diff --git a/Fix-buffer-overflow-when-unpacking-message-address-l.patch b/Fix-buffer-overflow-when-unpacking-message-address-l.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1648899
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Fix-buffer-overflow-when-unpacking-message-address-l.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From bf40cc27c4ce8451d4b062c9de0b67ec40894812 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Dunlap <cdunlap@llnl.gov>
+Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2026 20:42:40 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow when unpacking message address length
+
+Add validation that addr_len does not exceed the size of the addr
+field before copying IP address data in _msg_unpack().
+
+The m_msg structure contains a 4-byte struct in_addr for the IP
+address.  When unpacking a MUNGE_MSG_DEC_RSP message, the addr_len
+field (uint8_t) was read from untrusted message data and used directly
+in _copy() without validation.  An attacker setting addr_len to 255
+causes _copy() to write 251 bytes past the end of the addr field,
+corrupting subsequent structure members.
+
+This buffer overflow corrupts munged's internal state and can
+be exploited by a local attacker to leak conf->mac_key and other
+cryptographic secrets from process memory.  With the leaked key,
+an attacker can forge arbitrary MUNGE credentials to impersonate any
+user to services that rely on MUNGE for authentication.
+
+Any local user can trigger this by connecting to munged's Unix socket
+and sending a crafted MUNGE_MSG_DEC_RSP message.  While message type
+validation in job_exec() will reject response-type messages, this
+validation occurs after m_msg_recv() has already called _msg_unpack()
+to process the message body.  The buffer overflow occurs during the
+unpacking phase, before the message type is validated and rejected.
+
+A working proof-of-concept exploit exists that demonstrates key
+leakage and credential forgery.
+
+Reported-by: Titouan Lazard <t.lazard@lexfo.fr>
+Security: CVE-2026-25506
+---
+ src/libcommon/m_msg.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/libcommon/m_msg.c b/src/libcommon/m_msg.c
+index 38e01ae3dd81..eaeaf0b8bc3e 100644
+--- a/src/libcommon/m_msg.c
++++ b/src/libcommon/m_msg.c
+@@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ _msg_unpack (m_msg_t m, m_msg_type_t type, const void *src, int srclen)
+             else if ( _copy (m->realm_str, p, m->realm_len, p, q, &p) < 0) ;
+             else if (!_unpack (&(m->ttl), &p, sizeof (m->ttl), q)) ;
+             else if (!_unpack (&(m->addr_len), &p, sizeof (m->addr_len), q)) ;
++            else if (m->addr_len > sizeof (m->addr)) goto err;
+             else if ( _copy (&(m->addr), p, m->addr_len, p, q, &p) < 0) ;
+             else if (!_unpack (&(m->time0), &p, sizeof (m->time0), q)) ;
+             else if (!_unpack (&(m->time1), &p, sizeof (m->time1), q)) ;
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/munge.spec b/munge.spec
index d5b59fc..df537d6 100644
--- a/munge.spec
+++ b/munge.spec
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ Source1:        https://github.com/dun/munge/releases/download/%{name}-%{version
 Source2:        https://github.com/dun.gpg
 Source3:        munge.sysusers
 Source4:        README.md
+Patch01:	Fix-buffer-overflow-when-unpacking-message-address-l.patch
 
 BuildRequires:  make
 BuildRequires:  gcc