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Debrand for AlmaLinux

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This commit is contained in:
Eduard Abdullin 2026-06-25 00:12:02 +00:00 committed by root
commit cee5d8038d
3 changed files with 213 additions and 2 deletions
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72
SOURCES/0019-Rewrite-fix-buffer-overflow-with-overlapping-capture.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
From 6c5bb72a4ba7cfdf0be186020728a71b033d8ae3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roman Arutyunyan <arut@nginx.com>
Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 18:42:18 +0400
Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite: fix buffer overflow with overlapping captures
When the rewrite replacement string had no variables, but had
overlapping captures, the length of the allocated buffer could be
smaller than the replacement string. This could happen either
when the "redirect" parameter is specified, or when arguments are
present in the replacement string.
The following configurations resulted in heap buffer overflow when
using URI "/++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++":
location / {
rewrite ^/((.*))$ http://127.0.0.1:8080/$1$2 redirect;
return 200 foo;
}
location / {
rewrite ^/((.*))$ http://127.0.0.1:8080/?$1$2;
return 200 foo;
}
Reported by Mufeed VH of Winfunc Research.
---
src/http/ngx_http_script.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_script.c b/src/http/ngx_http_script.c
index 2ea6113..8a28e23 100644
--- a/src/http/ngx_http_script.c
+++ b/src/http/ngx_http_script.c
@@ -1037,6 +1037,8 @@ ngx_http_script_start_args_code(ngx_http_script_engine_t *e)
void
ngx_http_script_regex_start_code(ngx_http_script_engine_t *e)
{
+ int *cap;
+ u_char *p;
size_t len;
ngx_int_t rc;
ngx_uint_t n;
@@ -1143,15 +1145,19 @@ ngx_http_script_regex_start_code(ngx_http_script_engine_t *e)
if (code->lengths == NULL) {
e->buf.len = code->size;
- if (code->uri) {
- if (r->ncaptures && (r->quoted_uri || r->plus_in_uri)) {
- e->buf.len += 2 * ngx_escape_uri(NULL, r->uri.data, r->uri.len,
- NGX_ESCAPE_ARGS);
- }
- }
+ cap = r->captures;
+ p = r->captures_data;
for (n = 2; n < r->ncaptures; n += 2) {
- e->buf.len += r->captures[n + 1] - r->captures[n];
+ e->buf.len += cap[n + 1] - cap[n];
+
+ if (code->uri) {
+ if (r->quoted_uri || r->plus_in_uri) {
+ e->buf.len += 2 * ngx_escape_uri(NULL, &p[cap[n]],
+ cap[n + 1] - cap[n],
+ NGX_ESCAPE_ARGS);
+ }
+ }
}
} else {
--
2.44.0

126
SOURCES/0020-Added-max_headers-directive.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
From ccb278d26ab1df16b42cf092b793918fcb056a2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Maxim Dounin <mdounin@mdounin.ru>
Date: Fri, 24 May 2024 00:20:01 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Added max_headers directive.
The directive limits the number of request headers accepted from clients.
While the total amount of headers is believed to be sufficiently limited
by the existing buffer size limits (client_header_buffer_size and
large_client_header_buffers), the additional limit on the number of headers
might be beneficial to better protect backend servers.
Requested by Maksim Yevmenkin.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Zupancic <e.zupancic@f5.com>
Origin: <https://freenginx.org/hg/nginx/rev/199dc0d6b05be814b5c811876c20af58cd361fea>
---
src/http/ngx_http_core_module.c | 10 ++++++++++
src/http/ngx_http_core_module.h | 2 ++
src/http/ngx_http_request.c | 9 +++++++++
src/http/ngx_http_request.h | 1 +
src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c | 9 +++++++++
5 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_core_module.c b/src/http/ngx_http_core_module.c
index 2140e06..b1872bc 100644
--- a/src/http/ngx_http_core_module.c
+++ b/src/http/ngx_http_core_module.c
@@ -252,6 +252,13 @@ static ngx_command_t ngx_http_core_commands[] = {
offsetof(ngx_http_core_srv_conf_t, large_client_header_buffers),
NULL },
+ { ngx_string("max_headers"),
+ NGX_HTTP_MAIN_CONF|NGX_HTTP_SRV_CONF|NGX_CONF_TAKE1,
+ ngx_conf_set_num_slot,
+ NGX_HTTP_SRV_CONF_OFFSET,
+ offsetof(ngx_http_core_srv_conf_t, max_headers),
+ NULL },
+
{ ngx_string("ignore_invalid_headers"),
NGX_HTTP_MAIN_CONF|NGX_HTTP_SRV_CONF|NGX_CONF_FLAG,
ngx_conf_set_flag_slot,
@@ -3459,6 +3466,7 @@ ngx_http_core_create_srv_conf(ngx_conf_t *cf)
cscf->request_pool_size = NGX_CONF_UNSET_SIZE;
cscf->client_header_timeout = NGX_CONF_UNSET_MSEC;
cscf->client_header_buffer_size = NGX_CONF_UNSET_SIZE;
+ cscf->max_headers = NGX_CONF_UNSET_UINT;
cscf->ignore_invalid_headers = NGX_CONF_UNSET;
cscf->merge_slashes = NGX_CONF_UNSET;
cscf->underscores_in_headers = NGX_CONF_UNSET;
@@ -3500,6 +3508,8 @@ ngx_http_core_merge_srv_conf(ngx_conf_t *cf, void *parent, void *child)
return NGX_CONF_ERROR;
}
+ ngx_conf_merge_uint_value(conf->max_headers, prev->max_headers, 1000);
+
ngx_conf_merge_value(conf->ignore_invalid_headers,
prev->ignore_invalid_headers, 1);
diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_core_module.h b/src/http/ngx_http_core_module.h
index e41bc68..821736f 100644
--- a/src/http/ngx_http_core_module.h
+++ b/src/http/ngx_http_core_module.h
@@ -196,6 +196,8 @@ typedef struct {
ngx_msec_t client_header_timeout;
+ ngx_uint_t max_headers;
+
ngx_flag_t ignore_invalid_headers;
ngx_flag_t merge_slashes;
ngx_flag_t underscores_in_headers;
diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_request.c b/src/http/ngx_http_request.c
index 5e0340b..720f93e 100644
--- a/src/http/ngx_http_request.c
+++ b/src/http/ngx_http_request.c
@@ -1433,6 +1433,15 @@ ngx_http_process_request_headers(ngx_event_t *rev)
/* a header line has been parsed successfully */
+ if (r->headers_in.count++ >= cscf->max_headers) {
+ r->lingering_close = 1;
+ ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_INFO, c->log, 0,
+ "client sent too many header lines");
+ ngx_http_finalize_request(r,
+ NGX_HTTP_REQUEST_HEADER_TOO_LARGE);
+ break;
+ }
+
h = ngx_list_push(&r->headers_in.headers);
if (h == NULL) {
ngx_http_close_request(r, NGX_HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_request.h b/src/http/ngx_http_request.h
index 8c9eed2..01ac4f9 100644
--- a/src/http/ngx_http_request.h
+++ b/src/http/ngx_http_request.h
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct {
typedef struct {
ngx_list_t headers;
+ ngx_uint_t count;
ngx_table_elt_t *host;
ngx_table_elt_t *connection;
diff --git a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c
index 1116e56..05500a4 100644
--- a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c
+++ b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c
@@ -1856,6 +1856,15 @@ ngx_http_v2_state_process_header(ngx_http_v2_connection_t *h2c, u_char *pos,
}
} else {
+ cscf = ngx_http_get_module_srv_conf(r, ngx_http_core_module);
+
+ if (r->headers_in.count++ >= cscf->max_headers) {
+ ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_INFO, r->connection->log, 0,
+ "client sent too many header lines");
+ ngx_http_finalize_request(r, NGX_HTTP_REQUEST_HEADER_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
h = ngx_list_push(&r->headers_in.headers);
if (h == NULL) {
return ngx_http_v2_connection_error(h2c,
--
2.44.0

17
SPECS/nginx.spec
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@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
Name: nginx
Epoch: 1
Version: 1.24.0
Release: 7%{?dist}.1.alma.1
Release: 7%{?dist}.2.alma.1
Summary: A high performance web server and reverse proxy server
# BSD License (two clause)
@ -148,6 +148,13 @@ Patch15: 0017-Mp4-avoid-zero-size-buffers-in-output.patch
# upstream patch - https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/524977e7
Patch16: 0018-Rewrite-fixed-escaping-and-possible-buffer-overrun.patch
# https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHEL-178669
# upstream patch - https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/ca4f92a27464ae6c2082245e4f67048c633aa032
Patch17: 0019-Rewrite-fix-buffer-overflow-with-overlapping-capture.patch
# https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHEL-182544
# upstream patch - https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/365694160a85229a7cb006738de9260d49ff5fa2
Patch18: 0020-Added-max_headers-directive.patch
BuildRequires: make
BuildRequires: gcc
@ -661,9 +668,15 @@ fi
%changelog
* Wed May 20 2026 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 1:1.24.0-7.1.alma.1
* Thu Jun 25 2026 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 1:1.24.0-7.2.alma.1
- Debrand for AlmaLinux
* Wed Jun 10 2026 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 1:1.24.0-7.2
- Resolves: RHEL-178681 - nginx:1.24/nginx: code execution and denial
of service (CVE-2026-9256)
- Resolves: RHEL-182554 - nginx:1.24/nginx: HTTP/2: Remote Denial of
Service via compression bomb and Slowloris-style attack
* Thu May 14 2026 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 1:1.24.0-7.1
- Resolves: RHEL-176234 - nginx:1.24/nginx: NGINX: Arbitrary Code Execution
Vulnerability (CVE-2026-42945)