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libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.10.0-marvin3.patch
Jakub Jelen c54e9e9ce8 Fix CVE-2024-2236 
Resolves: RHEL-34579
2024-08-01 16:52:35 +02:00

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From 8cebc9ced630d4979b40c3553c5e6c93654852bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2024 18:04:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/9] tests: Remove needless PKCS#1.5 encryption and decryption
parameters
* tests/pkcs1v2.c (check_v15crypt): Remove needless flags from s-exp.
--
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
tests/pkcs1v2.c | 8 ++------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tests/pkcs1v2.c b/tests/pkcs1v2.c
index f26e779b..65f25bb0 100644
--- a/tests/pkcs1v2.c
+++ b/tests/pkcs1v2.c
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ check_v15crypt (void)
seed = data_from_hex (tbl[tno].m[mno].seed, &seed_len);
err = gcry_sexp_build (&plain, NULL,
- "(data (flags pkcs1)(hash-algo sha1)"
+ "(data (flags pkcs1)"
"(value %b)(random-override %b))",
(int)mesg_len, mesg,
(int)seed_len, seed);
@@ -474,19 +474,15 @@ check_v15crypt (void)
plain = NULL;
/* Now test the decryption. */
- seed = data_from_hex (tbl[tno].m[mno].seed, &seed_len);
encr = data_from_hex (tbl[tno].m[mno].encr, &encr_len);
err = gcry_sexp_build (&ciph, NULL,
- "(enc-val (flags pkcs1)(hash-algo sha1)"
- "(random-override %b)"
+ "(enc-val (flags pkcs1)"
"(rsa (a %b)))",
- (int)seed_len, seed,
(int)encr_len, encr);
if (err)
die ("constructing cipher data failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
gcry_free (encr);
- gcry_free (seed);
err = gcry_pk_decrypt (&plain, ciph, sec_key);
if (err)
--
2.45.2
From 6b6dd1c3ea843cbaabd3cf8cc768ac651f545aca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 14:42:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] rsa: Do not accept invalid PKCS#1.5 padding when
deciphering
The current code can accept 0-length padding when deciphering
PKCS#1.5 ciphertext. This is against the specification and hopefully
nobody depends on this.
--
* cipher/rsa-common.c (_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc): Fail for too
short padding.
* src/const-time.h (ct_lt_s): New.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/rsa-common.c | 2 ++
src/const-time.h | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/cipher/rsa-common.c b/cipher/rsa-common.c
index 1920eedd..e45cb30d 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa-common.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa-common.c
@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ _gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
failed |= not_found;
n0 += ct_is_zero (not_found); /* Skip the zero byte. */
+ /* the valid padding is at least 8 bytes -- the plaintext needs to start at index 11 or later */
+ failed |= ct_lt_s (n0, 11);
/* To avoid an extra allocation we reuse the frame buffer. The only
caller of this function will anyway free the result soon. */
diff --git a/src/const-time.h b/src/const-time.h
index fe07cc7a..0c641a64 100644
--- a/src/const-time.h
+++ b/src/const-time.h
@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ extern volatile unsigned int _gcry_ct_vone;
#endif
+static inline size_t
+ct_lt_s (size_t a, size_t b)
+{
+ return ((a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1));
+}
+
/*
* Return 0 if A is 0 and return 1 otherwise.
*/
--
2.45.2
From 067754b756a31c30e8a5969c31e1a05084bdea4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 15:18:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/9] rsa: Constant time blinding removal
* cipher/rsa.c (secret_blinded): Use constant time mulm implementation
* configure.ac: New configure option --enable-marvin-workaround
* mpi/Makefile.am: Build constant time multiplication
* mpi/mpi-internal.h: Add constant time function prototypes
* mpi/mpi-mul-cs.c: New file with constant time multiplication and
modulo.
* mpi/mpi-mul.c (_gcry_mpi_mul_sec): New function.
(_gcry_mpi_mod_sec): New function.
(_gcry_mpi_mod_sec): New function.
(_gcry_mpi_reverse_sec): New function.
(_gcry_mpi_mulm_sec): New function.
* src/gcrypt-int.h: Add new functions.
--
The current MPI code is not constant time, potentially leaking plaintext
when the attacker can observe enough decipher operations using RSA
PKCS#1.5. This is described as a Marvin Attack:
https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1442
Note, that this code is tested to be constant time only with the -O3
optimization level.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/rsa.c | 4 +
configure.ac | 16 +++
mpi/Makefile.am | 4 +
mpi/mpi-internal.h | 6 ++
mpi/mpi-mul-cs.c | 263 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
mpi/mpi-mul.c | 169 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/gcrypt-int.h | 6 ++
7 files changed, 468 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 mpi/mpi-mul-cs.c
diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
index c7a809f4..2f735f9c 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa.c
@@ -1197,7 +1197,11 @@ secret_blinded (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input,
/* Undo blinding. Here we calculate: y = (x * r^-1) mod n, where x
* is the blinded decrypted data, ri is the modular multiplicative
* inverse of r and n is the RSA modulus. */
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+ mpi_mulm_sec (output, output, ri, sk->n);
+#else
mpi_mulm (output, output, ri, sk->n);
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
_gcry_mpi_release (r);
_gcry_mpi_release (ri);
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index ab597962..6291a863 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -604,6 +604,22 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(jent-support,
jentsupport=$enableval,jentsupport=yes)
AC_MSG_RESULT($jentsupport)
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether a Marvin workaround is requested])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(marvin-workaround,
+ AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-marvin-workaround],
+ [Enable Marvin workaround for constant time PKCS1.5 depadding]),
+ [with_marvin_workaround="$enableval"],
+ [with_marvin_workaround=no])
+AC_MSG_RESULT($with_marvin_workaround)
+if test "$with_marvin_workaround" = no ; then
+ WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND=''
+else
+ AC_DEFINE(WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND,1,
+ [Define to provide constant time PKCS1.5 depadding])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND, test "x$with_marvin_workaround" != xno)
+AC_SUBST(WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND)
+
