From 3a50ed134f087fecdc66224326ec27c9e62b26cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AlmaLinux RelEng Bot Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 16:15:03 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] import UBI nginx-1.24.0-3.module+el8.10.0+24155+8a5ade52 --- ...-length-validation-for-COPY-and-MOVE.patch | 31 +++++++ ...le-integer-overflow-on-32-bit-platfo.patch | 84 +++++++++++++++++++ ...aring-s-passwd-in-auth-http-requests.patch | 31 +++++++ ...p4-avoid-zero-size-buffers-in-output.patch | 74 ++++++++++++++++ SPECS/nginx.spec | 49 +++++++++-- 5 files changed, 260 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 SOURCES/0008-Dav-destination-length-validation-for-COPY-and-MOVE.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0009-Mp4-fixed-possible-integer-overflow-on-32-bit-platfo.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0010-Mail-fixed-clearing-s-passwd-in-auth-http-requests.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/0011-Mp4-avoid-zero-size-buffers-in-output.patch diff --git a/SOURCES/0008-Dav-destination-length-validation-for-COPY-and-MOVE.patch b/SOURCES/0008-Dav-destination-length-validation-for-COPY-and-MOVE.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..615a70b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0008-Dav-destination-length-validation-for-COPY-and-MOVE.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +diff --git a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c +index cfb9892..6bf438a 100644 +--- a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c ++++ b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_dav_module.c +@@ -548,6 +548,7 @@ ngx_http_dav_copy_move_handler(ngx_http_request_t *r) + ngx_ext_rename_file_t ext; + ngx_http_dav_copy_ctx_t copy; + ngx_http_dav_loc_conf_t *dlcf; ++ ngx_http_core_loc_conf_t *clcf; + + if (r->headers_in.content_length_n > 0 || r->headers_in.chunked) { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, r->connection->log, 0, +@@ -644,6 +645,18 @@ destination_done: + return NGX_HTTP_CONFLICT; + } + ++ clcf = ngx_http_get_module_loc_conf(r, ngx_http_core_module); ++ ++ if (clcf->alias ++ && clcf->alias != NGX_MAX_SIZE_T_VALUE ++ && duri.len < clcf->alias) ++ { ++ ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, r->connection->log, 0, ++ "client sent invalid \"Destination\" header: \"%V\"", ++ &dest->value); ++ return NGX_HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; ++ } ++ + depth = ngx_http_dav_depth(r, NGX_HTTP_DAV_INFINITY_DEPTH); + + if (depth != NGX_HTTP_DAV_INFINITY_DEPTH) { diff --git a/SOURCES/0009-Mp4-fixed-possible-integer-overflow-on-32-bit-platfo.patch b/SOURCES/0009-Mp4-fixed-possible-integer-overflow-on-32-bit-platfo.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2dd1718 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0009-Mp4-fixed-possible-integer-overflow-on-32-bit-platfo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +From 3568812cf98dfd7661cd7516ecf9b398c134ab3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Roman Arutyunyan +Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2026 21:12:34 +0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Mp4: fixed possible integer overflow on 32-bit platforms. + +Previously, a 32-bit overflow could happen while validating atom entries +count. This allowed processing of an invalid atom with entrires beyond +its boundaries with reads and writes outside of the allocated mp4 buffer. + +Reported by Prabhav Srinath (sprabhav7). +--- + src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c | 14 +++++++------- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c +index 173d8ad54..678d6296c 100644 +--- a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c ++++ b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c +@@ -2297,7 +2297,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_read_stts_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4, uint64_t atom_data_size) + "mp4 time-to-sample entries:%uD", entries); + + if (ngx_mp4_atom_data_size(ngx_mp4_stts_atom_t) +- + entries * sizeof(ngx_mp4_stts_entry_t) > atom_data_size) ++ + (uint64_t) entries * sizeof(ngx_mp4_stts_entry_t) > atom_data_size) + { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, + "\"%s\" mp4 stts atom too small", mp4->file.name.data); +@@ -2612,7 +2612,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_read_stss_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4, uint64_t atom_data_size) + atom->last = atom_table; + + if (ngx_mp4_atom_data_size(ngx_http_mp4_stss_atom_t) +- + entries * sizeof(uint32_t) > atom_data_size) ++ + (uint64_t) entries * sizeof(uint32_t) > atom_data_size) + { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, + "\"%s\" mp4 stss atom too small", mp4->file.name.data); +@@ -2817,7 +2817,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_read_ctts_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4, uint64_t atom_data_size) + atom->last = atom_table; + + if (ngx_mp4_atom_data_size(ngx_mp4_ctts_atom_t) +- + entries * sizeof(ngx_mp4_ctts_entry_t) > atom_data_size) ++ + (uint64_t) entries * sizeof(ngx_mp4_ctts_entry_t) > atom_data_size) + { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, + "\"%s\" mp4 ctts atom too small", mp4->file.name.data); +@@ -2999,7 +2999,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_read_stsc_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4, uint64_t atom_data_size) + "sample-to-chunk entries:%uD", entries); + + if (ngx_mp4_atom_data_size(ngx_mp4_stsc_atom_t) +- + entries * sizeof(ngx_mp4_stsc_entry_t) > atom_data_size) ++ + (uint64_t) entries * sizeof(ngx_mp4_stsc_entry_t) > atom_data_size) + { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, + "\"%s\" mp4 stsc atom too small", mp4->file.name.data); +@@ -3393,7 +3393,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_read_stsz_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4, uint64_t atom_data_size) + + if (size == 0) { + if (ngx_mp4_atom_data_size(ngx_mp4_stsz_atom_t) +- + entries * sizeof(uint32_t) > atom_data_size) ++ + (uint64_t) entries * sizeof(uint32_t) > atom_data_size) + { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, + "\"%s\" mp4 stsz atom too small", +@@ -3552,7 +3552,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_read_stco_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4, uint64_t atom_data_size) + ngx_log_debug1(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_HTTP, mp4->file.log, 0, "chunks:%uD", entries); + + if (ngx_mp4_atom_data_size(ngx_mp4_stco_atom_t) +- + entries * sizeof(uint32_t) > atom_data_size) ++ + (uint64_t) entries * sizeof(uint32_t) > atom_data_size) + { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, + "\"%s\" mp4 stco atom too small", mp4->file.name.data); +@@ -3768,7 +3768,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_read_co64_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4, uint64_t atom_data_size) + ngx_log_debug1(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_HTTP, mp4->file.log, 0, "chunks:%uD", entries); + + if (ngx_mp4_atom_data_size(ngx_mp4_co64_atom_t) +- + entries * sizeof(uint64_t) > atom_data_size) ++ + (uint64_t) entries * sizeof(uint64_t) > atom_data_size) + { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, + "\"%s\" mp4 co64 atom too small", mp4->file.name.data); +-- +2.53.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0010-Mail-fixed-clearing-s-passwd-in-auth-http-requests.patch b/SOURCES/0010-Mail-fixed-clearing-s-passwd-in-auth-http-requests.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f6476a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0010-Mail-fixed-clearing-s-passwd-in-auth-http-requests.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From 9bc13718fe8a59a4538805516be7e141070c22d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sergey Kandaurov +Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2026 16:39:37 +0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Mail: fixed clearing s->passwd in auth http requests. + +Previously, it was not properly cleared retaining length as part of +authenticating with CRAM-MD5 and APOP methods that expect to receive +password in auth response. This resulted in null pointer dereference +and worker process crash in subsequent auth attempts with CRAM-MD5. + +Reported by Arkadi Vainbrand. +--- + src/mail/ngx_mail_auth_http_module.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/mail/ngx_mail_auth_http_module.c b/src/mail/ngx_mail_auth_http_module.c +index 4ca6d6e24..3e5095a2d 100644 +--- a/src/mail/ngx_mail_auth_http_module.c ++++ b/src/mail/ngx_mail_auth_http_module.c +@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ ngx_mail_auth_http_create_request(ngx_mail_session_t *s, ngx_pool_t *pool, + b->last = ngx_cpymem(b->last, "Auth-Salt: ", sizeof("Auth-Salt: ") - 1); + b->last = ngx_copy(b->last, s->salt.data, s->salt.len); + +- s->passwd.data = NULL; ++ ngx_str_null(&s->passwd); + } + + b->last = ngx_cpymem(b->last, "Auth-Protocol: ", +-- +2.53.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0011-Mp4-avoid-zero-size-buffers-in-output.patch b/SOURCES/0011-Mp4-avoid-zero-size-buffers-in-output.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f4edbf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0011-Mp4-avoid-zero-size-buffers-in-output.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From 7725c372c2fe11ff908b1d6138be219ad694c42f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Roman Arutyunyan +Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2026 12:04:36 +0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Mp4: avoid zero size buffers in output. + +Previously, data validation checks did not cover the cases when the output +contained empty buffers. Such buffers are considered illegal and produce +"zero size buf in output" alerts. The change rejects the mp4 files which +produce such alerts. + +Also, the change fixes possible buffer overread and overwrite that could +happen while processing empty stco and co64 atoms, as reported by +Pavel Kohout (Aisle Research) and Tim Becker. +--- + src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c | 15 +++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c +index 445fab1cd..173d8ad54 100644 +--- a/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c ++++ b/src/http/modules/ngx_http_mp4_module.c +@@ -901,8 +901,11 @@ ngx_http_mp4_process(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4) + } + } + +- if (end_offset < start_offset) { +- end_offset = start_offset; ++ if (end_offset <= start_offset) { ++ ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, ++ "no data between start time and end time in \"%s\"", ++ mp4->file.name.data); ++ return NGX_ERROR; + } + + mp4->moov_size += 8; +@@ -913,7 +916,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_process(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4) + + *prev = &mp4->mdat_atom; + +- if (start_offset > mp4->mdat_data.buf->file_last) { ++ if (start_offset >= mp4->mdat_data.buf->file_last) { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, + "start time is out mp4 mdat atom in \"%s\"", + mp4->file.name.data); +@@ -3444,7 +3447,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_stsz_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4, + if (data) { + entries = trak->sample_sizes_entries; + +- if (trak->start_sample > entries) { ++ if (trak->start_sample >= entries) { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, + "start time is out mp4 stsz samples in \"%s\"", + mp4->file.name.data); +@@ -3619,7 +3622,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_stco_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4, + return NGX_ERROR; + } + +- if (trak->start_chunk > trak->chunks) { ++ if (trak->start_chunk >= trak->chunks) { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, + "start time is out mp4 stco chunks in \"%s\"", + mp4->file.name.data); +@@ -3834,7 +3837,7 @@ ngx_http_mp4_update_co64_atom(ngx_http_mp4_file_t *mp4, + return NGX_ERROR; + } + +- if (trak->start_chunk > trak->chunks) { ++ if (trak->start_chunk >= trak->chunks) { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, mp4->file.log, 0, + "start time is out mp4 co64 chunks in \"%s\"", + mp4->file.name.data); +-- +2.53.0 + diff --git a/SPECS/nginx.spec b/SPECS/nginx.spec index c392b35..51b91c6 100644 --- a/SPECS/nginx.spec +++ b/SPECS/nginx.spec @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Name: nginx Epoch: 1 Version: 1.24.0 -Release: 2%{?dist} +Release: 3%{?dist} Summary: A high performance web server and reverse proxy server Group: System Environment/Daemons @@ -81,6 +81,23 @@ Patch6: nginx-1.22-CVE-2023-44487.patch # upstream patch - https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/784fa05025cb8cd0c770f99bc79d2794b9f85b6e Patch7: 0007-Upstream-detect-premature-plain-text-response-from-S.patch +# https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHEL-159561 +# upstream patch - https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/a1d18284e0a17 +# whitespace were removed from the patch +Patch8: 0008-Dav-destination-length-validation-for-COPY-and-MOVE.patch + +# https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHEL-159540 +# upstream patch - https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/3568812cf98df +Patch9: 0009-Mp4-fixed-possible-integer-overflow-on-32-bit-platfo.patch + +# https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHEL-159448 +# upstream patch - https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/9bc13718fe8a59a45 +Patch10: 0010-Mail-fixed-clearing-s-passwd-in-auth-http-requests.patch + +# https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHEL-157889 +# upstream patch - https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/7725c372c2f +Patch11: 0011-Mp4-avoid-zero-size-buffers-in-output.patch + %if 0%{?with_gperftools} BuildRequires: gperftools-devel %endif @@ -231,14 +248,18 @@ Requires: zlib-devel %prep %setup -q -%patch0 -p0 -%patch1 -p1 -%patch2 -p1 -%patch3 -p1 -%patch4 -p1 -%patch5 -p1 -%patch6 -p1 -%patch7 -p1 +%patch -P0 -p0 +%patch -P1 -p1 +%patch -P2 -p1 +%patch -P3 -p1 +%patch -P4 -p1 +%patch -P5 -p1 +%patch -P6 -p1 +%patch -P7 -p1 +%patch -P8 -p1 +%patch -P9 -p1 +%patch -P10 -p1 +%patch -P11 -p1 cp %{SOURCE200} %{SOURCE210} %{SOURCE10} %{SOURCE12} . @@ -551,6 +572,16 @@ fi %{nginx_srcdir}/ %changelog +* Fri Mar 27 2026 Zdenek Dohnal - 1:1.24.0-3 +- Resolves: RHEL-157877 CVE-2026-32647 nginx:1.24/nginx: NGINX: Denial of + Service or Code Execution via specially crafted MP4 files +- Resolves: RHEL-159436 CVE-2026-27651 nginx:1.24/nginx: NGINX: Denial of + Service via undisclosed requests when ngx_mail_auth_http_module is enabled +- Resolves: RHEL-159549 CVE-2026-27654 nginx:1.24/nginx: NGINX: Denial of + Service or file modification via buffer overflow in ngx_http_dav_module +- Resolves: RHEL-159528 CVE-2026-27784 nginx:1.24/nginx: NGINX: Denial of + Service due to memory corruption via crafted MP4 file + * Sun Feb 22 2026 Luboš Uhliarik - 1:1.24.0-2 - Resolves: RHEL-146517 - nginx:1.24/nginx: NGINX: Data injection via man-in-the-middle attack on TLS proxied connections (CVE-2026-1642)