RHEL 9.0.0 Alpha bootstrap
The content of this branch was automatically imported from Fedora ELN with the following as its source: https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/libseccomp#b7df1ffe6c217ba2fb9251b5b9c67f12040a68b5
This commit is contained in:
parent
fd6bf8f899
commit
ff3539e023
17
.gitignore
vendored
17
.gitignore
vendored
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
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*~
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/libseccomp-1.0.0.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-1.0.1.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.0.0.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.1.0.tar.gz
|
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/libseccomp-2.1.1.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.2.0.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.2.1.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.2.3.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.3.0.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.3.1.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.3.2.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.3.3.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.4.0.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.4.1.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.4.2.tar.gz
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/libseccomp-2.5.0.tar.gz
|
631
0101-all-only-request-the-userspace-notification-fd-once.patch
Normal file
631
0101-all-only-request-the-userspace-notification-fd-once.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,631 @@
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From bbf4ae95742662e641e0a456951b912024433435 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2020 11:01:49 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 101/102] all: only request the userspace notification fd once
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|
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It turns out that requesting the seccomp userspace notifcation fd
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more than once is a bad thing which causes the kernel to complain
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(rightfully so for a variety of reasons). Unfortunately as we were
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always requesting the notification fd whenever possible this results
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in problems at filter load time.
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Our solution is to move the notification fd out of the filter context
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and into the global task context, using a newly created task_state
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structure. This allows us to store, and retrieve the notification
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outside the scope of an individual filter context. It also provides
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some implementation improvements by giving us a convenient place to
|
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stash all of the API level related support variables. We also extend
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the seccomp_reset() API call to reset this internal global state when
|
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passed a NULL filter context.
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|
||||
There is one potential case which we don't currently handle well:
|
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threads. At the moment libseccomp is thread ignorant, and that works
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well as the only global state up to this point was the currently
|
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supported API level information which was common to all threads in a
|
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process. Unfortunately, it appears that the notification fd need not
|
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be common to all threads in a process, yet this patch treats it as if
|
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it is common. I suspect this is a very unusual use case so I decided
|
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to keep this patch simple and ignore this case, but in the future if
|
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we need to support this properly we should be able to do so without
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API changes by keeping an internal list of notification fds indexed
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by gettid(2).
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|
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This fixes the GitHub issue below:
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* https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/273
|
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|
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Reported-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
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Acked-by: Tom Hromatka <tom.hromatka@oracle.com>
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Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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---
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doc/man/man3/seccomp_init.3 | 10 +-
|
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doc/man/man3/seccomp_notify_alloc.3 | 3 +-
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src/api.c | 19 ++-
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src/db.c | 1 -
|
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src/db.h | 3 +-
|
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src/system.c | 204 ++++++++++++++++++----------
|
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src/system.h | 3 +
|
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tests/11-basic-basic_errors.c | 9 +-
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tests/51-live-user_notification.c | 21 +++
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tests/51-live-user_notification.py | 4 +
|
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10 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
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|
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diff --git a/doc/man/man3/seccomp_init.3 b/doc/man/man3/seccomp_init.3
|
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index 3ab68fe..87520cd 100644
|
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--- a/doc/man/man3/seccomp_init.3
|
||||
+++ b/doc/man/man3/seccomp_init.3
|
||||
@@ -36,7 +36,15 @@ The
|
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function releases the existing filter context state before reinitializing it
|
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and can only be called after a call to
|
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.BR seccomp_init ()
|
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-has succeeded.
|
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+has succeeded. If
|
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+.BR seccomp_reset ()
|
||||
+is called with a NULL filter, it resets the library's global task state;
|
||||
+normally this is not needed, but it may be required to continue using the
|
||||
+library after a
|
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+.BR fork ()
|
||||
+or
|
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+.BR clone ()
|
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+call to ensure the API level and user notification state is properly reset.
|
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.P
|
||||
When the caller is finished configuring the seccomp filter and has loaded it
|
||||
into the kernel, the caller should call
|
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diff --git a/doc/man/man3/seccomp_notify_alloc.3 b/doc/man/man3/seccomp_notify_alloc.3
|
||||
index 50c8970..cb1c048 100644
|
||||
--- a/doc/man/man3/seccomp_notify_alloc.3
|
||||
+++ b/doc/man/man3/seccomp_notify_alloc.3
|
||||
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ returns the notification fd of a filter after it has been loaded.
|
||||
.\" //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
The
|
||||
.BR seccomp_notify_fd ()
|
||||
-returns the notification fd of the loaded filter.
|
||||
+returns the notification fd of the loaded filter, -1 if a notification fd has
|
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+not yet been created, and -EINVAL if the filter context is invalid.
