Synced patches with native openssl-1.0.1e-38.fc21

- Synced patches with native openssl-1.0.1e-38.fc21
- Enable ECC support (RHBZ #1037919)
- Fixes CVE-2013-6450 (RHBZ #1047844)
- Fixes CVE-2013-4353 (RHBZ #1049062)
- Fixes CVE-2013-6449 (RHBZ #1045444)

.gitignore

@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ openssl-1.0.0a-usa.tar.bz2
 /openssl-1.0.0d-usa.tar.bz2
 /openssl-1.0.1c-usa.tar.xz
 /openssl-1.0.1e-usa.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1e-hobbled.tar.xz

README.FIPS

@@ -3,13 +3,15 @@ User guide for the FIPS Red Hat Enterprise Linux - OpenSSL Module
 
 This package contains libraries which comprise the FIPS 140-2
 Red Hat Enterprise Linux - OPENSSL Module.
+Note that the openssl-fips subpackage needs to be installed for the
+OpenSSL FIPS module installation to be complete.
 
 The module files
 ================
-/usr/lib[64]/libcrypto.so.1.0.0d
+/usr/lib[64]/libcrypto.so.1.0.1e
-/usr/lib[64]/libssl.so.1.0.0d
+/usr/lib[64]/libssl.so.1.0.1e
-/usr/lib[64]/.libcrypto.so.1.0.0d.hmac
+/usr/lib[64]/.libcrypto.so.1.0.1e.hmac
-/usr/lib[64]/.libssl.so.1.0.0d.hmac
+/usr/lib[64]/.libssl.so.1.0.1e.hmac
 
 Dependencies
 ============

ec_curve.c

@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
+/* crypto/ec/ec_curve.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2010 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by 
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+	int	field_type,	/* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or
+				 * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+		seed_len,
+		param_len;
+	unsigned int cofactor;	/* promoted to BN_ULONG */
+} EC_CURVE_DATA;
+
+static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20+48*6]; }
+	_EC_NIST_PRIME_384 = {
+	{ NID_X9_62_prime_field,20,48,1 },
+	{ 0xA3,0x35,0x92,0x6A,0xA3,0x19,0xA2,0x7A,0x1D,0x00,	/* seed */
+	  0x89,0x6A,0x67,0x73,0xA4,0x82,0x7A,0xCD,0xAC,0x73,
+
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,	/* p */
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFE,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
+	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,	/* a */
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFE,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
+	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFC,
+	  0xB3,0x31,0x2F,0xA7,0xE2,0x3E,0xE7,0xE4,0x98,0x8E,	/* b */
+	  0x05,0x6B,0xE3,0xF8,0x2D,0x19,0x18,0x1D,0x9C,0x6E,
+	  0xFE,0x81,0x41,0x12,0x03,0x14,0x08,0x8F,0x50,0x13,
+	  0x87,0x5A,0xC6,0x56,0x39,0x8D,0x8A,0x2E,0xD1,0x9D,
+	  0x2A,0x85,0xC8,0xED,0xD3,0xEC,0x2A,0xEF,
+	  0xAA,0x87,0xCA,0x22,0xBE,0x8B,0x05,0x37,0x8E,0xB1,	/* x */
+	  0xC7,0x1E,0xF3,0x20,0xAD,0x74,0x6E,0x1D,0x3B,0x62,
+	  0x8B,0xA7,0x9B,0x98,0x59,0xF7,0x41,0xE0,0x82,0x54,
+	  0x2A,0x38,0x55,0x02,0xF2,0x5D,0xBF,0x55,0x29,0x6C,
+	  0x3A,0x54,0x5E,0x38,0x72,0x76,0x0A,0xB7,
+	  0x36,0x17,0xde,0x4a,0x96,0x26,0x2c,0x6f,0x5d,0x9e,	/* y */
+	  0x98,0xbf,0x92,0x92,0xdc,0x29,0xf8,0xf4,0x1d,0xbd,
+	  0x28,0x9a,0x14,0x7c,0xe9,0xda,0x31,0x13,0xb5,0xf0,
+	  0xb8,0xc0,0x0a,0x60,0xb1,0xce,0x1d,0x7e,0x81,0x9d,
+	  0x7a,0x43,0x1d,0x7c,0x90,0xea,0x0e,0x5f,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,	/* order */
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xC7,0x63,0x4D,0x81,0xF4,0x37,
+	  0x2D,0xDF,0x58,0x1A,0x0D,0xB2,0x48,0xB0,0xA7,0x7A,
+	  0xEC,0xEC,0x19,0x6A,0xCC,0xC5,0x29,0x73 }
+	};
+
+static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20+66*6]; }
+	_EC_NIST_PRIME_521 = {
+	{ NID_X9_62_prime_field,20,66,1 },
+	{ 0xD0,0x9E,0x88,0x00,0x29,0x1C,0xB8,0x53,0x96,0xCC,	/* seed */
+	  0x67,0x17,0x39,0x32,0x84,0xAA,0xA0,0xDA,0x64,0xBA,
+
+	  0x01,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,	/* p */
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0x01,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,	/* a */
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFC,
+	  0x00,0x51,0x95,0x3E,0xB9,0x61,0x8E,0x1C,0x9A,0x1F,	/* b */
+	  0x92,0x9A,0x21,0xA0,0xB6,0x85,0x40,0xEE,0xA2,0xDA,
+	  0x72,0x5B,0x99,0xB3,0x15,0xF3,0xB8,0xB4,0x89,0x91,
+	  0x8E,0xF1,0x09,0xE1,0x56,0x19,0x39,0x51,0xEC,0x7E,
+	  0x93,0x7B,0x16,0x52,0xC0,0xBD,0x3B,0xB1,0xBF,0x07,
+	  0x35,0x73,0xDF,0x88,0x3D,0x2C,0x34,0xF1,0xEF,0x45,
+	  0x1F,0xD4,0x6B,0x50,0x3F,0x00,
+	  0x00,0xC6,0x85,0x8E,0x06,0xB7,0x04,0x04,0xE9,0xCD,	/* x */
+	  0x9E,0x3E,0xCB,0x66,0x23,0x95,0xB4,0x42,0x9C,0x64,
+	  0x81,0x39,0x05,0x3F,0xB5,0x21,0xF8,0x28,0xAF,0x60,
+	  0x6B,0x4D,0x3D,0xBA,0xA1,0x4B,0x5E,0x77,0xEF,0xE7,
+	  0x59,0x28,0xFE,0x1D,0xC1,0x27,0xA2,0xFF,0xA8,0xDE,
+	  0x33,0x48,0xB3,0xC1,0x85,0x6A,0x42,0x9B,0xF9,0x7E,
+	  0x7E,0x31,0xC2,0xE5,0xBD,0x66,
+	  0x01,0x18,0x39,0x29,0x6a,0x78,0x9a,0x3b,0xc0,0x04,	/* y */
+	  0x5c,0x8a,0x5f,0xb4,0x2c,0x7d,0x1b,0xd9,0x98,0xf5,
+	  0x44,0x49,0x57,0x9b,0x44,0x68,0x17,0xaf,0xbd,0x17,
+	  0x27,0x3e,0x66,0x2c,0x97,0xee,0x72,0x99,0x5e,0xf4,
+	  0x26,0x40,0xc5,0x50,0xb9,0x01,0x3f,0xad,0x07,0x61,
+	  0x35,0x3c,0x70,0x86,0xa2,0x72,0xc2,0x40,0x88,0xbe,
+	  0x94,0x76,0x9f,0xd1,0x66,0x50,
+	  0x01,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,	/* order */
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFA,0x51,0x86,0x87,0x83,0xBF,0x2F,
+	  0x96,0x6B,0x7F,0xCC,0x01,0x48,0xF7,0x09,0xA5,0xD0,
+	  0x3B,0xB5,0xC9,0xB8,0x89,0x9C,0x47,0xAE,0xBB,0x6F,
+	  0xB7,0x1E,0x91,0x38,0x64,0x09 }
+	};
+
+static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20+32*6]; }
+	_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1 = {
+	{ NID_X9_62_prime_field,20,32,1 },
+	{ 0xC4,0x9D,0x36,0x08,0x86,0xE7,0x04,0x93,0x6A,0x66,	/* seed */
+	  0x78,0xE1,0x13,0x9D,0x26,0xB7,0x81,0x9F,0x7E,0x90,
+
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,	/* p */
+	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,	/* a */
+	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFC,
+	  0x5A,0xC6,0x35,0xD8,0xAA,0x3A,0x93,0xE7,0xB3,0xEB,	/* b */
+	  0xBD,0x55,0x76,0x98,0x86,0xBC,0x65,0x1D,0x06,0xB0,
+	  0xCC,0x53,0xB0,0xF6,0x3B,0xCE,0x3C,0x3E,0x27,0xD2,
+	  0x60,0x4B,
+	  0x6B,0x17,0xD1,0xF2,0xE1,0x2C,0x42,0x47,0xF8,0xBC,	/* x */
+	  0xE6,0xE5,0x63,0xA4,0x40,0xF2,0x77,0x03,0x7D,0x81,
+	  0x2D,0xEB,0x33,0xA0,0xF4,0xA1,0x39,0x45,0xD8,0x98,
+	  0xC2,0x96,
+	  0x4f,0xe3,0x42,0xe2,0xfe,0x1a,0x7f,0x9b,0x8e,0xe7,	/* y */
+	  0xeb,0x4a,0x7c,0x0f,0x9e,0x16,0x2b,0xce,0x33,0x57,
+	  0x6b,0x31,0x5e,0xce,0xcb,0xb6,0x40,0x68,0x37,0xbf,
+	  0x51,0xf5,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,	/* order */
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xBC,0xE6,0xFA,0xAD,
+	  0xA7,0x17,0x9E,0x84,0xF3,0xB9,0xCA,0xC2,0xFC,0x63,
+	  0x25,0x51 }
+	};
+
+typedef struct _ec_list_element_st {
+	int	nid;
+	const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
+	const EC_METHOD *(*meth)(void);
+	const char *comment;
+	} ec_list_element;
+
+static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
+	/* prime field curves */
+	/* secg curves */
+	/* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
+	{ NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field" },
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+	{ NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, EC_GFp_nistp521_method, "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field" },
+#else
+	{ NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field" },
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+	{ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h, EC_GFp_nistp256_method, "X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field" },
+#else
+	{ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h, 0, "X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field" },
+#endif
+};
+
+#define curve_list_length (sizeof(curve_list)/sizeof(ec_list_element))
+
+static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const ec_list_element curve)
+	{
+	EC_GROUP *group=NULL;
+	EC_POINT *P=NULL;
+	BN_CTX	 *ctx=NULL;
+	BIGNUM	 *p=NULL, *a=NULL, *b=NULL, *x=NULL, *y=NULL, *order=NULL;
+	int	 ok=0;
+	int	 seed_len,param_len;
+	const EC_METHOD *meth;
+	const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
+	const unsigned char *params;
+
+	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	data = curve.data;
+	seed_len  = data->seed_len;
+	param_len = data->param_len;
+	params	  = (const unsigned char *)(data+1);	/* skip header */
+	params	 += seed_len;				/* skip seed   */
+
+	if (!(p = BN_bin2bn(params+0*param_len, param_len, NULL))
+		|| !(a = BN_bin2bn(params+1*param_len, param_len, NULL))
+		|| !(b = BN_bin2bn(params+2*param_len, param_len, NULL)))
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (curve.meth != 0)
+		{
+		meth = curve.meth();
+		if (((group = EC_GROUP_new(meth)) == NULL) ||
+			(!(group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx))))
+			{
+			ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	else if (data->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+		{
+		if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL)
+			{
+			ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+	else	/* field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+		{
+		if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL)
+			{
+			ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
+	if ((P = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (!(x = BN_bin2bn(params+3*param_len, param_len, NULL))
+		|| !(y = BN_bin2bn(params+4*param_len, param_len, NULL)))
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (!(order = BN_bin2bn(params+5*param_len, param_len, NULL))
+		|| !BN_set_word(x, (BN_ULONG)data->cofactor))
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, order, x))
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (seed_len)
+		{
+		if (!EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, params-seed_len, seed_len))
+			{
+			ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	ok=1;
+err:
+	if (!ok)
+		{
+		EC_GROUP_free(group);
+		group = NULL;
+		}
+	if (P)
+		EC_POINT_free(P);
+	if (ctx)
+		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+	if (p)
+		BN_free(p);
+	if (a)
+		BN_free(a);
+	if (b)
+		BN_free(b);
+	if (order)
+		BN_free(order);
+	if (x)
+		BN_free(x);
+	if (y)
+		BN_free(y);
+	return group;
+	}
+
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
+
+	if (nid <= 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	for (i=0; i<curve_list_length; i++)
+		if (curve_list[i].nid == nid)
+			{
+			ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve_list[i]);
+			break;
+			}
+
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+
+	EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(ret, nid);
+
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems)
+	{
+	size_t	i, min;
+
+	if (r == NULL || nitems == 0)
+		return curve_list_length;
+
+	min = nitems < curve_list_length ? nitems : curve_list_length;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < min; i++)
+		{
+		r[i].nid = curve_list[i].nid;
+		r[i].comment = curve_list[i].comment;
+		}
+
+	return curve_list_length;
+	}

