rpms/nettle
6
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity

import nettle-3.4.1-7.el8

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources 2021-07-15 14:16:36 +00:00 committed by Andrew Lukoshko
parent 3e7bab26b5
commit 713c49eb26
3 changed files with 692 additions and 41 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

114
SOURCES/nettle-3.4.1-powerpc64-ghash-asm.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,30 @@
diff -up ./configure.ac.ghash-asm ./configure.ac
--- ./configure.ac.ghash-asm 2021-06-30 16:04:51.228443240 +0200
+++ ./configure.ac 2021-06-30 16:04:51.230443230 +0200
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ asm_replace_list="aes-encrypt-internal.a
diff -up ./configure.ac.ghash ./configure.ac
--- ./configure.ac.ghash 2021-07-14 14:11:58.126891572 +0200
+++ ./configure.ac 2021-07-14 14:11:58.130891552 +0200
@@ -211,6 +211,22 @@ AC_C_BIGENDIAN([AC_DEFINE([WORDS_BIGENDI
ASM_WORDS_BIGENDIAN=yes],
[ASM_WORDS_BIGENDIAN=no])
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __builtin_bswap64],
+ nettle_cv_c_builtin_bswap64,
+[AC_TRY_LINK([
+#include <stdint.h>
+],[
+uint64_t x = 17;
+uint64_t y = __builtin_bswap64(x);
+],
+nettle_cv_c_builtin_bswap64=yes,
+nettle_cv_c_builtin_bswap64=no)])
+
+AH_TEMPLATE([HAVE_BUILTIN_BSWAP64], [Define if __builtin_bswap64 is available])
+if test "x$nettle_cv_c_builtin_bswap64" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUILTIN_BSWAP64)
+fi
+
LSH_GCC_ATTRIBUTES
# According to Simon Josefsson, looking for uint32_t and friends in
@@ -472,7 +488,7 @@ asm_replace_list="aes-encrypt-internal.a
sha3-permute.asm umac-nh.asm umac-nh-n.asm machine.m4"
# Assembler files which generate additional object files if they are used.
@ -10,7 +33,7 @@ diff -up ./configure.ac.ghash-asm ./configure.ac
aes-encrypt-internal-2.asm aes-decrypt-internal-2.asm memxor-2.asm \
salsa20-core-internal-2.asm sha1-compress-2.asm sha256-compress-2.asm \
sha3-permute-2.asm sha512-compress-2.asm \
@@ -588,6 +588,10 @@ AH_VERBATIM([HAVE_NATIVE],
@@ -588,6 +604,10 @@ AH_VERBATIM([HAVE_NATIVE],
#undef HAVE_NATIVE_ecc_384_redc
#undef HAVE_NATIVE_ecc_521_modp
#undef HAVE_NATIVE_ecc_521_redc
@ -21,9 +44,9 @@ diff -up ./configure.ac.ghash-asm ./configure.ac
#undef HAVE_NATIVE_gcm_hash8
#undef HAVE_NATIVE_salsa20_core
#undef HAVE_NATIVE_sha1_compress
diff -up ./ctr16.c.ghash-asm ./ctr16.c
--- ./ctr16.c.ghash-asm 2021-06-30 16:04:51.230443230 +0200
+++ ./ctr16.c 2021-06-30 16:04:51.230443230 +0200
diff -up ./ctr16.c.ghash ./ctr16.c
--- ./ctr16.c.ghash 2021-07-14 14:11:58.130891552 +0200
+++ ./ctr16.c 2021-07-14 14:11:58.130891552 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/* ctr16.c
+
@ -131,10 +154,10 @@ diff -up ./ctr16.c.ghash-asm ./ctr16.c
+ }
+ }
+}
diff -up ./ctr.c.ghash-asm ./ctr.c
--- ./ctr.c.ghash-asm 2018-12-04 21:56:05.000000000 +0100
+++ ./ctr.c 2021-06-30 16:04:51.230443230 +0200
@@ -41,11 +41,72 @@
diff -up ./ctr.c.ghash ./ctr.c
--- ./ctr.c.ghash 2018-12-04 21:56:05.000000000 +0100
+++ ./ctr.c 2021-07-14 14:13:07.714539484 +0200
@@ -41,11 +41,83 @@
#include "ctr.h"
@ -146,6 +169,17 @@ diff -up ./ctr.c.ghash-asm ./ctr.c
