lynx/lynx-CVE-2008-4690.patch
2008-11-07 13:50:50 +00:00

37 lines
1.4 KiB
Diff

--- lynx2-8-6/CHANGES.old 2008-11-06 15:29:26.000000000 +0100
+++ lynx2-8-6/CHANGES 2008-11-06 15:32:44.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
Changes since Lynx 2.8 release
===============================================================================
+2008-10-26
+* modify patch for CVE-2005-2929 to prompt user before executing command via
+ a lynxcgi link even in advanced mode, as the actual URL may not be shown but
+ hidden behind an HTTP redirect
+* set TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none in lynx.cfg to disable all lynxcgi URLs by default
+ [CVE-2008-4690]
2007-05-09 (2.8.6rel.5 fix from 2.8.7dev.5)
* correct loop-limit in print_crawl_to_fd(), which broke
--- lynx2-8-6/src/LYCgi.c.old 2008-11-06 15:29:58.000000000 +0100
+++ lynx2-8-6/src/LYCgi.c 2008-11-06 15:30:53.000000000 +0100
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static BOOL can_exec_cgi(const char *lin
if (!exec_ok(HTLoadedDocumentURL(), linktext, CGI_PATH)) {
/* exec_ok gives out msg. */
result = FALSE;
- } else if (user_mode < ADVANCED_MODE) {
+ } else {
StrAllocCopy(command, linktext);
if (non_empty(linkargs)) {
HTSprintf(&command, " %s", linkargs);
--- lynx2-8-5.orig/lynx.cfg 2008-10-26 21:45:02.000000000 +0100
+++ lynx2-8-5/lynx.cfg 2008-10-26 21:45:38.000000000 +0100
@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ CHARACTER_SET:utf-8
# ====
# Do not define this.
#
-#TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none
+TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none
.h2 LYNXCGI_ENVIRONMENT