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Rebase NSS 3.90 for Fireffox ESR 115

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Resolves: rhbz#2211858
This commit is contained in:
Robert Relyea 2023-07-26 16:40:08 -07:00
parent 09253f4bbb
commit 1ad49057af
17 changed files with 883 additions and 1732 deletions
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1
.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ SOURCES/nss-3.79.tar.gz
/blank-key4.db
/blank-secmod.db
/nss-3.79.tar.gz
/nss-3.90.tar.gz

92
cve-2023-0767.patch
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@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c b/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
--- a/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
+++ b/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
@@ -335,35 +335,42 @@
sec_PKCS12SafeContentsContext *safeContentsCtx =
(sec_PKCS12SafeContentsContext *)arg;
SEC_PKCS12DecoderContext *p12dcx;
SECStatus rv;
- /* make sure that we are not skipping the current safeBag,
- * and that there are no errors. If so, just return rather
- * than continuing to process.
- */
- if (!safeContentsCtx || !safeContentsCtx->p12dcx ||
- safeContentsCtx->p12dcx->error || safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag) {
+ if (!safeContentsCtx || !safeContentsCtx->p12dcx || !safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx) {
return;
}
p12dcx = safeContentsCtx->p12dcx;
+ /* make sure that there are no errors and we are not skipping the current safeBag */
+ if (p12dcx->error || safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
rv = SEC_ASN1DecoderUpdate(safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx, data, len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
p12dcx->errorValue = PORT_GetError();
+ p12dcx->error = PR_TRUE;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* The update may have set safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag, and we
+ * may not get another opportunity to clean up the decoder context.
+ */
+ if (safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag) {
goto loser;
}
return;
loser:
- /* set the error, and finish the decoder context. because there
+ /* Finish the decoder context. Because there
* is not a way of returning an error message, it may be worth
* while to do a check higher up and finish any decoding contexts
* that are still open.
*/
- p12dcx->error = PR_TRUE;
SEC_ASN1DecoderFinish(safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx);
safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx = NULL;
return;
}
diff --git a/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h b/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h
--- a/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h
+++ b/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h
@@ -71,10 +71,11 @@
SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag;
sec_PKCS12CertBag *certBag;
sec_PKCS12CRLBag *crlBag;
sec_PKCS12SecretBag *secretBag;
sec_PKCS12SafeContents *safeContents;
+ SECItem *unknownBag;
} safeBagContent;
sec_PKCS12Attribute **attribs;
/* used locally */
diff --git a/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c b/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c
--- a/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c
+++ b/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c
@@ -28,16 +28,16 @@
safeBag = (sec_PKCS12SafeBag *)src_or_dest;
oiddata = SECOID_FindOID(&safeBag->safeBagType);
if (oiddata == NULL) {
- return SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_AnyTemplate);
+ return SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_PointerToAnyTemplate);
}
switch (oiddata->offset) {
default:
- theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_AnyTemplate);
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_PointerToAnyTemplate);
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V1_KEY_BAG_ID:
theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SECKEY_PointerToPrivateKeyInfoTemplate);
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V1_CERT_BAG_ID:

168
fips_algorithms.h Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
/*
* Vendors should replace this header file with the file containing those
* algorithms which have NIST algorithm Certificates.
*/
/* handle special cases. Classes require existing code to already be
* in place for that class */
typedef enum {
SFTKFIPSNone = 0,
SFTKFIPSDH, /* allow only specific primes */
SFTKFIPSECC, /* not just keys but specific curves */
SFTKFIPSAEAD, /* single shot AEAD functions not allowed in FIPS mode */
SFTKFIPSRSAPSS
} SFTKFIPSSpecialClass;
typedef struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList;
struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr {
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type;
CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
CK_ULONG step;
SFTKFIPSSpecialClass special;
};
SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
/* A sample set of algorithms to allow basic testing in our continous
* testing infrastructure. The vendor version should replace this with
* a version that matches their algorithm testing and security policy */
/* NOTE, This looks a lot like the PKCS #11 mechanism list in pkcs11.c, it
* differs in the following ways:
* 1) the addition of step and class elements to help restrict
* the supported key sizes and types.
* 2) The mechanism flags are restricted to only those that map to
* fips approved operations.
* 3) All key sizes are in bits, independent of mechanism.
* 4) You can add more then one entry for the same mechanism to handle
* multiple descrete keys where the MIN/MAX/STEP semantics doesn't apply
* or where different operations have different key requirements.
* This table does not encode all the modules legal FIPS semantics, only
* those semantics that might possibly change due to algorithms dropping
* of the security policy late in the process. */
/* handy common flag types */
#define CKF_KPG CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR
#define CKF_GEN CKF_GENERATE
#define CKF_SGN (CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY)
#define CKF_ENC (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT | CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
#define CKF_KEK (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
#define CKF_KEA CKF_DERIVE
#define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
#define CKF_HSH CKF_DIGEST
#define CK_MAX 0xffffffffUL
/* mechanisms using the same key types share the same key type
* limits */
#define RSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
#define RSA_FB_STEP 1
#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY 1024, 1792 /* min, max */
#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP 256
#define DSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
#define DSA_FB_STEP 1024
#define DH_FB_KEY 2048, 8192 /* min, max */
#define DH_FB_STEP 1024
#define EC_FB_KEY 256, 521 /* min, max */
#define EC_FB_STEP 1 /* key limits handled by special operation */
#define AES_FB_KEY 128, 256
#define AES_FB_STEP 64
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* -------------- RSA Multipart Signing Operations -------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
/* ------------------------- DSA Operations --------------------------- */
{ CKM_DSA_SHA224, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA_SHA256, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA_SHA384, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA_SHA512, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* -------------------- Diffie Hellman Operations --------------------- */
{ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
{ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
/* -------------------- Elliptic Curve Operations --------------------- */
{ CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA224, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
/* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */
/* ------------------------- AES Operations --------------------------- */
{ CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_GEN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_ECB, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CBC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CMAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CTS, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CTR, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* --------------------- Secret Key Operations ------------------------ */
{ CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ---------------------- SSL/TLS operations ------------------------- */
{ CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- HKDF Operations -------------------------- */
{ CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 160, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 256, 512, CKF_GEN }, 128, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------ NIST 800-108 Key Derivations ------------------- */
{ CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
{ CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------ PBE Key Derivations ------------------- */
{ CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
};
const int SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_fips_mechs);

20
nss-3.66-disable-signature-policies.patch
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy 2021-06-03 10:08:49.988118880 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2021-06-03 10:16:26.059935708 -0700
@@ -391,12 +391,9 @@ static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy 2023-06-21 08:54:54.802785229 +0200
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2023-06-21 08:58:24.748282499 +0200
@@ -395,12 +395,9 @@ static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
/* Signatures */
{ CIPHER_NAME("DSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE,
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
};
typedef struct {
@@ -412,7 +409,7 @@ static const algListsDef algOptLists[] =
@@ -416,7 +413,7 @@ static const algListsDef algOptLists[] =
{ macOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(macOptList), "MAC", PR_FALSE },
{ cipherOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherOptList), "CIPHER", PR_FALSE },
{ kxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kxOptList), "OTHER-KX", PR_FALSE },
@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_signature_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
};
static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[] = {
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.policy_revert ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.policy_revert 2020-11-04 10:31:20.837715397 -0800
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2020-11-04 10:33:19.598357223 -0800
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.no_signature_policy 2023-06-21 09:00:17.720181306 +0200
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2023-06-21 09:00:55.637501208 +0200
@@ -193,7 +193,9 @@
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=all_allow=hmac-sha1:sha256:rsa-pkcs:rsa:des-ede3-cbc:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly Narrow
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=all_allow=md2/all:md4/all:md5/all:sha1/all:sha256/all:sha384/all:sha512/all:rsa-pkcs/all:rsa-pss/all:ecdsa/all:dsa/all:hmac-sha1/all:hmac-sha224/all:hmac-sha256/all:hmac-sha384/all:hmac-sha512/all:hmac-md5/all:camellia128-cbc/all:camellia192-cbc/all:camellia256-cbc/all:seed-cbc/all:des-ede3-cbc/all:des-40-cbc/all:des-cbc/all:null-cipher/all:rc2/all:rc4/all:idea/all:rsa/all:rsa-export/all:dhe-rsa/all:dhe-dss/all:ecdhe-ecdsa/all:ecdhe-rsa/all:ecdh-ecdsa/all:ecdh-rsa/all:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly
@ -37,6 +37,6 @@ diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.policy_revert ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
+# rsa-pkcs, rsa-pss, and ecdsa policy checking reverted in rhel8 for binary
+# compatibility reasons
+# 1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
# test default settings
# NOTE: tstclient will attempt to overide the defaults, so we detect we
# were successful by locking in our settings
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL

170
nss-3.79-dont-verify-default.patch
View File

@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c b/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
--- a/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
@@ -4272,16 +4272,17 @@ CreateTrust(void)
{
NSSLOWCERTTrust *trust = NULL;
nsslowcert_LockFreeList();
trust = trustListHead;
if (trust) {
trustListCount--;
trustListHead = trust->next;
+ trust->next = NULL;
}
PORT_Assert(trustListCount >= 0);
nsslowcert_UnlockFreeList();
if (trust) {
return trust;
}
return PORT_ZNew(NSSLOWCERTTrust);
@@ -5155,19 +5156,21 @@ done:
}
PRBool
nsslowcert_hasTrust(NSSLOWCERTCertTrust *trust)
{
if (trust == NULL) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
- return !((trust->sslFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN) &&
- (trust->emailFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN) &&
- (trust->objectSigningFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN));
+ /* if we only have CERTDB__USER and CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN bits, then
+ * we don't have a trust record. */
+ return !(((trust->sslFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0) &&
+ ((trust->emailFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0) &&
+ ((trust->objectSigningFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0));
}
/*
* This function has the logic that decides if another person's cert and
* email profile from an S/MIME message should be saved. It can deal with
* the case when there is no profile.
*/
static SECStatus
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
@@ -119,47 +119,79 @@ sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(CK_ATTRI
case CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED:
case CKA_NSS_OVERRIDE_EXTENSIONS:
return PR_TRUE;
default:
break;
}
return PR_FALSE;
}
-
/*
* convert a native ULONG to a database ulong. Database ulong's
* are all 4 byte big endian values.
*/
void
sftk_ULong2SDBULong(unsigned char *data, CK_ULONG value)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SDB_ULONG_SIZE; i++) {
data[i] = (value >> (SDB_ULONG_SIZE - 1 - i) * BBP) & 0xff;
}
}
/*
* convert a database ulong back to a native ULONG. (reverse of the above
- * function.
+ * function).
*/
static CK_ULONG
sftk_SDBULong2ULong(unsigned char *data)
{
int i;
CK_ULONG value = 0;
for (i = 0; i < SDB_ULONG_SIZE; i++) {
value |= (((CK_ULONG)data[i]) << (SDB_ULONG_SIZE - 1 - i) * BBP);
}
return value;
}
+/* certain trust records are default values, which are the values
+ * returned if the signature check fails anyway.
+ * In those cases, we can skip the signature check. */
+PRBool
+sftkdb_isNullTrust(const CK_ATTRIBUTE *template)
+{
+ switch (template->type) {
+ case CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH:
+ case CKA_TRUST_CLIENT_AUTH:
+ case CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION:
+ case CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING:
+ if (template->ulValueLen != SDB_ULONG_SIZE) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (sftk_SDBULong2ULong(template->pValue) ==
+ CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED:
+ if (template->ulValueLen != 1) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (*((unsigned char *)(template->pValue)) == 0) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
/*
* fix up the input templates. Our fixed up ints are stored in data and must
* be freed by the caller. The new template must also be freed. If there are no
* CK_ULONG attributes, the orignal template is passed in as is.
*/
static CK_ATTRIBUTE *
sftkdb_fixupTemplateIn(const CK_ATTRIBUTE *template, int count,
unsigned char **dataOut, int *dataOutSize)
@@ -410,17 +442,18 @@ sftkdb_fixupTemplateOut(CK_ATTRIBUTE *te
}
/* copy the plain text back into the template */
PORT_Memcpy(template[i].pValue, plainText->data, plainText->len);
template[i].ulValueLen = plainText->len;
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(plainText, PR_TRUE);
}
/* make sure signed attributes are valid */
- if (checkSig && sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(ntemplate[i].type)) {
+ if (checkSig && sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(ntemplate[i].type)
+ && !sftkdb_isNullTrust(&ntemplate[i])) {
SECStatus rv;
CK_RV local_crv;
SECItem signText;
SECItem plainText;
unsigned char signData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
signText.data = signData;
signText.len = sizeof(signData);
@@ -2387,16 +2420,18 @@ sftkdb_mergeObject(SFTKDBHandle *handle,
crv = (*source->sdb_GetAttributeValue)(source, id,
ptemplate, max_attributes);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto loser;
}
objectType = sftkdb_getULongFromTemplate(CKA_CLASS, ptemplate,
max_attributes);
+/*printf(" - merging object Type 0x%08lx id=0x%08lx updateID=%s\n", objectType, id,
+ handle->updateID?handle->updateID: "<NULL>");*/
/*
* Update Object updates the object template if necessary then returns
* whether or not we need to actually write the object out to our target
* database.
*/
if (!handle->updateID) {
crv = sftkdb_CreateObject(arena, handle, target, &newID,