-#define NBLOCKS 4
+#define MIN(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+
+/* The 'u64' member has been added in the public header
+ (nettle-types.h). Check that the alignment is not affected with
+ it using _Static_assert. */
+union nettle_block16_
+{
+ uint8_t b[16];
+ unsigned long w[16 / sizeof(unsigned long)];
+};
+_Static_assert(__alignof(union nettle_block16_) == __alignof(union nettle_block16),
+ "nettle_block16 alignment should be preserved");
+
+static size_t
+ctr_fill (size_t block_size, uint8_t *ctr, size_t length, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
@ -208,7 +242,7 @@ diff -up ./ctr.c.ghash-asm ./ctr.c
void
ctr_crypt(const void *ctx, nettle_cipher_func *f,
@@ -53,84 +114,64 @@ ctr_crypt(const void *ctx, nettle_cipher
@@ -53,84 +125,64 @@ ctr_crypt(const void *ctx, nettle_cipher
size_t length, uint8_t *dst,
const uint8_t *src)
{
@ -338,9 +372,9 @@ diff -up ./ctr.c.ghash-asm ./ctr.c
}
}
}
diff -up ./ctr-internal.h.ghash-asm ./ctr-internal.h
--- ./ctr-internal.h.ghash-asm 2021-06-30 16:04:51.230443230 +0200
+++ ./ctr-internal.h 2021-06-30 16:04:51.230443230 +0200
diff -up ./ctr-internal.h.ghash ./ctr-internal.h
--- ./ctr-internal.h.ghash 2021-07-14 14:11:58.130891552 +0200
+++ ./ctr-internal.h 2021-07-14 14:11:58.130891552 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/* ctr-internal.h
+
@ -398,9 +432,9 @@ diff -up ./ctr-internal.h.ghash-asm ./ctr-internal.h
+
+
+#endif /* NETTLE_CTR_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED */
diff -up ./fat-ppc.c.ghash-asm ./fat-ppc.c
--- ./fat-ppc.c.ghash-asm 2021-06-30 16:04:51.228443240 +0200
+++ ./fat-ppc.c 2021-06-30 16:04:51.230443230 +0200
diff -up ./fat-ppc.c.ghash ./fat-ppc.c
--- ./fat-ppc.c.ghash 2021-07-14 14:11:58.126891572 +0200
+++ ./fat-ppc.c 2021-07-14 14:11:58.130891552 +0200
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
#include "aes-internal.h"
@ -481,9 +515,9 @@ diff -up ./fat-ppc.c.ghash-asm ./fat-ppc.c
+ size_t length, const uint8_t *data),
+ (key, x, length, data))
+#endif /* GCM_TABLE_BITS == 8 */
diff -up ./fat-setup.h.ghash-asm ./fat-setup.h
--- ./fat-setup.h.ghash-asm 2018-12-04 21:56:06.000000000 +0100
+++ ./fat-setup.h 2021-06-30 16:04:51.230443230 +0200
diff -up ./fat-setup.h.ghash ./fat-setup.h
--- ./fat-setup.h.ghash 2018-12-04 21:56:06.000000000 +0100
+++ ./fat-setup.h 2021-07-14 14:11:58.130891552 +0200
@@ -159,6 +159,11 @@ typedef void aes_crypt_internal_func (un
size_t length, uint8_t *dst,
const uint8_t *src);
@ -496,9 +530,9 @@ diff -up ./fat-setup.h.ghash-asm ./fat-setup.h
typedef void *(memxor_func)(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n);
typedef void salsa20_core_func (uint32_t *dst, const uint32_t *src, unsigned rounds);
diff -up ./gcm.c.ghash-asm ./gcm.c
--- ./gcm.c.ghash-asm 2018-12-04 21:56:05.000000000 +0100
+++ ./gcm.c 2021-06-30 16:04:51.231443225 +0200
diff -up ./gcm.c.ghash ./gcm.c
--- ./gcm.c.ghash 2018-12-04 21:56:05.000000000 +0100
+++ ./gcm.c 2021-07-14 14:11:58.131891547 +0200
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
See also the gcm paper at
http://www.cryptobarn.com/papers/gcm-spec.pdf.
