import UBI nss-3.101.0-7.el8_8

2024-09-16 12:13:57 +00:00 · 2024-09-16 12:13:57 +00:00 · 8818c178b0
commit 8818c178b0
parent 0602db546c
37 changed files with 2450 additions and 47500 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 SOURCES/NameConstraints_Certs.tar
 SOURCES/blank-cert8.db
 SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
 SOURCES/blank-key3.db
 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
 SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
-SOURCES/nss-3.90.tar.gz
+SOURCES/nss-3.101.tar.gz
--- a/.nss.metadata
+++ b/.nss.metadata
@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 39ad4988f85b50fdc3569d21b6c885cf9eb390b0 SOURCES/NameConstraints_Certs.tar
 d272a7b58364862613d44261c5744f7a336bf177 SOURCES/blank-cert8.db
 b5570125fbf6bfb410705706af48217a0817c03a SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
 7f78b5bcecdb5005e7b803604b2ec9d1a9df2fb5 SOURCES/blank-key3.db
 f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
 bd748cf6e1465a1bbe6e751b72ffc0076aff0b50 SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
-1e7d2f16655281cfb2972688af1605e0de302481 SOURCES/nss-3.90.tar.gz
+90f6f1d5440e7cc72cd27f2ecf2e8f3f680a00aa SOURCES/nss-3.101.tar.gz
--- a/SOURCES/blinding_ct.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/blinding_ct.patch
@ -1,949 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
 --- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
 +++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi-priv.h
@@ -199,16 +199,19 @@ void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d(const mp_d
 void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len,
                                   mp_digit b, mp_digit *c);
 #endif
 void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add_prop(const mp_digit *a,
                                        mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
                                        mp_digit *c);
 +void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(const mp_digit *a,
 +                                       mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
 +                                       mp_digit *c, mp_size c_len);
 void MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_sqr_add_prop(const mp_digit *a,
                                      mp_size a_len,
                                      mp_digit *sqrs);
 mp_err MPI_ASM_DECL s_mpv_div_2dx1d(mp_digit Nhi, mp_digit Nlo,
                                     mp_digit divisor, mp_digit *quot, mp_digit *rem);
 /* c += a * b * (MP_RADIX ** offset);  */
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
 --- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
 +++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
@@ -5,16 +5,18 @@
  *
  * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
 #include "mpi-priv.h"
 #include "mplogic.h"
 +#include <assert.h>
 +
 #if defined(__arm__) && \
     ((defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__)) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_3__))
 /* 16-bit thumb or ARM v3 doesn't work inlined assember version */
 #undef MP_ASSEMBLY_MULTIPLY
 #undef MP_ASSEMBLY_SQUARE
 #endif
 #if MP_LOGTAB
@@ -797,25 +799,28 @@ mp_sub(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b,
 CLEANUP:
     return res;
 } /* end mp_sub() */
 /* }}} */
 -/* {{{ mp_mul(a, b, c) */
 +/* {{{ s_mp_mulg(a, b, c) */
 /*
 -  mp_mul(a, b, c)
 -
 -  Compute c = a * b.  All parameters may be identical.
 +  s_mp_mulg(a, b, c)
 +
 +  Compute c = a * b.  All parameters may be identical. if constantTime is set,
 +  then the operations are done in constant time. The original is mostly
 +  constant time as long as s_mpv_mul_d_add() is constant time. This is true
 +  of the x86 assembler, as well as the current c code.
  */
 mp_err
 -mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c)
 +s_mp_mulg(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c, int constantTime)
 {
     mp_digit *pb;
     mp_int tmp;
     mp_err res;
     mp_size ib;
     mp_size useda, usedb;
     ARGCHK(a != NULL && b != NULL && c != NULL, MP_BADARG);
@@ -841,17 +846,24 @@ mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b,
     }
     MP_USED(c) = 1;
     MP_DIGIT(c, 0) = 0;
     if ((res = s_mp_pad(c, USED(a) + USED(b))) != MP_OKAY)
         goto CLEANUP;
 #ifdef NSS_USE_COMBA
 -    if ((MP_USED(a) == MP_USED(b)) && IS_POWER_OF_2(MP_USED(b))) {
 +    /* comba isn't constant time because it clamps! If we cared
 +     * (we needed a constant time version of multiply that was 'faster'
 +     * we could easily pass constantTime down to the comba code and
 +     * get it to skip the clamp... but here are assembler versions
 +     * which add comba to platforms that can't compile the normal
 +     * comba's imbedded assembler which would also need to change, so
 +     * for now we just skip comba when we are running constant time. */
 +    if (!constantTime && (MP_USED(a) == MP_USED(b)) && IS_POWER_OF_2(MP_USED(b))) {
         if (MP_USED(a) == 4) {
             s_mp_mul_comba_4(a, b, c);
             goto CLEANUP;
         }
         if (MP_USED(a) == 8) {
             s_mp_mul_comba_8(a, b, c);
             goto CLEANUP;
         }
@@ -871,36 +883,82 @@ mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b,
     /* Outer loop:  Digits of b */
     useda = MP_USED(a);
     usedb = MP_USED(b);
     for (ib = 1; ib < usedb; ib++) {
         mp_digit b_i = *pb++;
         /* Inner product:  Digits of a */
 -        if (b_i)
 +        if (constantTime || b_i)
             s_mpv_mul_d_add(MP_DIGITS(a), useda, b_i, MP_DIGITS(c) + ib);
         else
             MP_DIGIT(c, ib + useda) = b_i;
     }
 -    s_mp_clamp(c);
 +    if (!constantTime) {
 +        s_mp_clamp(c);
 +    }
     if (SIGN(a) == SIGN(b) || s_mp_cmp_d(c, 0) == MP_EQ)
         SIGN(c) = ZPOS;
     else
         SIGN(c) = NEG;
 CLEANUP:
     mp_clear(&tmp);
     return res;
 +} /* end smp_mulg() */
 +
 +/* }}} */
 +
 +/* {{{ mp_mul(a, b, c) */
 +
 +/*
 +  mp_mul(a, b, c)
 +
 +  Compute c = a * b.  All parameters may be identical.
 + */
 +
 +mp_err
 +mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c)
 +{
 +    return s_mp_mulg(a, b, c, 0);
 } /* end mp_mul() */
 /* }}} */
 +/* {{{ mp_mulCT(a, b, c) */
 +
 +/*
 +  mp_mulCT(a, b, c)
 +
 +  Compute c = a * b. In constant time. Parameters may not be identical.
 +  NOTE: a and b may be modified.
 + */
 +
 +mp_err
 +mp_mulCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_size setSize)
 +{
 +    mp_err res;
 +
 +    /* make the multiply values fixed length so multiply
 +     * doesn't leak the length. at this point all the
 +     * values are blinded, but once we finish we want the
 +     * output size to be hidden (so no clamping the out put) */
 +    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(a, setSize));
 +    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(b, setSize));
 +    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(c, 2*setSize));
 +    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_mulg(a, b, c, 1));
 +CLEANUP:
 +    return res;
 +} /* end mp_mulCT() */
 +
 +/* }}} */
 +
 /* {{{ mp_sqr(a, sqr) */
 #if MP_SQUARE
 /*
   Computes the square of a.  This can be done more
   efficiently than a general multiplication, because many of the
   computation steps are redundant when squaring.  The inner product
   step is a bit more complicated, but we save a fair number of
@@ -1263,16 +1321,174 @@ mp_mod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m,
     }
     return MP_OKAY;
 } /* end mp_mod() */
 /* }}} */
 +/* {{{ s_mp_subCT_d(a, b, borrow, c) */
 +
 +/*
 +  s_mp_subCT_d(a, b, borrow, c)
 +
 +  Compute c = (a -b) - subtract in constant time. returns borrow
 + */
 +mp_digit
 +s_mp_subCT_d(mp_digit a, mp_digit b, mp_digit borrow, mp_digit *ret) {
 +    mp_digit borrow1, borrow2, t;
 +#ifdef MP_COMPILER_USES_CARRY
 +    /* while it doesn't look constant-time, this is idiomatic code
 +     * to tell compilers to use the carry bit from subtraction */
 +    t = a - borrow;
 +    if (t > a) {
 +        borrow1 = 1;
 +    } else {
 +        borrow1 = 0;
 +    }
 +    *ret = t - b;
 +    if (*ret > t) {
 +        borrow2 = 1;
 +    } else {
 +        borrow2 = 0;
 +    }
 +#else
 +    mp_digit bitr, bitb, nbitt;
 +    /* this is constant time independent of compilier */
 +    t = a - borrow;
 +    borrow1 = ((~a) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1)) & ((t) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1));
 +    *ret = t - b;
 +    bitb = b >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1);
 +    bitr = *ret >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1);
 +    nbitt = (~t) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT-1);
 +    borrow2  = (nbitt & bitb) | (bitb & bitr) | (nbitt & bitr);
 +#endif
 +    /* only borrow 1 or borrow 2 should be 1, we want to guarrentee
 +     * the overall borrow is 1, so use | here */
 +    return borrow1 | borrow2;
 +} /*  s_mp_subCT_d() */
 +
 +/* }}} */
 +
 +/* {{{ mp_subCT(a, b, ret, borrow) */
 +
 +/* return ret= a - b and borrow in borrow. done in constant time.
 + * b could be modified.
 + */
 +mp_err
 +mp_subCT(const mp_int *a,  mp_int *b, mp_int *ret, mp_digit *borrow)
 +{
 +    mp_size used_a = MP_USED(a);
 +    mp_size i;
 +    mp_err res;
 +
 +    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(b, used_a));
 +    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(ret, used_a));
 +    *borrow = 0;
 +    for (i=0; i < used_a; i++) {
 +        *borrow = s_mp_subCT_d(MP_DIGIT(a,i), MP_DIGIT(b,i), *borrow,
 +                               &MP_DIGIT(ret,i));
 +    }
 +
 +    res = MP_OKAY;
 +CLEANUP:
 +    return res;
 +} /*  end mp_subCT() */
 +
 +/* }}} */
 +
 +/* {{{ mp_selectCT(cond, a, b, ret) */
 +
 +/*
 + * return ret= cond ? a : b; cond should be either 0 or 1
 + */
 +mp_err
 +mp_selectCT(mp_digit cond, const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *ret)
 +{
 +    mp_size used_a = MP_USED(a);
 +    mp_err res;
 +    mp_size i;
 +
 +    cond *= MP_DIGIT_MAX;
 +
 +    /* we currently require these to be equal on input,
 +     * we could use pad to extend one of them, but that might
 +     * leak data as it wouldn't be constant time */
 +    assert(used_a == MP_USED(b));
 +
 +    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(ret, used_a));
 +    for (i=0; i < used_a; i++) {
 +        MP_DIGIT(ret,i) = (MP_DIGIT(a,i)&cond) | (MP_DIGIT(b,i)&~cond);
 +    }
 +    res = MP_OKAY;
 +CLEANUP:
 +    return res;
 +} /* end mp_selectCT() */
 +
 +
 +/* {{{ mp_reduceCT(a, m, c) */
 +
 +/*
 +  mp_reduceCT(a, m, c)
 +
 +  Compute c = aR^-1 (mod m) in constant time.
 +   input should be in montgomery form. If input is the
 +   result of a montgomery multiply then out put will be
 +   in mongomery form.
 +   Result will be reduced to MP_USED(m), but not be
 +   clamped.
 + */
 +
 +mp_err
 +mp_reduceCT(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *c)
 +{
 +    mp_size used_m = MP_USED(m);
 +    mp_size used_c = used_m*2+1;
 +    mp_digit *m_digits, *c_digits;
 +    mp_size i;
 +    mp_digit borrow, carry;
 +    mp_err res;
 +    mp_int sub;
 +
 +    MP_DIGITS(&sub) = 0;
 +    MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&sub,used_m));
 +
 +    if (a != c) {
 +        MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(a, c));
 +    }
 +    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(c, used_c));
 +    m_digits = MP_DIGITS(m);
 +    c_digits = MP_DIGITS(c);
 +    for (i=0; i < used_m; i++) {
 +        mp_digit m_i = MP_DIGIT(c,i)*n0i;
 +        s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(m_digits, used_m,  m_i, c_digits++, used_c--);
 +    }
 +    s_mp_rshd(c, used_m);
 +    /* MP_USED(c) should be used_m+1 with the high word being any carry
 +     * from the previous multiply, save that carry and drop the high
 +     * word for the substraction below */
 +    carry = MP_DIGIT(c,used_m);
 +    MP_DIGIT(c,used_m) = 0;
 +    MP_USED(c) = used_m;
 +    /* mp_subCT wants c and m to be the same size, we've already
 +     * guarrenteed that in the previous statement, so mp_subCT won't actually
 +     * modify m, so it's safe to recast */
 +    MP_CHECKOK(mp_subCT(c, (mp_int *)m, &sub, &borrow));
 +
 +    /* we return c-m if c >= m no borrow or there was a borrow and a carry */
 +    MP_CHECKOK(mp_selectCT(borrow ^ carry, c, &sub, c));
 +    res = MP_OKAY;
 +CLEANUP:
 +    mp_clear(&sub);
 +    return res;
 +}  /* end mp_reduceCT() */
 +
 +/* }}} */
 +
 /* {{{ mp_mod_d(a, d, c) */
 /*
   mp_mod_d(a, d, c)
   Compute c = a (mod d).  Result will always be 0 <= c < d
  */
 mp_err
@@ -1379,16 +1595,47 @@ mp_mulmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int 
     if ((res = mp_mod(c, m, c)) != MP_OKAY)
         return res;
     return MP_OKAY;
 }
 /* }}} */
 +/* {{{ mp_mulmontmodCT(a, b, m, c) */
 +
 +/*
 +  mp_mulmontmodCT(a, b, m, c)
 +
 +  Compute c = (a * b) mod m in constant time wrt a and b. either a or b
 +  should be in montgomery form and the output is native. If both a and b
 +  are in montgomery form, then the output will also be in montgomery form
 +  and can be recovered with an mp_reduceCT call.
 +  NOTE: a and b may be modified.
 + */
 +
 +mp_err
 +mp_mulmontmodCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i,
 +                mp_int *c)
 +{
 +    mp_err res;
 +
 +    ARGCHK(a != NULL && b != NULL && m != NULL && c != NULL, MP_BADARG);
 +
 +    if ((res = mp_mulCT(a, b, c, MP_USED(m))) != MP_OKAY)
 +        return res;
 +
 +    if ((res = mp_reduceCT(c, m, n0i, c)) != MP_OKAY)
 +        return res;
 +
 +    return MP_OKAY;
 +}
 +
 +/* }}} */
 +
 /* {{{ mp_sqrmod(a, m, c) */
 #if MP_SQUARE
 mp_err
 mp_sqrmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c)
 {
     mp_err res;
@@ -3936,25 +4183,73 @@ s_mp_mul(mp_int *a, const mp_int *b)
     {                                                              \
         mp_digit a0b1, a1b0;                                       \
         Plo = (a & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX) * (b & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX);   \
         Phi = (a >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT) * (b >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT); \
         a0b1 = (a & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX) * (b >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT); \
         a1b0 = (a >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT) * (b & MP_HALF_DIGIT_MAX); \
         a1b0 += a0b1;                                              \
         Phi += a1b0 >> MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT;                          \
 -        if (a1b0 < a0b1)                                           \
 -            Phi += MP_HALF_RADIX;                                  \
 +        Phi += (MP_CT_LTU(a1b0, a0b1)) << MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT;     \
         a1b0 <<= MP_HALF_DIGIT_BIT;                                \
         Plo += a1b0;                                               \
 -        if (Plo < a1b0)                                            \
 -            ++Phi;                                                 \
 +        Phi += MP_CT_LTU(Plo, a1b0);                                          \
     }
 #endif
 +/* Constant time version of s_mpv_mul_d_add_prop.
 + * Presently, this is only used by the Constant time Montgomery arithmetic code. */
 +/* c += a * b */
 +void
 +s_mpv_mul_d_add_propCT(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len, mp_digit b,
 +                       mp_digit *c, mp_size c_len)
 +{
 +#if !defined(MP_NO_MP_WORD) && !defined(MP_NO_MUL_WORD)
 +    mp_digit d = 0;
 +
 +    c_len -= a_len;
 +    /* Inner product:  Digits of a */
 +    while (a_len--) {
 +        mp_word w = ((mp_word)b * *a++) + *c + d;
 +        *c++ = ACCUM(w);
 +        d = CARRYOUT(w);
 +    }
 +
 +    /* propagate the carry to the end, even if carry is zero */
 +    while (c_len--) {
 +        mp_word w = (mp_word)*c + d;
 +        *c++ = ACCUM(w);
 +        d = CARRYOUT(w);
 +    }
 +#else
 +    mp_digit carry = 0;
 +    c_len -= a_len;
 +    while (a_len--) {
 +        mp_digit a_i = *a++;
 +        mp_digit a0b0, a1b1;
 +        MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
 +
 +        a0b0 += carry;
 +        a1b1 += MP_CT_LTU(a0b0, carry);
 +        a0b0 += a_i = *c;
 +        a1b1 += MP_CT_LTU(a0b0, a_i);
 +
 +        *c++ = a0b0;
 +        carry = a1b1;
 +    }
 +    /* propagate the carry to the end, even if carry is zero */
 +    while (c_len--) {
 +        mp_digit c_i = *c;
 +        carry += c_i;
 +        *c++ = carry;
 +        carry = MP_CT_LTU(carry, c_i);
 +    }
 +#endif
 +}
 +
 #if !defined(MP_ASSEMBLY_MULTIPLY)
 /* c = a * b */
 void
 s_mpv_mul_d(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a_len, mp_digit b, mp_digit *c)
 {
 #if !defined(MP_NO_MP_WORD) && !defined(MP_NO_MUL_WORD)
     mp_digit d = 0;
@@ -3969,18 +4264,17 @@ s_mpv_mul_d(const mp_digit *a, mp_size a
     mp_digit carry = 0;
     while (a_len--) {
         mp_digit a_i = *a++;
         mp_digit a0b0, a1b1;
         MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
         a0b0 += carry;
 -        if (a0b0 < carry)
 -            ++a1b1;
 +        a1b1 += a0b0 < carry;
         *c++ = a0b0;
         carry = a1b1;
     }
     *c = carry;
 #endif
 }
 /* c += a * b */
@@ -4002,21 +4296,19 @@ s_mpv_mul_d_add(const mp_digit *a, mp_si
     mp_digit carry = 0;
     while (a_len--) {
         mp_digit a_i = *a++;
         mp_digit a0b0, a1b1;
         MP_MUL_DxD(a_i, b, a1b1, a0b0);
         a0b0 += carry;
 -        if (a0b0 < carry)
 -            ++a1b1;
 +        a1b1 += (a0b0 < carry);
         a0b0 += a_i = *c;
 -        if (a0b0 < a_i)
 -            ++a1b1;
 +        a1b1 += (a0b0 < a_i);
         *c++ = a0b0;
         carry = a1b1;
     }
     *c = carry;
 #endif
 }
 /* Presently, this is only used by the Montgomery arithmetic code. */
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
 --- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
 +++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
@@ -145,16 +145,54 @@ typedef int mp_sword;
 #define MP_USED(MP) ((MP)->used)
 #define MP_ALLOC(MP) ((MP)->alloc)
 #define MP_DIGITS(MP) ((MP)->dp)
 #define MP_DIGIT(MP, N) (MP)->dp[(N)]
 /* This defines the maximum I/O base (minimum is 2)   */
 #define MP_MAX_RADIX 64
 +/* Constant Time Macros on mp_digits */
 +#define MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(x) ((mp_digit)((mp_digit)(x) >> (MP_DIGIT_BIT - 1)))
 +
 +/* basic zero and non zero tests */
 +#define MP_CT_NOT_ZERO(x) (MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(((x) | (((mp_digit)0) - (x)))))
 +#define MP_CT_ZERO(x) (~MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(((x) | (((mp_digit)0) - (x)))))
 +
 +
 +/* basic constant-time helper macro for equalities and inequalities.