|
||||
.P
|
||||
The
|
||||
.BR seccomp_notify_id_valid ()
|
||||
diff --git a/src/api.c b/src/api.c
|
||||
index 00975ad..5cec088 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/api.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/api.c
|
||||
@@ -301,10 +301,18 @@ API int seccomp_reset(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, uint32_t def_action)
|
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{
|
||||
struct db_filter_col *col = (struct db_filter_col *)ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
- /* use a NULL filter collection here since we are resetting it */
|
||||
- if (ctx == NULL || db_col_action_valid(NULL, def_action) < 0)
|
||||
+ /* a NULL filter context indicates we are resetting the global state */
|
||||
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
|
||||
+ /* reset the global state and redetermine the api level */
|
||||
+ sys_reset_state();
|
||||
+ _seccomp_api_update();
|
||||
+ return _rc_filter(0);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* ensure the default action is valid */
|
||||
+ if (db_col_action_valid(NULL, def_action) < 0)
|
||||
return _rc_filter(-EINVAL);
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* reset the filter */
|
||||
return _rc_filter(db_col_reset(col, def_action));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -675,16 +683,17 @@ API int seccomp_notify_id_valid(int fd, uint64_t id)
|
||||
/* NOTE - function header comment in include/seccomp.h */
|
||||
API int seccomp_notify_fd(const scmp_filter_ctx ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- struct db_filter_col *col;
|
||||
+ /* NOTE: for historical reasons, and possibly future use, we require a
|
||||
+ * valid filter context even though we don't actual use it here; the
|
||||
+ * api update is also not strictly necessary, but keep it for now */
|
||||
|
||||
/* force a runtime api level detection */
|
||||
_seccomp_api_update();
|
||||
|
||||
if (_ctx_valid(ctx))
|
||||
return _rc_filter(-EINVAL);
|
||||
- col = (struct db_filter_col *)ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
- return _rc_filter(col->notify_fd);
|
||||
+ return _rc_filter(sys_notify_fd());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* NOTE - function header comment in include/seccomp.h */
|
||||
diff --git a/src/db.c b/src/db.c
|
||||
index 4a87ea3..836171a 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/db.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/db.c
|
||||
@@ -1057,7 +1057,6 @@ int db_col_reset(struct db_filter_col *col, uint32_t def_action)
|
||||
if (col->filters)
|
||||
free(col->filters);
|
||||
col->filters = NULL;
|
||||
- col->notify_fd = -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* set the endianess to undefined */
|
||||
col->endian = 0;
|
||||
diff --git a/src/db.h b/src/db.h
|
||||
index b96b104..765c607 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/db.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/db.h
|
||||
@@ -160,8 +160,7 @@ struct db_filter_col {
|
||||
/* transaction snapshots */
|
||||
struct db_filter_snap *snapshots;
|
||||
|
||||
- /* notification fd that was returned from seccomp() */
|
||||
- int notify_fd;
|
||||
+ /* userspace notification */
|
||||
bool notify_used;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/system.c b/src/system.c
|
||||
index 6cdfc16..3b43b2a 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/system.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/system.c
|
||||
@@ -40,16 +40,61 @@
|
||||
* our next release we may have to enable the allowlist */
|
||||
#define SYSCALL_ALLOWLIST_ENABLE 0
|
||||
|
||||
-static int _nr_seccomp = -1;
|
||||
-static int _support_seccomp_syscall = -1;
|
||||
-static int _support_seccomp_flag_tsync = -1;
|
||||
-static int _support_seccomp_flag_log = -1;
|
||||
-static int _support_seccomp_action_log = -1;
|
||||
-static int _support_seccomp_kill_process = -1;
|
||||
-static int _support_seccomp_flag_spec_allow = -1;
|
||||
-static int _support_seccomp_flag_new_listener = -1;
|
||||
-static int _support_seccomp_user_notif = -1;
|
||||
-static int _support_seccomp_flag_tsync_esrch = -1;
|
||||
+/* task global state */
|
||||
+struct task_state {
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||||
+ /* seccomp(2) syscall */
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||||
+ int nr_seccomp;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* userspace notification fd */
|
||||
+ int notify_fd;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* runtime support flags */
|
||||
+ int sup_syscall;
|
||||
+ int sup_flag_tsync;
|
||||
+ int sup_flag_log;
|
||||
+ int sup_action_log;
|
||||
+ int sup_kill_process;
|
||||
+ int sup_flag_spec_allow;
|
||||
+ int sup_flag_new_listener;
|
||||
+ int sup_user_notif;
|
||||
+ int sup_flag_tsync_esrch;
|
||||
+};
|
||||
+static struct task_state state = {
|
||||
+ .nr_seccomp = -1,
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ .notify_fd = -1,
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ .sup_syscall = -1,
|
||||
+ .sup_flag_tsync = -1,
|
||||
+ .sup_flag_log = -1,
|
||||
+ .sup_action_log = -1,
|
||||
+ .sup_kill_process = -1,
|
||||
+ .sup_flag_spec_allow = -1,
|
||||
+ .sup_flag_new_listener = -1,
|
||||
+ .sup_user_notif = -1,
|
||||
+ .sup_flag_tsync_esrch = -1,
|
||||
+};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ * Reset the task state
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * This function fully resets the library's global "system task state".
