFILE}
echo "fips104" > ${FIPSBADPWFILE}
echo "pKcs12fips140" > ${FIPSP12PWFILE}
noise
P_SERVER_CADIR=${SERVER_CADIR}
@@ -656,16 +658,17 @@ if [ -z "${INIT_SOURCED}" -o "${INIT_SOU
P_R_NOLOGINDIR="multiaccess:${D_NOLOGIN}"
P_R_EXT_SERVERDIR="multiaccess:${D_EXT_SERVER}"
P_R_EXT_CLIENTDIR="multiaccess:${D_EXT_CLIENT}"
P_R_IMPLICIT_INIT_DIR="multiaccess:${D_IMPLICIT_INIT}"
P_R_RSAPSSDIR="multiaccess:${D_RSAPSS}"
fi
R_PWFILE=../tests.pw
+ R_LONGPWFILE=../tests.longpw
R_EMPTY_FILE=../tests_empty
R_NOISE_FILE=../tests_noise
R_FIPSPWFILE=../tests.fipspw
R_FIPSBADPWFILE=../tests.fipsbadpw
R_FIPSP12PWFILE=../tests.fipsp12pw
trap "Exit $0 Signal_caught" 2 3
diff --git a/tests/tools/tools.sh b/tests/tools/tools.sh
--- a/tests/tools/tools.sh
+++ b/tests/tools/tools.sh
@@ -382,16 +382,40 @@ tools_p12_export_list_import_with_defaul
check_tmpfile
echo "$SCRIPTNAME: Listing Alice's pk12 EC file -----------------"
echo "pk12util -l Alice-ec.p12 -w ${R_PWFILE}"
${BINDIR}/pk12util -l Alice-ec.p12 -w ${R_PWFILE} 2>&1
ret=$?
html_msg $ret 0 "Listing Alice's pk12 EC file (pk12util -l)"
check_tmpfile
+
+ echo "$SCRIPTNAME: Exporting Alice's email EC cert & key with long pw------"
+ echo "pk12util -o Alice-ec-long.p12 -n \"Alice-ec\" -d ${P_R_ALICEDIR} -k ${R_PWFILE} \\"
+ echo " -w ${R_LONGPWFILE}"
+ ${BINDIR}/pk12util -o Alice-ec-long.p12 -n "Alice-ec" -d ${P_R_ALICEDIR} -k ${R_PWFILE} \
+ -w ${R_LONGPWFILE} 2>&1
+ ret=$?
+ html_msg $ret 0 "Exporting Alice's email EC cert & key with long pw (pk12util -o)"
+ check_tmpfile
+ verify_p12 Alice-ec-long.p12 "default" "default" "default"
+
+ echo "$SCRIPTNAME: Importing Alice's email EC cert & key with long pw-----"
+ echo "pk12util -i Alice-ec-long.p12 -d ${P_R_COPYDIR} -k ${R_PWFILE} -w ${R_LONGPWFILE}"
+ ${BINDIR}/pk12util -i Alice-ec-long.p12 -d ${P_R_COPYDIR} -k ${R_PWFILE} -w ${R_LONGPWFILE} 2>&1
+ ret=$?
+ html_msg $ret 0 "Importing Alice's email EC cert & key with long pw (pk12util -i)"
+ check_tmpfile
+
+ echo "$SCRIPTNAME: Listing Alice's pk12 EC file with long pw ------------"
+ echo "pk12util -l Alice-ec-long.p12 -w ${R_LONGPWFILE}"
+ ${BINDIR}/pk12util -l Alice-ec-long.p12 -w ${R_LONGPWFILE} 2>&1
+ ret=$?
+ html_msg $ret 0 "Listing Alice's pk12 EC file with long pw (pk12util -l)"
+ check_tmpfile
}
tools_p12_import_old_files()
{
echo "$SCRIPTNAME: Importing PKCS#12 files created with older NSS --------------"
echo "pk12util -i TestOldCA.p12 -d ${P_R_COPYDIR} -k ${R_PWFILE} -w ${R_PWFILE}"
${BINDIR}/pk12util -i ${TOOLSDIR}/data/TestOldCA.p12 -d ${P_R_COPYDIR} -k ${R_PWFILE} -w ${R_PWFILE} 2>&1
ret=$?

3411
SOURCES/nss-3.79-dbtool.patch Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

375
SOURCES/nss-3.79-distrusted-certs.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User John M. Schanck <jschanck@mozilla.com>
# Date 1648094761 0
# Thu Mar 24 04:06:01 2022 +0000
# Node ID b722e523d66297fe4bc1fac0ebb06203138eccbb
# Parent 853b64626b19a46f41f4ba9c684490dc15923c94
Bug 1751305 - Remove expired explicitly distrusted certificates from certdata.txt. r=KathleenWilson
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D141919
diff --git a/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt b/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
--- a/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
+++ b/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
@@ -7663,197 +7663,16 @@ CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
\377\377
END
CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
#
-# Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
-#
-# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
-# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
-# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
-# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
-# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
-# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
-# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_CERTIFICATE
-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
-CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CKC_X_509
-CKA_SUBJECT MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
-\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
-\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
-\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
-\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
-\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
-END
-CKA_ID UTF8 "0"
-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
-\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
-\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
-\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
-\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
-\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
-END
-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\002\004\017\377\377\377
-END
-CKA_VALUE MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\060\202\006\225\060\202\004\175\240\003\002\001\002\002\004\017
-\377\377\377\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\013
-\005\000\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116
-\114\061\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151
-\116\157\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003
-\125\004\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120
-\113\111\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162
-\147\141\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\036
-\027\015\061\060\060\065\061\062\060\070\065\061\063\071\132\027
-\015\062\060\060\063\062\063\060\071\065\060\060\065\132\060\132
-\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\027\060
-\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141
-\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004\003\014
-\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111\157\166
-\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141\156\151
-\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\202\002\042\060\015
-\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\001\005\000\003\202\002
-\017\000\060\202\002\012\002\202\002\001\000\261\023\031\017\047
-\346\154\324\125\206\113\320\354\211\212\105\221\170\254\107\275
-\107\053\344\374\105\353\117\264\046\163\133\067\323\303\177\366
-\343\336\327\243\370\055\150\305\010\076\113\224\326\344\207\045
-\066\153\204\265\030\164\363\050\130\163\057\233\152\317\274\004
-\036\366\336\335\257\374\113\252\365\333\146\142\045\001\045\202
-\336\362\227\132\020\156\335\135\251\042\261\004\251\043\163\072
-\370\161\255\035\317\204\104\353\107\321\257\155\310\174\050\253
-\307\362\067\172\164\137\137\305\002\024\212\243\132\343\033\154
-\001\343\135\216\331\150\326\364\011\033\062\334\221\265\054\365
-\040\353\214\003\155\046\111\270\223\304\205\135\330\322\233\257
-\126\152\314\005\063\314\240\102\236\064\125\104\234\153\240\324
-\022\320\053\124\315\267\211\015\345\366\353\350\373\205\001\063
-\117\172\153\361\235\162\063\226\016\367\262\204\245\245\047\304
-\047\361\121\163\051\167\272\147\156\376\114\334\264\342\241\241
-\201\057\071\111\215\103\070\023\316\320\245\134\302\207\072\000
-\147\145\102\043\361\066\131\012\035\243\121\310\274\243\224\052
-\061\337\343\074\362\235\032\074\004\260\357\261\012\060\023\163
-\266\327\363\243\114\001\165\024\205\170\300\327\212\071\130\205
-\120\372\056\346\305\276\317\213\077\257\217\066\324\045\011\055
-\322\017\254\162\223\362\277\213\324\120\263\371\025\120\233\231
-\365\024\331\373\213\221\243\062\046\046\240\370\337\073\140\201
-\206\203\171\133\053\353\023\075\051\072\301\155\335\275\236\216
-\207\326\112\256\064\227\005\356\024\246\366\334\070\176\112\351
-\044\124\007\075\227\150\067\106\153\015\307\250\041\257\023\124
-\344\011\152\361\115\106\012\311\135\373\233\117\275\336\373\267
-\124\313\270\070\234\247\071\373\152\055\300\173\215\253\245\247
-\127\354\112\222\212\063\305\341\040\134\163\330\220\222\053\200
-\325\017\206\030\151\174\071\117\204\206\274\367\114\133\363\325
-\264\312\240\302\360\067\042\312\171\122\037\123\346\252\363\220
-\260\073\335\362\050\375\254\353\305\006\044\240\311\324\057\017
-\130\375\265\236\354\017\317\262\131\320\242\004\172\070\152\256
-\162\373\275\360\045\142\224\011\247\005\013\002\003\001\000\001
-\243\202\001\141\060\202\001\135\060\110\006\003\125\035\040\004
-\101\060\077\060\075\006\004\125\035\040\000\060\065\060\063\006
-\010\053\006\001\005\005\007\002\001\026\047\150\164\164\160\072
-\057\057\167\167\167\056\144\151\147\151\156\157\164\141\162\056
-\156\154\057\143\160\163\057\160\153\151\157\166\145\162\150\145
-\151\144\060\017\006\003\125\035\023\001\001\377\004\005\060\003
-\001\001\377\060\016\006\003\125\035\017\001\001\377\004\004\003
-\002\001\006\060\201\205\006\003\125\035\043\004\176\060\174\200
-\024\071\020\213\111\222\134\333\141\022\040\315\111\235\032\216
-\332\234\147\100\271\241\136\244\134\060\132\061\013\060\011\006
-\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\036\060\034\006\003\125\004
-\012\014\025\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
-\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\061\053\060\051\006\003\125\004
-\003\014\042\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
-\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\040\122\157\157\164\040\103\101
-\040\055\040\107\062\202\004\000\230\226\364\060\111\006\003\125
-\035\037\004\102\060\100\060\076\240\074\240\072\206\070\150\164
-\164\160\072\057\057\143\162\154\056\160\153\151\157\166\145\162
-\150\145\151\144\056\156\154\057\104\157\155\117\162\147\141\156
-\151\163\141\164\151\145\114\141\164\145\163\164\103\122\114\055
-\107\062\056\143\162\154\060\035\006\003\125\035\016\004\026\004
-\024\274\135\224\073\331\253\173\003\045\163\141\302\333\055\356
-\374\253\217\145\241\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001
-\001\013\005\000\003\202\002\001\000\217\374\055\114\267\331\055
-\325\037\275\357\313\364\267\150\027\165\235\116\325\367\335\234
-\361\052\046\355\237\242\266\034\003\325\123\263\354\010\317\064
-\342\343\303\364\265\026\057\310\303\276\327\323\163\253\000\066
-\371\032\112\176\326\143\351\136\106\272\245\266\216\025\267\243
-\052\330\103\035\357\135\310\037\201\205\263\213\367\377\074\364
-\331\364\106\010\077\234\274\035\240\331\250\114\315\045\122\116
-\012\261\040\367\037\351\103\331\124\106\201\023\232\300\136\164
-\154\052\230\062\352\374\167\273\015\245\242\061\230\042\176\174
-\174\347\332\244\255\354\267\056\032\031\161\370\110\120\332\103
-\217\054\204\335\301\100\047\343\265\360\025\116\226\324\370\134
-\343\206\051\106\053\327\073\007\353\070\177\310\206\127\227\323
-\357\052\063\304\027\120\325\144\151\153\053\153\105\136\135\057
-\027\312\132\116\317\303\327\071\074\365\073\237\106\271\233\347
-\016\111\227\235\326\325\343\033\017\352\217\001\116\232\023\224
-\131\012\002\007\110\113\032\140\253\177\117\355\013\330\125\015
-\150\157\125\234\151\145\025\102\354\300\334\335\154\254\303\026
-\316\013\035\126\233\244\304\304\322\056\340\017\342\104\047\053
-\120\151\244\334\142\350\212\041\051\102\154\314\000\072\226\166
-\233\357\100\300\244\136\167\204\062\154\046\052\071\146\256\135
-\343\271\271\262\054\150\037\036\232\220\003\071\360\252\263\244
-\314\111\213\030\064\351\067\311\173\051\307\204\174\157\104\025
-\057\354\141\131\004\311\105\313\242\326\122\242\174\177\051\222
-\326\112\305\213\102\250\324\376\352\330\307\207\043\030\344\235
-\172\175\163\100\122\230\240\256\156\343\005\077\005\017\340\245
-\306\155\115\355\203\067\210\234\307\363\334\102\232\152\266\327
-\041\111\066\167\362\357\030\117\305\160\331\236\351\336\267\053
-\213\364\274\176\050\337\015\100\311\205\134\256\235\305\061\377
-\320\134\016\265\250\176\360\351\057\272\257\210\256\345\265\321
-\130\245\257\234\161\247\051\001\220\203\151\067\202\005\272\374
-\011\301\010\156\214\170\073\303\063\002\200\077\104\205\010\035
-\337\125\126\010\255\054\205\055\135\261\003\341\256\252\164\305
-\244\363\116\272\067\230\173\202\271
-END
-
-# Trust for Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
-# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
-# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
-# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
-# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
-# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
-# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
-# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
-CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\325\362\127\251\277\055\320\077\213\106\127\371\053\311\244\306
-\222\341\102\102
-END
-CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\056\141\242\321\170\316\356\277\131\063\260\043\024\017\224\034
-END
-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
-\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
-\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
-\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
-\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
-\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
-END
-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\002\004\017\377\377\377
-END
-CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-
-#
# Certificate "Security Communication RootCA2"
#
# Issuer: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
# Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
# Subject: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
# Not Valid Before: Fri May 29 05:00:39 2009
# Not Valid After : Tue May 29 05:00:39 2029
# Fingerprint (SHA-256): 51:3B:2C:EC:B8:10:D4:CD:E5:DD:85:39:1A:DF:C6:C2:DD:60:D8:7B:B7:36:D2:B5:21:48:4A:A4:7A:0E:BE:F6
@@ -8337,78 +8156,16 @@ END
CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
\002\001\000
END
CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
-# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
-# Serial Number: 1800000005 (0x6b49d205)
-# Not Before: Apr 7 15:37:15 2011 GMT
-# Not After : Apr 4 15:37:15 2021 GMT
-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave"
-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
-\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
-\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
-\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
-\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
-\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
-\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
-\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
-\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
-\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
-\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
-END
-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\002\004\153\111\322\005
-END
-CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-
-# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
-# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
-# Serial Number: 1800000006 (0x6b49d206)
-# Not Before: Apr 18 21:09:30 2011 GMT
-# Not After : Apr 15 21:09:30 2021 GMT
-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave"
-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
-\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
-\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
-\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
-\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
-\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
-\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
-\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
-\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
-\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
-\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
-END
-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\002\004\153\111\322\006
-END
-CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-
#
# Certificate "Actalis Authentication Root CA"
#
# Issuer: CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA,O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967,L=Milan,C=IT
# Serial Number:57:0a:11:97:42:c4:e3:cc
# Subject: CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA,O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967,L=Milan,C=IT
# Not Valid Before: Thu Sep 22 11:22:02 2011
# Not Valid After : Sun Sep 22 11:22:02 2030
@@ -9042,84 +8799,16 @@ END
CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
\002\001\001
END
CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1", Bug 825022
-# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
-# Serial Number: 2087 (0x827)
-# Subject: CN=*.EGO.GOV.TR,OU=EGO BILGI ISLEM,O=EGO,L=ANKARA,ST=ANKARA,C=TR
-# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
-# Not Valid After : Tue Jul 06 07:07:51 2021
-# Fingerprint (MD5): F8:F5:25:FF:0C:31:CF:85:E1:0C:86:17:C1:CE:1F:8E
-# Fingerprint (SHA1): C6:9F:28:C8:25:13:9E:65:A6:46:C4:34:AC:A5:A1:D2:00:29:5D:B1
-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1"
-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
-\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
-\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
-\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
-\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
-\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
-\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
-\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
-\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
-\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
-\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
-END
-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\002\002\010\047
-END
-CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-
-# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2", Bug 825022
-# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
-# Serial Number: 2148 (0x864)
-# Subject: E=ileti@kktcmerkezbankasi.org,CN=e-islem.kktcmerkezbankasi.org,O=KKTC Merkez Bankasi,L=Lefkosa,ST=Lefkosa,C=TR
-# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
-# Not Valid After : Thu Aug 05 07:07:51 2021
-# Fingerprint (MD5): BF:C3:EC:AD:0F:42:4F:B4:B5:38:DB:35:BF:AD:84:A2
-# Fingerprint (SHA1): F9:2B:E5:26:6C:C0:5D:B2:DC:0D:C3:F2:DC:74:E0:2D:EF:D9:49:CB
-CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
-CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
-CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2"
-CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
-\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
-\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
-\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
-\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
-\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
-\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
-\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
-\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
-\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
-\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
-END
-CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
-\002\002\010\144
-END
-CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
-CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
-
#
# Certificate "D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009"
#
# Issuer: CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009,O=D-Trust GmbH,C=DE
# Serial Number: 623603 (0x983f3)
# Subject: CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009,O=D-Trust GmbH,C=DE
# Not Valid Before: Thu Nov 05 08:35:58 2009
# Not Valid After : Mon Nov 05 08:35:58 2029

170
SOURCES/nss-3.79-dont-verify-default.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
diff --git a/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c b/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
--- a/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
@@ -4272,16 +4272,17 @@ CreateTrust(void)
{
NSSLOWCERTTrust *trust = NULL;
nsslowcert_LockFreeList();
trust = trustListHead;
if (trust) {
trustListCount--;
trustListHead = trust->next;
+ trust->next = NULL;
}
PORT_Assert(trustListCount >= 0);
nsslowcert_UnlockFreeList();
if (trust) {
return trust;
}
return PORT_ZNew(NSSLOWCERTTrust);
@@ -5155,19 +5156,21 @@ done:
}
PRBool
nsslowcert_hasTrust(NSSLOWCERTCertTrust *trust)
{
if (trust == NULL) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
- return !((trust->sslFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN) &&
- (trust->emailFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN) &&
- (trust->objectSigningFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN));
+ /* if we only have CERTDB__USER and CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN bits, then
+ * we don't have a trust record. */
+ return !(((trust->sslFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0) &&
+ ((trust->emailFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0) &&
+ ((trust->objectSigningFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0));
}
/*
* This function has the logic that decides if another person's cert and
* email profile from an S/MIME message should be saved. It can deal with
* the case when there is no profile.
*/
static SECStatus
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
@@ -119,47 +119,79 @@ sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(CK_ATTRI
case CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED:
case CKA_NSS_OVERRIDE_EXTENSIONS:
return PR_TRUE;
default:
break;
}
return PR_FALSE;
}
-
/*
* convert a native ULONG to a database ulong. Database ulong's
* are all 4 byte big endian values.
*/
void
sftk_ULong2SDBULong(unsigned char *data, CK_ULONG value)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SDB_ULONG_SIZE; i++) {
data[i] = (value >> (SDB_ULONG_SIZE - 1 - i) * BBP) & 0xff;
}
}
/*
* convert a database ulong back to a native ULONG. (reverse of the above
- * function.
+ * function).
*/
static CK_ULONG
sftk_SDBULong2ULong(unsigned char *data)
{
int i;
CK_ULONG value = 0;
for (i = 0; i < SDB_ULONG_SIZE; i++) {
value |= (((CK_ULONG)data[i]) << (SDB_ULONG_SIZE - 1 - i) * BBP);
}
return value;
}
+/* certain trust records are default values, which are the values
+ * returned if the signature check fails anyway.
+ * In those cases, we can skip the signature check. */
+PRBool
+sftkdb_isNullTrust(const CK_ATTRIBUTE *template)
+{
+ switch (template->type) {
+ case CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH:
+ case CKA_TRUST_CLIENT_AUTH:
+ case CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION:
+ case CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING:
+ if (template->ulValueLen != SDB_ULONG_SIZE) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (sftk_SDBULong2ULong(template->pValue) ==
+ CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED:
+ if (template->ulValueLen != 1) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (*((unsigned char *)(template->pValue)) == 0) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
/*
* fix up the input templates. Our fixed up ints are stored in data and must
* be freed by the caller. The new template must also be freed. If there are no
* CK_ULONG attributes, the orignal template is passed in as is.
*/
static CK_ATTRIBUTE *
sftkdb_fixupTemplateIn(const CK_ATTRIBUTE *template, int count,
unsigned char **dataOut, int *dataOutSize)
@@ -410,17 +442,18 @@ sftkdb_fixupTemplateOut(CK_ATTRIBUTE *te
}
/* copy the plain text back into the template */
PORT_Memcpy(template[i].pValue, plainText->data, plainText->len);
template[i].ulValueLen = plainText->len;
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(plainText, PR_TRUE);
}
/* make sure signed attributes are valid */
- if (checkSig && sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(ntemplate[i].type)) {
+ if (checkSig && sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(ntemplate[i].type)
+ && !sftkdb_isNullTrust(&ntemplate[i])) {
SECStatus rv;
CK_RV local_crv;
SECItem signText;
SECItem plainText;
unsigned char signData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
signText.data = signData;
signText.len = sizeof(signData);
@@ -2387,16 +2420,18 @@ sftkdb_mergeObject(SFTKDBHandle *handle,
crv = (*source->sdb_GetAttributeValue)(source, id,
ptemplate, max_attributes);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto loser;
}
objectType = sftkdb_getULongFromTemplate(CKA_CLASS, ptemplate,
max_attributes);
+/*printf(" - merging object Type 0x%08lx id=0x%08lx updateID=%s\n", objectType, id,
+ handle->updateID?handle->updateID: "<NULL>");*/
/*
* Update Object updates the object template if necessary then returns
* whether or not we need to actually write the object out to our target
* database.