 + * The inequalities will produce incorrect results if
 + * abs(a-b) >= MP_DIGIT_SIZE/2. This can be avoided if unsigned values stay
 + * within the range 0-MP_DIGIT_MAX/2. */
 +#define MP_CT_EQ(a, b) MP_CT_ZERO(((a) - (b)))
 +#define MP_CT_NE(a, b) MP_CT_NOT_ZERO(((a) - (b)))
 +#define MP_CT_GT(a, b) MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((b) - (a))
 +#define MP_CT_LT(a, b) MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((a) - (b))
 +#define MP_CT_GE(a, b) (1^MP_CT_LT(a, b))
 +#define MP_CT_LE(a, b) (1^MP_CT_GT(a, b))
 +#define MP_CT_TRUE ((mp_digit)1)
 +#define MP_CT_FALSE ((mp_digit)0)
 +
 +/* use constant time result to select a boolean value */
 +#define MP_CT_SELB(m, l, r) (((m) & (l)) | (~(m) & (r)))
 +
 +/* full inequalities that work with full mp_digit values */
 +#define MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,c,d) \
 +        MP_CT_SELB(MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW((a)^(b)), \
 +                  (MP_CT_HIGH_TO_LOW(d)),c)
 +#define MP_CT_GTU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GT(a,b),a)
 +#define MP_CT_LTU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LT(a,b),b)
 +#define MP_CT_GEU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GE(a,b),a)
 +#define MP_CT_LEU(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LE(a,b),b)
 +#define MP_CT_GTS(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GT(a,b),b)
 +#define MP_CT_LTS(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LT(a,b),a)
 +#define MP_CT_GES(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_GE(a,b),b)
 +#define MP_CT_LES(a,b) MP_CT_OVERFLOW(a,b,MP_CT_LE(a,b),a)
 +
 +
 typedef struct {
     mp_sign sign;  /* sign of this quantity      */
     mp_size alloc; /* how many digits allocated  */
     mp_size used;  /* how many digits used       */
     mp_digit *dp;  /* the digits themselves      */
 } mp_int;
 /* Default precision       */
@@ -185,17 +223,19 @@ mp_err mp_expt_d(const mp_int *a, mp_dig
 /* Sign manipulations      */
 mp_err mp_abs(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b);
 mp_err mp_neg(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b);
 /* Full arithmetic         */
 mp_err mp_add(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
 mp_err mp_sub(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
 +mp_err mp_subCT(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_digit *borrow);
 mp_err mp_mul(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
 +mp_err mp_mulCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c, mp_size setSize);
 #if MP_SQUARE
 mp_err mp_sqr(const mp_int *a, mp_int *b);
 #else
 #define mp_sqr(a, b) mp_mul(a, a, b)
 #endif
 mp_err mp_div(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *q, mp_int *r);
 mp_err mp_div_2d(const mp_int *a, mp_digit d, mp_int *q, mp_int *r);
 mp_err mp_expt(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
@@ -212,23 +252,30 @@ mp_err mp_mulmod(const mp_int *a, const 
 mp_err mp_sqrmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
 #else
 #define mp_sqrmod(a, m, c) mp_mulmod(a, a, m, c)
 #endif
 mp_err mp_exptmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
 mp_err mp_exptmod_d(const mp_int *a, mp_digit d, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
 #endif /* MP_MODARITH */
 +/* montgomery math */
 +mp_err mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, const mp_int *N, mp_int *xMont);
 +mp_digit mp_calculate_mont_n0i(const mp_int *N);
 +mp_err mp_reduceCT(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *ct);
 +mp_err mp_mulmontmodCT(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, const mp_int *m, mp_digit n0i, mp_int *c);
 +
 /* Comparisons             */
 int mp_cmp_z(const mp_int *a);
 int mp_cmp_d(const mp_int *a, mp_digit d);
 int mp_cmp(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b);
 int mp_cmp_mag(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b);
 int mp_isodd(const mp_int *a);
 int mp_iseven(const mp_int *a);
 +mp_err mp_selectCT(mp_digit cond, const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *ret);
 /* Number theoretic        */
 mp_err mp_gcd(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
 mp_err mp_lcm(mp_int *a, mp_int *b, mp_int *c);
 mp_err mp_xgcd(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *b, mp_int *g, mp_int *x, mp_int *y);
 mp_err mp_invmod(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
 mp_err mp_invmod_xgcd(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *m, mp_int *c);
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
 --- a/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
 +++ b/lib/freebl/mpi/mpmontg.c
@@ -124,30 +124,37 @@ s_mp_mul_mont(const mp_int *a, const mp_
     }
     res = MP_OKAY;
 CLEANUP:
     return res;
 }
 #endif
 -STATIC
 mp_err
 -s_mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, mp_mont_modulus *mmm, mp_int *xMont)
 +mp_to_mont(const mp_int *x, const mp_int *N, mp_int *xMont)
 {
     mp_err res;
     /* xMont = x * R mod N   where  N is modulus */
 -    MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(x, xMont));
 -    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_lshd(xMont, MP_USED(&mmm->N))); /* xMont = x << b */
 -    MP_CHECKOK(mp_div(xMont, &mmm->N, 0, xMont));   /*         mod N */
 +    if (x != xMont) {
 +        MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(x, xMont));
 +    }
 +    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_lshd(xMont, MP_USED(N))); /* xMont = x << b */
 +    MP_CHECKOK(mp_div(xMont, N, 0, xMont));   /*         mod N */
 CLEANUP:
     return res;
 }
 +mp_digit
 +mp_calculate_mont_n0i(const mp_int *N)
 +{
 +    return 0 - s_mp_invmod_radix(MP_DIGIT(N,0));
 +}
 +
 #ifdef MP_USING_MONT_MULF
 /* the floating point multiply is already cache safe,
  * don't turn on cache safe unless we specifically
  * force it */
 #ifndef MP_FORCE_CACHE_SAFE
 #undef MP_USING_CACHE_SAFE_MOD_EXP
 #endif
@@ -193,17 +200,17 @@ mp_exptmod_f(const mp_int *montBase,
     MP_DIGITS(&accum1) = 0;
     for (i = 0; i < MAX_ODD_INTS; ++i)
         oddPowers[i] = 0;
     MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum1, 3 * nLen + 2));
     mp_set(&accum1, 1);
 -    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
 +    MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
     MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_pad(&accum1, nLen));
     oddPowSize = 2 * nLen + 1;
     dTmpSize = 2 * oddPowSize;
     dSize = sizeof(double) * (nLen * 4 + 1 +
                               ((odd_ints + 1) * oddPowSize) + dTmpSize);
     dBuf = malloc(dSize);
     if (!dBuf) {
@@ -473,17 +480,17 @@ mp_exptmod_i(const mp_int *montBase,
     for (i = 1; i < odd_ints; ++i) {
         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(oddPowers + i, nLen + 2 * MP_USED(&power2) + 2));
         MP_CHECKOK(mp_mul(oddPowers + (i - 1), &power2, oddPowers + i));
         MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_redc(oddPowers + i, mmm));
     }
     /* set accumulator to montgomery residue of 1 */
     mp_set(&accum1, 1);
 -    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
 +    MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
     pa1 = &accum1;
     pa2 = &accum2;
     for (expOff = bits_in_exponent - window_bits; expOff >= 0; expOff -= window_bits) {
         mp_size smallExp;
         MP_CHECKOK(mpl_get_bits(exponent, expOff, window_bits));
         smallExp = (mp_size)res;
@@ -862,17 +869,17 @@ mp_exptmod_safe_i(const mp_int *montBase
     /* build the first WEAVE_WORD powers inline */
     /* if WEAVE_WORD_SIZE is not 4, this code will have to change */
     if (num_powers > 2) {
         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[0], 3 * nLen + 2));
         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[1], 3 * nLen + 2));
         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[2], 3 * nLen + 2));
         MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&accum[3], 3 * nLen + 2));
         mp_set(&accum[0], 1);
 -        MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum[0], mmm, &accum[0]));
 +        MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum[0], &(mmm->N), &accum[0]));
         MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(montBase, &accum[1]));
         SQR(montBase, &accum[2]);
         MUL_NOWEAVE(montBase, &accum[2], &accum[3]);
         powersArray = (mp_digit *)malloc(num_powers * (nLen * sizeof(mp_digit) + 1));
         if (!powersArray) {
             res = MP_MEM;
             goto CLEANUP;
         }
@@ -881,17 +888,17 @@ mp_exptmod_safe_i(const mp_int *montBase
         MP_CHECKOK(mpi_to_weave(accum, powers, nLen, num_powers));
         if (first_window < 4) {
             MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(&accum[first_window], &accum1));
             first_window = num_powers;
         }
     } else {
         if (first_window == 0) {
             mp_set(&accum1, 1);
 -            MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(&accum1, mmm, &accum1));
 +            MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(&accum1, &(mmm->N), &accum1));
         } else {
             /* assert first_window == 1? */
             MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(montBase, &accum1));
         }
     }
     /*
      * calculate all the powers in the powers array.
@@ -1054,19 +1061,19 @@ mp_exptmod(const mp_int *inBase, const m
     nLen = MP_USED(modulus);
     MP_CHECKOK(mp_init_size(&montBase, 2 * nLen + 2));
     mmm.N = *modulus; /* a copy of the mp_int struct */
     /* compute n0', given n0, n0' = -(n0 ** -1) mod MP_RADIX
     **        where n0 = least significant mp_digit of N, the modulus.
     */
 -    mmm.n0prime = 0 - s_mp_invmod_radix(MP_DIGIT(modulus, 0));
 +    mmm.n0prime = mp_calculate_mont_n0i(modulus);
 -    MP_CHECKOK(s_mp_to_mont(base, &mmm, &montBase));
 +    MP_CHECKOK(mp_to_mont(base, modulus, &montBase));
     bits_in_exponent = mpl_significant_bits(exponent);
 #ifdef MP_USING_CACHE_SAFE_MOD_EXP
     if (mp_using_cache_safe_exp) {
         if (bits_in_exponent > 780)
             window_bits = 6;
         else if (bits_in_exponent > 256)
             window_bits = 5;
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/rsa.c b/lib/freebl/rsa.c
 --- a/lib/freebl/rsa.c
 +++ b/lib/freebl/rsa.c
@@ -65,16 +65,18 @@ struct blindingParamsStr {
 ** the Handbook of Applied Cryptography, 11.118-11.119.
 */
 struct RSABlindingParamsStr {
     /* Blinding-specific parameters */
     PRCList link;              /* link to list of structs            */
     SECItem modulus;           /* list element "key"                 */
     blindingParams *free, *bp; /* Blinding parameters queue          */
     blindingParams array[RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_CACHE_SIZE];
 +    /* precalculate montegomery reduction value */
 +    mp_digit n0i; /* n0i = -( n & MP_DIGIT) ** -1 mod mp_RADIX */
 };
 typedef struct RSABlindingParamsStr RSABlindingParams;
 /*
 ** RSABlindingParamsListStr
 **
 ** List of key-specific blinding params.  The arena holds the volatile pool
 ** of memory for each entry and the list itself.  The lock is for list
@@ -1210,16 +1212,18 @@ generate_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *
     CHECK_SEC_OK(RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(kb, modLen));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, kb, modLen));
     /* k < n */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&k, n, &k));
     /* f = k**e mod n */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&k, &e, n, f));
     /* g = k**-1 mod n */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, n, g));
 +    /* g in montgomery form.. */
 +    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_mont(g, n, g));
 cleanup:
     if (kb)
         PORT_ZFree(kb, modLen);
     mp_clear(&k);
     mp_clear(&e);
     if (err) {
         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
         rv = SECFailure;
@@ -1246,23 +1250,26 @@ init_blinding_params(RSABlindingParams *
      * of rsabp->array pointer and must be set to NULL
      */
     rsabp->array[RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_CACHE_SIZE - 1].next = NULL;
     bp = rsabp->array;
     rsabp->bp = NULL;
     rsabp->free = bp;
 +    /* precalculate montgomery reduction parameter */
 +    rsabp->n0i = mp_calculate_mont_n0i(n);
 +
     /* List elements are keyed using the modulus */
     return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &rsabp->modulus, &key->modulus);
 }
 static SECStatus
 get_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *n, unsigned int modLen,
 -                    mp_int *f, mp_int *g)
 +                    mp_int *f, mp_int *g, mp_digit *n0i)
 {
     RSABlindingParams *rsabp = NULL;
     blindingParams *bpUnlinked = NULL;
     blindingParams *bp;
     PRCList *el;
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
     int cmp = -1;
@@ -1312,16 +1319,17 @@ get_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *key, 
             ** head (since el would have looped back to the head).
             */
             PR_INSERT_BEFORE(&rsabp->link, el);
         }
         /* We've found (or created) the RSAblindingParams struct for this key.
          * Now, search its list of ready blinding params for a usable one.
          */
 +        *n0i = rsabp->n0i;
         while (0 != (bp = rsabp->bp)) {
 #ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
             /* Found a match and there are still remaining uses left */
             /* Return the parameters */
             CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&bp->f, f));
             CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_copy(&bp->g, g));
             PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock);
@@ -1426,16 +1434,17 @@ cleanup:
         rsabp->free = bp;
     }
     if (holdingLock) {
         PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock);
     }
     if (err) {
         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
     }
 +    *n0i = 0;
     return SECFailure;