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+void sys_reset_state(void)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ state.nr_seccomp = -1;
|
||||
+ state.notify_fd = -1;
|
||||
+ state.sup_syscall = -1;
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_tsync = -1;
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_log = -1;
|
||||
+ state.sup_action_log = -1;
|
||||
+ state.sup_kill_process = -1;
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_spec_allow = -1;
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_new_listener = -1;
|
||||
+ state.sup_user_notif = -1;
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_tsync_esrch = -1;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Check to see if the seccomp() syscall is supported
|
||||
@@ -68,8 +113,8 @@ int sys_chk_seccomp_syscall(void)
|
||||
/* NOTE: it is reasonably safe to assume that we should be able to call
|
||||
* seccomp() when the caller first starts, but we can't rely on
|
||||
* it later so we need to cache our findings for use later */
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_syscall >= 0)
|
||||
- return _support_seccomp_syscall;
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_syscall >= 0)
|
||||
+ return state.sup_syscall;
|
||||
|
||||
#if SYSCALL_ALLOWLIST_ENABLE
|
||||
/* architecture allowlist */
|
||||
@@ -100,11 +145,11 @@ int sys_chk_seccomp_syscall(void)
|
||||
goto supported;
|
||||
|
||||
unsupported:
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_syscall = 0;
|
||||
+ state.sup_syscall = 0;
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
supported:
|
||||
- _nr_seccomp = nr_seccomp;
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_syscall = 1;
|
||||
+ state.nr_seccomp = nr_seccomp;
|
||||
+ state.sup_syscall = 1;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -118,7 +163,7 @@ supported:
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void sys_set_seccomp_syscall(bool enable)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_syscall = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
+ state.sup_syscall = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -132,16 +177,16 @@ void sys_set_seccomp_syscall(bool enable)
|
||||
int sys_chk_seccomp_action(uint32_t action)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (action == SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS) {
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_kill_process < 0) {
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_kill_process < 0) {
|
||||
if (sys_chk_seccomp_syscall() == 1 &&
|
||||
- syscall(_nr_seccomp, SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0,
|
||||
- &action) == 0)
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_kill_process = 1;
|
||||
+ syscall(state.nr_seccomp,
|
||||
+ SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &action) == 0)
|
||||
+ state.sup_kill_process = 1;
|
||||
else
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_kill_process = 0;
|
||||
+ state.sup_kill_process = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- return _support_seccomp_kill_process;
|
||||
+ return state.sup_kill_process;
|
||||
} else if (action == SCMP_ACT_KILL_THREAD) {
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
} else if (action == SCMP_ACT_TRAP) {
|
||||
@@ -152,30 +197,30 @@ int sys_chk_seccomp_action(uint32_t action)
|
||||
} else if (action == SCMP_ACT_TRACE(action & 0x0000ffff)) {
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
} else if (action == SCMP_ACT_LOG) {
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_action_log < 0) {
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_action_log < 0) {
|
||||
if (sys_chk_seccomp_syscall() == 1 &&
|
||||
- syscall(_nr_seccomp, SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0,
|
||||
- &action) == 0)
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_action_log = 1;
|
||||
+ syscall(state.nr_seccomp,
|
||||
+ SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &action) == 0)
|
||||
+ state.sup_action_log = 1;
|
||||
else
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_action_log = 0;
|
||||
+ state.sup_action_log = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- return _support_seccomp_action_log;
|
||||
+ return state.sup_action_log;
|
||||
} else if (action == SCMP_ACT_ALLOW) {
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
} else if (action == SCMP_ACT_NOTIFY) {
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_user_notif < 0) {
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_user_notif < 0) {
|
||||
struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes;
|
||||
if (sys_chk_seccomp_syscall() == 1 &&
|
||||
- syscall(_nr_seccomp, SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0,
|
||||
- &sizes) == 0)
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_user_notif = 1;
|
||||
+ syscall(state.nr_seccomp,
|
||||
+ SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes) == 0)
|
||||
+ state.sup_user_notif = 1;
|
||||
else
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_user_notif = 0;
|
||||
+ state.sup_user_notif = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- return _support_seccomp_user_notif;
|
||||
+ return state.sup_user_notif;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
@@ -193,13 +238,13 @@ void sys_set_seccomp_action(uint32_t action, bool enable)
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (action) {
|
||||
case SCMP_ACT_LOG:
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_action_log = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
+ state.sup_action_log = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS:
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_kill_process = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
+ state.sup_kill_process = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SCMP_ACT_NOTIFY:
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_user_notif = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
+ state.sup_user_notif = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -212,13 +257,14 @@ void sys_set_seccomp_action(uint32_t action, bool enable)
|
||||
* Return one if the flag is supported, zero otherwise.
