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Related: RHEL-46852

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- Fix missing and inaccurate key length checks
This commit is contained in:
Robert Relyea 2024-07-25 14:16:05 -07:00
parent d8b27ada50
commit 3769bf7f69
2 changed files with 131 additions and 1 deletions
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126
nss-3.101-fix-missing-size-checks.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
--- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
+++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
@@ -371,16 +371,21 @@ static void GenerateWeakRsaKey(ScopedSEC
// Fail to connect with a weak RSA key.
TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
Reset(kPssDelegatorId);
EnsureTlsSetup();
static const SSLSignatureScheme kSchemes[] = {ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256};
client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
+ PRInt32 keySizeFlags;
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &keySizeFlags));
+ // turn off the signing key sizes so we actually test the ssl tests
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
+ NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG ));
#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
// save the MIN POLICY length.
PRInt32 minRsa;
ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minRsa));
#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS >= 2048
ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1024));
@@ -408,16 +413,17 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
client_->EnableDelegatedCredentials();
auto cfilter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionCapture>(
client_, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn);
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertInsufficientSecurity);
#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, minRsa));
#endif
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, keySizeFlags));
}
class ReplaceDCSigScheme : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
public:
ReplaceDCSigScheme(const std::shared_ptr<TlsAgent>& a)
: TlsHandshakeFilter(a, {ssl_hs_certificate_verify}) {}
protected:
diff --git a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
--- a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
+++ b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
@@ -1134,22 +1134,31 @@ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SE
return 0;
}
/* interpret modulus length as key strength */
switch (privk->keyType) {
case rsaKey:
case rsaPssKey:
case rsaOaepKey:
- /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
- * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary */
- bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
- if (bitSize == -1) {
- bitSize = 0;
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
+ CKA_MODULUS, NULL, &params);
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
+ /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
+ * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary. This
+ * method is less percise because it returns bytes instead
+ * bits, so we only do it if we can't get the modulus */
+ bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ if (bitSize == -1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return bitSize;
}
+ bitSize = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&params);
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
return bitSize;
case dsaKey:
case fortezzaKey:
case dhKey:
case keaKey:
rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
CKA_PRIME, NULL, &params);
if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
diff --git a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
--- a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+++ b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
@@ -1277,27 +1277,39 @@ ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(SSL3Hashes *h
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
goto done;
}
PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType);
int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key);
+ PRInt32 optval;
SECItem *params = NULL;
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams;
SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer,
(unsigned char *)&pssParams,
sizeof(pssParams) };
if (signatureLen <= 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
goto done;
}
+ /* since we are calling PK11_SignWithMechanism directly, we need to check the
+ * key policy ourselves (which is already checked in SGN_Digest */
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
+ if ((rv == SECSuccess) &&
+ ((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG)) {
+ rv = SECKEY_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType, SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(key),
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* error code already set */
+ }
+ }
buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen;
buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
if (!buf->data)
goto done; /* error code was set. */
if (useRsaPss) {
pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);

6
nss.spec
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
%global nss_version 3.101.0
%global nspr_version 4.35.0
%global baserelease 2
%global baserelease 3
%global nss_release %baserelease
# NOTE: To avoid NVR clashes of nspr* packages:
# use "%%global nspr_release %%[%%baserelease+n]" to handle offsets when
@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ Patch77: nss-3.101-fix-rsa-policy-test.patch
Patch78: nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-md5-decode.patch
Patch79: nss-3.101-el9-restore-old-pkcs12-default.patch
Patch80: nss-3.101-no-p12-smime-policy.patch
Patch81: nss-3.101-fix-missing-size-checks.patch
Patch100: nspr-config-pc.patch
Patch101: nspr-gcc-atomics.patch
@ -1192,6 +1193,9 @@ update-crypto-policies &> /dev/null || :
%changelog
* Wed Jul 24 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-3
- Fix missing and inaccurate key length checks
* Tue Jul 16 2024 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.101.0-2
- Fix MD-5 decode issue in pkcs #12
- turn off policy processing for pkcs12 and smime