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- fix certificate verification (CVE-2009-1390)

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- add support for gnutls INSECURE_ALGORITHM error code (#499390)
This commit is contained in:
Miroslav Lichvar 2009-06-09 15:14:58 +00:00
parent c16ce754c0
commit 5de8c3b96e
2 changed files with 629 additions and 1 deletions
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622
mutt-1.5.19-gnutls.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,622 @@
diff -r a4b47ac32d32 -r 15c662a95b91 mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
--- a/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c Mon Jan 05 16:37:27 2009 -0800
+++ b/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c Mon Jun 08 23:55:39 2009 -0700
@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@
#include "mutt_ssl.h"
#include "mutt_regex.h"
+/* certificate error bitmap values */
+#define CERTERR_VALID 0
+#define CERTERR_EXPIRED 1
+#define CERTERR_NOTYETVALID 2
+#define CERTERR_REVOKED 4
+#define CERTERR_NOTTRUSTED 8
+#define CERTERR_HOSTNAME 16
+#define CERTERR_SIGNERNOTCA 32
+#define CERTERR_INSECUREALG 64
+
typedef struct _tlssockdata
{
gnutls_session state;
@@ -265,6 +275,12 @@
SslClientCert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
}
+#if HAVE_DECL_GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_TIME_CHECKS
+ /* disable checking certificate activation/expiration times
+ in gnutls, we do the checks ourselves */
+ gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(data->xcred, GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_TIME_CHECKS);
+#endif
+
gnutls_init(&data->state, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
/* set socket */
@@ -408,7 +424,7 @@
}
b64_data.size = fread(b64_data.data, 1, b64_data.size, fd1);
- fclose(fd1);
+ safe_fclose (&fd1);
do {
ret = gnutls_pem_base64_decode_alloc(NULL, &b64_data, &cert);
@@ -504,7 +520,7 @@
buf[0] = '\0';
tls_fingerprint (GNUTLS_DIG_MD5, buf, sizeof (buf), cert);
- while ((linestr = mutt_read_line(linestr, &linestrsize, fp, &linenum)) != NULL)
+ while ((linestr = mutt_read_line(linestr, &linestrsize, fp, &linenum, 0)) != NULL)
{
if(linestr[0] == '#' && linestr[1] == 'H')
{
@@ -517,7 +533,7 @@
{
regfree(&preg);
FREE(&linestr);
- fclose(fp);
+ safe_fclose (&fp);
return 1;
}
}
@@ -525,24 +541,137 @@
}
regfree(&preg);
- fclose(fp);
+ safe_fclose (&fp);
}
/* not found a matching name */
return 0;
}
+static int tls_check_preauth (const gnutls_datum_t *certdata,
+ gnutls_certificate_status certstat,
+ const char *hostname, int chainidx, int* certerr,
+ int* savedcert)
+{
+ gnutls_x509_crt cert;
+
+ *certerr = CERTERR_VALID;
+ *savedcert = 0;
+
+ if (gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert) < 0)
+ {
+ mutt_error (_("Error initialising gnutls certificate data"));
+ mutt_sleep (2);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (gnutls_x509_crt_import (cert, certdata, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) < 0)
+ {
+ mutt_error (_("Error processing certificate data"));
+ mutt_sleep (2);
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (option (OPTSSLVERIFYDATES) != M_NO)
+ {
+ if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (cert) < time(NULL))
+ *certerr |= CERTERR_EXPIRED;
+ if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (cert) > time(NULL))
+ *certerr |= CERTERR_NOTYETVALID;
+ }
+
+ if (chainidx == 0 && option (OPTSSLVERIFYHOST) != M_NO
+ && !gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (cert, hostname)
+ && !tls_check_stored_hostname (certdata, hostname))
+ *certerr |= CERTERR_HOSTNAME;
+
+ /* see whether certificate is in our cache (certificates file) */
+ if (tls_compare_certificates (certdata))
+ {
+ *savedcert = 1;
+
+ if (chainidx == 0 && certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID)
+ {
+ /* doesn't matter - have decided is valid because server
+ certificate is in our trusted cache */
+ certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ if (chainidx == 0 && certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND)
+ {
+ /* doesn't matter that we haven't found the signer, since
+ certificate is in our trusted cache */
+ certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (chainidx <= 1 && certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA)
+ {
+ /* Hmm. Not really sure how to handle this, but let's say
+ that we don't care if the CA certificate hasn't got the
+ correct X.509 basic constraints if server or first signer
+ certificate is in our cache. */
+ certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA;
+ }
+
+ if (chainidx == 0 && certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM)
+ {
+ /* doesn't matter that it was signed using an insecure
+ algorithm, since certificate is in our trusted cache */
+ certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)
+ {
+ *certerr |= CERTERR_REVOKED;
+ certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED;
+ }
+
+ if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID)
+ {
+ *certerr |= CERTERR_NOTTRUSTED;
+ certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND)
+ {
+ /* NB: already cleared if cert in cache */
+ *certerr |= CERTERR_NOTTRUSTED;
+ certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA)
+ {
+ /* NB: already cleared if cert in cache */
+ *certerr |= CERTERR_SIGNERNOTCA;
+ certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA;
+ }
+
+ if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM)
+ {
+ /* NB: already cleared if cert in cache */
+ *certerr |= CERTERR_INSECUREALG;
+ certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
+
+ /* we've been zeroing the interesting bits in certstat -
+ don't return OK if there are any unhandled bits we don't
+ understand */
+ if (*certerr == CERTERR_VALID && certstat == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
static int tls_check_one_certificate (const gnutls_datum_t *certdata,
gnutls_certificate_status certstat,
const char* hostname, int idx, int len)
{
+ int certerr, savedcert;
gnutls_x509_crt cert;
- int certerr_hostname = 0;
- int certerr_expired = 0;
- int certerr_notyetvalid = 0;
- int certerr_nottrusted = 0;
- int certerr_revoked = 0;
- int certerr_signernotca = 0;
char buf[SHORT_STRING];
char fpbuf[SHORT_STRING];
size_t buflen;
@@ -562,13 +691,29 @@
gnutls_datum pemdata;
int i, row, done, ret;
+ if (!tls_check_preauth (certdata, certstat, hostname, idx, &certerr,
+ &savedcert))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* skip signers if insecure algorithm was used */
+ if (idx && (certerr & CERTERR_INSECUREALG))
+ {
+ if (idx == 1)
+ {
+ mutt_error (_("Warning: Server certificate was signed using an insecure algorithm"));
+ mutt_sleep (2);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* interactive check from user */
if (gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert) < 0)
{
mutt_error (_("Error initialising gnutls certificate data"));
mutt_sleep (2);
return 0;
}
-
+
if (gnutls_x509_crt_import (cert, certdata, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) < 0)
{
mutt_error (_("Error processing certificate data"));
@@ -576,94 +721,17 @@
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
return -1;
}
-
- if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (cert) < time(NULL))
- certerr_expired = 1;
- if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (cert) > time(NULL))
- certerr_notyetvalid = 1;
- if (!idx)
- {
- if (!gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (cert, hostname) &&
- !tls_check_stored_hostname (certdata, hostname))
- certerr_hostname = 1;
- }
-
- /* see whether certificate is in our cache (certificates file) */
- if (tls_compare_certificates (certdata))
- {
- if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID)
- {
- /* doesn't matter - have decided is valid because server
- certificate is in our trusted cache */
- certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
- }
-
- if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND)
- {
- /* doesn't matter that we haven't found the signer, since
- certificate is in our trusted cache */
- certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
- }
-
- if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA)
- {
- /* Hmm. Not really sure how to handle this, but let's say
- that we don't care if the CA certificate hasn't got the
- correct X.509 basic constraints if server certificate is
- in our cache. */
- certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA;
- }
- }
-
- if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)
- {
- certerr_revoked = 1;
- certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED;
- }
-
- if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID)
- {
- certerr_nottrusted = 1;
- certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
- }
-
- if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND)
- {
- /* NB: already cleared if cert in cache */
- certerr_nottrusted = 1;
- certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
- }
-
- if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA)
- {
- /* NB: already cleared if cert in cache */
- certerr_signernotca = 1;
- certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA;
- }
-
- /* OK if signed by (or is) a trusted certificate */
- /* we've been zeroing the interesting bits in certstat -
- don't return OK if there are any unhandled bits we don't
- understand */
- if (!(certerr_expired || certerr_notyetvalid ||
- certerr_hostname || certerr_nottrusted) && certstat == 0)
- {
- gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* interactive check from user */
menu = mutt_new_menu (-1);
menu->max = 25;
menu->dialog = (char **) safe_calloc (1, menu->max * sizeof (char *));
for (i = 0; i < menu->max; i++)
menu->dialog[i] = (char *) safe_calloc (1, SHORT_STRING * sizeof (char));
-
+
row = 0;
strfcpy (menu->dialog[row], _("This certificate belongs to:"), SHORT_STRING);
row++;
-
+
buflen = sizeof (dn_common_name);
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid (cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME, 0, 0,
dn_common_name, &buflen) != 0)
@@ -692,17 +760,17 @@
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid (cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COUNTRY_NAME, 0, 0,
dn_country, &buflen) != 0)
dn_country[0] = '\0';
-
+
snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, " %s %s", dn_common_name, dn_email);
snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, " %s", dn_organization);
snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, " %s", dn_organizational_unit);
snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, " %s %s %s",
dn_locality, dn_province, dn_country);
row++;
-
+
strfcpy (menu->dialog[row], _("This certificate was issued by:"), SHORT_STRING);
row++;
-
+
buflen = sizeof (dn_common_name);
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn_by_oid (cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME, 0, 0,
dn_common_name, &buflen) != 0)
@@ -731,52 +799,52 @@
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn_by_oid (cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COUNTRY_NAME, 0, 0,
dn_country, &buflen) != 0)
dn_country[0] = '\0';
-
+
snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, " %s %s", dn_common_name, dn_email);
snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, " %s", dn_organization);
snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, " %s", dn_organizational_unit);
snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, " %s %s %s",
dn_locality, dn_province, dn_country);
row++;
-
+
snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, _("This certificate is valid"));
-
+
t = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (cert);
- snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, _(" from %s"),
+ snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, _(" from %s"),
tls_make_date (t, datestr, 30));
-
+
t = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (cert);
- snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, _(" to %s"),
+ snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, _(" to %s"),
tls_make_date (t, datestr, 30));
-
+
fpbuf[0] = '\0';
tls_fingerprint (GNUTLS_DIG_SHA, fpbuf, sizeof (fpbuf), certdata);
snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, _("SHA1 Fingerprint: %s"), fpbuf);
fpbuf[0] = '\0';
tls_fingerprint (GNUTLS_DIG_MD5, fpbuf, sizeof (fpbuf), certdata);
snprintf (menu->dialog[row++], SHORT_STRING, _("MD5 Fingerprint: %s"), fpbuf);
-
- if (certerr_notyetvalid)
+
+ if (certerr & CERTERR_NOTYETVALID)
{
row++;
strfcpy (menu->dialog[row], _("WARNING: Server certificate is not yet valid"), SHORT_STRING);
}
- if (certerr_expired)
+ if (certerr & CERTERR_EXPIRED)
{
row++;
strfcpy (menu->dialog[row], _("WARNING: Server certificate has expired"), SHORT_STRING);
}
- if (certerr_revoked)
+ if (certerr & CERTERR_REVOKED)
{
row++;
strfcpy (menu->dialog[row], _("WARNING: Server certificate has been revoked"), SHORT_STRING);
}
- if (certerr_hostname)
+ if (certerr & CERTERR_HOSTNAME)
{
row++;
strfcpy (menu->dialog[row], _("WARNING: Server hostname does not match certificate"), SHORT_STRING);
}
- if (certerr_signernotca)
+ if (certerr & CERTERR_SIGNERNOTCA)
{
row++;
strfcpy (menu->dialog[row], _("WARNING: Signer of server certificate is not a CA"), SHORT_STRING);
@@ -788,7 +856,9 @@
menu->title = title;
/* certificates with bad dates, or that are revoked, must be
accepted manually each and every time */
- if (SslCertFile && !certerr_expired && !certerr_notyetvalid && !certerr_revoked)
+ if (SslCertFile && !savedcert
+ && !(certerr & (CERTERR_EXPIRED | CERTERR_NOTYETVALID
+ | CERTERR_REVOKED)))
{
menu->prompt = _("(r)eject, accept (o)nce, (a)ccept always");
menu->keys = _("roa");
@@ -798,14 +868,14 @@
menu->prompt = _("(r)eject, accept (o)nce");
menu->keys = _("ro");
}
-
+
helpstr[0] = '\0';
mutt_make_help (buf, sizeof (buf), _("Exit "), MENU_GENERIC, OP_EXIT);
safe_strcat (helpstr, sizeof (helpstr), buf);
mutt_make_help (buf, sizeof (buf), _("Help"), MENU_GENERIC, OP_HELP);
safe_strcat (helpstr, sizeof (helpstr), buf);
menu->help = helpstr;
-
+
done = 0;
set_option (OPTUNBUFFEREDINPUT);
while (!done)
@@ -822,12 +892,12 @@
if ((fp = fopen (SslCertFile, "a")))
{
/* save hostname if necessary */
- if (certerr_hostname)
+ if (certerr & CERTERR_HOSTNAME)
{
fprintf(fp, "#H %s %s\n", hostname, fpbuf);
done = 1;
}
- if (certerr_nottrusted)
+ if (certerr & CERTERR_NOTTRUSTED)
{
done = 0;
ret = gnutls_pem_base64_encode_alloc ("CERTIFICATE", certdata,
@@ -841,7 +911,7 @@
gnutls_free (pemdata.data);
}
}
- fclose (fp);
+ safe_fclose (&fp);
}
if (!done)
{
@@ -866,23 +936,14 @@
return (done == 2);
}
-static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
+/* sanity-checking wrapper for gnutls_certificate_verify_peers */
+static gnutls_certificate_status tls_verify_peers (gnutls_session tlsstate)
{
- tlssockdata *data = conn->sockdata;
- gnutls_session state = data->state;
- const gnutls_datum *cert_list;
- unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
gnutls_certificate_status certstat;
- int i, rc;
- if (gnutls_auth_get_type (state) != GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE)
- {
- mutt_error (_("Unable to get certificate from peer"));
- mutt_sleep (2);
- return 0;
- }
-
- certstat = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers (state);
+ certstat = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers (tlsstate);
+ if (!certstat)
+ return certstat;
if (certstat == GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND)
{
@@ -899,13 +960,34 @@
}
/* We only support X.509 certificates (not OpenPGP) at the moment */
- if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (state) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
+ if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (tlsstate) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
{
mutt_error (_("Certificate is not X.509"));
mutt_sleep (2);
return 0;
}
+ return certstat;
+}
+
+static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
+{
+ tlssockdata *data = conn->sockdata;
+ gnutls_session state = data->state;
+ const gnutls_datum *cert_list;
+ unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
+ gnutls_certificate_status certstat;
+ int certerr, i, preauthrc, savedcert, rc = 0;
+
+ if (gnutls_auth_get_type (state) != GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE)
+ {
+ mutt_error (_("Unable to get certificate from peer"));
+ mutt_sleep (2);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ certstat = tls_verify_peers (state);
+
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (state, &cert_list_size);
if (!cert_list)
{
@@ -914,13 +996,42 @@
return 0;
}
+ /* tls_verify_peers doesn't check hostname or expiration, so walk
+ * from most specific to least checking these. If we see a saved certificate,
+ * its status short-circuits the remaining checks. */
+ preauthrc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < cert_list_size; i++) {
+ rc = tls_check_preauth(&cert_list[i], certstat, conn->account.host, i,
+ &certerr, &savedcert);
+ preauthrc += rc;
+
+ if (savedcert)
+ {
+ if (!preauthrc)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* then check interactively, starting from chain root */
for (i = cert_list_size - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
rc = tls_check_one_certificate (&cert_list[i], certstat, conn->account.host,
i, cert_list_size);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+
+ /* add signers to trust set, then reverify */
+ if (i && rc) {
+ rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem (data->xcred, &cert_list[i],
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+ if (rc != 1)
+ dprint (1, (debugfile, "error trusting certificate %d: %d\n", i, rc));
+
+ certstat = tls_verify_peers (state);
+ if (!certstat)
+ return 1;
+ }
}
- return 0;
+ return rc;
}
diff -up mutt-1.5.19/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c.gnutls2 mutt-1.5.19/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
--- mutt-1.5.19/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c.gnutls2 2009-06-09 15:41:56.000000000 +0200
+++ mutt-1.5.19/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c 2009-06-09 16:05:51.000000000 +0200
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static int tls_negotiate (CONNECTION * c
SslClientCert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
}
-#if HAVE_DECL_GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_TIME_CHECKS
+#if 1
/* disable checking certificate activation/expiration times
in gnutls, we do the checks ourselves */
gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(data->xcred, GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_TIME_CHECKS);
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static int tls_check_stored_hostname (co
buf[0] = '\0';
tls_fingerprint (GNUTLS_DIG_MD5, buf, sizeof (buf), cert);
- while ((linestr = mutt_read_line(linestr, &linestrsize, fp, &linenum, 0)) != NULL)
+ while ((linestr = mutt_read_line(linestr, &linestrsize, fp, &linenum)) != NULL)
{
if(linestr[0] == '#' && linestr[1] == 'H')
{
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int tls_check_preauth (const gnut
return -1;
}
- if (option (OPTSSLVERIFYDATES) != M_NO)
+ if (1)
{
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (cert) < time(NULL))
*certerr |= CERTERR_EXPIRED;
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ static int tls_check_preauth (const gnut
*certerr |= CERTERR_NOTYETVALID;
}
- if (chainidx == 0 && option (OPTSSLVERIFYHOST) != M_NO
+ if (chainidx == 0
&& !gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (cert, hostname)
&& !tls_check_stored_hostname (certdata, hostname))
*certerr |= CERTERR_HOSTNAME;

8
mutt.spec
View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
Summary: A text mode mail user agent
Name: mutt
Version: 1.5.19
Release: 4%{?dist}
Release: 5%{?dist}
Epoch: 5
# The entire source code is GPLv2+ except
# pgpewrap.c setenv.c sha1.c wcwidth.c which are Public Domain
@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ Patch7: mutt-1.5.19-db47.patch
Patch8: mutt-1.5.19-realpath.patch
Patch9: mutt-1.5.19-inodesort.patch
Patch10: mutt-1.5.19-saslcb.patch
Patch11: mutt-1.5.19-gnutls.patch
Url: http://www.mutt.org/
Requires: mailcap urlview
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n)
@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ for selecting groups of messages.
%patch8 -p1 -b .realpath
%patch9 -p1 -b .inodesort
%patch10 -p1 -b .saslcb
%patch11 -p1 -b .gnutls
install -p -m644 %{SOURCE1} mutt_ldap_query
@ -148,6 +150,10 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%{_mandir}/man5/muttrc.*
%changelog
* Tue Jun 09 2009 Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com> 5:1.5.19-5
- fix certificate verification (CVE-2009-1390)
- add support for gnutls INSECURE_ALGORITHM error code (#499390)
* Wed Apr 01 2009 Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com> 5:1.5.19-4
- use PATH_MAX for buffers passed to realpath (#492861)
- unconditionally inode-sort Maildir and MH folders