nss/nss-3.79-fips.patch

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diff --git a/lib/freebl/config.mk b/lib/freebl/config.mk
--- a/lib/freebl/config.mk
+++ b/lib/freebl/config.mk
@@ -85,9 +85,13 @@ EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += \
$(NULL)
endif
endif
ifeq ($(OS_ARCH), Darwin)
EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += -dylib_file @executable_path/libplc4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplc4.dylib -dylib_file @executable_path/libplds4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplds4.dylib
endif
+ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
endif
+
+endif
diff --git a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
--- a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
+++ b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
@@ -20,53 +20,110 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
if (!numBytes) {
/* error is set */
return;
}
RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
}
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+#include <sys/random.h>
+#include "prinit.h"
+
+static int rng_grndFlags= 0;
+static PRCallOnceType rng_KernelFips;
+
+static PRStatus
+rng_getKernelFips()
+{
+#ifdef LINUX
+ FILE *f;
+ char d;
+ size_t size;
+
+ f = fopen("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+
+ size = fread(&d, 1, 1, f);
+ fclose(f);
+ if (size != 1)
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+ if (d != '1')
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+ /* if the kernel is in FIPS mode, set the GRND_RANDOM flag */
+ rng_grndFlags = GRND_RANDOM;
+#endif /* LINUX */
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif
+
size_t
RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
{
+ size_t fileBytes = 0;
+ unsigned char *buffer = dest;
+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
int fd;
int bytes;
- size_t fileBytes = 0;
- unsigned char *buffer = dest;
+#else
+ PR_CallOnce(&rng_KernelFips, rng_getKernelFips);
+#endif
#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || (defined(LINUX) && defined(__GLIBC__) && ((__GLIBC__ > 2) || ((__GLIBC__ == 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25))))
int result;
-
while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
size_t getBytes = maxLen - fileBytes;
if (getBytes > GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES) {
getBytes = GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES;
}
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+ /* FIP 140-3 requires full kernel reseeding for chained entropy sources
+ * so we need to use getrandom with GRND_RANDOM.
+ * getrandom returns -1 on failure, otherwise returns
+ * the number of bytes, which can be less than getBytes */
+ result = getrandom(buffer, getBytes, rng_grndFlags);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ fileBytes += result;
+ buffer += result;
+#else
+ /* get entropy returns 0 on success and always return
+ * getBytes on success */
result = getentropy(buffer, getBytes);
if (result == 0) { /* success */
fileBytes += getBytes;
buffer += getBytes;
} else {
break;
}
+#endif
}
if (fileBytes == maxLen) { /* success */
return maxLen;
}
+#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+ /* in FIPS 104-3 we don't fallback, just fail */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+ return 0;
+#else
/* If we failed with an error other than ENOSYS, it means the destination
* buffer is not writeable. We don't need to try writing to it again. */
if (errno != ENOSYS) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return 0;
}
+#endif /*!NSS_FIPS_140_3 */
+#endif /* platorm has getentropy */
+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
/* ENOSYS means the kernel doesn't support getentropy()/getrandom().
* Reset the number of bytes to get and fall back to /dev/urandom. */
fileBytes = 0;
-#endif
fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return 0;
}
while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
bytes = read(fd, buffer, maxLen - fileBytes);
if (bytes <= 0) {
@@ -76,9 +133,10 @@ RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
buffer += bytes;
}
(void)close(fd);
if (fileBytes != maxLen) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return 0;
}
return fileBytes;
+#endif
}
diff --git a/lib/softoken/config.mk b/lib/softoken/config.mk
--- a/lib/softoken/config.mk
+++ b/lib/softoken/config.mk
@@ -58,8 +58,12 @@ endif
ifdef NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
DEFINES += -DNSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
endif
ifdef NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID
DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID=\"${NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID}\"
endif
+ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
+DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
+endif
+
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
@@ -1766,16 +1766,20 @@ sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
unsigned char iteration_count = 5;
unsigned char keyLen = 64;
char *inKeyData = TEST_KEY;
- static const unsigned char saltData[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
+ static const unsigned char saltData[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
+ };
+
static const unsigned char pbkdf_known_answer[] = {
- 0x31, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x39, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x29,
- 0x68, 0xac, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x9c,
- 0x28, 0x59, 0x8b, 0x5c, 0xd8, 0xd4, 0x02, 0x37,
- 0x18, 0x22, 0xc1, 0x92, 0xd0, 0xfa, 0x72, 0x90,
- 0x2c, 0x8d, 0x19, 0xd4, 0x56, 0xfb, 0x16, 0xfa,
- 0x8d, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x5f, 0x17, 0xb1,
- 0x22, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0xaf, 0x5e, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0x66,
- 0xc6, 0x14, 0xfe, 0x83, 0xfa, 0x1a, 0x2a, 0xc5
+ 0x73, 0x8c, 0xfa, 0x02, 0xe8, 0xdb, 0x43, 0xe4,
+ 0x99, 0xc5, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0x7b,
+ 0xc4, 0xda, 0x22, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0xae, 0x23, 0x7a,