ectest.c

@@ -0,0 +1,742 @@
+/* crypto/ec/ectest.c */
+/*
+ * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by 
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef FLAT_INC
+#include "e_os.h"
+#else
+#include "../e_os.h"
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+int main(int argc, char * argv[]) { puts("Elliptic curves are disabled."); return 0; }
+#else
+
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_MIPS_) && (_MSC_VER/100==12)
+/* suppress "too big too optimize" warning */
+#pragma warning(disable:4959)
+#endif
+
+#define ABORT do { \
+	fflush(stdout); \
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: ABORT\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); \
+	ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); \
+	EXIT(1); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define TIMING_BASE_PT 0
+#define TIMING_RAND_PT 1
+#define TIMING_SIMUL 2
+
+#if 0
+static void timings(EC_GROUP *group, int type, BN_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	clock_t clck;
+	int i, j;
+	BIGNUM *s;
+	BIGNUM *r[10], *r0[10];
+	EC_POINT *P;
+		
+	s = BN_new();
+	if (s == NULL) ABORT;
+
+	fprintf(stdout, "Timings for %d-bit field, ", EC_GROUP_get_degree(group));
+	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, s, ctx)) ABORT;
+	fprintf(stdout, "%d-bit scalars ", (int)BN_num_bits(s));
+	fflush(stdout);
+
+	P = EC_POINT_new(group);
+	if (P == NULL) ABORT;
+	EC_POINT_copy(P, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
+		{
+		if ((r[i] = BN_new()) == NULL) ABORT;
+		if (!BN_pseudo_rand(r[i], BN_num_bits(s), 0, 0)) ABORT;
+		if (type != TIMING_BASE_PT)
+			{
+			if ((r0[i] = BN_new()) == NULL) ABORT;
+			if (!BN_pseudo_rand(r0[i], BN_num_bits(s), 0, 0)) ABORT;
+			}
+		}
+
+	clck = clock();
+	for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
+		{
+		for (j = 0; j < 10; j++)
+			{
+			if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, P, (type != TIMING_RAND_PT) ? r[i] : NULL, 
+				(type != TIMING_BASE_PT) ? P : NULL, (type != TIMING_BASE_PT) ? r0[i] : NULL, ctx)) ABORT;
+			}
+		}
+	clck = clock() - clck;
+
+	fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+
+#ifdef CLOCKS_PER_SEC
+	/* "To determine the time in seconds, the value returned
+	 * by the clock function should be divided by the value
+	 * of the macro CLOCKS_PER_SEC."
+	 *                                       -- ISO/IEC 9899 */
+#	define UNIT "s"
+#else
+	/* "`CLOCKS_PER_SEC' undeclared (first use this function)"
+	 *                            -- cc on NeXTstep/OpenStep */
+#	define UNIT "units"
+#	define CLOCKS_PER_SEC 1
+#endif
+
+	if (type == TIMING_BASE_PT) {
+		fprintf(stdout, "%i %s in %.2f " UNIT "\n", i*j,
+			"base point multiplications", (double)clck/CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+	} else if (type == TIMING_RAND_PT) {
+		fprintf(stdout, "%i %s in %.2f " UNIT "\n", i*j,
+			"random point multiplications", (double)clck/CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+	} else if (type == TIMING_SIMUL) {
+		fprintf(stdout, "%i %s in %.2f " UNIT "\n", i*j,
+			"s*P+t*Q operations", (double)clck/CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+	}
+	fprintf(stdout, "average: %.4f " UNIT "\n", (double)clck/(CLOCKS_PER_SEC*i*j));
+
+	EC_POINT_free(P);
+	BN_free(s);
+	for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
+		{
+		BN_free(r[i]);
+		if (type != TIMING_BASE_PT) BN_free(r0[i]);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+/* test multiplication with group order, long and negative scalars */
+static void group_order_tests(EC_GROUP *group)
+	{
+	BIGNUM *n1, *n2, *order;
+	EC_POINT *P = EC_POINT_new(group);
+	EC_POINT *Q = EC_POINT_new(group);
+	BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+
+	n1 = BN_new(); n2 = BN_new(); order = BN_new();
+	fprintf(stdout, "verify group order ...");
+	fflush(stdout);
+	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, order, NULL, NULL, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT;
+	fprintf(stdout, ".");
+	fflush(stdout);
+	if (!EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(group, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, order, NULL, NULL, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT;
+	fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
+	fprintf(stdout, "long/negative scalar tests ... ");
+	if (!BN_one(n1)) ABORT;
+	/* n1 = 1 - order */
+	if (!BN_sub(n1, n1, order)) ABORT;
+	if(!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n1, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT;
+	/* n2 = 1 + order */
+	if (!BN_add(n2, order, BN_value_one())) ABORT;
+	if(!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT;
+	/* n2 = (1 - order) * (1 + order) */
+	if (!BN_mul(n2, n1, n2, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if(!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT;
+	fprintf(stdout, "ok\n");
+	EC_POINT_free(P);
+	EC_POINT_free(Q);
+	BN_free(n1);
+	BN_free(n2);
+	BN_free(order);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+	}
+
+static void prime_field_tests(void)
+	{
+	BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
+	EC_GROUP *group;
+	EC_GROUP *P_160 = NULL, *P_192 = NULL, *P_224 = NULL, *P_256 = NULL, *P_384 = NULL, *P_521 = NULL;
+	EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R;
+	BIGNUM *x, *y, *z;
+	unsigned char buf[100];
+	size_t i, len;
+	int k;
+	
+#if 1 /* optional */
+	ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+	if (!ctx) ABORT;
+#endif
+
+	p = BN_new();
+	a = BN_new();
+	b = BN_new();
+	if (!p || !a || !b) ABORT;
+	
+	group = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GFp_mont_method()); /* applications should use EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp
+	                                             * so that the library gets to choose the EC_METHOD */
+	if (!group) ABORT;
+
+	P = EC_POINT_new(group);
+	Q = EC_POINT_new(group);
+	R = EC_POINT_new(group);
+	if (!P || !Q || !R) ABORT;
+
+	x = BN_new();
+	y = BN_new();
+	z = BN_new();
+	if (!x || !y || !z) ABORT;
+
+/* Curve P-256 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+	
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF")) ABORT;
+	if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL)) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC")) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "5AC635D8AA3A93E7B3EBBD55769886BC651D06B0CC53B0F63BCE3C3E27D2604B")) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT;
+
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "6B17D1F2E12C4247F8BCE6E563A440F277037D812DEB33A0F4A13945D898C296")) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E"
+		"84F3B9CAC2FC632551")) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT;
+
+	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT;
+	fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-256 -- Generator:\n     x = 0x");
+	BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+	fprintf(stdout, "\n     y = 0x");
+	BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+	fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+	/* G_y value taken from the standard: */
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "4FE342E2FE1A7F9B8EE7EB4A7C0F9E162BCE33576B315ECECBB6406837BF51F5")) ABORT;
+	if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z)) ABORT;
+	
+	fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
+	if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 256) ABORT;
+	fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
+	
+	group_order_tests(group);
+
+	if (!(P_256 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)))) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_256, group)) ABORT;
+
+
+	/* Curve P-384 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+	
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+		"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFF0000000000000000FFFFFFFF")) ABORT;
+	if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL)) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+		"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFF0000000000000000FFFFFFFC")) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "B3312FA7E23EE7E4988E056BE3F82D19181D9C6EFE8141"
+		"120314088F5013875AC656398D8A2ED19D2A85C8EDD3EC2AEF")) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT;
+
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "AA87CA22BE8B05378EB1C71EF320AD746E1D3B628BA79B"
+		"9859F741E082542A385502F25DBF55296C3A545E3872760AB7")) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+		"FFC7634D81F4372DDF581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973")) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT;
+
+	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT;
+	fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-384 -- Generator:\n     x = 0x");
+	BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+	fprintf(stdout, "\n     y = 0x");
+	BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+	fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+	/* G_y value taken from the standard: */
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "3617DE4A96262C6F5D9E98BF9292DC29F8F41DBD289A14"
+		"7CE9DA3113B5F0B8C00A60B1CE1D7E819D7A431D7C90EA0E5F")) ABORT;
+	if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z)) ABORT;
+	
+	fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
+	if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 384) ABORT;
+	fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
+
+	group_order_tests(group);
+
+	if (!(P_384 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)))) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_384, group)) ABORT;
+
+
+	/* Curve P-521 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */
+	
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+		"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+		"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF")) ABORT;
+	if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL)) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+		"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+		"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC")) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "051953EB9618E1C9A1F929A21A0B68540EEA2DA725B99B"
+		"315F3B8B489918EF109E156193951EC7E937B1652C0BD3BB1BF073573"
+		"DF883D2C34F1EF451FD46B503F00")) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT;
+
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "C6858E06B70404E9CD9E3ECB662395B4429C648139053F"
+		"B521F828AF606B4D3DBAA14B5E77EFE75928FE1DC127A2FFA8DE3348B"
+		"3C1856A429BF97E7E31C2E5BD66")) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+		"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A5D03BB5"
+		"C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386409")) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT;
+
+	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT;
+	fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-521 -- Generator:\n     x = 0x");
+	BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
+	fprintf(stdout, "\n     y = 0x");
+	BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
+	fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+	/* G_y value taken from the standard: */
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "11839296A789A3BC0045C8A5FB42C7D1BD998F54449579"
+		"B446817AFBD17273E662C97EE72995EF42640C550B9013FAD0761353C"
+		"7086A272C24088BE94769FD16650")) ABORT;
+	if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z)) ABORT;
+	
+	fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
+	if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 521) ABORT;
+	fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
+
+ 	group_order_tests(group);
+
+	if (!(P_521 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)))) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_521, group)) ABORT;
+
+
+	/* more tests using the last curve */
+
+	if (!EC_POINT_copy(Q, P)) ABORT;
+	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx)) ABORT; /* P = -2Q */
+
+	if (!EC_POINT_add(group, R, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_add(group, R, R, Q, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, R)) ABORT; /* R = P + 2Q */
+
+	{
+		const EC_POINT *points[4];
+		const BIGNUM *scalars[4];
+		BIGNUM scalar3;
+	
+		if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT;
+		points[0] = Q;
+		points[1] = Q;
+		points[2] = Q;
+		points[3] = Q;
+
+		if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, z, ctx)) ABORT;
+		if (!BN_add(y, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT;
+		if (BN_is_odd(y)) ABORT;
+		if (!BN_rshift1(y, y)) ABORT;
+		scalars[0] = y; /* (group order + 1)/2,  so  y*Q + y*Q = Q */
+		scalars[1] = y;
+
+		fprintf(stdout, "combined multiplication ...");
+		fflush(stdout);
+
+		/* z is still the group order */
+		if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT;
+		if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, R, z, 2, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT;
+		if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, R, ctx)) ABORT;
+		if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, R, Q, ctx)) ABORT;
+
+		fprintf(stdout, ".");
+		fflush(stdout);
+
+		if (!BN_pseudo_rand(y, BN_num_bits(y), 0, 0)) ABORT;
+		if (!BN_add(z, z, y)) ABORT;
+		BN_set_negative(z, 1);
+		scalars[0] = y;
+		scalars[1] = z; /* z = -(order + y) */
+
+		if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT;
+		if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT;
+
+		fprintf(stdout, ".");
+		fflush(stdout);
+
+		if (!BN_pseudo_rand(x, BN_num_bits(y) - 1, 0, 0)) ABORT;
+		if (!BN_add(z, x, y)) ABORT;
+		BN_set_negative(z, 1);
+		scalars[0] = x;
+		scalars[1] = y;
+		scalars[2] = z; /* z = -(x+y) */
+
+		BN_init(&scalar3);
+		BN_zero(&scalar3);
+		scalars[3] = &scalar3;
+
+		if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 4, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT;
+		if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT;
+
+		fprintf(stdout, " ok\n\n");
+
+		BN_free(&scalar3);
+	}
+
+
+#if 0
+	timings(P_256, TIMING_BASE_PT, ctx);
+	timings(P_256, TIMING_RAND_PT, ctx);
+	timings(P_256, TIMING_SIMUL, ctx);
+	timings(P_384, TIMING_BASE_PT, ctx);
+	timings(P_384, TIMING_RAND_PT, ctx);
+	timings(P_384, TIMING_SIMUL, ctx);
+#endif
+
+
+	if (ctx)
+		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+	BN_free(p); BN_free(a);	BN_free(b);
+	EC_GROUP_free(group);
+	EC_POINT_free(P);
+	EC_POINT_free(Q);
+	EC_POINT_free(R);
+	BN_free(x); BN_free(y); BN_free(z);
+
+	if (P_160) EC_GROUP_free(P_160);
+	if (P_192) EC_GROUP_free(P_192);
+	if (P_224) EC_GROUP_free(P_224);
+	if (P_256) EC_GROUP_free(P_256);
+	if (P_384) EC_GROUP_free(P_384);
+	if (P_521) EC_GROUP_free(P_521);
+
+	}
+
+
+static void internal_curve_test(void)
+	{
+	EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
+	size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0;
+	int    ok = 1;
+
+	crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
+
+	curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_builtin_curve) * crv_len);
+
+	if (curves == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(curves);
+		return;
+		}
+
+	fprintf(stdout, "testing internal curves: ");
+		
+	for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++)
+		{
+		EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+		int nid = curves[n].nid;
+		if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL)
+			{
+			ok = 0;
+			fprintf(stdout, "\nEC_GROUP_new_curve_name() failed with"
+				" curve %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+			/* try next curve */
+			continue;
+			}
+		if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL))
+			{
+			ok = 0;
+			fprintf(stdout, "\nEC_GROUP_check() failed with"
+				" curve %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+			EC_GROUP_free(group);
+			/* try the next curve */
+			continue;
+			}
+		fprintf(stdout, ".");
+		fflush(stdout);
+		EC_GROUP_free(group);
+		}
+	if (ok)
+		fprintf(stdout, " ok\n\n");
+	else
+		{
+		fprintf(stdout, " failed\n\n");
+		ABORT;
+		}
+	OPENSSL_free(curves);
+	return;
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+/* nistp_test_params contains magic numbers for testing our optimized
+ * implementations of several NIST curves with characteristic > 3. */
+struct nistp_test_params
+	{
+	const EC_METHOD* (*meth) ();
+	int degree;
+	/* Qx, Qy and D are taken from
+	 * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/ECDSA_Prime.pdf
+	 * Otherwise, values are standard curve parameters from FIPS 180-3 */
+	const char *p, *a, *b, *Qx, *Qy, *Gx, *Gy, *order, *d;
+	};
+
+static const struct nistp_test_params nistp_tests_params[] =
+	{
+		{
+		/* P-256 */
+		EC_GFp_nistp256_method,
+		256,
+		"ffffffff00000001000000000000000000000000ffffffffffffffffffffffff", /* p */
+		"ffffffff00000001000000000000000000000000fffffffffffffffffffffffc", /* a */
+		"5ac635d8aa3a93e7b3ebbd55769886bc651d06b0cc53b0f63bce3c3e27d2604b", /* b */
+		"b7e08afdfe94bad3f1dc8c734798ba1c62b3a0ad1e9ea2a38201cd0889bc7a19", /* Qx */
+		"3603f747959dbf7a4bb226e41928729063adc7ae43529e61b563bbc606cc5e09", /* Qy */
+		"6b17d1f2e12c4247f8bce6e563a440f277037d812deb33a0f4a13945d898c296", /* Gx */
+		"4fe342e2fe1a7f9b8ee7eb4a7c0f9e162bce33576b315ececbb6406837bf51f5", /* Gy */
+		"ffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632551", /* order */
+		"c477f9f65c22cce20657faa5b2d1d8122336f851a508a1ed04e479c34985bf96", /* d */
+		},
+	};
+
+void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
+	{
+	BN_CTX *ctx;
+	BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *x, *y, *n, *m, *order;
+	EC_GROUP *NISTP;
+	EC_POINT *G, *P, *Q, *Q_CHECK;
+
+	fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-%d (optimised implementation):\n", test->degree);
+	ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+	p = BN_new();
+	a = BN_new();
+	b = BN_new();
+	x = BN_new(); y = BN_new();
+	m = BN_new(); n = BN_new(); order = BN_new();
+
+	NISTP = EC_GROUP_new(test->meth());
+	if(!NISTP) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, test->p)) ABORT;
+	if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL)) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, test->a)) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, test->b)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(NISTP, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT;
+	G = EC_POINT_new(NISTP);
+	P = EC_POINT_new(NISTP);
+	Q = EC_POINT_new(NISTP);
+	Q_CHECK = EC_POINT_new(NISTP);
+	if(!BN_hex2bn(&x, test->Qx)) ABORT;
+	if(!BN_hex2bn(&y, test->Qy)) ABORT;
+	if(!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, Q_CHECK, x, y, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, test->Gx)) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, test->Gy)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, G, x, y, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&order, test->order)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(NISTP, G, order, BN_value_one())) ABORT;
+
+	fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ... ");
+	if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(NISTP) != test->degree) ABORT;
+	fprintf(stdout, "ok\n");
+
+	fprintf(stdout, "NIST test vectors ... ");
+	if (!BN_hex2bn(&n, test->d)) ABORT;
+	/* fixed point multiplication */
+	EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, n, NULL, NULL, ctx);
+	if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT;
+	/* random point multiplication */
+	EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, G, n, ctx);
+	if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT;
+
+	/* set generator to P = 2*G, where G is the standard generator */
+	if (!EC_POINT_dbl(NISTP, P, G, ctx)) ABORT;
+	if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(NISTP, P, order, BN_value_one())) ABORT;
+	/* set the scalar to m=n/2, where n is the NIST test scalar */
+	if (!BN_rshift(m, n, 1)) ABORT;
+
+	/* test the non-standard generator */
+	/* fixed point multiplication */
+	EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, m, NULL, NULL, ctx);
+	if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT;
+	/* random point multiplication */
+	EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, P, m, ctx);
+	if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT;
+
+	/* now repeat all tests with precomputation */
+	if (!EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(NISTP, ctx)) ABORT;
+
+	/* fixed point multiplication */
+	EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, m, NULL, NULL, ctx);
+	if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT;
+	/* random point multiplication */
+	EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, P, m, ctx);
+	if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT;
+
+	/* reset generator */
+	if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(NISTP, G, order, BN_value_one())) ABORT;
+	/* fixed point multiplication */
+	EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, n, NULL, NULL, ctx);
+	if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT;
+	/* random point multiplication */
+	EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, G, n, ctx);
+	if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT;
+
+	fprintf(stdout, "ok\n");
+	group_order_tests(NISTP);
+#if 0
+	timings(NISTP, TIMING_BASE_PT, ctx);
+	timings(NISTP, TIMING_RAND_PT, ctx);
+#endif
+	EC_GROUP_free(NISTP);
+	EC_POINT_free(G);
+	EC_POINT_free(P);
+	EC_POINT_free(Q);
+	EC_POINT_free(Q_CHECK);
+	BN_free(n);
+	BN_free(m);
+	BN_free(p);
+	BN_free(a);
+	BN_free(b);
+	BN_free(x);
+	BN_free(y);
+	BN_free(order);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+	}
+
+void nistp_tests()
+	{
+	unsigned i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nistp_tests_params) / sizeof(struct nistp_test_params); i++)
+		{
+		nistp_single_test(&nistp_tests_params[i]);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+	{	
+	
+	/* enable memory leak checking unless explicitly disabled */
+	if (!((getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY") != NULL) && (0 == strcmp(getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"), "off"))))
+		{
+		CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+		CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/* OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=off */
+		CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions(0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+		}
+	CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+	RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */
+
+	prime_field_tests();
+	puts("");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+	char2_field_tests();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+	nistp_tests();
+#endif
+	/* test the internal curves */
+	internal_curve_test();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+	ENGINE_cleanup();
+#endif
+	CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+	ERR_free_strings();
+	ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+	CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
+	
+	return 0;
+	}
+#endif

fixpatch

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Fixes patch from upstream tracker view
+gawk '
+BEGIN {
+   dir=""
+}
+/^Index: openssl\// {
+   dir = $2
+}
+/^(---|\+\+\+)/ {
+   $2 = dir
+}
+{
+   print
+}'

hobble-openssl

@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ set -e
 # Remove assembler portions of IDEA, MDC2, and RC5.
 (find crypto/rc5/asm -type f | xargs -r rm -fv)
 
-# RC5, EC, SRP.
+# RC5, SRP.
-for a in rc5 ec ecdh ecdsa srp; do
+for a in rc5 srp; do
   for c in `find crypto/$a -name "*.c" -a \! -name "*test*" -type f` ; do
 	echo Destroying $c
 	> $c
   done
 done
 
-for c in `find crypto/evp -name "*_rc5.c" -o -name "*_ecdsa.c"`; do
+for c in `find crypto/evp -name "*_rc5.c"`; do
 	echo Destroying $c
 	> $c
 done
@@ -31,15 +31,18 @@ for c in `find crypto/bn -name "*gf2m.c"`; do
 	> $c
 done
 
+for c in `find crypto/ec -name "ec2*.c" -o -name "ec_curve.c" -o -name "ecp_nistp?2?.c" -o -name "ectest.c"`; do
+	echo Destroying $c
+	> $c
+done
+
 for h in `find crypto ssl apps test -name "*.h"` ; do
-	echo Removing RC5, SRP and EC references from $h
+	echo Removing RC5, SRP and EC2M references from $h
 	cat $h | \
 	awk    'BEGIN {ech=1;} \
 		/^#[ \t]*ifndef.*NO_SRP/ {ech--; next;} \
 		/^#[ \t]*ifndef.*NO_RC5/ {ech--; next;} \
-		/^#[ \t]*ifndef.*NO_EC/ {ech--; next;} \
+		/^#[ \t]*ifndef.*NO_EC2M/ {ech--; next;} \
-		/^#[ \t]*ifndef.*NO_ECDH/ {ech--; next;} \
-		/^#[ \t]*ifndef.*NO_ECDSA/ {ech--; next;} \
                 /^#[ \t]*if/ {if(ech < 1) ech--;} \
 		{if(ech>0) {;print $0};} \
 		/^#[ \t]*endif/ {if(ech < 1) ech++;}' > $h.hobbled && \

mingw-openssl.spec

@@ -24,16 +24,17 @@
 
 Name:           mingw-openssl
 Version:        1.0.1e
-Release:        4%{?dist}
+Release:        5%{?dist}
 Summary:        MinGW port of the OpenSSL toolkit
 
 License:        OpenSSL
 Group:          Development/Libraries
 URL:            http://www.openssl.org/
 
-# We remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source tarball
+# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
-# with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
+# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
-Source0:        openssl-%{version}-usa.tar.xz
+# The original openssl upstream tarball cannot be shipped in the .src.rpm.
+Source:         openssl-%{version}-hobbled.tar.xz
 
 Source1:        hobble-openssl
 Source2:        Makefile.certificate
@@ -42,8 +43,10 @@ Source7:        renew-dummy-cert
 Source8:        openssl-thread-test.c
 Source9:        opensslconf-new.h
 Source10:       opensslconf-new-warning.h
-
 Source11:       README.FIPS
+Source12:       ec_curve.c
+Source13:       ectest.c
+
 # Build changes
 Patch1:         openssl-1.0.1-beta2-rpmbuild.patch
 Patch2:         openssl-1.0.0f-defaults.patch
@@ -68,7 +71,7 @@ Patch45:        openssl-1.0.1e-env-zlib.patch
 Patch47:        openssl-1.0.0-beta5-readme-warning.patch
 Patch49:        openssl-1.0.1a-algo-doc.patch
 Patch50:        openssl-1.0.1-beta2-dtls1-abi.patch
-Patch51:        openssl-1.0.1-version.patch
+Patch51:        openssl-1.0.1e-version.patch
 Patch56:        openssl-1.0.0c-rsa-x931.patch
 Patch58:        openssl-1.0.1-beta2-fips-md5-allow.patch
 Patch60:        openssl-1.0.0d-apps-dgst.patch
@@ -77,11 +80,24 @@ Patch65:        openssl-1.0.0e-chil-fixes.patch
 Patch66:        openssl-1.0.1-pkgconfig-krb5.patch
 Patch68:        openssl-1.0.1e-secure-getenv.patch
 Patch69:        openssl-1.0.1c-dh-1024.patch
+Patch70:        openssl-1.0.1e-fips-ec.patch
 Patch71:        openssl-1.0.1e-manfix.patch
+Patch72:        openssl-1.0.1e-fips-ctor.patch
+Patch73:        openssl-1.0.1e-ecc-suiteb.patch
+Patch74:        openssl-1.0.1e-no-md5-verify.patch
+Patch75:        openssl-1.0.1e-compat-symbols.patch
+Patch76:        openssl-1.0.1e-new-fips-reqs.patch
+Patch77:        openssl-1.0.1e-weak-ciphers.patch
+Patch78:        openssl-1.0.1e-3des-strength.patch
 # Backported fixes including security fixes
 Patch81:        openssl-1.0.1-beta2-padlock64.patch
 Patch82:        openssl-1.0.1e-backports.patch
 Patch83:        openssl-1.0.1e-bad-mac.patch
+Patch84:        openssl-1.0.1e-trusted-first.patch
+Patch85:        openssl-1.0.1e-arm-use-elf-auxv-caps.patch
+Patch86:        openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6449.patch
+Patch87:        openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6450.patch
+Patch88:        openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-4353.patch
 
 # MinGW-specific patches.
 # Rename *eay32.dll to lib*.dll
@@ -192,6 +208,9 @@ Static version of the MinGW port of the OpenSSL toolkit.
 # The hobble_openssl is called here redundantly, just to be sure.
 # The tarball has already the sources removed.
 %{SOURCE1} > /dev/null
+
+cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
+
 %patch1 -p1 -b .rpmbuild
 %patch2 -p1 -b .defaults
 %patch4 -p1 -b .enginesdir %{?_rawbuild}
@@ -200,6 +219,7 @@ Static version of the MinGW port of the OpenSSL toolkit.
 %patch7 -p1 -b .timezone
 %patch8 -p1 -b .perlfind %{?_rawbuild}
 %patch9 -p1 -b .aliasing
+
 %patch23 -p1 -b .default-paths
 %patch24 -p1 -b .issuer-hash
 
@@ -223,11 +243,24 @@ Static version of the MinGW port of the OpenSSL toolkit.
 %patch66 -p1 -b .krb5
 #patch68 -p1 -b .secure-getenv
 %patch69 -p1 -b .dh1024
+#patch70 -p1 -b .fips-ec
+#patch72 -p1 -b .fips-ctor
+%patch73 -p1 -b .suiteb
+#patch74 -p1 -b .no-md5-verify
+%patch75 -p1 -b .compat
+#patch76 -p1 -b .fips-reqs
+%patch77 -p1 -b .weak-ciphers
+%patch78 -p1 -b .3des-strength
 
 %patch81 -p1 -b .padlock64
 %patch82 -p1 -b .backports
 %patch71 -p1 -b .manfix
 %patch83 -p1 -b .bad-mac
+%patch84 -p1 -b .trusted-first
+%patch85 -p1 -b .armcap
+%patch86 -p1 -b .hash-crash
+%patch87 -p1 -b .dtls1-mitm
+%patch88 -p1 -b .handshake-crash
 
 # MinGW specific patches
 %patch101 -p1 -b .mingw-libversion
@@ -269,9 +302,9 @@ PERL=%{__perl} \
   --prefix=%{mingw32_prefix} \
   --openssldir=%{mingw32_sysconfdir}/pki/tls \
   zlib enable-camellia enable-seed enable-tlsext enable-rfc3779 \
-  enable-cms enable-md2 no-mdc2 no-rc5 no-ec no-ec2m no-ecdh no-ecdsa \
+  enable-cms enable-md2 no-mdc2 no-rc5 no-ec2m no-gost no-srp \
-  no-srp no-fips \
+  no-fips no-hw \
-  no-hw --cross-compile-prefix=%{mingw32_target}- \
+  --cross-compile-prefix=%{mingw32_target}- \
   --enginesdir=%{mingw32_libdir}/openssl/engines \
   shared mingw
 
@@ -284,11 +317,6 @@ make all build-shared
 # Generate hashes for the included certs.
 make rehash build-shared
 
-if ! iconv -f UTF-8 -t ASCII//TRANSLIT CHANGES >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
-  iconv -f ISO-8859-1 -t UTF-8 -o CHANGES.utf8 CHANGES && \
-    mv -f CHANGES.utf8 CHANGES
-fi
-
 popd
 
 ###############################################################################
@@ -301,9 +329,9 @@ PERL=%{__perl} \
   --prefix=%{mingw64_prefix} \
   --openssldir=%{mingw64_sysconfdir}/pki/tls \
   zlib enable-camellia enable-seed enable-tlsext enable-rfc3779 \
-  enable-cms enable-md2 no-mdc2 no-rc5 no-ec no-ec2m no-ecdh no-ecdsa \
+  enable-cms enable-md2 no-mdc2 no-rc5 no-ec2m no-gost no-srp \
-  no-srp no-fips \
+  no-fips no-hw \
-  no-hw --cross-compile-prefix=%{mingw64_target}- \
+  --cross-compile-prefix=%{mingw64_target}- \
   --enginesdir=%{mingw64_libdir}/openssl/engines \
   shared mingw64
 
@@ -316,11 +344,6 @@ make all build-shared
 # Generate hashes for the included certs.
 make rehash build-shared
 
-if ! iconv -f UTF-8 -t ASCII//TRANSLIT CHANGES >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
-  iconv -f ISO-8859-1 -t UTF-8 -o CHANGES.utf8 CHANGES && \
-    mv -f CHANGES.utf8 CHANGES
-fi
-
 popd
 
 
@@ -482,6 +505,13 @@ mkdir -m700 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{mingw64_sysconfdir}/pki/CA/private
 
 
 %changelog
+* Sat Jan 25 2014 Erik van Pienbroek <epienbro@fedoraproject.org> - 1.0.1e-5
+- Synced patches with native openssl-1.0.1e-38.fc21
+- Enable ECC support (RHBZ #1037919)
+- Fixes CVE-2013-6450 (RHBZ #1047844)
+- Fixes CVE-2013-4353 (RHBZ #1049062)
+- Fixes CVE-2013-6449 (RHBZ #1045444)
+
 * Sat Aug 03 2013 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 1.0.1e-4
 - Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_20_Mass_Rebuild
 

openssl-1.0.1-beta2-rpmbuild.patch

@@ -7,66 +7,67 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1-beta2/Configure.rpmbuild openssl-1.0.1-beta2/Configure
  # throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate...
 -"linux-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 -"linux-ppc",	"gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
++"linux-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
-+"linux-ppc",	"gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
++"linux-ppc",	"gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
  # It's believed that majority of ARM toolchains predefine appropriate -march.
  # If you compiler does not, do complement config command line with one!
 -"linux-armv4",	"gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-armv4",	"gcc:-DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
++"linux-armv4",	"gcc:-DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
  #### IA-32 targets...
  "linux-ia32-icc",	"icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 -"linux-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
++"linux-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
  "linux-aout",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
  ####
 -"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 -"linux-ppc64",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 -"linux-ia64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
++"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
-+"linux-ppc64",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64 \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER):::64",
++"linux-ppc64",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64 \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER):::64",
-+"linux-ia64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
++"linux-ia64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
  "linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
  "linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 -"linux-x86_64",	"gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 -"linux64-s390x",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux-x86_64",	"gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64 \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER):::64",
++"linux-x86_64",	"gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64 \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER):::64",
-+"linux64-s390x",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64 \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER):::64",
++"linux64-s390x",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64 \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER):::64",
  #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs
  # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see
  # /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of
-@@ -373,16 +373,16 @@ my %table=(
+@@ -373,16 +373,17 @@ my %table=(
  # ldconfig and run-time linker to autodiscover. Unfortunately it
  # doesn't work just yet, because of couple of bugs in glibc
  # sysdeps/s390/dl-procinfo.c affecting ldconfig and ld.so.1...
 -"linux32-s390x",	"gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/highgprs",
-+"linux32-s390x",	"gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31 \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER):::/highgprs",
++"linux32-s390x",	"gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31 \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER):::/highgprs",
  #### SPARC Linux setups
  # Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently
  # assisted with debugging of following two configs.
 -"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mv8 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
++"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
  # it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux, but
  # -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what.
 -"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
++"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
  # GCC 3.1 is a requirement
 -"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER):::64",
++"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER):::64",
++"linux-aarch64","gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER):::64",
  #### Alpha Linux with GNU C and Compaq C setups
  # Special notes:
  # - linux-alpha+bwx-gcc is ment to be used from ./config only. If you
-@@ -396,8 +396,8 @@ my %table=(
+@@ -396,8 +397,8 @@ my %table=(
  #
  #					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
  #
 -"linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 -"linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
++"linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
-+"linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
++"linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,-z,relro -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
  "linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
  "linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
  
-@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ while (<IN>)
+@@ -1678,7 +1679,7 @@ while (<IN>)
  	elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.s([ol])\.[^\.]*\.[^\.]*$/)
  		{
  		my $sotmp = $1;

openssl-1.0.1-version.patch

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1/crypto/cversion.c.version openssl-1.0.1/crypto/cversion.c
---- openssl-1.0.1/crypto/cversion.c.version	2004-04-19 20:09:22.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.0.1/crypto/cversion.c	2012-03-14 20:58:20.630352536 +0100
-@@ -110,8 +110,15 @@ const char *SSLeay_version(int t)
- 	return("not available");
- 	}
- 
--unsigned long SSLeay(void)
-+unsigned long _original_SSLeay(void)
-+	{
-+	return(0x10000003);
-+	}
-+
-+unsigned long _current_SSLeay(void)
- 	{
- 	return(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER);
- 	}
- 
-+__asm__(".symver _original_SSLeay,SSLeay@");
-+__asm__(".symver _current_SSLeay,SSLeay@@OPENSSL_1.0.1");
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1/Makefile.shared.version openssl-1.0.1/Makefile.shared
---- openssl-1.0.1/Makefile.shared.version	2012-03-14 20:58:20.553350959 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1/Makefile.shared	2012-03-14 20:58:20.631352556 +0100
-@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ DO_GNU_SO=$(CALC_VERSIONS); \
- 	SHLIB_SUFFIX=; \
- 	ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \
- 	NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \
--	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,-soname=$$SHLIB$$SHLIB_SOVER$$SHLIB_SUFFIX"
-+	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--default-symver,--version-script=version.map -Wl,-soname=$$SHLIB$$SHLIB_SOVER$$SHLIB_SUFFIX"
- 
- DO_GNU_APP=LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS)"
- 
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1/version.map.version openssl-1.0.1/version.map
---- openssl-1.0.1/version.map.version	2012-03-14 20:58:20.631352556 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1/version.map	2012-03-14 20:58:20.631352556 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
-+OPENSSL_1.0.1 {
-+    global:
-+	    SSLeay;
-+    local:
-+	    _original*;
-+	    _current*;
-+};

openssl-1.0.1e-3des-strength.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+Although the real strength is rather 112 bits we use 128 here as
+we do not want to sort it behind more obscure ciphers.
+AES-128 is preferred anyway.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.3des-strength openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.3des-strength	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c	2014-01-22 16:32:45.791700322 +0100
+@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_cip
+ 	SSL_SSLV2,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ 	0,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c.3des-strength openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c.3des-strength	2014-01-17 11:41:11.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c	2014-01-22 16:31:14.713666777 +0100
+@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_SSLV3,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_SSLV3,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_SSLV3,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_SSLV3,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_SSLV3,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_SSLV3,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_SSLV3,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_SSLV3,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -1685,7 +1685,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_TLSV1,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -2062,7 +2062,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_TLSV1,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_TLSV1,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -2222,7 +2222,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_TLSV1,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -2302,7 +2302,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_TLSV1,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -2382,7 +2382,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_TLSV1,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -2432,7 +2432,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_TLSV1,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_TLSV1,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 
+@@ -2464,7 +2464,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
+ 	SSL_TLSV1,
+ 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+-	168,
++	128,
+ 	168,
+ 	},
+ 

openssl-1.0.1e-arm-use-elf-auxv-caps.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/armcap.c b/crypto/armcap.c
+index 5258d2f..efb4009 100644
+--- a/crypto/armcap.c
++++ b/crypto/armcap.c
+@@ -9,11 +9,6 @@
+ 
+ unsigned int OPENSSL_armcap_P;
+ 
+-static sigset_t all_masked;
+-
+-static sigjmp_buf ill_jmp;
+-static void ill_handler (int sig) { siglongjmp(ill_jmp,sig); }
+-
+ /*
+  * Following subroutines could have been inlined, but it's not all
+  * ARM compilers support inline assembler...
+@@ -29,24 +24,26 @@ unsigned int OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+-#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+-void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) __attribute__((constructor));
+-#endif
+-void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
++#if defined(__GLIBC__) && __GLIBC__>=2 && __GLIBC_MINOR__>=16
++#include <sys/auxv.h>
++
++void OPENSSL_cpuid_find(void)
++	{
++		unsigned long hwcap = getauxval(AT_HWCAP);
++		char *plat = (char *)getauxval(AT_PLATFORM);
++
++		OPENSSL_armcap_P |= hwcap & HWCAP_ARM_NEON ? ARMV7_NEON : 0;
++		OPENSSL_armcap_P |= plat ? (plat[1] == '7' ? ARMV7_TICK : 0) : 0;
++	}
++#else
++static sigset_t all_masked;
++static sigjmp_buf ill_jmp;
++static void ill_handler (int sig) { siglongjmp(ill_jmp,sig); }
++
++void OPENSSL_cpuid_find(void)
+ 	{
+-	char *e;
+ 	struct sigaction	ill_oact,ill_act;
+ 	sigset_t		oset;
+-	static int trigger=0;
+-
+-	if (trigger) return;
+-	trigger=1;
+- 
+-	if ((e=getenv("OPENSSL_armcap")))
+-		{
+-		OPENSSL_armcap_P=strtoul(e,NULL,0);
+-		return;
+-		}
+ 
+ 	sigfillset(&all_masked);
+ 	sigdelset(&all_masked,SIGILL);
+@@ -55,8 +52,6 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+ 	sigdelset(&all_masked,SIGBUS);
+ 	sigdelset(&all_masked,SIGSEGV);
+ 
+-	OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0;
+-
+ 	memset(&ill_act,0,sizeof(ill_act));
+ 	ill_act.sa_handler = ill_handler;
+ 	ill_act.sa_mask    = all_masked;
+@@ -78,3 +73,25 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+ 	sigaction (SIGILL,&ill_oact,NULL);
+ 	sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK,&oset,NULL);
+ 	}
++#endif
++
++#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
++void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) __attribute__((constructor));
++#endif
++void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
++	{
++	char *e;
++	static int trigger=0;
++
++	if (trigger) return;
++	trigger=1;
++
++	if ((e=getenv("OPENSSL_armcap")))
++		{
++		OPENSSL_armcap_P=strtoul(e,NULL,0);
++		return;
++		}
++
++	OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0;
++	OPENSSL_cpuid_find();
++	}

openssl-1.0.1e-backports.patch

@@ -1,33 +1,84 @@
-From 08f8933fa34d242383a1e12d4701acb1855686bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pem/pem_info.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
-From: Nick Alcock <nix@esperi.org.uk>
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pem/pem_info.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 17:44:11 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pem/pem_info.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.726003892 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix POD errors to stop make install_docs dying with pod2man
+@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ start:
- 2.5.0+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ 			if (strcmp(name,PEM_STRING_RSA) == 0)
+ 			{
++			d2i=(D2I_OF(void))d2i_RSAPrivateKey;
+ 			if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) 
+ 				{
+ 				if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret,xi)) goto err;
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c.backports	2013-08-16 15:31:35.697003256 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c	2013-08-16 15:33:37.770673918 +0200
+@@ -582,6 +582,8 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CT
+ 			pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ 		else if (!strcmp(value, "oeap"))
+ 			pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
++		else if (!strcmp(value, "oaep"))
++			pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+ 		else if (!strcmp(value, "x931"))
+ 			pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
+ 		else if (!strcmp(value, "pss"))
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.backports	2013-08-16 15:31:35.721003782 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.726003892 +0200
+@@ -696,6 +696,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ct
+ 	X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+ 	X509 *x;
+ 	int ok, cnum;
++	unsigned int last_reasons;
+ 	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ 	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+ 	ctx->current_cert = x;
+@@ -704,6 +705,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ct
+ 	ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+ 	while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
+ 		{
++		last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+ 		/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
+ 		if (ctx->get_crl)
+ 			ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+@@ -747,6 +749,15 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ct
+ 		X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+ 		crl = NULL;
+ 		dcrl = NULL;
++		/* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
++		 * another iteration, so exit loop.
++		 */
++		if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
++			{
++			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
++			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
++			goto err;
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	err:
+ 	X509_CRL_free(crl);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c	2013-08-16 15:33:25.247399940 +0200
+@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, c
  
-podlators 2.5.0 has switched to dying on POD syntax errors. This means
+ int X509_sign_ctx(X509 *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-that a bunch of long-standing erroneous POD in the openssl documentation
+ 	{
-now leads to fatal errors from pod2man, halting installation.
++	x->cert_info->enc.modified = 1;
+ 	return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),
+ 		x->cert_info->signature,
+ 		x->sig_alg, x->signature, x->cert_info, ctx);
+@@ -123,6 +124,7 @@ int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY
  
-Unfortunately POD constraints mean that you have to sort numeric lists
+ int X509_CRL_sign_ctx(X509_CRL *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-in ascending order if they start with 1: you cannot do 1, 0, 2 even if
+ 	{
-you want 1 to appear first. I've reshuffled such (alas, I wish there
++	x->crl->enc.modified = 1;
-were a better way but I don't know of one).
+ 	return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
-(cherry picked from commit 5cc270774258149235f69e1789b3370f57b0e27b)
+ 		x->crl->sig_alg, x->sig_alg, x->signature, x->crl, ctx);
----
+ 	}
- doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod   |    2 ++
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
- doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod    |    8 ++++----
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
- doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod |    4 ++++
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
- doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod                    |   10 +++++-----
+@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ happen if extended CRL checking is enabl
- doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod                   |   10 +++++-----
- doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod              |   10 +++++-----
- doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod                  |   10 +++++-----
- 7 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
-index a883f6c..60e8332 100644
---- a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
-+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
-@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ happen if extended CRL checking is enabled.
  an application specific error. This will never be returned unless explicitly
  set by an application.
  
@@ -36,55 +87,9 @@ index a883f6c..60e8332 100644
  =head1 NOTES
  
  The above functions should be used instead of directly referencing the fields
-diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
-index 632b556..5e66133 100644
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
---- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
-+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
-@@ -66,16 +66,16 @@ values:
- 
- =over 4
- 
--=item 1
--
--The operation succeeded.
--
- =item 0
- 
- A failure while manipulating the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) object occurred or
- the X509_NAME could not be extracted from B<cacert>. Check the error stack
- to find out the reason.
- 
-+=item 1
-+
-+The operation succeeded.
-+
- =back
- 
- =head1 EXAMPLES
-diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
-index b80e25b..7e60df5 100644
---- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
-+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
-@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint() and SSL_use_psk_identity_hint() return
- 
- Return values from the server callback are interpreted as follows:
- 
-+=over 4
-+
- =item > 0
- 
- PSK identity was found and the server callback has provided the PSK
-@@ -99,4 +101,6 @@ completely.
- PSK identity was not found. An "unknown_psk_identity" alert message
- will be sent and the connection setup fails.
- 
-+=back
-+
- =cut
-diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
-index cc724c0..b1c34d1 100644
---- a/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
-+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
 @@ -44,17 +44,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -108,10 +113,9 @@ index cc724c0..b1c34d1 100644
  =item E<lt>0
  
  The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
-diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
-index cc56ebb..946ca89 100644
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
---- a/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
-+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
 @@ -41,17 +41,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -135,10 +139,52 @@ index cc56ebb..946ca89 100644
  =item E<lt>0
  
  The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred either
-diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
-index 2435764..7f8cf24 100644
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
---- a/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
-+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
+@@ -66,16 +66,16 @@ values:
+ 
+ =over 4
+ 
+-=item 1
+-
+-The operation succeeded.
+-
+ =item 0
+ 
+ A failure while manipulating the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) object occurred or
+ the X509_NAME could not be extracted from B<cacert>. Check the error stack
+ to find out the reason.
+ 
++=item 1
++
++The operation succeeded.
++
+ =back
+ 
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
+@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint() and SSL_
+ 
+ Return values from the server callback are interpreted as follows:
+ 
++=over 4
++
+ =item > 0
+ 
+ PSK identity was found and the server callback has provided the PSK
+@@ -99,4 +101,6 @@ completely.
+ PSK identity was not found. An "unknown_psk_identity" alert message
+ will be sent and the connection setup fails.
+ 
++=back
++
+ =cut
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
 @@ -45,17 +45,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -162,10 +208,9 @@ index 2435764..7f8cf24 100644
  =item E<lt>0
  
  The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
-diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
-index 89911ac..42a89b7 100644
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
---- a/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.728003935 +0200
-+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
 @@ -92,11 +92,6 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -178,7 +223,7 @@ index 89911ac..42a89b7 100644
  =item 0
  
  The shutdown is not yet finished. Call SSL_shutdown() for a second time,
-@@ -104,6 +99,11 @@ if a bidirectional shutdown shall be performed.
+@@ -104,6 +99,11 @@ if a bidirectional shutdown shall be per
  The output of L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> may be misleading, as an
  erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred.
  
@@ -190,26 +235,84 @@ index 89911ac..42a89b7 100644
  =item -1
  
  The shutdown was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
--- 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c
-1.7.9.5
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c	2013-08-16 15:33:33.306576363 +0200
+@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
+ 	pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
  
-From 147dbb2fe3bead7a10e2f280261b661ce7af7adc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+ 	OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
-From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
++	s->d1 = NULL;
-Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2013 18:24:03 +0000
+ 	}
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix for SSL_get_certificate
  
-Now we set the current certificate to the one used by a server
+ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
-there is no need to call ssl_get_server_send_cert which will
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c
-fail if we haven't sent a certificate yet.
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
----
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.728003935 +0200
- ssl/ssl_lib.c |    4 +---
+@@ -847,6 +847,12 @@ start:
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ 			}
+ 		}
  
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++	if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
-index 14d143d..ff5a85a 100644
++		{
---- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++		rr->length = 0;
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++		goto start;
-@@ -2792,9 +2792,7 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
++		}
++
+ 	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+ 
+ 	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+@@ -1051,6 +1057,7 @@ start:
+ 			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
+ 			!s->s3->renegotiate)
+ 			{
++			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+ 			s->new_session = 1;
+ 			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
+ 			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.728003935 +0200
+@@ -276,10 +276,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
+ 		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+ 
+ 			s->shutdown=0;
++			dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
+ 			dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ 			ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
+ 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+-			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
++			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ 			s->init_num=0;
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_cbc.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_cbc.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_cbc.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.729003956 +0200
+@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s
+ 	unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
+ 	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+ 	/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
+-	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
++	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ 		{
+ 		/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
+ 		 * non-constant time.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.729003956 +0200
+@@ -1797,7 +1797,9 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *m
+ 	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+ 
+ 	ret->extra_certs=NULL;
+-	ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
++	/* No compression for DTLS */
++	if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
++		ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+ 
+ 	ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ 
+@@ -2792,9 +2794,7 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
  /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
  X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
  	{
@@ -220,37 +323,23 @@ index 14d143d..ff5a85a 100644
  		return(s->cert->key->x509);
  	else
  		return(NULL);
--- 
+diff --git a/crypto/x86cpuid.pl b/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
-1.7.9.5
+index 3b6c469..e8a7518 100644
+--- a/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
++++ b/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+ 	&inc	("esi");		# number of cores
  
-From 9fe4603b8245425a4c46986ed000fca054231253 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+ 	&mov	("eax",1);
-From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
++	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
-Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 14:55:32 +0000
+ 	&cpuid	();
-Subject: [PATCH] Check DTLS_BAD_VER for version number.
+ 	&bt	("edx",28);
-
+ 	&jnc	(&label("generic"));
-The version check for DTLS1_VERSION was redundant as
+@@ -102,6 +103,7 @@ for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
-DTLS1_VERSION > TLS1_1_VERSION, however we do need to
-check for DTLS1_BAD_VER for compatibility.
-
-PR:2984
-(cherry picked from commit d980abb22e22661e98e5cee33d760ab0c7584ecc)
----
- ssl/s3_cbc.c |    2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
-index 02edf3f..443a31e 100644
---- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c
-+++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
-@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
- 	unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
- 	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
- 	/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
--	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
-+	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- 		{
- 		/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
- 		 * non-constant time.
--- 
-1.7.9.5
  
+ &set_label("nocacheinfo");
+ 	&mov	("eax",1);
++	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
+ 	&cpuid	();
+ 	&and	("edx",0xbfefffff);	# force reserved bits #20, #30 to 0
+ 	&cmp	("ebp",0);

openssl-1.0.1e-compat-symbols.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c.compat openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c.compat	2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c	2013-12-11 16:34:58.638549687 +0100
+@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ 
++/* just a compatibility symbol - no-op */
++void FIPS_corrupt_dsa_keygen(void)
++	{
++	}
++
+ static int fips_check_dsa(DSA *dsa)
+ 	{
+ 	EVP_PKEY *pk;
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_all.c.compat openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_all.c.compat	2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_all.c	2013-12-11 16:32:13.512820424 +0100
+@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++/* just backwards compatibility symbol - no-op */
++void ENGINE_load_aesni (void)
++{
++}
++
+ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void)
+ 	{
+ 	/* Some ENGINEs need this */
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c.compat openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c.compat	2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c	2013-12-11 16:38:52.524831858 +0100
+@@ -111,6 +111,12 @@ int FIPS_module_mode(void)
+ 	return ret;
+ 	}
+ 
++/* just a compat symbol - return NULL */
++const void *FIPS_rand_check(void)
++	{
++	return NULL;
++	}
++
+ int FIPS_selftest_failed(void)
+     {
+     int ret = 0;

openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-4353.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid 
+handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
+Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
+(CVE-2013-4353)
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c
+index 1e5dcab..53b9390 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_both.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_both.c
+@@ -210,7 +210,11 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+ 	{
+ 	const char *sender;
+ 	int slen;
+-
++	/* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will
++	 * set the appropriate error.
++	 */
++	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
++		return;
+ 	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ 		{
+ 		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;

openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6449.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+Use version in SSL_METHOD not SSL structure.
+
+When deciding whether to use TLS 1.2 PRF and record hash algorithms
+use the version number in the corresponding SSL_METHOD structure
+instead of the SSL structure. The SSL structure version is sometimes
+inaccurate. Note: OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later effectively do this already.
+(CVE-2013-6449)
+
+Also preventively check EVP errors for handshake digests.
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
+index bf832bb..c4ef273 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
+@@ -4286,7 +4286,7 @@ need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT.
+ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
+ 	{
+ 	long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
+-	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
++	if (s->method->version == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
+ 	    alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF))
+ 		return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
+ 	return alg2;
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c
+index ead01c8..1e5dcab 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_both.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_both.c
+@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
+ 
+ 		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ 			sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
++		if (i == 0)
++			return 0;
+ 		s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+ 		memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ 		p+=i;
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+index 804291e..c4bc4e7 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+ 			if (version != s->version)
+ 				{
+ 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+-                                if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
++                                if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
+                                 	/* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
+ 					s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+ 				al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+@@ -1459,8 +1459,14 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+ 		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+ 		}
+ 
+-	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
++	i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ 		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
++	if (i == 0)
++		{
++		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++		return 0;
++		}
++	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
+ 
+ 	return(1);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+index e5a8b3f..52efed3 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+@@ -958,7 +958,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 	    (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
+ 		{
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+-		if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
++		if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 
++			!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
+ 			{
+ 			/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
+ 			s->version = s->client_version;
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+index 809ad2e..72015f5 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+@@ -915,18 +915,19 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
+ 		if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
+ 			{
+ 			int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+-			if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
++			EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
++			if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
+ 				{
+ 				/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
+ 				err = 1;
+ 				}
+ 			else
+ 				{
+-				EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]);
+-				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
+-				if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */
++				if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
++					!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
++					(i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
+ 					err = 1;
+-				q+=i;
++				q+=hashsize;
+ 				}
+ 			}
+ 		}
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6450.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+Fix DTLS retransmission from previous session.
+
+For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session
+so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead
+of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450.
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 65ec001..7a5596a 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -214,6 +214,12 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
+ static void
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
+ 	{
++
++	if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
++		{
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
++		EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
++		}
+ 	if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+ 	if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+ 	OPENSSL_free(frag);
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+index 96ce9a7..e485907 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
++++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+@@ -621,6 +621,8 @@ extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data;
+ extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data;
+ extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data;
+ 
++#define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
++
+ #define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, func_name, s_accept, s_connect, \
+ 				s_get_meth) \
+ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+index 72015f5..56db834 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+@@ -414,15 +414,20 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ 			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ 			else
+ 			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+-		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
++		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ 			reuse_dd = 1;
+-		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
++		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ 			goto err;
+-		else
+-			/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ 		dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
+-		mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
++		if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
++			{
++			mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++			if (!mac_ctx)
++				goto err;
++			s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
++			}
++		else
++			mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ 		if (s->compress != NULL)
+ 			{
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c
+index 6fc469f..d14e8e4 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/digest.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c
+@@ -366,8 +366,11 @@ int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count,
+ 
+ void EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+ 	{
+-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+-	OPENSSL_free(ctx);
++	if (ctx)
++		{
++		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
++		OPENSSL_free(ctx);
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ /* This call frees resources associated with the context */

openssl-1.0.1e-ecc-suiteb.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/speed.c.suiteb openssl-1.0.1e/apps/speed.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/speed.c.suiteb	2013-11-08 18:02:53.815229706 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/speed.c	2013-11-08 18:04:47.016724297 +0100
+@@ -966,49 +966,23 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		else
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+-		     if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsap160") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_P160]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsap192") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_P192]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsap224") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_P224]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsap256") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_P256]=2;
++		if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsap256") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_P256]=2;
+ 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsap384") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_P384]=2;
+ 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsap521") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_P521]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsak163") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_K163]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsak233") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_K233]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsak283") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_K283]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsak409") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_K409]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsak571") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_K571]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsab163") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_B163]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsab233") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_B233]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsab283") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_B283]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsab409") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_B409]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsab571") == 0) ecdsa_doit[R_EC_B571]=2;
+ 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdsa") == 0)
+ 			{
+-			for (i=0; i < EC_NUM; i++)
++			for (i=R_EC_P256; i <= R_EC_P521; i++)
+ 				ecdsa_doit[i]=1;
+ 			}
+ 		else
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+-		     if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhp160") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_P160]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhp192") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_P192]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhp224") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_P224]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhp256") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_P256]=2;
++		if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhp256") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_P256]=2;
+ 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhp384") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_P384]=2;
+ 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhp521") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_P521]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhk163") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_K163]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhk233") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_K233]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhk283") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_K283]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhk409") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_K409]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhk571") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_K571]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhb163") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_B163]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhb233") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_B233]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhb283") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_B283]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhb409") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_B409]=2;
+-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdhb571") == 0) ecdh_doit[R_EC_B571]=2;
+ 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"ecdh") == 0)
+ 			{
+-			for (i=0; i < EC_NUM; i++)
++			for (i=R_EC_P256; i <= R_EC_P521; i++)
+ 				ecdh_doit[i]=1;
+ 			}
+ 		else
+@@ -1097,15 +1071,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"dsa512   dsa1024  dsa2048\n");
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+-			BIO_printf(bio_err,"ecdsap160 ecdsap192 ecdsap224 ecdsap256 ecdsap384 ecdsap521\n");
+-			BIO_printf(bio_err,"ecdsak163 ecdsak233 ecdsak283 ecdsak409 ecdsak571\n");
+-			BIO_printf(bio_err,"ecdsab163 ecdsab233 ecdsab283 ecdsab409 ecdsab571\n");
++			BIO_printf(bio_err,"ecdsap256 ecdsap384 ecdsap521\n");
+ 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"ecdsa\n");
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+-			BIO_printf(bio_err,"ecdhp160  ecdhp192  ecdhp224  ecdhp256  ecdhp384  ecdhp521\n");
+-			BIO_printf(bio_err,"ecdhk163  ecdhk233  ecdhk283  ecdhk409  ecdhk571\n");
+-			BIO_printf(bio_err,"ecdhb163  ecdhb233  ecdhb283  ecdhb409  ecdhb571\n");
++			BIO_printf(bio_err,"ecdhp256  ecdhp384 ecdhp521\n");
+ 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"ecdh\n");
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1184,11 +1154,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		    if (!FIPS_mode() || i != R_DSA_512)
+ 			dsa_doit[i]=1;
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+-		for (i=0; i<EC_NUM; i++)
++		for (i=R_EC_P256; i <= R_EC_P521; i++)
+ 			ecdsa_doit[i]=1;
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+-		for (i=0; i<EC_NUM; i++)
++		for (i=R_EC_P256; i <= R_EC_P521; i++)
+ 			ecdh_doit[i]=1;
+ #endif
+ 		}
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.suiteb openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.suiteb	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c	2013-11-08 18:05:27.551617554 +0100
+@@ -204,31 +204,9 @@ static int nid_list[] =
+ 
+ static int pref_list[] =
+ 	{
+-		NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
+-		NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
+ 		NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */	
+-		NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
+-		NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ 		NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+-		NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+-		NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+-		NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
+ 		NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
+-		NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
+-		NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+-		NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
+-		NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
+-		NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+-		NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
+-		NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
+-		NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+-		NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
+-		NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+-		NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+-		NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+-		NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+-		NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
+-		NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
+ 	};
+ 
+ int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)

openssl-1.0.1e-fips-ctor.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c.fips-ctor openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c.fips-ctor	2013-09-26 13:52:30.767885457 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c	2013-09-26 14:01:29.406010187 +0200
+@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@
+ #include <dlfcn.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <errno.h>
+ #include "fips_locl.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+@@ -198,8 +200,10 @@ bin2hex(void *buf, size_t len)
+ 	return hex;
+ }
+ 
+-#define HMAC_PREFIX "." 
+-#define HMAC_SUFFIX ".hmac" 
++#define HMAC_PREFIX "."
++#ifndef HMAC_SUFFIX
++#define HMAC_SUFFIX ".hmac"
++#endif
+ #define READ_BUFFER_LENGTH 16384
+ 
+ static char *
+@@ -279,19 +283,13 @@ end:
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-FIPSCHECK_verify(const char *libname, const char *symbolname)
++FIPSCHECK_verify(const char *path)
+ {
+-	char path[PATH_MAX+1];
+-	int rv;
++	int rv = 0;
+ 	FILE *hf;
+ 	char *hmacpath, *p;
+ 	char *hmac = NULL;
+ 	size_t n;
+-	
+-	rv = get_library_path(libname, symbolname, path, sizeof(path));
+-
+-	if (rv < 0)
+-		return 0;
+ 
+ 	hmacpath = make_hmac_path(path);
+ 	if (hmacpath == NULL)
+@@ -341,6 +339,53 @@ end:
+ 	return 1;	
+ }
+ 
++static int
++verify_checksums(void)
++    {
++	int rv;
++	char path[PATH_MAX+1];
++	char *p;
++
++	/* we need to avoid dlopening libssl, assume both libcrypto and libssl
++	   are in the same directory */
++
++	rv = get_library_path("libcrypto.so." SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER, "FIPS_mode_set", path, sizeof(path));
++	if (rv < 0)
++		return 0;
++
++	rv = FIPSCHECK_verify(path);
++	if (!rv)
++		return 0;
++
++	/* replace libcrypto with libssl */
++	while ((p = strstr(path, "libcrypto.so")) != NULL)
++	    {
++		p = stpcpy(p, "libssl");
++                memmove(p, p+3, strlen(p+2));
++	    }
++
++	rv = FIPSCHECK_verify(path);
++	if (!rv)
++		return 0;
++	return 1;
++    }
++
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE_PATH
++#define FIPS_MODULE_PATH "/etc/system-fips"
++#endif
++
++int
++FIPS_module_installed(void)
++    {
++    int rv;
++    rv = access(FIPS_MODULE_PATH, F_OK);
++    if (rv < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
++	rv = 0;
++
++    /* Installed == true */
++    return !rv;
++    }
++
+ int FIPS_module_mode_set(int onoff, const char *auth)
+     {
+     int ret = 0;
+@@ -379,15 +424,7 @@ int FIPS_module_mode_set(int onoff, cons
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
+-	if(!FIPSCHECK_verify("libcrypto.so." SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER,"FIPS_mode_set"))
+-	    {
+-	    FIPSerr(FIPS_F_FIPS_MODULE_MODE_SET,FIPS_R_FINGERPRINT_DOES_NOT_MATCH);
+-	    fips_selftest_fail = 1;
+-	    ret = 0;
+-	    goto end;
+-	    }
+-
+-	if(!FIPSCHECK_verify("libssl.so." SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER,"SSL_CTX_new"))
++	if(!verify_checksums())
+ 	    {
+ 	    FIPSerr(FIPS_F_FIPS_MODULE_MODE_SET,FIPS_R_FINGERPRINT_DOES_NOT_MATCH);
+ 	    fips_selftest_fail = 1;
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.h.fips-ctor openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.h.fips-ctor	2013-09-26 13:52:30.814886515 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.h	2013-09-26 13:52:30.816886560 +0200
+@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ struct hmac_ctx_st;
+ 
+ int FIPS_module_mode_set(int onoff, const char *auth);
+ int FIPS_module_mode(void);
++int FIPS_module_installed(void);
+ const void *FIPS_rand_check(void);
+ int FIPS_selftest(void);
+ int FIPS_selftest_failed(void);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/o_init.c.fips-ctor openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/o_init.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/o_init.c.fips-ctor	2013-09-26 13:52:30.807886357 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/o_init.c	2013-09-26 14:00:21.000000000 +0200
+@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ static void init_fips_mode(void)
+ 	char buf[2] = "0";
+ 	int fd;
+ 	
++	/* Ensure the selftests always run */
++	FIPS_mode_set(1);
++
+ 	if (secure_getenv("OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE") != NULL)
+ 		{
+ 		buf[0] = '1';
+@@ -85,9 +88,15 @@ static void init_fips_mode(void)
+ 	 * otherwise. 
+ 	 */
+ 	
+-	if (buf[0] == '1')
++	if (buf[0] != '1')
++		{
++		/* drop down to non-FIPS mode if it is not requested */
++		FIPS_mode_set(0);
++		}
++	else
+ 		{
+-		FIPS_mode_set(1);
++		/* abort if selftest failed */
++		FIPS_selftest_check();
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
+@@ -96,13 +105,17 @@ static void init_fips_mode(void)
+  * Currently only sets FIPS callbacks
+  */
+ 
+-void OPENSSL_init_library(void)
++void __attribute__ ((constructor)) OPENSSL_init_library(void)
+ 	{
+ 	static int done = 0;
+ 	if (done)
+ 		return;
+ 	done = 1;
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
++	if (!FIPS_module_installed())
++		{
++		return;
++		}
+ 	RAND_init_fips();
+ 	init_fips_mode();
+ 	if (!FIPS_mode())

openssl-1.0.1e-manfix.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/cms.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/cms.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/cms.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/cms.pod	2013-04-30 16:29:25.020724103 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/cms.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.147092310 +0200
 @@ -450,28 +450,28 @@ remains DER.
  
