SOURCES/nettle-3.4.1-ecdsa-verify.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From 932ea29845da1ae350d9c056cb2cb0379a66d642 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2021 09:22:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Port upstream hardening of EC scaler multiplication
+
+Some internal functions used in point multiplications are known to
+misbehave if the scaler is out-of-range.  This performs canonical
+reduction on scalers, before point multiplication.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
+---
+ ecc-ecdsa-sign.c   |  7 +++++--
+ ecc-ecdsa-verify.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
+ eddsa-hash.c       |  9 +++++++--
+ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c b/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c
+index 3b9e9cc1..45062528 100644
+--- a/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c
++++ b/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ ecc_ecdsa_sign (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
+ 		mp_limb_t *rp, mp_limb_t *sp,
+ 		mp_limb_t *scratch)
+ {
++  mp_limb_t cy;
++
+ #define P	    scratch
+ #define kinv	    scratch                /* Needs 5*ecc->p.size for computation */
+ #define hp	    (scratch  + ecc->p.size) /* NOTE: ecc->p.size + 1 limbs! */
+@@ -91,8 +93,9 @@ ecc_ecdsa_sign (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
+   ecc_modq_mul (ecc, tp, zp, rp);
+   ecc_modq_add (ecc, hp, hp, tp);
+   ecc_modq_mul (ecc, tp, hp, kinv);
+-
+-  mpn_copyi (sp, tp, ecc->p.size);
++  /* Ensure canonical reduction. */
++  cy = mpn_sub_n (sp, tp, ecc->q.m, ecc->q.size);
++  cnd_copy (cy, sp, tp, ecc->q.size);
+ #undef P
+ #undef hp
+ #undef kinv
+diff --git a/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c b/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c
+index d7f5b684..6b8acb07 100644
+--- a/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c
++++ b/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c
+@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ ecc_ecdsa_verify (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
+ 		  const mp_limb_t *rp, const mp_limb_t *sp,
+ 		  mp_limb_t *scratch)
+ {
++  mp_limb_t cy;
++
+   /* Procedure, according to RFC 6090, "KT-I". q denotes the group
+      order.
+ 
+@@ -98,6 +100,7 @@ ecc_ecdsa_verify (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
+ #define P1 (scratch + 4*ecc->p.size)
+ #define sinv (scratch)
+ #define hp (scratch + ecc->p.size)
++#define tp (scratch + 4*ecc->p.size)
+ 
+   if (! (ecdsa_in_range (ecc, rp)
+ 	 && ecdsa_in_range (ecc, sp)))
+@@ -112,10 +115,16 @@ ecc_ecdsa_verify (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
+ 
+   /* u1 = h / s, P1 = u1 * G */
+   ecc_hash (&ecc->q, hp, length, digest);
+-  ecc_modq_mul (ecc, u1, hp, sinv);
++  ecc_modq_mul (ecc, tp, hp, sinv);
++  /* Ensure canonical reduction. */
++  cy = mpn_sub_n (u1, tp, ecc->q.m, ecc->q.size);
++  cnd_copy (cy, u1, tp, ecc->q.size);
+ 
+   /* u2 = r / s, P2 = u2 * Y */
+-  ecc_modq_mul (ecc, u2, rp, sinv);
++  ecc_modq_mul (ecc, hp, rp, sinv);
++  /* Ensure canonical reduction. */
++  cy = mpn_sub_n (u2, hp, ecc->q.m, ecc->q.size);
++  cnd_copy (cy, u2, hp, ecc->q.size);
+ 
+    /* Total storage: 5*ecc->p.size + ecc->mul_itch */
+   ecc->mul (ecc, P2, u2, pp, u2 + ecc->p.size);
+@@ -154,4 +163,5 @@ ecc_ecdsa_verify (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
+ #undef u2
+ #undef hp
+ #undef u1
++#undef tp
+ }
+diff --git a/eddsa-hash.c b/eddsa-hash.c
+index 4fb79f1b..53c6fc49 100644
+--- a/eddsa-hash.c
++++ b/eddsa-hash.c
+@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ void
+ _eddsa_hash (const struct ecc_modulo *m,
+ 	     mp_limb_t *rp, const uint8_t *digest)
+ {
++  mp_limb_t cy;
++
+   size_t nbytes = 1 + m->bit_size / 8;
+-  mpn_set_base256_le (rp, 2*m->size, digest, 2*nbytes);
+-  m->mod (m, rp);
++  mpn_set_base256_le (rp + m->size, 2*m->size, digest, 2*nbytes);
++  m->mod (m, rp + m->size);
++  /* Ensure canonical reduction. */
++  cy = mpn_sub_n (rp, rp + m->size, m->m, m->size);
++  cnd_copy (cy, rp, rp + m->size, m->size);
+ }
+-- 
+2.30.2
+

SOURCES/nettle-3.4.1-rsa-decrypt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,609 @@
+From 5646ca77ee92de0ae33e7d2e0a3383c61a4091ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 21:30:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Add check that message length to _pkcs1_sec_decrypt is
+ valid.
