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109
SOURCES/nettle-3.4.1-ecdsa-verify.patch
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@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
From 932ea29845da1ae350d9c056cb2cb0379a66d642 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2021 09:22:47 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Port upstream hardening of EC scaler multiplication
Some internal functions used in point multiplications are known to
misbehave if the scaler is out-of-range. This performs canonical
reduction on scalers, before point multiplication.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
---
ecc-ecdsa-sign.c | 7 +++++--
ecc-ecdsa-verify.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
eddsa-hash.c | 9 +++++++--
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c b/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c
index 3b9e9cc1..45062528 100644
--- a/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c
+++ b/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ ecc_ecdsa_sign (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
mp_limb_t *rp, mp_limb_t *sp,
mp_limb_t *scratch)
{
+ mp_limb_t cy;
+
#define P scratch
#define kinv scratch /* Needs 5*ecc->p.size for computation */
#define hp (scratch + ecc->p.size) /* NOTE: ecc->p.size + 1 limbs! */
@@ -91,8 +93,9 @@ ecc_ecdsa_sign (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
ecc_modq_mul (ecc, tp, zp, rp);
ecc_modq_add (ecc, hp, hp, tp);
ecc_modq_mul (ecc, tp, hp, kinv);
-
- mpn_copyi (sp, tp, ecc->p.size);
+ /* Ensure canonical reduction. */
+ cy = mpn_sub_n (sp, tp, ecc->q.m, ecc->q.size);
+ cnd_copy (cy, sp, tp, ecc->q.size);
#undef P
#undef hp
#undef kinv
diff --git a/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c b/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c
index d7f5b684..6b8acb07 100644
--- a/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c
+++ b/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ ecc_ecdsa_verify (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
const mp_limb_t *rp, const mp_limb_t *sp,
mp_limb_t *scratch)
{
+ mp_limb_t cy;
+
/* Procedure, according to RFC 6090, "KT-I". q denotes the group
order.
@@ -98,6 +100,7 @@ ecc_ecdsa_verify (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
#define P1 (scratch + 4*ecc->p.size)
#define sinv (scratch)
#define hp (scratch + ecc->p.size)
+#define tp (scratch + 4*ecc->p.size)
if (! (ecdsa_in_range (ecc, rp)
&& ecdsa_in_range (ecc, sp)))
@@ -112,10 +115,16 @@ ecc_ecdsa_verify (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
/* u1 = h / s, P1 = u1 * G */
ecc_hash (&ecc->q, hp, length, digest);
- ecc_modq_mul (ecc, u1, hp, sinv);
+ ecc_modq_mul (ecc, tp, hp, sinv);
+ /* Ensure canonical reduction. */
+ cy = mpn_sub_n (u1, tp, ecc->q.m, ecc->q.size);
+ cnd_copy (cy, u1, tp, ecc->q.size);
/* u2 = r / s, P2 = u2 * Y */
- ecc_modq_mul (ecc, u2, rp, sinv);
+ ecc_modq_mul (ecc, hp, rp, sinv);
+ /* Ensure canonical reduction. */
+ cy = mpn_sub_n (u2, hp, ecc->q.m, ecc->q.size);
+ cnd_copy (cy, u2, hp, ecc->q.size);
/* Total storage: 5*ecc->p.size + ecc->mul_itch */
ecc->mul (ecc, P2, u2, pp, u2 + ecc->p.size);
@@ -154,4 +163,5 @@ ecc_ecdsa_verify (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
#undef u2
#undef hp
#undef u1
+#undef tp
}
diff --git a/eddsa-hash.c b/eddsa-hash.c
index 4fb79f1b..53c6fc49 100644
--- a/eddsa-hash.c
+++ b/eddsa-hash.c
@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ void
_eddsa_hash (const struct ecc_modulo *m,
mp_limb_t *rp, const uint8_t *digest)
{
+ mp_limb_t cy;
+
size_t nbytes = 1 + m->bit_size / 8;
- mpn_set_base256_le (rp, 2*m->size, digest, 2*nbytes);
- m->mod (m, rp);
+ mpn_set_base256_le (rp + m->size, 2*m->size, digest, 2*nbytes);
+ m->mod (m, rp + m->size);
+ /* Ensure canonical reduction. */
+ cy = mpn_sub_n (rp, rp + m->size, m->m, m->size);
+ cnd_copy (cy, rp, rp + m->size, m->size);
}
--
2.30.2

1142
SOURCES/nettle-3.4.1-powerpc64-aes-asm.patch
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

1519
SOURCES/nettle-3.4.1-powerpc64-ghash-asm.patch
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

609
SOURCES/nettle-3.4.1-rsa-decrypt.patch
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@ -1,609 +0,0 @@
From 5646ca77ee92de0ae33e7d2e0a3383c61a4091ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 21:30:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Add check that message length to _pkcs1_sec_decrypt is
valid.
* pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
length is valid, for given key size.
* testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
calls to rsa_sec_decrypt specifying a too large message length.
(cherry picked from commit 7616541e6eff73353bf682c62e3a68e4fe696707)
---
ChangeLog | 8 ++++++++
pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c | 4 +++-
testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 4c7338a1..7cd0455e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+2021-05-06 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+
+ Bug fixes merged from from 3.7.3 release (starting from 2021-05-06).
+ * pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
+ length is valid, for given key size.
+ * testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
+ calls to rsa_sec_decrypt specifying a too large message length.
+
2018-12-04 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
* Released nettle-3.4.1.
diff --git a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
index 722044b0..02fd07e1 100644
--- a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
+++ b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -64,7 +64,9 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt (size_t length, uint8_t *message,
volatile int ok;
size_t i, t;
- assert (padded_message_length >= length);
+ /* Message independent branch */
+ if (length + 11 > padded_message_length)
+ return 0;
t = padded_message_length - length - 1;
diff --git a/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c b/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
index 64f0b13c..4a9f301b 100644
--- a/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
+++ b/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ rsa_decrypt_for_test(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
#endif
#define PAYLOAD_SIZE 50
+#define DECRYPTED_SIZE 256
void
test_main(void)
{
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ test_main(void)
struct knuth_lfib_ctx random_ctx;
uint8_t plaintext[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
- uint8_t decrypted[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
+ uint8_t decrypted[DECRYPTED_SIZE];
uint8_t verifybad[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
unsigned n_size = 1024;
mpz_t gibberish;
@@ -98,6 +99,20 @@ test_main(void)
PAYLOAD_SIZE, decrypted, gibberish) == 1);
ASSERT (MEMEQ (PAYLOAD_SIZE, plaintext, decrypted));
+ ASSERT (pub.size > 10);
+ ASSERT (pub.size <= DECRYPTED_SIZE);
+
+ /* Check that too large message length is rejected, largest
+ valid size is pub.size - 11. */
+ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
+ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ pub.size - 10, decrypted, gibberish));
+
+ /* This case used to result in arithmetic underflow and a crash. */
+ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
+ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ pub.size, decrypted, gibberish));
+
/* bad one */
memcpy(decrypted, verifybad, PAYLOAD_SIZE);
nettle_mpz_random_size(garbage, &random_ctx,
--
2.31.1
From 743cdf38353f6dd5d3d91eadc769106cfc116301 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 21:30:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Fix comment typos.
(cherry picked from commit 0a714543136de97c7fd34f1c6ac1592dc5036879)
---
pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
index 02fd07e1..a7f85c2e 100644
--- a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
+++ b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt_variable(size_t *length, uint8_t *message,
/* length is discovered in a side-channel silent way.
* not_found goes to 0 when the terminator is found.
- * offset strts at 3 as it includes the terminator and
- * the fomat bytes already */
+ * offset starts at 3 as it includes the terminator and
+ * the format bytes already */
offset = 3;
for (i = 2; i < padded_message_length; i++)
{
--
2.31.1
From dfce46c4540d2abf040073070cff15f9d1708050 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 21:31:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Change _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr to take a fix input size.
Improves consistency with _rsa_sec_compute_root, and fixes zero-input bug.
(cherry picked from commit 485b5e2820a057e873b1ba812fdb39cae4adf98c)
---
ChangeLog | 17 +++++++++-
rsa-decrypt-tr.c | 7 ++---
rsa-internal.h | 4 +--
rsa-sec-decrypt.c | 9 ++++--
rsa-sign-tr.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++-------------------
testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c | 14 ++++++++-
6 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 7cd0455e..ae660fc0 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,21 @@
-2021-05-06 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+2021-05-14 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Bug fixes merged from from 3.7.3 release (starting from 2021-05-06).
+ * rsa-sign-tr.c (rsa_sec_blind): Delete mn argument.
+ (_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr): Delete mn argument, instead require
+ that input size matches key size. Rearrange use of temporary
+ storage, to support in-place operation, x == m. Update all
+ callers.
+
+ * rsa-decrypt-tr.c (rsa_decrypt_tr): Make zero-padded copy of
+ input, for calling _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr.
+ * rsa-sec-decrypt.c (rsa_sec_decrypt): Likewise.
+
+ * testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c (test_main): Test calling all of
+ rsa_decrypt, rsa_decrypt_tr, and rsa_sec_decrypt with zero input.
+
+2021-05-06 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+
* pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
length is valid, for given key size.
* testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
diff --git a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
index 5dfb91b1..c118e852 100644
--- a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+++ b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
@@ -52,14 +52,13 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
mp_size_t key_limb_size;
int res;
- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
+ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
+ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, key_limb_size);
- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
- mpz_size(gibberish));
+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, key_limb_size);
diff --git a/rsa-internal.h b/rsa-internal.h
index bd667bc2..64a7edf6 100644
--- a/rsa-internal.h
+++ b/rsa-internal.h
@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
mp_limb_t *scratch);
/* Safe side-channel silent variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the
- * result after CRT. */
+ * result after CRT. In-place calls, with x == m, is allowed. */
int
_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn);
+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m);
/* additional resistance to memory access side-channel attacks.
* Note: message buffer is returned unchanged on error */
diff --git a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
index e6a4b267..633a6852 100644
--- a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+++ b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -57,9 +57,12 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n));
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
- mpz_size(gibberish));
+ /* We need a copy because m can be shorter than key_size,
+ * but _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr expect all inputs to be
+ * normalized to a key_size long buffer length */
+ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, mpz_size(pub->n));
+
+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, mpz_size(pub->n));
diff --git a/rsa-sign-tr.c b/rsa-sign-tr.c
index 59c9bd07..141a52c7 100644
--- a/rsa-sign-tr.c
+++ b/rsa-sign-tr.c
@@ -131,35 +131,34 @@ int
_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
{
+ mp_size_t nn;
mpz_t mz;
mpz_t xz;
int res;
- mpz_init(mz);
mpz_init(xz);
- mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(mz, mn), m, mn);
- mpz_limbs_finish(mz, mn);
+ nn = mpz_size (pub->n);
- res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz, mz);
+ res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz,
+ mpz_roinit_n(mz, m, nn));
if (res)
- mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, mpz_size(pub->n));
+ mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, nn);
- mpz_clear(mz);
mpz_clear(xz);
return res;
}
#else
/* Blinds m, by computing c = m r^e (mod n), for a random r. Also
- returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. */
+ returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. Must have c != m,
+ no in-place operation.*/
static void
rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m,
- mp_size_t mn)
+ mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m)
{
const mp_limb_t *ep = mpz_limbs_read (pub->e);
const mp_limb_t *np = mpz_limbs_read (pub->n);
@@ -177,15 +176,15 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
/* c = m*(r^e) mod n */
itch = mpn_sec_powm_itch(nn, ebn, nn);
- i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, mn);
+ i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, nn);
itch = MAX(itch, i2);
- i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(nn + mn, nn);
+ i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(2*nn, nn);
itch = MAX(itch, i2);
i2 = mpn_sec_invert_itch(nn);
itch = MAX(itch, i2);
- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, nn + mn + itch);
- scratch = tp + nn + mn;
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, 2*nn + itch);
+ scratch = tp + 2*nn;
/* ri = r^(-1) */
do
@@ -198,9 +197,8 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
while (!mpn_sec_invert (ri, tp, np, nn, 2 * nn * GMP_NUMB_BITS, scratch));
mpn_sec_powm (c, rp, nn, ep, ebn, np, nn, scratch);
- /* normally mn == nn, but m can be smaller in some cases */
- mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, mn, scratch);
- mpn_sec_div_r (tp, nn + mn, np, nn, scratch);
+ mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, nn, scratch);
+ mpn_sec_div_r (tp, 2*nn, np, nn, scratch);
mpn_copyi(c, tp, nn);
TMP_GMP_FREE (r);
@@ -208,7 +206,7 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
TMP_GMP_FREE (tp);
}
-/* m = c ri mod n */
+/* m = c ri mod n. Allows x == c. */
static void
rsa_sec_unblind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
mp_limb_t *x, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *c)
@@ -298,7 +296,7 @@ int
_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
{
TMP_GMP_DECL (c, mp_limb_t);
TMP_GMP_DECL (ri, mp_limb_t);
@@ -306,7 +304,7 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
size_t key_limb_size;
int ret;
- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
+ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
/* mpz_powm_sec handles only odd moduli. If p, q or n is even, the
key is invalid and rejected by rsa_private_key_prepare. However,
@@ -320,19 +318,18 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
}
assert(mpz_size(pub->n) == key_limb_size);
- assert(mn <= key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (c, key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (ri, key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (scratch, _rsa_sec_compute_root_itch(key));
- rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, x, ri, m, mn);
+ rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, c, ri, m);
- _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, c, x, scratch);
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, x, c, scratch);
- ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, c, x);
+ ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, x, c);
- rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, c);
+ rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, x);
cnd_mpn_zero(1 - ret, x, key_limb_size);
@@ -356,17 +353,17 @@ rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
mpz_t x, const mpz_t m)
{
TMP_GMP_DECL (l, mp_limb_t);
+ mp_size_t nn = mpz_size(pub->n);
int res;
- mp_size_t l_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, l_size);
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, nn);
+ mpz_limbs_copy(l, m, nn);
- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l,
- mpz_limbs_read(m), mpz_size(m));
+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l, l);
if (res) {
- mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, l_size);
- mpn_copyi (xp, l, l_size);
- mpz_limbs_finish (x, l_size);
+ mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, nn);
+ mpn_copyi (xp, l, nn);
+ mpz_limbs_finish (x, nn);
}
TMP_GMP_FREE (l);
diff --git a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
index 87525f78..d3bc374b 100644
--- a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+++ b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ test_main(void)
uint8_t after;
mpz_t gibberish;
+ mpz_t zero;
rsa_private_key_init(&key);
rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
@@ -101,6 +102,17 @@ test_main(void)
ASSERT(decrypted[decrypted_length] == after);
ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A');
+ /* Test zero input. */
+ mpz_init_set_ui (zero, 0);
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
/* Test invalid key. */
mpz_add_ui (key.q, key.q, 2);
@@ -112,6 +124,6 @@ test_main(void)
rsa_private_key_clear(&key);
rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);
mpz_clear(gibberish);
+ mpz_clear(zero);
free(decrypted);
}
-
--
2.31.1
From f601611b3c315aba373c0ab2ddf24772e88c1b3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 21:32:38 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Add input check to rsa_decrypt family of functions.
(cherry picked from commit 0ad0b5df315665250dfdaa4a1e087f4799edaefe)
---
ChangeLog | 10 +++++++++-
rsa-decrypt-tr.c | 4 ++++
rsa-decrypt.c | 10 ++++++++++
rsa-sec-decrypt.c | 4 ++++
rsa.h | 5 +++--
testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
6 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index ae660fc0..27f022db 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,14 @@
-2021-05-14 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+2021-05-17 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Bug fixes merged from from 3.7.3 release (starting from 2021-05-06).
+ * rsa-decrypt-tr.c (rsa_decrypt_tr): Check up-front that input is
+ in range.
+ * rsa-sec-decrypt.c (rsa_sec_decrypt): Likewise.
+ * rsa-decrypt.c (rsa_decrypt): Likewise.
+ * testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c (test_main): Add tests with input > n.
+
+2021-05-14 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+
* rsa-sign-tr.c (rsa_sec_blind): Delete mn argument.
(_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr): Delete mn argument, instead require
that input size matches key size. Rearrange use of temporary
diff --git a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
index c118e852..1ba3d286 100644
--- a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+++ b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
mp_size_t key_limb_size;
int res;
+ /* First check that input is in range. */
+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
+ return 0;
+
key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size);
diff --git a/rsa-decrypt.c b/rsa-decrypt.c
index 7681439d..540d8baa 100644
--- a/rsa-decrypt.c
+++ b/rsa-decrypt.c
@@ -48,6 +48,16 @@ rsa_decrypt(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
int res;
mpz_init(m);
+
+ /* First check that input is in range. Since we don't have the
+ public key available here, we need to reconstruct n. */
+ mpz_mul (m, key->p, key->q);
+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, m) >= 0)
+ {
+ mpz_clear (m);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
rsa_compute_root(key, m, gibberish);
res = pkcs1_decrypt (key->size, m, length, message);
diff --git a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
index 633a6852..53113c69 100644
--- a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+++ b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
TMP_GMP_DECL (em, uint8_t);
int res;
+ /* First check that input is in range. */
+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
+ return 0;
+
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n));
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
diff --git a/rsa.h b/rsa.h
index 0aac6a26..54c35688 100644
--- a/rsa.h
+++ b/rsa.h
@@ -433,13 +433,14 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
size_t length, uint8_t *message,
const mpz_t gibberish);
-/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed. */
+/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed.
+ It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
void
rsa_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
mpz_t x, const mpz_t m);
/* Safer variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the result after
- CRT. */
+ CRT. It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
int
rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
diff --git a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
index d3bc374b..d1a440f6 100644
--- a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+++ b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
@@ -19,11 +19,12 @@ test_main(void)
uint8_t after;
mpz_t gibberish;
- mpz_t zero;
+ mpz_t bad_input;
rsa_private_key_init(&key);
rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
mpz_init(gibberish);
+ mpz_init(bad_input);
knuth_lfib_init(&lfib, 17);
@@ -103,15 +104,40 @@ test_main(void)
ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A');
/* Test zero input. */
- mpz_init_set_ui (zero, 0);
+ mpz_set_ui (bad_input, 0);
decrypted_length = msg_length;
- ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
&lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
- &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
&lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
- decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
+
+ /* Test input that is slightly larger than n */
+ mpz_add(bad_input, gibberish, pub.n);
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
+
+ /* Test input that is considerably larger than n */
+ mpz_mul_2exp (bad_input, pub.n, 100);
+ mpz_add (bad_input, bad_input, gibberish);
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
/* Test invalid key. */
@@ -124,6 +150,6 @@ test_main(void)
rsa_private_key_clear(&key);
rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);
mpz_clear(gibberish);
- mpz_clear(zero);
+ mpz_clear(bad_input);
free(decrypted);
}
--
2.31.1

27
SPECS/nettle.spec
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Name: nettle Name: nettle
Version: 3.4.1 Version: 3.4.1
Release: 7%{?dist} Release: 2%{?dist}
Summary: A low-level cryptographic library Summary: A low-level cryptographic library
Group: Development/Libraries Group: Development/Libraries
@ -13,11 +13,6 @@ Source0: %{name}-%{version}-hobbled.tar.xz
Patch0: nettle-3.3-remove-ecc-testsuite.patch Patch0: nettle-3.3-remove-ecc-testsuite.patch
Patch1: nettle-3.4-annocheck.patch Patch1: nettle-3.4-annocheck.patch
Patch2: nettle-3.4.1-enable-intel-cet.patch Patch2: nettle-3.4.1-enable-intel-cet.patch
# https://lists.lysator.liu.se/pipermail/nettle-bugs/2021/009458.html
Patch3: nettle-3.4.1-ecdsa-verify.patch
Patch4: nettle-3.4.1-powerpc64-aes-asm.patch
Patch5: nettle-3.4.1-powerpc64-ghash-asm.patch
Patch6: nettle-3.4.1-rsa-decrypt.patch
BuildRequires: gcc BuildRequires: gcc
BuildRequires: gmp-devel, m4 BuildRequires: gmp-devel, m4
@ -59,10 +54,6 @@ sed 's/ecc-224.c//g' -i Makefile.in
%patch0 -p1 %patch0 -p1
%patch1 -p1 %patch1 -p1
%patch2 -p1 %patch2 -p1
%patch3 -p1
%patch4 -p1
%patch5 -p1
%patch6 -p1
%build %build
autoreconf -ifv autoreconf -ifv
@ -135,22 +126,6 @@ fi
%changelog %changelog
* Wed Jul 14 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-7
- Backport CVE-2021-3580 from upstream 3.7.3 release (#1967990)
* Wed Jul 14 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-6
- Enable CTR mode optimization when the block size is 16
* Wed Jun 30 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-5
- Backport powerpc64 optimization patches from upstream (#1855228)
Patch from Christopher M. Riedl.
* Wed Apr 7 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-4
- Fix patch application
* Tue Mar 30 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-3
- Port fixes for potential miscalculation in ecdsa_verify (#1942925)
* Fri May 15 2020 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-2 * Fri May 15 2020 Anderson Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-2
- Enable Intel CET support (#1737542) - Enable Intel CET support (#1737542)