rpms/libsrtp
7
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity
8f9230903c
libsrtp/0001-Changes-for-OpenSSL-1.1.0-compatibility.patch

503 lines
16 KiB
Diff
Raw Blame History

From b1858f6b5fa33b9ef9eeea1f6152185d54bba323 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wim Taymans <wtaymans@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 13:19:44 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Changes for OpenSSL 1.1.0 compatibility
---
crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c | 36 +++++----
crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c | 18 +++--
crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c | 135 ++++++++++++----------------------
crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h | 2 +-
crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h | 2 +-
crypto/include/sha1.h | 14 ++--
6 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c b/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c
index dce2a33..943dbd5 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c
@@ -116,6 +116,13 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int key_len, int tlen)
(*c)->state = allptr + sizeof(cipher_t);
gcm = (aes_gcm_ctx_t *)(*c)->state;
+ gcm->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (gcm->ctx == NULL) {
+ crypto_free(*c);
+ *c = NULL;
+ return (err_status_alloc_fail);
+ }
+
/* increment ref_count */
switch (key_len) {
case AES_128_GCM_KEYSIZE_WSALT:
@@ -136,7 +143,6 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int key_len, int tlen)
/* set key size */
(*c)->key_len = key_len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&gcm->ctx);
return (err_status_ok);
}
@@ -151,7 +157,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c)
ctx = (aes_gcm_ctx_t*)c->state;
if (ctx) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
/* decrement ref_count for the appropriate engine */
switch (ctx->key_size) {
case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
@@ -197,7 +203,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_context_init (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, const uint8_t *key)
debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "key: %s", v128_hex_string((v128_t*)&c->key));
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(c->ctx);
return (err_status_ok);
}
@@ -231,19 +237,19 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_iv (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, void *iv,
break;
}
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, NULL, (const unsigned char*)&c->key.v8,
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(c->ctx, evp, NULL, (const unsigned char*)&c->key.v8,
NULL, (c->dir == direction_encrypt ? 1 : 0))) {
return (err_status_init_fail);
}
/* set IV len and the IV value, the followiong 3 calls are required */
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, 12, 0)) {
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, 12, 0)) {
return (err_status_init_fail);
}
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, iv)) {
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, iv)) {
return (err_status_init_fail);
}
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, 0, iv)) {
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, 0, iv)) {
return (err_status_init_fail);
}
@@ -267,9 +273,9 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_aad (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, unsigned char *aad,
* Set dummy tag, OpenSSL requires the Tag to be set before
* processing AAD
*/
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len, aad);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len, aad);
- rv = EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, aad, aad_len);
+ rv = EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, aad, aad_len);
if (rv != aad_len) {
return (err_status_algo_fail);
} else {
@@ -295,7 +301,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_encrypt (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, unsigned char *buf,
/*
* Encrypt the data
*/
- EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len);
+ EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len);
return (err_status_ok);
}
@@ -317,12 +323,12 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_get_tag (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, unsigned char *buf,
/*
* Calculate the tag
*/
- EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0);
/*
* Retreive the tag
*/
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, c->tag_len, buf);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, c->tag_len, buf);
/*
* Increase encryption length by desired tag size
@@ -351,14 +357,14 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_decrypt (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, unsigned char *buf,
/*
* Set the tag before decrypting
*/
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len,
buf + (*enc_len - c->tag_len));
- EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len - c->tag_len);
+ EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len - c->tag_len);
/*
* Check the tag
*/
- if (EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
+ if (EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
return (err_status_auth_fail);
}
diff --git a/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c b/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c
index eb58539..1ddd39e 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c
@@ -143,6 +143,13 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int key_len, int tlen)
(*c)->state = allptr + sizeof(cipher_t);