  =over 4
@@ -36,9 +36,109 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/cms.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/cms.pod
  
  the message was verified correctly but an error occurred writing out
  the signers certificates.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ec.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ec.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ec.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ec.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.147092310 +0200
+@@ -93,10 +93,6 @@ prints out the public, private key compo
+ 
+ this option prevents output of the encoded version of the key.
+ 
+-=item B<-modulus>
+-
+-this option prints out the value of the public key component of the key.
+-
+ =item B<-pubin>
+ 
+ by default a private key is read from the input file: with this option a
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/openssl.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/openssl.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/openssl.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/openssl.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.148092331 +0200
+@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ Create or examine a netscape certificate
+ 
+ Online Certificate Status Protocol utility.
+ 
+-=item L<B<passwd>|passwd(1)>
++=item L<B<passwd>|sslpasswd(1)>
+ 
+ Generation of hashed passwords.
+ 
+@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ Public key algorithm parameter managemen
+ 
+ Public key algorithm cryptographic operation utility.
+ 
+-=item L<B<rand>|rand(1)>
++=item L<B<rand>|sslrand(1)>
+ 
+ Generate pseudo-random bytes.
+ 
+@@ -401,9 +401,9 @@ L<crl(1)|crl(1)>, L<crl2pkcs7(1)|crl2pkc
+ L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, L<dsa(1)|dsa(1)>, L<dsaparam(1)|dsaparam(1)>,
+ L<enc(1)|enc(1)>, L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>, L<genpkey(1)|genpkey(1)>,
+ L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>, L<nseq(1)|nseq(1)>, L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>,
+-L<passwd(1)|passwd(1)>,
++L<sslpasswd(1)|sslpasswd(1)>,
+ L<pkcs12(1)|pkcs12(1)>, L<pkcs7(1)|pkcs7(1)>, L<pkcs8(1)|pkcs8(1)>,
+-L<rand(1)|rand(1)>, L<req(1)|req(1)>, L<rsa(1)|rsa(1)>,
++L<sslrand(1)|sslrand(1)>, L<req(1)|req(1)>, L<rsa(1)|rsa(1)>,
+ L<rsautl(1)|rsautl(1)>, L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)>,
+ L<s_server(1)|s_server(1)>, L<s_time(1)|s_time(1)>,
+ L<smime(1)|smime(1)>, L<spkac(1)|spkac(1)>,
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod.manfix	2013-09-12 11:17:41.517078502 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.149092353 +0200
+@@ -32,9 +32,14 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
+ [B<-ssl2>]
+ [B<-ssl3>]
+ [B<-tls1>]
++[B<-tls1_1>]
++[B<-tls1_2>]
++[B<-dtls1>]
+ [B<-no_ssl2>]
+ [B<-no_ssl3>]
+ [B<-no_tls1>]
++[B<-no_tls1_1>]
++[B<-no_tls1_2>]
+ [B<-bugs>]
+ [B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+ [B<-starttls protocol>]
+@@ -44,6 +49,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
+ [B<-sess_out filename>]
+ [B<-sess_in filename>]
+ [B<-rand file(s)>]
++[B<-nextprotoneg protocols>]
+ 
+ =head1 DESCRIPTION
+ 
+@@ -182,7 +188,7 @@ Use the PSK key B<key> when using a PSK
+ given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk
+ 1a2b3c4d.
+ 
+-=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>
++=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-dtls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
+ 
+ these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default
+ the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all
+@@ -243,6 +249,17 @@ Multiple files can be specified separate
+ The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+ all others.
+ 
++=item B<-nextprotoneg protocols>
++
++enable Next Protocol Negotiation TLS extension and provide a list of
++comma-separated protocol names that the client should advertise
++support for. The list should contain most wanted protocols first.
++Protocol names are printable ASCII strings, for example "http/1.1" or
++"spdy/3".
++Empty list of protocols is treated specially and will cause the client to
++advertise support for the TLS extension but disconnect just after
++reciving ServerHello with a list of server supported protocols.
++
+ =back
+ 
+ =head1 CONNECTED COMMANDS
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/smime.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/smime.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/smime.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/smime.pod	2013-04-30 20:55:00.982603518 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/smime.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.150092375 +0200
 @@ -308,28 +308,28 @@ remains DER.
  
  =over 4
@@ -74,9 +174,96 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/smime.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/smime.
  
  the message was verified correctly but an error occurred writing out
  the signers certificates.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_server.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_server.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_server.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_server.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.150092375 +0200
+@@ -40,10 +40,16 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
+ [B<-ssl2>]
+ [B<-ssl3>]
+ [B<-tls1>]
++[B<-tls1_1>]
++[B<-tls1_2>]
++[B<-dtls1>]
+ [B<-no_ssl2>]
+ [B<-no_ssl3>]
+ [B<-no_tls1>]
++[B<-no_tls1_1>]
++[B<-no_tls1_2>]
+ [B<-no_dhe>]
++[B<-no_ecdhe>]
+ [B<-bugs>]
+ [B<-hack>]
+ [B<-www>]
+@@ -54,6 +60,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
+ [B<-no_ticket>]
+ [B<-id_prefix arg>]
+ [B<-rand file(s)>]
++[B<-nextprotoneg protocols>]
+ 
+ =head1 DESCRIPTION
+ 
+@@ -131,6 +138,10 @@ a static set of parameters hard coded in
+ if this option is set then no DH parameters will be loaded effectively
+ disabling the ephemeral DH cipher suites.
+ 
++=item B<-no_ecdhe>
++
++if this option is set then ephemeral ECDH cipher suites will be disabled.
++
+ =item B<-no_tmp_rsa>
+ 
+ certain export cipher suites sometimes use a temporary RSA key, this option
+@@ -201,7 +212,7 @@ Use the PSK key B<key> when using a PSK
+ given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk
+ 1a2b3c4d.
+ 
+-=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>
++=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-dtls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
+ 
+ these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default
+ the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all
+@@ -276,6 +287,14 @@ Multiple files can be specified separate
+ The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+ all others.
+ 
++=item B<-nextprotoneg protocols>
++
++enable Next Protocol Negotiation TLS extension and provide a
++comma-separated list of supported protocol names.
++The list should contain most wanted protocols first.
++Protocol names are printable ASCII strings, for example "http/1.1" or
++"spdy/3".
++
+ =back
+ 
+ =head1 CONNECTED COMMANDS
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/verify.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/verify.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/verify.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/verify.pod	2013-09-12 11:25:13.994994992 +0200
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
+ [B<-untrusted file>]
+ [B<-help>]
+ [B<-issuer_checks>]
++[B<-attime timestamp>]
+ [B<-verbose>]
+ [B<->]
+ [certificates]
+@@ -80,6 +81,12 @@ rejected. The presence of rejection mess
+ anything is wrong; during the normal verification process, several
+ rejections may take place.
+ 
++=item B<-attime timestamp>
++
++Perform validation checks using the time specified by B<timestamp> and not
++the current system time. B<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
++01.01.1970 (UNIX time).
++
+ =item B<-policy arg>
+ 
+ Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
---- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod.manfix	2013-04-30 15:30:40.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod.manfix	2013-09-12 11:17:42.129091915 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod	2013-04-30 21:17:28.057369256 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.156092507 +0200
 @@ -44,13 +44,13 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -95,7 +282,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL
  established.
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod	2013-04-30 21:19:20.057609717 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.158092551 +0200
 @@ -56,12 +56,12 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -112,9 +299,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_
  The SSL_clear() operation was successful.
  
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod
---- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod.manfix	2013-09-12 11:17:42.049090162 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod	2013-04-30 21:11:49.602141805 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.159092573 +0200
-@@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() may re
+@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() may re
  
  =over 4
  
@@ -129,8 +316,8 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod.manfix opens
  The operation failed. Check the error queue to find out the reason.
  
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
---- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod.manfix	2013-04-30 15:30:40.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod.manfix	2013-09-12 11:17:42.130091937 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod	2013-04-30 21:15:09.791416694 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.161092616 +0200
 @@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -149,7 +336,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SS
  established.
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod	2013-04-30 21:12:39.211201170 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.162092638 +0200
 @@ -52,13 +52,13 @@ The following values are returned by all
  
  =over 4
@@ -168,7 +355,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/do
  
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod	2013-04-30 21:22:20.102446527 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.163092660 +0200
 @@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -186,8 +373,8 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod.manfix openssl
  The operation succeeded.
  
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
---- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod.manfix	2013-04-30 15:30:40.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod.manfix	2013-09-12 11:17:42.132091981 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod	2013-04-30 21:23:02.644353105 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.164092682 +0200
 @@ -66,13 +66,13 @@ values:
  
  =over 4
@@ -206,7 +393,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod.manfix openssl-1.
  
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod	2013-04-30 21:15:37.490008175 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.166092726 +0200
 @@ -64,13 +64,13 @@ return the following values:
  
  =over 4
@@ -225,7 +412,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod.manfix openss
  
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod	2013-04-30 21:19:59.388447867 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.167092748 +0200
 @@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ and SSL_set_ssl_method():
  
  =over 4
@@ -241,8 +428,8 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1
  The operation succeeded.
  
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
---- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod.manfix	2013-04-30 15:30:40.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod.manfix	2013-09-12 11:17:42.133092003 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod	2013-04-30 21:14:20.037354235 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.168092770 +0200
 @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ data to B<psk> and return the length of
  connection will fail with decryption_error before it will be finished
  completely.
@@ -253,8 +440,8 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod.manfix openssl
  PSK identity was not found. An "unknown_psk_identity" alert message
  will be sent and the connection setup fails.
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
---- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod.manfix	2013-04-30 15:30:40.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod.manfix	2013-09-12 11:17:42.135092047 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod	2013-04-30 21:21:52.906866978 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.170092814 +0200
 @@ -45,13 +45,13 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -273,7 +460,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/s
  established.
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod	2013-04-30 21:13:05.809769163 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.171092836 +0200
 @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ The following return values can occur:
  The read operation was successful; the return value is the number of
  bytes actually read from the TLS/SSL connection.
@@ -285,7 +472,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_r
  shutdown due to a "close notify" alert sent by the peer (in which case
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod	2013-04-30 21:16:30.000129487 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.172092857 +0200
 @@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -302,7 +489,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc
  
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod	2013-04-30 21:20:49.594517776 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.174092901 +0200
 @@ -35,11 +35,11 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -319,7 +506,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL
  
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod	2013-04-30 21:17:57.551999090 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.175092923 +0200
 @@ -37,11 +37,11 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -335,8 +522,8 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ss
  The operation succeeded.
  
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
---- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod.manfix	2013-04-30 15:30:40.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod.manfix	2013-09-12 11:17:42.137092090 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod	2013-04-30 21:18:44.571853502 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.177092967 +0200
 @@ -92,14 +92,14 @@ The following return values can occur:
  
  =over 4
@@ -356,7 +543,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/S
  and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod.manfix	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod	2013-04-30 21:13:31.129309841 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod	2013-09-12 11:17:42.177092967 +0200
 @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ The following return values can occur:
  The write operation was successful, the return value is the number of
  bytes actually written to the TLS/SSL connection.