@ -847,9 +881,9 @@ diff -up ./gcm.c.ghash-asm ./gcm.c
ctx->data_size += length;
}
diff -up ./gcm-internal.h.ghash-asm ./gcm-internal.h
--- ./gcm-internal.h.ghash-asm 2021-06-30 16:04:51.231443225 +0200
+++ ./gcm-internal.h 2021-06-30 16:04:51.231443225 +0200
diff -up ./gcm-internal.h.ghash ./gcm-internal.h
--- ./gcm-internal.h.ghash 2021-07-14 14:11:58.131891547 +0200
+++ ./gcm-internal.h 2021-07-14 14:11:58.131891547 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/* gcm-internal.h
+
@ -905,9 +939,9 @@ diff -up ./gcm-internal.h.ghash-asm ./gcm-internal.h
+#endif
+
+#endif /* NETTLE_GCM_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED */
diff -up ./Makefile.in.ghash-asm ./Makefile.in
--- ./Makefile.in.ghash-asm 2021-06-30 16:04:51.227443245 +0200
+++ ./Makefile.in 2021-06-30 16:04:51.230443230 +0200
diff -up ./Makefile.in.ghash ./Makefile.in
--- ./Makefile.in.ghash 2021-07-14 14:11:58.124891582 +0200
+++ ./Makefile.in 2021-07-14 14:11:58.131891547 +0200
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ nettle_SOURCES = aes-decrypt-internal.c
chacha-crypt.c chacha-core-internal.c \
chacha-poly1305.c chacha-poly1305-meta.c \
@ -926,9 +960,9 @@ diff -up ./Makefile.in.ghash-asm ./Makefile.in
gmp-glue.h ecc-internal.h fat-setup.h \
mini-gmp.h asm.m4 \
nettle.texinfo nettle.info nettle.html nettle.pdf sha-example.c
diff -up ./nettle-types.h.ghash-asm ./nettle-types.h
--- ./nettle-types.h.ghash-asm 2018-12-04 21:56:06.000000000 +0100
+++ ./nettle-types.h 2021-06-30 16:06:24.608978492 +0200
diff -up ./nettle-types.h.ghash ./nettle-types.h
--- ./nettle-types.h.ghash 2018-12-04 21:56:06.000000000 +0100
+++ ./nettle-types.h 2021-07-14 14:11:58.131891547 +0200
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ union nettle_block16
{
uint8_t b[16];
@ -937,9 +971,9 @@ diff -up ./nettle-types.h.ghash-asm ./nettle-types.h
};
/* Randomness. Used by key generation and dsa signature creation. */
diff -up ./powerpc64/fat/gcm-hash.asm.ghash-asm ./powerpc64/fat/gcm-hash.asm
--- ./powerpc64/fat/gcm-hash.asm.ghash-asm 2021-06-30 16:04:51.231443225 +0200
+++ ./powerpc64/fat/gcm-hash.asm 2021-06-30 16:04:51.231443225 +0200
diff -up ./powerpc64/fat/gcm-hash.asm.ghash ./powerpc64/fat/gcm-hash.asm
--- ./powerpc64/fat/gcm-hash.asm.ghash 2021-07-14 14:11:58.131891547 +0200
+++ ./powerpc64/fat/gcm-hash.asm 2021-07-14 14:11:58.131891547 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+C powerpc64/fat/gcm-hash.asm
+
@ -980,9 +1014,9 @@ diff -up ./powerpc64/fat/gcm-hash.asm.ghash-asm ./powerpc64/fat/gcm-hash.asm
+
+define(<fat_transform>, <$1_ppc64>)
+include_src(<powerpc64/p8/gcm-hash.asm>)
diff -up ./powerpc64/p8/gcm-hash.asm.ghash-asm ./powerpc64/p8/gcm-hash.asm
--- ./powerpc64/p8/gcm-hash.asm.ghash-asm 2021-06-30 16:04:51.231443225 +0200
+++ ./powerpc64/p8/gcm-hash.asm 2021-06-30 16:04:51.231443225 +0200
diff -up ./powerpc64/p8/gcm-hash.asm.ghash ./powerpc64/p8/gcm-hash.asm
--- ./powerpc64/p8/gcm-hash.asm.ghash 2021-07-14 14:11:58.131891547 +0200
+++ ./powerpc64/p8/gcm-hash.asm 2021-07-14 14:11:58.131891547 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
+C powerpc64/p8/gcm-hash.asm
+

609
SOURCES/nettle-3.4.1-rsa-decrypt.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,609 @@
From 5646ca77ee92de0ae33e7d2e0a3383c61a4091ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 21:30:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Add check that message length to _pkcs1_sec_decrypt is
valid.
* pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
length is valid, for given key size.
* testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
calls to rsa_sec_decrypt specifying a too large message length.
(cherry picked from commit 7616541e6eff73353bf682c62e3a68e4fe696707)
---
ChangeLog | 8 ++++++++
pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c | 4 +++-
testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 4c7338a1..7cd0455e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+2021-05-06 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+
+ Bug fixes merged from from 3.7.3 release (starting from 2021-05-06).
+ * pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
+ length is valid, for given key size.
+ * testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
+ calls to rsa_sec_decrypt specifying a too large message length.
+
2018-12-04 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
* Released nettle-3.4.1.
diff --git a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
index 722044b0..02fd07e1 100644
--- a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
+++ b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -64,7 +64,9 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt (size_t length, uint8_t *message,
volatile int ok;
size_t i, t;
- assert (padded_message_length >= length);
+ /* Message independent branch */
+ if (length + 11 > padded_message_length)
+ return 0;
t = padded_message_length - length - 1;
diff --git a/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c b/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
index 64f0b13c..4a9f301b 100644
--- a/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
+++ b/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ rsa_decrypt_for_test(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
#endif
#define PAYLOAD_SIZE 50
+#define DECRYPTED_SIZE 256
void
test_main(void)
{
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ test_main(void)
struct knuth_lfib_ctx random_ctx;
uint8_t plaintext[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
- uint8_t decrypted[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
+ uint8_t decrypted[DECRYPTED_SIZE];
uint8_t verifybad[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
unsigned n_size = 1024;
mpz_t gibberish;
@@ -98,6 +99,20 @@ test_main(void)
PAYLOAD_SIZE, decrypted, gibberish) == 1);
ASSERT (MEMEQ (PAYLOAD_SIZE, plaintext, decrypted));
+ ASSERT (pub.size > 10);
+ ASSERT (pub.size <= DECRYPTED_SIZE);
+
+ /* Check that too large message length is rejected, largest
+ valid size is pub.size - 11. */
+ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
+ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ pub.size - 10, decrypted, gibberish));
+
+ /* This case used to result in arithmetic underflow and a crash. */
+ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
+ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ pub.size, decrypted, gibberish));
+
/* bad one */
memcpy(decrypted, verifybad, PAYLOAD_SIZE);
nettle_mpz_random_size(garbage, &random_ctx,
--
2.31.1
From 743cdf38353f6dd5d3d91eadc769106cfc116301 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 21:30:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Fix comment typos.
(cherry picked from commit 0a714543136de97c7fd34f1c6ac1592dc5036879)
---
pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
index 02fd07e1..a7f85c2e 100644
--- a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
+++ b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt_variable(size_t *length, uint8_t *message,
/* length is discovered in a side-channel silent way.
* not_found goes to 0 when the terminator is found.
- * offset strts at 3 as it includes the terminator and
- * the fomat bytes already */
+ * offset starts at 3 as it includes the terminator and
+ * the format bytes already */
offset = 3;
for (i = 2; i < padded_message_length; i++)
{
--
2.31.1
From dfce46c4540d2abf040073070cff15f9d1708050 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 21:31:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Change _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr to take a fix input size.
Improves consistency with _rsa_sec_compute_root, and fixes zero-input bug.