+
+* pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
+length is valid, for given key size.
+* testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
+calls to rsa_sec_decrypt specifying a too large message length.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 7616541e6eff73353bf682c62e3a68e4fe696707)
+---
+ ChangeLog                        |  8 ++++++++
+ pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c              |  4 +++-
+ testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
+ 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 4c7338a1..7cd0455e 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
++2021-05-06  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
++
++	Bug fixes merged from from 3.7.3 release (starting from 2021-05-06).
++	* pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
++	length is valid, for given key size.
++	* testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
++	calls to rsa_sec_decrypt specifying a too large message length.
++
+ 2018-12-04  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+ 
+ 	* Released nettle-3.4.1.
+diff --git a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
+index 722044b0..02fd07e1 100644
+--- a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
++++ b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
+@@ -64,7 +64,9 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt (size_t length, uint8_t *message,
+   volatile int ok;
+   size_t i, t;
+ 
+-  assert (padded_message_length >= length);
++  /* Message independent branch */
++  if (length + 11 > padded_message_length)
++    return 0;
+ 
+   t = padded_message_length - length - 1;
+ 
+diff --git a/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c b/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
+index 64f0b13c..4a9f301b 100644
+--- a/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
++++ b/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ rsa_decrypt_for_test(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ #endif
+ 
+ #define PAYLOAD_SIZE 50
++#define DECRYPTED_SIZE 256
+ void
+ test_main(void)
+ {
+@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ test_main(void)
+   struct knuth_lfib_ctx random_ctx;
+ 
+   uint8_t plaintext[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
+-  uint8_t decrypted[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
++  uint8_t decrypted[DECRYPTED_SIZE];
+   uint8_t verifybad[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
+   unsigned n_size = 1024;
+   mpz_t gibberish;
+@@ -98,6 +99,20 @@ test_main(void)
+                                     PAYLOAD_SIZE, decrypted, gibberish) == 1);
+       ASSERT (MEMEQ (PAYLOAD_SIZE, plaintext, decrypted));
+ 
++      ASSERT (pub.size > 10);
++      ASSERT (pub.size <= DECRYPTED_SIZE);
++
++      /* Check that too large message length is rejected, largest
++	 valid size is pub.size - 11. */
++      ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
++				     (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++				     pub.size - 10, decrypted, gibberish));
++
++      /* This case used to result in arithmetic underflow and a crash. */
++      ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
++				     (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++				     pub.size, decrypted, gibberish));
++
+       /* bad one */
+       memcpy(decrypted, verifybad, PAYLOAD_SIZE);
+       nettle_mpz_random_size(garbage, &random_ctx,
+-- 
+2.31.1
+
+
+From 743cdf38353f6dd5d3d91eadc769106cfc116301 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 21:30:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Fix comment typos.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0a714543136de97c7fd34f1c6ac1592dc5036879)
+---
+ pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
+index 02fd07e1..a7f85c2e 100644
+--- a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
++++ b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
+@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt_variable(size_t *length, uint8_t *message,
+ 
+   /* length is discovered in a side-channel silent way.
+    * not_found goes to 0 when the terminator is found.
+-   * offset strts at 3 as it includes the terminator and
+-   * the fomat bytes already */
++   * offset starts at 3 as it includes the terminator and
++   * the format bytes already */
+   offset = 3;
+   for (i = 2; i < padded_message_length; i++)
+     {
+-- 
+2.31.1
+
+
+From dfce46c4540d2abf040073070cff15f9d1708050 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 21:31:39 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Change _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr to take a fix input size.
+
+Improves consistency with _rsa_sec_compute_root, and fixes zero-input bug.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 485b5e2820a057e873b1ba812fdb39cae4adf98c)
+---
+ ChangeLog                    | 17 +++++++++-
+ rsa-decrypt-tr.c             |  7 ++---
+ rsa-internal.h               |  4 +--
+ rsa-sec-decrypt.c            |  9 ++++--
+ rsa-sign-tr.c                | 61 +++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c | 14 ++++++++-
+ 6 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 7cd0455e..ae660fc0 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,6 +1,21 @@
+-2021-05-06  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
++2021-05-14  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+ 
+ 	Bug fixes merged from from 3.7.3 release (starting from 2021-05-06).
++	* rsa-sign-tr.c (rsa_sec_blind): Delete mn argument.
++	(_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr): Delete mn argument, instead require
++	that input size matches key size. Rearrange use of temporary
++	storage, to support in-place operation, x == m. Update all
++	callers.
++
++	* rsa-decrypt-tr.c (rsa_decrypt_tr): Make zero-padded copy of
++	input, for calling _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr.
++	* rsa-sec-decrypt.c (rsa_sec_decrypt): Likewise.
++
++	* testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c (test_main): Test calling all of
++	rsa_decrypt, rsa_decrypt_tr, and rsa_sec_decrypt with zero input.
++
++2021-05-06  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
++
+ 	* pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
+ 	length is valid, for given key size.
+ 	* testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
+diff --git a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+index 5dfb91b1..c118e852 100644
+--- a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
++++ b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+@@ -52,14 +52,13 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+   mp_size_t key_limb_size;
+   int res;
+ 
+-  key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
++  key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
+ 
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size);
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
++  mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, key_limb_size);
+ 
+-  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
+-				  mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
+-				  mpz_size(gibberish));
++  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
+ 
+   mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, key_limb_size);
+ 
+diff --git a/rsa-internal.h b/rsa-internal.h
+index bd667bc2..64a7edf6 100644
+--- a/rsa-internal.h
++++ b/rsa-internal.h
+@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+                       mp_limb_t *scratch);
+ 
+ /* Safe side-channel silent variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the
+- * result after CRT. */
++ * result after CRT. In-place calls, with x == m, is allowed. */
+ int
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ 			 const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+ 			 void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+-			 mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn);
++			 mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m);
+ 
+ /* additional resistance to memory access side-channel attacks.
+  * Note: message buffer is returned unchanged on error */
+diff --git a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+index e6a4b267..633a6852 100644
+--- a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
++++ b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+@@ -57,9 +57,12 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n));
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
+ 
+-  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
+-				  mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
+-				  mpz_size(gibberish));
++  /* We need a copy because m can be shorter than key_size,
++   * but _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr expect all inputs to be
++   * normalized to a key_size long buffer length */
++  mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, mpz_size(pub->n));
++
++  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
+ 
+   mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, mpz_size(pub->n));
+ 
+diff --git a/rsa-sign-tr.c b/rsa-sign-tr.c
+index 59c9bd07..141a52c7 100644
+--- a/rsa-sign-tr.c
++++ b/rsa-sign-tr.c
+@@ -131,35 +131,34 @@ int
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ 			 const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+ 			 void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+-			 mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
++			 mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
+ {
++  mp_size_t nn;
+   mpz_t mz;
+   mpz_t xz;
+   int res;
+ 
+-  mpz_init(mz);
+   mpz_init(xz);
+ 
+-  mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(mz, mn), m, mn);
+-  mpz_limbs_finish(mz, mn);
++  nn = mpz_size (pub->n);
+ 
+-  res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz, mz);
++  res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz,
++			    mpz_roinit_n(mz, m, nn));
+ 
+   if (res)
+-    mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, mpz_size(pub->n));
++    mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, nn);
+ 
+-  mpz_clear(mz);
+   mpz_clear(xz);
+   return res;
+ }
+ #else
+ /* Blinds m, by computing c = m r^e (mod n), for a random r. Also
+-   returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. */
++   returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. Must have c != m,
++   no in-place operation.*/
+ static void
+ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+                void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+-               mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m,
+-               mp_size_t mn)
++               mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m)
+ {
+   const mp_limb_t *ep = mpz_limbs_read (pub->e);
+   const mp_limb_t *np = mpz_limbs_read (pub->n);
+@@ -177,15 +176,15 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ 
+   /* c = m*(r^e) mod n */
+   itch = mpn_sec_powm_itch(nn, ebn, nn);
+-  i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, mn);
++  i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, nn);
+   itch = MAX(itch, i2);
+-  i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(nn + mn, nn);
++  i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(2*nn, nn);
+   itch = MAX(itch, i2);
+   i2 = mpn_sec_invert_itch(nn);
+   itch = MAX(itch, i2);
+ 
+-  TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, nn + mn + itch);
+-  scratch = tp + nn + mn;
++  TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, 2*nn  + itch);
++  scratch = tp + 2*nn;
+ 
+   /* ri = r^(-1) */
+   do
+@@ -198,9 +197,8 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+   while (!mpn_sec_invert (ri, tp, np, nn, 2 * nn * GMP_NUMB_BITS, scratch));
+ 
+   mpn_sec_powm (c, rp, nn, ep, ebn, np, nn, scratch);
+-  /* normally mn == nn, but m can be smaller in some cases */
+-  mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, mn, scratch);
+-  mpn_sec_div_r (tp, nn + mn, np, nn, scratch);
++  mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, nn, scratch);
++  mpn_sec_div_r (tp, 2*nn, np, nn, scratch);
+   mpn_copyi(c, tp, nn);
+ 
+   TMP_GMP_FREE (r);
+@@ -208,7 +206,7 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+   TMP_GMP_FREE (tp);
+ }
+ 
+-/* m = c ri mod n */
++/* m = c ri mod n. Allows x == c. */
+ static void
+ rsa_sec_unblind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+                  mp_limb_t *x, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *c)
+@@ -298,7 +296,7 @@ int
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ 			 const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+ 			 void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+-			 mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
++			 mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
+ {
+   TMP_GMP_DECL (c, mp_limb_t);
+   TMP_GMP_DECL (ri, mp_limb_t);
+@@ -306,7 +304,7 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+   size_t key_limb_size;
+   int ret;
+ 
+-  key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
++  key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
+ 
+   /* mpz_powm_sec handles only odd moduli. If p, q or n is even, the
+      key is invalid and rejected by rsa_private_key_prepare. However,
+@@ -320,19 +318,18 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+     }
+ 
+   assert(mpz_size(pub->n) == key_limb_size);
+-  assert(mn <= key_limb_size);
+ 
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (c, key_limb_size);
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (ri, key_limb_size);
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (scratch, _rsa_sec_compute_root_itch(key));
+ 
+-  rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, x, ri, m, mn);
++  rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, c, ri, m);
+ 
+-  _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, c, x, scratch);
++  _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, x, c, scratch);
+ 
+-  ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, c, x);
++  ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, x, c);
+ 
+-  rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, c);
++  rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, x);
+ 
+   cnd_mpn_zero(1 - ret, x, key_limb_size);
+ 
+@@ -356,17 +353,17 @@ rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ 		    mpz_t x, const mpz_t m)
+ {
+   TMP_GMP_DECL (l, mp_limb_t);
++  mp_size_t nn = mpz_size(pub->n);
+   int res;
+ 
+-  mp_size_t l_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
+-  TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, l_size);
++  TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, nn);
++  mpz_limbs_copy(l, m, nn);
+ 
+-  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l,
+-				  mpz_limbs_read(m), mpz_size(m));
++  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l, l);
+   if (res) {
+-    mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, l_size);
+-    mpn_copyi (xp, l, l_size);
+-    mpz_limbs_finish (x, l_size);
++    mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, nn);
++    mpn_copyi (xp, l, nn);
++    mpz_limbs_finish (x, nn);
+   }
+ 
+   TMP_GMP_FREE (l);
+diff --git a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+index 87525f78..d3bc374b 100644
+--- a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
++++ b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ test_main(void)
+   uint8_t after;
+ 
+   mpz_t gibberish;
++  mpz_t zero;
+ 
+   rsa_private_key_init(&key);
+   rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
+@@ -101,6 +102,17 @@ test_main(void)
+   ASSERT(decrypted[decrypted_length] == after);
+   ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A');
+ 
++  /* Test zero input. */
++  mpz_init_set_ui (zero, 0);
++  decrypted_length = msg_length;
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
++			 &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++			 &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
++			  &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++			  decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++  ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
+ 
+   /* Test invalid key. */
+   mpz_add_ui (key.q, key.q, 2);
+@@ -112,6 +124,6 @@ test_main(void)
+   rsa_private_key_clear(&key);
+   rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);
+   mpz_clear(gibberish);
++  mpz_clear(zero);
+   free(decrypted);
+ }
+-  
+-- 
+2.31.1
+
+
+From f601611b3c315aba373c0ab2ddf24772e88c1b3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 21:32:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Add input check to rsa_decrypt family of functions.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0ad0b5df315665250dfdaa4a1e087f4799edaefe)
+---
+ ChangeLog                    | 10 +++++++++-
+ rsa-decrypt-tr.c             |  4 ++++
+ rsa-decrypt.c                | 10 ++++++++++
+ rsa-sec-decrypt.c            |  4 ++++
+ rsa.h                        |  5 +++--
+ testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 6 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index ae660fc0..27f022db 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,6 +1,14 @@
+-2021-05-14  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
++2021-05-17  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+ 
+ 	Bug fixes merged from from 3.7.3 release (starting from 2021-05-06).
++	* rsa-decrypt-tr.c (rsa_decrypt_tr): Check up-front that input is
++	in range.
++	* rsa-sec-decrypt.c (rsa_sec_decrypt): Likewise.
++	* rsa-decrypt.c (rsa_decrypt): Likewise.
++	* testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c (test_main): Add tests with input > n.
++
++2021-05-14  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
++
+ 	* rsa-sign-tr.c (rsa_sec_blind): Delete mn argument.
+ 	(_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr): Delete mn argument, instead require
+ 	that input size matches key size. Rearrange use of temporary
+diff --git a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+index c118e852..1ba3d286 100644
+--- a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
++++ b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+   mp_size_t key_limb_size;
+   int res;
+ 
++  /* First check that input is in range. */
++  if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
++    return 0;
++
+   key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
+ 
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size);
+diff --git a/rsa-decrypt.c b/rsa-decrypt.c
+index 7681439d..540d8baa 100644
+--- a/rsa-decrypt.c
++++ b/rsa-decrypt.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,16 @@ rsa_decrypt(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+   int res;
+ 
+   mpz_init(m);
++
++  /* First check that input is in range. Since we don't have the
++     public key available here, we need to reconstruct n. */
++  mpz_mul (m, key->p, key->q);
++  if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, m) >= 0)
++    {
++      mpz_clear (m);
++      return 0;
++    }
++
+   rsa_compute_root(key, m, gibberish);
+ 
+   res = pkcs1_decrypt (key->size, m, length, message);
+diff --git a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+index 633a6852..53113c69 100644
+--- a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
++++ b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+   TMP_GMP_DECL (em, uint8_t);
+   int res;
+ 
++  /* First check that input is in range. */
++  if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
++    return 0;
++
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n));
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
+ 
+diff --git a/rsa.h b/rsa.h
+index 0aac6a26..54c35688 100644
+--- a/rsa.h
++++ b/rsa.h
+@@ -433,13 +433,14 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ 	        size_t length, uint8_t *message,
+ 	        const mpz_t gibberish);
+ 
+-/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed. */
++/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed.