icm = (aes_icm_ctx_t*)(*c)->state;
+ icm->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (icm->ctx == NULL) {
+ crypto_free(*c);
+ *c = NULL;
+ return err_status_alloc_fail;
+ }
+
/* increment ref_count */
switch (key_len) {
case AES_128_KEYSIZE_WSALT:
@@ -169,7 +176,6 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int key_len, int tlen)
/* set key size */
(*c)->key_len = key_len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&icm->ctx);
return err_status_ok;
}
@@ -191,7 +197,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c)
*/
ctx = (aes_icm_ctx_t*)c->state;
if (ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
/* decrement ref_count for the appropriate engine */
switch (ctx->key_size) {
case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
@@ -271,7 +277,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx_t *c, const uint8_t *key,
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "key: %s", v128_hex_string((v128_t*)&c->key));
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "offset: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->offset));
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(c->ctx);
return err_status_ok;
}
@@ -312,7 +318,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv (aes_icm_ctx_t *c, void *iv, int dir)
break;
}
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp,
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(c->ctx, evp,
NULL, c->key.v8, c->counter.v8)) {
return err_status_fail;
} else {
@@ -334,12 +340,12 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_encrypt (aes_icm_ctx_t *c, unsigned char *buf, unsi
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "rs0: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter));
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ctx, buf, &len, buf, *enc_len)) {
+ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(c->ctx, buf, &len, buf, *enc_len)) {
return err_status_cipher_fail;
}
*enc_len = len;
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&c->ctx, buf, &len)) {
+ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(c->ctx, buf, &len)) {
return err_status_cipher_fail;
}
*enc_len += len;
diff --git a/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c b/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c
index f62ce57..3f6f97d 100644
--- a/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c
@@ -49,8 +49,10 @@
#include "hmac.h"
#include "alloc.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#define HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX 20
+#define HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX 20
+#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20
/* the debug module for authentiation */
@@ -64,8 +66,6 @@ err_status_t
hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
{
extern auth_type_t hmac;
- uint8_t *pointer;
- hmac_ctx_t *new_hmac_ctx;
debug_print(mod_hmac, "allocating auth func with key length %d", key_len);
debug_print(mod_hmac, " tag length %d", out_len);
@@ -79,25 +79,28 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
}
/* check output length - should be less than 20 bytes */
- if (out_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
+ if (out_len > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
return err_status_bad_param;
}
/* allocate memory for auth and hmac_ctx_t structures */
- pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(hmac_ctx_t) + sizeof(auth_t));
- if (pointer == NULL) {
+ *a = crypto_alloc(sizeof(auth_t));
+ if (*a == NULL) {
+ return err_status_alloc_fail;
+ }
+
+ (*a)->state = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ if ((*a)->state == NULL) {
+ crypto_free(*a);
+ *a = NULL;
return err_status_alloc_fail;
}
/* set pointers */
- *a = (auth_t*)pointer;
(*a)->type = &hmac;
- (*a)->state = pointer + sizeof(auth_t);
(*a)->out_len = out_len;
(*a)->key_len = key_len;
(*a)->prefix_len = 0;
- new_hmac_ctx = (hmac_ctx_t*)((*a)->state);
- memset(new_hmac_ctx, 0, sizeof(hmac_ctx_t));
/* increment global count of all hmac uses */
hmac.ref_count++;
@@ -109,19 +112,14 @@ err_status_t
hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a)
{
extern auth_type_t hmac;
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx;
- hmac_ctx = (hmac_ctx_t*)a->state;
- if (hmac_ctx->ctx_initialized) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx->ctx);
- }
- if (hmac_ctx->init_ctx_initialized) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx->init_ctx);
- }
+ hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)a->state;
+
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
/* zeroize entire state*/
- octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a,
- sizeof(hmac_ctx_t) + sizeof(auth_t));
+ octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a, sizeof(auth_t));
/* free memory */
crypto_free(a);
@@ -133,109 +131,68 @@ hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a)
}
err_status_t
-hmac_init (hmac_ctx_t *state, const uint8_t *key, int key_len)
+hmac_start (hmac_ctx_t *statev)
{
- int i;
- uint8_t ipad[64];
-
- /*
- * check key length - note that we don't support keys larger
- * than 20 bytes yet
- */
- if (key_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
- return err_status_bad_param;
- }
-
- /*
- * set values of ipad and opad by exoring the key into the
- * appropriate constant values
- */
- for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++) {
- ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
- state->opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
- }
- /* set the rest of ipad, opad to constant values */
- for (; i < sizeof(ipad); i++) {
