libksba/SOURCES/libksba-1.5.1-overflow.patch
2023-03-29 09:10:29 +00:00

105 lines
3.1 KiB
Diff

From 4b7d9cd4a018898d7714ce06f3faf2626c14582b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2022 14:19:06 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Detect a possible overflow directly in the TLV parser.
* src/ber-help.c (_ksba_ber_read_tl): Check for overflow of a commonly
used sum.
--
It is quite common to have checks like
if (ti.nhdr + ti.length >= DIM(tmpbuf))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
This patch detects possible integer overflows immmediately when
creating the TI object.
Reported-by: ZDI-CAN-18927, ZDI-CAN-18928, ZDI-CAN-18929
---
src/ber-help.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/ber-help.c b/src/ber-help.c
index 81c31ed..56efb6a 100644
--- a/src/ber-help.c
+++ b/src/ber-help.c
@@ -182,6 +182,12 @@ _ksba_ber_read_tl (ksba_reader_t reader, struct tag_info *ti)
ti->length = len;
}
+ if (ti->length > ti->nhdr && (ti->nhdr + ti->length) < ti->length)
+ {
+ ti->err_string = "header+length would overflow";
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOVERFLOW);
+ }
+
/* Without this kludge some example certs can't be parsed */
if (ti->class == CLASS_UNIVERSAL && !ti->tag)
ti->length = 0;
--
2.37.3
commit f61a5ea4e0f6a80fd4b28ef0174bee77793cf070
Author: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Date: Tue Nov 22 16:36:46 2022 +0100
Fix an integer overflow in the CRL signature parser.
* src/crl.c (parse_signature): N+N2 now checked for overflow.
* src/ocsp.c (parse_response_extensions): Do not accept too large
values.
(parse_single_extensions): Ditto.
--
The second patch is an extra safegourd not related to the reported
bug.
GnuPG-bug-id: 6284
Reported-by: Joseph Surin, elttam
diff --git a/src/crl.c b/src/crl.c
index 9f71c85..2e6ca29 100644
--- a/src/crl.c
+++ b/src/crl.c
@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ parse_signature (ksba_crl_t crl)
&& !ti.is_constructed) )
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CRL_OBJ);
n2 = ti.nhdr + ti.length;
- if (n + n2 >= DIM(tmpbuf))
+ if (n + n2 >= DIM(tmpbuf) || (n + n2) < n)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
memcpy (tmpbuf+n, ti.buf, ti.nhdr);
err = read_buffer (crl->reader, tmpbuf+n+ti.nhdr, ti.length);
diff --git a/src/ocsp.c b/src/ocsp.c
index d4cba04..657d15f 100644
--- a/src/ocsp.c
+++ b/src/ocsp.c
@@ -721,6 +721,12 @@ parse_response_extensions (ksba_ocsp_t ocsp,
else
ocsp->good_nonce = 1;
}
+ if (ti.length > (1<<24))
+ {
+ /* Bail out on much too large objects. */
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
+ goto leave;
+ }
ex = xtrymalloc (sizeof *ex + strlen (oid) + ti.length);
if (!ex)
{
@@ -788,6 +794,12 @@ parse_single_extensions (struct ocsp_reqitem_s *ri,
err = parse_octet_string (&data, &datalen, &ti);
if (err)
goto leave;
+ if (ti.length > (1<<24))
+ {
+ /* Bail out on much too large objects. */
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
+ goto leave;
+ }
ex = xtrymalloc (sizeof *ex + strlen (oid) + ti.length);
if (!ex)
{