+ 0x21, 0x27, 0xbd, 0xcc, 0x78, 0xc4, 0xe6, 0xc5,
+ 0x33, 0x38, 0x35, 0xe0, 0x68, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x06,
+ 0xad, 0xaf, 0x7f, 0xd7, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x90,
+ 0x17, 0x97, 0x73, 0x75, 0x7b, 0x88, 0x49, 0xd8,
+ 0x6f, 0x78, 0x5a, 0xde, 0x50, 0x20, 0x55, 0x33
};
sftk_PBELockInit();
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
@@ -4609,16 +4609,17 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
goto loser;
}
/* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
+
/* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
@@ -4812,16 +4813,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
+ /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
+ * fips requirements */
+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
*phKey = key->handle;
}
loser:
PORT_Memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf);
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
@@ -5780,16 +5784,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return crv;
}
+ /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
+ privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
+ publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return CKR_OK;
}
@@ -6990,16 +6997,17 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
}
/* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
if (params->bExtract) {
CK_BYTE *salt;
CK_ULONG saltLen;
HMACContext *hmac;
unsigned int bufLen;
+ SFTKSource saltKeySource = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
switch (params->ulSaltType) {
case CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL:
saltLen = hashLen;
salt = hashbuf;
memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
break;
case CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA:
@@ -7026,29 +7034,54 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
if (isFIPS && (key->isFIPS == 0) && (saltKey->isFIPS == 1)) {
CK_MECHANISM mech;
mech.mechanism = CKM_HKDF_DERIVE;
mech.pParameter = params;
mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
}
+ saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
if (saltKey_att == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/* save the resulting salt */
salt = saltKey_att->attrib.pValue;
saltLen = saltKey_att->attrib.ulValueLen;
break;
default:
return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
+ /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
+ * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
+ if (isFIPS && key && sourceKey) {
+ PRBool fipsOK = PR_FALSE;
+ /* case one: mix the kea with a previous or default
+ * salt */
+ if ((sourceKey->source == SFTK_SOURCE_KEA) &&
+ (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
+ (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
+ fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ /* case two: restart, remix the previous secret as a salt */
+ if ((sourceKey->objclass == CKO_DATA) &&
+ (NSS_SecureMemcmpZero(sourceKeyBytes, sourceKeyLen) == 0) &&
+ (sourceKeyLen == rawHash->length) &&
+ (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
+ (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
+ fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if (!fipsOK) {
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT;
hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
if (saltKey_att) {
sftk_FreeAttribute(saltKey_att);
}
if (saltKey) {
sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
}
@@ -7076,16 +7109,40 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
/* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
* T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
* key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
*/
HMACContext *hmac;
CK_BYTE bi;
unsigned iterations;
+ /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
+ * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
+ if (isFIPS && key && key->isFIPS && sourceKey) {
+ unsigned char *info=&params->pInfo[3];
+ /* only one case,
+ * 1) Expand only
+ * 2) with a key whose source was
+ * SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND or SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
+ * 3) source key length == rawHash->length
+ * 4) Info has tls or dtls
+ * If any of those conditions aren't met, then we turn
+ * off the fips indicator */
+ if (params->bExtract ||
+ ((sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT) &&
+ (sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND)) ||
+ (sourceKeyLen != rawHash->length) ||
+ (params->ulInfoLen < 7) ||
+ ((PORT_Memcmp(info,"tls",3) != 0) &&
+ (PORT_Memcmp(info,"dtls",4) != 0))) {
+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND;
+
genLen = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen);
iterations = genLen / hashLen;
if (genLen > sizeof(keyBlock)) {
keyBlockAlloc = PORT_Alloc(genLen);
if (keyBlockAlloc == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
@@ -8434,16 +8491,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
/* calculate private value - oct */
rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhValue, PR_FALSE);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&derived, PR_FALSE);
crv = CKR_OK;
} else
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
@@ -8564,16 +8622,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
}
PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize - secretlen], secret, secretlen);
secret = keyData;
} else {
secret += (secretlen - keySize);
}
secretlen = keySize;
}
+ key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
if (keyData) {
PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
}
break;
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
@@ -147,16 +147,26 @@ typedef enum {
*/
typedef enum {
SFTK_DestroyFailure,
SFTK_Destroyed,
SFTK_Busy
} SFTKFreeStatus;
/*
+ * Source of various objects
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT=0,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_KEA,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND,
+ SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
+} SFTKSource;
+
+/*
* attribute values of an object.
