.gitignore

@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-SOURCES/mutt-2.0.6.tar.gz
+SOURCES/mutt-2.0.7.tar.gz
+/mutt-2.0.7.tar.gz

.mutt.metadata

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-c4621f76c5493db8055ccfd1b0ed37800962229c SOURCES/mutt-2.0.6.tar.gz

0015-Fix-rfc2047-base64-decoding-to-abort-on-illegal-char.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 29754579de3a4e720ea0b30bc3e4c03dd905fd66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kevin McCarthy <kevin@8t8.us>
+Date: Sun, 3 Sep 2023 12:22:01 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix rfc2047 base64 decoding to abort on illegal characters.
+
+For some reason, the rfc2047 base64 decoder ignored illegal
+characters, instead of aborting.  This seems innocuous, but in fact
+leads to at least three crash-bugs elsewhere in Mutt.
+
+These stem from Mutt, in some cases, passing an entire header
+field (name, colon, and body) to the rfc2047 decoder.  (It is
+technically incorrect to do so, by the way, but is beyond scope for
+these fixes in stable).  Mutt then assumes the result can't be empty
+because of a previous check that the header contains at least a colon.
+
+This commit takes care of the source of the crashes, by aborting the
+rfc2047 decode.  The following two commits add protective fixes to the
+specific crash points.
+
+Thanks to Chenyuan Mi (@morningbread) for discovering the strchr
+crashes, giving a working example draft message, and providing the
+stack traces for the two NULL derefences.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 452ee330e094bfc7c9a68555e5152b1826534555)
+---
+ rfc2047.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/rfc2047.c b/rfc2047.c
+index 488771bd..1a765b87 100644
+--- a/rfc2047.c
++++ b/rfc2047.c
+@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static int rfc2047_decode_word (BUFFER *d, const char *s, char **charset)
+ 	    if (*pp == '=')
+ 	      break;
+ 	    if ((*pp & ~127) || (c = base64val(*pp)) == -1)
+-	      continue;
++              goto error_out_0;
+ 	    if (k + 6 >= 8)
+ 	    {
+ 	      k -= 2;

0016-CVE-2023-4874-Fix-write_one_header-illegal-header-ch.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 427e205f3f5759c153a1d424ac6f6a82ac16a352 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kevin McCarthy <kevin@8t8.us>
+Date: Sun, 3 Sep 2023 14:11:48 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] (CVE-2023-4874) Fix write_one_header() illegal header check.
+
+This is another crash caused by the rfc2047 decoding bug fixed in the
+second prior commit.
+
+In this case, an empty header line followed by a header line starting
+with ":", would result in t==end.
+
+The mutt_substrdup() further below would go very badly at that point,
+with t >= end+1.  This could result in either a memcpy onto NULL or a
+huge malloc call.
+
+Thanks to Chenyuan Mi (@morningbread) for giving a working example
+draft message of the rfc2047 decoding flaw.  This allowed me, with
+further testing, to discover this additional crash bug.
+
+(cherry picked from commit a4752eb0ae0a521eec02e59e51ae5daedf74fda0)
+---
+ sendlib.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/sendlib.c b/sendlib.c
+index 8fd5e6cb..8569e5cf 100644
+--- a/sendlib.c
++++ b/sendlib.c
+@@ -2038,7 +2038,7 @@ static int write_one_header (FILE *fp, int pfxw, int max, int wraplen,
+   else
+   {
+     t = strchr (start, ':');
+-    if (!t || t > end)
++    if (!t || t >= end)
+     {
+       dprint (1, (debugfile, "mwoh: warning: header not in "
+ 		  "'key: value' format!\n"));

0017-CVE-2023-4875-Check-for-NULL-userhdrs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 74b4833b56212dbbac6f6353f6989f91176671a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kevin McCarthy <kevin@8t8.us>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2023 12:50:07 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] (CVE-2023-4875) Check for NULL userhdrs.
+
+When composing an email, miscellaneous extra headers are stored in a
+userhdrs list.  Mutt first checks to ensure each header contains at
+least a colon character, passes the entire userhdr field (name, colon,
+and body) to the rfc2047 decoder, and safe_strdup()'s the result on
+the userhdrs list.  An empty result would from the decode would result
+in a NULL headers being added to list.
+
+The previous commit removed the possibility of the decoded header
+field being empty, but it's prudent to add a check to the strchr
+calls, in case there is another unexpected bug resulting in one.
+
+Thanks to Chenyuan Mi (@morningbread) for discovering the two strchr
+crashes, giving a working example draft message, and providing the
+stack traces for the two NULL derefences.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 4cc3128abdf52c615911589394a03271fddeefc6)
+---
+ sendlib.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sendlib.c b/sendlib.c
+index 8569e5cf..007baac1 100644
+--- a/sendlib.c
++++ b/sendlib.c
+@@ -2318,7 +2318,7 @@ int mutt_write_rfc822_header (FILE *fp, ENVELOPE *env, BODY *attach, char *date,
+   /* Add any user defined headers */
+   for (; tmp; tmp = tmp->next)
+   {
+-    if ((p = strchr (tmp->data, ':')))
++    if ((p = strchr (NONULL (tmp->data), ':')))
+     {
+       q = p;
+ 
+@@ -2366,7 +2366,7 @@ static void encode_headers (LIST *h)
+ 
+   for (; h; h = h->next)
+   {
+-    if (!(p = strchr (h->data, ':')))
++    if (!(p = strchr (NONULL (h->data), ':')))
+       continue;
+ 
+     i = p - h->data;

gating.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+--- !Policy
+product_versions:
+  - rhel-8
+decision_context: osci_compose_gate
+rules:
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: baseos-ci.brew-build.tier1.functional}

mutt-2.0.7-cve-2022-1328.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From e5ed080c00e59701ca62ef9b2a6d2612ebf765a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kevin McCarthy <kevin@8t8.us>
+Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 11:05:52 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix uudecode buffer overflow.
+
+mutt_decode_uuencoded() used each line's initial "length character"
+without any validation.  It would happily read past the end of the
+input line, and with a suitable value even past the length of the
+input buffer.
+
+As I noted in ticket 404, there are several other changes that could
+be added to make the parser more robust.  However, to avoid
+accidentally introducing another bug or regression, I'm restricting
+this patch to simply addressing the overflow.
+
+Thanks to Tavis Ormandy for reporting the issue, along with a sample
+message demonstrating the problem.
+---
+ handler.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/handler.c b/handler.c
+index d1b4bc73..c97cf0cb 100644
+--- a/handler.c
++++ b/handler.c
+@@ -404,9 +404,9 @@ static void mutt_decode_uuencoded (STATE *s, LOFF_T len, int istext, iconv_t cd)
+     pt = tmps;
+     linelen = decode_byte (*pt);
+     pt++;
+-    for (c = 0; c < linelen;)
++    for (c = 0; c < linelen && *pt;)
+     {
+-      for (l = 2; l <= 6; l += 2)
++      for (l = 2; l <= 6 && *pt && *(pt + 1); l += 2)
+       {
+ 	out = decode_byte (*pt) << l;
+ 	pt++;
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

mutt.spec

@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
 
 Summary: A text mode mail user agent
 Name: mutt
-Version: 2.0.6
-Release: 1%{?dist}
+Version: 2.0.7
+Release: 3%{?dist}
 Epoch: 5
 # The entire source code is GPLv2+ except
 # pgpewrap.c setenv.c sha1.c wcwidth.c which are Public Domain
@@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ Patch10: mutt-1.9.4-lynx_no_backscapes.patch
 Patch12: mutt-1.9.5-nodotlock.patch
 # Fixs compatibility with previous versions
 Patch13: mutt_disable_ssl_enforce.patch
+Patch14: mutt-2.0.7-cve-2022-1328.patch
+
+# CVE-2023-4874 CVE-2023-4875
+Patch0015: 0015-Fix-rfc2047-base64-decoding-to-abort-on-illegal-char.patch
+Patch0016: 0016-CVE-2023-4874-Fix-write_one_header-illegal-header-ch.patch
+Patch0017: 0017-CVE-2023-4875-Check-for-NULL-userhdrs.patch
+
 # Coverity patches
 # https://cov01.lab.eng.brq.redhat.com/el8-results/el8/mutt-1.9.3-1.el8+7/scan-results-imp.html
 Patch111: mutt-1.10.1-mutt-1.9.3-1_coverity_166.patch
@@ -100,6 +107,11 @@ autoreconf --install
 %patch8 -p1 -b .system_certs
 %patch9 -p1 -b .ssl_ciphers
 %patch13 -p1
+%patch14 -p1 -b .cve-2022-1328
+
+%patch15 -p1
+%patch16 -p1
+%patch17 -p1
 
 %patch111 -p1 -b .mutt-1.9.3-1_coverity_166
 %patch112 -p1 -b .mutt-1.9.3-1_coverity_181
@@ -224,6 +236,18 @@ ln -sf ./muttrc.5 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man5/muttrc.local.5
 
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Oct 11 2023 Matej Mužila <mmuzila@redhat.com> - 5:2.0.7-3
+- Fix for: CVE-2023-4874 CVE-2023-4875
+- Resolves: RHEL-2811
+
+* Thu Jul 21 2022 Matej Mužila <mmuzila@redhat.com> - 5:2.0.7-2
+- Fix CVE-2022-1328 (#2109247)
+
+* Wed May 5 2021 Filip Januš <fjanus@redhat.com> - 5:2.0.7-1
+- Upgrade to v2.0.7
+- New bug fix release
+- Resolves: #1912614
+
 * Thu Apr 8 2021 Filip Januš <fjanus@redhat.com> - 5:2.0.6-1
 - Upgrade to v2.0.6
 - Resolves: #1912614

sources

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA512 (mutt-2.0.7.tar.gz) = 1eb689fb9e6aa3cf0bcd0b696c25477cd04b74d8ec93404df071de6dc051e46bbad88131cdf610eb01df4789984707f3791366ae2fda28de2d2739aeb9d34e30