*/
if (!handle->updateID) {
crv = sftkdb_CreateObject(arena, handle, target, &newID,

522
SOURCES/nss-3.79-enable-POST-rerun.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,522 @@
diff --git a/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c b/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
--- a/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
+++ b/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
@@ -3870,17 +3870,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
rv = blapi_selftest(modesToTest, numModesToTest, inoff, outoff,
encrypt, decrypt);
PORT_Free(cipherInfo);
return rv == SECSuccess ? 0 : 1;
}
/* Do FIPS self-test */
if (bltest.commands[cmd_FIPS].activated) {
- CK_RV ckrv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK();
+ CK_RV ckrv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE);
fprintf(stdout, "CK_RV: %ld.\n", ckrv);
PORT_Free(cipherInfo);
if (ckrv == CKR_OK)
return SECSuccess;
return SECFailure;
}
/*
diff --git a/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c b/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
--- a/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
+++ b/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
@@ -318,23 +318,25 @@ static PRBool verbose = PR_FALSE;
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
CK_C_GetFunctionList pC_GetFunctionList;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFunctionList;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS initArgs;
+ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS initArgsRerun; /* rerun selftests */
CK_SLOT_ID *pSlotList = NULL;
CK_TOKEN_INFO tokenInfo;
CK_ULONG slotID = 0; /* slotID == 0 for FIPSMODE */
CK_UTF8CHAR *pwd = NULL;
CK_ULONG pwdLen = 0;
char *moduleSpec = NULL;
+ char *moduleSpecRerun = NULL;
char *configDir = NULL;
char *dbPrefix = NULL;
char *disableUnload = NULL;
PRBool doForkTests = PR_TRUE;
PLOptStatus os;
PLOptState *opt = PL_CreateOptState(argc, argv, "nvhf:Fd:p:");
while (PL_OPT_EOL != (os = PL_GetNextOpt(opt))) {
@@ -458,18 +460,23 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
initArgs.CreateMutex = NULL;
initArgs.DestroyMutex = NULL;
initArgs.LockMutex = NULL;
initArgs.UnlockMutex = NULL;
initArgs.flags = CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK;
moduleSpec = PR_smprintf("configdir='%s' certPrefix='%s' "
"keyPrefix='%s' secmod='secmod.db' flags= ",
configDir, dbPrefix, dbPrefix);
+ moduleSpecRerun = PR_smprintf("configdir='%s' certPrefix='%s' "
+ "keyPrefix='%s' secmod='secmod.db' flags=forcePOST ",
+ configDir, dbPrefix, dbPrefix);
initArgs.LibraryParameters = (CK_CHAR_PTR *)moduleSpec;
initArgs.pReserved = NULL;
+ initArgsRerun = initArgs;
+ initArgsRerun.LibraryParameters = (CK_CHAR_PTR *)moduleSpecRerun;
/*DebugBreak();*/
/* FIPSMODE invokes FC_Initialize as pFunctionList->C_Initialize */
/* NSS cryptographic module library initialization for the FIPS */
/* Approved mode when FC_Initialize is envoked will perfom */
/* software integrity test, and power-up self-tests before */
/* FC_Initialize returns */
crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgs);
@@ -705,17 +712,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
PKM_Error("PKM_HybridMode failed with 0x%08X, %-26s\n", crv,
PKM_CK_RVtoStr(crv));
goto cleanup;
}
if (doForkTests) {
/* testing one more C_Initialize / C_Finalize to exercise getpid()
* fork check code */
- crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgs);
+ crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgsRerun);
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
PKM_LogIt("C_Initialize succeeded\n");
} else {
PKM_Error("C_Initialize failed with 0x%08X, %-26s\n", crv,
PKM_CK_RVtoStr(crv));
goto cleanup;
}
crv = pFunctionList->C_Finalize(NULL);
@@ -741,16 +748,19 @@ cleanup:
free(configDir);
}
if (dbPrefix) {
free(dbPrefix);
}
if (moduleSpec) {
PR_smprintf_free(moduleSpec);
}
+ if (moduleSpecRerun) {
+ PR_smprintf_free(moduleSpecRerun);
+ }
#ifdef _WIN32
FreeLibrary(hModule);
#else
disableUnload = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_DISABLE_UNLOAD");
if (!disableUnload) {
PR_UnloadLibrary(lib);
}
diff --git a/lib/freebl/blapii.h b/lib/freebl/blapii.h
--- a/lib/freebl/blapii.h
+++ b/lib/freebl/blapii.h
@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ typedef SECStatus (*freeblAeadFunc)(void
void *params, unsigned int paramsLen,
const unsigned char *aad, unsigned int aadLen,
unsigned int blocksize);
typedef void (*freeblDestroyFunc)(void *cx, PRBool freeit);
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
-SECStatus BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freeblOnly);
+SECStatus BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freeblOnly, PRBool rerun);
PRBool BL_POSTRan(PRBool freeblOnly);
#endif
#if defined(XP_UNIX) && !defined(NO_FORK_CHECK)
extern PRBool bl_parentForkedAfterC_Initialize;
#define SKIP_AFTER_FORK(x) \
diff --git a/lib/freebl/blapit.h b/lib/freebl/blapit.h
--- a/lib/freebl/blapit.h
+++ b/lib/freebl/blapit.h
@@ -223,16 +223,21 @@ typedef int __BLAPI_DEPRECATED __attribu
*
* If we arbitrarily set p = 10^-18 (1 chance in trillion trillion operation)
* we get GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS = -(-18)/.301 -1 = 59 (.301 = log10 2)
* GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS should be at least 59, call it a round 64. NOTE:
* the variable IV size for TLS is 64 bits, which explains why it's not safe
* to use a random value for the nonce in TLS. */
#define GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS 64
+/* flag to tell BLAPI_Verify* to rerun the post and integrity tests */
+#define BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG '\377' /* 0xff, 255 invalide code for UFT8/ASCII */
+#define BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING "\377" /* The above as a C string */
+
+
/***************************************************************************
** Opaque objects
*/
struct DESContextStr;
struct RC2ContextStr;
struct RC4ContextStr;
struct RC5ContextStr;
diff --git a/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c b/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
--- a/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
@@ -2211,29 +2211,37 @@ bl_startup_tests(void)
}
/*
* this is called from the freebl init entry points that controll access to
* all other freebl functions. This prevents freebl from operating if our
* power on selftest failed.
*/
SECStatus
-BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freebl_only)
+BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freebl_only, PRBool rerun)
{
#ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
/* this should only be set on platforms that can't handle one of the INIT
* schemes. This code allows those platforms to continue to function,
* though they don't meet the strict NIST requirements. If NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
* is not set, and init support has not been properly enabled, freebl
* will always fail because of the test below
*/
if (!self_tests_freebl_ran) {
bl_startup_tests();
}
#endif
+ if (rerun) {
+ /* reset the flags */
+ self_tests_freebl_ran = PR_FALSE;
+ self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
+ self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
+ self_tests_freebl_success = PR_FALSE;
+ bl_startup_tests();
+ }
/* if the general self tests succeeded, we're done */
if (self_tests_success) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* standalone freebl can initialize */
if (freebl_only && self_tests_freebl_success) {
return SECSuccess;
}
diff --git a/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c b/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
--- a/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
@@ -55,17 +55,17 @@ NSSLOW_Init(void)
#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
(void)FREEBL_InitStubs();
#endif
#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
/* make sure the FIPS product is installed if we are trying to
* go into FIPS mode */
if (nsslow_GetFIPSEnabled()) {
- if (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) {
+ if (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
post_failed = PR_TRUE;
return NULL;
}
}
#endif
post_failed = PR_FALSE;
diff --git a/lib/freebl/shvfy.c b/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
--- a/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
@@ -282,52 +282,62 @@ readItem(PRFileDesc *fd, SECItem *item)
PORT_Free(item->data);
item->data = NULL;
item->len = 0;
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
-static PRBool blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self);
+static PRBool blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun);
static PRBool
-blapi_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr, PRBool self)
+blapi_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
{
PRBool result = PR_FALSE; /* if anything goes wrong,
* the signature does not verify */
/* find our shared library name */
char *shName = PR_GetLibraryFilePathname(name, addr);
if (!shName) {
goto loser;
}
- result = blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, self);
+ result = blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, self, rerun);
loser:
if (shName != NULL) {
PR_Free(shName);
}
return result;
}
PRBool
BLAPI_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr)
{
- return blapi_SHVerify(name, addr, PR_FALSE);
+ PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
+ if (name && *name == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
+ name++;
+ rerun = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return blapi_SHVerify(name, addr, PR_FALSE, rerun);
}
PRBool
BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
{
- return blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, PR_FALSE);
+ PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
+ if (shName && *shName == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
+ shName++;
+ rerun = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, PR_FALSE, rerun);
}
static PRBool
-blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self)
+blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
{
char *checkName = NULL;
PRFileDesc *checkFD = NULL;
PRFileDesc *shFD = NULL;
void *hashcx = NULL;
const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL;
SECItem signature = { 0, NULL, 0 };
SECItem hash;
@@ -346,17 +356,17 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
unsigned char hashBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
hash.data = hashBuf;
hash.len = sizeof(hashBuf);
/* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
* integrity checks to prevent any token going into FIPS mode. */
- if (!self && (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)) {
+ if (!self && (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE, rerun) != SECSuccess)) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
if (!shName) {
goto loser;
}
/* figure out the name of our check file */
@@ -536,17 +546,17 @@ BLAPI_VerifySelf(const char *name)
{
if (name == NULL) {
/*
* If name is NULL, freebl is statically linked into softoken.
* softoken will call BLAPI_SHVerify next to verify itself.
*/
return PR_TRUE;
}
- return blapi_SHVerify(name, (PRFuncPtr)decodeInt, PR_TRUE);
+ return blapi_SHVerify(name, (PRFuncPtr)decodeInt, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE);
}
#else /* NSS_FIPS_DISABLED */
PRBool
BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
{
return PR_FALSE;
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
--- a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
@@ -684,22 +684,25 @@ sftk_fips_HKDF_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
static PRBool sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_FALSE;
static PRBool sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
/*
* This function is called at dll load time, the code tha makes this
* happen is platform specific on defined above.
*/
-static void
-sftk_startup_tests(void)
+void sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PRBool rerun)
{
SECStatus rv;
- const char *libraryName = SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
-
+ /*const char *nlibraryName = SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
+ const char *rlibraryName = BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME; */
+ const char *libraryName = rerun ?
+ BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME :
+ SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
+
PORT_Assert(!sftk_self_tests_ran);
PORT_Assert(!sftk_self_tests_success);
sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_TRUE;
sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE; /* just in case */
/* need to initiallize the oid library before the RSA tests */
rv = SECOID_Init();
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
@@ -746,35 +749,46 @@ sftk_startup_tests(void)
rv = sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests();
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return;
}
sftk_self_tests_success = PR_TRUE;
}
+static void
+sftk_startup_tests(void)
+{
+ sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PR_FALSE);
+}
+
/*
* this is called from nsc_Common_Initizialize entry points that gates access
* to * all other pkcs11 functions. This prevents softoken operation if our
* power on selftest failed.
*/
CK_RV
-sftk_FIPSEntryOK()
+sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool rerun)
{
#ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
/* this should only be set on platforms that can't handle one of the INIT
* schemes. This code allows those platforms to continue to function,
* though they don't meet the strict NIST requirements. If NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
* is not set, and init support has not been properly enabled, softken
* will always fail because of the test below
*/
if (!sftk_self_tests_ran) {
sftk_startup_tests();
}
#endif
+ if (rerun) {
+ sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_FALSE;
+ sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
+ sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PR_TRUE);
+ }
if (!sftk_self_tests_success) {
return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
return CKR_OK;
}
#else
#include "pkcs11t.h"
CK_RV
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c b/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
--- a/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
@@ -524,25 +524,32 @@ fc_log_init_error(CK_RV crv)
}
/* FC_Initialize initializes the PKCS #11 library. */
CK_RV
FC_Initialize(CK_VOID_PTR pReserved)
{
const char *envp;
CK_RV crv;
+ PRBool rerun;
if ((envp = PR_GetEnv("NSS_ENABLE_AUDIT")) != NULL) {
sftk_audit_enabled = (atoi(envp) == 1);
}
+ /* if we have the forcePOST flag on, rerun the integrity checks */
+ /* we need to know this before we fully parse the arguments in
+ * nsc_CommonInitialize, so read it now */
+ rerun = sftk_RawArgHasFlag("flags", "forcePost", pReserved);
+
/* At this point we should have already done post and integrity checks.
* if we haven't, it probably means the FIPS product has not been installed
- * or the tests failed. Don't let an application try to enter FIPS mode */
- crv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK();
+ * or the tests failed. Don't let an application try to enter FIPS mode. This
+ * also forces the tests to be rerun if forcePOST is set. */
+ crv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK(rerun);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
fc_log_init_error(crv);
return crv;
}
sftk_ForkReset(pReserved, &crv);
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
@@ -869,16 +869,17 @@ extern CK_RV sftk_MechAllowsOperation(CK
* acquiring a reference to the keydb from the slot */
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *sftk_FindKeyByPublicKey(SFTKSlot *slot, SECItem *dbKey);
/*
* parameter parsing functions
*/
CK_RV sftk_parseParameters(char *param, sftk_parameters *parsed, PRBool isFIPS);
void sftk_freeParams(sftk_parameters *params);
+PRBool sftk_RawArgHasFlag(const char *entry, const char *flag, const void *pReserved);
/*
* narrow objects
*/
SFTKSessionObject *sftk_narrowToSessionObject(SFTKObject *);
SFTKTokenObject *sftk_narrowToTokenObject(SFTKObject *);
/*
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c b/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
@@ -244,8 +244,21 @@ sftk_freeParams(sftk_parameters *params)
FREE_CLEAR(params->configdir);
FREE_CLEAR(params->secmodName);
FREE_CLEAR(params->man);
FREE_CLEAR(params->libdes);
FREE_CLEAR(params->tokens);
FREE_CLEAR(params->updatedir);
FREE_CLEAR(params->updateID);
}
+
+PRBool
+sftk_RawArgHasFlag(const char *entry, const char *flag, const void *pReserved)
+{
+ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *init_args = (CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *)pReserved;
+
+ /* if we don't have any params, the flag isn't set */
+ if ((!init_args || !init_args->LibraryParameters)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag(entry, flag, (const char *)init_args->LibraryParameters);
+}
diff --git a/lib/softoken/softoken.h b/lib/softoken/softoken.h
--- a/lib/softoken/softoken.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/softoken.h
@@ -52,17 +52,17 @@ extern unsigned char *CBC_PadBuffer(PLAr
unsigned int inlen, unsigned int *outlen,
int blockSize);
/****************************************/
/*
** Power-Up selftests are required for FIPS.
*/
/* make sure Power-up selftests have been run. */
-extern CK_RV sftk_FIPSEntryOK(void);
+extern CK_RV sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool rerun);
/*
** make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
*/
unsigned long sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType);
/*
** FIPS 140-2 auditing

742
SOURCES/nss-3.79-fips.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,742 @@
diff --git a/lib/freebl/config.mk b/lib/freebl/config.mk
--- a/lib/freebl/config.mk
+++ b/lib/freebl/config.mk
@@ -85,9 +85,13 @@ EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += \
$(NULL)
endif
endif
ifeq ($(OS_ARCH), Darwin)
EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += -dylib_file @executable_path/libplc4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplc4.dylib -dylib_file @executable_path/libplds4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplds4.dylib
endif
+ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
endif
+
+endif
diff --git a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
--- a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
@@ -20,53 +20,110 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
if (!numBytes) {
/* error is set */
return;
}
RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
}
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+#include <sys/random.h>
+#include "prinit.h"
+
+static int rng_grndFlags= 0;
+static PRCallOnceType rng_KernelFips;
+
+static PRStatus
+rng_getKernelFips()
+{
+#ifdef LINUX
+ FILE *f;
+ char d;
+ size_t size;
+
+ f = fopen("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+
+ size = fread(&d, 1, 1, f);
+ fclose(f);
+ if (size != 1)
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+ if (d != '1')
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+ /* if the kernel is in FIPS mode, set the GRND_RANDOM flag */
+ rng_grndFlags = GRND_RANDOM;
+#endif /* LINUX */
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif
+
size_t
RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
{
+ size_t fileBytes = 0;
+ unsigned char *buffer = dest;
+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
int fd;
int bytes;
- size_t fileBytes = 0;
- unsigned char *buffer = dest;
+#else
+ PR_CallOnce(&rng_KernelFips, rng_getKernelFips);
+#endif
#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || (defined(LINUX) && defined(__GLIBC__) && ((__GLIBC__ > 2) || ((__GLIBC__ == 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25))))
int result;
-
while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
size_t getBytes = maxLen - fileBytes;
if (getBytes > GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES) {
getBytes = GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES;
}
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+ /* FIP 140-3 requires full kernel reseeding for chained entropy sources
+ * so we need to use getrandom with GRND_RANDOM.
+ * getrandom returns -1 on failure, otherwise returns
+ * the number of bytes, which can be less than getBytes */
+ result = getrandom(buffer, getBytes, rng_grndFlags);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ fileBytes += result;
+ buffer += result;
+#else
+ /* get entropy returns 0 on success and always return
+ * getBytes on success */
result = getentropy(buffer, getBytes);
if (result == 0) { /* success */
fileBytes += getBytes;
buffer += getBytes;
} else {
break;
}
+#endif
}
if (fileBytes == maxLen) { /* success */
return maxLen;
}
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+ /* in FIPS 104-3 we don't fallback, just fail */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+ return 0;
+#else
/* If we failed with an error other than ENOSYS, it means the destination
* buffer is not writeable. We don't need to try writing to it again. */
if (errno != ENOSYS) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return 0;
}
+#endif /*!NSS_FIPS_140_3 */
+#endif /* platorm has getentropy */
+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
/* ENOSYS means the kernel doesn't support getentropy()/getrandom().
* Reset the number of bytes to get and fall back to /dev/urandom. */
fileBytes = 0;
-#endif
fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return 0;
}
while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
bytes = read(fd, buffer, maxLen - fileBytes);
if (bytes <= 0) {
@@ -76,9 +133,10 @@ RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
buffer += bytes;
}
(void)close(fd);
if (fileBytes != maxLen) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return 0;
}
return fileBytes;
+#endif
}
diff --git a/lib/softoken/config.mk b/lib/softoken/config.mk
--- a/lib/softoken/config.mk
+++ b/lib/softoken/config.mk
@@ -58,8 +58,12 @@ endif
ifdef NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
DEFINES += -DNSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
endif
ifdef NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID
DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID=\"${NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID}\"
endif
+ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
+endif
+
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h b/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
--- a/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
@@ -49,33 +49,45 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[]
#define CKF_KEK (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
#define CKF_KEA CKF_DERIVE
#define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
#define CKF_HSH CKF_DIGEST
#define CK_MAX 0xffffffffUL
/* mechanisms using the same key types share the same key type
* limits */
#define RSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
-#define RSA_FB_STEP 1024
+#define RSA_FB_STEP 1
+#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY 1024, 1792 /* min, max */
+#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP 256
+
#define DSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
#define DSA_FB_STEP 1024
#define DH_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
#define DH_FB_STEP 1024
#define EC_FB_KEY 256, 521 /* min, max */
#define EC_FB_STEP 1 /* key limits handled by special operation */
#define AES_FB_KEY 128, 256
#define AES_FB_STEP 64
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+
/* -------------- RSA Multipart Signing Operations -------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- DSA Operations --------------------------- */
{ CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
@@ -95,76 +107,73 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[]
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
/* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */
/* ------------------------- AES Operations --------------------------- */
{ CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_GEN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_ECB, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CBC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_MAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CMAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CTS, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CTR, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96, { 96, 96, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC, { 128, 128, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 128, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 128, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 192, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 192, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 256, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 256, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* --------------------- Secret Key Operations ------------------------ */
- { CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 8, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ---------------------- SSL/TLS operations ------------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 224, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION, { 128, 256, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION, { 192, 284, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION, { 256, 512, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 256, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 284, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 512, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, { 8, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 8, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* sigh, is this algorithm really tested. ssl doesn't seem to have a
* way of turning the extension off */
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- HKDF Operations -------------------------- */
- { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 8, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 160, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 256, 512, CKF_GEN }, 128, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------ NIST 800-108 Key Derivations ------------------- */
- { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
- { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------ PBE Key Derivations ------------------- */
- { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 1, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA224_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 224, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA256_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 256, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA384_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA512_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 512, 512, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone }
};
const int SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_fips_mechs);
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
@@ -1765,27 +1765,29 @@ SECStatus
sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
{
SECItem *result;
SECItem inKey;
NSSPKCS5PBEParameter pbe_params;
unsigned char iteration_count = 5;
unsigned char keyLen = 64;
char *inKeyData = TEST_KEY;
- static const unsigned char saltData[] =
- { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
+ static const unsigned char saltData[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
+ };
static const unsigned char pbkdf_known_answer[] = {
- 0x31, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x39, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x29,
- 0x68, 0xac, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x9c,
- 0x28, 0x59, 0x8b, 0x5c, 0xd8, 0xd4, 0x02, 0x37,
- 0x18, 0x22, 0xc1, 0x92, 0xd0, 0xfa, 0x72, 0x90,
- 0x2c, 0x8d, 0x19, 0xd4, 0x56, 0xfb, 0x16, 0xfa,
- 0x8d, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x5f, 0x17, 0xb1,
- 0x22, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0xaf, 0x5e, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0x66,
- 0xc6, 0x14, 0xfe, 0x83, 0xfa, 0x1a, 0x2a, 0xc5
+ 0x73, 0x8c, 0xfa, 0x02, 0xe8, 0xdb, 0x43, 0xe4,
+ 0x99, 0xc5, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0x7b,
+ 0xc4, 0xda, 0x22, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0xae, 0x23, 0x7a,
+ 0x21, 0x27, 0xbd, 0xcc, 0x78, 0xc4, 0xe6, 0xc5,
+ 0x33, 0x38, 0x35, 0xe0, 0x68, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x06,
+ 0xad, 0xaf, 0x7f, 0xd7, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x90,
+ 0x17, 0x97, 0x73, 0x75, 0x7b, 0x88, 0x49, 0xd8,
+ 0x6f, 0x78, 0x5a, 0xde, 0x50, 0x20, 0x55, 0x33
};
sftk_PBELockInit();
inKey.data = (unsigned char *)inKeyData;
inKey.len = sizeof(TEST_KEY) - 1;
pbe_params.salt.data = (unsigned char *)saltData;
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
@@ -4609,16 +4609,17 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
goto loser;
}
/* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
+
/* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
@@ -4812,16 +4813,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
+ /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
+ * fips requirements */
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
*phKey = key->handle;
}
loser:
PORT_Memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf);
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
@@ -5780,16 +5784,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return crv;
}
+ /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
+ privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
+ publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return CKR_OK;
}
@@ -6990,16 +6997,17 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
}
/* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
if (params->bExtract) {
CK_BYTE *salt;
CK_ULONG saltLen;
HMACContext *hmac;
unsigned int bufLen;
+ SFTKSource saltKeySource = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
switch (params->ulSaltType) {
case CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL:
saltLen = hashLen;
salt = hashbuf;
memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
break;
case CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA:
@@ -7026,29 +7034,54 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
if (isFIPS && (key->isFIPS == 0) && (saltKey->isFIPS == 1)) {
CK_MECHANISM mech;
mech.mechanism = CKM_HKDF_DERIVE;
mech.pParameter = params;
mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
}
+ saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
if (saltKey_att == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/* save the resulting salt */
salt = saltKey_att->attrib.pValue;
saltLen = saltKey_att->attrib.ulValueLen;
break;
default:
return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
+ /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
+ * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
+ if (isFIPS && key && sourceKey) {
+ PRBool fipsOK = PR_FALSE;
+ /* case one: mix the kea with a previous or default
+ * salt */
+ if ((sourceKey->source == SFTK_SOURCE_KEA) &&
+ (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
+ (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
+ fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ /* case two: restart, remix the previous secret as a salt */
+ if ((sourceKey->objclass == CKO_DATA) &&
+ (NSS_SecureMemcmpZero(sourceKeyBytes, sourceKeyLen) == 0) &&
+ (sourceKeyLen == rawHash->length) &&
+ (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
+ (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
+ fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if (!fipsOK) {
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT;
hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
if (saltKey_att) {
sftk_FreeAttribute(saltKey_att);
}
if (saltKey) {
sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
}
@@ -7076,16 +7109,40 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
/* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
* T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
* key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
*/
HMACContext *hmac;
CK_BYTE bi;
unsigned iterations;
+ /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
+ * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
+ if (isFIPS && key && key->isFIPS && sourceKey) {
+ unsigned char *info=&params->pInfo[3];
+ /* only one case,
+ * 1) Expand only
+ * 2) with a key whose source was
+ * SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND or SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
+ * 3) source key length == rawHash->length
+ * 4) Info has tls or dtls
+ * If any of those conditions aren't met, then we turn
+ * off the fips indicator */
+ if (params->bExtract ||
+ ((sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT) &&
+ (sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND)) ||
+ (sourceKeyLen != rawHash->length) ||
+ (params->ulInfoLen < 7) ||
+ ((PORT_Memcmp(info,"tls",3) != 0) &&
+ (PORT_Memcmp(info,"dtls",4) != 0))) {
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND;
+
genLen = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen);
iterations = genLen / hashLen;
if (genLen > sizeof(keyBlock)) {
keyBlockAlloc = PORT_Alloc(genLen);
if (keyBlockAlloc == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
@@ -8434,16 +8491,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
/* calculate private value - oct */
rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhValue, PR_FALSE);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&derived, PR_FALSE);
crv = CKR_OK;
} else
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
@@ -8564,16 +8622,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
}
PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize - secretlen], secret, secretlen);
secret = keyData;
} else {
secret += (secretlen - keySize);
}
secretlen = keySize;
}
+ key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
if (keyData) {
PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
}
break;
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
@@ -147,16 +147,26 @@ typedef enum {
*/
typedef enum {
SFTK_DestroyFailure,
SFTK_Destroyed,
SFTK_Busy
} SFTKFreeStatus;
/*
+ * Source of various objects
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT=0,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_KEA,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
+} SFTKSource;
+
+/*
* attribute values of an object.
*/
struct SFTKAttributeStr {
SFTKAttribute *next;
SFTKAttribute *prev;
PRBool freeAttr;
PRBool freeData;
/*must be called handle to make sftkqueue_find work */
@@ -189,16 +199,17 @@ struct SFTKObjectStr {
CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
int refCount;
PZLock *refLock;
SFTKSlot *slot;
void *objectInfo;
SFTKFree infoFree;
PRBool isFIPS;
+ SFTKSource source;
};
struct SFTKTokenObjectStr {
SFTKObject obj;
SECItem dbKey;
};
struct SFTKSessionObjectStr {
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
@@ -1090,16 +1090,17 @@ sftk_NewObject(SFTKSlot *slot)
sessObject->attrList[i].freeData = PR_FALSE;
}
sessObject->optimizeSpace = slot->optimizeSpace;
object->handle = 0;
object->next = object->prev = NULL;
object->slot = slot;
object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
+ object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
object->refCount = 1;
sessObject->sessionList.next = NULL;
sessObject->sessionList.prev = NULL;
sessObject->sessionList.parent = object;
sessObject->session = NULL;
sessObject->wasDerived = PR_FALSE;
if (!hasLocks)
@@ -1674,16 +1675,17 @@ fail:
CK_RV
sftk_CopyObject(SFTKObject *destObject, SFTKObject *srcObject)
{
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
SFTKSessionObject *src_so = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(srcObject);
unsigned int i;
destObject->isFIPS = srcObject->isFIPS;
+ destObject->source = srcObject->source;
if (src_so == NULL) {
return sftk_CopyTokenObject(destObject, srcObject);
}
PZ_Lock(src_so->attributeLock);
for (i = 0; i < src_so->hashSize; i++) {
attribute = src_so->head[i];
do {
@@ -2059,16 +2061,17 @@ sftk_NewTokenObject(SFTKSlot *slot, SECI
/* every object must have a class, if we can't get it, the object
* doesn't exist */
crv = handleToClass(slot, handle, &object->objclass);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto loser;
}
object->slot = slot;
object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
+ object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
object->objectInfo = NULL;
object->infoFree = NULL;
if (!hasLocks) {
object->refLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockRefLock);
}
if (object->refLock == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
@@ -2225,16 +2228,25 @@ sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE
break;
case CKA_DERIVE:
flags = CKF_DERIVE;
break;
/* fake attribute to select digesting */
case CKA_DIGEST:
flags = CKF_DIGEST;
break;
+ /* fake attribute to select key gen */
+ case CKA_NSS_GENERATE:
+ flags = CKF_GENERATE;
+ break;
+ /* fake attribute to select key pair gen */
+ case CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR:
+ flags = CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR;
+ break;
+ /* fake attributes to to handle MESSAGE* flags */
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT;
break;
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT;
break;
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN;
@@ -2278,17 +2290,17 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
}
/* This function currently only returns valid lengths for
* FIPS approved ECC curves. If we want to make this generic
* in the future, that Curve determination can be done in
* the sftk_handleSpecial. Since it's currently only used
* in FIPS indicators, it's currently only compiled with
* the FIPS indicator code */
-static int
+static CK_ULONG
sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
{
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
CK_RV crv;
diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
--- a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+++ b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
@@ -58,16 +58,18 @@
/*
* NSS-defined certificate types
*
*/
#define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
/* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
#define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L
+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE 0x81000001L
+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x81000002L
#define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE 0x82000000L
#define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK 0xff000000L
#define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */
/*
* NSS-defined object attributes
*
*/

23
SOURCES/nss-3.79-fix-client-cert-crash.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
diff --git a/lib/ssl/authcert.c b/lib/ssl/authcert.c
--- a/lib/ssl/authcert.c
+++ b/lib/ssl/authcert.c
@@ -201,16 +201,19 @@ NSS_GetClientAuthData(void *arg,
/* otherwise look through the cache based on usage
* if chosenNickname is set, we ignore the expiration date */
if (certList == NULL) {
certList = CERT_FindUserCertsByUsage(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
certUsageSSLClient,
PR_FALSE, chosenNickName == NULL,
pw_arg);
+ if (certList == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
/* filter only the certs that meet the nickname requirements */
if (chosenNickName) {
rv = CERT_FilterCertListByNickname(certList, chosenNickName,
pw_arg);
} else {
int nnames = 0;
char **names = ssl_DistNamesToStrings(caNames, &nnames);
rv = CERT_FilterCertListByCANames(certList, nnames, names,

22
SOURCES/nss-3.79-increase-pbe-cache.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
@@ -565,17 +565,17 @@ struct KDFCacheItemStr {
int iterations;
int keyLen;
};
typedef struct KDFCacheItemStr KDFCacheItem;
/* Bug 1606992 - Cache the hash result for the common case that we're
* asked to repeatedly compute the key for the same password item,
* hash, iterations and salt. */
-#define KDF2_CACHE_COUNT 3
+#define KDF2_CACHE_COUNT 150
static struct {
PZLock *lock;
struct {
KDFCacheItem common;
int ivLen;
PRBool faulty3DES;
} cacheKDF1;
struct {

21
SOURCES/nss-3.79-pkcs12-fix-null-password.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.fix_null_password ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
--- ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.fix_null_password 2022-07-20 14:15:45.081009438 -0700
+++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c 2022-07-20 14:19:40.856546963 -0700
@@ -968,15 +968,14 @@ sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(PLAre
if (zeroTerm) {
/* unicode adds two nulls at the end */
if (toUnicode) {
- if ((dest->len >= 2) &&
- (dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2])) {
+ if ((dest->len < 2) || dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2]) {
/* we've already allocated space for these new NULLs */
PORT_Assert(dest->len + 2 <= bufferSize);
dest->len += 2;
dest->data[dest->len - 1] = dest->data[dest->len - 2] = 0;
}
/* ascii/utf-8 adds just 1 */
- } else if ((dest->len >= 1) && dest->data[dest->len - 1]) {
+ } else if (!dest->len || dest->data[dest->len - 1]) {
PORT_Assert(dest->len + 1 <= bufferSize);
dest->len++;
dest->data[dest->len - 1] = 0;

672
SOURCES/nss-3.79-rhel-9-fips-signature-policy.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,672 @@
diff -up ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c.signature-policy ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c
--- ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.916905015 -0700
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
#include "sechash.h"
#endif
-#define MAX_KEY_LEN 512
+#define MAX_KEY_LEN 1024
#define PATH_LEN 150
#define BUFF_SIZE 150
#define UID_BITS 800
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc.signature-policy ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc
--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc 2022-06-21 09:16:23.916905015 -0700
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "secerr.h"
#include "sechash.h"
#include "pk11_signature_test.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
#include "testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha224-vectors.h"
#include "testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha256-vectors.h"
@@ -109,7 +110,11 @@ class Pkcs11RsaPkcs1WycheproofTest
* Use 6 as the invalid value since modLen % 16 must be zero.