522
nss-3.79-enable-POST-rerun.patch
View File

@ -1,522 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c b/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
--- a/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
+++ b/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
@@ -3870,17 +3870,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
rv = blapi_selftest(modesToTest, numModesToTest, inoff, outoff,
encrypt, decrypt);
PORT_Free(cipherInfo);
return rv == SECSuccess ? 0 : 1;
}
/* Do FIPS self-test */
if (bltest.commands[cmd_FIPS].activated) {
- CK_RV ckrv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK();
+ CK_RV ckrv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE);
fprintf(stdout, "CK_RV: %ld.\n", ckrv);
PORT_Free(cipherInfo);
if (ckrv == CKR_OK)
return SECSuccess;
return SECFailure;
}
/*
diff --git a/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c b/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
--- a/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
+++ b/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
@@ -318,23 +318,25 @@ static PRBool verbose = PR_FALSE;
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
CK_C_GetFunctionList pC_GetFunctionList;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFunctionList;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS initArgs;
+ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS initArgsRerun; /* rerun selftests */
CK_SLOT_ID *pSlotList = NULL;
CK_TOKEN_INFO tokenInfo;
CK_ULONG slotID = 0; /* slotID == 0 for FIPSMODE */
CK_UTF8CHAR *pwd = NULL;
CK_ULONG pwdLen = 0;
char *moduleSpec = NULL;
+ char *moduleSpecRerun = NULL;
char *configDir = NULL;
char *dbPrefix = NULL;
char *disableUnload = NULL;
PRBool doForkTests = PR_TRUE;
PLOptStatus os;
PLOptState *opt = PL_CreateOptState(argc, argv, "nvhf:Fd:p:");
while (PL_OPT_EOL != (os = PL_GetNextOpt(opt))) {
@@ -458,18 +460,23 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
initArgs.CreateMutex = NULL;
initArgs.DestroyMutex = NULL;
initArgs.LockMutex = NULL;
initArgs.UnlockMutex = NULL;
initArgs.flags = CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK;
moduleSpec = PR_smprintf("configdir='%s' certPrefix='%s' "
"keyPrefix='%s' secmod='secmod.db' flags= ",
configDir, dbPrefix, dbPrefix);
+ moduleSpecRerun = PR_smprintf("configdir='%s' certPrefix='%s' "
+ "keyPrefix='%s' secmod='secmod.db' flags=forcePOST ",
+ configDir, dbPrefix, dbPrefix);
initArgs.LibraryParameters = (CK_CHAR_PTR *)moduleSpec;
initArgs.pReserved = NULL;
+ initArgsRerun = initArgs;
+ initArgsRerun.LibraryParameters = (CK_CHAR_PTR *)moduleSpecRerun;
/*DebugBreak();*/
/* FIPSMODE invokes FC_Initialize as pFunctionList->C_Initialize */
/* NSS cryptographic module library initialization for the FIPS */
/* Approved mode when FC_Initialize is envoked will perfom */
/* software integrity test, and power-up self-tests before */
/* FC_Initialize returns */
crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgs);
@@ -705,17 +712,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
PKM_Error("PKM_HybridMode failed with 0x%08X, %-26s\n", crv,
PKM_CK_RVtoStr(crv));
goto cleanup;
}
if (doForkTests) {
/* testing one more C_Initialize / C_Finalize to exercise getpid()
* fork check code */
- crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgs);
+ crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgsRerun);
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
PKM_LogIt("C_Initialize succeeded\n");
} else {
PKM_Error("C_Initialize failed with 0x%08X, %-26s\n", crv,
PKM_CK_RVtoStr(crv));
goto cleanup;
}
crv = pFunctionList->C_Finalize(NULL);
@@ -741,16 +748,19 @@ cleanup:
free(configDir);
}
if (dbPrefix) {
free(dbPrefix);
}
if (moduleSpec) {
PR_smprintf_free(moduleSpec);
}
+ if (moduleSpecRerun) {
+ PR_smprintf_free(moduleSpecRerun);
+ }
#ifdef _WIN32
FreeLibrary(hModule);
#else
disableUnload = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_DISABLE_UNLOAD");
if (!disableUnload) {
PR_UnloadLibrary(lib);
}
diff --git a/lib/freebl/blapii.h b/lib/freebl/blapii.h
--- a/lib/freebl/blapii.h
+++ b/lib/freebl/blapii.h
@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ typedef SECStatus (*freeblAeadFunc)(void
void *params, unsigned int paramsLen,
const unsigned char *aad, unsigned int aadLen,
unsigned int blocksize);
typedef void (*freeblDestroyFunc)(void *cx, PRBool freeit);
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
-SECStatus BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freeblOnly);
+SECStatus BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freeblOnly, PRBool rerun);
PRBool BL_POSTRan(PRBool freeblOnly);
#endif
#if defined(XP_UNIX) && !defined(NO_FORK_CHECK)
extern PRBool bl_parentForkedAfterC_Initialize;
#define SKIP_AFTER_FORK(x) \
diff --git a/lib/freebl/blapit.h b/lib/freebl/blapit.h
--- a/lib/freebl/blapit.h
+++ b/lib/freebl/blapit.h
@@ -223,16 +223,21 @@ typedef int __BLAPI_DEPRECATED __attribu
*
* If we arbitrarily set p = 10^-18 (1 chance in trillion trillion operation)
* we get GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS = -(-18)/.301 -1 = 59 (.301 = log10 2)
* GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS should be at least 59, call it a round 64. NOTE:
* the variable IV size for TLS is 64 bits, which explains why it's not safe
* to use a random value for the nonce in TLS. */
#define GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS 64
+/* flag to tell BLAPI_Verify* to rerun the post and integrity tests */
+#define BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG '\377' /* 0xff, 255 invalide code for UFT8/ASCII */
+#define BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING "\377" /* The above as a C string */
+
+
/***************************************************************************
** Opaque objects
*/
struct DESContextStr;
struct RC2ContextStr;
struct RC4ContextStr;
struct RC5ContextStr;
diff --git a/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c b/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
--- a/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
@@ -2211,29 +2211,37 @@ bl_startup_tests(void)
}
/*
* this is called from the freebl init entry points that controll access to
* all other freebl functions. This prevents freebl from operating if our
* power on selftest failed.
*/
SECStatus
-BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freebl_only)
+BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freebl_only, PRBool rerun)
{
#ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
/* this should only be set on platforms that can't handle one of the INIT
* schemes. This code allows those platforms to continue to function,
* though they don't meet the strict NIST requirements. If NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
* is not set, and init support has not been properly enabled, freebl
* will always fail because of the test below
*/
if (!self_tests_freebl_ran) {
bl_startup_tests();
}
#endif
+ if (rerun) {
+ /* reset the flags */
+ self_tests_freebl_ran = PR_FALSE;
+ self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
+ self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
+ self_tests_freebl_success = PR_FALSE;
+ bl_startup_tests();
+ }
/* if the general self tests succeeded, we're done */
if (self_tests_success) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* standalone freebl can initialize */
if (freebl_only && self_tests_freebl_success) {
return SECSuccess;
}
diff --git a/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c b/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
--- a/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
@@ -55,17 +55,17 @@ NSSLOW_Init(void)
#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
(void)FREEBL_InitStubs();
#endif
#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
/* make sure the FIPS product is installed if we are trying to
* go into FIPS mode */
if (nsslow_GetFIPSEnabled()) {
- if (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) {
+ if (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
post_failed = PR_TRUE;
return NULL;
}
}
#endif
post_failed = PR_FALSE;
diff --git a/lib/freebl/shvfy.c b/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
--- a/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
@@ -282,52 +282,62 @@ readItem(PRFileDesc *fd, SECItem *item)
PORT_Free(item->data);
item->data = NULL;
item->len = 0;
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
-static PRBool blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self);
+static PRBool blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun);
static PRBool
-blapi_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr, PRBool self)
+blapi_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
{
PRBool result = PR_FALSE; /* if anything goes wrong,
* the signature does not verify */
/* find our shared library name */
char *shName = PR_GetLibraryFilePathname(name, addr);
if (!shName) {
goto loser;
}
- result = blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, self);
+ result = blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, self, rerun);
loser:
if (shName != NULL) {
PR_Free(shName);
}
return result;
}
PRBool
BLAPI_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr)
{
- return blapi_SHVerify(name, addr, PR_FALSE);
+ PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
+ if (name && *name == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
+ name++;
+ rerun = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return blapi_SHVerify(name, addr, PR_FALSE, rerun);
}
PRBool
BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
{
- return blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, PR_FALSE);
+ PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
+ if (shName && *shName == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
+ shName++;
+ rerun = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, PR_FALSE, rerun);
}
static PRBool
-blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self)
+blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
{
char *checkName = NULL;
PRFileDesc *checkFD = NULL;
PRFileDesc *shFD = NULL;
void *hashcx = NULL;
const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL;
SECItem signature = { 0, NULL, 0 };
SECItem hash;
@@ -346,17 +356,17 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
unsigned char hashBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
hash.data = hashBuf;
hash.len = sizeof(hashBuf);
/* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
* integrity checks to prevent any token going into FIPS mode. */
- if (!self && (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)) {
+ if (!self && (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE, rerun) != SECSuccess)) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
if (!shName) {
goto loser;
}
/* figure out the name of our check file */
@@ -536,17 +546,17 @@ BLAPI_VerifySelf(const char *name)
{
if (name == NULL) {
/*
* If name is NULL, freebl is statically linked into softoken.
* softoken will call BLAPI_SHVerify next to verify itself.
*/
return PR_TRUE;
}
- return blapi_SHVerify(name, (PRFuncPtr)decodeInt, PR_TRUE);
+ return blapi_SHVerify(name, (PRFuncPtr)decodeInt, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE);
}
#else /* NSS_FIPS_DISABLED */
PRBool
BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
{
return PR_FALSE;
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
--- a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
@@ -684,22 +684,25 @@ sftk_fips_HKDF_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
static PRBool sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_FALSE;
static PRBool sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
/*
* This function is called at dll load time, the code tha makes this
* happen is platform specific on defined above.
*/
-static void
-sftk_startup_tests(void)
+void sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PRBool rerun)
{
SECStatus rv;
- const char *libraryName = SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
-
+ /*const char *nlibraryName = SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
+ const char *rlibraryName = BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME; */
+ const char *libraryName = rerun ?
+ BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME :
+ SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
+
PORT_Assert(!sftk_self_tests_ran);
PORT_Assert(!sftk_self_tests_success);
sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_TRUE;
sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE; /* just in case */
/* need to initiallize the oid library before the RSA tests */
rv = SECOID_Init();
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
@@ -746,35 +749,46 @@ sftk_startup_tests(void)
rv = sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests();
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return;
}
sftk_self_tests_success = PR_TRUE;
}
+static void
+sftk_startup_tests(void)
+{
+ sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PR_FALSE);
+}
+
/*
* this is called from nsc_Common_Initizialize entry points that gates access
* to * all other pkcs11 functions. This prevents softoken operation if our
* power on selftest failed.
*/
CK_RV
-sftk_FIPSEntryOK()
+sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool rerun)
{
#ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
/* this should only be set on platforms that can't handle one of the INIT
* schemes. This code allows those platforms to continue to function,
* though they don't meet the strict NIST requirements. If NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
* is not set, and init support has not been properly enabled, softken
* will always fail because of the test below
*/
if (!sftk_self_tests_ran) {
sftk_startup_tests();
}
#endif
+ if (rerun) {
+ sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_FALSE;
+ sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
+ sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PR_TRUE);
+ }
if (!sftk_self_tests_success) {
return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
return CKR_OK;
}
#else
#include "pkcs11t.h"
CK_RV
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c b/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
--- a/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
@@ -524,25 +524,32 @@ fc_log_init_error(CK_RV crv)
}
/* FC_Initialize initializes the PKCS #11 library. */
CK_RV
FC_Initialize(CK_VOID_PTR pReserved)
{
const char *envp;
CK_RV crv;
+ PRBool rerun;
if ((envp = PR_GetEnv("NSS_ENABLE_AUDIT")) != NULL) {
sftk_audit_enabled = (atoi(envp) == 1);
}
+ /* if we have the forcePOST flag on, rerun the integrity checks */
+ /* we need to know this before we fully parse the arguments in
+ * nsc_CommonInitialize, so read it now */
+ rerun = sftk_RawArgHasFlag("flags", "forcePost", pReserved);
+
/* At this point we should have already done post and integrity checks.
* if we haven't, it probably means the FIPS product has not been installed
- * or the tests failed. Don't let an application try to enter FIPS mode */
- crv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK();
+ * or the tests failed. Don't let an application try to enter FIPS mode. This
+ * also forces the tests to be rerun if forcePOST is set. */
+ crv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK(rerun);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
fc_log_init_error(crv);
return crv;
}
sftk_ForkReset(pReserved, &crv);
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
@@ -869,16 +869,17 @@ extern CK_RV sftk_MechAllowsOperation(CK
* acquiring a reference to the keydb from the slot */
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *sftk_FindKeyByPublicKey(SFTKSlot *slot, SECItem *dbKey);
/*
* parameter parsing functions
*/
CK_RV sftk_parseParameters(char *param, sftk_parameters *parsed, PRBool isFIPS);
void sftk_freeParams(sftk_parameters *params);
+PRBool sftk_RawArgHasFlag(const char *entry, const char *flag, const void *pReserved);
/*
* narrow objects
*/
SFTKSessionObject *sftk_narrowToSessionObject(SFTKObject *);
SFTKTokenObject *sftk_narrowToTokenObject(SFTKObject *);
/*
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c b/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
@@ -244,8 +244,21 @@ sftk_freeParams(sftk_parameters *params)
FREE_CLEAR(params->configdir);
FREE_CLEAR(params->secmodName);
FREE_CLEAR(params->man);
FREE_CLEAR(params->libdes);
FREE_CLEAR(params->tokens);
FREE_CLEAR(params->updatedir);
FREE_CLEAR(params->updateID);
}
+
+PRBool
+sftk_RawArgHasFlag(const char *entry, const char *flag, const void *pReserved)
+{
+ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *init_args = (CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *)pReserved;
+
+ /* if we don't have any params, the flag isn't set */
+ if ((!init_args || !init_args->LibraryParameters)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag(entry, flag, (const char *)init_args->LibraryParameters);
+}
diff --git a/lib/softoken/softoken.h b/lib/softoken/softoken.h
--- a/lib/softoken/softoken.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/softoken.h
@@ -52,17 +52,17 @@ extern unsigned char *CBC_PadBuffer(PLAr
unsigned int inlen, unsigned int *outlen,
int blockSize);
/****************************************/
/*
** Power-Up selftests are required for FIPS.
*/
/* make sure Power-up selftests have been run. */
-extern CK_RV sftk_FIPSEntryOK(void);
+extern CK_RV sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool rerun);
/*
** make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
*/
unsigned long sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType);
/*
** FIPS 140-2 auditing

