.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/0.4.15.tar.gz
+/0.4.15.tar.gz

.libproxy.metadata

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-2dc0fc31cad78ce3d7a5ceb8fa8df07010f5c13e SOURCES/0.4.15.tar.gz

SOURCES/libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-From a83dae404feac517695c23ff43ce1e116e2bfbe0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@gnome.org>
-Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 11:12:02 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite url::recvline to be nonrecursive
-
-This function processes network input. It's semi-trusted, because the
-PAC ought to be trusted. But we still shouldn't allow it to control how
-far we recurse. A malicious PAC can cause us to overflow the stack by
-sending a sufficiently-long line without any '\n' character.
-
-Also, this function failed to properly handle EINTR, so let's fix that
-too, for good measure.
-
-Fixes #134
----
- libproxy/url.cpp | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp
-index ee776b2..68d69cd 100644
---- a/libproxy/url.cpp
-+++ b/libproxy/url.cpp
-@@ -388,16 +388,24 @@ string url::to_string() const {
- 	return m_orig;
- }
- 
--static inline string recvline(int fd) {
--	// Read a character.
--	// If we don't get a character, return empty string.
--	// If we are at the end of the line, return empty string.
--	char c = '\0';
--	
--	if (recv(fd, &c, 1, 0) != 1 || c == '\n')
--		return "";
--
--	return string(1, c) + recvline(fd);
-+static string recvline(int fd) {
-+	string line;
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	// Reserve arbitrary amount of space to avoid small memory reallocations.
-+	line.reserve(128);
-+
-+	do {
-+		char c;
-+		ret = recv(fd, &c, 1, 0);
-+		if (ret == 1) {
-+			if (c == '\n')
-+				return line;
-+			line += c;
-+		}
-+	} while (ret == 1 || (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR));
-+
-+	return line;
- }
- 
- char* url::get_pac() {

SOURCES/libproxy-0.4.15-fix-pac-buffer-overflow.patch

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-From 4411b523545b22022b4be7d0cac25aa170ae1d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Fei Li <lifeibiren@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 02:18:37 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow when PAC is enabled
-
-The bug was found on Windows 10 (MINGW64) when PAC is enabled. It turned
-out to be the large PAC file (more than 102400 bytes) returned by a
-local proxy program with no content-length present.
----
- libproxy/url.cpp | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp
-index ee776b2..8684086 100644
---- a/libproxy/url.cpp
-+++ b/libproxy/url.cpp
-@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ using namespace std;
- #define PAC_MIME_TYPE_FB "text/plain"
- 
- // This is the maximum pac size (to avoid memory attacks)
--#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 102400
-+#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 0x800000
- // This is the default block size to use when receiving via HTTP
- #define PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE 512
- 
-@@ -478,15 +478,13 @@ char* url::get_pac() {
- 		}
- 
- 		// Get content
--		unsigned int recvd = 0;
--		buffer = new char[PAC_MAX_SIZE];
--		memset(buffer, 0, PAC_MAX_SIZE);
-+		std::vector<char> dynamic_buffer;
- 		do {
- 			unsigned int chunk_length;
- 
- 			if (chunked) {
- 				// Discard the empty line if we received a previous chunk
--				if (recvd > 0) recvline(sock);
-+				if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) recvline(sock);
- 
- 				// Get the chunk-length line as an integer
- 				if (sscanf(recvline(sock).c_str(), "%x", &chunk_length) != 1 || chunk_length == 0) break;
-@@ -498,21 +496,41 @@ char* url::get_pac() {
- 
- 			if (content_length >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) break;
- 
--			while (content_length == 0 || recvd != content_length) {
--				int r = recv(sock, buffer + recvd,
--				             content_length == 0 ? PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE
--				                                 : content_length - recvd, 0);
-+			while (content_length == 0 || dynamic_buffer.size() != content_length) {
-+				// Calculate length to recv
-+				unsigned int length_to_read = PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+				if (content_length > 0)
-+					length_to_read = content_length - dynamic_buffer.size();
-+
-+				// Prepare buffer
-+				dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() + length_to_read);
-+
-+				int r = recv(sock, dynamic_buffer.data() + dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read, length_to_read, 0);
-+
-+				// Shrink buffer to fit
-+				if (r >= 0)
-+					dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read + r);
-+
-+				// PAC size too large, discard
-+				if (dynamic_buffer.size() >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) {
-+					chunked = false;
-+					dynamic_buffer.clear();
-+					break;
-+				}
-+
- 				if (r <= 0) {
- 					chunked = false;
- 					break;
- 				}
--				recvd += r;
- 			}
- 		} while (chunked);
- 
--		if (content_length != 0 && string(buffer).size() != content_length) {
--			delete[] buffer;
--			buffer = NULL;
-+		if (content_length == 0 || content_length == dynamic_buffer.size()) {
-+			buffer = new char[dynamic_buffer.size() + 1];
-+			if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) {
-+				memcpy(buffer, dynamic_buffer.data(), dynamic_buffer.size());
-+			}
-+			buffer[dynamic_buffer.size()] = '\0';
- 		}
- 	}
- 

gating.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+--- !Policy
+product_versions:
+  - rhel-8
+decision_context: osci_compose_gate
+rules:
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: baseos-ci.brew-build.tier1-gating.functional}
+#  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build.tier0.functional}

libproxy.spec

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 Name:           libproxy
 Version:        0.4.15
-Release:        5.5%{?dist}
+Release:        5.2%{?dist}
 Summary:        A library handling all the details of proxy configuration
 
 Group:          System Environment/Libraries
@@ -15,12 +15,6 @@ Source0:        https://github.com/libproxy/%{name}/archive/%{version}.tar.gz
 Source1:        proxy.1
 Patch1:         libproxy-0.4.11-crash.patch
 
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1880350
-Patch2:         libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch
-
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1883584
-Patch3:         libproxy-0.4.15-fix-pac-buffer-overflow.patch
-
 BuildRequires:  libmodman-devel >= 2.0.1
 BuildRequires:  cmake >= 2.6.0
 
@@ -187,15 +181,6 @@ make test
 
 
 %changelog
-* Thu Aug 15 2024 Michael Santana <msantana@redhat.com> - 0.4.15-5.5
-- Bump up version number
-
-* Tue Jul 30 2024 Michael Santana <msantana@redhat.com> - 0.4.15-5.4
-- Fix PAC buffer overflow (#1869639)
-
-* Tue Jul 30 2024 Michael Santana <msantana@redhat.com> - 0.4.15-5.3
-- Fix CVE-2020-25219 (#1880349)
-
 * Thu May 31 2018 Dan Winship <danw@redhat.com> - 0.4.15-5.2
 - Drop pacrunner-mozjs (#1571640)
 

sources

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA512 (0.4.15.tar.gz) = 8f68bd56e44aeb3f553f4657bef82a5d14302780508dafa32454d6f724b724c884ceed6042f8df53a081d26ea0b05598cf35eab44823257c47c5ef8afb36442b