 }
 /*
 ** Perform a raw private-key operation
 **  Length of input and output buffers are equal to key's modulus len.
 */
 static SECStatus
@@ -1445,16 +1454,17 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
                  PRBool check)
 {
     unsigned int modLen;
     unsigned int offset;
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     mp_err err;
     mp_int n, c, m;
     mp_int f, g;
 +    mp_digit n0i;
     if (!key || !output || !input) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     /* check input out of range (needs to be in range [0..n-1]) */
     modLen = rsa_modulusLen(&key->modulus);
     if (modLen == 0) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
@@ -1476,17 +1486,17 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&f));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&g));
     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->modulus, &n);
     OCTETS_TO_MPINT(input, &c, modLen);
     /* If blinding, compute pre-image of ciphertext by multiplying by
     ** blinding factor
     */
     if (nssRSAUseBlinding) {
 -        CHECK_SEC_OK(get_blinding_params(key, &n, modLen, &f, &g));
 +        CHECK_SEC_OK(get_blinding_params(key, &n, modLen, &f, &g, &n0i));
         /* c' = c*f mod n */
         CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&c, &f, &n, &c));
     }
     /* Do the private key operation m = c**d mod n */
     if (key->prime1.len == 0 ||
         key->prime2.len == 0 ||
         key->exponent1.len == 0 ||
         key->exponent2.len == 0 ||
@@ -1497,17 +1507,17 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key,
     } else {
         CHECK_SEC_OK(rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTNoCheck(key, &m, &c));
     }
     /* If blinding, compute post-image of plaintext by multiplying by
     ** blinding factor
     */
     if (nssRSAUseBlinding) {
         /* m = m'*g mod n */
 -        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&m, &g, &n, &m));
 +        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmontmodCT(&m, &g, &n, n0i, &m));
     }
     err = mp_to_fixlen_octets(&m, output, modLen);
     if (err >= 0)
         err = MP_OKAY;
 cleanup:
     mp_clear(&n);
     mp_clear(&c);
     mp_clear(&m);
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-add-certificate-compression-test.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-add-certificate-compression-test.patch
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-add-ems-policy.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-add-ems-policy.patch
@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
+diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.ems ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.add_ems_policy	2023-06-12 15:37:49.292905411 -0700
+--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.ems	2024-06-11 13:09:25.956760476 -0700
-+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2024-06-11 13:09:52.837067481 -0700
-@@ -389,6 +389,8 @@ static const oidValDef kxOptList[] = {
+@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ static const oidValDef kxOptList[] = {
     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDHE-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-ECDSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
 +    /* not really a key exchange, but it's the closest fit */
 +    { CIPHER_NAME("TLS-REQUIRE-EMS"), SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
 +
 };
- static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
+ static const oidValDef smimeKxOptList[] = {
 diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h
 --- ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h	2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
@ -65,40 +65,43 @@ diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
     if (isTLS12) {
         if (isDH)
             master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
-diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/util/secoid.c
+diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.ems ./lib/util/secoid.c
--- ./lib/util/secoid.c.add_ems_policy	2023-06-12 15:37:49.293905422 -0700
+--- ./lib/util/secoid.c.ems	2024-06-11 13:11:28.078155282 -0700
-+++ ./lib/util/secoid.c	2023-06-12 17:20:29.498142775 -0700
+++ ./lib/util/secoid.c	2024-06-11 13:12:58.511188172 -0700
-@@ -1795,6 +1795,11 @@ const static SECOidData oids[SEC_OID_TOT
+@@ -1890,6 +1890,12 @@ const static SECOidData oids[SEC_OID_TOT
-        SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_USER,
+     ODE(SEC_OID_RC2_64_CBC, "RC2-64-CBC", CKM_RC2_CBC, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
-        "IPsec User",
+     ODE(SEC_OID_RC2_128_CBC, "RC2-128-CBC", CKM_RC2_CBC, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
-        CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
+     ODE(SEC_OID_ECDH_KEA, "ECDH", CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
 +
 +    /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
 +    /* we need it for the policy code.  */
 +    ODE(SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1,
 +        "TLS Require EMS", CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
 +
 };
 /* PRIVATE EXTENDED SECOID Table
-@@ -2095,6 +2100,8 @@ SECOID_Init(void)
+@@ -2198,6 +2204,10 @@ SECOID_Init(void)
     /* turn off NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL by default */
     xOids[SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY].notPolicyFlags = NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL;
 +    /* turn off TLS REQUIRE EMS by default */
 +    xOids[SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1].notPolicyFlags = ~0;
 +
 +
     envVal = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_HASH_ALG_SUPPORT");
     if (envVal)
-diff -up ./lib/util/secoidt.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/util/secoidt.h
+diff -up ./lib/util/secoidt.h.ems ./lib/util/secoidt.h
--- ./lib/util/secoidt.h.add_ems_policy	2023-06-12 17:18:35.131938535 -0700
+--- ./lib/util/secoidt.h.ems	2024-06-11 13:16:13.212411967 -0700
-+++ ./lib/util/secoidt.h	2023-06-12 17:21:49.675987022 -0700
+++ ./lib/util/secoidt.h	2024-06-11 13:16:48.098810434 -0700
-@@ -501,6 +501,9 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -530,6 +530,9 @@ typedef enum {
-     SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_END = 361,
+     SEC_OID_RC2_64_CBC = 385,
-     SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_TUNNEL = 362,
+     SEC_OID_RC2_128_CBC = 386,
-     SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_USER = 363,
+     SEC_OID_ECDH_KEA = 387,
 +    /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
 +    /* give it an obscure name here */
-+    SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1 = 372,
+    SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1 = 388,
     SEC_OID_TOTAL
 } SECOidTag;
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-chacha-timing-fix.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-chacha-timing-fix.patch
@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c b/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
 --- a/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
 +++ b/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -213,27 +213,31 @@
 {
 #ifdef NSS_X64
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_AVX2
     if (avx2_support()) {
         Hacl_Chacha20_Vec256_chacha20_encrypt_256(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
 +        return;
     }
 #endif
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_SSE3
     if (ssse3_support() && sse4_1_support() && avx_support()) {
         Hacl_Chacha20_Vec128_chacha20_encrypt_128(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
 +        return;
     }
 #endif
 #elif defined(__powerpc64__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \
     !defined(NSS_DISABLE_ALTIVEC) && !defined(NSS_DISABLE_CRYPTO_VSX)
     if (ppc_crypto_support()) {
         chacha20vsx(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
 -    } else
 +        return;
 +    }
 #endif
     {
         Hacl_Chacha20_chacha20_encrypt(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
 +        return;
     }
 }
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY */
 SECStatus
@@ -449,20 +453,18 @@
             (uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
             (uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
         goto finish;
     }
 #endif
 -
 -    else
 #elif defined(__powerpc64__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \
     !defined(NSS_DISABLE_ALTIVEC) && !defined(NSS_DISABLE_CRYPTO_VSX)
     if (ppc_crypto_support()) {
         Chacha20Poly1305_vsx_aead_encrypt(
             (uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
             (uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
         goto finish;
 -    } else
 +    }
 #endif
     {
         Hacl_Chacha20Poly1305_32_aead_encrypt(
             (uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
             (uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-default-libpkix.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-default-libpkix.patch
@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
 diff --git a/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c b/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
 --- a/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
 +++ b/lib/certhigh/certvfypkix.c
@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@
 pkix_pl_lifecycle_ObjectTableUpdate(int *objCountTable);
 PRInt32 parallelFnInvocationCount;
 #endif /* PKIX_OBJECT_LEAK_TEST */
 -static PRBool usePKIXValidationEngine = PR_FALSE;
 +static PRBool usePKIXValidationEngine = PR_TRUE;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX */
 /*
  * FUNCTION: CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation
  * DESCRIPTION:
 diff --git a/lib/nss/nssinit.c b/lib/nss/nssinit.c
 --- a/lib/nss/nssinit.c
 +++ b/lib/nss/nssinit.c
@@ -762,13 +762,13 @@
                                     PKIX_MINOR_VERSION, &actualMinorVersion, &plContext);
         if (pkixError != NULL) {
             goto loser;
         } else {
 -            char *ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY");
 +            char *ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY");
             if (ev && ev[0]) {
 -                CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation(PR_TRUE);
 +                CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation(PR_FALSE);
             }
         }
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX */
     }
 diff --git a/tests/all.sh b/tests/all.sh
 --- a/tests/all.sh
 +++ b/tests/all.sh
@@ -141,17 +141,22 @@
 ########################################################################
 run_cycle_standard()
 {
     TEST_MODE=STANDARD
 +    NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY="1"
 +    export NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
 +
     TESTS="${ALL_TESTS}"
     TESTS_SKIP="libpkix pkits"
     NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE=${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE:-"sql"}
     export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE
     run_tests
 +
 +    unset NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
 }
 ############################ run_cycle_pkix ############################
 # run test suites with PKIX enabled
 ########################################################################
@@ -165,13 +170,10 @@
     HOSTDIR="${HOSTDIR}/pkix"
     mkdir -p "${HOSTDIR}"
     init_directories
 -    NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY="1"
 -    export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
 -
     TESTS="${ALL_TESTS}"
     TESTS_SKIP="cipher dbtests sdr crmf smime merge multinit"
     export -n NSS_SSL_RUN
 diff --git a/tests/common/init.sh b/tests/common/init.sh
 --- a/tests/common/init.sh
 +++ b/tests/common/init.sh
@@ -138,12 +138,12 @@
         echo "NSS_TEST_DISABLE_CRL=${NSS_TEST_DISABLE_CRL}"
         echo "NSS_SSL_TESTS=\"${NSS_SSL_TESTS}\""
         echo "NSS_SSL_RUN=\"${NSS_SSL_RUN}\""
         echo "NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE=${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE}"
         echo "export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE"
 -        echo "NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY}"
 -        echo "export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY"
 +        echo "NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY}"
 +        echo "export NSS_DISABLE_PKIX_VERIFY"
         echo "init_directories"
     }
 # Exit shellfunction to clean up at exit (error, regular or signal)
     Exit()
 diff --git a/tests/ssl/ssl.sh b/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
 --- a/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
 +++ b/tests/ssl/ssl.sh
@@ -960,13 +960,12 @@
 ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp()
 {
   #verbose="-v"
   html_head "Check that OCSP doesn't break if we disable sha1 $NORM_EXT - server $SERVER_MODE/client $CLIENT_MODE"
 -  PKIX_SAVE=${NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY-"unset"}
 -  NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY="1"
 -  export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
 +  PKIX_SAVE=${NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY-"unset"}
 +  unset NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
   testname=""
   if [ ! -f "${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt" ] ; then
       html_failed "${SCRIPTNAME}: ${P_R_SERVERDIR} is not initialized"
@@ -987,16 +986,14 @@
   grep 12276 ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/vfy.out
   RET=$?
   html_msg $RET $RET_EXP "${testname}" \
            "produced a returncode of $RET, expected is $RET_EXP"
 -  if [ "${PKIX_SAVE}" = "unset" ]; then
 -      unset NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
 -  else
 -      NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY=${PKIX_SAVE}
 -      export NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY
 +  if [ "{PKIX_SAVE}" != "unset" ]; then
 +      export NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY=${PKIX_SAVE}
   fi
 +
   cp ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt.sav ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/pkcs11.txt
   html "</TABLE><BR>"
 }
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable-ech.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable-ech.patch
@ -1,12 +1,18 @@
-diff --git a/lib/ssl/sslsock.c b/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
+diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
--- a/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
+--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech	2024-06-12 13:29:17.162207862 -0700
-+++ b/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn	2024-06-12 13:30:25.699047788 -0700
-@@ -4394,62 +4394,82 @@ ssl_ClearPRCList(PRCList *list, void (*f
+@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ CPPSRCS = \
-         }
+       tls_protect.cc \
-         PORT_Free(cursor);
+       tls_psk_unittest.cc \
-     }
+       tls_subcerts_unittest.cc \
- }
+-      tls_ech_unittest.cc \
- 
+       tls_xyber_unittest.cc \
       $(SSLKEYLOGFILE_FILES) \
       $(NULL)
 diff -up ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.disable_ech ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c
 --- ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.disable_ech	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c	2024-06-12 13:29:17.162207862 -0700
@@ -4415,17 +4415,23 @@ ssl_ClearPRCList(PRCList *list, void (*f
 SECStatus
 SSLExp_EnableTls13GreaseEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
 {
@ -30,13 +36,7 @@ diff --git a/lib/ssl/sslsock.c b/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
     if (!ss || size == 0) {
         return SECFailure;
-     }
+@@ -4439,28 +4445,42 @@ SSLExp_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(PRFileDesc
     ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
     ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchSize = size;
     ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
     return SECSuccess;
@ -79,18 +79,3 @@ diff --git a/lib/ssl/sslsock.c b/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
 }
 SECStatus
 SSLExp_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
 {
     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
     if (!ss) {
         return SECFailure;
 diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
 --- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech	2023-06-21 19:02:02.160400997 +0200
 +++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn	2023-06-21 19:02:18.226618324 +0200
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ CPPSRCS = \
       tls_filter.cc \
       tls_protect.cc \
       tls_psk_unittest.cc \
 -      tls_ech_unittest.cc \
       $(SSLKEYLOGFILE_FILES) \
       $(NULL)
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable-md5.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable-md5.patch
@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
 diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_md ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
 --- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_md	2024-06-11 12:41:35.054654990 -0700
 +++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2024-06-11 12:46:25.347979894 -0700
@@ -329,14 +329,11 @@ static const oidValDef curveOptList[] =
 static const oidValDef hashOptList[] = {
     /* Hashes */
     { CIPHER_NAME("MD2"), SEC_OID_MD2,
 -      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
 -          NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
 +      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
     { CIPHER_NAME("MD4"), SEC_OID_MD4,
 -      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
 -          NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
 +      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
     { CIPHER_NAME("MD5"), SEC_OID_MD5,
 -      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
 -          NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
 +      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
     { CIPHER_NAME("SHA1"), SEC_OID_SHA1,
       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
           NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
 diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.no_md ./lib/util/secoid.c
 diff -r 699541a7793b lib/util/secoid.c
 --- a/lib/util/secoid.c	Tue Jun 16 23:03:22 2020 +0000
 +++ b/lib/util/secoid.c	Thu Jun 25 14:33:09 2020 +0200
@@ -2042,6 +2042,19 @@
             int i;
             for (i = 1; i < SEC_OID_TOTAL; i++) {
 +                switch (i) {
 +                case SEC_OID_MD2:
 +                case SEC_OID_MD4:
 +                case SEC_OID_MD5:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD2_AND_DES_CBC:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC:
 +                    continue;
 +                default:
 +                    break;
 +                }
                 if (oids[i].desc && strstr(arg, oids[i].desc)) {
                     xOids[i].notPolicyFlags = notEnable |
                                               (xOids[i].notPolicyFlags & ~(DEF_FLAGS));
 diff -up ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5_test ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt
 --- ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5_test	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt	2024-06-19 11:15:46.666728170 -0700
@@ -91,21 +91,21 @@
   0 18 allow_all disallow=rc2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC4 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC SHA-1  disallow rc2 (read), RC4 and RC2
 # integrity policy check the various has based controls.
 #  NOTE: md4, md2, and md5 are turned off by policy by default for encrypting
 -# (decrypting is fine). To be enabled, you must allow=all or allow=mdX on the
 +# (decrypting is fine). To be enabled, you must allow=mdX/pkcs12 on the
 # encryption side. These tests purposefully tests that the default fails to encrypt
 # but succeeds when decrypting.
  27  x allow=tls allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Use default policy with multiple hashes
 -  0  0 allow=all allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all encrypt, use default decrypt with multiple hashes
 -  0  0 allow=all allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all with multiple hashes
 - 28  x disallow=sha1_allow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on write
 +  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all encrypt, use default decrypt with multiple hashes
 +  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all with multiple hashes
 + 28  x disallow=sha1_allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on write
  27  x disallow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on write
 - 29  x disallow=sha256_allow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on write
 -  0 19 allow=all disallow=sha1 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
 -  0 18 allow=all disallow=md2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
 -  0 17 allow=all disallow=sha256 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
 -  0  0 allow=all disallow=md2/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
 -  0  0 allow=all disallow=sha1/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
 -  0  0 allow=all disallow=sha256/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
 + 29  x disallow=sha256_allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on write
 +  0 19 allow=all:md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha1 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
 +  0 18 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=md2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
 +  0 17 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha256 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
 +  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=md2/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
 +  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha1/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
 +  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha256/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
   0  0 allow=all allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
  29  x disallow=hmac-sha256 allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
   0 18 allow=all disallow=hmac-sha256 AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable-signature-policies.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable-signature-policies.patch
@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
 +    { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PKCS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, 0},
 +    { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PSS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE, 0},
 +    { CIPHER_NAME("ECDSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY, 0},
     { CIPHER_NAME("ED25519"), SEC_OID_ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY,
       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
 };
 typedef struct {
@ -21,6 +23,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
     { macOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(macOptList), "MAC", PR_FALSE },
     { cipherOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherOptList), "CIPHER", PR_FALSE },
     { kxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kxOptList), "OTHER-KX", PR_FALSE },
     { smimeKxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(smimeKxOptList), "SMIME-KX", PR_TRUE },
 -    { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_FALSE },
 +    { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_TRUE },
 };
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-ec-dbm-test.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-ec-dbm-test.patch
@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
 diff -up ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.dbm ./tests/ec/ectest.sh
 --- ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.dbm	2024-06-18 14:53:51.201438651 -0700
 +++ ./tests/ec/ectest.sh	2024-06-18 14:56:09.993993637 -0700
@@ -45,12 +45,20 @@ ectest_genkeydb_test()
   if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
     return $?
   fi
 +  if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
   curves=( \
     "curve25519" \
     "secp256r1" \
     "secp384r1" \
     "secp521r1" \
   )
 +  else
 +  curves=( \
 +    "secp256r1" \
 +    "secp384r1" \
 +    "secp521r1" \
 +  )
 +  fi
   for curve in "${curves[@]}"; do
     echo "Test $curve key generation using certutil ..."
     certutil -G -d "${HOSTDIR}" -k ec -q $curve -f "${R_PWFILE}" -z ${NOISE_FILE}
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-el8-fix-rsa-policy-test.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-el8-fix-rsa-policy-test.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.rsa_disable_test ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
 --- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.rsa_disable_test	2024-06-19 11:17:10.261637015 -0700
 +++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt	2024-06-19 11:18:22.797425628 -0700
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@
 # compatibility reasons
 #  1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
 -  1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
 +  0 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
   0 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=1023 Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
 # test default settings
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-el8-no-p12-smime-policy.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-el8-no-p12-smime-policy.patch
@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
 diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c.no_p12_smime_policy ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c
 --- ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c.no_p12_smime_policy	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12plcy.c	2024-07-17 11:26:00.334836451 -0700
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ static pkcs12SuiteMap pkcs12SuiteMaps[]
 static PRBool
 sec_PKCS12Allowed(SECOidTag alg, PRUint32 needed)
 {
 +#ifdef notdef
     PRUint32 policy;
     SECStatus rv;
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ sec_PKCS12Allowed(SECOidTag alg, PRUint3
         return PR_TRUE;
     }
     return PR_FALSE;
 +#else
 +    return PR_TRUE;
 +#endif
 }
 PRBool
 diff -up ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c.no_p12_smime_policy ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c
 --- ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c.no_p12_smime_policy	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/smime/smimeutil.c	2024-07-17 11:27:04.716617111 -0700
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ smime_get_policy_tag_from_key_length(SEC
 PRBool
 smime_allowed_by_policy(SECOidTag algtag, PRUint32 neededPolicy)
 {
 +#ifdef notdef
     PRUint32 policyFlags;
     /* some S/MIME algs map to the same underlying KEA mechanism,
@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ smime_allowed_by_policy(SECOidTag algtag
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_EXPORT_ALGORITHM);
         return PR_FALSE;
     }
 +#endif
     return PR_TRUE;
 }
@@ -485,6 +487,7 @@ smime_init_once(void *arg)
         return PR_FAILURE;
     }
 +#ifdef notdef
     /* At initialization time, we need to set up the defaults. We first
      * look to see if the system or application has set up certain algorithms
      * by policy. If they have set up values by policy we'll only allow those
@@ -497,6 +500,11 @@ smime_init_once(void *arg)
         PORT_Free(tags);
         tags = NULL;
     }
 +#else
 +    /* just initialize the old maps */
 +    rv = SECSuccess;
 +    tagCount = 0;
 +#endif
     if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (tagCount == 0)) {
         /* No algorithms have been enabled by policy (either by the system
          * or by the application, we then will use the traditional default
 diff -up ./smime/smime.sh.no_p12_smime_policy ./smime/smime.sh
 --- ./tests/smime/smime.sh.no_p12_smime_policy	2024-07-17 12:27:36.262106070 -0
 700
 +++ ./tests/smime/smime.sh	2024-07-17 12:29:08.251207306 -0700
@@ -872,8 +872,8 @@ smime_init
 smime_main
 smime_data_tb
 smime_p7
 -if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
 -  smime_policy
 -fi
 +#if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
 +#  smime_policy
 +#fi
 smime_cleanup
 diff -up ./tools/tools.sh.no_p12_smime_policy ./tools/tools.sh
 --- ./tests/tools/tools.sh.no_p12_smime_policy	2024-07-17 12:27:36.262106070 -0
 700
 +++ ./tests/tools/tools.sh	2024-07-17 12:28:32.418778346 -0700
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ tools_p12()
   tools_p12_import_pbmac1_samples
   if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
     tools_p12_import_rsa_pss_private_key
 -    tools_p12_policy
 +#tools_p12_policy
   fi
 }
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-el8-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-el8-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch
@ -26,6 +26,20 @@ diff -up ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.orig ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c
     if (pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].activated) {
         char *cipherString = pk12util.options[opt_CertCipher].arg;
 --- ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c.no_pkcs12_macpbe_default	2024-07-18 08:26:35.7732
 48450 -0700
 +++ ./cmd/pk12util/pk12util.c	2024-07-18 08:27:05.796595554 -0700
@@ -1165,10 +1165,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
             }
         }
     }
 -    /* in FIPS mode default to encoding with pkcs5v2 for the MAC */
 -    if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
 -        hash = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;
 -    }
     if (pk12util.options[opt_Mac].activated) {
         char *hashString = pk12util.options[opt_Mac].arg;
 diff -up ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig ./tests/tools/tools.sh
 --- ./tests/tools/tools.sh.orig	2021-06-15 17:06:27.650564449 -0700
 +++ ./tests/tools/tools.sh	2021-06-15 17:07:59.934117192 -0700
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-enable-kyber-policy.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-enable-kyber-policy.patch
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
 diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.enable_kyber_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
 --- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.enable_kyber_policy	2024-06-12 14:44:24.680338868 -0700
 +++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2024-06-12 14:44:48.368609356 -0700
@@ -245,7 +245,8 @@ static const oidValDef curveOptList[] =
       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
     { CIPHER_NAME("CURVE25519"), SEC_OID_CURVE25519,
       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
 -    { CIPHER_NAME("XYBER768D00"), SEC_OID_XYBER768D00, 0 },
 +    { CIPHER_NAME("XYBER768D00"), SEC_OID_XYBER768D00, 
 +      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
     /* ANSI X9.62 named elliptic curves (characteristic two field) */
     { CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB163V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V1,
       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-extend-db-dump-time.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-extend-db-dump-time.patch
@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ diff -up ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh.extend ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh
       RARRAY=($dtime)
       TIMEARRAY=(${RARRAY[1]//./ })
       echo "${TIMEARRAY[0]} seconds"
-      test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt 2
+-      test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt 5
-+      test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt ${NSS_DB_DUMP_TIME-3}
+      test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt ${NSS_DB_DUMP_TIME-5}
       ret=$?
       html_msg ${ret} 0 "certutil dump keys with explicit default trust flags"
     fi
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fips-indicators.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fips-indicators.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators	2023-11-27 11:21:42.459523398 -0800
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators	2024-06-12 13:38:15.995811284 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2023-11-27 11:22:56.821120920 -0800
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-06-12 13:41:30.008188930 -0700
-@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, C
+@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, C
     context->blockSize = 0;
     context->maxLen = 0;
     context->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(session->slot, pMechanism,
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
     *contextPtr = context;
     return CKR_OK;
 }
-@@ -4816,7 +4816,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
+@@ -4885,7 +4885,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
     /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
      * key length against fips requirements */
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
     session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
-@@ -5836,7 +5836,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+@@ -6020,7 +6020,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
         return crv;
     }
     /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
     publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
     session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
-@@ -7036,6 +7036,10 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+@@ -7220,6 +7220,10 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
         return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
     }
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
     /* sourceKey is NULL if we are called from the POST, skip the
      * sensitiveCheck */
     if (sourceKey != NULL) {
-@@ -7085,7 +7089,8 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+@@ -7269,7 +7273,8 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
                     mech.pParameter = params;
                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
                 }
                 saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
-@@ -7152,7 +7157,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
+@@ -7336,7 +7341,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
     /* HKDF-Expand */
     if (!params->bExpand) {
         okm = prk;
@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
     } else {
         /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
          * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
-@@ -7398,7 +7403,8 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+@@ -7583,7 +7588,8 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
             return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
         }
     }
@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
     switch (mechanism) {
         /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators	2023-11-27 11:21:42.450523326 -0800
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators	2024-06-12 13:38:15.988811198 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2023-11-27 11:22:56.821120920 -0800
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2024-06-12 13:38:15.996811296 -0700
@@ -979,7 +979,8 @@ CK_FLAGS sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIB
 /* check the FIPS table to determine if this current operation is allowed by
  * FIPS security policy */
@ -82,9 +82,9 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
 CK_RV sftk_CreateValidationObjects(SFTKSlot *slot);
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators	2023-11-27 11:21:42.451523334 -0800
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators	2024-06-12 13:38:15.990811223 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2023-11-27 11:31:51.812419789 -0800
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-06-12 13:38:15.996811296 -0700
-@@ -2330,7 +2330,7 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
+@@ -2336,7 +2336,7 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
 static CK_ULONG
 sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
 {
@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
     CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
-@@ -2392,13 +2392,29 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
+@@ -2398,13 +2398,29 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
     return keyLength;
 }
@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
 {
     switch (mechInfo->special) {
         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
-@@ -2458,10 +2474,15 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+@@ -2464,10 +2480,15 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
             if (hashObj == NULL) {
                 return PR_FALSE;
             }
@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
         }
         case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
             /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
-@@ -2486,6 +2507,13 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+@@ -2492,6 +2513,13 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
              }
              return PR_TRUE;
         }
@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
         default:
             break;
     }
-@@ -2496,7 +2524,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+@@ -2502,7 +2530,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
 PRBool
 sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op,
@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
 {
 #ifndef NSS_HAS_FIPS_INDICATORS
     return PR_FALSE;
-@@ -2528,13 +2556,17 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
+@@ -2534,13 +2562,17 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
         SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechs = &sftk_fips_mechs[i];
         /* if we match the number of records exactly, then we are an
          * approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fips-review.patches
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fips-review.patches
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review ./lib/freebl/dh.c
--- ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+--- ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/freebl/dh.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.453233170 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/dh.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.639360404 -0700
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ cleanup:
 PRBool
 KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, SECItem *subPrime)
@ -50,9 +50,17 @@ diff -up ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review ./lib/freebl/dh.c
         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
         return PR_FALSE;
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review	2023-06-12 15:29:04.096403884 -0700
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review	2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-06-12 13:06:35.410551333 -0700
-@@ -4785,6 +4785,10 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include "prprf.h"
 #include "prenv.h"
 +#include "prerror.h"
 #define __PASTE(x, y) x##y
 #define BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMech, typeSize) (!pMech->pParameter || pMech->ulParameterLen < typeSize)
@@ -4882,6 +4883,10 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
      * handle the base object stuff
      */
     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
@ -63,7 +71,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
-@@ -4792,9 +4796,6 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
+@@ -4889,9 +4894,6 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
     if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
     }
@ -73,7 +81,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
     if (crv == CKR_OK) {
         *phKey = key->handle;
     }
-@@ -5098,60 +5099,67 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
+@@ -5199,60 +5201,68 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
     if (isDerivable) {
         SFTKAttribute *pubAttribute = NULL;
@ -156,7 +164,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
 +            }
 +            /* make sure it has the same encoding */
 +            if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
-+                lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
+                lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named) {
 +              lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
 +            } else {
 +              lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
@ -169,7 +177,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
 +        default:
 +            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
         }
-
+ 
 -        crv = NSC_DeriveKey(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle, template, templateCount, &newKey);
 -        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 -            sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
@ -189,7 +197,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
         /* FIPS requires full validation, but in fipx mode NSC_Derive
          * only does partial validation with approved primes, now handle
          * full validation */
-@@ -5159,44 +5167,78 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
+@@ -5260,44 +5270,78 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
             SECItem pubKey;
             SECItem prime;
             SECItem subPrime;
@ -283,7 +291,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
     }
     return CKR_OK;
-@@ -5714,8 +5756,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+@@ -5925,8 +5969,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
      * created and linked.
      */
     crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
@ -293,7 +301,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
         sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
-@@ -5757,6 +5799,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+@@ -5968,6 +6012,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
@ -301,7 +309,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
-@@ -5766,6 +5809,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
+@@ -5977,6 +6022,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
     /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
     privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
     publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
@ -310,7 +318,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
     *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
     *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
-@@ -8386,7 +8431,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+@@ -8610,7 +8657,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
             /* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
              * checks. */
@ -319,7 +327,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
             if (subPrime == NULL) {
                 SECItem dhSubPrime;
                 /* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
-@@ -8568,6 +8613,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
+@@ -8792,6 +8839,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
                 secretlen = tmp.len;
             } else {
                 secretlen = keySize;
@ -327,24 +335,9 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
                 crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
                                           &tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
                                           mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.fips-review	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
@@ -4625,7 +4625,10 @@ NSC_CreateObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSess
     if (object == NULL) {
         return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
 -    object->isFIPS = PR_FALSE; /* if we created the object on the fly,
 +    /* object types that we aren't allowed to create in FIPS mode are
 +     * already rejected explicitly. If we get here, then the object is
 +     * FIPS OK (most notably public key objects )*/
 +    /* object->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;  if we created the object on the fly,
                                 * it's not a FIPS object */
     /*
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review	2023-06-12 15:29:04.097403894 -0700
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review	2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
 /* dh verify functions */
 /* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes, and if so return
@ -355,9 +348,9 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
 SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
 /* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review	2023-06-12 15:29:04.097403894 -0700
+--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review	2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
-@@ -2403,15 +2403,27 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
+@@ -2409,15 +2409,27 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
     switch (mechInfo->special) {
         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
             SECItem dhPrime;
@ -388,8 +381,8 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
         case SFTKFIPSNone:
             return PR_FALSE;
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+--- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.455233191 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
@@ -6726,11 +6726,20 @@ static const SECItem subprime_tls_8192 =
                                            (unsigned char *)subprime_tls_8192_data,
                                            sizeof(subprime_tls_8192_data) };
@ -481,8 +474,8 @@ diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
             }
             break;
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+--- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
-+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c	2023-06-12 15:30:23.455233191 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
             goto fail;
         }
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-cms-abi-break.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-cms-abi-break.patch
@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
 diff -up ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c
 --- ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c.restore_abi	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c	2024-09-06 18:05:27.808338289 -0700
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static const SEC_ASN1Template NSSCMSKeyA
     { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_EXPLICIT |
           SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 1,
       offsetof(NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfo, ukm),
 -      SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_OctetStringTemplate) },
 +      SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_PointerToOctetStringTemplate) },
     { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
       offsetof(NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfo, keyEncAlg),
       SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
 diff -up ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h
 --- ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h.restore_abi	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h	2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_DecryptSymKey_RSA_OAEP(SECKE
 extern SECStatus
 NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArenaPool *poolp, CERTCertificate *cert, PK11SymKey *key,
 -                                 SECItem *encKey, PRBool genUkm, SECItem *ukm,
 +                                 SECItem *encKey, PRBool genUkm, SECItem **ukm,
                                  SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg, SECItem *originatorPubKey, void *wincx);
 PK11SymKey *
 diff -up ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c
 --- ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c.restore_abi	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c	2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
@@ -292,9 +292,15 @@ Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(PLArenaPool *p
     unsigned char suppPubInfo[4] = { 0 };
     SI.keyInfo = keyInfo;
 -    SI.entityUInfo.type = ukm->type;
 -    SI.entityUInfo.data = ukm->data;
 -    SI.entityUInfo.len = ukm->len;
 +    if (ukm) {
 +        SI.entityUInfo.type = ukm->type;
 +        SI.entityUInfo.data = ukm->data;
 +        SI.entityUInfo.len = ukm->len;
 +    } else {
 +        SI.entityUInfo.type = siBuffer;
 +        SI.entityUInfo.data = NULL;
 +        SI.entityUInfo.len = 0;
 +    }
     SI.suppPubInfo.type = siBuffer;
     SI.suppPubInfo.data = suppPubInfo;
@@ -322,7 +328,7 @@ Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(PLArenaPool *p
 SECStatus
 NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArenaPool *poolp, CERTCertificate *cert,
                                  PK11SymKey *bulkkey, SECItem *encKey,
 -                                 PRBool genUkm, SECItem *ukm,
 +                                 PRBool genUkm, SECItem **ukmp,
                                  SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg, SECItem *pubKey,
                                  void *wincx)
 {
@@ -337,10 +343,11 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArena
     SECAlgorithmID keyWrapAlg;
     SECOidTag keyEncAlgtag;
     SECItem keyWrapAlg_params, *keyEncAlg_params, *SharedInfo;
 +    SECItem *ukm = *ukmp;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyDerivationType, keyWrapMech;
     CK_ULONG kdf;
 -    if (genUkm && (ukm->len != 0 || ukm->data != NULL)) {
 +    if (genUkm && (ukm != NULL)) {
         PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
         return SECFailure;
     }
@@ -427,17 +434,17 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArena
      * contain 512 bits for Diffie-Hellman key agreement. */
     if (genUkm) {
 -        ukm->type = siBuffer;
 -        ukm->len = 64;
 -        ukm->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, ukm->len);
 -
 -        if (ukm->data == NULL) {
 +        ukm = SECITEM_AllocItem(poolp, NULL, 64);
 +        if (ukm == NULL) {
             goto loser;
         }
 +        ukm->type = siBuffer;
 +
         rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(ukm->data, ukm->len);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             goto loser;
         }
 +        *ukmp = ukm; /* return it */
     }
     SharedInfo = Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(poolp, &keyWrapAlg,
 diff -up ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c
 --- ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c.restore_abi	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c	2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_UnwrapBulkKey(NSSCM
             parameters = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg.parameters);
             enckey = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[subIndex]->encKey);
             oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey);
 -            ukm = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm);
 +            ukm = ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm;
             break;
         case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KEK:
             algid = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg);
 diff -up ./lib/smime/cmst.h.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmst.h
 --- ./lib/smime/cmst.h.restore_abi	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/smime/cmst.h	2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ typedef struct NSSCMSRecipientEncryptedK
 struct NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfoStr {
     SECItem version;
     NSSCMSOriginatorIdentifierOrKey originatorIdentifierOrKey;
 -    SECItem ukm; /* optional */
 +    SECItem *ukm; /* optional */
     SECAlgorithmID keyEncAlg;
     NSSCMSRecipientEncryptedKey **recipientEncryptedKeys;
 };
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-missing-size-checks.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-missing-size-checks.patch
@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
 diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
 --- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
 +++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
@@ -371,16 +371,21 @@ static void GenerateWeakRsaKey(ScopedSEC
 // Fail to connect with a weak RSA key.
 TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
   Reset(kPssDelegatorId);
   EnsureTlsSetup();
   static const SSLSignatureScheme kSchemes[] = {ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
                                                 ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256};
   client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
   server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
 +  PRInt32 keySizeFlags;
 +  ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &keySizeFlags));
 +  // turn off the signing key sizes so we actually test the ssl tests
 +  ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
 +            NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG ));
 #if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
   // save the MIN POLICY length.