++   It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
+ void
+ rsa_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+ 		 mpz_t x, const mpz_t m);
+ 
+ /* Safer variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the result after
+-   CRT. */
++   CRT. It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
+ int
+ rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ 		    const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+diff --git a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+index d3bc374b..d1a440f6 100644
+--- a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
++++ b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+@@ -19,11 +19,12 @@ test_main(void)
+   uint8_t after;
+ 
+   mpz_t gibberish;
+-  mpz_t zero;
++  mpz_t bad_input;
+ 
+   rsa_private_key_init(&key);
+   rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
+   mpz_init(gibberish);
++  mpz_init(bad_input);
+ 
+   knuth_lfib_init(&lfib, 17);
+   
+@@ -103,15 +104,40 @@ test_main(void)
+   ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A');
+ 
+   /* Test zero input. */
+-  mpz_init_set_ui (zero, 0);
++  mpz_set_ui (bad_input, 0);
+   decrypted_length = msg_length;
+-  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+   ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
+ 			 &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+-			 &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++			 &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+   ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
+ 			  &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+-			  decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++			  decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
++
++  /* Test input that is slightly larger than n */
++  mpz_add(bad_input, gibberish, pub.n);
++  decrypted_length = msg_length;
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
++			 &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++			 &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
++			  &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++			  decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
++
++  /* Test input that is considerably larger than n */
++  mpz_mul_2exp (bad_input, pub.n, 100);
++  mpz_add (bad_input, bad_input, gibberish);
++  decrypted_length = msg_length;
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
++			 &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++			 &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
++			  &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++			  decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+   ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
+ 
+   /* Test invalid key. */
+@@ -124,6 +150,6 @@ test_main(void)
+   rsa_private_key_clear(&key);
+   rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);
+   mpz_clear(gibberish);
+-  mpz_clear(zero);
++  mpz_clear(bad_input);
+   free(decrypted);
+ }
+-- 
+2.31.1
+

SPECS/nettle.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:           nettle
 Version:        3.4.1
-Release:        2%{?dist}
+Release:        7%{?dist}
 Summary:        A low-level cryptographic library
 
 Group:          Development/Libraries
@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ Source0:	%{name}-%{version}-hobbled.tar.xz
 Patch0:		nettle-3.3-remove-ecc-testsuite.patch
 Patch1:		nettle-3.4-annocheck.patch
 Patch2:		nettle-3.4.1-enable-intel-cet.patch
+# https://lists.lysator.liu.se/pipermail/nettle-bugs/2021/009458.html
+Patch3:		nettle-3.4.1-ecdsa-verify.patch
+Patch4:		nettle-3.4.1-powerpc64-aes-asm.patch
+Patch5:		nettle-3.4.1-powerpc64-ghash-asm.patch
+Patch6:		nettle-3.4.1-rsa-decrypt.patch
 
 BuildRequires:  gcc
 BuildRequires:  gmp-devel, m4
@@ -54,6 +59,10 @@ sed 's/ecc-224.c//g' -i Makefile.in
 %patch0 -p1
 %patch1 -p1
 %patch2 -p1
+%patch3 -p1
+%patch4 -p1
+%patch5 -p1
+%patch6 -p1
 
 %build
 autoreconf -ifv
@@ -126,6 +135,22 @@ fi
 
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Jul 14 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-7
+- Backport CVE-2021-3580 from upstream 3.7.3 release (#1967990)
+
+* Wed Jul 14 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-6
+- Enable CTR mode optimization when the block size is 16
+
+* Wed Jun 30 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-5
+- Backport powerpc64 optimization patches from upstream (#1855228)
+  Patch from Christopher M. Riedl.
+
+* Wed Apr  7 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-4
+- Fix patch application
+
+* Tue Mar 30 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-3
+- Port fixes for potential miscalculation in ecdsa_verify (#1942925)
+
 * Fri May 15 2020 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-2
 - Enable Intel CET support (#1737542)