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+.\"
+.\" Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+.\" Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+.\"
+.\" %%%LICENSE_START(GPLv2+_SW_ONEPARA)
+.\" This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+.\" modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+.\" as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+.\" 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+.\" %%%LICENSE_END
+.\"
+.TH "KERNEL LOCKDOWN" 7 2017-10-05 Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual"
+.SH NAME
+Kernel Lockdown \- Kernel image access prevention feature
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+The Kernel Lockdown feature is designed to prevent both direct and indirect
+access to a running kernel image, attempting to protect against unauthorised
+modification of the kernel image and to prevent access to security and
+cryptographic data located in kernel memory, whilst still permitting driver
+modules to be loaded.
+.P
+Lockdown is typically enabled during boot and may be terminated, if configured,
+by typing a special key combination on a directly attached physical keyboard.
+.P
+If a prohibited or restricted feature is accessed or used, the kernel will emit
+a message that looks like:
+.P
+.RS
+ Lockdown: X: Y is restricted, see man kernel_lockdown.7
+.RE
+.P
+where X indicates the process name and Y indicates what is restricted.
+.P
+On an EFI-enabled x86 or arm64 machine, lockdown will be automatically enabled
+if the system boots in EFI Secure Boot mode.
+.P
+If the kernel is appropriately configured, lockdown may be lifted by typing the
+appropriate sequence on a directly attached physical keyboard.  For x86
+machines, this is
+.IR SysRq+x .
+.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+.SH COVERAGE
+When lockdown is in effect, a number of features are disabled or have their use
+restricted.  This includes special device files and kernel services that allow
+direct access of the kernel image:
+.P
+.RS
+/dev/mem
+.br
+/dev/kmem
+.br
+/dev/kcore
+.br
+/dev/ioports
+.br
+BPF
+.br
+kprobes
+.RE
+.P
+and the ability to directly configure and control devices, so as to prevent the
+use of a device to access or modify a kernel image:
+.P
+.RS
+The use of module parameters that directly specify hardware parameters to
+drivers through the kernel command line or when loading a module.
+.P
+The use of direct PCI BAR access.
+.P
+The use of the ioperm and iopl instructions on x86.
+.P
+The use of the KD*IO console ioctls.
+.P
+The use of the TIOCSSERIAL serial ioctl.
+.P
+The alteration of MSR registers on x86.
+.P
+The replacement of the PCMCIA CIS.
+.P
+The overriding of ACPI tables.
+.P
+The use of ACPI error injection.
+.P
+The specification of the ACPI RDSP address.
+.P
+The use of ACPI custom methods.
+.RE
+.P
+Certain facilities are restricted:
+.P
+.RS
+Only validly signed modules may be loaded (waived if the module file being
+loaded is vouched for by IMA appraisal).
+.P
+Only validly signed binaries may be kexec'd (waived if the binary image file to
+be executed is vouched for by IMA appraisal).
+.P
+Unencrypted hibernation/suspend to swap are disallowed as the kernel image is
+saved to a medium that can then be accessed.
+.P
+Use of debugfs is not permitted as this allows a whole range of actions
+including direct configuration of, access to and driving of hardware.
+.P
+IMA requires the addition of the "secure_boot" rules to the policy, whether or
+not they are specified on the command line, for both the builtin and custom
+policies in secure boot lockdown mode.
+.RE