|
||||
*
|
||||
*/
|
||||
-static int _sys_chk_seccomp_flag_kernel(int flag)
|
||||
+static int _sys_chk_flag_kernel(int flag)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* this is an invalid seccomp(2) call because the last argument
|
||||
* is NULL, but depending on the errno value of EFAULT we can
|
||||
* guess if the filter flag is supported or not */
|
||||
if (sys_chk_seccomp_syscall() == 1 &&
|
||||
- syscall(_nr_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL) == -1 &&
|
||||
+ syscall(state.nr_seccomp,
|
||||
+ SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL) == -1 &&
|
||||
errno == EFAULT)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -238,29 +284,25 @@ int sys_chk_seccomp_flag(int flag)
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (flag) {
|
||||
case SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC:
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_flag_tsync < 0)
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_flag_tsync = _sys_chk_seccomp_flag_kernel(flag);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- return _support_seccomp_flag_tsync;
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_flag_tsync < 0)
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_tsync = _sys_chk_flag_kernel(flag);
|
||||
+ return state.sup_flag_tsync;
|
||||
case SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG:
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_flag_log < 0)
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_flag_log = _sys_chk_seccomp_flag_kernel(flag);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- return _support_seccomp_flag_log;
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_flag_log < 0)
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_log = _sys_chk_flag_kernel(flag);
|
||||
+ return state.sup_flag_log;
|
||||
case SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW:
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_flag_spec_allow < 0)
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_flag_spec_allow = _sys_chk_seccomp_flag_kernel(flag);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- return _support_seccomp_flag_spec_allow;
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_flag_spec_allow < 0)
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_spec_allow = _sys_chk_flag_kernel(flag);
|
||||
+ return state.sup_flag_spec_allow;
|
||||
case SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER:
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_flag_new_listener < 0)
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_flag_new_listener = _sys_chk_seccomp_flag_kernel(flag);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- return _support_seccomp_flag_new_listener;
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_flag_new_listener < 0)
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_new_listener = _sys_chk_flag_kernel(flag);
|
||||
+ return state.sup_flag_new_listener;
|
||||
case SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH:
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_flag_tsync_esrch < 0)
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_flag_tsync_esrch = _sys_chk_seccomp_flag_kernel(flag);
|
||||
- return _support_seccomp_flag_tsync_esrch;
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_flag_tsync_esrch < 0)
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_tsync_esrch = _sys_chk_flag_kernel(flag);
|
||||
+ return state.sup_flag_tsync_esrch;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
||||
@@ -279,19 +321,19 @@ void sys_set_seccomp_flag(int flag, bool enable)
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (flag) {
|
||||
case SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC:
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_flag_tsync = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_tsync = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG:
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_flag_log = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_log = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW:
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_flag_spec_allow = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_spec_allow = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER:
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_flag_new_listener = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_new_listener = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH:
|
||||
- _support_seccomp_flag_tsync_esrch = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
+ state.sup_flag_tsync_esrch = (enable ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -324,7 +366,7 @@ int sys_filter_load(struct db_filter_col *col, bool rawrc)
|
||||
goto filter_load_out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- tsync_notify = (_support_seccomp_flag_tsync_esrch > 0);
|
||||
+ tsync_notify = state.sup_flag_tsync_esrch > 0 && state.notify_fd == -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* load the filter into the kernel */
|
||||
if (sys_chk_seccomp_syscall() == 1) {
|
||||
@@ -333,28 +375,29 @@ int sys_filter_load(struct db_filter_col *col, bool rawrc)
|
||||
if (col->attr.tsync_enable)
|
||||
flgs |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC | \
|
||||
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH;
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_user_notif > 0)
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_user_notif > 0)
|
||||
flgs |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER;
|
||||
} else if (col->attr.tsync_enable)
|
||||
flgs |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC;
|
||||
- else if (_support_seccomp_user_notif > 0)
|
||||
+ else if (state.sup_user_notif > 0 && state.notify_fd == -1)
|
||||
flgs |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER;
|
||||
if (col->attr.log_enable)
|
||||
flgs |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG;
|
||||
if (col->attr.spec_allow)
|
||||
flgs |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW;
|
||||
- rc = syscall(_nr_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flgs, prgm);
|
||||
+ rc = syscall(state.nr_seccomp,
|
||||
+ SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flgs, prgm);
|
||||
if (tsync_notify && rc > 0) {
|
||||
/* return 0 on NEW_LISTENER success, but save the fd */
|
||||
- col->notify_fd = rc;
|
||||
+ state.notify_fd = rc;
|
||||
rc = 0;
|
||||
} else if (rc > 0 && col->attr.tsync_enable) {
|
||||
/* always return -ESRCH if we fail to sync threads */
|
||||
errno = ESRCH;
|
||||
rc = -errno;
|
||||
- } else if (rc > 0 && _support_seccomp_user_notif > 0) {
|
||||
+ } else if (rc > 0 && state.sup_user_notif > 0) {
|
||||
/* return 0 on NEW_LISTENER success, but save the fd */
|
||||
- col->notify_fd = rc;
|
||||
+ state.notify_fd = rc;
|
||||
rc = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else
|
||||
@@ -370,6 +413,19 @@ filter_load_out:
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ * Return the userspace notification fd
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * This function returns the userspace notification fd from
|
||||
+ * SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER. If the notification fd has not yet been
|
||||
+ * set, or an error has occurred, -1 is returned.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+int sys_notify_fd(void)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return state.notify_fd;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Allocate a pair of notification request/response structures
|
||||
* @param req the request location
|
||||
@@ -386,7 +442,7 @@ int sys_notify_alloc(struct seccomp_notif **req,
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
static struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes = { 0, 0, 0 };
|
||||
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_syscall <= 0)
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_syscall <= 0)
|
||||
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
||||
|
||||
if (sizes.seccomp_notif == 0 && sizes.seccomp_notif_resp == 0) {
|
||||
@@ -427,7 +483,7 @@ int sys_notify_alloc(struct seccomp_notif **req,
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int sys_notify_receive(int fd, struct seccomp_notif *req)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_user_notif <= 0)
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_user_notif <= 0)
|
||||
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ioctl(fd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, req) < 0)
|
||||
@@ -448,7 +504,7 @@ int sys_notify_receive(int fd, struct seccomp_notif *req)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int sys_notify_respond(int fd, struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_user_notif <= 0)
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_user_notif <= 0)
|
||||
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ioctl(fd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, resp) < 0)
|
||||
@@ -467,7 +523,7 @@ int sys_notify_respond(int fd, struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int sys_notify_id_valid(int fd, uint64_t id)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if (_support_seccomp_user_notif <= 0)
|
||||
+ if (state.sup_user_notif <= 0)
|
||||
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ioctl(fd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &id) < 0)
|
||||
diff --git a/src/system.h b/src/system.h
|
||||
index 133f9b1..096f3ca 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/system.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/system.h
|
||||
@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ struct seccomp_notif_resp {
|
||||
#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID SECCOMP_IOR(2, __u64)
|
||||
#endif /* SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF */
|
||||
|
||||
+void sys_reset_state(void);
|
||||
+
|
||||
int sys_chk_seccomp_syscall(void);
|
||||
void sys_set_seccomp_syscall(bool enable);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -193,6 +195,7 @@ void sys_set_seccomp_flag(int flag, bool enable);
|
||||
|
||||
int sys_filter_load(struct db_filter_col *col, bool rawrc);
|
||||
|
||||
+int sys_notify_fd(void);
|
||||
int sys_notify_alloc(struct seccomp_notif **req,
|
||||
struct seccomp_notif_resp **resp);
|
||||
int sys_notify_receive(int fd, struct seccomp_notif *req);
|
||||
diff --git a/tests/11-basic-basic_errors.c b/tests/11-basic-basic_errors.c
|
||||
index d3b2256..da059df 100644
|
||||
--- a/tests/11-basic-basic_errors.c
|
||||
+++ b/tests/11-basic-basic_errors.c
|
||||
@@ -41,12 +41,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
seccomp_release(ctx);
|
||||
ctx = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
- /* seccomp_reset error */
|
||||
- rc = seccomp_reset(ctx, SCMP_ACT_KILL + 1);
|
||||
- if (rc != -EINVAL)
|
||||
- return -1;
|
||||
- rc = seccomp_reset(ctx, SCMP_ACT_KILL);
|
||||
- if (rc != -EINVAL)
|
||||
+ /* ensure that seccomp_reset(NULL, ...) is accepted */
|
||||
+ rc = seccomp_reset(NULL, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
|
||||
+ if (rc != 0)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* seccomp_load error */
|
||||
diff --git a/tests/51-live-user_notification.c b/tests/51-live-user_notification.c
|
||||
index de31d2f..a00627b 100644
|
||||
--- a/tests/51-live-user_notification.c
|
||||
+++ b/tests/51-live-user_notification.c
|
||||
@@ -98,6 +98,27 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ rc = seccomp_reset(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
|
||||
+ if (rc < 0)
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_NOTIFY, SCMP_SYS(getppid), 0, NULL);
|
||||
+ if (rc)
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ rc = seccomp_load(ctx);
|
||||
+ if (rc < 0)
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ rc = seccomp_notify_fd(ctx);
|
||||
+ if (rc < 0)
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ if (rc != fd) {
|
||||
+ rc = -EFAULT;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ } else
|
||||
+ rc = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
out:
|
||||
if (fd >= 0)
|
||||
close(fd);
|
||||
diff --git a/tests/51-live-user_notification.py b/tests/51-live-user_notification.py
|
||||
index 0d81f5e..3449c44 100755
|
||||
--- a/tests/51-live-user_notification.py
|
||||
+++ b/tests/51-live-user_notification.py
|
||||
@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ def test():
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("Child process error")
|
||||
if os.WEXITSTATUS(rc) != 0:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("Child process error")
|
||||
+ f.reset(ALLOW)
|
||||
+ f.add_rule(NOTIFY, "getppid")
|
||||
+ f.load()
|
||||
+ # no easy way to check the notification fd here
|
||||
quit(160)
|
||||
|
||||
test()
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.26.2
|
||||
|
93
0102-system-change-our-notification-fd-handling.patch
Normal file
93
0102-system-change-our-notification-fd-handling.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
|
||||
From 5201e324d2025b1febbade9bb90d6e405b92a14c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 10:52:08 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 102/102] system: change our notification fd handling
|
||||
|
||||
This commit changes how we handle the notification fd by only
|
||||
requesting it via _NEW_LISTENER if the filter has a _NOTIFY action
|
||||
in it. We also augment the seccomp_reset(NULL, ...) behavior so
|
||||
that it closes the notification fd before resetting the global
|
||||
state; applications that need to keep their notification fd open
|
||||
across a call to seccomp_reset(NULL, ...) can simply dup() it.
|
||||
Although one would have to wonder why the application would be
|
||||
calling seccomp_reset(NULL, ...) in that case.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
doc/man/man3/seccomp_init.3 | 6 ++++--
|
||||
src/system.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
|
||||
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/doc/man/man3/seccomp_init.3 b/doc/man/man3/seccomp_init.3
|
||||
index 87520cd..7881c35 100644
|
||||
--- a/doc/man/man3/seccomp_init.3
|
||||
+++ b/doc/man/man3/seccomp_init.3
|
||||
@@ -38,8 +38,10 @@ and can only be called after a call to
|
||||
.BR seccomp_init ()
|
||||
has succeeded. If
|
||||
.BR seccomp_reset ()
|
||||
-is called with a NULL filter, it resets the library's global task state;
|
||||
-normally this is not needed, but it may be required to continue using the
|
||||
+is called with a NULL filter, it resets the library's global task state,
|
||||
+including any notification file descriptors retrieved by
|
||||
+.BR seccomp_notify_fd(3) .