497
nss-3.79-fips-review.patches Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,497 @@
diff -up ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review ./lib/freebl/dh.c
--- ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/dh.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.453233170 -0700
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ cleanup:
PRBool
KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, SECItem *subPrime)
{
- mp_int p, q, y, r;
+ mp_int p, q, y, r, psub1;
mp_err err;
int cmp = 1; /* default is false */
if (!Y || !prime || !subPrime) {
@@ -456,13 +456,30 @@ KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, S
MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&y) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
+ MP_DIGITS(&psub1) = 0;
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&y));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&psub1));
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*prime, &p);
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*subPrime, &q);
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*Y, &y);
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&p, 1, &psub1));
+ /*
+ * We check that the public value isn't zero (which isn't in the
+ * group), one (subgroup of order one) or p-1 (subgroup of order 2). We
+ * also check that the public value is less than p, to avoid being fooled
+ * by values like p+1 or 2*p-1.
+ * This check is required by SP-800-56Ar3. It's also done in derive,
+ * but this is only called in various FIPS cases, so put it here to help
+ * reviewers find it.
+ */
+ if (mp_cmp_d(&y, 1) <= 0 ||
+ mp_cmp(&y, &psub1) >= 0) {
+ err = MP_BADARG;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
/* compute r = y**q mod p */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&y, &q, &p, &r));
/* compare to 1 */
@@ -472,6 +489,7 @@ cleanup:
mp_clear(&q);
mp_clear(&y);
mp_clear(&r);
+ mp_clear(&psub1);
if (err) {
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
return PR_FALSE;
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review 2023-06-12 15:29:04.096403884 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
@@ -4785,6 +4785,10 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
* handle the base object stuff
*/
crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+ /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
+ * key length against fips requirements */
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
@@ -4792,9 +4796,6 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
- /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
- * fips requirements */
- key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
*phKey = key->handle;
}
@@ -5098,60 +5099,67 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
if (isDerivable) {
SFTKAttribute *pubAttribute = NULL;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKey;
PRBool isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
- CK_RV crv2;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
- CK_KEY_TYPE generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
- CK_ULONG keyLen = 128;
- CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
- { CKA_CLASS, &secret, sizeof(secret) },
- { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &generic, sizeof(generic) },
- { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) },
- { CKA_DERIVE, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue) }
- };
- CK_ULONG templateCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template);
- CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS ecParams;
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lowPrivKey = NULL;
+ ECPrivateKey *ecPriv;
+ SECItem *lowPubValue = NULL;
+ SECItem item;
+ SECStatus rv;
crv = CKR_OK; /*paranoia, already get's set before we drop to the end */
- /* FIPS 140-2 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key.
- * The easiest way to do this is to do a derive operation, which checks
- * the validity of the key */
-
+ /* FIPS 140-3 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key
+ * by recalculating the public can an compare it to our own public
+ * key. */
+ lowPrivKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(privateKey, keyType, &crv);
+ if (lowPrivKey == NULL) {
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ }
+ /* recalculate the public key from the private key */
switch (keyType) {
- case CKK_DH:
- mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
- pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
- if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
- }
- mech.pParameter = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
- mech.ulParameterLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
- break;
- case CKK_EC:
- mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
- pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
- if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
- }
- ecParams.kdf = CKD_NULL;
- ecParams.ulSharedDataLen = 0;
- ecParams.pSharedData = NULL;
- ecParams.ulPublicDataLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
- ecParams.pPublicData = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
- mech.pParameter = &ecParams;
- mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ecParams);
- break;
- default:
- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ case CKK_DH:
+ rv = DH_Derive(&lowPrivKey->u.dh.base, &lowPrivKey->u.dh.prime,
+ &lowPrivKey->u.dh.privateValue, &item, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&item);
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&item, PR_FALSE);
+ pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
+ break;
+ case CKK_EC:
+ rv = EC_NewKeyFromSeed(&lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPriv,
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.data,
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ /* make sure it has the same encoding */
+ if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
+ lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
+ } else {
+ lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));;
+ }
+ pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
+ /* clear out our generated private key */
+ PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
-
- crv = NSC_DeriveKey(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle, template, templateCount, &newKey);
- if (crv != CKR_OK) {
- sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
- return crv;
+ /* now compare new public key with our already generated key */
+ if ((pubAttribute == NULL) || (lowPubValue == NULL) ||
+ (pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen != lowPubValue->len) ||
+ (PORT_Memcmp(pubAttribute->attrib.pValue, lowPubValue->data,
+ lowPubValue->len) != 0)) {
+ if (pubAttribute) sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
+ if (lowPubValue) SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
+
/* FIPS requires full validation, but in fipx mode NSC_Derive
* only does partial validation with approved primes, now handle
* full validation */
@@ -5159,44 +5167,78 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
SECItem pubKey;
SECItem prime;
SECItem subPrime;
+ SECItem base;
+ SECItem generator;
const SECItem *subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
pubKey.data = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
pubKey.len = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
- prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
- prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
+ base.data = prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
+ base.len = prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto done;
}
- crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &base, privateKey, CKA_BASE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto done;
+ }
/* we ignore the return code an only look at the length */
- if (subPrime.len == 0) {
- /* subprime not supplied, In this case look it up.
- * This only works with approved primes, but in FIPS mode
- * that's the only kine of prime that will get here */
- subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, isFIPS);
- if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
- crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ /* do we have a known prime ? */
+ subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, &generator, isFIPS);
+ if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
+ if (subPrime.len == 0) {
+ /* if not a known prime, subprime must be supplied */
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ /* not a known prime, check for primality of prime
+ * and subPrime */
+ if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&prime)) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&subPrime)) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* if we aren't using a defined group, make sure base is in the
+ * subgroup. If it's not, then our key could fail or succeed sometimes.
+ * This makes the failure reliable */
+ if (!KEA_Verify(&base, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+ subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
+ } else {
+ /* we're using a known group, make sure we are using the known generator for that group */
+ if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&generator, &base) != 0) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
goto done;
}
+ if (subPrime.len != 0) {
+ /* we have a known prime and a supplied subPrime,
+ * make sure the subPrime matches the subPrime for
+ * the known Prime */
+ if (SECITEM_CompareItem(subPrimePtr, &subPrime) != 0) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
}
if (!KEA_Verify(&pubKey, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
- crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
}
done:
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&base, PR_FALSE);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&subPrime, PR_FALSE);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&prime, PR_FALSE);
}
/* clean up before we return */
sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
- crv2 = NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, newKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
return crv;
}
- if (crv2 != CKR_OK) {
- return crv2;
- }
}
return CKR_OK;
@@ -5714,8 +5756,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
* created and linked.
*/
crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
- sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
@@ -5757,6 +5799,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
@@ -5766,6 +5809,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
/* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
@@ -8386,7 +8431,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
/* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
* checks. */
- subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, isFIPS);
+ subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, NULL, isFIPS);
if (subPrime == NULL) {
SECItem dhSubPrime;
/* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
@@ -8568,6 +8613,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
secretlen = tmp.len;
} else {
secretlen = keySize;
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
&tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c.fips-review 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
@@ -4625,7 +4625,10 @@ NSC_CreateObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSess
if (object == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
- object->isFIPS = PR_FALSE; /* if we created the object on the fly,
+ /* object types that we aren't allowed to create in FIPS mode are
+ * already rejected explicitly. If we get here, then the object is
+ * FIPS OK (most notably public key objects )*/
+ /* object->isFIPS = PR_FALSE; if we created the object on the fly,
* it's not a FIPS object */
/*
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review 2023-06-12 15:29:04.097403894 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h 2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
/* dh verify functions */
/* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes, and if so return
* it's subprime value */
-const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS);
+const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *generator, PRBool isFIPS);
/* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
/* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review 2023-06-12 15:29:04.097403894 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.454233181 -0700
@@ -2403,15 +2403,27 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
switch (mechInfo->special) {
case SFTKFIPSDH: {
SECItem dhPrime;
+ SECItem dhBase;
+ SECItem dhGenerator;
+ PRBool val = PR_FALSE;
const SECItem *dhSubPrime;
CK_RV crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime,
source, CKA_PRIME);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
- dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, PR_TRUE);
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhBase, source, CKA_BASE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, &dhGenerator, PR_TRUE);
+ val = (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+ if (val && (SECITEM_CompareItem(&dhBase, &dhGenerator) != 0)) {
+ val = PR_FALSE;
+ }
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
- return (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhBase, PR_FALSE);
+ return val;
}
case SFTKFIPSNone:
return PR_FALSE;
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.455233191 -0700
@@ -6726,11 +6726,20 @@ static const SECItem subprime_tls_8192 =
(unsigned char *)subprime_tls_8192_data,
sizeof(subprime_tls_8192_data) };
+/* generator for all the groups is 2 */
+static const unsigned char generator_2_data[] = { 2 };
+
+
+static const SECItem generator_2 =
+ { siBuffer,
+ (unsigned char *)generator_2_data,
+ sizeof(generator_2_data) };
+
/*
* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes
*/
const SECItem *
-sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS)
+sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *g, PRBool isFIPS)
{
/* use the length to decide which primes to check */
switch (dhPrime->len) {
@@ -6741,56 +6750,67 @@ sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PR
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_1536,
sizeof(prime_ike_1536)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_1536;
}
break;
case 2048 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_2048,
sizeof(prime_tls_2048)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_tls_2048;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_2048,
sizeof(prime_ike_2048)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_2048;
}
break;
case 3072 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_3072,
sizeof(prime_tls_3072)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_tls_3072;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_3072,
sizeof(prime_ike_3072)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_3072;
}
break;
case 4096 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_4096,
sizeof(prime_tls_4096)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_tls_4096;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_4096,
sizeof(prime_ike_4096)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_4096;
}
break;
case 6144 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_6144,
sizeof(prime_tls_6144)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_tls_6144;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_6144,
sizeof(prime_ike_6144)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_6144;
}
break;
case 8192 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_8192,
sizeof(prime_tls_8192)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_tls_8192;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_8192,
sizeof(prime_ike_8192)) == 0) {
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
return &subprime_ike_8192;
}
break;
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c 2023-06-12 15:30:23.455233191 -0700
@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
goto fail;
}
} else {
+ /* ikev1 isn't validated, if we use this function in ikev1 mode,
+ * mark the resulting key as not FIPS */
+ if (!params->bRekey) {
+ outKey->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {

172
nss-3.79-fips.patch
View File

@ -160,178 +160,19 @@ diff --git a/lib/softoken/config.mk b/lib/softoken/config.mk
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
+endif
+
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h b/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
--- a/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/fips_algorithms.h
@@ -49,33 +49,46 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[]
#define CKF_KEK (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
#define CKF_KEA CKF_DERIVE
#define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
#define CKF_HSH CKF_DIGEST
#define CK_MAX 0xffffffffUL
/* mechanisms using the same key types share the same key type
* limits */
#define RSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
-#define RSA_FB_STEP 1024
+#define RSA_FB_STEP 1
+#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY 1024, 1792 /* min, max */
+#define RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP 256
+
#define DSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
#define DSA_FB_STEP 1024
#define DH_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
#define DH_FB_STEP 1024
#define EC_FB_KEY 256, 521 /* min, max */
#define EC_FB_STEP 1 /* key limits handled by special operation */
#define AES_FB_KEY 128, 256
#define AES_FB_STEP 64
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+
/* -------------- RSA Multipart Signing Operations -------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- DSA Operations --------------------------- */
{ CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, { DSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
@@ -95,76 +108,73 @@ SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[]
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
{ CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
/* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */
/* ------------------------- AES Operations --------------------------- */
{ CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_GEN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_ECB, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CBC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_MAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CMAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CTS, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_CTR, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96, { 96, 96, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC, { 128, 128, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA256, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 128, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 128, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 192, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 192, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 256, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 256, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* --------------------- Secret Key Operations ------------------------ */
- { CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 8, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ---------------------- SSL/TLS operations ------------------------- */
{ CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 224, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION, { 128, 256, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION, { 192, 284, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION, { 256, 512, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 256, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 284, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION, { 112, 512, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, { 8, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 8, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* sigh, is this algorithm really tested. ssl doesn't seem to have a
* way of turning the extension off */
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------------- HKDF Operations -------------------------- */
- { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 8, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 160, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 256, 512, CKF_GEN }, 128, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------ NIST 800-108 Key Derivations ------------------- */
- { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 0, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
- { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
- { CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE, { 8, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
/* ------------------ PBE Key Derivations ------------------- */
- { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 1, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
+ { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA224_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 224, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA256_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 256, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA384_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
{ CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA512_HMAC_KEY_GEN, { 512, 512, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone }
};
const int SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_fips_mechs);
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
@@ -1765,27 +1765,29 @@ SECStatus
sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
{
SECItem *result;
SECItem inKey;
NSSPKCS5PBEParameter pbe_params;
@@ -1766,16 +1766,20 @@ sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
unsigned char iteration_count = 5;
unsigned char keyLen = 64;
char *inKeyData = TEST_KEY;
- static const unsigned char saltData[] =
- { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
- static const unsigned char saltData[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
+ static const unsigned char saltData[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
+ };
+
static const unsigned char pbkdf_known_answer[] = {
- 0x31, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x39, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x29,
- 0x68, 0xac, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x9c,
@ -350,13 +191,8 @@ diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
+ 0x17, 0x97, 0x73, 0x75, 0x7b, 0x88, 0x49, 0xd8,
+ 0x6f, 0x78, 0x5a, 0xde, 0x50, 0x20, 0x55, 0x33
};
sftk_PBELockInit();
inKey.data = (unsigned char *)inKeyData;
inKey.len = sizeof(TEST_KEY) - 1;
pbe_params.salt.data = (unsigned char *)saltData;
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c

23
nss-3.79-fix-client-cert-crash.patch
View File

@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/lib/ssl/authcert.c b/lib/ssl/authcert.c
--- a/lib/ssl/authcert.c
+++ b/lib/ssl/authcert.c
@@ -201,16 +201,19 @@ NSS_GetClientAuthData(void *arg,
/* otherwise look through the cache based on usage
* if chosenNickname is set, we ignore the expiration date */
if (certList == NULL) {
certList = CERT_FindUserCertsByUsage(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
certUsageSSLClient,
PR_FALSE, chosenNickName == NULL,
pw_arg);
+ if (certList == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
/* filter only the certs that meet the nickname requirements */
if (chosenNickName) {
rv = CERT_FilterCertListByNickname(certList, chosenNickName,
pw_arg);
} else {
int nnames = 0;
char **names = ssl_DistNamesToStrings(caNames, &nnames);
rv = CERT_FilterCertListByCANames(certList, nnames, names,

22
nss-3.79-increase-pbe-cache.patch
View File

@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
@@ -565,17 +565,17 @@ struct KDFCacheItemStr {
int iterations;
int keyLen;
};
typedef struct KDFCacheItemStr KDFCacheItem;
/* Bug 1606992 - Cache the hash result for the common case that we're
* asked to repeatedly compute the key for the same password item,
* hash, iterations and salt. */
-#define KDF2_CACHE_COUNT 3
+#define KDF2_CACHE_COUNT 150
static struct {
PZLock *lock;
struct {
KDFCacheItem common;
int ivLen;
PRBool faulty3DES;
} cacheKDF1;
struct {

21
nss-3.79-pkcs12-fix-null-password.patch
View File

@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.fix_null_password ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
--- ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.fix_null_password 2022-07-20 14:15:45.081009438 -0700
+++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c 2022-07-20 14:19:40.856546963 -0700
@@ -968,15 +968,14 @@ sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(PLAre
if (zeroTerm) {
/* unicode adds two nulls at the end */
if (toUnicode) {
- if ((dest->len >= 2) &&
- (dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2])) {
+ if ((dest->len < 2) || dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2]) {
/* we've already allocated space for these new NULLs */
PORT_Assert(dest->len + 2 <= bufferSize);
dest->len += 2;
dest->data[dest->len - 1] = dest->data[dest->len - 2] = 0;
}
/* ascii/utf-8 adds just 1 */
- } else if ((dest->len >= 1) && dest->data[dest->len - 1]) {
+ } else if (!dest->len || dest->data[dest->len - 1]) {
PORT_Assert(dest->len + 1 <= bufferSize);
dest->len++;
dest->data[dest->len - 1] = 0;