# Implementation of the --disable-padlock-support switch.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether padlock support is requested])
AC_ARG_ENABLE(padlock-support,
diff --git a/mpi/Makefile.am b/mpi/Makefile.am
index d06be7aa..1f1f550c 100644
--- a/mpi/Makefile.am
+++ b/mpi/Makefile.am
@@ -178,3 +178,7 @@ libmpi_la_SOURCES = longlong.h \
ec.c ec-internal.h ec-ed25519.c ec-nist.c ec-inline.h \
ec-hw-s390x.c
EXTRA_libmpi_la_SOURCES = asm-common-aarch64.h asm-common-amd64.h
+
+if WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+libmpi_la_SOURCES += mpi-mul-cs.c
+endif
diff --git a/mpi/mpi-internal.h b/mpi/mpi-internal.h
index 935bf3e1..39de5161 100644
--- a/mpi/mpi-internal.h
+++ b/mpi/mpi-internal.h
@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ void _gcry_mpih_mul_karatsuba_case( mpi_ptr_t prodp,
mpi_ptr_t vp, mpi_size_t vsize,
struct karatsuba_ctx *ctx );
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+/*-- mpih-mul-cs.c --*/
+void mul_cs(mpi_limb_t *ret, mpi_limb_t *a, mpi_limb_t *b, size_t n, mpi_limb_t *tmp);
+void mod_cs(mpi_limb_t *ret, mpi_limb_t *a, size_t anum, mpi_limb_t *mod, size_t modnum, mpi_limb_t *tmp);
+size_t mod_limb_numb(size_t anum, size_t modnum);
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
/*-- mpih-mul_1.c (or xxx/cpu/ *.S) --*/
mpi_limb_t _gcry_mpih_mul_1( mpi_ptr_t res_ptr, mpi_ptr_t s1_ptr,
diff --git a/mpi/mpi-mul-cs.c b/mpi/mpi-mul-cs.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dba5ce16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mpi/mpi-mul-cs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2024, Hubert Kario, Red Hat
+ * Released under BSD 2-Clause License, see LICENSE for details
+ */
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "mpi-internal.h"
+#include "longlong.h"
+
+/* For multiplication we're using schoolbook multiplication,
+ * so if we have two numbers, each with 6 "digits" (words)
+ * the multiplication is calculated as follows:
+ * A B C D E F
+ * x I J K L M N
+ * --------------
+ * N*F
+ * N*E
+ * N*D
+ * N*C
+ * N*B
+ * N*A
+ * M*F
+ * M*E
+ * M*D
+ * M*C
+ * M*B
+ * M*A
+ * L*F
+ * L*E
+ * L*D
+ * L*C
+ * L*B
+ * L*A
+ * K*F
+ * K*E
+ * K*D
+ * K*C
+ * K*B
+ * K*A
+ * J*F
+ * J*E
+ * J*D
+ * J*C
+ * J*B
+ * J*A
+ * I*F
+ * I*E
+ * I*D
+ * I*C
+ * I*B
+ * + I*A
+ * ==========================
+ * N*B N*D N*F
+ * + N*A N*C N*E
+ * + M*B M*D M*F
+ * + M*A M*C M*E
+ * + L*B L*D L*F
+ * + L*A L*C L*E
+ * + K*B K*D K*F
+ * + K*A K*C K*E
+ * + J*B J*D J*F
+ * + J*A J*C J*E
+ * + I*B I*D I*F
+ * + I*A I*C I*E
+ *
+ * 1+1 1+3 1+5
+ * 1+0 1+2 1+4
+ * 0+1 0+3 0+5
+ * 0+0 0+2 0+4
+ *
+ * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
+ * which requires n^2 multiplications and 2n full length additions
+ * as we can keep every other result of limb multiplication in two separate
+ * limbs
+ */
+
+typedef mpi_limb_t limb_t;
+#if BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB == SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG
+#define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 64
+#define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 8
+#elif BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB == SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG
+#define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 32
+#define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 4
+/* if we're on a 32 bit platform */
+#else
+#define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 16
+#define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 2
+/*
+ * if the compiler doesn't have either a 128bit data type nor a "return
+ * high 64 bits of multiplication"
+ */
+#endif
+
+/* add two limbs with carry in, return carry out */
+static limb_t
+_add_limb (limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t carry)
+{
+ limb_t carry1, carry2, t;
+ add_ssaaaa (carry1, t, 0, a, 0, carry);
+ add_ssaaaa (carry2, t, 0, b, 0, t);
+ *ret = t;
+ return carry1 + carry2;
+}
+
+/* add two numbers of the same size, return overflow
+ *
+ * add a to b, place result in ret; all arrays need to be n limbs long
+ * return overflow from addition (0 or 1)
+ */
+static limb_t
+add (limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
+{
+ limb_t c = 0;
+ for (ssize_t i = n - 1; i > -1; i--)
+ {
+ c = _add_limb (&ret[i], a[i], b[i], c);
+ }
+ return c;
+}
+
+/* multiply two numbers of the same size
+ *
+ * multiply a by b, place result in ret; a and b need to be n limbs long
+ * ret needs to be 2*n limbs long, tmp needs to be 2 * n 2 limbs
+ * long
+ */
+void
+mul_cs (limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n, limb_t *tmp)
+{
+ limb_t *r_odd, *r_even;
+ r_odd = tmp;
+ r_even = &tmp[2 * n];
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 2 * n; i++)
+ {
+ ret[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i=0; i<n; i++)
+ {
+ for (size_t k=0; k<i+n+1; k++)
+ {
+ r_even[k] = 0;
+ r_odd[k] = 0;
+ }
+ for (size_t j=0; j<n; j++)
+ {
+ /* place results from even and odd limbs in separate arrays so that
+ * we don't have to calculate overflow every time we get individual
+ * limb multiplication result */
+ if (j % 2 == 0)
+ {
+ umul_ppmm (r_even[i+j], r_even[i+j+1], a[i], b[j]);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ umul_ppmm (r_odd[i+j], r_odd[i+j+1], a[i], b[j]);
+ }
+ }
+ /* skip the least significant limbs when adding multiples of
+ * more significant limbs (they're zero anyway) */
+ add (ret, ret, r_even, n+i+1);
+ add (ret, ret, r_odd, n+i+1);
+ }
+}
+
+/* modifies the value in place by performing a right shift by one bit */
+static void
+rshift1 (limb_t *val, size_t n)
+{
+ limb_t shift_in = 0, shift_out = 0;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ {
+ shift_out = val[i] & 1;
+ val[i] = shift_in << (LIMB_BIT_SIZE-1) | (val[i] >> 1);
+ shift_in = shift_out;
+ }
+}
+
+/* copy from either a or b to ret based on flag
+ * when flag == 0, then copies from b
+ * when flag == 1, then copies from a
+ */
+static void
+cselect (limb_t flag, limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
+{
+ /* would be more efficient with non volatile mask, but then gcc
+ * generates code with jumps */
+ limb_t mask1 = ct_limb_gen_mask (flag);
+ limb_t mask2 = ct_limb_gen_inv_mask (flag);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ {
+ ret[i] = (mask1 & a[i]) | (mask2 & b[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+static limb_t
+_sub_limb (limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t borrow)
+{
+ limb_t borrow1, borrow2, t;
+ sub_ddmmss (borrow1, t, 0, a, 0, borrow);
+ sub_ddmmss (borrow2, t, 0, t, 0, b);
+ *ret = t;
+ return -(borrow1 + borrow2);
+}
+
+/* place the result of a - b into ret, return the borrow bit.
+ * All arrays need to be n limbs long
+ */
+static limb_t
+sub (limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
+{
+ limb_t borrow = 0;
+ for (ssize_t i=n-1; i>-1; i--)
+ {
+ borrow = _sub_limb (&ret[i], a[i], b[i], borrow);
+ }
+ return borrow;
+}
+
+/* return the number of limbs necessary to allocate for the mod() tmp operand */
+size_t
+mod_limb_numb (size_t anum, size_t modnum)
+{
+ return (anum + modnum) * 3;
+}
+
+/* calculate a % mod, place the result in ret
+ * size of a is defined by anum, size of ret and mod is modnum,
+ * size of tmp is returned by mod_limb_numb()
+ */
+void
+mod_cs (limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum, limb_t *mod, size_t modnum, limb_t *tmp)
+{
+ limb_t *atmp, *modtmp, *rettmp;
+ limb_t res;
+
+ memset (tmp, 0, mod_limb_numb(anum, modnum) * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
+
+ atmp = tmp;
+ modtmp = &tmp[anum+modnum];
+ rettmp = &tmp[(anum+modnum)*2];
+
+ for (size_t i=modnum; i<modnum+anum; i++)
+ {
+ atmp[i] = a[i-modnum];
+ }
+ for (size_t i=0; i<modnum; i++)
+ {
+ modtmp[i] = mod[i];
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i=0; i<anum*LIMB_BIT_SIZE; i++)
+ {
+ rshift1 (modtmp, anum+modnum);
+ res = sub (rettmp, atmp, modtmp, anum+modnum);
+ cselect (res, atmp, atmp, rettmp, anum+modnum);
+ }
+
+ memcpy (ret, &atmp[anum], sizeof(limb_t)*modnum);
+}
diff --git a/mpi/mpi-mul.c b/mpi/mpi-mul.c
index e8e57475..e318f7da 100644
--- a/mpi/mpi-mul.c
+++ b/mpi/mpi-mul.c
@@ -203,6 +203,133 @@ _gcry_mpi_mul (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v)
_gcry_mpi_free_limb_space (tmp_limb, tmp_limb_nlimbs);
}
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+static void
+_gcry_mpi_mul_sec (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v)
+{
+ mpi_size_t usize, vsize, wsize;
+ mpi_ptr_t up, vp, wp;
+ int usign, vsign, usecure, vsecure, sign_product;
+ int assign_wp = 0;
+ int clean_vp = 0;
+ mpi_ptr_t tmp_limb = NULL;
+ unsigned int tmp_limb_nlimbs = 0;
+
+ if (u->nlimbs < v->nlimbs)
+ { /* Swap U and V. */
+ usize = v->nlimbs;
+ usign = v->sign;
+ usecure = mpi_is_secure (v);
+ up = v->d;
+ vsize = u->nlimbs;
+ vsign = u->sign;
+ vsecure = mpi_is_secure (u);
+ vp = u->d;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ usize = u->nlimbs;
+ usign = u->sign;
+ usecure = mpi_is_secure (u);
+ up = u->d;
+ vsize = v->nlimbs;
+ vsign = v->sign;
+ vsecure = mpi_is_secure (v);
+ vp = v->d;
+ }
+ sign_product = usign ^ vsign;
+ wp = w->d;
+
+ /* make sure u and v have the same length by extending the limbs to the larger one, now u */
+ if (usize != vsize)
+ {
+ mpi_limb_t *tmp_vp = mpi_alloc_limb_space (usize, vsecure);
+ clean_vp = 1;
+ MPN_ZERO (tmp_vp, (usize - vsize));
+ MPN_COPY (tmp_vp + (usize - vsize), vp, vsize);
+ vsize = usize;
+ vp = tmp_vp;
+ }
+
+ /* w == u */
+ /* Ensure W has space enough to store the result. */
+ wsize = usize + vsize;
+ if (!mpi_is_secure (w) && (mpi_is_secure (u) || mpi_is_secure (v)))
+ {
+ /* w is not allocated in secure space but u or v is. To make sure
+ * that no temporary results are stored in w, we temporary use
+ * a newly allocated limb space for w */
+ wp = mpi_alloc_limb_space( wsize, 1 );
+ assign_wp = 2; /* mark it as 2 so that we can later copy it back to
+ * normal memory */
+ }
+ else if (w->alloced < wsize )
+ {
+ if (wp == up || wp == vp)
+ {
+ wp = mpi_alloc_limb_space (wsize, mpi_is_secure (w));
+ assign_wp = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mpi_resize(w, wsize );
+ wp = w->d;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ { /* Make U and V not overlap with W. */
+ if (wp == up)
+ {
+ /* W and U are identical. Allocate temporary space for U. */
+ tmp_limb_nlimbs = usize;
+ up = tmp_limb = mpi_alloc_limb_space (usize, usecure);
+ /* Is V identical too? Keep it identical with U. */
+ if (wp == vp)
+ vp = up;
+ /* Copy to the temporary space. */
+ MPN_COPY (up, wp, usize);
+ }
+ else if (wp == vp)
+ {
+ /* W and V are identical. Allocate temporary space for V. */
+ tmp_limb_nlimbs = vsize;
+ vp = tmp_limb = mpi_alloc_limb_space (vsize, vsecure);
+ /* Copy to the temporary space. */
+ MPN_COPY (vp, wp, vsize);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!vsize)
+ wsize = 0;
+ else
+ {
+ mpi_limb_t *tmp = mpi_alloc_limb_space (wsize * 2, mpi_is_secure (w));
+ mul_cs (wp, up, vp, vsize, tmp);
+ _gcry_mpi_free_limb_space (tmp, wsize * 2);
+ }
+
+ if (clean_vp)
+ {
+ _gcry_mpi_free_limb_space (vp, vsize);
+ }
+ if (assign_wp)
+ {
+ if (assign_wp == 2)
+ {
+ /* copy the temp wp from secure memory back to normal memory */
+ mpi_ptr_t tmp_wp = mpi_alloc_limb_space (wsize, 0);
+ MPN_COPY (tmp_wp, wp, wsize);
+ _gcry_mpi_free_limb_space (wp, 0);
+ wp = tmp_wp;
+ }
+ _gcry_mpi_assign_limb_space (w, wp, wsize);
+ }
+ w->nlimbs = wsize;
+ w->sign = sign_product;
+ if (tmp_limb)
+ _gcry_mpi_free_limb_space (tmp_limb, tmp_limb_nlimbs);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
void
_gcry_mpi_mulm (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, gcry_mpi_t m)
@@ -221,3 +348,45 @@ _gcry_mpi_mulm (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, gcry_mpi_t m)
if (temp_m)
mpi_free(temp_m);
}
+
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+static void
+_gcry_mpi_mod_sec (gcry_mpi_t ret, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t mod)
+{
+ size_t asize = a->nlimbs;
+ size_t modsize = mod->nlimbs;
+ size_t tmp_size = mod_limb_numb (asize, modsize);
+ mpi_limb_t *tmp_limb = mpi_alloc_limb_space (tmp_size, mpi_is_secure(a));
+ mod_cs (ret->d, a->d, asize, mod->d, modsize, tmp_limb);
+ /* cut the length to the mod size */
+ ret->nlimbs = mod->nlimbs;
+ _gcry_mpi_free_limb_space (tmp_limb, tmp_size);
+}
+
+/* The constant time code uses different order of the limbs ... */
+static void
+_gcry_mpi_reverse_sec (gcry_mpi_t w)
+{
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < w->nlimbs/2; i++)
+ {
+ mpi_limb_t t = w->d[i];
+ w->d[i] = w->d[w->nlimbs - i - 1];
+ w->d[w->nlimbs - i - 1] = t;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+_gcry_mpi_mulm_sec (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, gcry_mpi_t m)
+{
+ /* w == u */
+ _gcry_mpi_reverse_sec (u);
+ _gcry_mpi_reverse_sec (v);
+ _gcry_mpi_reverse_sec (m);
+ _gcry_mpi_mul_sec (w, u, v);
+ _gcry_mpi_mod_sec (w, w, m);
+
+ /* get them back to the order the rest of the code expects */
+ _gcry_mpi_reverse_sec (w); /* -- this is the result */
+ _gcry_mpi_reverse_sec (m); /* -- this might be still used by the calling function */
+}
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
diff --git a/src/gcrypt-int.h b/src/gcrypt-int.h
index 1b449281..7e9e9894 100644
--- a/src/gcrypt-int.h
+++ b/src/gcrypt-int.h
@@ -453,6 +453,9 @@ void _gcry_mpi_subm (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, gcry_mpi_t m);
void _gcry_mpi_mul (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v);
void _gcry_mpi_mul_ui (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, unsigned long v );
void _gcry_mpi_mulm (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, gcry_mpi_t m);
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+void _gcry_mpi_mulm_sec (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, gcry_mpi_t m);
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
void _gcry_mpi_mul_2exp (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, unsigned long cnt);
void _gcry_mpi_div (gcry_mpi_t q, gcry_mpi_t r,
gcry_mpi_t dividend, gcry_mpi_t divisor, int round);
@@ -548,6 +551,9 @@ int _gcry_mpi_get_flag (gcry_mpi_t a, enum gcry_mpi_flag flag);
#define mpi_mul_2exp(w,u,v) _gcry_mpi_mul_2exp ((w),(u),(v))
#define mpi_mul(w,u,v) _gcry_mpi_mul ((w),(u),(v))
#define mpi_mulm(w,u,v,m) _gcry_mpi_mulm ((w),(u),(v),(m))
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+#define mpi_mulm_sec(w,u,v,m) _gcry_mpi_mulm_sec ((w),(u),(v),(m))
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
#define mpi_powm(w,b,e,m) _gcry_mpi_powm ( (w), (b), (e), (m) )
#define mpi_tdiv(q,r,a,m) _gcry_mpi_div ( (q), (r), (a), (m), 0)
#define mpi_fdiv(q,r,a,m) _gcry_mpi_div ( (q), (r), (a), (m), -1)
--
2.45.2
From d53f8b647dce87ebede7992b63add0271907fdc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2024 16:39:18 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/9] Constant time conversion of the message to the SEXP
* cipher/rsa.c (rsa_decrypt): Use constant time conversion to SEXP after
decryption.
* src/const-time.c (_gcry_ct_memcpy): Constant time memcpy. New.
* src/const-time.h (ct_lt): New.
(ct_char_gen{,_inv}_mask): New.
* src/sexp.c (do_vsexp_sscan): Introduce constant time version of %b
--
The current conversion of the message back to the SEXP buffer leaks the
length of the decrypted message. This introduces a constant-time variant
that should run for the same time for any input length.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/rsa.c | 4 ++++
src/const-time.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/const-time.h | 12 ++++++++++++
src/sexp.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
index 2f735f9c..52f2aa89 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa.c
@@ -1519,7 +1519,11 @@ rsa_decrypt (gcry_sexp_t *r_plain, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
rc = _gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (&unpad, &unpadlen, nbits, plain);
mpi_free (plain);
plain = NULL;
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+ rc_sexp = sexp_build (&result, NULL, "(value %c)", (int)unpadlen, unpad, (nbits + 7) / 8);
+#else
rc_sexp = sexp_build (&result, NULL, "(value %b)", (int)unpadlen, unpad);
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
*r_plain = sexp_null_cond (result, ct_is_not_zero (rc));
dummy = sexp_null_cond (result, ct_is_zero (rc));
sexp_release (dummy);
diff --git a/src/const-time.c b/src/const-time.c
index 0fb53a07..3f9a9d17 100644
--- a/src/const-time.c
+++ b/src/const-time.c
@@ -86,3 +86,27 @@ _gcry_ct_memmov_cond (void *dst, const void *src, size_t len,
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
b_dst[i] = (b_dst[i] & mask2) | (b_src[i] & mask1);
}
+
+/*
+ * Copy LEN bytes from memory area SRC to memory area DST. The
+ * bytes are read up to the BUFFER_LEN size to keep the operation
+ * not dependent on the message length (both SRC and DST buffers
+ * need to have this size!).
+ */
+void
+_gcry_ct_memcpy (void *dst, const void *src, size_t len, size_t buffer_len)
+{
+ unsigned char mask_a, mask_b;
+ unsigned char *b_dst = dst;
+ const unsigned char *b_src = src;
+ unsigned int writing;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < buffer_len; i++)
+ {
+ writing = ct_lt (i, len);
+ mask_b = ct_uchar_gen_inv_mask (writing);
+ mask_a = ct_uchar_gen_mask (writing);
+ b_dst[i] = (b_src[i] & mask_a) | (b_dst[i] & mask_b);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/src/const-time.h b/src/const-time.h
index 0c641a64..e997158e 100644
--- a/src/const-time.h
+++ b/src/const-time.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#define ct_not_memequal _gcry_ct_not_memequal
#define ct_memequal _gcry_ct_memequal
#define ct_memmov_cond _gcry_ct_memmov_cond
+#define ct_memcpy _gcry_ct_memcpy
#ifndef HAVE_GCC_ASM_VOLATILE_MEMORY
@@ -33,6 +34,14 @@ extern volatile unsigned int _gcry_ct_vzero;
extern volatile unsigned int _gcry_ct_vone;
#endif
+/*
+ * Return 1 if A < B and return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int
+ct_lt (unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+ return (a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))) >> (sizeof(unsigned int)*8 - 1);
+}
static inline size_t
ct_lt_s (size_t a, size_t b)
@@ -111,6 +120,7 @@ unsigned int _gcry_ct_memequal (const void *b1, const void *b2, size_t len);
#endif
DEFINE_CT_TYPE_GEN_MASK(uintptr, uintptr_t)
DEFINE_CT_TYPE_GEN_MASK(ulong, unsigned long)
+DEFINE_CT_TYPE_GEN_MASK(uchar, unsigned char)
/*
* Return all bits set if A is 0 and return 1 otherwise.
