libslirp/0001-Add-mtod_check.patch
Marc-André Lureau 091d374633 Fix CVE-2021-3592 CVE-2021-3593 CVE-2021-3594 CVE-2021-3595 out-of-bounds access
Resolves: rhbz#1970826
Resolves: rhbz#1970839
Resolves: rhbz#1970857
Resolves: rhbz#1970847
2021-06-18 17:14:15 +04:00

55 lines
1.5 KiB
Diff

From 87f5d0c70bdb46d467d32e3c3a8d7a472c97e148 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Marc-Andr=C3=A9=20Lureau?= <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 2021 15:58:25 +0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/7] Add mtod_check()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Recent security issues demonstrate the lack of safety care when casting
a mbuf to a particular structure type. At least, it should check that
the buffer is large enough. The following patches will make use of this
function.
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 93e645e72a056ec0b2c16e0299fc5c6b94e4ca17)
---
src/mbuf.c | 11 +++++++++++
src/mbuf.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/mbuf.c b/src/mbuf.c
index 54ec721..cb2e971 100644
--- a/src/mbuf.c
+++ b/src/mbuf.c
@@ -222,3 +222,14 @@ struct mbuf *dtom(Slirp *slirp, void *dat)
return (struct mbuf *)0;
}
+
+void *mtod_check(struct mbuf *m, size_t len)
+{
+ if (m->m_len >= len) {
+ return m->m_data;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG_ERROR("mtod failed");
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/mbuf.h b/src/mbuf.h
index 546e785..2015e32 100644
--- a/src/mbuf.h
+++ b/src/mbuf.h
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ void m_inc(struct mbuf *, int);
void m_adj(struct mbuf *, int);
int m_copy(struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *, int, int);
struct mbuf *dtom(Slirp *, void *);
+void *mtod_check(struct mbuf *, size_t len);
static inline void ifs_init(struct mbuf *ifm)
{
--
2.29.0