685
nss-3.79-rhel-8-fips-signature-policy.patch
View File

@ -1,685 +0,0 @@
diff -up ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c.sign_policy ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c
--- ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.023785628 -0700
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
#include "sechash.h"
#endif
-#define MAX_KEY_LEN 512
+#define MAX_KEY_LEN 1024
#define PATH_LEN 150
#define BUFF_SIZE 150
#define UID_BITS 800
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc.sign_policy ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc
--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "secerr.h"
#include "sechash.h"
#include "pk11_signature_test.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
#include "testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha224-vectors.h"
#include "testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha256-vectors.h"
@@ -109,7 +110,11 @@ class Pkcs11RsaPkcs1WycheproofTest
* Use 6 as the invalid value since modLen % 16 must be zero.
*/
TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, Pkcs1MinimumPadding) {
- const size_t kRsaShortKeyBits = 736;
+#define RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH 736
+/* if our minimum supported key length is big enough to handle
+ * our largest Hash function, we can't test a short length */
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS < RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH
+ const size_t kRsaShortKeyBits = RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH;
const size_t kRsaKeyBits = 752;
static const std::vector<uint8_t> kMsg{'T', 'E', 'S', 'T'};
static const std::vector<uint8_t> kSha512DigestInfo{
@@ -209,6 +214,9 @@ TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, Pkcs1MinimumPadding)
SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512,
nullptr);
EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
+#else
+ GTEST_SKIP();
+#endif
}
TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, RequireNullParameter) {
diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc.sign_policy ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
#include "prtime.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "ssl.h"
+#include "nss.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
#include "gtest_utils.h"
#include "tls_agent.h"
@@ -348,9 +350,14 @@ static void GenerateWeakRsaKey(ScopedSEC
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
ASSERT_TRUE(slot);
PK11RSAGenParams rsaparams;
- // The absolute minimum size of RSA key that we can use with SHA-256 is
- // 256bit (hash) + 256bit (salt) + 8 (start byte) + 8 (end byte) = 528.
+// The absolute minimum size of RSA key that we can use with SHA-256 is
+// 256bit (hash) + 256bit (salt) + 8 (start byte) + 8 (end byte) = 528.
+#define RSA_WEAK_KEY 528
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS < RSA_WEAK_KEY
rsaparams.keySizeInBits = 528;
+#else
+ rsaparams.keySizeInBits = RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1;
+#endif
rsaparams.pe = 65537;
// Bug 1012786: PK11_GenerateKeyPair can fail if there is insufficient
@@ -390,6 +397,18 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256};
client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
+ // save the MIN POLICY length.
+ PRInt32 minRsa;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minRsa));
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS >= 2048
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
+ NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1024));
+#else
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, 2048));
+#endif
+#endif
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey dc_priv;
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey dc_pub;
@@ -412,6 +431,9 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
auto cfilter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionCapture>(
client_, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn);
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertInsufficientSecurity);
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, minRsa));
+#endif
}
class ReplaceDCSigScheme : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h
--- ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ extern unsigned SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength
extern unsigned SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk);
/*
+** Return the strength of the private key in bits
+*/
+extern unsigned SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPrivateKey *privk);
+
+/*
** Return the length of the signature in bytes
*/
extern unsigned SECKEY_SignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk);
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h
--- ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.024785635 -0700
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#ifndef _KEYI_H_
#define _KEYI_H_
+#include "secerr.h"
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
/* NSS private functions */
@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ SECStatus sec_DecodeRSAPSSParamsToMechan
const SECItem *params,
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *mech);
+/* make sure the key length matches the policy for keyType */
+SECStatus seckey_EnforceKeySize(KeyType keyType, unsigned keyLength,
+ SECErrorCodes error);
SEC_END_PROTOS
#endif /* _KEYHI_H_ */
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
--- ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include "secdig.h"
#include "prtime.h"
#include "keyi.h"
+#include "nss.h"
SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)
SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SEC_IntegerTemplate)
@@ -1042,6 +1043,62 @@ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(const SEC
return bitSize;
}
+unsigned
+SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPrivateKey *privk)
+{
+ unsigned bitSize = 0;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attribute = CKT_INVALID_TYPE;
+ SECItem params;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (!privk) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* interpret modulus length as key strength */
+ switch (privk->keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ case rsaOaepKey:
+ /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
+ * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary */
+ bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ if (bitSize == -1) {
+ bitSize = 0;
+ }
+ return bitSize;
+ case dsaKey:
+ case fortezzaKey:
+ case dhKey:
+ case keaKey:
+ attribute = CKA_PRIME;
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
+ CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, &params);
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ bitSize = SECKEY_ECParamsToKeySize(&params);
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
+ return bitSize;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(attribute != CKT_INVALID_TYPE);
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
+ attribute, NULL, &params);
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ bitSize = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&params);
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
+ return bitSize;
+}
+
/* returns signature length in bytes (not bits) */
unsigned
SECKEY_SignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk)
@@ -1212,6 +1269,51 @@ SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(const SECKEYPublicK
}
/*
+ * Check that a given key meets the policy limits for the given key
+ * size.
+ */
+SECStatus
+seckey_EnforceKeySize(KeyType keyType, unsigned keyLength, SECErrorCodes error)
+{
+ PRInt32 opt = -1;
+ PRInt32 optVal;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ switch (keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ case rsaOaepKey:
+ opt = NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ case fortezzaKey:
+ opt = NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case dhKey:
+ case keaKey:
+ opt = NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ opt = NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case nullKey:
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(opt != -1);
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(opt, &optVal);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ if (optVal < keyLength) {
+ PORT_SetError(error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
* Use the private key to find a public key handle. The handle will be on
* the same slot as the private key.
*/
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c
--- ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "keyi.h"
+#include "nss.h"
struct SGNContextStr {
SECOidTag signalg;
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ sgn_NewContext(SECOidTag alg, SECItem *p
SECOidTag hashalg, signalg;
KeyType keyType;
PRUint32 policyFlags;
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
SECStatus rv;
/* OK, map a PKCS #7 hash and encrypt algorithm into
@@ -56,6 +58,16 @@ sgn_NewContext(SECOidTag alg, SECItem *p
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
return NULL;
}
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) {
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType,
+ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(key),
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
/* check the policy on the hash algorithm */
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashalg, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
@@ -467,9 +479,20 @@ SGN_Digest(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
SGNDigestInfo *di = 0;
SECOidTag enctag;
PRUint32 policyFlags;
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
result->data = 0;
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) {
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(privKey->keyType,
+ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(privKey),
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
/* check the policy on the hash algorithm */
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(algtag, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c.sign_policy ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
--- ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "secdig.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "keyi.h"
+#include "nss.h"
/*
** Recover the DigestInfo from an RSA PKCS#1 signature.
@@ -467,6 +468,7 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey
unsigned int sigLen;
KeyType type;
PRUint32 policyFlags;
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
/* make sure the encryption algorithm matches the key type */
/* RSA-PSS algorithm can be used with both rsaKey and rsaPssKey */
@@ -476,7 +478,16 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_KEYALG_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
-
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG) {
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType,
+ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(key),
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
/* check the policy on the encryption algorithm */
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(encAlg, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.sign_policy ./lib/freebl/blapit.h
--- ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/freebl/blapit.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.025785641 -0700
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ typedef int __BLAPI_DEPRECATED __attribu
* These values come from the initial key size limits from the PKCS #11
* module. They may be arbitrarily adjusted to any value freebl supports.
*/
-#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 128
+#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1023 /* 128 */
#define RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
#define RSA_MAX_EXPONENT_BITS 64
#define DH_MIN_P_BITS 128
diff -up ./lib/nss/nss.h.sign_policy ./lib/nss/nss.h
--- ./lib/nss/nss.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/nss/nss.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
@@ -302,6 +302,28 @@ SECStatus NSS_UnregisterShutdown(NSS_Shu
#define NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS 0x00d /* lock default values */
#define NSS_DEFAULT_SSL_LOCK 1 /* lock the ssl default values */
+/* NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY controls what kinds of operations are subject to
+ * the NSS_XXX_MIN_KEY_SIZE values.
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS sets and clears all the flags to the input
+ * value
+ * On get it returns all the flags
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS sets only the flags=1 in theinput value and
+ * does not affect the other flags
+ * On get it returns all the flags
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS clears only the flags=1 in the input
+ * value and does not affect the other flags
+ * On get it returns all the compliment of all the flags
+ * (cleared flags == 1) */
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS 0x00e
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS 0x00f
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS 0x010
+/* currently defined flags */
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG 1
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG 2
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG 4
+
+#define NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE 0x011
+
/*
* Set and get global options for the NSS library.
*/
diff -up ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c.sign_policy ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c
--- ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct nssOps {
PRInt32 dtlsVersionMaxPolicy;
PRInt32 pkcs12DecodeForceUnicode;
PRInt32 defaultLocks;
+ PRInt32 keySizePolicyFlags;
+ PRInt32 eccMinKeySize;
};
static struct nssOps nss_ops = {
@@ -37,7 +39,9 @@ static struct nssOps nss_ops = {
1,
0xffff,
PR_FALSE,
- 0
+ 0,
+ NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG,
+ SSL_ECC_MIN_CURVE_BITS
};
SECStatus
@@ -78,6 +82,18 @@ NSS_OptionSet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 val
case NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS:
nss_ops.defaultLocks = value;
break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS:
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags = value;
+ break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS:
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags |= value;
+ break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS:
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags &= ~value;
+ break;
+ case NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE:
+ nss_ops.eccMinKeySize = value;
+ break;
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
rv = SECFailure;
@@ -119,6 +135,16 @@ NSS_OptionGet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 *va
case NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS:
*value = nss_ops.defaultLocks;
break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS:
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS:
+ *value = nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags;
+ break;
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS:
+ *value = ~nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags;
+ break;
+ case NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE:
+ *value = nss_ops.eccMinKeySize;
+ break;
default:
rv = SECFailure;
}
diff -up ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h.sign_policy ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h
--- ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@
* happens because NSS used to count bit lengths incorrectly. */
#define SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS 1023
#define SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS 1023
+/* not really used by SSL, but define it here for consistency */
+#define SSL_ECC_MIN_CURVE_BITS 256
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c.sign_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
@@ -78,15 +78,14 @@ pk11_KeyExchange(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_
if (privKeyHandle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
PK11RSAGenParams rsaParams;
- if (symKeyLength > 53) /* bytes */ {
- /* we'd have to generate an RSA key pair > 512 bits long,
+ if (symKeyLength > 120) /* bytes */ {
+ /* we'd have to generate an RSA key pair > 1024 bits long,
** and that's too costly. Don't even try.
*/
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CANNOT_MOVE_SENSITIVE_KEY);
goto rsa_failed;
}
- rsaParams.keySizeInBits =
- (symKeyLength > 21 || symKeyLength == 0) ? 512 : 256;
+ rsaParams.keySizeInBits = 1024;
rsaParams.pe = 0x10001;
privKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN,
&rsaParams, &pubKey, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE, symKey->cx);
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.sign_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.sign_policy 2022-06-20 16:47:35.004785510 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.026785647 -0700
@@ -427,12 +427,21 @@ static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[]
{ CIPHER_NAME("DTLS1.3"), 0x304 },
};
+static const optionFreeDef keySizeFlagsList[] = {
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SSL"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SIGN"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-VERIFY"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG },
+};
+
static const optionFreeDef freeOptList[] = {
/* Restrictions for asymetric keys */
{ CIPHER_NAME("RSA-MIN"), NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
{ CIPHER_NAME("DH-MIN"), NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
{ CIPHER_NAME("DSA-MIN"), NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECC-MIN"), NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
+ /* what operations doe the key size apply to */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-FLAGS"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS },
/* constraints on SSL Protocols */
{ CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MIN"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MIN_POLICY },
{ CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MAX"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MAX_POLICY },
@@ -540,6 +549,7 @@ secmod_getPolicyOptValue(const char *pol
*result = val;
return SECSuccess;
}
+ /* handle any ssl strings */
for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sslOptList); i++) {
if (policyValueLength == sslOptList[i].name_size &&
PORT_Strncasecmp(sslOptList[i].name, policyValue,
@@ -548,7 +558,29 @@ secmod_getPolicyOptValue(const char *pol
return SECSuccess;
}
}
- return SECFailure;
+ /* handle key_size flags. Each flag represents a bit, which
+ * gets or'd together. They can be separated by , | or + */
+ val = 0;
+ while (*policyValue) {
+ PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(keySizeFlagsList); i++) {
+ if (PORT_Strncasecmp(keySizeFlagsList[i].name, policyValue,
+ keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size) == 0) {
+ val |= keySizeFlagsList[i].option;
+ found = PR_TRUE;
+ policyValue += keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (*policyValue == ',' || *policyValue == '|' || *policyValue == '+') {
+ policyValue++;
+ }
+ }
+ *result = val;
+ return SECSuccess;
}
/* Policy operations:
diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.sign_policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.sign_policy 2022-06-20 16:47:34.998785473 -0700
+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2022-06-20 16:47:35.028785660 -0700
@@ -7409,6 +7409,8 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket
unsigned dh_p_bits;
unsigned dh_g_bits;
PRInt32 minDH;
+ PRInt32 optval;
+ PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_FALSE;
SSL3Hashes hashes;
SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
@@ -7419,8 +7421,13 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* malformed. */
}
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG);
+ }
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv != SECSuccess || minDH <= 0) {
minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS;
}
@@ -11411,13 +11418,20 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 minKey;
PRInt32 optval;
+ PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_TRUE;
+
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG);
+ }
ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey);
switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey)) {
case rsaKey:
case rsaPssKey:
case rsaOaepKey:
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
} else {
@@ -11426,7 +11440,8 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
break;
case dsaKey:
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
} else {
@@ -11435,7 +11450,8 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
break;
case dhKey:
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
} else {
@@ -11444,9 +11460,15 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
break;
case ecKey:
- /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we only
- * support curves we like. */
- minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
+ minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
+ } else {
+ /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we
+ * only support curves we like. */
+ minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ }
break;
default:
diff -up ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt.sign_policy ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt
--- ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt.sign_policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
+++ ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt 2022-06-20 16:47:35.028785660 -0700
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA1:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP256R1:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:aes256-cbc:camellia256-cbc:aes128-gcm:aes128-cbc:camellia128-cbc:SHA256:SHA384:SHA512:SHA1:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.0:dtls-version-min=dtls1.0:DH-MIN=1023:DSA-MIN=2048:RSA-MIN=2048 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Standard policy
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA1:HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP256R1:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:aes256-cbc:camellia256-cbc:aes128-gcm:aes128-cbc:camellia128-cbc:des-ede3-cbc:rc4:SHA256:SHA384:SHA512:SHA1:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:DHE-DSS:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.0:dtls-version-min=tls1.0:DH-MIN=1023:DSA-MIN=1023:RSA-MIN=1023 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Legacy policy
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Reduced policy
+0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072:KEY-SIZE-FLAGS=KEY-SIZE-SSL,KEY-SIZE-SIGN,KEY-SIZE-VERIFY NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Valid key size
+2 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072:KEY-SIZE-FLAGS=UNKNOWN,KEY-SIZE-SIGN,KEY-SIZE-VERIFY NSS-POLICY-FAIL.*unknown.* Invalid key size
2 disallow=ALL_allow=dtls-version-min=:dtls-version-max= NSS-POLICY-FAIL Missing value
2 disallow=ALL_allow=RSA-MIN=whatever NSS-POLICY-FAIL Invalid value
2 disallow=ALL_allow=flower NSS-POLICY-FAIL Invalid identifier
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.sign_policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.sign_policy 2022-06-20 16:47:35.028785660 -0700
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2022-06-20 16:50:08.958742135 -0700
@@ -196,6 +196,11 @@
# rsa-pkcs, rsa-pss, and ecdsa policy checking reverted in rhel8 for binary
# compatibility reasons
# 1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
+ 0 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=1023 Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
+
# test default settings
# NOTE: tstclient will attempt to overide the defaults, so we detect we
# were successful by locking in our settings
diff -up ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh.sign_policy ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh
--- ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh.sign_policy 2022-06-22 08:43:55.905407738 -0700
+++ ./tests/dbupgrade/dbupgrade.sh 2022-06-22 08:43:58.837426779 -0700
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ dbupgrade_main()
echo $i
if [ -d $i ]; then
echo "upgrading db $i"
- ${BINDIR}/certutil -G -g 512 -d sql:$i -f ${PWFILE} -z ${NOISE_FILE} 2>&1
+ ${BINDIR}/certutil -G -g 1024 -d sql:$i -f ${PWFILE} -z ${NOISE_FILE} 2>&1
html_msg $? 0 "Upgrading $i"
else
echo "skipping db $i"