*/
TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, Pkcs1MinimumPadding) {
- const size_t kRsaShortKeyBits = 736;
+#define RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH 736
+/* if our minimum supported key length is big enough to handle
+ * our largest Hash function, we can't test a short length */
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS < RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH
+ const size_t kRsaShortKeyBits = RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH;
const size_t kRsaKeyBits = 752;
static const std::vector<uint8_t> kMsg{'T', 'E', 'S', 'T'};
static const std::vector<uint8_t> kSha512DigestInfo{
@@ -209,6 +214,9 @@ TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, Pkcs1MinimumPadding)
SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512,
nullptr);
EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
+#else
+ GTEST_SKIP();
+#endif
}
TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, RequireNullParameter) {
diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc.signature-policy ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc.signature-policy 2022-06-21 09:16:23.901904919 -0700
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc 2022-06-21 09:19:12.482981408 -0700
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
#include "prtime.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "ssl.h"
+#include "nss.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
#include "gtest_utils.h"
#include "tls_agent.h"
@@ -357,9 +359,14 @@ static void GenerateWeakRsaKey(ScopedSEC
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
ASSERT_TRUE(slot);
PK11RSAGenParams rsaparams;
- // The absolute minimum size of RSA key that we can use with SHA-256 is
- // 256bit (hash) + 256bit (salt) + 8 (start byte) + 8 (end byte) = 528.
+// The absolute minimum size of RSA key that we can use with SHA-256 is
+// 256bit (hash) + 256bit (salt) + 8 (start byte) + 8 (end byte) = 528.
+#define RSA_WEAK_KEY 528
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS < RSA_WEAK_KEY
rsaparams.keySizeInBits = 528;
+#else
+ rsaparams.keySizeInBits = RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1;
+#endif
rsaparams.pe = 65537;
// Bug 1012786: PK11_GenerateKeyPair can fail if there is insufficient
@@ -399,6 +406,18 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256};
client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
+ // save the MIN POLICY length.
+ PRInt32 minRsa;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minRsa));
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS >= 2048
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
+ NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1024));
+#else
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, 2048));
+#endif
+#endif
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey dc_priv;
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey dc_pub;
@@ -421,6 +440,9 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
auto cfilter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionCapture>(
client_, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn);
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertInsufficientSecurity);
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, minRsa));
+#endif
}
class ReplaceDCSigScheme : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h.signature-policy ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h
--- ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h 2022-06-21 09:16:23.917905021 -0700
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ extern unsigned SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength
extern unsigned SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk);
/*
+** Return the strength of the private key in bits
+*/
+extern unsigned SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPrivateKey *privk);
+
+/*
** Return the length of the signature in bytes
*/
extern unsigned SECKEY_SignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk);
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h.signature-policy ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h
--- ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h 2022-06-21 09:16:23.917905021 -0700
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#ifndef _KEYI_H_
#define _KEYI_H_
+#include "secerr.h"
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
/* NSS private functions */
@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ SECStatus sec_DecodeRSAPSSParamsToMechan
const SECItem *params,
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *mech);
+/* make sure the key length matches the policy for keyType */
+SECStatus seckey_EnforceKeySize(KeyType keyType, unsigned keyLength,
+ SECErrorCodes error);
SEC_END_PROTOS
#endif /* _KEYHI_H_ */
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.signature-policy ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
--- ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.917905021 -0700
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include "secdig.h"
#include "prtime.h"
#include "keyi.h"
+#include "nss.h"
SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)
SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SEC_IntegerTemplate)
@@ -1042,6 +1043,62 @@ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(const SEC
return bitSize;
}
+unsigned
+SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPrivateKey *privk)
+{
+ unsigned bitSize = 0;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attribute = CKT_INVALID_TYPE;
+ SECItem params;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (!privk) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* interpret modulus length as key strength */
+ switch (privk->keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ case rsaOaepKey:
+ /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
+ * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary */
+ bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ if (bitSize == -1) {
+ bitSize = 0;
+ }
+ return bitSize;
+ case dsaKey:
+ case fortezzaKey:
+ case dhKey:
+ case keaKey:
+ attribute = CKA_PRIME;
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
+ CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, &params);
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ bitSize = SECKEY_ECParamsToKeySize(&params);
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
+ return bitSize;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(attribute != CKT_INVALID_TYPE);
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
+ attribute, NULL, &params);
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ bitSize = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&params);
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
+ return bitSize;
+}
+
/* returns signature length in bytes (not bits) */
unsigned
SECKEY_SignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk)
@@ -1212,6 +1269,51 @@ SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(const SECKEYPublicK
}
/*
+ * Check that a given key meets the policy limits for the given key
+ * size.
+ */
+SECStatus
+seckey_EnforceKeySize(KeyType keyType, unsigned keyLength, SECErrorCodes error)
+{
+ PRInt32 opt = -1;
+ PRInt32 optVal;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ switch (keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ case rsaOaepKey:
+ opt = NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ case fortezzaKey:
+ opt = NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case dhKey:
+ case keaKey:
+ opt = NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ opt = NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case nullKey:
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(opt != -1);
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(opt, &optVal);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ if (optVal < keyLength) {
+ PORT_SetError(error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
* Use the private key to find a public key handle. The handle will be on
* the same slot as the private key.
*/
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c.signature-policy ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c
--- ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.917905021 -0700
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "keyi.h"
+#include "nss.h"
struct SGNContextStr {
SECOidTag signalg;
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ sgn_NewContext(SECOidTag alg, SECItem *p
SECOidTag hashalg, signalg;
KeyType keyType;
PRUint32 policyFlags;
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
SECStatus rv;
/* OK, map a PKCS #7 hash and encrypt algorithm into
@@ -56,6 +58,16 @@ sgn_NewContext(SECOidTag alg, SECItem *p
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
return NULL;
}
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) {
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType,
+ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(key),
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
/* check the policy on the hash algorithm */
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashalg, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
@@ -467,9 +479,20 @@ SGN_Digest(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
SGNDigestInfo *di = 0;
SECOidTag enctag;
PRUint32 policyFlags;
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
result->data = 0;
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) {
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(privKey->keyType,
+ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(privKey),
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
/* check the policy on the hash algorithm */
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(algtag, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c.signature-policy ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
--- ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "secdig.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "keyi.h"
+#include "nss.h"
/*
** Recover the DigestInfo from an RSA PKCS#1 signature.
@@ -467,6 +468,7 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey
unsigned int sigLen;
KeyType type;
PRUint32 policyFlags;
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
/* make sure the encryption algorithm matches the key type */
/* RSA-PSS algorithm can be used with both rsaKey and rsaPssKey */
@@ -476,7 +478,16 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_KEYALG_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
-
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG) {
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType,
+ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(key),
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
/* check the policy on the encryption algorithm */
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(encAlg, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.signature-policy ./lib/freebl/blapit.h
--- ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/blapit.h 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ typedef int __BLAPI_DEPRECATED __attribu
* These values come from the initial key size limits from the PKCS #11
* module. They may be arbitrarily adjusted to any value freebl supports.
*/
-#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 128
+#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1023 /* 128 */
#define RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
#define RSA_MAX_EXPONENT_BITS 64
#define DH_MIN_P_BITS 128
diff -up ./lib/nss/nss.h.signature-policy ./lib/nss/nss.h
--- ./lib/nss/nss.h.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/nss/nss.h 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
@@ -302,6 +302,28 @@ SECStatus NSS_UnregisterShutdown(NSS_Shu
#define NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS 0x00d /* lock default values */
#define NSS_DEFAULT_SSL_LOCK 1 /* lock the ssl default values */
+/* NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY controls what kinds of operations are subject to
+ * the NSS_XXX_MIN_KEY_SIZE values.
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS sets and clears all the flags to the input
+ * value
+ * On get it returns all the flags
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS sets only the flags=1 in theinput value and
+ * does not affect the other flags
+ * On get it returns all the flags
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS clears only the flags=1 in the input
+ * value and does not affect the other flags
+ * On get it returns all the compliment of all the flags
+ * (cleared flags == 1) */
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS 0x00e
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS 0x00f
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS 0x010
+/* currently defined flags */
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG 1
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG 2
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG 4
+
+#define NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE 0x011
+
/*
* Set and get global options for the NSS library.
*/
diff -up ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c.signature-policy ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c
--- ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct nssOps {
PRInt32 dtlsVersionMaxPolicy;
PRInt32 pkcs12DecodeForceUnicode;
PRInt32 defaultLocks;
+ PRInt32 keySizePolicyFlags;
+ PRInt32 eccMinKeySize;
};
static struct nssOps nss_ops = {
@@ -37,7 +39,9 @@ static struct nssOps nss_ops = {
1,
0xffff,
PR_FALSE,
- 0
+ 0,
+ NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG,
+ SSL_ECC_MIN_CURVE_BITS
};
SECStatus
@@ -78,6 +82,18 @@ NSS_OptionSet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 val
case NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS:
nss_ops.defaultLocks = value;
break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS:
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags = value;
+ break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS:
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags |= value;
+ break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS:
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags &= ~value;
+ break;
+ case NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE:
+ nss_ops.eccMinKeySize = value;
+ break;
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
rv = SECFailure;
@@ -119,6 +135,16 @@ NSS_OptionGet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 *va
case NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS:
*value = nss_ops.defaultLocks;
break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS:
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS:
+ *value = nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags;
+ break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS:
+ *value = ~nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags;
+ break;
+ case NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE:
+ *value = nss_ops.eccMinKeySize;
+ break;
default:
rv = SECFailure;
}
diff -up ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h.signature-policy ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h
--- ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@
* happens because NSS used to count bit lengths incorrectly. */
#define SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS 1023
#define SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS 1023
+/* not really used by SSL, but define it here for consistency */
+#define SSL_ECC_MIN_CURVE_BITS 256
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c.signature-policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
@@ -78,15 +78,14 @@ pk11_KeyExchange(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_
if (privKeyHandle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
PK11RSAGenParams rsaParams;
- if (symKeyLength > 53) /* bytes */ {
- /* we'd have to generate an RSA key pair > 512 bits long,
+ if (symKeyLength > 120) /* bytes */ {
+ /* we'd have to generate an RSA key pair > 1024 bits long,
** and that's too costly. Don't even try.
*/
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CANNOT_MOVE_SENSITIVE_KEY);
goto rsa_failed;
}
- rsaParams.keySizeInBits =
- (symKeyLength > 21 || symKeyLength == 0) ? 512 : 256;
+ rsaParams.keySizeInBits = 1024;
rsaParams.pe = 0x10001;
privKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN,
&rsaParams, &pubKey, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE, symKey->cx);
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.signature-policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.signature-policy 2022-06-21 09:16:23.898904900 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
@@ -430,12 +430,21 @@ static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[]
{ CIPHER_NAME("DTLS1.3"), 0x304 },
};
+static const optionFreeDef keySizeFlagsList[] = {
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SSL"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SIGN"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-VERIFY"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG },
+};
+
static const optionFreeDef freeOptList[] = {
/* Restrictions for asymetric keys */
{ CIPHER_NAME("RSA-MIN"), NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
{ CIPHER_NAME("DH-MIN"), NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
{ CIPHER_NAME("DSA-MIN"), NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECC-MIN"), NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
+ /* what operations doe the key size apply to */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-FLAGS"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS },
/* constraints on SSL Protocols */
{ CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MIN"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MIN_POLICY },
{ CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MAX"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MAX_POLICY },
@@ -543,6 +552,7 @@ secmod_getPolicyOptValue(const char *pol
*result = val;
return SECSuccess;
}
+ /* handle any ssl strings */
for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sslOptList); i++) {
if (policyValueLength == sslOptList[i].name_size &&
PORT_Strncasecmp(sslOptList[i].name, policyValue,
@@ -551,7 +561,29 @@ secmod_getPolicyOptValue(const char *pol
return SECSuccess;
}
}
- return SECFailure;
+ /* handle key_size flags. Each flag represents a bit, which
+ * gets or'd together. They can be separated by , | or + */
+ val = 0;
+ while (*policyValue) {
+ PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(keySizeFlagsList); i++) {
+ if (PORT_Strncasecmp(keySizeFlagsList[i].name, policyValue,
+ keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size) == 0) {
+ val |= keySizeFlagsList[i].option;
+ found = PR_TRUE;
+ policyValue += keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (*policyValue == ',' || *policyValue == '|' || *policyValue == '+') {
+ policyValue++;
+ }
+ }
+ *result = val;
+ return SECSuccess;
}
/* Policy operations:
diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.signature-policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.920905040 -0700
@@ -7409,6 +7409,8 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket
unsigned dh_p_bits;
unsigned dh_g_bits;
PRInt32 minDH;
+ PRInt32 optval;
+ PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_FALSE;
SSL3Hashes hashes;
SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
@@ -7419,8 +7421,13 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed. */
}
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG);
+ }
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv != SECSuccess || minDH <= 0) {
minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS;
}
@@ -11411,13 +11418,20 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 minKey;
PRInt32 optval;
+ PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_TRUE;
+
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG);
+ }
ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey);
switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey)) {
case rsaKey:
case rsaPssKey:
case rsaOaepKey:
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
} else {
@@ -11426,7 +11440,8 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
break;
case dsaKey:
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
} else {
@@ -11435,7 +11450,8 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
break;
case dhKey:
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
} else {
@@ -11444,9 +11460,15 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
break;
case ecKey:
- /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we only
- * support curves we like. */
- minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
+ minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
+ } else {
+ /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we
+ * only support curves we like. */
+ minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ }
break;
default:
diff -up ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt.signature-policy ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt
--- ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt 2022-06-21 09:16:23.920905040 -0700
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA1:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP256R1:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:aes256-cbc:camellia256-cbc:aes128-gcm:aes128-cbc:camellia128-cbc:SHA256:SHA384:SHA512:SHA1:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.0:dtls-version-min=dtls1.0:DH-MIN=1023:DSA-MIN=2048:RSA-MIN=2048 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Standard policy
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA1:HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP256R1:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:aes256-cbc:camellia256-cbc:aes128-gcm:aes128-cbc:camellia128-cbc:des-ede3-cbc:rc4:SHA256:SHA384:SHA512:SHA1:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:DHE-DSS:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.0:dtls-version-min=tls1.0:DH-MIN=1023:DSA-MIN=1023:RSA-MIN=1023 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Legacy policy
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Reduced policy
+0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072:KEY-SIZE-FLAGS=KEY-SIZE-SSL,KEY-SIZE-SIGN,KEY-SIZE-VERIFY NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Valid key size
+2 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072:KEY-SIZE-FLAGS=UNKNOWN,KEY-SIZE-SIGN,KEY-SIZE-VERIFY NSS-POLICY-FAIL.*unknown.* Invalid key size
2 disallow=ALL_allow=dtls-version-min=:dtls-version-max= NSS-POLICY-FAIL Missing value
2 disallow=ALL_allow=RSA-MIN=whatever NSS-POLICY-FAIL Invalid value
2 disallow=ALL_allow=flower NSS-POLICY-FAIL Invalid identifier
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.signature-policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2022-06-21 09:16:23.920905040 -0700
@@ -194,6 +194,10 @@
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=all_allow=md2/all:md4/all:md5/all:sha1/all:sha256/all:sha384/all:sha512/all:rsa-pkcs/all:rsa-pss/all:ecdsa/all:dsa/all:hmac-sha1/all:hmac-sha224/all:hmac-sha256/all:hmac-sha384/all:hmac-sha512/all:hmac-md5/all:camellia128-cbc/all:camellia192-cbc/all:camellia256-cbc/all:seed-cbc/all:des-ede3-cbc/all:des-40-cbc/all:des-cbc/all:null-cipher/all:rc2/all:rc4/all:idea/all:rsa/all:rsa-export/all:dhe-rsa/all:dhe-dss/all:ecdhe-ecdsa/all:ecdhe-rsa/all:ecdh-ecdsa/all:ecdh-rsa/all:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly
0 noECC SSL3 d disallow=dsa Disallow DSA Signatures Explicitly
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
+ 0 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=1023 Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
# test default settings
# NOTE: tstclient will attempt to overide the defaults, so we detect we
# were successful by locking in our settings

32
SOURCES/nss-disable-dc.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.orig ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.orig 2021-06-02 15:40:48.677355426 -0700
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn 2021-06-02 15:42:31.248977261 -0700
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ CPPSRCS = \
tls_filter.cc \
tls_protect.cc \
tls_psk_unittest.cc \
- tls_subcerts_unittest.cc \
tls_ech_unittest.cc \
$(SSLKEYLOGFILE_FILES) \
$(NULL)
diff -up ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.orig ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c
--- ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.orig 2021-05-28 02:50:43.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c 2021-06-02 15:40:48.676355420 -0700
@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ SSL_OptionSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 wh
break;
case SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS:
- ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials = val;
+ /* disable it for now */
break;
case SSL_ENABLE_NPN:
@@ -1337,7 +1337,7 @@ SSL_OptionSetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRIn
break;
case SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS:
- ssl_defaults.enableDelegatedCredentials = val;
+ /* disable it for now */
break;
case SSL_ENABLE_NPN:

207
SPECS/nss.spec
View File

@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
%global nspr_version 4.32.0
%global nss_version 3.79.0
%global nspr_version 4.34.0
%global baserelease 14
%global nss_release %baserelease
# NOTE: To avoid NVR clashes of nspr* packages:
# - reset %%{nspr_release} to 1, when updating %%{nspr_version}
# - increment %%{nspr_version}, when updating the NSS part only
# - put the nss_release number here next to nspr, as they both
# need to be updated on a given release
%global nss_release 7
%global nspr_release %[ %nss_release+2]
%global nss_version 3.71.0
# use "%%global nspr_release %%[%%baserelease+n]" to handle offsets when
# release number between nss and nspr are different.
# when a new nspr is released with nss, reset nspr_release to baserelease.
# for each new nss relase with the same nspr, change increment n by one.
%global nspr_release %baserelease
# only need to update this as we added new
# algorithms under nss policy control
%global crypto_policies_version 20210118
@ -56,6 +57,21 @@ rpm.define(string.format("nss_release_tag NSS_%s_RTM",
string.gsub(rpm.expand("%nss_archive_version"), "%.", "_")))
}
# This is taken from gnutls.spec
%define srpmhash() %{lua:
local files = rpm.expand("%_specdir/nss.spec")
for i, p in ipairs(patches) do
files = files.." "..p
end
for i, p in ipairs(sources) do
files = files.." "..p
end
local sha256sum = assert(io.popen("cat "..files.."| sha256sum"))
local hash = sha256sum:read("*a")
sha256sum:close()
print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
}
Summary: Network Security Services
Name: nss
Version: %{nss_version}
@ -110,14 +126,13 @@ Source22: pkcs11.txt.xml
Source24: cert9.db.xml
Source26: key4.db.xml
Source28: nss-p11-kit.config
Source30: PayPalEE.cert
# fips algorithms are tied to the red hat validation, others
# will have their own validation
Source30: fips_algorithms.h
Source100: nspr-%{nspr_archive_version}.tar.gz
Source101: nspr-config.xml
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=617723
Patch2: nss-3.71-ipv6-fix.patch
# This patch uses the GCC -iquote option documented at
# http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Directory-Options.html#Directory-Options
# to give the in-tree headers a higher priority over the system headers,
@ -140,21 +155,37 @@ Patch32: nss-disable-md5.patch
%else
Patch33: nss-no-dbm-man-page.patch
%endif
# upstream bug https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1729550
Patch50: nss-3.71-fips-module-name.patch
# upstream bug https://buzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1737470
Patch60: nss-3.67-cve-2021-43527.patch
Patch70: nss-3.67-cve-2021-43527-test.patch
# not upstreamable patch...
Patch80: nss-3.71-fix-lto-gtests.patch
Patch34: nss-3.71-fix-lto-gtests.patch
# camellia pkcs12 docs.
patch85: nss-3.71-camellia-pkcs12-doc.patch
# fix issue with long passwords in pkcs12
patch90: nss-3.75-fix-pkcs12-passwords.patch
Patch35: nss-3.71-camellia-pkcs12-doc.patch
# disable delegated credentials
Patch36: nss-disable-dc.patch
# patches that expect to be upstreamed
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1774659
Patch51: nss-3.79-dbtool.patch
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1774657
Patch52: nss-3.79-dont-verify-default.patch
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1774654
Patch53: nss-3.79-fix-client-cert-crash.patch
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1767883
Patch54: nss-3.79-rhel-9-fips-signature-policy.patch
Patch55: nss-3.79-enable-POST-rerun.patch
Patch56: nss-3.79-increase-pbe-cache.patch
Patch57: nss-3.79-pkcs12-fix-null-password.patch
Patch58: nss-3.79-fips.patch
Patch100: nspr-config-pc.patch
Patch101: nspr-gcc-atomics.patch
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1769293
Patch110: nspr-4.34-fix-coverity-loop-issue.patch
Patch120: nspr-4.34-server-passive.patch
# NSS reverse patches
Patch300: nss-3.79-distrusted-certs.patch
%description
Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to
@ -313,17 +344,25 @@ Header files for doing development with the Netscape Portable Runtime.
%setup -q -T -b 0 -n %{name}-%{nss_archive_version}
mv ../nspr-%{nspr_archive_version}/nspr .
cp ./nspr/config/nspr-config.in ./nspr/config/nspr-config-pc.in
%{__cp} %{SOURCE30} -f ./nss/tests/libpkix/certs
%patch100 -p0 -b .flags
pushd nspr
%patch101 -p1 -b .gcc-atomics
%patch110 -p1 -b .coverity
%patch120 -p1 -b .server-passive
popd
pushd nss
%autopatch -p1 -M 99
%patch300 -R -p1
popd
# copy the fips_algorithms.h for this release
# this file is release specific and matches what
# each vendors claim in their own FIPS certification
cp %{SOURCE30} nss/lib/softoken/
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1247353
find nss/lib/libpkix -perm /u+x -type f -exec chmod -x {} \;
@ -389,24 +428,13 @@ export IN_TREE_FREEBL_HEADERS_FIRST=1
# FIPS related defines
export NSS_FORCE_FIPS=1
export NSS_FIPS_VERSION="%{name}\ %{version}-$(date +%Y%m%d)"
%if %{defined rhel}
%if %{defined centos}
export NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID="Centos\ %rhel\ ${NSS_FIPS_VERSION}\ unvalidated"
%else
if grep "Red Hat" /etc/system-release; then
export NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID="Red\ Hat\ Enterprise\ Linux\ %rhel\ ${NSS_FIPS_VERSION}"
else
export NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID="Generic\ Enterprise\ Linux\ %rhel\ ${NSS_FIPS_VERSION}\ unvalidated"
fi
%endif
%else
%if %{defined fedora}
export NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID="Fedora\ %fedora\ ${NSS_FIPS_VERSION}\ unvalidated"
%else
export NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID="Generic\ Linux\ ${NSS_FIPS_VERSION}\ unvalidated"
%endif
%endif
export NSS_FIPS_VERSION="%{name}\ %{version}-%{srpmhash}"
eval $(sed -n 's/^\(\(NAME\|VERSION_ID\)=.*\)/OS_\1/p' /etc/os-release | sed -e 's/ /\\ /g')
export FIPS_MODULE_OS="$OS_NAME\ ${OS_VERSION_ID%%.*}"
export NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID="${FIPS_MODULE_OS}\ ${NSS_FIPS_VERSION}"
# remove when the infrastructure is fixed
export NSS_FIPS_140_3=1
export NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS=1
# Enable compiler optimizations and disable debugging code
export BUILD_OPT=1
@ -433,6 +461,7 @@ export PKG_CONFIG_ALLOW_SYSTEM_LIBS=1
export PKG_CONFIG_ALLOW_SYSTEM_CFLAGS=1
export NSPR_INCLUDE_DIR=$PWD/dist/include/nspr
export NSPR_LIB_DIR=$PWD/dist/lib
export NSS_USE_SYSTEM_SQLITE=1
@ -601,6 +630,15 @@ export USE_64=1
# End -- copied from the build section
# copy the nspr libraries into the NSS object directory so we use the
# newly compiled nspr binaries in our test rather than the build root
# versions
export LOBJDIR=`make -s -C ./nss/tests/common objdir_name`
for i in ./dist/lib/*.so
do
cp $i ./dist/${LOBJDIR}/lib
done
# This is necessary because the test suite tests algorithms that are
# disabled by the system policy.
export NSS_IGNORE_SYSTEM_POLICY=1
@ -624,9 +662,9 @@ if [ $SPACEISBAD -ne 0 ]; then
echo "error: filenames containing space are not supported (xargs)"
exit 1
fi
MYRAND=`perl -e 'print 9000 + int rand 1000'`; echo $MYRAND ||:
RANDSERV=selfserv_${MYRAND}; echo $RANDSERV ||:
DISTBINDIR=`ls -d ./dist/*.OBJ/bin`; echo $DISTBINDIR ||:
export MYRAND=`perl -e 'print 9000 + int rand 1000'`; echo $MYRAND
export RANDSERV=selfserv_${MYRAND}; echo $RANDSERV
export DISTBINDIR=./dist/${LOBJDIR}/bin
pushd "$DISTBINDIR"
ln -s selfserv $RANDSERV
popd
@ -685,6 +723,25 @@ for f in nspr-config; do
done
popd
# Begin -- copied from the build section
# this is needed to make sure LOBJDIR is correct
export FREEBL_NO_DEPEND=1
export BUILD_OPT=1
export NSS_DISABLE_PPC_GHASH=1
%ifnarch noarch
%if 0%{__isa_bits} == 64
export USE_64=1
%endif
%endif
# End -- copied from the build section
# get the objdir value from the test make file
export LOBJDIR=`make -s -C ./nss/tests/common objdir_name`
# There is no make install target so we'll do it ourselves.
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_includedir}/nss3
@ -713,7 +770,7 @@ mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5
# Copy the binary libraries we want
for file in libnssutil3.so libsoftokn3.so %{?with_dbm:libnssdbm3.so} libfreebl3.so libfreeblpriv3.so libnss3.so libnsssysinit.so libsmime3.so libssl3.so
do
install -p -m 755 dist/*.OBJ/lib/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}
install -p -m 755 dist/${LOBJDIR}/lib/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}
done
# Install the empty NSS db files
@ -732,19 +789,19 @@ install -p -m 644 %{SOURCE15} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/pki/nssdb/pkcs11.tx
# Copy the development libraries we want
for file in libcrmf.a libnssb.a libnssckfw.a
do
install -p -m 644 dist/*.OBJ/lib/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}
install -p -m 644 dist/${LOBJDIR}/lib/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}
done
# Copy the binaries we want
for file in certutil cmsutil crlutil modutil nss-policy-check pk12util signver ssltap
do
install -p -m 755 dist/*.OBJ/bin/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}
install -p -m 755 dist/${LOBJDIR}/bin/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}
done
# Copy the binaries we ship as unsupported
for file in bltest ecperf fbectest fipstest shlibsign atob btoa derdump listsuites ocspclnt pp selfserv signtool strsclnt symkeyutil tstclnt validation vfyserv vfychain
for file in bltest dbtool ecperf fbectest fipstest shlibsign atob btoa derdump listsuites ocspclnt pp selfserv signtool strsclnt symkeyutil tstclnt validation vfyserv vfychain
do
install -p -m 755 dist/*.OBJ/bin/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{unsupported_tools_directory}
install -p -m 755 dist/${LOBJDIR}/bin/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{unsupported_tools_directory}
done
# Copy the include files we want
@ -762,7 +819,7 @@ done
# Copy the static freebl library
for file in libfreebl.a
do
install -p -m 644 dist/*.OBJ/lib/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}
install -p -m 644 dist/${LOBJDIR}/lib/$file $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}
done
# Copy the template files we want
@ -1047,6 +1104,7 @@ update-crypto-policies &> /dev/null || :
%dir %{saved_files_dir}
%dir %{unsupported_tools_directory}
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/bltest
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/dbtool
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/ecperf
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/fbectest
%{unsupported_tools_directory}/fipstest
@ -1107,6 +1165,55 @@ update-crypto-policies &> /dev/null || :
%changelog
* Wed Aug 24 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-14
- Update fips_algorithms.h to match the final FIPS requirements
- Disable delegated credentials
* Wed Aug 24 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-13
- remove OAEP from the FIPS indicators
* Thu Aug 11 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-12
- only turn off rand changes on all non-fips kernels
* Mon Aug 8 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-11
- only turn off rand changes on ppc64le at build-test time.
* Mon Aug 8 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-10
- turn off rand changes on ppc64le
* Sun Aug 7 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-9
- FIPS 140-3 changes
* Thu Jul 21 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-8
- fix encoding issue with NULL passwords
* Thu Jul 7 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-7
- more complete fix for cert auth regression crash
* Wed Jun 22 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-6
- Remove debugging printf from a patch
- increase the pbe cache size to handle reusing the same token key.
* Mon Jun 20 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-5
- FIPS 140-3 changes
- Reject Small RSA keys, 1024 bit keys are marked as FIP OK when verifying, reject
signature keys by policy
- Allow applications to retrigger selftests on demand.
* Tue Jun 14 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-4
- server passive fix
* Sat Jun 11 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-3
- fix regressions in test suite
* Mon Jun 6 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-2
- fix nspr coverify issues.
* Wed Jun 1 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.79.0-1
- update to NSS 3.79
- update to NSPR 4.34
- change FIPS Modulename to conform with our final module standard
* Wed Feb 16 2022 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.71.0-7
- Fix handling of pkcs12 passwords for PKCS5v2 cases which causes failures
on long passwords.