181 lines
7.6 KiB
Diff
181 lines
7.6 KiB
Diff
diff -rupN --no-dereference openssl-3.0.9/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c openssl-3.0.9-new/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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--- openssl-3.0.9/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2023-05-30 14:31:57.000000000 +0200
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+++ openssl-3.0.9-new/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2023-05-31 14:33:15.228113675 +0200
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@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include "internal/dane.h"
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+#include "internal/sslconf.h"
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#include "crypto/x509.h"
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#include "x509_local.h"
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@@ -3438,14 +3439,31 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CT
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{
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int secbits = -1;
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int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
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+ int nid;
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+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
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if (level <= 0)
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return 1;
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if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
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level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
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- if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
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+ if (ctx->libctx)
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+ libctx = ctx->libctx;
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+ else if (cert->libctx)
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+ libctx = cert->libctx;
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+ else
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+ libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default();
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+
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+ if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, &nid, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
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return 0;
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+ if ((nid == NID_sha1 || nid == NID_md5_sha1)
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+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
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+ && ctx->param->auth_level < 2)
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+ /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
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+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. Also allow
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+ * MD5-SHA1 because TLS 1.0 is still supported, which uses it. */
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+ return 1;
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+
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return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
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}
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diff -rupN --no-dereference openssl-3.0.9/doc/man5/config.pod openssl-3.0.9-new/doc/man5/config.pod
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--- openssl-3.0.9/doc/man5/config.pod 2023-05-31 14:33:14.947113797 +0200
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+++ openssl-3.0.9-new/doc/man5/config.pod 2023-05-31 14:33:15.229113675 +0200
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@@ -317,6 +317,13 @@ this option is set to B<no>. Because TL
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pseudorandom function (PRF) to derive key material, disabling
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B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> requires the use of TLS 1.2 or newer.
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+Note that enabling B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> will allow TLS signature
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+algorithms that use SHA1 in security level 1, despite the definition of
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+security level 1 of 80 bits of security, which SHA1 and MD5-SHA1 do not meet.
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+This allows using SHA1 and MD5-SHA1 in TLS in the LEGACY crypto-policy on
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+Fedora without requiring to set the security level to 0, which would include
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+further insecure algorithms, and thus restores support for TLS 1.0 and 1.1.
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+
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=item B<fips_mode> (deprecated)
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The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>. If the value is
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diff -rupN --no-dereference openssl-3.0.9/ssl/t1_lib.c openssl-3.0.9-new/ssl/t1_lib.c
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--- openssl-3.0.9/ssl/t1_lib.c 2023-05-31 14:33:14.950113795 +0200
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+++ openssl-3.0.9-new/ssl/t1_lib.c 2023-05-31 14:33:15.229113675 +0200
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/provider.h>
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#include <openssl/param_build.h>
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+#include "crypto/x509.h"
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#include "internal/sslconf.h"
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#include "internal/nelem.h"
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#include "internal/sizes.h"
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@@ -1567,19 +1568,28 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
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return 0;
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}
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- /*
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- * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
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- * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
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- */
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- sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
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- sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
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- secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
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- if (secbits == 0 ||
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- !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
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- md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
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- (void *)sigalgstr)) {
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- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
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- return 0;
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+
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+ if ((lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_md5_sha1)
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+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0)
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+ && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2) {
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+ /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
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+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. Also allow
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+ * MD5-SHA1 because TLS 1.0 is still supported, which uses it. */
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+ } else {
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+ /*
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+ * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
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+ * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
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+ */
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+ sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
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+ sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
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+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
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+ if (secbits == 0 ||
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+ !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
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+ md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
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+ (void *)sigalgstr)) {
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+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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}
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/* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
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s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
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@@ -2117,6 +2127,15 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SS
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}
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}
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+ if ((lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_md5_sha1)
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+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0)
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+ && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2) {
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+ /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
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+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. Also allow
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+ * MD5-SHA1 because TLS 1.0 is still supported, which uses it. */
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+ return 1;
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+ }
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+
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/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
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secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
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sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
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@@ -2986,6 +3005,8 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s,
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{
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/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
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int secbits, nid, pknid;
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+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
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+
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/* Don't check signature if self signed */
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if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
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return 1;
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@@ -2994,6 +3015,26 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s,
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/* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
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if (nid == NID_undef)
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nid = pknid;
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+
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+ if (x && x->libctx)
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+ libctx = x->libctx;
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+ else if (ctx && ctx->libctx)
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+ libctx = ctx->libctx;
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+ else if (s && s->ctx && s->ctx->libctx)
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+ libctx = s->ctx->libctx;
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+ else
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+ libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default();
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+
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+ if ((nid == NID_sha1 || nid == NID_md5_sha1)
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+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
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+ && ((s != NULL && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2)
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+ || (ctx != NULL && SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx) < 2)
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+ ))
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+ /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
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+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. Also allow
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+ * MD5-SHA1 because TLS 1.0 is still supported, which uses it. */
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+ return 1;
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+
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if (s)
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return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
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else
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diff -rupN --no-dereference openssl-3.0.9/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t openssl-3.0.9-new/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
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--- openssl-3.0.9/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t 2023-05-30 14:31:57.000000000 +0200
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+++ openssl-3.0.9-new/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t 2023-05-31 14:33:15.230113674 +0200
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@@ -419,8 +419,8 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root
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ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], ),
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"CA with PSS signature using SHA256");
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-ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "1"),
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- "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 1");
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+ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
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+ "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 2");
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ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
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"PSS signature using SHA256 and auth level 2");
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