@@ -135,6 +145,7 @@ DEFINE_CT_TYPE_GEN_MASK(ulong, unsigned long)
#endif
DEFINE_CT_TYPE_GEN_INV_MASK(uintptr, uintptr_t)
DEFINE_CT_TYPE_GEN_INV_MASK(ulong, unsigned long)
+DEFINE_CT_TYPE_GEN_INV_MASK(uchar, unsigned char)
/*
* Return A when OP_ENABLED=1
@@ -169,5 +180,6 @@ sexp_null_cond (gcry_sexp_t w, unsigned long op_enable)
*/
void _gcry_ct_memmov_cond (void *dst, const void *src, size_t len,
unsigned long op_enable);
+void _gcry_ct_memcpy (void *dst, const void *src, size_t len, size_t buffer_len);
#endif /*GCRY_CONST_TIME_H*/
diff --git a/src/sexp.c b/src/sexp.c
index b15cb486..8d10cd8c 100644
--- a/src/sexp.c
+++ b/src/sexp.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#define GCRYPT_NO_MPI_MACROS 1
#include "g10lib.h"
+#include "const-time.h"
/* Notes on the internal memory layout.
@@ -1079,6 +1080,10 @@ unquote_string (const char *string, size_t length, unsigned char *buf)
* %d - integer stored as string (no autoswitch to secure allocation)
* %b - memory buffer; this takes _two_ arguments: an integer with the
* length of the buffer and a pointer to the buffer.
+ * %c - memory buffer same as %b, but written in constant time; this
+ * takes _three_ arguments: an integer with the length of the buffer,
+ * a pointer to the buffer and the maximum length of the buffer
+ * to avoid potential side channel leaking the buffer length.
* %S - Copy an gcry_sexp_t here. The S-expression needs to be a
* regular one, starting with a parenthesis.
* (no autoswitch to secure allocation)
@@ -1204,7 +1209,7 @@ do_vsexp_sscan (gcry_sexp_t *retsexp, size_t *erroff,
{
switch (*p)
{
- case 'b': case 't': case 'v': case 'n': case 'f':
+ case 'b': case 'c': case 't': case 'v': case 'n': case 'f':
case 'r': case '"': case '\'': case '\\':
quoted_esc = 0;
break;
@@ -1538,14 +1543,27 @@ do_vsexp_sscan (gcry_sexp_t *retsexp, size_t *erroff,
memcpy (c.pos, astr, alen);
c.pos += alen;
}
- else if (*p == 'b')
+ else if (*p == 'b' || *p == 'c')
{
/* Insert a memory buffer. */
const char *astr;
- int alen;
+ int alen, buflen = 0, reallen = 0;
ARG_NEXT (alen, int);
ARG_NEXT (astr, const char *);
+ if (*p == 'c')
+ {
+ ARG_NEXT (buflen, int);
+ if (buflen < alen)
+ {
+ *erroff = p - buffer;
+ err = GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ /* Do all the calculations with the buflen */
+ reallen = alen;
+ alen = buflen;
+ }
if (alen < 0)
{
@@ -1578,9 +1596,18 @@ do_vsexp_sscan (gcry_sexp_t *retsexp, size_t *erroff,
}
*c.pos++ = ST_DATA;
- STORE_LEN (c.pos, alen);
- memcpy (c.pos, astr, alen);
- c.pos += alen;
+ if (*p == 'c')
+ {
+ STORE_LEN (c.pos, reallen);
+ ct_memcpy (c.pos, astr, reallen, buflen);
+ c.pos += reallen;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ STORE_LEN (c.pos, alen);
+ memcpy (c.pos, astr, alen);
+ c.pos += alen;
+ }
}
else if (*p == 'd')
{
--
2.45.2
From 79bcb76bae1ebf4bda66d69c332d19cfc0c7f64f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 30 May 2024 17:50:36 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 6/9] rsa: Implement constant-time conversion of MPI to string
--
* cipher/rsa-common.c (_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc): Replace
_gcry_mpi_print() with constant time operation.
The _gcry_mpi_print() does a lot of housekeeping on the provided MPI
including skipping all the leading zeroes. If the ciphertext decrypted
to many leading zeroes, the output from this function is much shorter
(could be even all zeroes), which would immediately fail.
This implements the dummy conversion of the MPI with the knowledge that
the encrypted data will always have the fixed length, providing constant
time operation.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/rsa-common.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/cipher/rsa-common.c b/cipher/rsa-common.c
index e45cb30d..a61d82e3 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa-common.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa-common.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include "cipher.h"
#include "pubkey-internal.h"
#include "const-time.h"
+#include "bufhelp.h"
/* Turn VALUE into an octet string and store it in an allocated buffer
@@ -199,7 +200,6 @@ gpg_err_code_t
_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
unsigned int nbits, gcry_mpi_t value)
{
- gcry_error_t err;
unsigned char *frame = NULL;
size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
size_t n, n0;
@@ -208,6 +208,36 @@ _gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
*r_result = NULL;
+ {
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+ /* Allocate more to fit the whole MPI and allow moving it later to the right place */
+ size_t alloc_len = value->nlimbs * BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB;
+ if ( !(frame = xtrymalloc_secure (alloc_len)))
+ return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+
+ /* shovel the MPI content to the buffer as it is */
+ unsigned char *p = frame;
+ for (int i = value->nlimbs - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ {
+ mpi_limb_t *alimb = &value->d[i];
+#if BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB == 4
+ buf_put_be32 (p, *alimb);
+ p += 4;
+#elif BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB == 8
+ buf_put_be64 (p, *alimb);
+ p += 8;
+#else
+# error please implement for this limb size.
+#endif
+ }
+ /* Remove leading zeroes, but not all! Keep the buffer to the nframe length!
+ * -- valid PKCS#1.5 padding will never have different lengths, than modulus */
+ memmov_independently (frame, frame + (alloc_len - nframe), nframe, alloc_len);
+ n = 0;
+ failed |= ct_not_equal_byte (frame[n++], 0x00);
+#else
+ gcry_error_t err;
+
if ( !(frame = xtrymalloc_secure (nframe)))
return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
@@ -235,6 +265,9 @@ _gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
n = 0;
if (!frame[0])
n++;
+#endif
+ }
+
failed |= ct_not_equal_byte (frame[n++], 0x02);
/* Find the terminating zero byte. */
--
2.45.2
From 40439e26a5c4785222f9d48b1b31f12a583e1e0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 15:03:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 7/9] cipher: Use the constant time conversion also for OAEP
--
* cipher/rsa-common.c (mpi_to_string): New function
(_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc): Use new function for MPI to string
conversion.
(_gcry_rsa_oaep_decode): Use the new function for MPI to string
conversion.
* cipher/rsa.c (rsa_decrypt): Use constant time conversion to S-exp for
OAEP padding.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/rsa-common.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
cipher/rsa.c | 4 +++
2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/rsa-common.c b/cipher/rsa-common.c
index a61d82e3..82a9e083 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa-common.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa-common.c
@@ -192,31 +192,26 @@ memmov_independently (void *dst, const void *src, size_t len, size_t buflen)
}
-/* Decode a plaintext in VALUE assuming pkcs#1 block type 2 padding.
- NBITS is the size of the secret key. On success the result is
- stored as a newly allocated buffer at R_RESULT and its valid length at
- R_RESULTLEN. On error NULL is stored at R_RESULT. */
-gpg_err_code_t
-_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
- unsigned int nbits, gcry_mpi_t value)
+static unsigned char *
+mpi_to_string(gcry_mpi_t value, size_t nframe)
{
unsigned char *frame = NULL;
- size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
- size_t n, n0;
- unsigned int failed = 0;
- unsigned int not_found = 1;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ size_t noff;
+ /* Allocate memory to fit the whole MPI limbs and allow moving it later to the right place */
+ size_t alloc_len = value->nlimbs * BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB;
- *r_result = NULL;
+ /* for too short input, we need to allocate at least modulus length (which might still be valid in case of OAEP) */
+ noff = (alloc_len < nframe) ? nframe - alloc_len : 0;
+ alloc_len = alloc_len + noff;
- {
-#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
- /* Allocate more to fit the whole MPI and allow moving it later to the right place */
- size_t alloc_len = value->nlimbs * BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB;
if ( !(frame = xtrymalloc_secure (alloc_len)))
- return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+ return NULL;
+ if (noff)
+ memset (frame, 0, noff);
+ p = frame + noff;
/* shovel the MPI content to the buffer as it is */
- unsigned char *p = frame;
for (int i = value->nlimbs - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
mpi_limb_t *alimb = &value->d[i];
@@ -230,9 +225,34 @@ _gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
# error please implement for this limb size.
#endif
}
- /* Remove leading zeroes, but not all! Keep the buffer to the nframe length!
- * -- valid PKCS#1.5 padding will never have different lengths, than modulus */
+ /* Move the MPI to the right place -- with the least significant bytes aligned to the modulus length
+ * -- this might keep some leading zeroes at the beginning of the buffer, but this might be valid for OAEP */
memmov_independently (frame, frame + (alloc_len - nframe), nframe, alloc_len);
+ return frame;
+}
+
+/* Decode a plaintext in VALUE assuming pkcs#1 block type 2 padding.
+ NBITS is the size of the secret key. On success the result is
+ stored as a newly allocated buffer at R_RESULT and its valid length at
+ R_RESULTLEN. On error NULL is stored at R_RESULT. */
+gpg_err_code_t
+_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
+ unsigned int nbits, gcry_mpi_t value)
+{
+ unsigned char *frame = NULL;
+ size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
+ size_t n, n0;
+ unsigned int failed = 0;
+ unsigned int not_found = 1;
+
+ *r_result = NULL;
+
+ {
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+ frame = mpi_to_string(value, nframe);
+ if (frame == NULL)
+ return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+
n = 0;
failed |= ct_not_equal_byte (frame[n++], 0x00);
#else
@@ -265,7 +285,7 @@ _gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
n = 0;
if (!frame[0])
n++;
-#endif
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
}
failed |= ct_not_equal_byte (frame[n++], 0x02);
@@ -709,14 +729,23 @@ _gcry_rsa_oaep_decode (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
happen due to the leading zero in OAEP frames and due to the
following random octets (seed^mask) which may have leading zero
bytes. This all is needed to cope with our leading zeroes
- suppressing MPI implementation. The code implictly implements
+ suppressing MPI implementation. The code implicitly implements
Step 1b (bail out if NFRAME != N). */
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+ frame = mpi_to_string(value, nkey);
+ if (frame == NULL)
+ {
+ xfree (lhash);
+ return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+ }
+#else
rc = octet_string_from_mpi (&frame, NULL, value, nkey);
if (rc)
{
xfree (lhash);
return GPG_ERR_ENCODING_PROBLEM;
}
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
nframe = nkey;
/* Step 1c: Check that the key is long enough. */
@@ -731,7 +760,7 @@ _gcry_rsa_oaep_decode (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
gcry_mpi_aprint above. */
/* Allocate space for SEED and DB. */
- seed = xtrymalloc_secure (nframe - 1);
+ seed = xtrymalloc_secure (nframe);
if (!seed)
{
rc = gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
index 52f2aa89..c196724c 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa.c
@@ -1537,7 +1537,11 @@ rsa_decrypt (gcry_sexp_t *r_plain, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
plain, ctx.label, ctx.labellen);
mpi_free (plain);
plain = NULL;
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+ rc_sexp = sexp_build (&result, NULL, "(value %c)", (int)unpadlen, unpad, (nbits + 7) / 8);
+#else
rc_sexp = sexp_build (&result, NULL, "(value %b)", (int)unpadlen, unpad);
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
*r_plain = sexp_null_cond (result, ct_is_not_zero (rc));
dummy = sexp_null_cond (result, ct_is_zero (rc));
sexp_release (dummy);
--
2.45.2
From 70e52a964f4ce6ef7c9f0ad53722e2aa289f685b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2024 19:06:17 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 8/9] Implement implicit rejection for PKCS#1.5 decipher
--
* cipher/pubkey-internal.h
(_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc_implicit_rejection): New.
* pubkey-util.c (_gcry_pk_util_parse_flaglist): Parse the new flag
no-implicit-rejection.
* cipher/rsa-common.c (rsa_prf): New function.
(_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc_implicit_rejection): New function.
* cipher/rsa.c (rsa_decrypt): Handle implicit rejection.
* src/cipher.h (pk_encoding): New flag.
* tests/pkcs1v2.c (extract_cmp_data): Allow quiet test.
(check_v15crypt): Add support for implicit rejection.
* tests/pkcs1v2-v15c.h: Add test vectors for implicit rejection.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/pubkey-internal.h | 8 ++
cipher/pubkey-util.c | 9 ++
cipher/rsa-common.c | 182 +++++++++++++++++++++++
cipher/rsa.c | 81 +++++++++++
src/cipher.h | 37 ++---
src/const-time.c | 2 +-
src/const-time.h | 3 +-
tests/pkcs1v2-v15c.h | 304 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/pkcs1v2.c | 120 +++++++++++-----
9 files changed, 689 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/pubkey-internal.h b/cipher/pubkey-internal.h
index acf45105..f66574fa 100644
--- a/cipher/pubkey-internal.h
+++ b/cipher/pubkey-internal.h
@@ -55,6 +55,14 @@ _gcry_rsa_pkcs1_encode_for_enc (gcry_mpi_t *r_result, unsigned int nbits,
gpg_err_code_t
_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
unsigned int nbits, gcry_mpi_t value);
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+gpg_err_code_t
+_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc_implicit_rejection (unsigned char **r_result,
+ size_t *r_resultlen,
+ unsigned int nbits,
+ gcry_mpi_t value,
+ unsigned char *kdk);
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
gpg_err_code_t
_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_encode_raw_for_sig (gcry_mpi_t *r_result, unsigned int nbits,
const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen);
diff --git a/cipher/pubkey-util.c b/cipher/pubkey-util.c
index 68defea6..e760dd4c 100644
--- a/cipher/pubkey-util.c
+++ b/cipher/pubkey-util.c
@@ -193,6 +193,15 @@ _gcry_pk_util_parse_flaglist (gcry_sexp_t list,
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_FLAG;
break;
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+ case 21:
+ if (!memcmp (s, "no-implicit-rejection", 21))
+ flags |= PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECTION;
+ else if (!igninvflag)
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INV_FLAG;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
+
default:
if (!igninvflag)
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_FLAG;
diff --git a/cipher/rsa-common.c b/cipher/rsa-common.c
index 82a9e083..3fd62505 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa-common.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa-common.c
@@ -318,6 +318,187 @@ _gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (unsigned char **r_result, size_t *r_resultlen,
}
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+#define SHA256_LEN 32
+static gcry_err_code_t
+rsa_prf(unsigned char *out, size_t out_len, const char *label, size_t label_len, unsigned char *kdk, size_t nbits)
+{
+ gcry_err_code_t rc = GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
+ size_t pos;
+ uint16_t iter = 0;
+ unsigned char be_iter[2];
+ unsigned char be_bitlen[2];
+ gcry_md_hd_t hd;
+ gcry_error_t err;
+
+ be_bitlen[0] = (nbits >> 8) & 0xff;
+ be_bitlen[1] = nbits & 0xff;
+
+ err = _gcry_md_open (&hd, GCRY_MD_SHA256, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ return GPG_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ }
+ err = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, kdk, SHA256_LEN);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ _gcry_md_close (hd);
+ return GPG_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ }
+ for (pos = 0; pos < out_len; pos += SHA256_LEN, iter++)
+ {
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+
+ _gcry_md_reset(hd);
+
+ be_iter[0] = (iter >> 8) & 0xff;
+ be_iter[1] = iter & 0xff;
+ _gcry_md_write (hd, be_iter, sizeof (be_iter));
+ _gcry_md_write (hd, label, label_len);
+ _gcry_md_write (hd, be_bitlen, sizeof (be_bitlen));
+
+ tmp = _gcry_md_read(hd, 0);
+ if (pos + SHA256_LEN > out_len)
+ {
+ memcpy(out + pos, tmp, out_len - pos);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(out + pos, tmp, SHA256_LEN);
+ }
+ }
+ _gcry_md_close (hd);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Decode a plaintext in VALUE assuming pkcs#1 block type 2 padding.
+ NBITS is the size of the secret key. On success the result is
+ stored as a newly allocated buffer at R_RESULT and its valid length at
+ R_RESULTLEN. On error R_RESULT contains bogus value of random length.
+ For more information, see description of Implicit Rejection in Marvin paper
+ https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/marvin-attack-paper.pdf */
+#define MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES 128
+gpg_err_code_t
+_gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc_implicit_rejection (unsigned char **r_result,
+ size_t *r_resultlen,
+ unsigned int nbits,
+ gcry_mpi_t value,
+ unsigned char *kdk)
+{
+ unsigned char *frame = NULL;
+ size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
+ size_t n, n0;
+ unsigned int failed = 0;
+ unsigned int not_found = 1;
+ int i, j;
+ uint16_t len_mask;
+ uint16_t max_sep_offset;
+ unsigned char *synthetic = NULL;
+ unsigned long synthethic_length;
+ uint16_t len_candidate;
+ unsigned char candidate_lengths[MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate)];
+ int synth_msg_index = 0, msg_index;
+
+ *r_result = NULL;
+
+ synthetic = xtrymalloc(nframe);
+ if (synthetic == NULL)
+ {
+ free (synthetic);
+ return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+ }
+
+ if (rsa_prf(synthetic, nframe, "message", 7, kdk, nframe * 8) < 0)
+ {
+ xfree (synthetic);
+ return GPG_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ }
+
+ /* decide how long the random message should be */
+ if (rsa_prf(candidate_lengths, sizeof(candidate_lengths),
+ "length", 6, kdk, MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate) * 8) < 0)
+ {
+ xfree (synthetic);
+ return GPG_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ }
+
+ len_mask = max_sep_offset = nframe - 2 - 8;
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 1;
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 2;
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 4;
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 8;
+
+ synthethic_length = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * (int)sizeof(len_candidate);
+ i += sizeof(len_candidate))
+ {
+ len_candidate = (candidate_lengths[i] << 8) | candidate_lengths[i + 1];
+ len_candidate &= len_mask;
+
+ synthethic_length = ct_ulong_select(
+ len_candidate, synthethic_length,
+ ct_lt(len_candidate, max_sep_offset));
+ }
+
+ synth_msg_index = nframe - synthethic_length;
+
+ /* we have alternative message ready, check the real one */
+ /* mostly copy from _gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc */
+ frame = mpi_to_string(value, nframe);
+ if (frame == NULL)
+ {
+ xfree (synthetic);
+ return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+ }
+
+ /* FRAME = 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M */
+ n = 0;
+ failed |= ct_not_equal_byte (frame[n++], 0x00);
+ failed |= ct_not_equal_byte (frame[n++], 0x02);
+
+ /* Find the terminating zero byte. */
+ n0 = n;
+ for (; n < nframe; n++)
+ {
+ not_found &= ct_not_equal_byte (frame[n], 0x00);
+ n0 += not_found;
+ }
+
+ failed |= not_found;
+ n0 += ct_is_zero (not_found); /* Skip the zero byte. */
+ /* the valid padding is at least 8 bytes -- the plaintext needs to start at index 11 or later */
+ failed |= ct_lt_s (n0, 11);
+
+ msg_index = ct_ulong_select (synth_msg_index, n0, failed);
+
+ /* To avoid the need memmove (O(N*log(N))), we use separate buffer where we move either
+ * of the messages. We can now also use the msg_index safely as its timing is not
+ * possible to distinguish valid and invalid padding */
+ for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < nframe && j < nframe; i++, j++)
+ {
+ frame[j] = ct_uchar_select (synthetic[i], frame[i], failed);
