diff --git a/memcached-CVE-2026-47783.patch b/memcached-CVE-2026-47783.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5229d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/memcached-CVE-2026-47783.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 4df7ac75345b3ea4e0662444621de2ee1959d77c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sarthak Munshi <sarthakmunshi@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2026 15:20:25 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix timing side-channel in SASL password database
+ authentication
+
+sasl_server_userdb_checkpass() broke out of the password file loop
+early when a valid username was found, creating a measurable timing
+difference between valid and invalid usernames. Additionally, the
+password comparison used memcmp() which returns early on the first
+differing byte, potentially leaking password bytes via timing analysis.
+
+Fix both issues with minimal changes per reviewer feedback:
+- Clear buffer to zero before each fgets so comparisons past the
+  stored password hit known zero bytes
+- Use safe_memcmp() for both username and password comparisons
+  (constant-time, volatile-qualified)
+- Remove the early break so the entire file is always scanned
+---
+ sasl_defs.c | 21 ++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sasl_defs.c b/sasl_defs.c
+index 370f947..2a46ec3 100644
+--- a/sasl_defs.c
++++ b/sasl_defs.c
+@@ -71,19 +71,18 @@ static int sasl_server_userdb_checkpass(sasl_conn_t *conn,
+     char buffer[MAX_ENTRY_LEN];
+     bool ok = false;
+ 
+-    while ((fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), pwfile)) != NULL) {
+-        if (memcmp(user, buffer, unmlen) == 0 && buffer[unmlen] == ':') {
+-            /* This is the correct user */
+-            ++unmlen;
+-            if (memcmp(pass, buffer + unmlen, passlen) == 0 &&
+-                (buffer[unmlen + passlen] == ':' || /* Additional tokens */
+-                 buffer[unmlen + passlen] == '\n' || /* end of line */
+-                 buffer[unmlen + passlen] == '\r'|| /* dos format? */
+-                 buffer[unmlen + passlen] == '\0')) { /* line truncated */
++    while (1) {
++        memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
++        if (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), pwfile) == NULL)
++            break;
++        if (safe_memcmp(user, buffer, unmlen) && buffer[unmlen] == ':') {
++            if (safe_memcmp(pass, buffer + unmlen + 1, passlen) &&
++                (buffer[unmlen + 1 + passlen] == ':' ||
++                 buffer[unmlen + 1 + passlen] == '\n' ||
++                 buffer[unmlen + 1 + passlen] == '\r' ||
++                 buffer[unmlen + 1 + passlen] == '\0')) {
+                 ok = true;
+             }
+-
+-            break;
+         }
+     }
+     (void)fclose(pwfile);
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/memcached.spec b/memcached.spec
index 6a6d1e1..1b77a97 100644
--- a/memcached.spec
+++ b/memcached.spec
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 Name:           memcached
 Version:        1.5.22
-Release:        2%{?dist}
+Release:        3%{?dist}
 Epoch:          0
 Summary:        High Performance, Distributed Memory Object Cache
 
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ Patch12:	memcached-restart-del-items-fail.patch
 Patch13:	memcached-restart-double-free.patch
 Patch14:	memcached-issue685.patch
 Patch15:	memcached-test-cache-dump.patch
+# https://github.com/memcached/memcached/commit/d13f282b4bce33a9c33b8a1bbf07f12114160fed
+Patch16:	memcached-CVE-2026-47783.patch
 
 BuildRequires:  gcc libevent-devel systemd
 BuildRequires:  perl-generators
@@ -139,6 +141,11 @@ exit 0
 %{_includedir}/memcached/*
 
 %changelog
+* Fri Jun 12 2026 RHEL Packaging Agent <redhat-ymir-agent@redhat.com> - 0:1.5.22-3
+- Fix timing side-channel in SASL password database authentication
+- CVE-2026-47783
+- Resolves: RHEL-179088
+
 * Thu Jun 04 2020 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 0:1.5.22-2
 - Update testing (#1809536)