.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7.tar.gz
+SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.13.tar.xz

.libxml2.metadata

@@ -1 +1 @@
-ab3325e6cdda50ab2382fdfe0bdb6f7d1b9224a6 SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7.tar.gz
+7dced00d88181d559ee76c6d8ef4571eb1bd0b26 SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.13.tar.xz

SOURCES/libxml2-2.11.0-fix-CVE-2023-39615.patch

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From d0c3f01e110d54415611c5fa0040cdf4a56053f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
-Date: Sat, 6 May 2023 17:47:37 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] parser: Fix old SAX1 parser with custom callbacks
-
-For some reason, xmlCtxtUseOptionsInternal set the start and end element
-SAX handlers to the internal DOM builder functions when XML_PARSE_SAX1
-was specified. This means that custom SAX handlers could never work with
-that flag because these functions would receive the wrong user data
-argument and crash immediately.
-
-Fixes #535.
----
- parser.c | 2 --
- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index bb05791d3..0c8bed129 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -14479,8 +14479,6 @@ xmlCtxtUseOptionsInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int options, const char *encodi
-     }
- #ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
-     if (options & XML_PARSE_SAX1) {
--        ctxt->sax->startElement = xmlSAX2StartElement;
--        ctxt->sax->endElement = xmlSAX2EndElement;
-         ctxt->sax->startElementNs = NULL;
-         ctxt->sax->endElementNs = NULL;
-         ctxt->sax->initialized = 1;
--- 
-GitLab
-

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.0-do-not-check-crc.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-diff -up libxml2-2.9.0/xzlib.c.do-not-check-crc libxml2-2.9.0/xzlib.c
---- libxml2-2.9.0/xzlib.c.do-not-check-crc	2012-09-11 05:52:46.000000000 +0200
-+++ libxml2-2.9.0/xzlib.c	2012-11-19 19:28:42.431700534 +0100
-@@ -552,17 +552,20 @@ xz_decomp(xz_statep state)
- #ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
-         if (state->how == GZIP) {
-             if (gz_next4(state, &crc) == -1 || gz_next4(state, &len) == -1) {
--                xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "unexpected end of file");
--                return -1;
--            }
--            if (crc != state->zstrm.adler) {
--                xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "incorrect data check");
--                return -1;
--            }
--            if (len != (state->zstrm.total_out & 0xffffffffL)) {
--                xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "incorrect length check");
--                return -1;
--            }
-+                /*
-+               xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "unexpected end of file");
-+               return -1;
-+                */
-+            } else {
-+               if (crc != state->zstrm.adler) {
-+                   xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "incorrect data check");
-+                   return -1;
-+               }
-+               if (len != (state->zstrm.total_out & 0xffffffffL)) {
-+                   xz_error(state, LZMA_DATA_ERROR, "incorrect length check");
-+                   return -1;
-+               }
-+           }
-             state->strm.avail_in = 0;
-             state->strm.next_in = NULL;
-             state->strm.avail_out = 0;

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2022-29824.patch

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From d410ac5b7ef6ecf1254606408d55f98547c22bda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From ecc43dce8e2cd19f635841e788421d0f4bd72cce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
 Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 20:10:02 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2022-29824] Fix integer overflows in xmlBuf and
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Thanks to Felix Wilhelm for the report.
  2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/buf.c b/buf.c
-index 21cb9d80..f861d79b 100644
+index 24368d37..40a5ee06 100644
 --- a/buf.c
 +++ b/buf.c
 @@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
@@ -192,10 +192,10 @@ index 21cb9d80..f861d79b 100644
  
  /**
 diff --git a/tree.c b/tree.c
-index 86a8da79..fc75f962 100644
+index 9d94aa42..86afb7d6 100644
 --- a/tree.c
 +++ b/tree.c
-@@ -7049,6 +7049,8 @@ xmlBufferPtr
+@@ -7104,6 +7104,8 @@ xmlBufferPtr
  xmlBufferCreateSize(size_t size) {
      xmlBufferPtr ret;
  
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ index 86a8da79..fc75f962 100644
      ret = (xmlBufferPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlBuffer));
      if (ret == NULL) {
  	xmlTreeErrMemory("creating buffer");
-@@ -7056,7 +7058,7 @@ xmlBufferCreateSize(size_t size) {
+@@ -7111,7 +7113,7 @@ xmlBufferCreateSize(size_t size) {
      }
      ret->use = 0;
      ret->alloc = xmlBufferAllocScheme;
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ index 86a8da79..fc75f962 100644
      if (ret->size){
          ret->content = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(ret->size * sizeof(xmlChar));
          if (ret->content == NULL) {
-@@ -7116,6 +7118,8 @@ xmlBufferCreateStatic(void *mem, size_t size) {
+@@ -7171,6 +7173,8 @@ xmlBufferCreateStatic(void *mem, size_t size) {
  
      if ((mem == NULL) || (size == 0))
          return(NULL);
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ index 86a8da79..fc75f962 100644
  
      ret = (xmlBufferPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlBuffer));
      if (ret == NULL) {
-@@ -7263,28 +7267,23 @@ xmlBufferShrink(xmlBufferPtr buf, unsigned int len) {
+@@ -7318,28 +7322,23 @@ xmlBufferShrink(xmlBufferPtr buf, unsigned int len) {
   */
  int
  xmlBufferGrow(xmlBufferPtr buf, unsigned int len) {
@@ -262,11 +262,11 @@ index 86a8da79..fc75f962 100644
  
      if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) && (buf->contentIO != NULL)) {
          size_t start_buf = buf->content - buf->contentIO;
-@@ -7406,7 +7405,10 @@ xmlBufferResize(xmlBufferPtr buf, unsigned int size)
+@@ -7466,7 +7465,10 @@ xmlBufferResize(xmlBufferPtr buf, unsigned int size)
  	case XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO:
  	case XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_DOUBLEIT:
  	    /*take care of empty case*/
--	    newSize = (buf->size ? buf->size*2 : size + 10);
+-	    newSize = (buf->size ? buf->size : size + 10);
 +            if (buf->size == 0)
 +                newSize = (size > UINT_MAX - 10 ? UINT_MAX : size + 10);
 +            else
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ index 86a8da79..fc75f962 100644
  	    while (size > newSize) {
  	        if (newSize > UINT_MAX / 2) {
  	            xmlTreeErrMemory("growing buffer");
-@@ -7416,7 +7418,7 @@ xmlBufferResize(xmlBufferPtr buf, unsigned int size)
+@@ -7476,7 +7478,7 @@ xmlBufferResize(xmlBufferPtr buf, unsigned int size)
  	    }
  	    break;
  	case XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_EXACT:
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ index 86a8da79..fc75f962 100644
  	    break;
          case XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_HYBRID:
              if (buf->use < BASE_BUFFER_SIZE)
-@@ -7434,7 +7436,7 @@ xmlBufferResize(xmlBufferPtr buf, unsigned int size)
+@@ -7494,7 +7496,7 @@ xmlBufferResize(xmlBufferPtr buf, unsigned int size)
              break;
  
  	default:
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ index 86a8da79..fc75f962 100644
  	    break;
      }
  
-@@ -7520,8 +7522,10 @@ xmlBufferAdd(xmlBufferPtr buf, const xmlChar *str, int len) {
+@@ -7580,8 +7582,10 @@ xmlBufferAdd(xmlBufferPtr buf, const xmlChar *str, int len) {
      if (len < 0) return -1;
      if (len == 0) return 0;
  
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ index 86a8da79..fc75f962 100644
          if (!xmlBufferResize(buf, needSize)){
  	    xmlTreeErrMemory("growing buffer");
              return XML_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
-@@ -7634,29 +7638,7 @@ xmlBufferCat(xmlBufferPtr buf, const xmlChar *str) {
+@@ -7694,29 +7698,7 @@ xmlBufferCat(xmlBufferPtr buf, const xmlChar *str) {
   */
  int
  xmlBufferCCat(xmlBufferPtr buf, const char *str) {
@@ -337,5 +337,5 @@ index 86a8da79..fc75f962 100644
  
  /**
 -- 
-2.36.1
+2.36.0
 

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2022-40303.patch

@@ -1,18 +1,28 @@
-From 7afb666b26cfb17689e5da98bed610a417083f9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David King <amigadave@amigadave.com>
-Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2023 09:57:28 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix CVE-2022-40303
+From c846986356fc149915a74972bf198abc266bc2c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 17:43:08 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2022-40303] Fix integer overflows with XML_PARSE_HUGE
 
-Adapted from https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/c846986356fc149915a74972bf198abc266bc2c0
+Also impose size limits when XML_PARSE_HUGE is set. Limit size of names
+to XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH (10 million bytes) and other content to
+XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH (1 billion bytes).
+
+Move some the length checks to the end of the respective loop to make
+them strict.
+
+xmlParseEntityValue didn't have a length limitation at all. But without
+XML_PARSE_HUGE, this should eventually trigger an error in xmlGROW.
+
+Thanks to Maddie Stone working with Google Project Zero for the report!
 ---
- parser.c | 232 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
- 1 file changed, 121 insertions(+), 111 deletions(-)
+ parser.c | 233 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 121 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
+index 93f031be..79479979 100644
 --- a/parser.c
 +++ b/parser.c
-@@ -108,6 +108,8 @@ static void xmlHaltParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt);
+@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ xmlParseElementEnd(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt);
   *									*
   ************************************************************************/
  
@@ -21,7 +31,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  #define XML_PARSER_BIG_ENTITY 1000
  #define XML_PARSER_LOT_ENTITY 5000
  
-@@ -532,7 +534,7 @@ xmlFatalErr(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error, const char *info)
+@@ -552,7 +554,7 @@ xmlFatalErr(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error, const char *info)
              errmsg = "Malformed declaration expecting version";
              break;
          case XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG:
@@ -30,7 +40,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
              break;
  #if 0
          case:
-@@ -3150,6 +3152,9 @@ xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -3202,6 +3204,9 @@ xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      int len = 0, l;
      int c;
      int count = 0;
@@ -40,7 +50,17 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  
  #ifdef DEBUG
      nbParseNameComplex++;
-@@ -3241,13 +3246,13 @@ xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -3267,7 +3272,8 @@ xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+                 if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
+                     return(NULL);
+ 	    }
+-	    len += l;
++            if (len <= INT_MAX - l)
++	        len += l;
+ 	    NEXTL(l);
+ 	    c = CUR_CHAR(l);
+ 	}
+@@ -3293,13 +3299,13 @@ xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
                  if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
                      return(NULL);
  	    }
@@ -57,7 +77,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
          xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Name");
          return(NULL);
      }
-@@ -3286,7 +3291,10 @@ const xmlChar *
+@@ -3338,7 +3344,10 @@ const xmlChar *
  xmlParseName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      const xmlChar *in;
      const xmlChar *ret;
@@ -69,7 +89,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  
      GROW;
  
-@@ -3310,8 +3318,7 @@ xmlParseName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -3362,8 +3371,7 @@ xmlParseName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  	    in++;
  	if ((*in > 0) && (*in < 0x80)) {
  	    count = in - ctxt->input->cur;
@@ -79,7 +99,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
                  xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Name");
                  return(NULL);
              }
-@@ -3333,6 +3340,9 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -3384,6 +3392,9 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      int len = 0, l;
      int c;
      int count = 0;
@@ -89,7 +109,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      size_t startPosition = 0;
  
  #ifdef DEBUG
-@@ -3353,17 +3363,13 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -3404,17 +3415,13 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */
  	   (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c) && (c != ':'))) {
  	if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) {
@@ -109,7 +129,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  	NEXTL(l);
  	c = CUR_CHAR(l);
  	if (c == 0) {
-@@ -3381,8 +3387,7 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -3432,8 +3439,7 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  	    c = CUR_CHAR(l);
  	}
      }
@@ -119,7 +139,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
          xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
          return(NULL);
      }
-@@ -3408,7 +3413,10 @@ static const xmlChar *
+@@ -3459,7 +3465,10 @@ static const xmlChar *
  xmlParseNCName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      const xmlChar *in, *e;
      const xmlChar *ret;
@@ -131,7 +151,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  
  #ifdef DEBUG
      nbParseNCName++;
-@@ -3433,8 +3441,7 @@ xmlParseNCName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -3484,8 +3493,7 @@ xmlParseNCName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  	    goto complex;
  	if ((*in > 0) && (*in < 0x80)) {
  	    count = in - ctxt->input->cur;
@@ -141,7 +161,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
                  xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
                  return(NULL);
              }
-@@ -3517,6 +3524,9 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) {
+@@ -3567,6 +3575,9 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) {
      const xmlChar *cur = *str;
      int len = 0, l;
      int c;
@@ -151,7 +171,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  
  #ifdef DEBUG
      nbParseStringName++;
-@@ -3552,12 +3562,6 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) {
+@@ -3602,12 +3613,6 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) {
  		if (len + 10 > max) {
  		    xmlChar *tmp;
  
@@ -164,7 +184,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  		    max *= 2;
  		    tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
  			                            max * sizeof(xmlChar));
-@@ -3571,14 +3575,18 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) {
+@@ -3621,14 +3626,18 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) {
  		COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c);
  		cur += l;
  		c = CUR_SCHAR(cur, l);
@@ -185,7 +205,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
          xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
          return(NULL);
      }
-@@ -3605,6 +3613,9 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -3655,6 +3664,9 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      int len = 0, l;
      int c;
      int count = 0;
@@ -195,7 +215,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  
  #ifdef DEBUG
      nbParseNmToken++;
-@@ -3656,12 +3667,6 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -3706,12 +3718,6 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  		if (len + 10 > max) {
  		    xmlChar *tmp;
  
@@ -208,7 +228,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  		    max *= 2;
  		    tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
  			                            max * sizeof(xmlChar));
-@@ -3675,6 +3680,11 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -3725,6 +3731,11 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  		COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c);
  		NEXTL(l);
  		c = CUR_CHAR(l);
@@ -220,7 +240,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  	    }
  	    buffer[len] = 0;
  	    return(buffer);
-@@ -3682,8 +3692,7 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -3732,8 +3743,7 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      }
      if (len == 0)
          return(NULL);
@@ -230,7 +250,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
          xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NmToken");
          return(NULL);
      }
-@@ -3709,6 +3718,9 @@ xmlParseEntityValue(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **orig) {
+@@ -3759,6 +3769,9 @@ xmlParseEntityValue(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **orig) {
      int len = 0;
      int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
      int c, l;
@@ -240,7 +260,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      xmlChar stop;
      xmlChar *ret = NULL;
      const xmlChar *cur = NULL;
-@@ -3768,6 +3780,14 @@ xmlParseEntityValue(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **orig) {
+@@ -3818,6 +3831,12 @@ xmlParseEntityValue(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **orig) {
  	    GROW;
  	    c = CUR_CHAR(l);
  	}
@@ -248,14 +268,12 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
 +        if (len > maxLength) {
 +            xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_FINISHED,
 +                           "entity value too long\n");
-+        if (buf != NULL)
-+            xmlFree(buf);
-+        return(ret);
++            goto error;
 +        }
      }
      buf[len] = 0;
      if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
-@@ -3855,6 +3875,9 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
+@@ -3905,6 +3924,9 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
      xmlChar *rep = NULL;
      size_t len = 0;
      size_t buf_size = 0;
@@ -265,7 +283,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      int c, l, in_space = 0;
      xmlChar *current = NULL;
      xmlEntityPtr ent;
-@@ -3886,16 +3909,6 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
+@@ -3936,16 +3958,6 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
      while (((NXT(0) != limit) && /* checked */
              (IS_CHAR(c)) && (c != '<')) &&
              (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
@@ -279,10 +297,10 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
 -                           "AttValue length too long\n");
 -            goto mem_error;
 -        }
- 	if (c == 0) break;
  	if (c == '&') {
  	    in_space = 0;
-@@ -4041,6 +4054,11 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
+ 	    if (NXT(1) == '#') {
+@@ -4093,6 +4105,11 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
  	}
  	GROW;
  	c = CUR_CHAR(l);
@@ -294,13 +312,13 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      }
      if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
          goto error;
-@@ -4062,16 +4080,6 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
+@@ -4114,16 +4131,6 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
      } else
  	NEXT;
  
 -    /*
 -     * There we potentially risk an overflow, don't allow attribute value of
--     * length more than INT_MAX it is a very reasonnable assumption !
+-     * length more than INT_MAX it is a very reasonable assumption !
 -     */
 -    if (len >= INT_MAX) {
 -        xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
@@ -311,7 +329,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      if (attlen != NULL) *attlen = (int) len;
      return(buf);
  
-@@ -4142,6 +4150,9 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -4194,6 +4201,9 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      int len = 0;
      int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
      int cur, l;
@@ -321,7 +339,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      xmlChar stop;
      int state = ctxt->instate;
      int count = 0;
-@@ -4169,13 +4180,6 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -4221,13 +4231,6 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  	if (len + 5 >= size) {
  	    xmlChar *tmp;
  
@@ -335,7 +353,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  	    size *= 2;
  	    tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
  	    if (tmp == NULL) {
-@@ -4203,6 +4207,12 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -4256,6 +4259,12 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  	    SHRINK;
  	    cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
  	}
@@ -348,7 +366,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      }
      buf[len] = 0;
      ctxt->instate = (xmlParserInputState) state;
-@@ -4230,6 +4240,9 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -4283,6 +4292,9 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      xmlChar *buf = NULL;
      int len = 0;
      int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
@@ -358,7 +376,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      xmlChar cur;
      xmlChar stop;
      int count = 0;
-@@ -4257,12 +4270,6 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -4310,12 +4322,6 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  	if (len + 1 >= size) {
  	    xmlChar *tmp;
  
@@ -371,7 +389,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  	    size *= 2;
  	    tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
  	    if (tmp == NULL) {
-@@ -4289,6 +4296,11 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -4343,6 +4349,11 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  	    SHRINK;
  	    cur = CUR;
  	}
@@ -383,7 +401,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      }
      buf[len] = 0;
      if (cur != stop) {
-@@ -4686,6 +4698,9 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf,
+@@ -4742,6 +4753,9 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf,
      int r, rl;
      int cur, l;
      size_t count = 0;
@@ -393,7 +411,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      int inputid;
  
      inputid = ctxt->input->id;
-@@ -4731,13 +4746,6 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf,
+@@ -4787,13 +4801,6 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf,
  	if ((r == '-') && (q == '-')) {
  	    xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_HYPHEN_IN_COMMENT, NULL);
  	}
@@ -407,7 +425,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  	if (len + 5 >= size) {
  	    xmlChar *new_buf;
              size_t new_size;
-@@ -4774,6 +4782,13 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf,
+@@ -4831,6 +4838,13 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf,
  	    GROW;
  	    cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
  	}
@@ -421,7 +439,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      }
      buf[len] = 0;
      if (cur == 0) {
-@@ -4818,6 +4833,9 @@ xmlParseComment(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -4875,6 +4889,9 @@ xmlParseComment(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      xmlChar *buf = NULL;
      size_t size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
      size_t len = 0;
@@ -431,7 +449,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      xmlParserInputState state;
      const xmlChar *in;
      size_t nbchar = 0;
-@@ -4901,8 +4919,7 @@ get_more:
+@@ -4958,8 +4975,7 @@ get_more:
  		buf[len] = 0;
  	    }
  	}
@@ -441,7 +459,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
              xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
                           "Comment too big found", NULL);
              xmlFree (buf);
-@@ -5098,6 +5115,9 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -5159,6 +5175,9 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      xmlChar *buf = NULL;
      size_t len = 0;
      size_t size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
@@ -451,7 +469,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      int cur, l;
      const xmlChar *target;
      xmlParserInputState state;
-@@ -5172,14 +5192,6 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -5234,14 +5253,6 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
                          return;
                      }
  		    count = 0;
@@ -466,7 +484,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  		}
  		COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,cur);
  		NEXTL(l);
-@@ -5189,15 +5201,14 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -5251,15 +5262,14 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  		    GROW;
  		    cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
  		}
@@ -489,7 +507,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  	    buf[len] = 0;
  	    if (cur != '?') {
  		xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_FINISHED,
-@@ -8851,6 +8862,9 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+@@ -8954,6 +8964,9 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
      const xmlChar *in = NULL, *start, *end, *last;
      xmlChar *ret = NULL;
      int line, col;
@@ -499,27 +517,27 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  
      GROW;
      in = (xmlChar *) CUR_PTR;
-@@ -8906,8 +8920,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
- 		    in = in + delta;
- 		}
- 		end = ctxt->input->end;
+@@ -8993,8 +9006,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+ 	    start = in;
+ 	    if (in >= end) {
+                 GROW_PARSE_ATT_VALUE_INTERNAL(ctxt, in, start, end)
 -                if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
 -                    ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
 +                if ((in - start) > maxLength) {
                      xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
                                     "AttValue length too long\n");
                      return(NULL);
-@@ -8929,8 +8942,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
- 		    in = in + delta;
- 		}
- 		end = ctxt->input->end;
+@@ -9007,8 +9019,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+ 	    if ((*in++ == 0x20) && (*in == 0x20)) break;
+ 	    if (in >= end) {
+                 GROW_PARSE_ATT_VALUE_INTERNAL(ctxt, in, start, end)
 -                if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
 -                    ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
 +                if ((in - start) > maxLength) {
                      xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
                                     "AttValue length too long\n");
                      return(NULL);
-@@ -8963,16 +8975,14 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+@@ -9041,16 +9052,14 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
  		    last = last + delta;
  		}
  		end = ctxt->input->end;
@@ -538,17 +556,17 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
              xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
                             "AttValue length too long\n");
              return(NULL);
-@@ -8994,8 +9004,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
- 		    in = in + delta;
- 		}
- 		end = ctxt->input->end;
+@@ -9063,8 +9072,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+ 	    col++;
+ 	    if (in >= end) {
+                 GROW_PARSE_ATT_VALUE_INTERNAL(ctxt, in, start, end)
 -                if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
 -                    ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
 +                if ((in - start) > maxLength) {
                      xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
                                     "AttValue length too long\n");
                      return(NULL);
-@@ -9003,8 +9012,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+@@ -9072,8 +9080,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
  	    }
  	}
  	last = in;
@@ -558,7 +576,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
              xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
                             "AttValue length too long\n");
              return(NULL);
-@@ -9711,6 +9719,9 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -9763,6 +9770,9 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
      int	s, sl;
      int cur, l;
      int count = 0;
@@ -568,7 +586,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  
      /* Check 2.6.0 was NXT(0) not RAW */
      if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', '[', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A', '[')) {
-@@ -9744,13 +9755,6 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -9796,13 +9806,6 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  	if (len + 5 >= size) {
  	    xmlChar *tmp;
  
@@ -582,7 +600,7 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
  	    tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * 2 * sizeof(xmlChar));
  	    if (tmp == NULL) {
  	        xmlFree(buf);
-@@ -9776,6 +9780,12 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+@@ -9829,6 +9832,12 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  	}
  	NEXTL(l);
  	cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
@@ -596,5 +614,5 @@ index 1c5e036e..e66e4196 100644
      buf[len] = 0;
      ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
 -- 
-2.39.0
+GitLab
 

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2022-40304.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-From a8fa5f7b5c3c745397b3178405d6be9fdb3cfcbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 1b41ec4e9433b05bb0376be4725804c54ef1d80b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
 Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2022 22:11:25 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix dict corruption caused by entity reference cycles
+Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2022-40304] Fix dict corruption caused by entity
+ reference cycles
 
 When an entity reference cycle is detected, the entity content is
 cleared by setting its first byte to zero. But the entity content might
@@ -20,10 +21,10 @@ Zero for the report!
  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/entities.c b/entities.c
-index c8193376..3bf1c3ce 100644
+index 84435515..d4e5412e 100644
 --- a/entities.c
 +++ b/entities.c
-@@ -112,36 +112,19 @@ xmlFreeEntity(xmlEntityPtr entity)
+@@ -128,36 +128,19 @@ xmlFreeEntity(xmlEntityPtr entity)
      if ((entity->children) && (entity->owner == 1) &&
          (entity == (xmlEntityPtr) entity->children->parent))
          xmlFreeNodeList(entity->children);
@@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ index c8193376..3bf1c3ce 100644
      xmlFree(entity);
  }
  
-@@ -177,18 +160,12 @@ xmlCreateEntity(xmlDictPtr dict, const xmlChar *name, int type,
+@@ -193,18 +176,12 @@ xmlCreateEntity(xmlDictPtr dict, const xmlChar *name, int type,
  	    ret->SystemID = xmlStrdup(SystemID);
      } else {
          ret->name = xmlDictLookup(dict, name, -1);
@@ -96,5 +97,5 @@ index c8193376..3bf1c3ce 100644
          ret->length = 0;
          ret->content = NULL;
 -- 
-2.39.0
+GitLab
 

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2023-29469.patch

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From a40db8fde759261b042138646da36c632a739f31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 09a2dd453007f9c7205274623acdd73747c22d64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
 Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2023 11:49:27 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2023-29469] Hashing of empty dict strings isn't
@@ -14,29 +14,24 @@ have an impact on security.
 Found by OSS-Fuzz.
 
 Fixes #510.
-
-Incorporates change from commit
-09a2dd453007f9c7205274623acdd73747c22d64.
 ---
- dict.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ dict.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/dict.c b/dict.c
-index 0ef3718d..5e84cfca 100644
+index c29d2af7..12ba94fd 100644
 --- a/dict.c
 +++ b/dict.c
-@@ -444,8 +444,9 @@ static unsigned long
+@@ -453,7 +453,8 @@ static unsigned long
  xmlDictComputeFastKey(const xmlChar *name, int namelen, int seed) {
      unsigned long value = seed;
  
 -    if (name == NULL) return(0);
--    value = *name;
 +    if ((name == NULL) || (namelen <= 0))
 +        return(value);
-+    value += *name;
+     value += *name;
      value <<= 5;
      if (namelen > 10) {
-         value += name[namelen - 1];
 -- 
-2.41.0
+GitLab
 

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.4-remove-pyverify_fd.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -Nur libxml2-2.9.4.orig/python/types.c libxml2-2.9.4/python/types.c
---- libxml2-2.9.4.orig/python/types.c	2016-02-09 03:17:33.000000000 -0700
-+++ libxml2-2.9.4/python/types.c	2016-12-21 12:34:06.755650986 -0700
-@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
-     const char *mode;
- 
-     fd = PyObject_AsFileDescriptor(f);
--    if (!_PyVerify_fd(fd))
--        return(NULL);
-     /*
-      * Get the flags on the fd to understand how it was opened
-      */

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2016-3709.patch

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-From c1ba6f54d32b707ca6d91cb3257ce9de82876b6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
-Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2020 18:32:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Do not URI escape in server side includes"
-
-This reverts commit 960f0e275616cadc29671a218d7fb9b69eb35588.
-
-This commit introduced
-
-- an infinite loop, found by OSS-Fuzz, which could be easily fixed.
-- an algorithm with quadratic runtime
-- a security issue, see
-  https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=769760
-
-A better approach is to add an option not to escape URLs at all
-which libxml2 should have possibly done in the first place.
----
- HTMLtree.c | 49 +++++++++++--------------------------------------
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/HTMLtree.c b/HTMLtree.c
-index 8d236bb3..cdb7f86a 100644
---- a/HTMLtree.c
-+++ b/HTMLtree.c
-@@ -706,49 +706,22 @@ htmlAttrDumpOutput(xmlOutputBufferPtr buf, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlAttrPtr cur,
- 		 (!xmlStrcasecmp(cur->name, BAD_CAST "src")) ||
- 		 ((!xmlStrcasecmp(cur->name, BAD_CAST "name")) &&
- 		  (!xmlStrcasecmp(cur->parent->name, BAD_CAST "a"))))) {
-+		xmlChar *escaped;
- 		xmlChar *tmp = value;
--		/* xmlURIEscapeStr() escapes '"' so it can be safely used. */
--		xmlBufCCat(buf->buffer, "\"");
- 
- 		while (IS_BLANK_CH(*tmp)) tmp++;
- 
--		/* URI Escape everything, except server side includes. */
--		for ( ; ; ) {
--		    xmlChar *escaped;
--		    xmlChar endChar;
--		    xmlChar *end = NULL;
--		    xmlChar *start = (xmlChar *)xmlStrstr(tmp, BAD_CAST "<!--");
--		    if (start != NULL) {
--			end = (xmlChar *)xmlStrstr(tmp, BAD_CAST "-->");
--			if (end != NULL) {
--			    *start = '\0';
--			}
--		    }
--
--		    /* Escape the whole string, or until start (set to '\0'). */
--		    escaped = xmlURIEscapeStr(tmp, BAD_CAST"@/:=?;#%&,+");
--		    if (escaped != NULL) {
--		        xmlBufCat(buf->buffer, escaped);
--		        xmlFree(escaped);
--		    } else {
--		        xmlBufCat(buf->buffer, tmp);
--		    }
--
--		    if (end == NULL) { /* Everything has been written. */
--			break;
--		    }
--
--		    /* Do not escape anything within server side includes. */
--		    *start = '<'; /* Restore the first character of "<!--". */
--		    end += 3; /* strlen("-->") */
--		    endChar = *end;
--		    *end = '\0';
--		    xmlBufCat(buf->buffer, start);
--		    *end = endChar;
--		    tmp = end;
-+		/*
-+		 * the < and > have already been escaped at the entity level
-+		 * And doing so here breaks server side includes
-+		 */
-+		escaped = xmlURIEscapeStr(tmp, BAD_CAST"@/:=?;#%&,+<>");
-+		if (escaped != NULL) {
-+		    xmlBufWriteQuotedString(buf->buffer, escaped);
-+		    xmlFree(escaped);
-+		} else {
-+		    xmlBufWriteQuotedString(buf->buffer, value);
- 		}
--
--		xmlBufCCat(buf->buffer, "\"");
- 	    } else {
- 		xmlBufWriteQuotedString(buf->buffer, value);
- 	    }
--- 
-GitLab
-

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2019-20388.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 7ffcd44d7e6c46704f8af0321d9314cd26e0e18a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
-Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 16:33:06 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix memory leak in xmlSchemaValidateStream
-
-When ctxt->schema is NULL, xmlSchemaSAXPlug->xmlSchemaPreRun
-alloc a new schema for ctxt->schema and set vctxt->xsiAssemble
-to 1. Then xmlSchemaVStart->xmlSchemaPreRun initialize
-vctxt->xsiAssemble to 0 again which cause the alloced schema
-can not be freed anymore.
-
-Found with libFuzzer.
-
-Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
----
- xmlschemas.c | 1 -
- 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xmlschemas.c b/xmlschemas.c
-index 301c8449..39d92182 100644
---- a/xmlschemas.c
-+++ b/xmlschemas.c
-@@ -28090,7 +28090,6 @@ xmlSchemaPreRun(xmlSchemaValidCtxtPtr vctxt) {
-     vctxt->nberrors = 0;
-     vctxt->depth = -1;
-     vctxt->skipDepth = -1;
--    vctxt->xsiAssemble = 0;
-     vctxt->hasKeyrefs = 0;
- #ifdef ENABLE_IDC_NODE_TABLES_TEST
-     vctxt->createIDCNodeTables = 1;
--- 
-2.24.1
-

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2020-24977.patch

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From 50f06b3efb638efb0abd95dc62dca05ae67882c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
-Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2020 21:54:27 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix out-of-bounds read with 'xmllint --htmlout'
-
-Make sure that truncated UTF-8 sequences don't cause an out-of-bounds
-array access.
-
-Thanks to @SuhwanSong and the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) for
-the report.
-
-Fixes #178.
----
- xmllint.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xmllint.c b/xmllint.c
-index f6a8e4636..c647486f3 100644
---- a/xmllint.c
-+++ b/xmllint.c
-@@ -528,6 +528,12 @@ static void
- xmlHTMLEncodeSend(void) {
-     char *result;
- 
-+    /*
-+     * xmlEncodeEntitiesReentrant assumes valid UTF-8, but the buffer might
-+     * end with a truncated UTF-8 sequence. This is a hack to at least avoid
-+     * an out-of-bounds read.
-+     */
-+    memset(&buffer[sizeof(buffer)-4], 0, 4);
-     result = (char *) xmlEncodeEntitiesReentrant(NULL, BAD_CAST buffer);
-     if (result) {
- 	xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "%s", result);
--- 
-GitLab
-

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2020-7595.patch

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 0e1a49c8907645d2e155f0d89d4d9895ac5112b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
-Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 17:30:55 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix infinite loop in xmlStringLenDecodeEntities
-
-When ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF,xmlParseStringEntityRef
-return NULL which cause a infinite loop in xmlStringLenDecodeEntities
-
-Found with libFuzzer.
-
-Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
----
- parser.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index d1c31963..a34bb6cd 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -2646,7 +2646,8 @@ xmlStringLenDecodeEntities(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *str, int len,
-     else
-         c = 0;
-     while ((c != 0) && (c != end) && /* non input consuming loop */
--	   (c != end2) && (c != end3)) {
-+           (c != end2) && (c != end3) &&
-+           (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
- 
- 	if (c == 0) break;
-         if ((c == '&') && (str[1] == '#')) {
--- 
-2.24.1
-

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2021-3516.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From 1358d157d0bd83be1dfe356a69213df9fac0b539 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
-Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 13:23:27 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix use-after-free with `xmllint --html --push`
-
-Call htmlCtxtUseOptions to make sure that names aren't stored in
-dictionaries.
-
-Note that this issue only affects xmllint using the HTML push parser.
-
-Fixes #230.
----
- xmllint.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xmllint.c b/xmllint.c
-index 6ca1bf54..dbef273a 100644
---- a/xmllint.c
-+++ b/xmllint.c
-@@ -2213,7 +2213,7 @@ static void parseAndPrintFile(char *filename, xmlParserCtxtPtr rectxt) {
-             if (res > 0) {
-                 ctxt = htmlCreatePushParserCtxt(NULL, NULL,
-                             chars, res, filename, XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE);
--                xmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
-+                htmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
-                 while ((res = fread(chars, 1, pushsize, f)) > 0) {
-                     htmlParseChunk(ctxt, chars, res, 0);
-                 }
--- 
-GitLab
-

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2021-3517.patch

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From bf22713507fe1fc3a2c4b525cf0a88c2dc87a3a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Joel Hockey <joel.hockey@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2020 17:19:35 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] Validate UTF8 in xmlEncodeEntities
-
-Code is currently assuming UTF-8 without validating. Truncated UTF-8
-input can cause out-of-bounds array access.
-
-Adds further checks to partial fix in 50f06b3e.
-
-Fixes #178
----
- entities.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/entities.c b/entities.c
-index 37b99a56..1a8f86f0 100644
---- a/entities.c
-+++ b/entities.c
-@@ -704,11 +704,25 @@ xmlEncodeEntitiesInternal(xmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *input, int attr) {
- 	    } else {
- 		/*
- 		 * We assume we have UTF-8 input.
-+		 * It must match either:
-+		 *   110xxxxx 10xxxxxx
-+		 *   1110xxxx 10xxxxxx 10xxxxxx
-+		 *   11110xxx 10xxxxxx 10xxxxxx 10xxxxxx
-+		 * That is:
-+		 *   cur[0] is 11xxxxxx
-+		 *   cur[1] is 10xxxxxx
-+		 *   cur[2] is 10xxxxxx if cur[0] is 111xxxxx
-+		 *   cur[3] is 10xxxxxx if cur[0] is 1111xxxx
-+		 *   cur[0] is not 11111xxx
- 		 */
- 		char buf[11], *ptr;
- 		int val = 0, l = 1;
- 
--		if (*cur < 0xC0) {
-+		if (((cur[0] & 0xC0) != 0xC0) ||
-+		    ((cur[1] & 0xC0) != 0x80) ||
-+		    (((cur[0] & 0xE0) == 0xE0) && ((cur[2] & 0xC0) != 0x80)) ||
-+		    (((cur[0] & 0xF0) == 0xF0) && ((cur[3] & 0xC0) != 0x80)) ||
-+		    (((cur[0] & 0xF8) == 0xF8))) {
- 		    xmlEntitiesErr(XML_CHECK_NOT_UTF8,
- 			    "xmlEncodeEntities: input not UTF-8");
- 		    if (doc != NULL)
--- 
-GitLab
-

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2021-3518.patch

@@ -1,247 +0,0 @@
-From 752e5f71d7cea2ca5a7e7c0b8f72ed04ce654be4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
-Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 16:34:52 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Don't recurse into xi:include children in
- xmlXIncludeDoProcess
-
-Otherwise, nested xi:include nodes might result in a use-after-free
-if XML_PARSE_NOXINCNODE is specified.
-
-Found with libFuzzer and ASan.
----
- result/XInclude/fallback3.xml     |  8 ++++++++
- result/XInclude/fallback3.xml.err |  0
- result/XInclude/fallback3.xml.rdr | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
- result/XInclude/fallback4.xml     | 10 ++++++++++
- result/XInclude/fallback4.xml.err |  0
- result/XInclude/fallback4.xml.rdr | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- test/XInclude/docs/fallback3.xml  |  9 +++++++++
- test/XInclude/docs/fallback4.xml  |  7 +++++++
- xinclude.c                        | 24 ++++++++++--------------
- 9 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 result/XInclude/fallback3.xml
- create mode 100644 result/XInclude/fallback3.xml.err
- create mode 100644 result/XInclude/fallback3.xml.rdr
- create mode 100644 result/XInclude/fallback4.xml
- create mode 100644 result/XInclude/fallback4.xml.err
- create mode 100644 result/XInclude/fallback4.xml.rdr
- create mode 100644 test/XInclude/docs/fallback3.xml
- create mode 100644 test/XInclude/docs/fallback4.xml
-
-diff --git a/result/XInclude/fallback3.xml b/result/XInclude/fallback3.xml
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..b4235514
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/result/XInclude/fallback3.xml
-@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
-+<?xml version="1.0"?>
-+<a>
-+    <doc xml:base="../ents/something.xml">
-+<p>something</p>
-+<p>really</p>
-+<p>simple</p>
-+</doc>
-+</a>
-diff --git a/result/XInclude/fallback3.xml.err b/result/XInclude/fallback3.xml.err
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..e69de29b
-diff --git a/result/XInclude/fallback3.xml.rdr b/result/XInclude/fallback3.xml.rdr
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..aa2f1374
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/result/XInclude/fallback3.xml.rdr
-@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
-+0 1 a 0 0
-+1 14 #text 0 1 
-+    
-+1 1 doc 0 0
-+2 14 #text 0 1 
-+
-+2 1 p 0 0
-+3 3 #text 0 1 something
-+2 15 p 0 0
-+2 14 #text 0 1 
-+
-+2 1 p 0 0
-+3 3 #text 0 1 really
-+2 15 p 0 0
-+2 14 #text 0 1 
-+
-+2 1 p 0 0
-+3 3 #text 0 1 simple
-+2 15 p 0 0
-+2 14 #text 0 1 
-+
-+1 15 doc 0 0
-+1 14 #text 0 1 
-+
-+0 15 a 0 0
-diff --git a/result/XInclude/fallback4.xml b/result/XInclude/fallback4.xml
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..9883fd54
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/result/XInclude/fallback4.xml
-@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
-+<?xml version="1.0"?>
-+<a>
-+    
-+            <doc xml:base="../ents/something.xml">
-+<p>something</p>
-+<p>really</p>
-+<p>simple</p>
-+</doc>
-+        
-+</a>
-diff --git a/result/XInclude/fallback4.xml.err b/result/XInclude/fallback4.xml.err
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..e69de29b
-diff --git a/result/XInclude/fallback4.xml.rdr b/result/XInclude/fallback4.xml.rdr
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..628b9513
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/result/XInclude/fallback4.xml.rdr
-@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
-+0 1 a 0 0
-+1 14 #text 0 1 
-+    
-+1 14 #text 0 1 
-+            
-+1 1 doc 0 0
-+2 14 #text 0 1 
-+
-+2 1 p 0 0
-+3 3 #text 0 1 something
-+2 15 p 0 0
-+2 14 #text 0 1 
-+
-+2 1 p 0 0
-+3 3 #text 0 1 really
-+2 15 p 0 0
-+2 14 #text 0 1 
-+
-+2 1 p 0 0
-+3 3 #text 0 1 simple
-+2 15 p 0 0
-+2 14 #text 0 1 
-+
-+1 15 doc 0 0
-+1 14 #text 0 1 
-+        
-+1 14 #text 0 1 
-+
-+0 15 a 0 0
-diff --git a/test/XInclude/docs/fallback3.xml b/test/XInclude/docs/fallback3.xml
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..0c8b6c9e
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/test/XInclude/docs/fallback3.xml
-@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
-+<a>
-+    <xi:include href="../ents/something.xml" xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
-+        <xi:fallback>
-+            <xi:include href="c.xml">
-+                <xi:fallback>There is no c.xml ... </xi:fallback>
-+            </xi:include>
-+        </xi:fallback>
-+    </xi:include>
-+</a>
-diff --git a/test/XInclude/docs/fallback4.xml b/test/XInclude/docs/fallback4.xml
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..b500a635
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/test/XInclude/docs/fallback4.xml
-@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
-+<a>
-+    <xi:include href="c.xml" xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
-+        <xi:fallback>
-+            <xi:include href="../ents/something.xml"/>
-+        </xi:fallback>
-+    </xi:include>
-+</a>
-diff --git a/xinclude.c b/xinclude.c
-index ba850fa5..f260c1a7 100644
---- a/xinclude.c
-+++ b/xinclude.c
-@@ -2392,21 +2392,19 @@ xmlXIncludeDoProcess(xmlXIncludeCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr tree) {
-      * First phase: lookup the elements in the document
-      */
-     cur = tree;
--    if (xmlXIncludeTestNode(ctxt, cur) == 1)
--	xmlXIncludePreProcessNode(ctxt, cur);
-     while ((cur != NULL) && (cur != tree->parent)) {
- 	/* TODO: need to work on entities -> stack */
--	if ((cur->children != NULL) &&
--	    (cur->children->type != XML_ENTITY_DECL) &&
--	    (cur->children->type != XML_XINCLUDE_START) &&
--	    (cur->children->type != XML_XINCLUDE_END)) {
--	    cur = cur->children;
--	    if (xmlXIncludeTestNode(ctxt, cur))
--		xmlXIncludePreProcessNode(ctxt, cur);
--	} else if (cur->next != NULL) {
-+        if (xmlXIncludeTestNode(ctxt, cur) == 1) {
-+            xmlXIncludePreProcessNode(ctxt, cur);
-+        } else if ((cur->children != NULL) &&
-+                   (cur->children->type != XML_ENTITY_DECL) &&
-+                   (cur->children->type != XML_XINCLUDE_START) &&
-+                   (cur->children->type != XML_XINCLUDE_END)) {
-+            cur = cur->children;
-+            continue;
-+        }
-+	if (cur->next != NULL) {
- 	    cur = cur->next;
--	    if (xmlXIncludeTestNode(ctxt, cur))
--		xmlXIncludePreProcessNode(ctxt, cur);
- 	} else {
- 	    if (cur == tree)
- 	        break;
-@@ -2416,8 +2414,6 @@ xmlXIncludeDoProcess(xmlXIncludeCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr tree) {
- 		    break; /* do */
- 		if (cur->next != NULL) {
- 		    cur = cur->next;
--		    if (xmlXIncludeTestNode(ctxt, cur))
--			xmlXIncludePreProcessNode(ctxt, cur);
- 		    break; /* do */
- 		}
- 	    } while (cur != NULL);
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-
-From 49cc4182543dba73216add4021994a81678763bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
-Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 19:26:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix user-after-free with `xmllint --xinclude --dropdtd`
-
-The --dropdtd option can leave dangling pointers in entity reference
-nodes. Make sure to skip these nodes when processing XIncludes.
-
-This also avoids scanning entity declarations and even modifying
-them inadvertently during XInclude processing.
-
-Move from a block list to an allow list approach to avoid descending
-into other node types that can't contain elements.
-
-Fixes #237.
----
- xinclude.c | 5 ++---
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xinclude.c b/xinclude.c
-index f260c1a7..d7648529 100644
---- a/xinclude.c
-+++ b/xinclude.c
-@@ -2397,9 +2397,8 @@ xmlXIncludeDoProcess(xmlXIncludeCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr tree) {
-         if (xmlXIncludeTestNode(ctxt, cur) == 1) {
-             xmlXIncludePreProcessNode(ctxt, cur);
-         } else if ((cur->children != NULL) &&
--                   (cur->children->type != XML_ENTITY_DECL) &&
--                   (cur->children->type != XML_XINCLUDE_START) &&
--                   (cur->children->type != XML_XINCLUDE_END)) {
-+                   ((cur->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
-+                    (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE))) {
-             cur = cur->children;
-             continue;
-         }
--- 
-2.31.1
-

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2021-3537.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From babe75030c7f64a37826bb3342317134568bef61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
-Date: Sat, 1 May 2021 16:53:33 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Propagate error in xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv
-
-Check return value of recursive calls to
-xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv and return immediately in case
-of errors. Otherwise, struct xmlElementContent could contain unexpected
-null pointers, leading to a null deref when post-validating documents
-which aren't well-formed and parsed in recovery mode.
-
-Fixes #243.
----
- parser.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index b42e6043..73c27edd 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -6208,6 +6208,8 @@ xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int inputchk,
- 	SKIP_BLANKS;
-         cur = ret = xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(ctxt, inputid,
-                                                            depth + 1);
-+        if (cur == NULL)
-+            return(NULL);
- 	SKIP_BLANKS;
- 	GROW;
-     } else {
-@@ -6341,6 +6343,11 @@ xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int inputchk,
- 	    SKIP_BLANKS;
- 	    last = xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(ctxt, inputid,
-                                                           depth + 1);
-+            if (last == NULL) {
-+		if (ret != NULL)
-+		    xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
-+		return(NULL);
-+            }
- 	    SKIP_BLANKS;
- 	} else {
- 	    elem = xmlParseName(ctxt);
--- 
-GitLab
-

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2021-3541.patch

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-From 8598060bacada41a0eb09d95c97744ff4e428f8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Veillard <veillard@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 13 May 2021 14:55:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Patch for security issue CVE-2021-3541
-
-This is relapted to parameter entities expansion and following
-the line of the billion laugh attack. Somehow in that path the
-counting of parameters was missed and the normal algorithm based
-on entities "density" was useless.
----
- parser.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index f5e5e169..c9312fa4 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ xmlParserEntityCheck(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, size_t size,
-                      xmlEntityPtr ent, size_t replacement)
- {
-     size_t consumed = 0;
-+    int i;
- 
-     if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE))
-         return (0);
-@@ -177,6 +178,28 @@ xmlParserEntityCheck(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, size_t size,
- 	    rep = NULL;
- 	}
-     }
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Prevent entity exponential check, not just replacement while
-+     * parsing the DTD
-+     * The check is potentially costly so do that only once in a thousand
-+     */
-+    if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_DTD) && (ctxt->nbentities > 10000) &&
-+        (ctxt->nbentities % 1024 == 0)) {
-+	for (i = 0;i < ctxt->inputNr;i++) {
-+	    consumed += ctxt->inputTab[i]->consumed +
-+	               (ctxt->inputTab[i]->cur - ctxt->inputTab[i]->base);
-+	}
-+	if (ctxt->nbentities > consumed * XML_PARSER_NON_LINEAR) {
-+	    xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP, NULL);
-+	    ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
-+	    return (1);
-+	}
-+	consumed = 0;
-+    }
-+
-+
-+
-     if (replacement != 0) {
- 	if (replacement < XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH)
- 	    return(0);
-@@ -7963,6 +7986,9 @@ xmlParsePEReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
-             xmlChar start[4];
-             xmlCharEncoding enc;
- 
-+	    if (xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, entity, 0))
-+	        return;
-+
- 	    if ((entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
- 	        ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_NOENT) == 0) &&
- 		((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDVALID) == 0) &&
--- 
-GitLab
-

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2022-23308.patch

@@ -1,196 +0,0 @@
-From 7f70302bfa9faeac9c9f7be8adf96d32c16acb72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
-Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 03:29:24 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2022-23308] Use-after-free of ID and IDREF attributes
-
-If a document is parsed with XML_PARSE_DTDVALID and without
-XML_PARSE_NOENT, the value of ID attributes has to be normalized after
-potentially expanding entities in xmlRemoveID. Otherwise, later calls
-to xmlGetID can return a pointer to previously freed memory.
-
-ID attributes which are empty or contain only whitespace after
-entity expansion are affected in a similar way. This is fixed by
-not storing such attributes in the ID table.
-
-The test to detect streaming mode when validating against a DTD was
-broken. In connection with the defects above, this could result in a
-use-after-free when using the xmlReader interface with validation.
-Fix detection of streaming mode to avoid similar issues. (This changes
-the expected result of a test case. But as far as I can tell, using the
-XML reader with XIncludes referencing the root document never worked
-properly, anyway.)
-
-All of these issues can result in denial of service. Using xmlReader
-with validation could result in disclosure of memory via the error
-channel, typically stderr. The security impact of xmlGetID returning
-a pointer to freed memory depends on the application. The typical use
-case of calling xmlGetID on an unmodified document is not affected.
----
- valid.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/valid.c b/valid.c
-index a64b96be..5b81059f 100644
---- a/valid.c
-+++ b/valid.c
-@@ -479,6 +479,35 @@ nodeVPop(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt)
-     return (ret);
- }
- 
-+/**
-+ * xmlValidNormalizeString:
-+ * @str: a string
-+ *
-+ * Normalize a string in-place.
-+ */
-+static void
-+xmlValidNormalizeString(xmlChar *str) {
-+    xmlChar *dst;
-+    const xmlChar *src;
-+
-+    if (str == NULL)
-+        return;
-+    src = str;
-+    dst = str;
-+
-+    while (*src == 0x20) src++;
-+    while (*src != 0) {
-+	if (*src == 0x20) {
-+	    while (*src == 0x20) src++;
-+	    if (*src != 0)
-+		*dst++ = 0x20;
-+	} else {
-+	    *dst++ = *src++;
-+	}
-+    }
-+    *dst = 0;
-+}
-+
- #ifdef DEBUG_VALID_ALGO
- static void
- xmlValidPrintNode(xmlNodePtr cur) {
-@@ -2546,6 +2575,24 @@ xmlDumpNotationTable(xmlBufferPtr buf, xmlNotationTablePtr table) {
- 	    (xmlDictOwns(dict, (const xmlChar *)(str)) == 0)))	\
- 	    xmlFree((char *)(str));
- 
-+static int
-+xmlIsStreaming(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt) {
-+    xmlParserCtxtPtr pctxt;
-+
-+    if (ctxt == NULL)
-+        return(0);
-+    /*
-+     * These magic values are also abused to detect whether we're validating
-+     * while parsing a document. In this case, userData points to the parser
-+     * context.
-+     */
-+    if ((ctxt->finishDtd != XML_CTXT_FINISH_DTD_0) &&
-+        (ctxt->finishDtd != XML_CTXT_FINISH_DTD_1))
-+        return(0);
-+    pctxt = ctxt->userData;
-+    return(pctxt->parseMode == XML_PARSE_READER);
-+}
-+
- /**
-  * xmlFreeID:
-  * @not:  A id
-@@ -2589,7 +2636,7 @@ xmlAddID(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *value,
-     if (doc == NULL) {
- 	return(NULL);
-     }
--    if (value == NULL) {
-+    if ((value == NULL) || (value[0] == 0)) {
- 	return(NULL);
-     }
-     if (attr == NULL) {
-@@ -2620,7 +2667,7 @@ xmlAddID(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *value,
-      */
-     ret->value = xmlStrdup(value);
-     ret->doc = doc;
--    if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->vstateNr != 0)) {
-+    if (xmlIsStreaming(ctxt)) {
- 	/*
- 	 * Operating in streaming mode, attr is gonna disapear
- 	 */
-@@ -2754,6 +2801,7 @@ xmlRemoveID(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlAttrPtr attr) {
-     ID = xmlNodeListGetString(doc, attr->children, 1);
-     if (ID == NULL)
-         return(-1);
-+    xmlValidNormalizeString(ID);
- 
-     id = xmlHashLookup(table, ID);
-     if (id == NULL || id->attr != attr) {
-@@ -2942,7 +2990,7 @@ xmlAddRef(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *value,
-      * fill the structure.
-      */
-     ret->value = xmlStrdup(value);
--    if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->vstateNr != 0)) {
-+    if (xmlIsStreaming(ctxt)) {
- 	/*
- 	 * Operating in streaming mode, attr is gonna disapear
- 	 */
-@@ -3962,8 +4010,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeValue2(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
- xmlChar *
- xmlValidCtxtNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
- 	     xmlNodePtr elem, const xmlChar *name, const xmlChar *value) {
--    xmlChar *ret, *dst;
--    const xmlChar *src;
-+    xmlChar *ret;
-     xmlAttributePtr attrDecl = NULL;
-     int extsubset = 0;
- 
-@@ -4004,19 +4051,7 @@ xmlValidCtxtNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
-     ret = xmlStrdup(value);
-     if (ret == NULL)
- 	return(NULL);
--    src = value;
--    dst = ret;
--    while (*src == 0x20) src++;
--    while (*src != 0) {
--	if (*src == 0x20) {
--	    while (*src == 0x20) src++;
--	    if (*src != 0)
--		*dst++ = 0x20;
--	} else {
--	    *dst++ = *src++;
--	}
--    }
--    *dst = 0;
-+    xmlValidNormalizeString(ret);
-     if ((doc->standalone) && (extsubset == 1) && (!xmlStrEqual(value, ret))) {
- 	xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, elem, XML_DTD_NOT_STANDALONE,
- "standalone: %s on %s value had to be normalized based on external subset declaration\n",
-@@ -4048,8 +4083,7 @@ xmlValidCtxtNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
- xmlChar *
- xmlValidNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr elem,
- 			        const xmlChar *name, const xmlChar *value) {
--    xmlChar *ret, *dst;
--    const xmlChar *src;
-+    xmlChar *ret;
-     xmlAttributePtr attrDecl = NULL;
- 
-     if (doc == NULL) return(NULL);
-@@ -4079,19 +4113,7 @@ xmlValidNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr elem,
-     ret = xmlStrdup(value);
-     if (ret == NULL)
- 	return(NULL);
--    src = value;
--    dst = ret;
--    while (*src == 0x20) src++;
--    while (*src != 0) {
--	if (*src == 0x20) {
--	    while (*src == 0x20) src++;
--	    if (*src != 0)
--		*dst++ = 0x20;
--	} else {
--	    *dst++ = *src++;
--	}
--    }
--    *dst = 0;
-+    xmlValidNormalizeString(ret);
-     return(ret);
- }
- 
--- 
-2.35.1
-

SOURCES/libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2024-25062.patch

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From b9d4ab2fd6b7da380edab777a0414ef254804f0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
-Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2023 22:45:54 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2024-25062] xmlreader: Don't expand XIncludes when
- backtracking
-
-Fixes a use-after-free if XML Reader if used with DTD validation and
-XInclude expansion.
-
-Fixes #604.
----
- xmlreader.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/xmlreader.c b/xmlreader.c
-index 34c4c6bc..8f2f9131 100644
---- a/xmlreader.c
-+++ b/xmlreader.c
-@@ -1511,6 +1511,7 @@ node_found:
-      * Handle XInclude if asked for
-      */
-     if ((reader->xinclude) && (reader->node != NULL) &&
-+        (reader->state != XML_TEXTREADER_BACKTRACK) &&
- 	(reader->node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
- 	(reader->node->ns != NULL) &&
- 	((xmlStrEqual(reader->node->ns->href, XINCLUDE_NS)) ||
--- 
-2.44.0
-

SOURCES/libxml2-CVE-2016-9597.patch

@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
-Make the XML entity recursion check more precise.
-
-libxml doesn't detect entity recursion specifically but has a variety
-of related checks, such as entities not expanding too deeply or
-producing exponential blow-ups in content.
-
-Because entity declarations are parsed in a separate context with
-their own element recursion budget, a recursive entity can overflow
-the stack using a lot of open elements (but within the per-context
-limit) as it slowly consumes (but does not exhaust) the entity depth
-budget.
-
-This adds a specific, precise check for recursive entities that
-detects entity recursion specifically and fails immediately.
-
-The existing entity expansion depth checks are still relevant for long
-chains of different entities.
-
-BUG=628581
-
-Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2539003002
-Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#436899}
-
-
-Index: libxml2-2.9.4/entities.c
-===================================================================
---- libxml2-2.9.4.orig/entities.c
-+++ libxml2-2.9.4/entities.c
-@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ xmlCreateEntity(xmlDictPtr dict, const x
-     memset(ret, 0, sizeof(xmlEntity));
-     ret->type = XML_ENTITY_DECL;
-     ret->checked = 0;
-+    ret->guard = XML_ENTITY_NOT_BEING_CHECKED;
- 
-     /*
-      * fill the structure.
-@@ -931,6 +932,7 @@ xmlCopyEntity(xmlEntityPtr ent) {
- 	cur->orig = xmlStrdup(ent->orig);
-     if (ent->URI != NULL)
- 	cur->URI = xmlStrdup(ent->URI);
-+    cur->guard = 0;
-     return(cur);
- }
- 
-Index: libxml2-2.9.4/include/libxml/entities.h
-===================================================================
---- libxml2-2.9.4.orig/include/libxml/entities.h
-+++ libxml2-2.9.4/include/libxml/entities.h
-@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ typedef enum {
-     XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY = 6
- } xmlEntityType;
- 
-+typedef enum {
-+  XML_ENTITY_NOT_BEING_CHECKED,
-+  XML_ENTITY_BEING_CHECKED              /* entity check is in progress */
-+} xmlEntityRecursionGuard;
-+
- /*
-  * An unit of storage for an entity, contains the string, the value
-  * and the linkind data needed for the linking in the hash table.
-@@ -60,6 +65,7 @@ struct _xmlEntity {
- 					/* this is also used to count entities
- 					 * references done from that entity
- 					 * and if it contains '<' */
-+     xmlEntityRecursionGuard guard;
- };
- 
- /*
-Index: libxml2-2.9.4/parser.c
-===================================================================
---- libxml2-2.9.4.orig/parser.c
-+++ libxml2-2.9.4/parser.c
-@@ -133,6 +133,10 @@ xmlParserEntityCheck(xmlParserCtxtPtr ct
-     if (ctxt->lastError.code == XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP)
-         return (1);
- 
-+	if ((ent != NULL) && (ent->guard == XML_ENTITY_BEING_CHECKED)) {
-+        xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP, NULL);
-+        return (1);
-+    }
-     /*
-      * This may look absurd but is needed to detect
-      * entities problems
-@@ -143,12 +147,14 @@ xmlParserEntityCheck(xmlParserCtxtPtr ct
- 	unsigned long oldnbent = ctxt->nbentities;
- 	xmlChar *rep;
- 
-+    ent->guard = XML_ENTITY_BEING_CHECKED;
- 	ent->checked = 1;
- 
-         ++ctxt->depth;
- 	rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
- 				  XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF, 0, 0, 0);
-         --ctxt->depth;
-+	ent->guard = XML_ENTITY_NOT_BEING_CHECKED;
- 	if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP) {
- 	    ent->content[0] = 0;
- 	}
-@@ -7337,23 +7343,28 @@ xmlParseReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
- 	 * if its replacement text matches the production labeled
- 	 * content.
- 	 */
--	if (ent->etype == XML_INTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITY) {
--	    ctxt->depth++;
--	    ret = xmlParseBalancedChunkMemoryInternal(ctxt, ent->content,
--	                                              user_data, &list);
--	    ctxt->depth--;
--
--	} else if (ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY) {
--	    ctxt->depth++;
--	    ret = xmlParseExternalEntityPrivate(ctxt->myDoc, ctxt, ctxt->sax,
--	                                   user_data, ctxt->depth, ent->URI,
--					   ent->ExternalID, &list);
--	    ctxt->depth--;
--	} else {
--	    ret = XML_ERR_ENTITY_PE_INTERNAL;
--	    xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
--			 "invalid entity type found\n", NULL);
--	}
-+    if (ent->guard == XML_ENTITY_BEING_CHECKED) {
-+        ret = XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP;
-+    } else {
-+        ent->guard = XML_ENTITY_BEING_CHECKED;
-+        if (ent->etype == XML_INTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITY) {
-+            ctxt->depth++;
-+            ret = xmlParseBalancedChunkMemoryInternal(ctxt, ent->content,
-+                                                      user_data, &list);
-+            ctxt->depth--;
-+        } else if (ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY) {
-+            ctxt->depth++;
-+            ret = xmlParseExternalEntityPrivate(ctxt->myDoc, ctxt, ctxt->sax,
-+                                           user_data, ctxt->depth, ent->URI,
-+                                           ent->ExternalID, &list);
-+            ctxt->depth--;
-+        } else {
-+            ret = XML_ERR_ENTITY_PE_INTERNAL;
-+            xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-+                         "invalid entity type found\n", NULL);
-+        }
-+        ent->guard = XML_ENTITY_NOT_BEING_CHECKED;
-+    }
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Store the number of entities needing parsing for this entity
-@@ -7456,23 +7467,29 @@ xmlParseReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
- 	    else
- 		user_data = ctxt->userData;
- 
--	    if (ent->etype == XML_INTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITY) {
--		ctxt->depth++;
--		ret = xmlParseBalancedChunkMemoryInternal(ctxt,
--				   ent->content, user_data, NULL);
--		ctxt->depth--;
--	    } else if (ent->etype ==
--		       XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY) {
--		ctxt->depth++;
--		ret = xmlParseExternalEntityPrivate(ctxt->myDoc, ctxt,
--			   ctxt->sax, user_data, ctxt->depth,
--			   ent->URI, ent->ExternalID, NULL);
--		ctxt->depth--;
--	    } else {
--		ret = XML_ERR_ENTITY_PE_INTERNAL;
--		xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
--			     "invalid entity type found\n", NULL);
--	    }
-+        if (ent->guard == XML_ENTITY_BEING_CHECKED) {
-+            ret = XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP;
-+        } else {
-+            ent->guard = XML_ENTITY_BEING_CHECKED;
-+            if (ent->etype == XML_INTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITY) {
-+                ctxt->depth++;
-+                ret = xmlParseBalancedChunkMemoryInternal(ctxt,
-+                                   ent->content, user_data, NULL);
-+                ctxt->depth--;
-+            } else if (ent->etype ==
-+                       XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY) {
-+                ctxt->depth++;
-+                ret = xmlParseExternalEntityPrivate(ctxt->myDoc, ctxt,
-+                           ctxt->sax, user_data, ctxt->depth,
-+                           ent->URI, ent->ExternalID, NULL);
-+                ctxt->depth--;
-+            } else {
-+                ret = XML_ERR_ENTITY_PE_INTERNAL;
-+                xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-+                             "invalid entity type found\n", NULL);
-+            }
-+            ent->guard = XML_ENTITY_NOT_BEING_CHECKED;
-+        }
- 	    if (ret == XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP) {
- 		xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP, NULL);
- 		return;

SOURCES/libxml2-CVE-2018-14404.patch

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-From a436374994c47b12d5de1b8b1d191a098fa23594 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 12:54:38 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix nullptr deref with XPath logic ops
-
-If the XPath stack is corrupted, for example by a misbehaving extension
-function, the "and" and "or" XPath operators could dereference NULL
-pointers. Check that the XPath stack isn't empty and optimize the
-logic operators slightly.
-
-Closes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/issues/5
-
-Also see
-https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=901817
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1595985
-
-This is CVE-2018-14404.
-
-Thanks to Guy Inbar for the report.
----
- xpath.c | 10 ++++------
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xpath.c b/xpath.c
-index 3fae0bf4..5e3bb9ff 100644
---- a/xpath.c
-+++ b/xpath.c
-@@ -13234,9 +13234,8 @@ xmlXPathCompOpEval(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlXPathStepOpPtr op)
- 		return(0);
- 	    }
-             xmlXPathBooleanFunction(ctxt, 1);
--            arg1 = valuePop(ctxt);
--            arg1->boolval &= arg2->boolval;
--            valuePush(ctxt, arg1);
-+            if (ctxt->value != NULL)
-+                ctxt->value->boolval &= arg2->boolval;
- 	    xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, arg2);
-             return (total);
-         case XPATH_OP_OR:
-@@ -13252,9 +13251,8 @@ xmlXPathCompOpEval(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlXPathStepOpPtr op)
- 		return(0);
- 	    }
-             xmlXPathBooleanFunction(ctxt, 1);
--            arg1 = valuePop(ctxt);
--            arg1->boolval |= arg2->boolval;
--            valuePush(ctxt, arg1);
-+            if (ctxt->value != NULL)
-+                ctxt->value->boolval |= arg2->boolval;
- 	    xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, arg2);
-             return (total);
-         case XPATH_OP_EQUAL:
--- 
-2.22.0
-

SOURCES/libxml2-CVE-2018-9251.patch

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-From 2240fbf5912054af025fb6e01e26375100275e74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 13:14:11 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix infinite loop in LZMA decompression
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Check the liblzma error code more thoroughly to avoid infinite loops.
-
-Closes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/issues/13
-Closes: https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=794914
-
-This is CVE-2018-9251 and CVE-2018-14567.
-
-Thanks to Dongliang Mu and Simon Wörner for the reports.
----
- xzlib.c | 9 +++++++++
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xzlib.c b/xzlib.c
-index a839169e..0ba88cfa 100644
---- a/xzlib.c
-+++ b/xzlib.c
-@@ -562,6 +562,10 @@ xz_decomp(xz_statep state)
-                          "internal error: inflate stream corrupt");
-                 return -1;
-             }
-+            /*
-+             * FIXME: Remapping a couple of error codes and falling through
-+             * to the LZMA error handling looks fragile.
-+             */
-             if (ret == Z_MEM_ERROR)
-                 ret = LZMA_MEM_ERROR;
-             if (ret == Z_DATA_ERROR)
-@@ -587,6 +591,11 @@ xz_decomp(xz_statep state)
-             xz_error(state, LZMA_PROG_ERROR, "compression error");
-             return -1;
-         }
-+        if ((state->how != GZIP) &&
-+            (ret != LZMA_OK) && (ret != LZMA_STREAM_END)) {
-+            xz_error(state, ret, "lzma error");
-+            return -1;
-+        }
-     } while (strm->avail_out && ret != LZMA_STREAM_END);
- 
-     /* update available output and crc check value */
--- 
-2.22.0
-

SOURCES/libxml2-CVE-2019-19956.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 5a02583c7e683896d84878bd90641d8d9b0d0549 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
-Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2019 17:39:17 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix memory leak in xmlParseBalancedChunkMemoryRecover
-
-When doc is NULL, namespace created in xmlTreeEnsureXMLDecl
-is bind to newDoc->oldNs, in this case, set newDoc->oldNs to
-NULL and free newDoc will cause a memory leak.
-
-Found with libFuzzer.
-
-Closes #82.
----
- parser.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
-index 1ce1ccf1..26d9f4e3 100644
---- a/parser.c
-+++ b/parser.c
-@@ -13894,7 +13894,8 @@ xmlParseBalancedChunkMemoryRecover(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax,
-     xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
-     newDoc->intSubset = NULL;
-     newDoc->extSubset = NULL;
--    newDoc->oldNs = NULL;
-+    if(doc != NULL)
-+	newDoc->oldNs = NULL;
-     xmlFreeDoc(newDoc);
- 
-     return(ret);
--- 
-2.24.1
-

SOURCES/libxml2-multilib.patch

@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
   exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
   includedir=@includedir@
 ! libdir=@libdir@
+  cflags=
+  libs=
   
-  usage()
-  {
 --- 3,14 ----
   prefix=@prefix@
   exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
@@ -19,6 +19,6 @@
 ! else
 !     libdir=${exec_prefix}/lib64
 ! fi
+  cflags=
+  libs=
   
-  usage()
-  {

SPECS/libxml2.spec

@@ -1,72 +1,29 @@
-%if 0%{?rhel} > 7
-# Disable python2 build by default
-%bcond_with python2
-%else
-%bcond_without python2
-%endif
-
 Name:           libxml2
-Version:        2.9.7
-Release:        18%{?dist}.1
+Version:        2.9.13
+Release:        4%{?dist}
 Summary:        Library providing XML and HTML support
 
 License:        MIT
 URL:            http://xmlsoft.org/
-Source:         ftp://xmlsoft.org/libxml2/libxml2-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source0:        https://download.gnome.org/sources/%{name}/2.9/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz
 Patch0:         libxml2-multilib.patch
-# workaround for #877567 - Very weird bug gzip decompression bug in "recent" libxml2 versions
-Patch1:         libxml2-2.9.0-do-not-check-crc.patch
-# In python3.6 _PyVerify_fd is no more
-#  http://bugs.python.org/issue23524
-Patch2:         libxml2-2.9.4-remove-pyverify_fd.patch
-# https://codereview.chromium.org/2539003002
-Patch3:         libxml2-CVE-2016-9597.patch
-# Fix some crashes under Python 3
-# https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=789714
-Patch4:         libxml2-python3-unicode-errors.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1565322
-Patch5:         libxml2-CVE-2018-9251.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1595989
-Patch6:         libxml2-CVE-2018-14404.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1793001
-Patch7:         libxml2-CVE-2019-19956.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1799786
-Patch8:         libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2020-7595.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1810058
-Patch9:         libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2019-20388.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1878252
-Patch10:        libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2020-24977.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1956976
-Patch11:        libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2021-3516.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1957001
-Patch12:        libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2021-3517.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1957028
-Patch13:        libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2021-3518.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1957284
-Patch14:        libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2021-3537.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1958783
-Patch15:        libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2021-3541.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2057664
-Patch16:        libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2022-23308.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2082298
-Patch17:        libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2022-29824.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120781
-Patch18:        libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2016-3709.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136563
-Patch19:        libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2022-40303.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136568
-Patch20:        libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2022-40304.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2186692
-Patch21:         libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2023-28484.patch
-Patch22:         libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2023-28484.2.patch
-Patch23:         libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2023-29469.patch
-# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-5179
-Patch24:         libxml2-2.11.0-fix-CVE-2023-39615.patch
-# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-31056
-Patch25:         libxml2-2.9.7-CVE-2024-25062.patch
+# Patch from openSUSE.
+# See:  https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=789714
+Patch1:         libxml2-2.9.8-python3-unicode-errors.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2082300
+Patch2:         libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2022-29824.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136564
+Patch3:         libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2022-40303.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136569
+Patch4:         libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2022-40304.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2186694
+Patch5:         libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2023-28484.patch
+Patch6:         libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2023-28484.2.patch
+Patch7:         libxml2-2.9.13-CVE-2023-29469.patch
 
-BuildRequires:  gcc
 BuildRequires:  cmake-rpm-macros
+BuildRequires:  gcc
+BuildRequires:  make
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(zlib)
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(liblzma)
 
@@ -106,26 +63,6 @@ Summary:        Static library for libxml2
 Static library for libxml2 provided for specific uses or shaving a few
 microseconds when parsing, do not link to them for generic purpose packages.
 
-%if %{with python2}
-%package -n python2-%{name}
-%{?python_provide:%python_provide python2-%{name}}
-Summary:        Python bindings for the libxml2 library
-BuildRequires:  python2-devel
-Requires:       %{name}%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
-Obsoletes:      %{name}-python < %{version}-%{release}
-Provides:       %{name}-python = %{version}-%{release}
-
-%description -n python2-%{name}
-The libxml2-python package contains a Python 2 module that permits applications
-written in the Python programming language, version 2, to use the interface
-supplied by the libxml2 library to manipulate XML files.
-
-This library allows to manipulate XML files. It includes support
-to read, modify and write XML and HTML files. There is DTDs support
-this includes parsing and validation even with complex DTDs, either
-at parse time or later once the document has been modified.
-%endif # with python2
-
 %package -n python3-%{name}
 Summary:        Python 3 bindings for the libxml2 library
 BuildRequires:  python3-devel
@@ -147,27 +84,15 @@ at parse time or later once the document has been modified.
 %autosetup -p1
 find doc -type f -executable -print -exec chmod 0644 {} ';'
 
+# Remove files generated by python/generator.py to force regenerating them
+rm python/{libxml2-py.c,libxml2-py.h,libxml2-export.c}
+
 %build
-%if %{with python2}
-mkdir py2
-%endif # with python2
-mkdir py3
-%global _configure ../configure
-%global _configure_disable_silent_rules 1
-%if %{with python2}
-( cd py2 && %configure --cache-file=../config.cache --with-python=%{__python2} )
-%endif # with python2
-( cd py3 && %configure --cache-file=../config.cache --with-python=%{__python3} )
-%if %{with python2}
-%make_build -C py2
-%endif # with python2
-%make_build -C py3
+%configure --with-python=%{__python3}
+%make_build
 
 %install
-%if %{with python2}
-%make_install -C py2
-%endif # with python2
-%make_install -C py3
+%make_install
 
 # multiarch crazyness on timestamp differences or Makefile/binaries for examples
 touch -m --reference=%{buildroot}%{_includedir}/libxml2/libxml/parser.h %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/xml2-config
@@ -175,20 +100,17 @@ touch -m --reference=%{buildroot}%{_includedir}/libxml2/libxml/parser.h %{buildr
 find %{buildroot} -type f -name '*.la' -print -delete
 rm -vf %{buildroot}{%{python2_sitearch},%{python3_sitearch}}/*.a
 rm -vrf %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/doc/
-#(cd doc/examples ; make clean ; rm -rf .deps Makefile)
+(cd doc/examples ; make clean ; rm -rf .deps Makefile)
 gzip -9 -c doc/libxml2-api.xml > doc/libxml2-api.xml.gz
 
 %check
-%if %{with python2}
-%make_build runtests -C py2
-%endif # with python2
-%make_build runtests -C py3
+%make_build runtests
 
 %ldconfig_scriptlets
 
 %files
 %license Copyright
-%doc AUTHORS NEWS README TODO
+%doc NEWS README.md TODO
 %{_libdir}/libxml2.so.2*
 %{_mandir}/man3/libxml.3*
 %{_bindir}/xmllint
@@ -216,15 +138,6 @@ gzip -9 -c doc/libxml2-api.xml > doc/libxml2-api.xml.gz
 %license Copyright
 %{_libdir}/libxml2.a
 
-%if %{with python2}
-%files -n python2-%{name}
-%doc python/TODO python/libxml2class.txt
-%doc doc/*.py doc/python.html
-%{python2_sitearch}/libxml2.py*
-%{python2_sitearch}/drv_libxml2.py*
-%{python2_sitearch}/libxml2mod.so
-%endif # with python2
-
 %files -n python3-%{name}
 %doc python/TODO python/libxml2class.txt
 %doc doc/*.py doc/python.html
@@ -235,58 +148,111 @@ gzip -9 -c doc/libxml2-api.xml > doc/libxml2-api.xml.gz
 %{python3_sitearch}/libxml2mod.so
 
 %changelog
-* Mon Apr 29 2024 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 2.9.7-18.1
-- Fix CVE-2024-25062 (RHEL-31056)
+* Fri Apr 14 2023 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 2.9.13-4
+- Fix CVE-2023-28484 (#2186694)
+- Fix CVE-2023-29469 (#2186694)
 
-* Thu Sep 14 2023 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 2.9.7-18
-- Fix CVE-2023-39615 (RHEL-5179)
+* Tue Nov 01 2022 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 2.9.13-3
+- Fix CVE-2022-40303 (#2136564)
+- Fix CVE-2022-40304 (#2136569)
 
-* Fri Jul 14 2023 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 2.9.7-17
-- Fix CVE-2023-28484 (#2186692)
-- Fix CVE-2023-29469 (#2186692)
+* Tue May 10 2022 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 2.9.13-2
+- Fix CVE-2022-29824 (#2082300)
 
-* Wed Nov 02 2022 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-16
-- Fix CVE-2022-40303 (#2136563)
-- Fix CVE-2022-40304 (#2136568)
+* Thu Feb 24 2022 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 2.9.13-1
+- Update to 2.9.13 (#2057665)
 
-* Wed Aug 24 2022 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-15
-- Fix CVE-2016-3709 (#2120781)
+* Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 2.9.12-4
+- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
+  Related: rhbz#1991688
 
-* Thu May 12 2022 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-14
-- Fix CVE-2022-29824 (#2082298)
+* Wed Jun 09 2021 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.12-3
+- Fix xmlNodeDumpOutputInternal regression (#1969892)
 
-* Thu Feb 24 2022 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-13
-- Bump release (#2057664)
+* Tue May 25 2021 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.12-2
+- Fix multiarch conflict in devel subpackage (#1964346)
 
-* Thu Feb 24 2022 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-12
-- Fix CVE-2022-23308 (#2057664)
+* Fri May 14 2021 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.12-1
+- Rebase to 2.9.12 (#1960623)
 
-* Wed May 19 2021 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-11
-- Fix CVE-2021-3541 (#1958783)
+* Thu May 13 2021 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.10-12
+- Fix CVE-2021-3516 (#1956969)
+- Fix CVE-2021-3517 (#1957002)
+- Fix CVE-2021-3518 (#1957029)
+- Fix CVE-2021-3537 (#1957285)
 
-* Fri May 07 2021 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-10
-- Fix CVE-2021-3516 (#1956976)
-- Fix CVE-2021-3517 (#1957001)
-- Fix CVE-2021-3518 (#1957028)
-- Fix CVE-2021-3537 (#1957284)
+* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 2.9.10-11
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
 
-* Mon Oct 19 2020 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-9
-- Fix CVE-2020-24977 (#1878252)
+* Tue Jan 26 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.9.10-10
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
 
-* Mon Jan 20 2020 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-8
-- Fix CVE-2019-19956 (#1793001)
+* Thu Nov 12 11:57:41 CET 2020 Victor Stinner <vstinner@python.org> - 2.9.10-9
+- Build the Python extension with the PY_SSIZE_T_CLEAN macro to make it
+  compatible with Python 3.10.
+- Fixes: rhbz#1890878.
+
+* Wed Nov 11 2020 Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> - 2.9.10-8
+- Add correct fix for CVE-2020-24977 (RHBZ#1877788), thanks: Jan de Groot.
+
+* Fri Sep 11 2020 Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> - 2.9.10-7
+- Add fix for CVE-2020-24977 (RHBZ#1877788).
+
+* Tue Jul 28 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.9.10-6
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat May 23 2020 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 2.9.10-5
+- Rebuilt for Python 3.9
+
+* Mon Feb 10 2020 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 2.9.10-4
+- Fix CVE-2019-20388 (#1799736)
 - Fix CVE-2020-7595 (#1799786)
-- Fix CVE-2019-20388 (#1810058)
 
-* Thu Oct 24 2019 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-7
-- Fix CVE-2018-14404 (#1595989)
+* Wed Jan 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.9.10-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
 
-* Thu Oct 24 2019 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-6
-- Fix CVE-2018-9251 (#1565322)
+* Fri Jan 03 2020 Jan Pokorny <jpokorny@fedoraproject.org> - 2.9.10-2
+- Fix relaxed approach to nested documents on object disposal (#1780573)
 
-* Fri Aug 03 2018 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-5
-- Fix some crashes under Python 3
-- Conditionalize the python2 subpackage
+* Fri Nov 01 2019 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 2.9.10-1
+- Update to 2.9.10 (#1767151)
+
+* Thu Oct 31 2019 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 2.9.9-7
+- Subpackage python2-libxml2 has been removed
+  See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Mass_Python_2_Package_Removal
+
+* Thu Oct 03 2019 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 2.9.9-6
+- Rebuilt for Python 3.8.0rc1 (#1748018)
+
+* Fri Aug 23 2019 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> - 2.9.9-5
+- Rebuild to fix corrupted libxml2-static package on aarch64 (#1745020)
+
+* Fri Aug 16 2019 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 2.9.9-4
+- Rebuilt for Python 3.8
+
+* Thu Jul 25 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.9.9-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Feb 01 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.9.9-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jan 25 2019 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 2.9.9-1
+- Update to 2.9.9
+
+* Sun Jan 06 2019 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2.9.8-5
+- Add patch to fix crash: xmlParserPrintFileContextInternal mangles utf8
+
+* Thu Aug 02 2018 Igor Gnatenko <ignatenkobrain@fedoraproject.org> - 2.9.8-4
+- Backport patches from upstream
+
+* Fri Jul 13 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.9.8-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jun 19 2018 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 2.9.8-2
+- Rebuilt for Python 3.7
+
+* Tue Apr 03 2018 Igor Gnatenko <ignatenkobrain@fedoraproject.org> - 2.9.8-1
+- Update to 2.9.8
 
 * Sat Feb 24 2018 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> - 2.9.7-4
 - Rebuild with new LDFLAGS from redhat-rpm-config