   PRInt32 minRsa;
   ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minRsa));
 #if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS >= 2048
   ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
             NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1024));
@@ -408,16 +413,17 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
   client_->EnableDelegatedCredentials();
   auto cfilter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionCapture>(
       client_, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn);
   ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertInsufficientSecurity);
 #if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
   ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, minRsa));
 #endif
 +  ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, keySizeFlags));
 }
 class ReplaceDCSigScheme : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
  public:
   ReplaceDCSigScheme(const std::shared_ptr<TlsAgent>& a)
       : TlsHandshakeFilter(a, {ssl_hs_certificate_verify}) {}
  protected:
 diff --git a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
 --- a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
 +++ b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
@@ -1134,22 +1134,31 @@ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SE
         return 0;
     }
     /* interpret modulus length as key strength */
     switch (privk->keyType) {
         case rsaKey:
         case rsaPssKey:
         case rsaOaepKey:
 -            /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
 -             * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary */
 -            bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
 -            if (bitSize == -1) {
 -                bitSize = 0;
 +            rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
 +                                    CKA_MODULUS, NULL, &params);
 +            if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
 +                /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
 +                 * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary. This
 +                 * method is less percise because it returns bytes instead
 +                 * bits, so we only do it if we can't get the modulus */
 +                bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
 +                if (bitSize == -1) {
 +                    return 0;
 +                }
 +                return bitSize;
             }
 +            bitSize = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&params);
 +            PORT_Free(params.data);
             return bitSize;
         case dsaKey:
         case fortezzaKey:
         case dhKey:
         case keaKey:
             rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
                                     CKA_PRIME, NULL, &params);
             if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
 diff --git a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
 --- a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
 +++ b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
@@ -1277,27 +1277,39 @@ ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(SSL3Hashes *h
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
             goto done;
     }
     PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
     if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
         CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType);
         int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key);
 +        PRInt32 optval;
         SECItem *params = NULL;
         CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams;
         SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer,
                                   (unsigned char *)&pssParams,
                                   sizeof(pssParams) };
         if (signatureLen <= 0) {
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
             goto done;
         }
 +        /* since we are calling PK11_SignWithMechanism directly, we need to check the
 +         * key policy ourselves (which is already checked in SGN_Digest */
 +        rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
 +        if ((rv == SECSuccess) &&
 +            ((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG)) {
 +            rv = SECKEY_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType, SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(key),
 +                                       SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
 +            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 +                goto done; /* error code already set */
 +            }
 +        }
         buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen;
         buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
         if (!buf->data)
             goto done; /* error code was set. */
         if (useRsaPss) {
             pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-md5-decode.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-md5-decode.patch
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
 diff --git a/lib/util/nsshash.c b/lib/util/nsshash.c
 --- a/lib/util/nsshash.c
 +++ b/lib/util/nsshash.c
@@ -102,16 +102,19 @@ HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashTy
 SECOidTag
 HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(SECOidTag hmacOid)
 {
     SECOidTag hashOid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
     switch (hmacOid) {
         /* no oid exists for HMAC_MD2 */
         /* NSS does not define a oid for HMAC_MD4 */
 +        case SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5:
 +            hashOid = SEC_OID_MD5;
 +            break;
         case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1:
             hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA1;
             break;
         case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224:
             hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA224;
             break;
         case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256:
             hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA256;
@@ -145,16 +148,19 @@ HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(SECOidTag
 SECOidTag
 HASH_GetHMACOidTagByHashOidTag(SECOidTag hashOid)
 {
     SECOidTag hmacOid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
     switch (hashOid) {
         /* no oid exists for HMAC_MD2 */
         /* NSS does not define a oid for HMAC_MD4 */
 +        case SEC_OID_MD5:
 +            hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5;
 +            break;
         case SEC_OID_SHA1:
             hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
             break;
         case SEC_OID_SHA224:
             hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224;
             break;
         case SEC_OID_SHA256:
             hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-pbkdf1-encoding.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-pbkdf1-encoding.patch
@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
 diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
 --- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
 +++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
@@ -1710,20 +1710,26 @@ PK11_ParamToAlgid(SECOidTag algTag, SECI
         case CKM_BATON_ECB96:
         case CKM_BATON_CBC128:
         case CKM_BATON_COUNTER:
         case CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE:
         case CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128:
         case CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128:
         case CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER:
         case CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE:
 -            newParams = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, param,
 -                                           SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
 -            if (newParams == NULL)
 -                break;
 +            /* if no parameters have been supplied, then encode a NULL params
 +             */
 +            if (param && param->len > 0) {
 +                newParams = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, param,
 +                                               SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
 +                if (newParams == NULL)
 +                    break;
 +            } else {
 +                newParams = NULL;
 +            }
             rv = SECSuccess;
             break;
     }
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         if (newParams)
             SECITEM_FreeItem(newParams, PR_TRUE);
         return rv;
 diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
 --- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
 +++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
@@ -765,45 +765,53 @@ sec_pkcs5CreateAlgorithmID(SECOidTag alg
          * algorithm is). We use choose this algorithm oid based on the
          * cipherAlgorithm to determine what this should be (MAC1 or PBES2).
          */
         if (algorithm == SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2) {
             /* choose mac or pbes */
             algorithm = sec_pkcs5v2_get_pbe(cipherAlgorithm);
         }
 +        SECOidTag hashAlg = HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(cipherAlgorithm);
 +
         /* set the PKCS5v2 specific parameters */
         if (keyLength == 0) {
 -            SECOidTag hashAlg = HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(cipherAlgorithm);
             if (hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
                 keyLength = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg);
             } else {
                 keyLength = sec_pkcs5v2_default_key_length(cipherAlgorithm);
             }
             if (keyLength <= 0) {
                 goto loser;
             }
         }
         /* currently SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 is the default */
         if (prfAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
             prfAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
         }
 -        /* build the PKCS5v2 cipher algorithm id */
 -        cipherParams = pk11_GenerateNewParamWithKeyLen(
 -            PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(cipherAlgorithm), keyLength);
 -        if (!cipherParams) {
 -            goto loser;
 +        /* build the PKCS5v2 cipher algorithm id, if cipher
 +         * is an HMAC, the cipherParams should be NULL */
 +        if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 +            cipherParams = pk11_GenerateNewParamWithKeyLen(
 +                PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(cipherAlgorithm), keyLength);
 +            if (!cipherParams) {
 +                goto loser;
 +            }
 +        } else {
 +            cipherParams = NULL;
         }
         PORT_Memset(&pbeV2_param, 0, sizeof(pbeV2_param));
         rv = PK11_ParamToAlgid(cipherAlgorithm, cipherParams,
                                poolp, &pbeV2_param.cipherAlgId);
 -        SECITEM_FreeItem(cipherParams, PR_TRUE);
 +        if (cipherParams) {
 +            SECITEM_FreeItem(cipherParams, PR_TRUE);
 +        }
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             goto loser;
         }
     }
     /* generate the parameter */
     pbe_param = sec_pkcs5_create_pbe_parameter(pbeAlgorithm, salt, iteration,
                                                keyLength, prfAlg);
 diff --git a/lib/util/secalgid.c b/lib/util/secalgid.c
 --- a/lib/util/secalgid.c
 +++ b/lib/util/secalgid.c
@@ -50,17 +50,18 @@ SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(PLArenaPool *arena
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &id->algorithm, &oiddata->oid))
         return SECFailure;
     if ((secoid_IsRSAPKCS1(which)) ||
 -        (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(which) != HASH_AlgNULL)) {
 +        (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(which) != HASH_AlgNULL) /* ||
 +        (HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(which) != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) */) {
         add_null_param = PR_TRUE;
     } else {
         add_null_param = PR_FALSE;
     }
     if (params) {
         /*
          * I am specifically *not* enforcing the following assertion
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-long-pwd-fix.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-long-pwd-fix.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.long_pw_fix ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
 --- ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.long_pw_fix	2024-09-06 17:58:39.905517185 -0700
 +++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c	2024-09-06 17:59:19.568985976 -0700
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ sec_pkcs12_integrity_key(PK11SlotInfo *s
         *hmacMech = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hmacAlg);
         /* pkcs12v2 hmac uses UTF8 rather than unicode */
         if (!sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(NULL, &utf8Pw, pwitem,
 -                                                PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
 +                                                PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
             return NULL;
         }
         symKey = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, prfAlgid, &utf8Pw, PR_FALSE, pwarg);
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.79-dbtool.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.79-dbtool.patch
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-DisablingASM.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-DisablingASM.patch
@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/Makefile b/lib/freebl/Makefile
 index 74e8e65..8995752 100644
 --- a/lib/freebl/Makefile
 +++ b/lib/freebl/Makefile
@@ -568,7 +568,6 @@ ifneq ($(shell $(CC) -? 2>&1 >/dev/null </dev/null | sed -e 's/:.*//;1q'),lcc)
             HAVE_INT128_SUPPORT = 1
             DEFINES += -DHAVE_INT128_SUPPORT
     else ifeq (1,$(CC_IS_GCC))
 -        SUPPORTS_VALE_CURVE25519 = 1
         ifneq (,$(filter 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9,$(word 1,$(GCC_VERSION)).$(word 2,$(GCC_VERSION))))
             HAVE_INT128_SUPPORT = 1
             DEFINES += -DHAVE_INT128_SUPPORT
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp b/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
 index 65f9a80..23940ef 100644
 --- a/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
 +++ b/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
@@ -866,12 +866,6 @@
           }],
         ],
       }],
 -      [ 'supports_vale_curve25519==1', {
 -        'defines': [
 -          # The Makefile does version-tests on GCC, but we're not doing that here.
 -          'HACL_CAN_COMPILE_INLINE_ASM',
 -        ],
 -      }],
       [ 'OS=="linux" or OS=="android"', {
         'conditions': [
           [ 'target_arch=="x64"', {
@@ -934,11 +928,6 @@
   'variables': {
     'module': 'nss',
     'conditions': [
 -      [ 'target_arch=="x64" and cc_is_gcc==1', {
 -        'supports_vale_curve25519%': 1,
 -      }, {
 -        'supports_vale_curve25519%': 0,
 -      }],
       [ 'target_arch=="x64" or target_arch=="arm64" or target_arch=="aarch64"', {
         'have_int128_support%': 1,
       }, {
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi b/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
 index d198c44..34b6b3c 100644
 --- a/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
 +++ b/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
@@ -151,11 +151,6 @@
         'ecl/curve25519_32.c',
       ],
     }],
 -    ['supports_vale_curve25519==1', {
 -      'sources': [
 -        'verified/Hacl_Curve25519_64.c',
 -      ],
 -    }],
     ['(target_arch!="ppc64" and target_arch!="ppc64le") or disable_altivec==1', {
       'sources': [
         # Gyp does not support per-file cflags, so working around like this.
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-ecc-wrap-fix.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-ecc-wrap-fix.patch
@ -1,194 +0,0 @@
 diff -up ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c.ecc_wrap ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c
 --- ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c.ecc_wrap	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./cmd/pk11ectest/pk11ectest.c	2024-01-23 14:07:29.421036328 -0800
@@ -10,6 +10,32 @@
 #include "pk11pub.h"
 #include <stdio.h>
 +typedef struct KeyLengthEntryStr {
 +    SECOidTag tag;
 +    unsigned int len;
 +    PRBool encoded;
 +} KeyLengthEntry;
 +
 +const KeyLengthEntry keyLengthTable[] = {
 +    { SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1, 65, PR_TRUE },
 +    { SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1, 97, PR_TRUE },
 +    { SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1, 133, PR_TRUE },
 +    { SEC_OID_CURVE25519, 32, PR_FALSE }
 +};
 +
 +const KeyLengthEntry *
 +getKeyLengthEntry(SECOidTag tag)
 +{
 +    int i;
 +
 +    for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(keyLengthTable); i++) {
 +        if (keyLengthTable[i].tag == tag) {
 +            return &keyLengthTable[i];
 +        }
 +    }
 +    return NULL;
 +}
 +
 void
 printBuf(const SECItem *item)
 {
@@ -53,6 +79,10 @@ ectest_curve_pkcs11(SECOidTag oid)
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
     PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
 +    const KeyLengthEntry *keyLengthEntry;
 +    SECItem point = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
 +    SECItem value = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
 +    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
     oidData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(oid);
     if (oidData == NULL) {
@@ -79,8 +109,63 @@ ectest_curve_pkcs11(SECOidTag oid)
         goto cleanup;
     }
     PrintKey(symKey);
 -    rv = SECSuccess;
 +    keyLengthEntry = getKeyLengthEntry(oid);
 +    /* this shouldn't happen unless new curves are added without adding them
 +     * to the keyLengthTable */
 +    PR_ASSERT(keyLengthEntry);
 +
 +    /* make sure we are returning CKA_EC_POINT according to the PKCS #11 standard.
 +     * NSS itself can tolerate non-standard CKA_EC_POINT, so this is the only place
 +     * our test will detect incorrect behavior */
 +    rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePubKey, pubKey, CKA_EC_POINT, &point);
 +    if (rv == SECFailure) {
 +        printf(" >>> Couldn't get CKA_EC_POINT from the ec pubKey.\n");
 +        goto cleanup;
 +    }
 +    rv = SECFailure;
 +    if (keyLengthEntry->encoded) {
 +        if (point.len == keyLengthEntry->len) {
 +            printf(" >>> Expected encoded CKA_EC_POINT and got a decoded value.\n");
 +            printBuf(&point);
 +            goto cleanup;
 +        }
 +        arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
 +        if (arena == NULL) {
 +            printf(" >>> arena alloc failed.\n");
 +            goto cleanup;
 +        }
 +
 +        rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &value, SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate),
 +                                    &point);
 +        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 +            printf(" >>> invalid endoded CKA_EC_POINT.\n");
 +            printBuf(&point);
 +            goto cleanup;
 +        }
 +        rv = SECFailure;
 +        if (value.len != keyLengthEntry->len) {
 +            printf(" >>> invalid decoded CKA_EC_POINT len (%d) expected %d.\n",
 +                   value.len, keyLengthEntry->len);
 +            printBuf(&value);
 +            goto cleanup;
 +        }
 +        if (value.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) {
 +            printf(" >>> invalid CKA_EC_POINT format (%02x) expected %02x.\n",
 +                   value.data[0], EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED);
 +            printBuf(&value);
 +            goto cleanup;
 +        }
 +    } else {
 +        if (point.len != keyLengthEntry->len) {
 +            printf(" >>> invalid CKA_EC_POINT len (%d) expected %d.\n",
 +                   point.len, keyLengthEntry->len);
 +            printBuf(&point);
 +            goto cleanup;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
 +    rv = SECSuccess;
 cleanup:
     if (privKey) {
         SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
@@ -91,7 +176,11 @@ cleanup:
     if (symKey) {
         PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
     }
 +    if (arena) {
 +        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
 +    }
     SECITEM_FreeItem(&pk_11_ecParams, PR_FALSE);
 +    SECITEM_FreeItem(&point, PR_FALSE);
     return rv;
 }
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.ecc_wrap ./lib/freebl/blapit.h
 --- ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.ecc_wrap	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/blapit.h	2024-01-23 14:07:29.421036328 -0800
@@ -375,7 +375,9 @@ typedef struct DHPrivateKeyStr DHPrivate
 */
 typedef enum { ec_params_explicit,
 -               ec_params_named
 +               ec_params_named,
 +               ec_params_edwards_named,
 +               ec_params_montgomery_named,
 } ECParamsType;
 typedef enum { ec_field_GFp = 1,
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c.ecc_wrap ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c.ecc_wrap	2024-01-23 14:07:14.533870602 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/ecdecode.c	2024-01-23 14:07:29.422036340 -0800
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ EC_FillParams(PLArenaPool *arena, const
         case SEC_OID_CURVE25519:
             /* Populate params for Curve25519 */
 +            params->type = ec_params_montgomery_named;
             CHECK_SEC_OK(gf_populate_params_bytes(ECCurve25519,
                                                   ec_field_plain,
                                                   params));
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.ecc_wrap ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.ecc_wrap	2024-01-23 14:07:14.520870457 -0800
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-01-23 14:08:38.198801966 -0800
@@ -5164,7 +5164,7 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
             }
             /* make sure it has the same encoding */
             if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
 -                lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
 +                lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named) {
               lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
             } else {
               lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
@@ -5694,7 +5694,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
             }
             if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
 -                ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
 +                ecParams->type != ec_params_named) {
                 PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
                 crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
                                             sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.ecc_wrap ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.ecc_wrap	2024-01-23 14:07:14.505870290 -0800
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c	2024-01-23 14:07:29.423036351 -0800
@@ -1897,8 +1897,8 @@ sftk_GetPubKey(SFTKObject *object, CK_KE
                 /* Handle the non-DER encoded case.
                  * Some curves are always pressumed to be non-DER.