|
||||
+Normally this is not needed, but it may be required to continue using the
|
||||
library after a
|
||||
.BR fork ()
|
||||
or
|
||||
diff --git a/src/system.c b/src/system.c
|
||||
index 3b43b2a..c646c65 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/system.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/system.c
|
||||
@@ -84,7 +84,11 @@ static struct task_state state = {
|
||||
void sys_reset_state(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
state.nr_seccomp = -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (state.notify_fd > 0)
|
||||
+ close(state.notify_fd);
|
||||
state.notify_fd = -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
state.sup_syscall = -1;
|
||||
state.sup_flag_tsync = -1;
|
||||
state.sup_flag_log = -1;
|
||||
@@ -353,6 +357,7 @@ int sys_filter_load(struct db_filter_col *col, bool rawrc)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
bool tsync_notify;
|
||||
+ bool listener_req;
|
||||
struct bpf_program *prgm = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = gen_bpf_generate(col, &prgm);
|
||||
@@ -367,6 +372,8 @@ int sys_filter_load(struct db_filter_col *col, bool rawrc)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tsync_notify = state.sup_flag_tsync_esrch > 0 && state.notify_fd == -1;
|
||||
+ listener_req = state.sup_user_notif > 0 && \
|
||||
+ col->notify_used && state.notify_fd == -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* load the filter into the kernel */
|
||||
if (sys_chk_seccomp_syscall() == 1) {
|
||||
@@ -375,11 +382,16 @@ int sys_filter_load(struct db_filter_col *col, bool rawrc)
|
||||
if (col->attr.tsync_enable)
|
||||
flgs |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC | \
|
||||
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH;
|
||||
- if (state.sup_user_notif > 0)
|
||||
+ if (listener_req)
|
||||
flgs |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER;
|
||||
- } else if (col->attr.tsync_enable)
|
||||
+ } else if (col->attr.tsync_enable) {
|
||||
+ if (listener_req) {
|
||||
+ /* NOTE: we _should_ catch this in db.c */
|
||||
+ rc = -EFAULT;
|
||||
+ goto filter_load_out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
flgs |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC;
|
||||
- else if (state.sup_user_notif > 0 && state.notify_fd == -1)
|
||||
+ } else if (listener_req)
|
||||
flgs |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER;
|
||||
if (col->attr.log_enable)
|
||||
flgs |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.26.2
|
||||
|
239
libseccomp.spec
Normal file
239
libseccomp.spec
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
|
||||
Name: libseccomp
|
||||
Version: 2.5.0
|
||||
Release: 3%{?dist}
|
||||
Summary: Enhanced seccomp library
|
||||
License: LGPLv2
|
||||
URL: https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp
|
||||
Source0: %{url}/releases/download/v%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
|
||||
|
||||
# Backports from upstream
|
||||
|
||||
# Patches pending merge
|
||||
## From: https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/pull/280
|
||||
## Reference: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1865802
|
||||
Patch0101: 0101-all-only-request-the-userspace-notification-fd-once.patch
|
||||
Patch0102: 0102-system-change-our-notification-fd-handling.patch
|
||||
|
||||
BuildRequires: gcc
|
||||
BuildRequires: gperf
|
||||
BuildRequires: make
|
||||
|
||||
%ifnarch riscv64 s390
|
||||
# Versions prior to 3.13.0-4 do not work on ARM with newer glibc 2.25.0-6
|
||||
# See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1466017
|
||||
BuildRequires: valgrind >= 1:3.13.0-4
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
|
||||
%description
|
||||
The libseccomp library provides an easy to use interface to the Linux Kernel's
|
||||
syscall filtering mechanism, seccomp. The libseccomp API allows an application
|
||||
to specify which syscalls, and optionally which syscall arguments, the
|
||||
application is allowed to execute, all of which are enforced by the Linux
|
||||
Kernel.
|
||||
|
||||
%package devel
|
||||
Summary: Development files used to build applications with libseccomp support
|
||||
Requires: %{name}%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
|
||||
%description devel
|
||||
The libseccomp library provides an easy to use interface to the Linux Kernel's
|
||||
syscall filtering mechanism, seccomp. The libseccomp API allows an application
|
||||
to specify which syscalls, and optionally which syscall arguments, the
|
||||
application is allowed to execute, all of which are enforced by the Linux
|
||||
Kernel.
|
||||
|
||||
%package static
|
||||
Summary: Enhanced seccomp static library
|
||||
Requires: %{name}-devel%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
|
||||
%description static
|
||||
The libseccomp library provides an easy to use interface to the Linux Kernel's
|
||||
syscall filtering mechanism, seccomp. The libseccomp API allows an application
|
||||
to specify which syscalls, and optionally which syscall arguments, the
|
||||
application is allowed to execute, all of which are enforced by the Linux
|
||||
Kernel.