57
nss-3.90-DisablingASM.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
diff --git a/lib/freebl/Makefile b/lib/freebl/Makefile
index 74e8e65..8995752 100644
--- a/lib/freebl/Makefile
+++ b/lib/freebl/Makefile
@@ -568,7 +568,6 @@ ifneq ($(shell $(CC) -? 2>&1 >/dev/null </dev/null | sed -e 's/:.*//;1q'),lcc)
HAVE_INT128_SUPPORT = 1
DEFINES += -DHAVE_INT128_SUPPORT
else ifeq (1,$(CC_IS_GCC))
- SUPPORTS_VALE_CURVE25519 = 1
ifneq (,$(filter 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9,$(word 1,$(GCC_VERSION)).$(word 2,$(GCC_VERSION))))
HAVE_INT128_SUPPORT = 1
DEFINES += -DHAVE_INT128_SUPPORT
diff --git a/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp b/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
index 65f9a80..23940ef 100644
--- a/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
+++ b/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
@@ -866,12 +866,6 @@
}],
],
}],
- [ 'supports_vale_curve25519==1', {
- 'defines': [
- # The Makefile does version-tests on GCC, but we're not doing that here.
- 'HACL_CAN_COMPILE_INLINE_ASM',
- ],
- }],
[ 'OS=="linux" or OS=="android"', {
'conditions': [
[ 'target_arch=="x64"', {
@@ -934,11 +928,6 @@
'variables': {
'module': 'nss',
'conditions': [
- [ 'target_arch=="x64" and cc_is_gcc==1', {
- 'supports_vale_curve25519%': 1,
- }, {
- 'supports_vale_curve25519%': 0,
- }],
[ 'target_arch=="x64" or target_arch=="arm64" or target_arch=="aarch64"', {
'have_int128_support%': 1,
}, {
diff --git a/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi b/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
index d198c44..34b6b3c 100644
--- a/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
+++ b/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
@@ -151,11 +151,6 @@
'ecl/curve25519_32.c',
],
}],
- ['supports_vale_curve25519==1', {
- 'sources': [
- 'verified/Hacl_Curve25519_64.c',
- ],
- }],
['(target_arch!="ppc64" and target_arch!="ppc64le") or disable_altivec==1', {
'sources': [
# Gyp does not support per-file cflags, so working around like this.