                  */
 -                if (pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len == keyLen &&
 -                    (pubKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type == ec_field_plain ||
 +                if (pubKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named ||
 +                    (pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len == keyLen &&
                      pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data[0] == EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED)) {
                     break; /* key was not DER encoded, no need to unwrap */
                 }
@@ -1918,8 +1918,7 @@ sftk_GetPubKey(SFTKObject *object, CK_KE
                         break;
                     }
                     /* we don't handle compressed points except in the case of ECCurve25519 */
 -                    if ((pubKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type != ec_field_plain) &&
 -                        (publicValue.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED)) {
 +                    if (publicValue.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) {
                         crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
                         break;
                     }
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-ecdsa-sign-padding-fix.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-ecdsa-sign-padding-fix.patch
@ -1,335 +0,0 @@
 --- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_vectors.h.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-04 21:20:23.166838534 +0200
 +++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_vectors.h	2024-04-10 09:05:12.664050773 +0200
@@ -280,4 +280,101 @@ const uint8_t kP256SpkiPointNotOnCurve[]
     0x28, 0xbc, 0x64, 0xf2, 0xf1, 0xb2, 0x0c, 0x2d, 0x7e, 0x9f, 0x51, 0x77,
     0xa3, 0xc2, 0x94, 0x00, 0x33, 0x11, 0x77};
 +const uint8_t kP521DataUnpaddedSigLong[] = {'W', 'T', 'F', '6', '0', 'M', 'W', 'M', 'N', '3'};
 +const uint8_t kP521DataUnpaddedSigShort[] = { 'M', 'I', '6', '3', 'V', 'N', 'G', 'L', 'F', 'R',};
 +const uint8_t kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig[] = {
 +    0x30, 0x81, 0x9b, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d,
 +    0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x23, 0x03, 0x81, 0x86,
 +    0x00, 0x04, 0x01, 0xd2, 0x37, 0xeb, 0x78, 0xc7, 0x9b, 0x86, 0xff, 0x29,
 +    0x7b, 0x55, 0x4d, 0x11, 0xc7, 0x9c, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x67, 0x9f, 0xad, 0x2a,
 +    0xa9, 0xb9, 0x51, 0x30, 0x6d, 0xde, 0x14, 0x16, 0xea, 0xb3, 0x9d, 0x18,
 +    0xfc, 0xf0, 0x38, 0x6e, 0x7f, 0xa6, 0x82, 0xb9, 0x19, 0x01, 0xaf, 0xe7,
 +    0xc3, 0xd8, 0xec, 0x9a, 0x62, 0x7b, 0xbf, 0x41, 0xc7, 0x86, 0x89, 0x52,
 +    0x76, 0x8e, 0x01, 0x97, 0x1b, 0x16, 0x97, 0x69, 0x01, 0x2d, 0x07, 0x88,
 +    0x6f, 0xe0, 0x17, 0xbe, 0x82, 0xc4, 0x12, 0xd6, 0x16, 0x72, 0xf8, 0x57,
 +    0x75, 0x5c, 0x69, 0x79, 0xd0, 0x11, 0x05, 0x96, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x61, 0xcd,
 +    0x8f, 0x54, 0x95, 0x58, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0x71, 0x84, 0x63, 0x18, 0xb8, 0x5b,
 +    0xaa, 0x1b, 0xd2, 0xe9, 0x65, 0x63, 0x15, 0x34, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2f, 0x35,
 +    0x27, 0x3a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x42, 0x8e, 0xfd, 0x15, 0xbe, 0x0c, 0x0c,
 +    0xe2, 0x9f};
 +const uint8_t kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigLong[] = {
 +    0x01, 0xa7, 0x3a, 0x14, 0x79, 0x77, 0x9e, 0x48, 0xb0, 0xff, 0xb5, 0xbe,
 +    0xfb, 0xfa, 0x7a, 0x84, 0x24, 0xb3, 0x5c, 0xf0, 0xfd, 0x77, 0x9d, 0xd4,
 +    0x66, 0x49, 0xfd, 0xbf, 0x04, 0xbf, 0xbb, 0x75, 0x22, 0xbb, 0x35, 0x42,
 +    0xdb, 0xe7, 0xed, 0x5a, 0x8f, 0x15, 0xf3, 0xa9, 0x0e, 0xb6, 0x5b, 0xde,
 +    0x23, 0x79, 0x47, 0xa7, 0x1d, 0x25, 0x24, 0x68, 0x63, 0xf6, 0x9c, 0x2e,
 +    0x21, 0xe0, 0x30, 0xfc, 0xd3, 0x65, 0x01, 0x12, 0x4e, 0xf0, 0xbb, 0x89,
 +    0xec, 0xec, 0x4f, 0xef, 0xbe, 0xdc, 0xd6, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x16, 0x68, 0x2b,
 +    0x78, 0xdf, 0x6c, 0x6e, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x5b, 0x45, 0x1b, 0xdd, 0x84, 0x40,
 +    0x94, 0x07, 0xc7, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0x57, 0x92, 0xf1, 0x64, 0xb9, 0x2c, 0xcb,
 +    0x1d, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x78, 0x97, 0x8b, 0x84, 0x4e, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x0b,
 +    0xb0, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x84, 0x18, 0x82, 0x8d, 0x55, 0xdf, 0x36, 0x43, 0x8a};
 +const uint8_t kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigShort[] = {
 +    0x40, 0x12, 0xa7, 0x96, 0x5d, 0x77, 0xba, 0x8a, 0x90, 0x57, 0x52, 0x11,
 +    0xad, 0x72, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x6c, 0x73, 0x81, 0x43, 0x5d, 0x09, 0xe4, 0xde,
 +    0xee, 0xc2, 0xb5, 0x03, 0x1f, 0x0f, 0xd1, 0x6a, 0xfc, 0x26, 0x6d, 0x99,
 +    0x6d, 0x84, 0x32, 0x05, 0x56, 0x66, 0xe3, 0x6b, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0x04, 0xc9,
 +    0x44, 0x17, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0x24, 0xd8, 0x87, 0x4e, 0x53, 0x9d, 0x08, 0x65,
 +    0x91, 0x95, 0xeb, 0xeb, 0x92, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0x34, 0x80, 0xe8, 0x9f, 0x38,
 +    0x73, 0x00, 0x7c, 0xfc, 0x2b, 0xfa, 0xcf, 0xa6, 0x6c, 0x1c, 0xb0, 0x75,
 +    0x76, 0x01, 0x22, 0xe7, 0x3c, 0xd8, 0xc4, 0x1f, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x0b, 0x95,
 +    0x7a, 0x50, 0x2b, 0x8c, 0x87, 0xc4, 0x12, 0x8e, 0x00, 0x09, 0x29, 0x2c,
 +    0x21, 0xd1, 0x96, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0x54, 0xdb, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0x90, 0xf5,
 +    0x5c, 0x7a, 0x8d, 0x83, 0x9c, 0x39, 0x38, 0x58, 0x5a, 0x0e};
 +const uint8_t kP384DataUnpaddedSigLong[] = {'L', 'T', 'N', '4', 'B', 'P', 'X', 'Y', '5', 'N'};
 +const uint8_t kP384DataUnpaddedSigShort[] = {'3', 'U', 'S', 'N', 'N', 'U', '6', 'E', 'E', '0'};
 +const uint8_t kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig[] = {
 +    0x30, 0x76, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02,
 +    0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04,
 +    0x1e, 0x98, 0x4c, 0xcf, 0x05, 0xd4, 0x9b, 0x98, 0x11, 0xae, 0xa1, 0xaa,
 +    0x72, 0x27, 0xac, 0xde, 0x7f, 0xe8, 0x4d, 0xda, 0xaa, 0x67, 0x51, 0x2e,
 +    0x0b, 0x30, 0x31, 0xab, 0x05, 0xac, 0x95, 0xdf, 0x09, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xe3,
 +    0xf5, 0xfa, 0x30, 0xad, 0x43, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0x7e, 0xd7, 0xd1, 0xee, 0x4e,
 +    0x83, 0x53, 0xe3, 0x26, 0xeb, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0xe5, 0x35, 0x36, 0x1a, 0xbf,
 +    0xbf, 0x99, 0xd6, 0xe2, 0x14, 0x43, 0xcb, 0x54, 0xde, 0x06, 0xb5, 0x7d,
 +    0x27, 0xb7, 0xc2, 0x27, 0xaf, 0xb6, 0x12, 0x4f, 0x47, 0xa0, 0xdb, 0xb5,
 +    0x6e, 0x7b, 0x44, 0x0d, 0xc8, 0xbd, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x27, 0x7c, 0xf2, 0x3a};
 +const uint8_t kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigLong[] = {
 +    0x19, 0x22, 0x21, 0x72, 0x8a, 0xa4, 0x22, 0x26, 0x75, 0x16, 0x9c, 0x58,
 +    0x93, 0xd8, 0x43, 0xac, 0x28, 0x78, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0xf2, 0x5d, 0xa6, 0x59,
 +    0x74, 0x6d, 0x55, 0x95, 0xe1, 0xa8, 0xc9, 0x18, 0x54, 0x5d, 0x03, 0xa0,
 +    0xb0, 0x90, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x29, 0x1a, 0x50, 0x9d, 0xe3, 0xde,
 +    0x4a, 0x69, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0x53, 0xd7, 0xe8, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0xfc,
 +    0x07, 0x66, 0xbc, 0xa7, 0xb5, 0x47, 0x29, 0xbd, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x57, 0x6c,
 +    0xde, 0x37, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xd4, 0x61, 0x79, 0x92, 0x67, 0x25, 0x2e, 0xbc,
 +    0x8b, 0x88, 0x6a, 0xfa, 0xa5, 0x00, 0x19, 0x11, 0x64, 0x69, 0x7b, 0xf6};
 +const uint8_t kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigShort[] = {
 +    0x69, 0xe6, 0xc2, 0xd0, 0xb0, 0x59, 0xca, 0x1f, 0x07, 0x4c, 0x90, 0x13,
 +    0x75, 0xe0, 0xc5, 0xb9, 0x38, 0xf2, 0xd8, 0x55, 0xf7, 0x08, 0xbd, 0x8e,
 +    0x61, 0xbd, 0x50, 0x7e, 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xea, 0xbc, 0xa4, 0xa0, 0x18, 0x9b,
 +    0x63, 0x6b, 0x8a, 0x91, 0x88, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xbe, 0x6a, 0xb6, 0x4b, 0xaf,
 +    0xcb, 0x31, 0x89, 0xcf, 0x43, 0x28, 0x4b, 0x04, 0x6a, 0xe0, 0x8d, 0xbc,
 +    0xbf, 0xa2, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x1c, 0x83, 0x82, 0x3e, 0x2b, 0xa3, 0xea, 0x50,
 +    0x80, 0xec, 0x31, 0x48, 0x20, 0x30, 0x75, 0x94, 0xd9, 0x08, 0x9f, 0x6f,
 +    0x53, 0x21, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x74, 0x0c, 0xc4, 0x21, 0x28, 0xc9};
 +const uint8_t kP256DataUnpaddedSigLong[] = {'J', '5', 'C', 'N', 'Q', 'T', 'F', 'A', 'J', 'T'};
 +const uint8_t kP256DataUnpaddedSigShort[] = {'K', 'O', 'S', '9', '4', 'F', 'V', 'C', 'Y', 'C'};
 +const uint8_t kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig[] = {
 +    0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02,
 +    0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03,
 +    0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30, 0x40, 0x9d, 0x57, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x70, 0x1d, 0x4b,
 +    0x40, 0x84, 0xd4, 0x7a, 0xc0, 0x30, 0x68, 0x33, 0xf1, 0x1d, 0x47, 0xaa,
 +    0x37, 0x4d, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xce, 0xdc, 0x82, 0x1d, 0xf7, 0xcf, 0xdd, 0x9e,
 +    0xb6, 0x6c, 0x85, 0x87, 0x9d, 0x31, 0x79, 0x7e, 0xe4, 0xe9, 0xc7, 0x4f,
 +    0xd6, 0x07, 0x1d, 0x2f, 0x54, 0x82, 0x5d, 0x22, 0xbf, 0xbc, 0xf0, 0x75,
 +    0x01, 0x09, 0x43, 0xc6, 0x52, 0xcb, 0x45 };
 +const uint8_t kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigLong[] = {
 +    0xad, 0x6f, 0xcf, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x83, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0xe0, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0x56,
 +    0xa5, 0x17, 0x60, 0xbf, 0x80, 0x71, 0x18, 0x54, 0x1d, 0x82, 0xdb, 0xe6,
 +    0xc2, 0x4e, 0x60, 0x4a, 0xa6, 0x0c, 0xed, 0xcf, 0xe9, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x11,
 +    0xc2, 0x0a, 0x9c, 0x02, 0x5f, 0xb6, 0xa0, 0xb8, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xbf, 0x80,
 +    0xb4, 0xfb, 0x68, 0xab, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x07, 0xeb, 0x50, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0x47,
 +    0xcf, 0x61, 0x91, 0x5f};
 +const uint8_t kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigShort[] = {
 +    0x3d, 0x99, 0x94, 0xa9, 0x80, 0x12, 0x43, 0x27, 0xde, 0x78, 0x9e, 0x61,
 +    0xaf, 0x10, 0xee, 0xd2, 0x22, 0xc6, 0x6e, 0x1c, 0xdf, 0xe7, 0x75, 0x28,
 +    0x84, 0xae, 0xb8, 0xdb, 0x7b, 0xf1, 0x91, 0x86, 0x5b, 0x5a, 0x28, 0x16,
 +    0x15, 0xfe, 0xd9, 0x48, 0x33, 0x95, 0xa8, 0x8f, 0x92, 0xbb, 0xe3, 0x9c,
 +    0xca, 0x04, 0xef, 0x56, 0x48, 0x16, 0x73, 0xa6, 0xb6, 0x6a, 0x38, 0xc9,
 +    0x78, 0xc4};
 }  // namespace nss_test
 --- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_unittest.cc.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-04 21:19:59.583677319 +0200
 +++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_ecdsa_unittest.cc	2024-04-10 17:03:24.202133898 +0200
@@ -326,4 +326,47 @@ INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(Pkcs11EcdsaRoun
                                            SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1,
                                            SEC_OID_CURVE25519));
 +class Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest
 +    : public Pkcs11EcdsaTestBase,
 +      public ::testing::WithParamInterface<Pkcs11EcdsaTestParams> {
 + public:
 +  Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest() : Pkcs11EcdsaTestBase(GetParam().hash_oid_) {}
 +};
 +
 +static const Pkcs11EcdsaTestParams kEcdsaUnpaddedSignaturesVectors[] = {
 +    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
 +     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
 +      DataBuffer(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP256DataUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP256DataUnpaddedSigLong)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigLong))}},
 +    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
 +     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
 +      DataBuffer(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP256SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP256DataUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP256DataUnpaddedSigShort)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP256SignatureUnpaddedSigShort))}},
 +    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
 +     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
 +      DataBuffer(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP384DataUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP384DataUnpaddedSigLong)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigLong))}},
 +    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
 +     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
 +      DataBuffer(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP384SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP384DataUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP384DataUnpaddedSigShort)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP384SignatureUnpaddedSigShort))}},
 +    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
 +     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
 +      DataBuffer(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP521DataUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP521DataUnpaddedSigLong)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigLong, sizeof(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigLong))}},
 +    {SEC_OID_SHA512,
 +     {DataBuffer(NULL, 0),
 +      DataBuffer(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig, sizeof(kP521SpkiUnpaddedSig)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP521DataUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP521DataUnpaddedSigShort)),
 +      DataBuffer(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigShort, sizeof(kP521SignatureUnpaddedSigShort))}}
 +};
 +
 +TEST_P(Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest, Verify) { Verify(GetParam().sig_params_); }
 +INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(EcdsaVerifyUnpaddedSignatures, Pkcs11EcdsaUnpaddedSignatureTest,
 +                         ::testing::ValuesIn(kEcdsaUnpaddedSignaturesVectors));
 }  // namespace nss_test
 --- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp256r1.c.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-09 14:58:28.413482715 +0200
 +++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp256r1.c	2024-04-09 21:15:23.717222679 +0200
@@ -214,6 +214,9 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
 {
     SECStatus res = SECSuccess;
 +    unsigned char _padded_sig_data[64] = { 0 };
 +    unsigned char *sig_r, *sig_s;
 +
     if (!key || !signature || !digest ||
         !key->publicValue.data ||
         !signature->data || !digest->data ||
@@ -223,9 +226,10 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
         return res;
     }
 -    if (key->publicValue.len != 65 ||
 -        digest->len == 0 ||
 -        signature->len != 64) {
 +    unsigned int olen = key->ecParams.order.len;
 +    if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len % 2 != 0 ||
 +        signature->len > 2 * olen ||
 +        digest->len == 0 || key->publicValue.len != 65) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
         res = SECFailure;
         return res;
@@ -237,6 +241,25 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
         return res;
     }
 +    /* P-256 signature has to be 64 bytes long, pad it with 0s if it isn't */
 +    if (signature->len != 64) {
 +        unsigned split = signature->len / 2;
 +        unsigned pad = 32 - split;
 +
 +        unsigned char *o_sig = signature->data;
 +        unsigned char *p_sig = _padded_sig_data;
 +
 +        memcpy(p_sig + pad, o_sig, split);
 +        memcpy(p_sig + 32 + pad, o_sig + split, split);
 +
 +        sig_r = p_sig;
 +        sig_s = p_sig + 32;
 +    } else {
 +        sig_r = signature->data;
 +        sig_s = signature->data + 32;
 +    }
 +
 +
     uint8_t hash[32] = { 0 };
     if (digest->len < 32) {
         memcpy(hash + 32 - digest->len, digest->data, digest->len);
@@ -247,7 +270,7 @@ ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
     bool b = Hacl_P256_ecdsa_verif_without_hash(
         32, hash,
         key->publicValue.data + 1,
 -        signature->data, signature->data + 32);
 +        sig_r, sig_s);
     if (!b) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
         res = SECFailure;
 --- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp384r1.c.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-09 14:58:12.726377972 +0200
 +++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp384r1.c	2024-04-09 14:50:47.932425779 +0200
@@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
 {
     SECStatus res = SECSuccess;
 +    unsigned char _padded_sig_data[96] = { 0 };
 +    unsigned char *sig_r, *sig_s;
 +
     if (!key || !signature || !digest ||
         !key->publicValue.data ||
         !signature->data || !digest->data ||
@@ -194,9 +197,10 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
         return res;
     }
 -    if (key->publicValue.len != 97 ||
 -        digest->len == 0 ||
 -        signature->len != 96) {
 +    unsigned int olen = key->ecParams.order.len;
 +    if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len % 2 != 0 ||
 +        signature->len > 2 * olen ||
 +        digest->len == 0 || key->publicValue.len != 97) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
         res = SECFailure;
         return res;
@@ -208,6 +212,24 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
         return res;
     }
 +    /* P-384 signature has to be 96 bytes long, pad it with 0s if it isn't */
 +    if (signature->len != 96) {
 +        unsigned split = signature->len / 2;
 +        unsigned pad = 48 - split;
 +
 +        unsigned char *o_sig = signature->data;
 +        unsigned char *p_sig = _padded_sig_data;
 +
 +        memcpy(p_sig + pad, o_sig, split);
 +        memcpy(p_sig + 48 + pad, o_sig + split, split);
 +
 +        sig_r = p_sig;
 +        sig_s = p_sig + 48;
 +    } else {
 +        sig_r = signature->data;
 +        sig_s = signature->data + 48;
 +    }
 +
     uint8_t hash[48] = { 0 };
     if (digest->len < 48) {
         memcpy(hash + 48 - digest->len, digest->data, digest->len);
@@ -218,7 +240,7 @@ ec_secp384r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
     bool b = Hacl_P384_ecdsa_verif_without_hash(
         48, hash,
         key->publicValue.data + 1,
 -        signature->data, signature->data + 48);
 +        sig_r, sig_s);
     if (!b) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
         res = SECFailure;
 --- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp521r1.c.ecdsa-sign-padding-fix	2024-04-05 22:42:26.553728340 +0200
 +++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_secp521r1.c	2024-04-09 13:02:14.821865860 +0200
@@ -189,6 +189,9 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
 {
     SECStatus res = SECSuccess;
 +    unsigned char _padded_sig_data[132] = { 0 };
 +    unsigned char *sig_r, *sig_s;
 +
     if (!key || !signature || !digest ||
         !key->publicValue.data ||
         !signature->data || !digest->data ||
@@ -198,9 +201,10 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
         return res;
     }
 -    if (key->publicValue.len != 133 ||
 -        digest->len == 0 ||
 -        signature->len != 132) {
 +    unsigned int olen = key->ecParams.order.len;
 +    if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len % 2 != 0 ||
 +        signature->len > 2 * olen ||
 +        digest->len == 0 || key->publicValue.len != 133) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
         res = SECFailure;
         return res;
@@ -212,6 +216,24 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
         return res;
     }
 +    /* P-521 signature has to be 132 bytes long, pad it with 0s if it isn't */
 +    if (signature->len != 132) {
 +        unsigned split = signature->len / 2;
 +        unsigned pad = 66 - split;
 +
 +        unsigned char *o_sig = signature->data;
 +        unsigned char *p_sig = _padded_sig_data;
 +
 +        memcpy(p_sig + pad, o_sig, split);
 +        memcpy(p_sig + 66 + pad, o_sig + split, split);
 +
 +        sig_r = p_sig;
 +        sig_s = p_sig + 66;
 +    } else {
 +        sig_r = signature->data;
 +        sig_s = signature->data + 66;
 +    }
 +
     uint8_t hash[66] = { 0 };
     if (digest->len < 66) {
         memcpy(hash + 66 - digest->len, digest->data, digest->len);
@@ -227,7 +249,7 @@ ec_secp521r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *
     bool b = Hacl_P521_ecdsa_verif_without_hash(
         66, hash,
         key->publicValue.data + 1,
 -        signature->data, signature->data + 66);
 +        sig_r, sig_s);
     if (!b) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
         res = SECFailure;
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-pkcs11-long-hash.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-pkcs11-long-hash.patch
@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
 --- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
 +++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
@@ -15,10 +15,13 @@
  *   keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token.