(cherry picked from commit 485b5e2820a057e873b1ba812fdb39cae4adf98c)
---
ChangeLog | 17 +++++++++-
rsa-decrypt-tr.c | 7 ++---
rsa-internal.h | 4 +--
rsa-sec-decrypt.c | 9 ++++--
rsa-sign-tr.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++-------------------
testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c | 14 ++++++++-
6 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 7cd0455e..ae660fc0 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,21 @@
-2021-05-06 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+2021-05-14 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Bug fixes merged from from 3.7.3 release (starting from 2021-05-06).
+ * rsa-sign-tr.c (rsa_sec_blind): Delete mn argument.
+ (_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr): Delete mn argument, instead require
+ that input size matches key size. Rearrange use of temporary
+ storage, to support in-place operation, x == m. Update all
+ callers.
+
+ * rsa-decrypt-tr.c (rsa_decrypt_tr): Make zero-padded copy of
+ input, for calling _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr.
+ * rsa-sec-decrypt.c (rsa_sec_decrypt): Likewise.
+
+ * testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c (test_main): Test calling all of
+ rsa_decrypt, rsa_decrypt_tr, and rsa_sec_decrypt with zero input.
+
+2021-05-06 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+
* pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
length is valid, for given key size.
* testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
diff --git a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
index 5dfb91b1..c118e852 100644
--- a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+++ b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
@@ -52,14 +52,13 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
mp_size_t key_limb_size;
int res;
- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
+ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
+ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, key_limb_size);
- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
- mpz_size(gibberish));
+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, key_limb_size);
diff --git a/rsa-internal.h b/rsa-internal.h
index bd667bc2..64a7edf6 100644
--- a/rsa-internal.h
+++ b/rsa-internal.h
@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
mp_limb_t *scratch);
/* Safe side-channel silent variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the
- * result after CRT. */
+ * result after CRT. In-place calls, with x == m, is allowed. */
int
_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn);
+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m);
/* additional resistance to memory access side-channel attacks.
* Note: message buffer is returned unchanged on error */
diff --git a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
index e6a4b267..633a6852 100644
--- a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+++ b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -57,9 +57,12 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n));
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
- mpz_size(gibberish));
+ /* We need a copy because m can be shorter than key_size,
+ * but _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr expect all inputs to be
+ * normalized to a key_size long buffer length */
+ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, mpz_size(pub->n));
+
+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, mpz_size(pub->n));
diff --git a/rsa-sign-tr.c b/rsa-sign-tr.c
index 59c9bd07..141a52c7 100644
--- a/rsa-sign-tr.c
+++ b/rsa-sign-tr.c
@@ -131,35 +131,34 @@ int
_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
{
+ mp_size_t nn;
mpz_t mz;
mpz_t xz;
int res;
- mpz_init(mz);
mpz_init(xz);
- mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(mz, mn), m, mn);
- mpz_limbs_finish(mz, mn);
+ nn = mpz_size (pub->n);
- res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz, mz);
+ res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz,
+ mpz_roinit_n(mz, m, nn));
if (res)
- mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, mpz_size(pub->n));
+ mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, nn);
- mpz_clear(mz);
mpz_clear(xz);
return res;
}
#else
/* Blinds m, by computing c = m r^e (mod n), for a random r. Also
- returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. */
+ returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. Must have c != m,
+ no in-place operation.*/
static void
rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m,
- mp_size_t mn)
+ mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m)
{
const mp_limb_t *ep = mpz_limbs_read (pub->e);
const mp_limb_t *np = mpz_limbs_read (pub->n);
@@ -177,15 +176,15 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
/* c = m*(r^e) mod n */
itch = mpn_sec_powm_itch(nn, ebn, nn);
- i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, mn);
+ i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, nn);
itch = MAX(itch, i2);
- i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(nn + mn, nn);
+ i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(2*nn, nn);
itch = MAX(itch, i2);
i2 = mpn_sec_invert_itch(nn);
itch = MAX(itch, i2);
- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, nn + mn + itch);
- scratch = tp + nn + mn;
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, 2*nn + itch);
+ scratch = tp + 2*nn;
/* ri = r^(-1) */
do
@@ -198,9 +197,8 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
while (!mpn_sec_invert (ri, tp, np, nn, 2 * nn * GMP_NUMB_BITS, scratch));
mpn_sec_powm (c, rp, nn, ep, ebn, np, nn, scratch);
- /* normally mn == nn, but m can be smaller in some cases */
- mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, mn, scratch);
- mpn_sec_div_r (tp, nn + mn, np, nn, scratch);
+ mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, nn, scratch);
+ mpn_sec_div_r (tp, 2*nn, np, nn, scratch);
mpn_copyi(c, tp, nn);
TMP_GMP_FREE (r);
@@ -208,7 +206,7 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
TMP_GMP_FREE (tp);
}
-/* m = c ri mod n */
+/* m = c ri mod n. Allows x == c. */
static void
rsa_sec_unblind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
mp_limb_t *x, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *c)
@@ -298,7 +296,7 @@ int
_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
{
TMP_GMP_DECL (c, mp_limb_t);
TMP_GMP_DECL (ri, mp_limb_t);
@@ -306,7 +304,7 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
size_t key_limb_size;
int ret;
- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
+ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
/* mpz_powm_sec handles only odd moduli. If p, q or n is even, the
key is invalid and rejected by rsa_private_key_prepare. However,
@@ -320,19 +318,18 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
}
assert(mpz_size(pub->n) == key_limb_size);
- assert(mn <= key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (c, key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (ri, key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (scratch, _rsa_sec_compute_root_itch(key));
- rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, x, ri, m, mn);
+ rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, c, ri, m);
- _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, c, x, scratch);
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, x, c, scratch);
- ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, c, x);
+ ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, x, c);
- rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, c);
+ rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, x);
cnd_mpn_zero(1 - ret, x, key_limb_size);
@@ -356,17 +353,17 @@ rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
mpz_t x, const mpz_t m)
{
TMP_GMP_DECL (l, mp_limb_t);
+ mp_size_t nn = mpz_size(pub->n);
int res;
- mp_size_t l_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, l_size);
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, nn);
+ mpz_limbs_copy(l, m, nn);
- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l,
- mpz_limbs_read(m), mpz_size(m));
+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l, l);
if (res) {
- mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, l_size);
- mpn_copyi (xp, l, l_size);
- mpz_limbs_finish (x, l_size);
+ mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, nn);
+ mpn_copyi (xp, l, nn);
+ mpz_limbs_finish (x, nn);
}
TMP_GMP_FREE (l);
diff --git a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
index 87525f78..d3bc374b 100644
--- a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+++ b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ test_main(void)
uint8_t after;
mpz_t gibberish;
+ mpz_t zero;
rsa_private_key_init(&key);
rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
@@ -101,6 +102,17 @@ test_main(void)
ASSERT(decrypted[decrypted_length] == after);
ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A');
+ /* Test zero input. */
+ mpz_init_set_ui (zero, 0);
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
/* Test invalid key. */
mpz_add_ui (key.q, key.q, 2);
@@ -112,6 +124,6 @@ test_main(void)
rsa_private_key_clear(&key);
rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);
mpz_clear(gibberish);
+ mpz_clear(zero);
free(decrypted);
}
-
--
2.31.1
From f601611b3c315aba373c0ab2ddf24772e88c1b3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 21:32:38 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Add input check to rsa_decrypt family of functions.
(cherry picked from commit 0ad0b5df315665250dfdaa4a1e087f4799edaefe)
---
ChangeLog | 10 +++++++++-
rsa-decrypt-tr.c | 4 ++++
rsa-decrypt.c | 10 ++++++++++
rsa-sec-decrypt.c | 4 ++++
rsa.h | 5 +++--
testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
6 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index ae660fc0..27f022db 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,14 @@
-2021-05-14 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+2021-05-17 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Bug fixes merged from from 3.7.3 release (starting from 2021-05-06).
+ * rsa-decrypt-tr.c (rsa_decrypt_tr): Check up-front that input is
+ in range.
+ * rsa-sec-decrypt.c (rsa_sec_decrypt): Likewise.
+ * rsa-decrypt.c (rsa_decrypt): Likewise.
+ * testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c (test_main): Add tests with input > n.
+
+2021-05-14 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+
* rsa-sign-tr.c (rsa_sec_blind): Delete mn argument.
(_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr): Delete mn argument, instead require
that input size matches key size. Rearrange use of temporary
diff --git a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
index c118e852..1ba3d286 100644
--- a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+++ b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
mp_size_t key_limb_size;
int res;
+ /* First check that input is in range. */
+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
+ return 0;
+
key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size);
diff --git a/rsa-decrypt.c b/rsa-decrypt.c
index 7681439d..540d8baa 100644
--- a/rsa-decrypt.c
+++ b/rsa-decrypt.c
@@ -48,6 +48,16 @@ rsa_decrypt(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
int res;
mpz_init(m);
+
+ /* First check that input is in range. Since we don't have the
+ public key available here, we need to reconstruct n. */
+ mpz_mul (m, key->p, key->q);
+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, m) >= 0)
+ {
+ mpz_clear (m);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
rsa_compute_root(key, m, gibberish);
res = pkcs1_decrypt (key->size, m, length, message);
diff --git a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
index 633a6852..53113c69 100644
--- a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+++ b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
TMP_GMP_DECL (em, uint8_t);
int res;
+ /* First check that input is in range. */
+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
+ return 0;
+
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n));
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
diff --git a/rsa.h b/rsa.h
index 0aac6a26..54c35688 100644
--- a/rsa.h
+++ b/rsa.h
@@ -433,13 +433,14 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
size_t length, uint8_t *message,
const mpz_t gibberish);
-/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed. */
+/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed.
+ It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
void
rsa_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
mpz_t x, const mpz_t m);
/* Safer variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the result after
- CRT. */
+ CRT. It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
int
rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
diff --git a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
index d3bc374b..d1a440f6 100644
--- a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+++ b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
@@ -19,11 +19,12 @@ test_main(void)
uint8_t after;
mpz_t gibberish;
- mpz_t zero;
+ mpz_t bad_input;
rsa_private_key_init(&key);
rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
mpz_init(gibberish);
+ mpz_init(bad_input);
knuth_lfib_init(&lfib, 17);
@@ -103,15 +104,40 @@ test_main(void)
ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A');
/* Test zero input. */
- mpz_init_set_ui (zero, 0);
+ mpz_set_ui (bad_input, 0);
decrypted_length = msg_length;
- ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
&lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
- &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
&lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
- decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
+
+ /* Test input that is slightly larger than n */
+ mpz_add(bad_input, gibberish, pub.n);
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
+
+ /* Test input that is considerably larger than n */
+ mpz_mul_2exp (bad_input, pub.n, 100);
+ mpz_add (bad_input, bad_input, gibberish);
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
/* Test invalid key. */
@@ -124,6 +150,6 @@ test_main(void)
rsa_private_key_clear(&key);
rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);
mpz_clear(gibberish);
- mpz_clear(zero);
+ mpz_clear(bad_input);
free(decrypted);
}
--
2.31.1

10
SPECS/nettle.spec
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Name: nettle
Version: 3.4.1
Release: 5%{?dist}
Release: 7%{?dist}
Summary: A low-level cryptographic library
Group: Development/Libraries
@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ Patch2: nettle-3.4.1-enable-intel-cet.patch
Patch3: nettle-3.4.1-ecdsa-verify.patch
Patch4: nettle-3.4.1-powerpc64-aes-asm.patch
Patch5: nettle-3.4.1-powerpc64-ghash-asm.patch
Patch6: nettle-3.4.1-rsa-decrypt.patch
BuildRequires: gcc
BuildRequires: gmp-devel, m4
@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ sed 's/ecc-224.c//g' -i Makefile.in
%patch3 -p1
%patch4 -p1
%patch5 -p1
%patch6 -p1
%build
autoreconf -ifv
@ -133,6 +135,12 @@ fi
%changelog
* Wed Jul 14 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-7
- Backport CVE-2021-3580 from upstream 3.7.3 release (#1967990)
* Wed Jul 14 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-6
- Enable CTR mode optimization when the block size is 16
* Wed Jun 30 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.4.1-5
- Backport powerpc64 optimization patches from upstream (#1855228)
Patch from Christopher M. Riedl.