openssl-1.0.1e-no-md5-verify.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c.no-md5-verify openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c.no-md5-verify	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c	2013-11-13 16:30:04.628791616 +0100
+@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@
+  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+  */
+ 
++/* for secure_getenv */
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
++
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <time.h>
+ 
+@@ -171,6 +174,11 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it
+ 			goto err;
+ 		ret = -1;
+ 		}
++	else if (mdnid == NID_md5 && secure_getenv("OPENSSL_ENABLE_MD5_VERIFY") == NULL)
++		{
++		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
++		goto err;
++		}
+ 	else
+ 		{
+ 		const EVP_MD *type;

openssl-1.0.1e-trusted-first.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/apps.c.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/apps/apps.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/apps.c.trusted-first	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/apps.c	2013-08-16 15:42:39.920534769 +0200
+@@ -2361,6 +2361,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *parg
+ 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY;
+ 	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig"))
+ 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE;
++	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-trusted_first"))
++		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST;
+ 	else
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/cms.c.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/apps/cms.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/cms.c.trusted-first	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/cms.c	2013-08-16 15:43:56.671213879 +0200
+@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text          include or delete text MIME headers\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir    trusted certificates directory\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file   trusted certificates file\n");
++		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check     check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/ocsp.c.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/apps/ocsp.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/ocsp.c.trusted-first	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/ocsp.c	2013-08-16 15:49:47.477572414 +0200
+@@ -595,6 +595,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-path              path to use in OCSP request\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir        trusted certificates directory\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file       trusted certificates file\n");
++		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first     use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-VAfile file       validator certificates file\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-validity_period n maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-status_age n      maximum status age in seconds\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c.trusted-first	2013-08-16 15:42:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c	2013-08-16 15:49:00.727542994 +0200
+@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -pass arg     - private key file pass phrase source\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CApath arg   - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg   - PEM format file of CA's\n");
++	BIO_printf(bio_err," -trusted_first - Use trusted CA's first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -reconnect    - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -pause        - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -showcerts    - show all certificates in the chain\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/smime.c.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/apps/smime.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/smime.c.trusted-first	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/smime.c	2013-08-16 15:46:44.024875150 +0200
+@@ -479,6 +479,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text          include or delete text MIME headers\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir    trusted certificates directory\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file   trusted certificates file\n");
++		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check     check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_server.c.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_server.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_server.c.trusted-first	2013-08-16 15:42:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_server.c	2013-08-16 15:48:19.469634430 +0200
+@@ -501,6 +501,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -state        - Print the SSL states\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CApath arg   - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg   - PEM format file of CA's\n");
++	BIO_printf(bio_err," -trusted_first - Use trusted CA's first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -nocert       - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -cipher arg   - play with 'openssl ciphers' to see what goes here\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -serverpref   - Use server's cipher preferences\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_time.c.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_time.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_time.c.trusted-first	2013-08-16 15:42:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_time.c	2013-08-16 15:47:35.862674188 +0200
+@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ static void s_time_usage(void)
+                 file if not specified by this option\n\
+ -CApath arg   - PEM format directory of CA's\n\
+ -CAfile arg   - PEM format file of CA's\n\
++-trusted_first - Use trusted CA's first when building the trust chain\n\
+ -cipher       - preferred cipher to use, play with 'openssl ciphers'\n\n";
+ 
+ 	printf( "usage: s_time <args>\n\n" );
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/ts.c.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/apps/ts.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/ts.c.trusted-first	2013-08-16 15:42:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/ts.c	2013-08-16 15:45:27.766206812 +0200
+@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		   "ts -verify [-data file_to_hash] [-digest digest_bytes] "
+ 		   "[-queryfile request.tsq] "
+ 		   "-in response.tsr [-token_in] "
+-		   "-CApath ca_path -CAfile ca_file.pem "
++		   "-CApath ca_path -CAfile ca_file.pem -trusted_first"
+ 		   "-untrusted cert_file.pem\n");
+  cleanup:
+ 	/* Clean up. */
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/verify.c.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/apps/verify.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/verify.c.trusted-first	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/verify.c	2013-08-16 15:46:09.720124654 +0200
+@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ end:
+ 	if (ret == 1) {
+-		BIO_printf(bio_err,"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
++		BIO_printf(bio_err,"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-trusted_first] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
+ 		BIO_printf(bio_err," [-attime timestamp]");
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ 		BIO_printf(bio_err," [-engine e]");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.trusted-first	2013-08-16 15:42:39.864533545 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2013-08-16 15:42:39.921534791 +0200
+@@ -207,6 +207,21 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
+ 
+ 		/* If we are self signed, we break */
+ 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
++		/* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
++		if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
++			{
++			ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
++			if (ok < 0)
++				return ok;
++			/* If successful for now free up cert so it
++			 * will be picked up again later.
++			 */
++			if (ok > 0)
++				{
++				X509_free(xtmp);
++				break;
++				}
++			}
+ 
+ 		/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
+ 		if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h.trusted-first	2013-08-16 15:42:39.356522432 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h	2013-08-16 15:42:39.922534813 +0200
+@@ -389,6 +389,8 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE
+ #define X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS			0x2000
+ /* Check selfsigned CA signature */
+ #define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE		0x4000
++/* Use trusted store first */
++#define X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST		0x8000
+ 
+ 
+ #define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT			0x1
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/cms.pod.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/cms.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/cms.pod.trusted-first	2013-08-16 15:42:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/cms.pod	2013-08-16 15:50:48.723921117 +0200
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ B<openssl> B<cms>
+ [B<-print>]
+ [B<-CAfile file>]
+ [B<-CApath dir>]
++[B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-md digest>]
+ [B<-[cipher]>]
+ [B<-nointern>]
+@@ -238,6 +239,12 @@ B<-verify>. This directory must be a sta
+ is a hash of each subject name (using B<x509 -hash>) should be linked
+ to each certificate.
+ 
++=item B<-trusted_first>
++
++Use certificates in CA file or CA directory before untrusted certificates
++from the message when building the trust chain to verify certificates.
++This is mainly useful in environments with Bridge CA or Cross-Certified CAs.
++
+ =item B<-md digest>
+ 
+ digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning. If not present then the
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ocsp.pod.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ocsp.pod.trusted-first	2013-08-16 15:42:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ocsp.pod	2013-08-16 15:52:20.106933403 +0200
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
+ [B<-path>]
+ [B<-CApath dir>]
+ [B<-CAfile file>]
++[B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-VAfile file>]
+ [B<-validity_period n>]
+ [B<-status_age n>]
+@@ -138,6 +139,13 @@ or "/" by default.
+ file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify
+ the signature on the OCSP response.
+ 
++=item B<-trusted_first>
++
++Use certificates in CA file or CA directory over certificates provided
++in the response or residing in other certificates file when building the trust
++chain to verify responder certificate.
++This is mainly useful in environments with Bridge CA or Cross-Certified CAs.
++
+ =item B<-verify_other file>
+ 
+ file containing additional certificates to search when attempting to locate
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod.trusted-first	2013-08-16 15:42:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod	2013-08-16 15:53:17.364194159 +0200
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
+ [B<-pass arg>]
+ [B<-CApath directory>]
+ [B<-CAfile filename>]
++[B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-reconnect>]
+ [B<-pause>]
+ [B<-showcerts>]
+@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ also used when building the client certi
+ A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
+ and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
+ 
+-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
++=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig, -trusted_first>
+ 
+ Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
+ L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/smime.pod.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/smime.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/smime.pod.trusted-first	2013-08-16 15:42:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/smime.pod	2013-08-16 15:56:12.497050767 +0200
+@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ B<openssl> B<smime>
+ [B<-pk7out>]
+ [B<-[cipher]>]
+ [B<-in file>]
++[B<-CAfile file>]
++[B<-CApath dir>]
++[B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-certfile file>]
+ [B<-signer file>]
+ [B<-recip  file>]
+@@ -146,6 +149,12 @@ B<-verify>. This directory must be a sta
+ is a hash of each subject name (using B<x509 -hash>) should be linked
+ to each certificate.
+ 
++=item B<-trusted_first>
++
++Use certificates in CA file or CA directory over certificates provided
++in the message when building the trust chain to verify a certificate.
++This is mainly useful in environments with Bridge CA or Cross-Certified CAs.
++
+ =item B<-md digest>
+ 
+ digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning. If not present then the
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_server.pod.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_server.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_server.pod.trusted-first	2013-08-16 15:42:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_server.pod	2013-08-16 15:54:33.609873214 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
+ [B<-state>]
+ [B<-CApath directory>]
+ [B<-CAfile filename>]
++[B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-nocert>]
+ [B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+ [B<-quiet>]
+@@ -168,6 +169,12 @@ and to use when attempting to build the
+ is also used in the list of acceptable client CAs passed to the client when
+ a certificate is requested.
+ 
++=item B<-trusted_first>
++
++Use certificates in CA file or CA directory before other certificates 
++when building the trust chain to verify client certificates.
++This is mainly useful in environments with Bridge CA or Cross-Certified CAs.
++
+ =item B<-state>
+ 
+ prints out the SSL session states.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_time.pod.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_time.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_time.pod.trusted-first	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_time.pod	2013-08-16 15:55:12.651732938 +0200
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_time>
+ [B<-key filename>]
+ [B<-CApath directory>]
+ [B<-CAfile filename>]
++[B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-reuse>]
+ [B<-new>]
+ [B<-verify depth>]
+@@ -76,6 +77,12 @@ also used when building the client certi
+ A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
+ and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
+ 
++=item B<-trusted_first>
++
++Use certificates in CA file or CA directory over the certificates provided
++by the server when building the trust chain to verify server certificate.
++This is mainly useful in environments with Bridge CA or Cross-Certified CAs.
++
+ =item B<-new>
+ 
+ performs the timing test using a new session ID for each connection.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ts.pod.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ts.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ts.pod.trusted-first	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ts.pod	2013-08-16 15:57:17.399479957 +0200
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ B<-verify>
+ [B<-token_in>]
+ [B<-CApath> trusted_cert_path]
+ [B<-CAfile> trusted_certs.pem]
++[B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-untrusted> cert_file.pem]
+ 
+ =head1 DESCRIPTION
+@@ -324,6 +325,12 @@ L<verify(1)|verify(1)> for additional de
+ or B<-CApath> must be specified.
+ (Optional)
+ 
++=item B<-trusted_first>
++
++Use certificates in CA file or CA directory before other certificates
++when building the trust chain to verify certificates.
++This is mainly useful in environments with Bridge CA or Cross-Certified CAs.
++
+ =item B<-untrusted> cert_file.pem
+ 
+ Set of additional untrusted certificates in PEM format which may be
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/verify.pod.trusted-first openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/verify.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/verify.pod.trusted-first	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/verify.pod	2013-08-16 15:58:00.267423925 +0200
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ verify - Utility to verify certificates.
+ B<openssl> B<verify>
+ [B<-CApath directory>]
+ [B<-CAfile file>]
++[B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-purpose purpose>]
+ [B<-policy arg>]
+ [B<-ignore_critical>]
+@@ -56,6 +57,12 @@ in PEM format concatenated together.
+ A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
+ in PEM format concatenated together.
+ 
++=item B<-trusted_first>
++
++Use certificates in CA file or CA directory before the certificates in the untrusted
++file when building the trust chain to verify certificates.
++This is mainly useful in environments with Bridge CA or Cross-Certified CAs.
++
+ =item B<-purpose purpose>
+ 
+ The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified,

openssl-1.0.1e-version.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cversion.c.version openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cversion.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cversion.c.version	2013-02-11 16:02:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cversion.c	2013-07-26 12:28:12.739161925 +0200
+@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
+ #include "buildinf.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+-const char *SSLeay_version(int t)
++const char *_current_SSLeay_version(int t)
+ 	{
+ 	if (t == SSLEAY_VERSION)
+ 		return OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
+@@ -110,8 +110,25 @@ const char *SSLeay_version(int t)
+ 	return("not available");
+ 	}
+ 
+-unsigned long SSLeay(void)
++const char *_original_SSLeay_version(int t)
++	{
++	if (t == SSLEAY_VERSION)
++		return "OpenSSL 1.0.0-fips 29 Mar 2010";
++	else
++		return _current_SSLeay_version(t);
++	}
++
++unsigned long _original_SSLeay(void)
++	{
++	return(0x10000003);
++	}
++
++unsigned long _current_SSLeay(void)
+ 	{
+ 	return(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ 	}
+ 
++__asm__(".symver _original_SSLeay,SSLeay@");
++__asm__(".symver _original_SSLeay_version,SSLeay_version@");
++__asm__(".symver _current_SSLeay,SSLeay@@OPENSSL_1.0.1");
++__asm__(".symver _current_SSLeay_version,SSLeay_version@@OPENSSL_1.0.1");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/Makefile.shared.version openssl-1.0.1e/Makefile.shared
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/Makefile.shared.version	2013-07-26 12:23:43.615545603 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/Makefile.shared	2013-07-26 12:23:43.701547398 +0200
+@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ DO_GNU_SO=$(CALC_VERSIONS); \
+ 	SHLIB_SUFFIX=; \
+ 	ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \
+ 	NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \
+-	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,-soname=$$SHLIB$$SHLIB_SOVER$$SHLIB_SUFFIX"
++	SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--default-symver,--version-script=version.map -Wl,-soname=$$SHLIB$$SHLIB_SOVER$$SHLIB_SUFFIX"
+ 
+ DO_GNU_APP=LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS)"
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/version.map.version openssl-1.0.1e/version.map
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/version.map.version	2013-07-26 12:23:43.701547398 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/version.map	2013-07-26 12:29:10.698371472 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
++OPENSSL_1.0.1 {
++    global:
++	    SSLeay;
++	    SSLeay_version;
++    local:
++	    _original*;
++	    _current*;
++};

openssl-1.0.1e-weak-ciphers.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.weak-ciphers openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.weak-ciphers	2013-12-18 15:50:40.881620314 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h	2013-12-18 14:25:25.596566704 +0100
+@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ /* The following cipher list is used by default.
+  * It also is substituted when an application-defined cipher list string
+  * starts with 'DEFAULT'. */
+-#define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST	"ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
++#define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST	"ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2:!EXPORT:!RC2:!DES"
+ /* As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always
+  * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is
+  * throwing out anonymous and unencrypted ciphersuites!

openssl-fips.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+-b /usr/lib{,64}/libcrypto.so.*
+-b /usr/lib{,64}/libssl.so.*

sources

@@ -1 +1 @@
-641677c116865e60601677329b514e2d  openssl-1.0.1e-usa.tar.xz
+6115ae0bb61b481a9195baef72514c2e  openssl-1.0.1e-hobbled.tar.xz