- ipad[i] = 0x36;
- ((uint8_t*)state->opad)[i] = 0x5c;
- }
-
- debug_print(mod_hmac, "ipad: %s", octet_string_hex_string(ipad, sizeof(ipad)));
+ HMAC_CTX *state = (HMAC_CTX *)statev;
- /* initialize sha1 context */
- sha1_init(&state->init_ctx);
- state->init_ctx_initialized = 1;
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(state, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) == 0)
+ return err_status_auth_fail;
- /* hash ipad ^ key */
- sha1_update(&state->init_ctx, ipad, sizeof(ipad));
- return (hmac_start(state));
+ return err_status_ok;
}
err_status_t
-hmac_start (hmac_ctx_t *state)
+hmac_init (hmac_ctx_t *statev, const uint8_t *key, int key_len)
{
- if (state->ctx_initialized) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&state->ctx);
- }
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&state->ctx, &state->init_ctx)) {
+ HMAC_CTX *state = (HMAC_CTX *)statev;
+
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(state, key, key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL) == 0)
return err_status_auth_fail;
- } else {
- state->ctx_initialized = 1;
- return err_status_ok;
- }
+
+ return err_status_ok;
}
err_status_t
-hmac_update (hmac_ctx_t *state, const uint8_t *message, int msg_octets)
+hmac_update (hmac_ctx_t *statev, const uint8_t *message, int msg_octets)
{
+ HMAC_CTX *state = (HMAC_CTX *)statev;
+
debug_print(mod_hmac, "input: %s",
octet_string_hex_string(message, msg_octets));
- /* hash message into sha1 context */
- sha1_update(&state->ctx, message, msg_octets);
+ if (HMAC_Update(state, message, msg_octets) == 0)
+ return err_status_auth_fail;
return err_status_ok;
}
err_status_t
-hmac_compute (hmac_ctx_t *state, const void *message,
+hmac_compute (hmac_ctx_t *statev, const void *message,
int msg_octets, int tag_len, uint8_t *result)
{
- uint32_t hash_value[5];
- uint32_t H[5];
+ HMAC_CTX *state = (HMAC_CTX *)statev;
+ uint8_t hash_value[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
int i;
+ unsigned int len;
/* check tag length, return error if we can't provide the value expected */
- if (tag_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
+ if (tag_len > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
return err_status_bad_param;
}
/* hash message, copy output into H */
- sha1_update(&state->ctx, message, msg_octets);
- sha1_final(&state->ctx, H);
-
- /*
- * note that we don't need to debug_print() the input, since the
- * function hmac_update() already did that for us
- */
- debug_print(mod_hmac, "intermediate state: %s",
- octet_string_hex_string((uint8_t*)H, sizeof(H)));
-
- /* re-initialize hash context */
- sha1_init(&state->ctx);
-
- /* hash opad ^ key */
- sha1_update(&state->ctx, (uint8_t*)state->opad, sizeof(state->opad));
+ if (HMAC_Update(state, message, msg_octets) == 0)
+ return err_status_auth_fail;
- /* hash the result of the inner hash */
- sha1_update(&state->ctx, (uint8_t*)H, sizeof(H));
+ if (HMAC_Final(state, hash_value, &len) == 0)
+ return err_status_auth_fail;
- /* the result is returned in the array hash_value[] */
- sha1_final(&state->ctx, hash_value);
+ if (len < tag_len)
+ return err_status_auth_fail;
/* copy hash_value to *result */
for (i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) {
- result[i] = ((uint8_t*)hash_value)[i];
+ result[i] = hash_value[i];
}
debug_print(mod_hmac, "output: %s",
diff --git a/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h b/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h
index 8e7711d..4f49b51 100644
--- a/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h
+++ b/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ typedef struct {
v256_t key;
int key_size;
int tag_len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
cipher_direction_t dir;
} aes_gcm_ctx_t;
diff --git a/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h b/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h
index b4ec40a..af23320 100644
--- a/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h
+++ b/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ typedef struct {
v128_t offset; /* initial offset value */
v256_t key;
int key_size;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
} aes_icm_ctx_t;
err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv(aes_icm_ctx_t *c, void *iv, int dir);
diff --git a/crypto/include/sha1.h b/crypto/include/sha1.h
index 2ce53e8..fb5bd95 100644
--- a/crypto/include/sha1.h
+++ b/crypto/include/sha1.h
@@ -56,8 +56,6 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdint.h>
-typedef EVP_MD_CTX sha1_ctx_t;
-
/*
* sha1_init(&ctx) initializes the SHA1 context ctx
*
@@ -72,23 +70,27 @@ typedef EVP_MD_CTX sha1_ctx_t;
*
*/
+typedef EVP_MD_CTX* sha1_ctx_t;
+
static inline void sha1_init (sha1_ctx_t *ctx)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
- EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sha1());
+ *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_DigestInit(*ctx, EVP_sha1());
}
static inline void sha1_update (sha1_ctx_t *ctx, const uint8_t *M, int octets_in_msg)
{
- EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, M, octets_in_msg);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(*ctx, M, octets_in_msg);
}
static inline void sha1_final (sha1_ctx_t *ctx, uint32_t *output)
{
unsigned int len = 0;
- EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (unsigned char*)output, &len);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(*ctx, (unsigned char*)output, &len);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(*ctx);
}
+
#else
#include "datatypes.h"
--
2.17.1
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink