Updated to latest RC release: libtirpc-0-2-2-rc1

This commit is contained in:
Steve Dickson 2010-03-22 15:07:48 +00:00
parent a1c517f42b
commit d0331caa9f
2 changed files with 322 additions and 1 deletions

314
libtirpc-0-2-2-rc1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
commit 599511589ca7ddb3b2eac8d3aa5b0b38be7a7691
Author: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Mar 5 14:27:13 2010 -0500
libtirpc: allow larger ticket sizes with RPCSEC_GSS
libtirpc currently limits RPCSEC_GSS args to MAX_NETOBJ_SZ (1024) bytes.
This causes problems when you try to use large krb5 tickets, such as
those handed out by MS' Active Directory when the user has a large PAC.
This patch backports a set of changes from librpcsecgss which fixed this
problem there. It declares a new routine specifically for encoding
gss_buffer_t's and has the various auth_gss routines use that instead of
calling xdr_bytes directly.
An RPC_SLACK_SPACE constant is defined and added to the buffer length to
get a max buffer length to pass to xdr_rpc_gss_buf for the appropriate
callers.
This seems to fix the bug reported here:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=562807
Reported-by: Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
diff --git a/src/authgss_prot.c b/src/authgss_prot.c
index ab72d91..9d7fa09 100644
--- a/src/authgss_prot.c
+++ b/src/authgss_prot.c
@@ -44,6 +44,34 @@
#include <rpc/rpc.h>
#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+/* additional space needed for encoding */
+#define RPC_SLACK_SPACE 1024
+
+bool_t
+xdr_rpc_gss_buf(XDR *xdrs, gss_buffer_t buf, u_int maxsize)
+{
+ bool_t xdr_stat;
+ u_int tmplen;
+
+ if (xdrs->x_op != XDR_DECODE) {
+ if (buf->length > UINT_MAX)
+ return FALSE;
+ else
+ tmplen = buf->length;
+ }
+ xdr_stat = xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&buf->value, &tmplen, maxsize);
+
+ if (xdr_stat && xdrs->x_op == XDR_DECODE)
+ buf->length = tmplen;
+
+ log_debug("xdr_rpc_gss_buf: %s %s (%p:%d)",
+ (xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE) ? "encode" : "decode",
+ (xdr_stat == TRUE) ? "success" : "failure",
+ buf->value, buf->length);
+
+ return xdr_stat;
+}
+
bool_t
xdr_rpc_gss_cred(XDR *xdrs, struct rpc_gss_cred *p)
{
@@ -53,8 +81,7 @@ xdr_rpc_gss_cred(XDR *xdrs, struct rpc_gss_cred *p)
xdr_enum(xdrs, (enum_t *)&p->gc_proc) &&
xdr_u_int(xdrs, &p->gc_seq) &&
xdr_enum(xdrs, (enum_t *)&p->gc_svc) &&
- xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&p->gc_ctx.value,
- (u_int *)&p->gc_ctx.length, MAX_AUTH_BYTES));
+ xdr_rpc_gss_buf(xdrs, &p->gc_ctx, MAX_AUTH_BYTES));
log_debug("xdr_rpc_gss_cred: %s %s "
"(v %d, proc %d, seq %d, svc %d, ctx %p:%d)",
@@ -70,9 +97,9 @@ bool_t
xdr_rpc_gss_init_args(XDR *xdrs, gss_buffer_desc *p)
{
bool_t xdr_stat;
+ u_int maxlen = (u_int)(p->length + RPC_SLACK_SPACE);
- xdr_stat = xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&p->value,
- (u_int *)&p->length, MAX_NETOBJ_SZ);
+ xdr_stat = xdr_rpc_gss_buf(xdrs, p, maxlen);
log_debug("xdr_rpc_gss_init_args: %s %s (token %p:%d)",
(xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE) ? "encode" : "decode",
@@ -87,13 +114,14 @@ xdr_rpc_gss_init_res(XDR *xdrs, struct rpc_gss_init_res *p)
{
bool_t xdr_stat;
- xdr_stat = (xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&p->gr_ctx.value,
- (u_int *)&p->gr_ctx.length, MAX_NETOBJ_SZ) &&
+ u_int ctx_maxlen = (u_int)(p->gr_ctx.length + RPC_SLACK_SPACE);
+ u_int tok_maxlen = (u_int)(p->gr_token.length + RPC_SLACK_SPACE);
+
+ xdr_stat = (xdr_rpc_gss_buf(xdrs, &p->gr_ctx, ctx_maxlen) &&
xdr_u_int(xdrs, &p->gr_major) &&
xdr_u_int(xdrs, &p->gr_minor) &&
xdr_u_int(xdrs, &p->gr_win) &&
- xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&p->gr_token.value,
- (u_int *)&p->gr_token.length, MAX_NETOBJ_SZ));
+ xdr_rpc_gss_buf(xdrs, &p->gr_token, tok_maxlen));
log_debug("xdr_rpc_gss_init_res %s %s "
"(ctx %p:%d, maj %d, min %d, win %d, token %p:%d)",
@@ -115,28 +143,33 @@ xdr_rpc_gss_wrap_data(XDR *xdrs, xdrproc_t xdr_func, caddr_t xdr_ptr,
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
int start, end, conf_state;
bool_t xdr_stat;
+ u_int databuflen, maxwrapsz;
/* Skip databody length. */
start = XDR_GETPOS(xdrs);
XDR_SETPOS(xdrs, start + 4);
+ memset(&databuf, 0, sizeof(databuf));
+ memset(&wrapbuf, 0, sizeof(wrapbuf));
+
/* Marshal rpc_gss_data_t (sequence number + arguments). */
if (!xdr_u_int(xdrs, &seq) || !(*xdr_func)(xdrs, xdr_ptr))
return (FALSE);
end = XDR_GETPOS(xdrs);
/* Set databuf to marshalled rpc_gss_data_t. */
- databuf.length = end - start - 4;
+ databuflen = end - start - 4;
XDR_SETPOS(xdrs, start + 4);
- databuf.value = XDR_INLINE(xdrs, databuf.length);
+ databuf.value = XDR_INLINE(xdrs, databuflen);
xdr_stat = FALSE;
if (svc == RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY) {
/* Marshal databody_integ length. */
XDR_SETPOS(xdrs, start);
- if (!xdr_u_int(xdrs, (u_int *)&databuf.length))
+ if (!xdr_u_int(xdrs, (u_int *)&databuflen))
return (FALSE);
+ databuf.length = databuflen;
/* Checksum rpc_gss_data_t. */
maj_stat = gss_get_mic(&min_stat, ctx, qop,
@@ -147,8 +180,8 @@ xdr_rpc_gss_wrap_data(XDR *xdrs, xdrproc_t xdr_func, caddr_t xdr_ptr,
}
/* Marshal checksum. */
XDR_SETPOS(xdrs, end);
- xdr_stat = xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&wrapbuf.value,
- (u_int *)&wrapbuf.length, MAX_NETOBJ_SZ);
+ maxwrapsz = (u_int)(wrapbuf.length + RPC_SLACK_SPACE);
+ xdr_stat = xdr_rpc_gss_buf(xdrs, &wrapbuf, maxwrapsz);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &wrapbuf);
}
else if (svc == RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY) {
@@ -161,8 +194,8 @@ xdr_rpc_gss_wrap_data(XDR *xdrs, xdrproc_t xdr_func, caddr_t xdr_ptr,
}
/* Marshal databody_priv. */
XDR_SETPOS(xdrs, start);
- xdr_stat = xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&wrapbuf.value,
- (u_int *)&wrapbuf.length, MAX_NETOBJ_SZ);
+ maxwrapsz = (u_int)(wrapbuf.length + RPC_SLACK_SPACE);
+ xdr_stat = xdr_rpc_gss_buf(xdrs, &wrapbuf, maxwrapsz);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &wrapbuf);
}
return (xdr_stat);
@@ -188,14 +221,12 @@ xdr_rpc_gss_unwrap_data(XDR *xdrs, xdrproc_t xdr_func, caddr_t xdr_ptr,
if (svc == RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY) {
/* Decode databody_integ. */
- if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&databuf.value, (u_int *)&databuf.length,
- MAX_NETOBJ_SZ)) {
+ if (!xdr_rpc_gss_buf(xdrs, &databuf, (u_int)-1)) {
log_debug("xdr decode databody_integ failed");
return (FALSE);
}
/* Decode checksum. */
- if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&wrapbuf.value, (u_int *)&wrapbuf.length,
- MAX_NETOBJ_SZ)) {
+ if (!xdr_rpc_gss_buf(xdrs, &wrapbuf, (u_int)-1)) {
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &databuf);
log_debug("xdr decode checksum failed");
return (FALSE);
@@ -213,8 +244,7 @@ xdr_rpc_gss_unwrap_data(XDR *xdrs, xdrproc_t xdr_func, caddr_t xdr_ptr,
}
else if (svc == RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY) {
/* Decode databody_priv. */
- if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&wrapbuf.value, (u_int *)&wrapbuf.length,
- MAX_NETOBJ_SZ)) {
+ if (!xdr_rpc_gss_buf(xdrs, &wrapbuf, (u_int)-1)) {
log_debug("xdr decode databody_priv failed");
return (FALSE);
}
commit 89323aafc77e1a40800332fb135888782b1bfee6
Author: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Mar 5 12:55:31 2010 -0500
libtirpc: don't call abort() in the AUTH_UNIX creation codepaths
When there are problems creating an AUTH_UNIX auth handle, libtirpc will
sometimes call abort(). It's bad for a library to do this since
decisions about how to handle errors are better left up to the
application and abort() generally causes the app to crash and dump core.
Make it so that these functions return NULL instead in these situations.
authunix_create already returns NULL for other error conditions so it
seems like an appropriate way to handle errors in these codepaths.
Have authunix_create and authunix_create_default set appropriate errors
in the rpc_createerr struct. It seems a little odd to do this since
rpc_createerr is supposed to report information about why CLIENT
creation failed, and the problem here is in creating an AUTH handle.
authgss_create does this already however, so there is some precedent.
While we're at it, it's also bad for libraries to log to stderr. It's
possible that a daemon is calling here and it has closed stderr and is
resuing fd 2 for something else. Rip out the warnx calls from these two
functions to make sure that they don't cause problems.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
diff --git a/src/auth_unix.c b/src/auth_unix.c
index 71ca15d..ddd89cc 100644
--- a/src/auth_unix.c
+++ b/src/auth_unix.c
@@ -49,7 +49,9 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <rpc/clnt.h>
#include <rpc/types.h>
#include <rpc/xdr.h>
#include <rpc/auth.h>
@@ -95,6 +97,8 @@ authunix_create(machname, uid, gid, len, aup_gids)
AUTH *auth;
struct audata *au;
+ memset(&rpc_createerr, 0, sizeof(rpc_createerr));
+
/*
* Allocate and set up auth handle
*/
@@ -102,14 +106,16 @@ authunix_create(machname, uid, gid, len, aup_gids)
auth = mem_alloc(sizeof(*auth));
#ifndef _KERNEL
if (auth == NULL) {
- warnx("authunix_create: out of memory");
+ rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR;
+ rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup_authunix_create;
}
#endif
au = mem_alloc(sizeof(*au));
#ifndef _KERNEL
if (au == NULL) {
- warnx("authunix_create: out of memory");
+ rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR;
+ rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup_authunix_create;
}
#endif
@@ -134,15 +140,18 @@ authunix_create(machname, uid, gid, len, aup_gids)
* Serialize the parameters into origcred
*/
xdrmem_create(&xdrs, mymem, MAX_AUTH_BYTES, XDR_ENCODE);
- if (! xdr_authunix_parms(&xdrs, &aup))
- abort();
+ if (!xdr_authunix_parms(&xdrs, &aup)) {
+ rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_CANTENCODEARGS;
+ goto cleanup_authunix_create;
+ }
au->au_origcred.oa_length = len = XDR_GETPOS(&xdrs);
au->au_origcred.oa_flavor = AUTH_UNIX;
#ifdef _KERNEL
au->au_origcred.oa_base = mem_alloc((u_int) len);
#else
if ((au->au_origcred.oa_base = mem_alloc((u_int) len)) == NULL) {
- warnx("authunix_create: out of memory");
+ rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR;
+ rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup_authunix_create;
}
#endif
@@ -180,13 +189,22 @@ authunix_create_default()
gid_t gid;
gid_t gids[NGRPS];
- if (gethostname(machname, sizeof machname) == -1)
- abort();
+ memset(&rpc_createerr, 0, sizeof(rpc_createerr));
+
+ if (gethostname(machname, sizeof machname) == -1) {
+ rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR;
+ rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = errno;
+ return NULL;
+ }
machname[sizeof(machname) - 1] = 0;
uid = geteuid();
gid = getegid();
- if ((len = getgroups(NGRPS, gids)) < 0)
- abort();
+ len = getgroups(NGRPS, gids);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR;
+ rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = errno;
+ return NULL;
+ }
/* XXX: interface problem; those should all have been unsigned */
return (authunix_create(machname, uid, gid, len, gids));
}

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@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
Name: libtirpc
Version: 0.2.1
Release: 1%{?dist}
Release: 2%{?dist}
Summary: Transport Independent RPC Library
Group: System Environment/Libraries
License: SISSL and BSD
URL: http://nfsv4.bullopensource.org/
Patch001: libtirpc-0-2-2-rc1.patch
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n)
Source0: http://downloads.sourceforge.net/libtirpc/libtirpc-%{version}.tar.bz2
@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ developing programs which use the tirpc library.
%prep
%setup -q
%patch001 -p1
# Remove .orig files
find . -name "*.orig" | xargs rm -f
@ -121,6 +125,9 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}
%{_mandir}/*/*
%changelog
* Mon Mar 22 2010 Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> 0.2.1-2
- Updated to latest RC release: libtirpc-0-2-2-rc1
* Mon Nov 30 2009 Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> 0.2.1-1
- Updated to latest upstream version: 0.2.1