*/
struct SFTKAttributeStr {
SFTKAttribute *next;
SFTKAttribute *prev;
PRBool freeAttr;
PRBool freeData;
/*must be called handle to make sftkqueue_find work */
@@ -189,16 +199,17 @@ struct SFTKObjectStr {
CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
int refCount;
PZLock *refLock;
SFTKSlot *slot;
void *objectInfo;
SFTKFree infoFree;
PRBool isFIPS;
+ SFTKSource source;
};
struct SFTKTokenObjectStr {
SFTKObject obj;
SECItem dbKey;
};
struct SFTKSessionObjectStr {
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
@@ -1090,16 +1090,17 @@ sftk_NewObject(SFTKSlot *slot)
sessObject->attrList[i].freeData = PR_FALSE;
}
sessObject->optimizeSpace = slot->optimizeSpace;
object->handle = 0;
object->next = object->prev = NULL;
object->slot = slot;
object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
+ object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
object->refCount = 1;
sessObject->sessionList.next = NULL;
sessObject->sessionList.prev = NULL;
sessObject->sessionList.parent = object;
sessObject->session = NULL;
sessObject->wasDerived = PR_FALSE;
if (!hasLocks)
@@ -1674,16 +1675,17 @@ fail:
CK_RV
sftk_CopyObject(SFTKObject *destObject, SFTKObject *srcObject)
{
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
SFTKSessionObject *src_so = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(srcObject);
unsigned int i;
destObject->isFIPS = srcObject->isFIPS;
+ destObject->source = srcObject->source;
if (src_so == NULL) {
return sftk_CopyTokenObject(destObject, srcObject);
}
PZ_Lock(src_so->attributeLock);
for (i = 0; i < src_so->hashSize; i++) {
attribute = src_so->head[i];
do {
@@ -2059,16 +2061,17 @@ sftk_NewTokenObject(SFTKSlot *slot, SECI
/* every object must have a class, if we can't get it, the object
* doesn't exist */
crv = handleToClass(slot, handle, &object->objclass);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto loser;
}
object->slot = slot;
object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
+ object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
object->objectInfo = NULL;
object->infoFree = NULL;
if (!hasLocks) {
object->refLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockRefLock);
}
if (object->refLock == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
@@ -2225,16 +2228,25 @@ sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE
break;
case CKA_DERIVE:
flags = CKF_DERIVE;
break;
/* fake attribute to select digesting */
case CKA_DIGEST:
flags = CKF_DIGEST;
break;
+ /* fake attribute to select key gen */
+ case CKA_NSS_GENERATE:
+ flags = CKF_GENERATE;
+ break;
+ /* fake attribute to select key pair gen */
+ case CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR:
+ flags = CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR;
+ break;
+ /* fake attributes to to handle MESSAGE* flags */
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT;
break;
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT;
break;
case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN;
@@ -2278,17 +2290,17 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
}
/* This function currently only returns valid lengths for
* FIPS approved ECC curves. If we want to make this generic
* in the future, that Curve determination can be done in
* the sftk_handleSpecial. Since it's currently only used
* in FIPS indicators, it's currently only compiled with
* the FIPS indicator code */
-static int
+static CK_ULONG
sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
{
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
CK_RV crv;
diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
--- a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+++ b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
@@ -58,16 +58,18 @@
/*
* NSS-defined certificate types
*
*/
#define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
/* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
#define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L
+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE 0x81000001L
+#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x81000002L
#define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE 0x82000000L
#define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK 0xff000000L
#define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */
/*
* NSS-defined object attributes
*
*/