104
nss-3.90-add-ems-policy.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.add_ems_policy 2023-06-12 15:37:49.292905411 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
@@ -389,6 +389,8 @@ static const oidValDef kxOptList[] = {
{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDHE-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-ECDSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ /* not really a key exchange, but it's the closest fit */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("TLS-REQUIRE-EMS"), SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
};
static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h 2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
@@ -202,4 +202,10 @@ struct PK11GenericObjectStr {
/* This mask includes all CK_FLAGs with an equivalent CKA_ attribute. */
#define CKF_KEY_OPERATION_FLAGS 0x000e7b00UL
+/* this oid value could change values if it's added after other new
+ * upstream oids. We protect applications by hiding the define in a private
+ * header file that only NSS sees. Currently it's only available through
+ * the policy code */
+#define SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1
+
#endif /* _SECMODTI_H_ */
diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2023-06-12 17:18:35.130938525 -0700
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "secmod.h"
#include "blapi.h"
+#include "secmodti.h" /* until SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS is upstream */
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -3480,6 +3481,29 @@ ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *s
CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
unsigned int master_params_len;
+ /* if we are using TLS and we aren't using the extended master secret,
+ * and SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS policy is true, fail. The caller will
+ * send and alert (eventually). In the RSA Server case, the alert
+ * won't happen until Finish time because the upper level code
+ * can't tell a difference between this failure and an RSA decrypt
+ * failure, so it will proceed with a faux key */
+ if (isTLS) {
+ PRUint32 policy;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* first fetch the policy for this algorithm */
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, &policy);
+ /* we only look at the policy if we can fetch it. */
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ if (policy & NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL) {
+ /* just set the error, we don't want to map any errors
+ * set by NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy here */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
if (isTLS12) {
if (isDH)
master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/util/secoid.c
--- ./lib/util/secoid.c.add_ems_policy 2023-06-12 15:37:49.293905422 -0700
+++ ./lib/util/secoid.c 2023-06-12 17:20:29.498142775 -0700
@@ -1795,6 +1795,11 @@ const static SECOidData oids[SEC_OID_TOT
SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_USER,
"IPsec User",
CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
+
+ /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
+ /* we need it for the policy code. */
+ ODE(SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1,
+ "TLS Require EMS", CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
};
/* PRIVATE EXTENDED SECOID Table
@@ -2095,6 +2100,8 @@ SECOID_Init(void)
/* turn off NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL by default */
xOids[SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY].notPolicyFlags = NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL;
+ /* turn off TLS REQUIRE EMS by default */
+ xOids[SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1].notPolicyFlags = ~0;
envVal = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_HASH_ALG_SUPPORT");
if (envVal)
diff -up ./lib/util/secoidt.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/util/secoidt.h
--- ./lib/util/secoidt.h.add_ems_policy 2023-06-12 17:18:35.131938535 -0700
+++ ./lib/util/secoidt.h 2023-06-12 17:21:49.675987022 -0700
@@ -501,6 +501,9 @@ typedef enum {
SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_END = 361,
SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_TUNNEL = 362,
SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_USER = 363,
+ /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
+ /* give it an obscure name here */
+ SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1 = 372,
SEC_OID_TOTAL
} SECOidTag;

18
nss-3.90-no-dbm-25519.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
diff -up ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.no_dbm_25519 ./tests/ec/ectest.sh
--- ./tests/ec/ectest.sh.no_dbm_25519 2023-07-26 10:12:29.531147406 -0700
+++ ./tests/ec/ectest.sh 2023-07-26 10:12:39.547245445 -0700
@@ -46,11 +46,13 @@ ectest_genkeydb_test()
return $?
fi
curves=( \
- "curve25519" \
"secp256r1" \
"secp384r1" \
"secp521r1" \
)
+ if [ "${NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE}" = "sql" ] ; then
+ curves=( "curve25519" "${curves[@]}" )
+ fi
for curve in "${curves[@]}"; do
echo "Test $curve key generation using certutil ..."
certutil -G -d "${HOSTDIR}" -k ec -q $curve -f "${R_PWFILE}" -z ${NOISE_FILE}

41
nss.spec
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
%global nspr_build_version 4.34.0-3
%global nspr_release -3
%global nspr_version 4.34.0
%global nss_version 3.79.0
%global nspr_build_version 4.35.0-1
%global nspr_release -1
%global nspr_version 4.35.0
%global nss_version 3.90.0
%global unsupported_tools_directory %{_libdir}/nss/unsupported-tools
%global saved_files_dir %{_libdir}/nss/saved
%global dracutlibdir %{_prefix}/lib/dracut
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
Summary: Network Security Services
Name: nss
Version: %{nss_version}
Release: 11%{?dist}
Release: 1%{?dist}
License: MPLv2.0
URL: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/
Requires: nspr >= %{nspr_version}%{nspr_release}
@ -109,6 +109,9 @@ Source25: key3.db.xml
Source26: key4.db.xml
Source27: secmod.db.xml
Source28: nss-p11-kit.config
# fips algorithms are tied to the red hat validation, others
# will have their own validation
Source30: fips_algorithms.h
# To inject hardening flags for DSO
Patch1: nss-dso-ldflags.patch
@ -157,19 +160,16 @@ Patch51: nss-3.79-revert-distrusted-certs.patch
Patch52: nss-3.79-pkcs12-fips-defaults.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1774659
Patch60: nss-3.79-dbtool.patch
Patch61: nss-3.79-dont-verify-default.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1774654
Patch63: nss-3.79-fix-client-cert-crash.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1767883
Patch64: nss-3.79-rhel-8-fips-signature-policy.patch
Patch65: nss-3.79-enable-POST-rerun.patch
Patch66: nss-3.79-increase-pbe-cache.patch
Patch67: nss-3.79-pkcs12-fix-null-password.patch
Patch68: nss-3.79-fips.patch
# cve 2023-0767, remove on rebase to nss 3.88.1 or later
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1804640
Patch70: cve-2023-0767.patch
Patch57: nss-3.79-dbtool.patch
Patch58: nss-3.79-fips.patch
Patch61: nss-3.79-fips-review.patches
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1836781
# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1836925
Patch62: nss-3.90-DisablingASM.patch
Patch63: nss-3.90-no-dbm-25519.patch
#ems policy. needs to upstream
Patch70: nss-3.90-add-ems-policy.patch
%description
Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to
@ -302,6 +302,11 @@ pushd nss
%autopatch -p1
popd
# copy the fips_algorithms.h for this release
# this file is release specific and matches what
# each vendors claim in their own FIPS certification
cp %{SOURCE30} nss/lib/softoken/
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1247353
find nss/lib/libpkix -perm /u+x -type f -exec chmod -x {} \;

2
sources
View File

@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ SHA512 (blank-cert9.db) = 2f8eab4c0612210ee47db8a3a80c1b58a0b43849551af78c7da403
SHA512 (blank-key3.db) = 01f7314e9fc8a7c9aa997652624cfcde213d18a6b3bb31840c1a60bbd662e56b5bc3221d13874abb42ce78163b225a6dfce2e1326cf6dd29366ad9c28ba5a71c
SHA512 (blank-key4.db) = 8fedae93af7163da23fe9492ea8e785a44c291604fa98e58438448efb69c85d3253fc22b926d5c3209c62e58a86038fd4d78a1c4c068bc00600a7f3e5382ebe7
SHA512 (blank-secmod.db) = 06a2dbd861839ef6315093459328b500d3832333a34b30e6fac4a2503af337f014a4d319f0f93322409e719142904ce8bc08252ae9a4f37f30d4c3312e900310
SHA512 (nss-3.79.tar.gz) = d3311da3bd0e6907760390221c1307a63d84dd8ad9b85dbfdbf59fe4678341c9856b6f93235731999a1236c98dc0ac66d2dc023eb439cb696f73509dae70c41d
SHA512 (nss-3.90.tar.gz) = e41f4de73f4971c8f35dffe3926b6845ef12a1ce7e8f3fe682e643ddb791a009d079c1706f66d065333af884726840dbc96d4e44762f9c3e48b8d919c09ae625