|
||||
|
||||
%prep
|
||||
%autosetup -p1
|
||||
|
||||
%build
|
||||
%configure
|
||||
%make_build
|
||||
|
||||
%install
|
||||
mkdir -p %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}
|
||||
mkdir -p %{buildroot}/%{_includedir}
|
||||
mkdir -p %{buildroot}/%{_mandir}
|
||||
|
||||
%make_install
|
||||
|
||||
rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/libseccomp.la
|
||||
|
||||
%check
|
||||
# Tests 36 and 37 fail on the build systems for the arches below and I'm not
|
||||
# able to reproduce the failure so just skip the tests for now
|
||||
%ifarch i686 ppc64le s390x
|
||||
rm -f tests/36-sim-ipc_syscalls.tests tests/37-sim-ipc_syscalls_be.tests
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
%make_build check
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%files
|
||||
%license LICENSE
|
||||
%doc CREDITS README.md CHANGELOG CONTRIBUTING.md
|
||||
%{_libdir}/libseccomp.so.*
|
||||
|
||||
%files devel
|
||||
%{_includedir}/seccomp.h
|
||||
%{_includedir}/seccomp-syscalls.h
|
||||
%{_libdir}/libseccomp.so
|
||||
%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/libseccomp.pc
|
||||
%{_bindir}/scmp_sys_resolver
|
||||
%{_mandir}/man1/*
|
||||
%{_mandir}/man3/*
|
||||
|
||||
%files static
|
||||
%{_libdir}/libseccomp.a
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Wed Aug 05 2020 Neal Gompa <ngompa13@gmail.com> - 2.5.0-3
|
||||
- Apply fixes to change internal handling of the notification fd (#1865802)
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jul 28 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.5.0-2
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jul 24 2020 Neal Gompa <ngompa13@gmail.com> - 2.5.0-1
|
||||
- New upstream version (#1858965)
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jan 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.4.2-3
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Dec 16 2019 Neal Gompa <ngompa13@gmail.com> - 2.4.2-2
|
||||
- Modernize spec
|
||||
- Backport fix for missing __SNR_ppoll symbol (#1777889)
|
||||
- Refresh patch to build on aarch64 with upstream version
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Nov 20 2019 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> - 2.4.2-1
|
||||
- New upstream version (#1765314)
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jul 25 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.4.1-1
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Apr 17 2019 Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> - 2.4.1-0
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Mar 14 2019 Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> - 2.4.0-0
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
- Added a hack to workaround test failures (see %check above)
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Feb 01 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.3.3-5
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Nov 07 2018 Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> - 2.3.3-4
|
||||
- Remove ldconfig scriptlet, thanks to James Antill (RHBZ #1644074)
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jul 13 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.3.3-3
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Feb 07 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.3.3-2
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_28_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jan 10 2018 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.3.3-1
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Aug 03 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.3.2-5
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_27_Binutils_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jul 26 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.3.2-4
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_27_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jun 29 2017 Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com> - 2.3.2-3
|
||||
- Re-enable valgrind-based tests on ARMv7
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jun 29 2017 Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com> - 2.3.2-2
|
||||
- Disable running valgrind-based tests on ARMv7 due to glibc/valgrind bug (RHBZ #1466017)
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Mar 01 2017 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> -2.3.2-1
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Feb 10 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.3.1-2
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_26_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Apr 20 2016 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.3.1-1
|
||||
- Cleanup the changelog whitespace and escape the macros to make rpmlint happy
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Apr 20 2016 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.3.1-0
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Mar 1 2016 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> 2.3.0-1
|
||||
- No valgrind on s390
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Feb 29 2016 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.3.0-0
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Feb 04 2016 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.3-1
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_24_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jul 08 2015 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.2.3-0
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jun 17 2015 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.2.1-1
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_23_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed May 13 2015 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.2.1-0
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Feb 12 2015 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.2.0-0
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
- Added aarch64 support
|
||||
- Added a static build
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Sep 18 2014 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.1.1-6
|
||||
- Fully builds on i686, x86_64, and armv7hl (RHBZ #1106071)
|
||||
|
||||
* Sun Aug 17 2014 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.1-5
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_22_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jul 18 2014 Tom Callaway <spot@fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.1-4
|
||||
- fix license handling
|
||||
|
||||
* Sat Jun 07 2014 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.1-3
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Feb 27 2014 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.1.1-2
|
||||
- Build with CFLAGS="${optflags}"
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Feb 17 2014 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.1.1-1
|
||||
- Removed the kernel dependency (RHBZ #1065572)
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Oct 31 2013 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.1.1-0
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
- Added a %%check procedure for self-test during build
|
||||
|
||||
* Sat Aug 03 2013 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.1.0-1
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_20_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 11 2013 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.1.0-0
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
- Added support for the ARM architecture
|
||||
- Added the scmp_sys_resolver tool
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jan 28 2013 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2.0.0-0
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Nov 13 2012 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 1.0.1-0
|
||||
- New upstream version with several important fixes
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jul 31 2012 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-0
|
||||
- New upstream version
|
||||
- Remove verbose build patch as it is no longer needed
|
||||
- Enable _smp_mflags during build stage
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jul 19 2012 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 0.1.0-2
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_18_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jul 10 2012 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 0.1.0-1
|
||||
- Limit package to x86/x86_64 platforms (RHBZ #837888)
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 12 2012 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 0.1.0-0
|
||||
- Initial version
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user