  *
  *   In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session
  *   that created or generated them.
  */
 +
 +#include <limits.h> /* for UINT_MAX and ULONG_MAX */
 +
 #include "seccomon.h"
 #include "secitem.h"
 #include "secport.h"
 #include "blapi.h"
 #include "pkcs11.h"
@@ -1954,12 +1957,21 @@
     if (pDigest == NULL) {
         *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
         goto finish;
     }
 -    /* do it: */
 +#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
 +    /* The context->hashUpdate function takes an unsigned int for its data
 +     * length argument, but NSC_Digest takes an unsigned long. */
 +    while (ulDataLen > UINT_MAX) {
 +        (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, UINT_MAX);
 +        pData += UINT_MAX;
 +        ulDataLen -= UINT_MAX;
 +    }
 +#endif
     (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen);
 +
     /*  NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */
     (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
     *pulDigestLen = digestLen;
     sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
@@ -1980,12 +1992,22 @@
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, NULL);
     if (crv != CKR_OK)
         return crv;
 -    /* do it: */
 +
 +#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
 +    /* The context->hashUpdate function takes an unsigned int for its data
 +     * length argument, but NSC_DigestUpdate takes an unsigned long. */
 +    while (ulPartLen > UINT_MAX) {
 +        (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, UINT_MAX);
 +        pPart += UINT_MAX;
 +        ulPartLen -= UINT_MAX;
 +    }
 +#endif
     (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
 +
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
 CK_RV
@@ -3166,10 +3188,17 @@
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, type, PR_TRUE, &session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK)
         return crv;
     if (context->hashInfo) {
 +#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
 +        while (ulPartLen > UINT_MAX) {
 +            (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, UINT_MAX);
 +            pPart += UINT_MAX;
 +            ulPartLen -= UINT_MAX;
 +        }
 +#endif
         (*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
     } else {
         /* must be block cipher MACing */
         unsigned int blkSize = context->blockSize;
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-no-dbm-25519.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-no-dbm-25519.patch
@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
 diff -up ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.no_dbm_25519 ./tests/ec/ectest.sh
 --- ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.no_dbm_25519	2023-07-26 10:12:29.531147406 -0700
 +++ ./tests/ec/ectest.sh	2023-07-26 10:12:39.547245445 -0700
@@ -46,11 +46,13 @@ ectest_genkeydb_test()
     return $?
   fi
   curves=( \
 -    "curve25519" \
     "secp256r1" \
     "secp384r1" \
     "secp521r1" \
   )
 +  if [ "${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE}" = "sql" ] ; then
 +      curves=( "curve25519"  "${curves[@]}" )
 +  fi
   for curve in "${curves[@]}"; do
     echo "Test $curve key generation using certutil ..."
     certutil -G -d "${HOSTDIR}" -k ec -q $curve -f "${R_PWFILE}" -z ${NOISE_FILE}
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-ppc_no_init.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-ppc_no_init.patch
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/Makefile.ppc_no_init ./lib/freebl/Makefile
 --- ./lib/freebl/Makefile.ppc_no_init	2024-06-03 14:12:24.216755903 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/Makefile	2024-06-03 14:11:36.464234903 -0700
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ endif
 ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
     EXTRA_SRCS += gcm-ppc.c
 ifdef USE_64
 -    DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
 +#    DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
     PPC_ABI := $(shell $(CC) -dM -E - < /dev/null | awk '$$2 == "_CALL_ELF" {print $$3}')
     ifeq ($(PPC_ABI),2)
         ASFILES += sha512-p8.s
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/Makefile.ppc_no_init ./lib/softoken/Makefile
 --- ./lib/softoken/Makefile.ppc_no_init	2024-06-03 14:12:44.664979003 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/Makefile	2024-06-03 14:10:26.703473806 -0700
@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/config.mk
 ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
     DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
 endif
 -ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Linux)
 -ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
 -ifdef USE_64
 -    DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
 -endif # USE_64
 -endif # ppc
 -endif # Linux
 +#ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Linux)
 +#ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
 +#ifdef USE_64
 +#    DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
 +#endif # USE_64
 +#endif # ppc
 +#endif # Linux
 #######################################################################
--- a/SOURCES/nss-disable-dc.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-disable-dc.patch
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
 diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.orig ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
 --- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.orig	2021-06-02 15:40:48.677355426 -0700
 +++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn	2021-06-02 15:42:31.248977261 -0700
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ CPPSRCS = \
       tls_filter.cc \
       tls_protect.cc \
       tls_psk_unittest.cc \
 -      tls_subcerts_unittest.cc \
       tls_ech_unittest.cc \
       $(SSLKEYLOGFILE_FILES) \
       $(NULL)
 diff -up ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.orig ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c
 --- ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.orig	2021-05-28 02:50:43.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c	2021-06-02 15:40:48.676355420 -0700
@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ SSL_OptionSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 wh
             break;
         case SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS:
 -            ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials = val;
 +            /* disable it for now */
             break;
         case SSL_ENABLE_NPN:
@@ -1337,7 +1337,7 @@ SSL_OptionSetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRIn
             break;
         case SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS:
 -            ssl_defaults.enableDelegatedCredentials = val;
 +            /* disable it for now */
             break;
         case SSL_ENABLE_NPN:
--- a/SOURCES/nss-disable-md5.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-disable-md5.patch
@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
 diff -r 699541a7793b lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
 --- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2021-04-16 14:43:41.668835607 -0700
 +++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2021-04-16 14:43:50.585888411 -0700
@@ -324,11 +324,11 @@ static const oidValDef curveOptList[] =
 static const oidValDef hashOptList[] = {
     /* Hashes */
     { CIPHER_NAME("MD2"), SEC_OID_MD2,
 -      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
 +      0 },
     { CIPHER_NAME("MD4"), SEC_OID_MD4,
 -      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
 +      0 },
     { CIPHER_NAME("MD5"), SEC_OID_MD5,
 -      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
 +      0 },
     { CIPHER_NAME("SHA1"), SEC_OID_SHA1,
       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
     { CIPHER_NAME("SHA224"), SEC_OID_SHA224,
 diff -r 699541a7793b lib/util/secoid.c
 --- a/lib/util/secoid.c	Tue Jun 16 23:03:22 2020 +0000
 +++ b/lib/util/secoid.c	Thu Jun 25 14:33:09 2020 +0200
@@ -2042,6 +2042,19 @@
             int i;
             for (i = 1; i < SEC_OID_TOTAL; i++) {
 +                switch (i) {
 +                case SEC_OID_MD2:
 +                case SEC_OID_MD4:
 +                case SEC_OID_MD5:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD2_AND_DES_CBC:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC:
 +                    continue;
 +                default:
 +                    break;
 +                }
                 if (oids[i].desc && strstr(arg, oids[i].desc)) {
                     xOids[i].notPolicyFlags = notEnable |
                                               (xOids[i].notPolicyFlags & ~(DEF_FLAGS));
--- a/SOURCES/nss_p256_scalar_validated.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss_p256_scalar_validated.patch
--- a/SOURCES/nss_p384_hacl.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss_p384_hacl.patch
--- a/SOURCES/nss_p384_scalar_validated.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss_p384_scalar_validated.patch
@ -1,644 +0,0 @@
 diff -up ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh.p384 ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh
 --- ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh.p384	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./automation/taskcluster/scripts/run_hacl.sh	2024-01-09 11:49:58.650418434 -0800
@@ -40,5 +40,14 @@ files=($(find ~/nss/lib/freebl/verified/
 for f in "${files[@]}"; do
     file_name=$(basename "$f")
     hacl_file=($(find ~/hacl-star/dist/mozilla/ ~/hacl-star/dist/karamel/ -type f -name $file_name -not -path "*/hacl-star/dist/mozilla/internal/*"))
 +    # TODO(Bug 1854438): Remove P384 exception.
 +    # TODO(Bug 1854439): Remove P521 exception.
 +    if [ $file_name == "Hacl_P384.c"  \
 +        -o $file_name == "Hacl_P384.h" \
 +        -o $file_name == "Hacl_P521.c" \
 +        -o $file_name == "Hacl_P521.h" ]
 +    then
 +        continue;
 +    fi
     diff $hacl_file $f
 done
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/ec.c.p384 ./lib/freebl/ec.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/ec.c.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:14.118980084 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/ec.c	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
@@ -15,15 +15,62 @@
 #include "mplogic.h"
 #include "ec.h"
 #include "ecl.h"
 +#include "verified/Hacl_P384.h"
 +#include "verified/Hacl_P521.h"
 #define EC_DOUBLECHECK PR_FALSE
 +SECStatus
 +ec_secp384r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar)
 +{
 +    if (!scalar || !scalar->data) {
 +        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 +        return SECFailure;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (scalar->len != 48) {
 +        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
 +        return SECFailure;
 +    }
 +
 +    bool b = Hacl_P384_validate_private_key(scalar->data);
 +
 +    if (!b) {
 +        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
 +        return SECFailure;
 +    }
 +    return SECSuccess;
 +}
 +
 +SECStatus
 +ec_secp521r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar)
 +{
 +    if (!scalar || !scalar->data) {
 +        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 +        return SECFailure;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (scalar->len != 66) {
 +        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
 +        return SECFailure;
 +    }
 +
 +    bool b = Hacl_P521_validate_private_key(scalar->data);
 +
 +    if (!b) {
 +        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
 +        return SECFailure;
 +    }
 +    return SECSuccess;
 +}
 +
 static const ECMethod kMethods[] = {
     { ECCurve25519,
       ec_Curve25519_pt_mul,
       ec_Curve25519_pt_validate,
       ec_Curve25519_scalar_validate,
 -      NULL, NULL },
 +      NULL,
 +      NULL },
     {
         ECCurve_NIST_P256,
         ec_secp256r1_pt_mul,
@@ -352,8 +415,7 @@ EC_NewKeyFromSeed(ECParams *ecParams, EC
 SECStatus
 ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(ECParams *ecParams, SECItem *privKey)
 {
 -    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
 -    mp_err err;
 +    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
     unsigned int len = EC_GetScalarSize(ecParams);
@@ -362,82 +424,43 @@ ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(ECParams *ec
         return SECFailure;
     }
 -    /* For known curves, use rejection sampling A.4.2 */
 -    if (ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
 -        const ECMethod *method = ec_get_method_from_name(ecParams->name);
 -        rv = SECFailure;
 -        if (method == NULL || method->scalar_validate == NULL) {
 -            /* unknown curve */
 -            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 -            goto done;
 -        }
 -        int count = 100;
 -        while (rv != SECSuccess && count >= 0) {
 -            rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKey->data, len);
 -            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 -                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
 -                goto done;
 -            }
 -            rv = method->scalar_validate(privKey);
 -            count--;
 -        }
 -        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 -            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
 -        }
 -        goto done;
 +    const ECMethod *method = ec_get_method_from_name(ecParams->name);
 +    if (method == NULL || method->scalar_validate == NULL) {
 +        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
 +        return SECFailure;
     }
 -    /* For unknown curves, use algotithm A.4.1 */
 -
 -    unsigned char *order = ecParams->order.data;
 -    mp_int privKeyVal, order_1, one;
 -    unsigned char *privKeyBytes = NULL;
 -
 -    MP_DIGITS(&privKeyVal) = 0;
 -    MP_DIGITS(&order_1) = 0;
 -    MP_DIGITS(&one) = 0;
 -    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&privKeyVal));
 -    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&order_1));
 -    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&one));
 -
 -    /* Generates 2*len random bytes using the global random bit generator
 -     * (which implements Algorithm 1 of FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1) then
 -     * reduces modulo the group order.
 -     */
 -
 -    if ((privKeyBytes = PORT_Alloc(2 * len)) == NULL) {
 -        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
 -        rv = SECFailure;
 -        goto cleanup;
 +    uint8_t leading_coeff_mask;
 +    switch (ecParams->name) {
 +        case ECCurve25519:
 +        case ECCurve_NIST_P256:
 +        case ECCurve_NIST_P384:
 +            leading_coeff_mask = 0xff;
 +            break;
 +        case ECCurve_NIST_P521:
 +            leading_coeff_mask = 0x01;
 +            break;
 +        default:
 +            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
 +            return SECFailure;
     }
 -    CHECK_SEC_OK(RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKeyBytes, 2 * len));
 -    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, 2 * len));
 -    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&order_1, order, len));
 -    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_set_int(&one, 1));
 -    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub(&order_1, &one, &order_1));
 -    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&privKeyVal, &order_1, &privKeyVal));
 -    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&privKeyVal, &one, &privKeyVal));
 -    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_fixlen_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, len));
 -    memcpy(privKey->data, privKeyBytes, len);
 +    /* The rejection sampling method from FIPS 186-5 A.4.2 */
 +    int count = 100;
 +    do {
 +        rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKey->data, len);
 +        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 +            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
 +            return SECFailure;
 +        }
 +        privKey->data[0] &= leading_coeff_mask;
 +        rv = method->scalar_validate(privKey);
 +    } while (rv != SECSuccess && --count > 0);
 -cleanup:
 -    mp_clear(&privKeyVal);
 -    mp_clear(&order_1);
 -    mp_clear(&one);
 -    if (privKeyBytes) {
 -        PORT_ZFree(privKeyBytes, 2 * len);
 -    }
 -    if (err < MP_OKAY) {
 -        MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
 -        rv = SECFailure;
 +    if (rv != SECSuccess) { // implies count == 0
 +        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
     }
 -done:
 -    if (rv != SECSuccess && privKey->data) {
 -        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(privKey, PR_FALSE);
 -        return rv;
 -    }
     return rv;
 }
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h.p384 ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h
 --- ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:14.118980084 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/ecl/ecl.h	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
@@ -57,4 +57,8 @@ SECStatus ec_secp256r1_sign_digest(ECPri
 SECStatus ec_secp256r1_verify_digest(ECPublicKey *key, const SECItem *signature,
                                      const SECItem *digest);
 +SECStatus ec_secp384r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar);
 +
 +SECStatus ec_secp521r1_scalar_validate(const SECItem *scalar);
 +
 #endif /* __ecl_h_ */
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi.p384 ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
 --- ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:14.118980084 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
     'ecl/ecp_secp384r1.c',
     'ecl/ecp_secp521r1.c',
     'verified/Hacl_P256.c',
 +    'verified/Hacl_P384.c',
 +    'verified/Hacl_P521.c',
     'fipsfreebl.c',
     'blinit.c',
     'freeblver.c',
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/Makefile.p384 ./lib/freebl/Makefile
 --- ./lib/freebl/Makefile.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.650418434 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/Makefile	2024-01-09 11:51:20.500224176 -0800
@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ ifndef NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY
     VERIFIED_SRCS += Hacl_Poly1305_32.c Hacl_Chacha20.c Hacl_Chacha20Poly1305_32.c
 endif # NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY
 -VERIFIED_SRCS += Hacl_P256.c
 +VERIFIED_SRCS += Hacl_P256.c Hacl_P384.c Hacl_P521.c
 ifeq (,$(filter-out x86_64 aarch64,$(CPU_ARCH)))
     # All 64-bit architectures get the 64 bit version.
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.c	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
 +/* MIT License
 + *
 + * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
 + * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
 + *
 + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
 + * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
 + * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
 + * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
 + * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
 + * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
 + *
 + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
 + * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
 + *
 + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
 + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
 + * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
 + * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
 + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
 + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
 + * SOFTWARE.
 + */
 +
 +#include "Hacl_P384.h"
 +
 +#include "internal/Hacl_Krmllib.h"
 +#include "internal/Hacl_Bignum_Base.h"
 +
 +static inline uint64_t
 +bn_is_eq_mask(uint64_t *x, uint64_t *y)
 +{
 +    uint64_t mask = (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
 +    KRML_MAYBE_FOR6(i,
 +                    (uint32_t)0U,
 +                    (uint32_t)6U,
 +                    (uint32_t)1U,
 +                    uint64_t uu____0 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(x[i], y[i]);
 +                    mask = uu____0 & mask;);
 +    uint64_t mask1 = mask;
 +    return mask1;
 +}
 +
 +static inline uint64_t
 +bn_sub(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t *c)
 +{
 +    uint64_t c1 = (uint64_t)0U;
 +    {
 +        uint64_t t1 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U];
 +        uint64_t t20 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U];
 +        uint64_t *res_i0 = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U;
 +        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t20, res_i0);
 +        uint64_t t10 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)1U];
 +        uint64_t t21 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)1U];
 +        uint64_t *res_i1 = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)1U;
 +        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t10, t21, res_i1);
 +        uint64_t t11 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)2U];
 +        uint64_t t22 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)2U];
 +        uint64_t *res_i2 = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)2U;
 +        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t11, t22, res_i2);
 +        uint64_t t12 = b[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)3U];
 +        uint64_t t2 = c[(uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)3U];
 +        uint64_t *res_i = a + (uint32_t)4U * (uint32_t)0U + (uint32_t)3U;
 +        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t12, t2, res_i);
 +    }
 +    KRML_MAYBE_FOR2(i,
 +                    (uint32_t)4U,
 +                    (uint32_t)6U,
 +                    (uint32_t)1U,
 +                    uint64_t t1 = b[i];
 +                    uint64_t t2 = c[i];
 +                    uint64_t *res_i = a + i;
 +                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t2, res_i););
 +    uint64_t c10 = c1;
 +    return c10;
 +}
 +
 +static inline void
 +bn_from_bytes_be(uint64_t *a, uint8_t *b)
 +{
 +    KRML_MAYBE_FOR6(i,
 +                    (uint32_t)0U,
 +                    (uint32_t)6U,
 +                    (uint32_t)1U,
 +                    uint64_t *os = a;
 +                    uint64_t u = load64_be(b + ((uint32_t)6U - i - (uint32_t)1U) * (uint32_t)8U);
 +                    uint64_t x = u;
 +                    os[i] = x;);
 +}
 +
 +static inline void
 +p384_make_order(uint64_t *n)
 +{
 +    n[0U] = (uint64_t)0xecec196accc52973U;
 +    n[1U] = (uint64_t)0x581a0db248b0a77aU;
 +    n[2U] = (uint64_t)0xc7634d81f4372ddfU;
 +    n[3U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
 +    n[4U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
 +    n[5U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 +Private key validation.
 +
 +  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
 +
 +  The argument `private_key` points to 48 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[48].
 +
 +  The private key is valid:
 +    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
 +*/
 +bool
 +Hacl_P384_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key)
 +{
 +    uint64_t bn_sk[6U] = { 0U };
 +    bn_from_bytes_be(bn_sk, private_key);
 +    uint64_t tmp[6U] = { 0U };
 +    p384_make_order(tmp);
 +    uint64_t c = bn_sub(tmp, bn_sk, tmp);
 +    uint64_t is_lt_order = (uint64_t)0U - c;
 +    uint64_t bn_zero[6U] = { 0U };
 +    uint64_t res = bn_is_eq_mask(bn_sk, bn_zero);
 +    uint64_t is_eq_zero = res;
 +    uint64_t res0 = is_lt_order & ~is_eq_zero;
 +    return res0 == (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
 +}
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h
 --- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P384.h	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
 +/* MIT License
 + *
 + * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
 + * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
 + *
 + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
 + * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
 + * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
 + * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
 + * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
 + * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
 + *
 + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
 + * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
 + *
 + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
 + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
 + * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
 + * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
 + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
 + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
 + * SOFTWARE.
 + */
 +
 +#ifndef __Hacl_P384_H
 +#define __Hacl_P384_H
 +
 +#if defined(__cplusplus)
 +extern "C" {
 +#endif
 +
 +#include <string.h>
 +#include "krml/internal/types.h"
 +#include "krml/lowstar_endianness.h"
 +
 +#include "lib_intrinsics.h"
 +
 +/*******************************************************************************
 +
 + Verified C library for ECDSA and ECDH functions over the P-384 NIST curve.
 +
 + This module implements signing and verification, key validation, conversions
 + between various point representations, and ECDH key agreement.
 +
 +*******************************************************************************/
 +
 +/******************/
 +/* Key validation */
 +/******************/
 +
 +/**
 +Private key validation.
 +
 +  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
 +
 +  The argument `private_key` points to 32 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[32].
 +
 +  The private key is valid:
 +    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
 +*/
 +bool Hacl_P384_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key);
 +
 +#if defined(__cplusplus)
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 +#define __Hacl_P384_H_DEFINED
 +#endif
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.c	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
 +/* MIT License
 + *
 + * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
 + * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
 + *
 + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
 + * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
 + * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
 + * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
 + * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
 + * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
 + *
 + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
 + * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
 + *
 + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
 + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
 + * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
 + * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
 + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
 + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
 + * SOFTWARE.
 + */
 +
 +#include "Hacl_P521.h"
 +
 +#include "internal/Hacl_Krmllib.h"
 +#include "internal/Hacl_Bignum_Base.h"
 +
 +static inline uint64_t
 +bn_is_eq_mask(uint64_t *x, uint64_t *y)
 +{
 +    uint64_t mask = (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
 +    KRML_MAYBE_FOR9(i,
 +                    (uint32_t)0U,
 +                    (uint32_t)9U,
 +                    (uint32_t)1U,
 +                    uint64_t uu____0 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(x[i], y[i]);
 +                    mask = uu____0 & mask;);
 +    uint64_t mask1 = mask;
 +    return mask1;
 +}
 +
 +static inline uint64_t
 +bn_sub(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t *c)
 +{
 +    uint64_t c1 = (uint64_t)0U;
 +    KRML_MAYBE_FOR2(i,
 +                    (uint32_t)0U,
 +                    (uint32_t)2U,
 +                    (uint32_t)1U,
 +                    uint64_t t1 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i];
 +                    uint64_t t20 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i];
 +                    uint64_t *res_i0 = a + (uint32_t)4U * i;
 +                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t20, res_i0);
 +                    uint64_t t10 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)1U];
 +                    uint64_t t21 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)1U];
 +                    uint64_t *res_i1 = a + (uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)1U;
 +                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t10, t21, res_i1);
 +                    uint64_t t11 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)2U];
 +                    uint64_t t22 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)2U];
 +                    uint64_t *res_i2 = a + (uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)2U;
 +                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t11, t22, res_i2);
 +                    uint64_t t12 = b[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)3U];
 +                    uint64_t t2 = c[(uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)3U];
 +                    uint64_t *res_i = a + (uint32_t)4U * i + (uint32_t)3U;
 +                    c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t12, t2, res_i););
 +    {
 +        uint64_t t1 = b[8U];
 +        uint64_t t2 = c[8U];
 +        uint64_t *res_i = a + (uint32_t)8U;
 +        c1 = Lib_IntTypes_Intrinsics_sub_borrow_u64(c1, t1, t2, res_i);
 +    }
 +    uint64_t c10 = c1;
 +    return c10;
 +}
 +
 +static inline void
 +bn_from_bytes_be(uint64_t *a, uint8_t *b)
 +{
 +    uint8_t tmp[72U] = { 0U };
 +    memcpy(tmp + (uint32_t)6U, b, (uint32_t)66U * sizeof(uint8_t));
 +    KRML_MAYBE_FOR9(i,
 +                    (uint32_t)0U,
 +                    (uint32_t)9U,
 +                    (uint32_t)1U,
 +                    uint64_t *os = a;
 +                    uint64_t u = load64_be(tmp + ((uint32_t)9U - i - (uint32_t)1U) * (uint32_t)8U);
 +                    uint64_t x = u;
 +                    os[i] = x;);
 +}
 +
 +static inline void
 +p521_make_order(uint64_t *n)
 +{
 +    n[0U] = (uint64_t)0xbb6fb71e91386409U;
 +    n[1U] = (uint64_t)0x3bb5c9b8899c47aeU;
 +    n[2U] = (uint64_t)0x7fcc0148f709a5d0U;
 +    n[3U] = (uint64_t)0x51868783bf2f966bU;
 +    n[4U] = (uint64_t)0xfffffffffffffffaU;
 +    n[5U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
 +    n[6U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
 +    n[7U] = (uint64_t)0xffffffffffffffffU;
 +    n[8U] = (uint64_t)0x1ffU;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 +Private key validation.
 +
 +  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
 +
 +  The argument `private_key` points to 66 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[66].
 +
 +  The private key is valid:
 +    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
 +*/
 +bool
 +Hacl_P521_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key)
 +{
 +    uint64_t bn_sk[9U] = { 0U };
 +    bn_from_bytes_be(bn_sk, private_key);
 +    uint64_t tmp[9U] = { 0U };
 +    p521_make_order(tmp);
 +    uint64_t c = bn_sub(tmp, bn_sk, tmp);
 +    uint64_t is_lt_order = (uint64_t)0U - c;
 +    uint64_t bn_zero[9U] = { 0U };
 +    uint64_t res = bn_is_eq_mask(bn_sk, bn_zero);
 +    uint64_t is_eq_zero = res;
 +    uint64_t res0 = is_lt_order & ~is_eq_zero;
 +    return res0 == (uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFU;
 +}
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h.p384 ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h
 --- ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h.p384	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/verified/Hacl_P521.h	2024-01-09 11:49:58.651418444 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
 +/* MIT License
 + *
 + * Copyright (c) 2016-2022 INRIA, CMU and Microsoft Corporation
 + * Copyright (c) 2022-2023 HACL* Contributors
 + *
 + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
 + * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
 + * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
 + * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
 + * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
 + * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
 + *
 + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
 + * copies or substantial portions of the Software.
 + *
 + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
 + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
 + * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
 + * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
 + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
 + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
 + * SOFTWARE.
 + */
 +
 +#ifndef __Hacl_P521_H
 +#define __Hacl_P521_H
 +
 +#if defined(__cplusplus)
 +extern "C" {
 +#endif
 +
 +#include <string.h>
 +#include "krml/internal/types.h"
 +#include "krml/lowstar_endianness.h"
 +
 +#include "lib_intrinsics.h"
 +
 +/******************/
 +/* Key validation */
 +/******************/
 +
 +/**
 +Private key validation.
 +
 +  The function returns `true` if a private key is valid and `false` otherwise.
 +
 +  The argument `private_key` points to 66 bytes of valid memory, i.e., uint8_t[66].
 +
 +  The private key is valid:
 +    • 0 < `private_key` < the order of the curve
 +*/
 +bool Hacl_P521_validate_private_key(uint8_t *private_key);
 +
 +#if defined(__cplusplus)
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 +#define __Hacl_P521_H_DEFINED
 +#endif
--- a/SOURCES/nss_p521_hacl.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss_p521_hacl.patch
--- a/SPECS/nss.spec
+++ b/SPECS/nss.spec
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 %global nspr_build_version 4.35.0-1
 %global nspr_release -1
 %global nspr_version 4.35.0
-%global nss_version 3.90.0
+%global nss_version 3.101.0
 %global unsupported_tools_directory %{_libdir}/nss/unsupported-tools
 %global saved_files_dir %{_libdir}/nss/saved
 %global dracutlibdir %{_prefix}/lib/dracut
@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Source28:         nss-p11-kit.config
 # will have their own validation
 Source30:         fips_algorithms.h
-Source50:         NameConstraints_Certs.tar
+#Source50:         NameConstraints_Certs.tar
 # To inject hardening flags for DSO
 Patch1:           nss-dso-ldflags.patch
@ -129,67 +129,82 @@ Patch1:           nss-dso-ldflags.patch
 # Once the buildroot aha been bootstrapped the patch may be removed
 # but it doesn't hurt to keep it.
 Patch4:           iquote.patch
 #
 # RHEL-8 specific patches not in RHEL-9
 #
 # To revert the change in:
 # https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=818686
-Patch9:		  nss-sysinit-userdb.patch
+Patch10:	  nss-sysinit-userdb.patch
 # Disable nss-sysinit test which is solely to test the above change
-Patch10:          nss-skip-sysinit-gtests.patch
+Patch11:          nss-skip-sysinit-gtests.patch
 Patch15:          nss-3.90-extend-db-dump-time.patch
 # For compatibility reasons, we stick with the old PKCS #11 2.40
 # definition of CK_GCM_PARAMS:
 %if 0%{?fedora} < 34
 %if 0%{?rhel} < 9
-Patch20:          nss-gcm-param-default-pkcs11v2.patch
+Patch12:          nss-gcm-param-default-pkcs11v2.patch
 %endif
 %endif
 # Local patch: disable MD5 (also MD2 and MD4) completely
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1849938
 Patch25:          nss-disable-md5.patch
 # Local patch for TLS_ECDHE_{ECDSA|RSA}_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphers
-Patch30:          rhbz1185708-enable-ecc-3des-ciphers-by-default.patch
+Patch13:          rhbz1185708-enable-ecc-3des-ciphers-by-default.patch
 Patch34:          nss-3.71-fix-lto-gtests.patch
 # Local patch: disable Delegated Credentials
 Patch35:	  nss-disable-dc.patch
 # Local patch: ignore rsa, rsa-pss, ecdsa policies until crypto-policies
 # is updated.
-Patch40:          nss-3.66-disable-signature-policies.patch
+Patch14:          nss-3.101-disable-signature-policies.patch
 Patch15:          nss-3.101-el8-fix-rsa-policy-test.patch
 # Local patch: disable tests that require external reference so brew completes
-Patch45:          nss-3.66-disable-external-host-test.patch
+Patch16:          nss-3.66-disable-external-host-test.patch
 # Local patch: restore old pkcs 12 defaults on old version of rhel
-Patch50:          nss-3.66-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch
+Patch17:          nss-3.101-el8-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch
 # Local Patch: restore expired distrusted certs for now
-Patch51:          nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch
+Patch18:          nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch
 # Local Patch: update fipsdefaults to AES
-Patch52:          nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch
+Patch19:          nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch
-Patch53:          nss-3.71-camellia-pkcs12-doc.patch
+# Local Patch: curve25519 keys can't be stored in dbm databases,
-Patch54:          nss-3.90-disable-ech.patch
+# only rhel-8 has dbm databases left, don't try to store
 # curve25519 keys in the dbm database.
 Patch20:          nss-3.101-ec-dbm-test.patch
 # end of RHEL-8 specific patches
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1774659
+# RHEL-specific shared with RHEL-9
-Patch57:          nss-3.79-dbtool.patch
+Patch30:          nss-3.101-extend-db-dump-time.patch
-Patch58:          nss-3.79-fips.patch
+# Local patch: disable MD5 (also MD2 and MD4) completely
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1849938
 Patch32:          nss-3.101-disable-md5.patch
 Patch34:          nss-3.71-fix-lto-gtests.patch
 Patch35:          nss-3.71-camellia-pkcs12-doc.patch
 Patch36:          nss-3.101-disable-ech.patch
 # patches that expect to be upstreamed
 # https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1767883
 Patch50:          nss-3.79-fips.patch
 # https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1836781
 # https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1836925
-Patch60:          nss-3.90-DisablingASM.patch
+Patch51:          nss-3.101-fips-review.patches
-Patch61:          nss-3.79-fips-review.patches
+Patch52:          nss-3.90-pbkdf2-indicator.patch
 Patch62:          nss-3.90-no-dbm-25519.patch
 Patch63:          nss-3.90-pbkdf2-indicator.patch
 # ems policy. needs to upstream
-Patch70:          nss-3.90-add-ems-policy.patch
+Patch60:          nss-3.101-add-ems-policy.patch
 Patch70:          nss-3.90-fips-safe-memset.patch
 Patch71:          nss-3.101-fips-indicators.patch
 Patch72:          nss-3.90-aes-gmc-indicator.patch
 Patch73:          nss-3.90-fips-indicators2.patch
 Patch74:          nss-3.90-dh-test-update.patch
 Patch75:          nss-3.90-ppc_no_init.patch
 Patch76:          nss-3.101-enable-kyber-policy.patch
 Patch78:          nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-md5-decode.patch
 Patch80:          nss-3.101-el8-no-p12-smime-policy.patch
 Patch81:          nss-3.101-fix-missing-size-checks.patch
 # https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1905691
 Patch82:          nss-3.101-chacha-timing-fix.patch
 Patch83:          nss-3.101-add-certificate-compression-test.patch
 Patch84:          nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-pbkdf1-encoding.patch
 # https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=676100
 Patch85:          nss-3.101-fix-cms-abi-break.patch
 Patch86:          nss-3.101-long-pwd-fix.patch
 #revert patches
 Patch300:         nss-3.101-default-libpkix.patch
 Patch80:         blinding_ct.patch
 Patch81:         nss-3.90-fips-pkcs11-long-hash.patch
 Patch82:         nss-3.90-fips-safe-memset.patch
 Patch83:         nss-3.90-fips-indicators.patch
 Patch84:         nss-3.90-aes-gmc-indicator.patch
 Patch85:         nss-3.90-fips-indicators2.patch
 Patch86:         nss-3.90-dh-test-update.patch
 Patch90:         nss_p256_scalar_validated.patch
 Patch91:         nss_p384_scalar_validated.patch
 Patch92:         nss_p384_hacl.patch
 Patch93:         nss_p521_hacl.patch
 Patch94:         nss-3.90-ecc-wrap-fix.patch
 Patch95:         nss-3.90-ecdsa-sign-padding-fix.patch
 %description
 Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to
@ -319,7 +334,8 @@ Header and library files for doing development with Network Security Services.
 %prep
 %autosetup -N -n %{name}-%{nss_archive_version}
 pushd nss
-%autopatch -p1 
+%autopatch -M 299 -p1 
 %patch -P 300 -p1 -R
 popd
 # copy the fips_algorithms.h for this release
@ -328,9 +344,9 @@ popd
 cp %{SOURCE30} nss/lib/softoken/
 #update expired test certs
-pushd nss
+#pushd nss
-tar xvf %{SOURCE50}
+#tar xvf %{SOURCE50}
-popd
+#popd
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1247353
 find nss/lib/libpkix -perm /u+x -type f -exec chmod -x {} \;
@ -888,11 +904,13 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
 %{_includedir}/nss3/ciferfam.h
 %{_includedir}/nss3/eccutil.h
 %{_includedir}/nss3/hasht.h
 %{_includedir}/nss3/kyber.h
 %{_includedir}/nss3/nssb64.h
 %{_includedir}/nss3/nssb64t.h
-%{_includedir}/nss3/nsslocks.h
+%{_includedir}/nss3/nsshash.h
 %{_includedir}/nss3/nssilock.h
 %{_includedir}/nss3/nssilckt.h
 %{_includedir}/nss3/nsslocks.h
 %{_includedir}/nss3/nssrwlk.h
 %{_includedir}/nss3/nssrwlkt.h
 %{_includedir}/nss3/nssutil.h
@ -981,6 +999,26 @@ update-crypto-policies --no-reload &> /dev/null || :
 %changelog
 * Wed Sep 4 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-7
 - fix cms abi breakage
 - fix long password issue on pbmac encodings
 * Thu Aug 1 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-6
 - fix param encoding in pkcs12 pbamac encoding
 - add support for certificate compression in selfserv and tstclient
 * Wed Jul 24 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-3
 - Fix missing and inaccurate key length checks
 - Fix chacha timing issue
 * Wed Jul 17 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-2
 - Fix MD-5 decode issue in pkcs #12
 - turn off policy processing for pkcs12 and smime
 - update the restore defaults for pkcs12
 * Tue Jun 18 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-1
 - Rebase to NSS 3.101
 * Wed Apr 10 2024 Frantisek Krenzelok <krenzelok.frantisek@gmail.com> - 3.90.0-7
 - Allow for shorter ecdsa signatures by padding them to full length