+ }
+
+ *r_resultlen = j;
+ *r_result = frame;
+
+ if (DBG_CIPHER)
+ {
+ if (!failed)
+ log_printhex ("value extracted from PKCS#1 block type 2 encoded data",
+ frame, nframe - n0);
+ else
+ log_printhex ("Synthetic value from implicit rejection",
+ synthetic, synthethic_length);
+ }
+
+ xfree (synthetic);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
+
+
/* Encode {VALUE,VALUELEN} for an NBITS keys and hash algorithm ALGO
using the pkcs#1 block type 1 padding. On success the result is
stored as a new MPI at R_RESULT. On error the value at R_RESULT is
diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
index c196724c..9c1ef1f7 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa.c
@@ -1436,6 +1436,7 @@ rsa_encrypt (gcry_sexp_t *r_ciph, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
}
+#define SHA256_LEN 32
static gcry_err_code_t
rsa_decrypt (gcry_sexp_t *r_plain, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
@@ -1451,6 +1452,9 @@ rsa_decrypt (gcry_sexp_t *r_plain, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
unsigned int nbits = rsa_get_nbits (keyparms);
gcry_sexp_t result = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t dummy = NULL;
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+ unsigned char kdk[SHA256_LEN];
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
rc = rsa_check_keysize (nbits);
if (rc)
@@ -1498,6 +1502,71 @@ rsa_decrypt (gcry_sexp_t *r_plain, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
mpi_normalize (data);
mpi_fdiv_r (data, data, sk.n);
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+ /* Implicit rejection: Derive KDK */
+ if (ctx.encoding == PUBKEY_ENC_PKCS1)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf, *tmp;
+ unsigned int nbytes = (mpi_get_nbits (sk.n)+7)/8;
+ unsigned char key[SHA256_LEN];
+ gcry_md_hd_t hd;
+
+ /* (a) Convert `d` to big endian representation, left padded to the length of `n` */
+ rc = _gcry_mpi_to_octet_string (&buf, NULL, sk.d, nbytes);
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* (b) Hash it using SHA-256 */
+ rc = _gcry_md_open (&hd, GCRY_MD_SHA256, 0);
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ xfree (buf);
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ _gcry_md_write (hd, buf, nbytes);
+ /* keep the buffer around -- it will be needed for the ciphertext */
+ tmp = _gcry_md_read (hd, GCRY_MD_SHA256);
+ memcpy(key, tmp, SHA256_LEN);
+ _gcry_md_close (hd);
+
+ /* (c) Use the hash as a SHA-256 HMAC key and ciphertext as a message */
+ rc = _gcry_md_open (&hd, GCRY_MD_SHA256, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC);
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ xfree (buf);
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ rc = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, key, sizeof (key));
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ xfree (buf);
+ _gcry_md_close (hd);
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to convert the ciphertext to string, padded to the length of modulus */
+ rc = _gcry_mpi_to_octet_string (NULL, buf, data, nbytes);
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ xfree (buf);
+ _gcry_md_close (hd);
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ _gcry_md_write (hd, buf, nbytes);
+ xfree (buf);
+ buf = _gcry_md_read (hd, 0);
+ memcpy(kdk, buf, SHA256_LEN);
+ _gcry_md_close (hd);
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
+
/* Allocate MPI for the plaintext. */
plain = mpi_snew (nbits);
@@ -1516,6 +1585,18 @@ rsa_decrypt (gcry_sexp_t *r_plain, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
switch (ctx.encoding)
{
case PUBKEY_ENC_PKCS1:
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+ if (!(ctx.flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECTION))
+ {
+ rc = _gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc_implicit_rejection (&unpad, &unpadlen, nbits, plain, kdk);
+ mpi_free (plain);
+ plain = NULL;
+ rc_sexp = sexp_build (&result, NULL, "(value %c)", (int)unpadlen, unpad, (nbits + 7) / 8);
+ *r_plain = result;
+ rc = ct_ulong_select (rc_sexp, rc, ct_is_zero (rc) & ct_is_not_zero (rc_sexp));
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
rc = _gcry_rsa_pkcs1_decode_for_enc (&unpad, &unpadlen, nbits, plain);
mpi_free (plain);
plain = NULL;
diff --git a/src/cipher.h b/src/cipher.h
index 0a2551fe..e522f39b 100644
--- a/src/cipher.h
+++ b/src/cipher.h
@@ -26,24 +26,25 @@
#include "../random/random.h"
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING (1 << 0)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_RFC6979 (1 << 1)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_FIXEDLEN (1 << 2)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_LEGACYRESULT (1 << 3)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_RAW_FLAG (1 << 4)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_TRANSIENT_KEY (1 << 5)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_USE_X931 (1 << 6)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_USE_FIPS186 (1 << 7)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_USE_FIPS186_2 (1 << 8)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_PARAM (1 << 9)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_COMP (1 << 10)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_NOCOMP (1 << 11)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_EDDSA (1 << 12)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_GOST (1 << 13)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_KEYTEST (1 << 14)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK (1 << 15)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_SM2 (1 << 16)
-#define PUBKEY_FLAG_PREHASH (1 << 17)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING (1 << 0)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_RFC6979 (1 << 1)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_FIXEDLEN (1 << 2)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_LEGACYRESULT (1 << 3)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_RAW_FLAG (1 << 4)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_TRANSIENT_KEY (1 << 5)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_USE_X931 (1 << 6)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_USE_FIPS186 (1 << 7)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_USE_FIPS186_2 (1 << 8)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_PARAM (1 << 9)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_COMP (1 << 10)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_NOCOMP (1 << 11)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_EDDSA (1 << 12)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_GOST (1 << 13)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_KEYTEST (1 << 14)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK (1 << 15)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_SM2 (1 << 16)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_PREHASH (1 << 17)
+#define PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (1 << 18)
enum pk_operation
diff --git a/src/const-time.c b/src/const-time.c
index 3f9a9d17..c7c42aa1 100644
--- a/src/const-time.c
+++ b/src/const-time.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ _gcry_ct_memmov_cond (void *dst, const void *src, size_t len,
void
_gcry_ct_memcpy (void *dst, const void *src, size_t len, size_t buffer_len)
{
- unsigned char mask_a, mask_b;
+ volatile unsigned char mask_a, mask_b;
unsigned char *b_dst = dst;
const unsigned char *b_src = src;
unsigned int writing;
diff --git a/src/const-time.h b/src/const-time.h
index e997158e..4a5abafc 100644
--- a/src/const-time.h
+++ b/src/const-time.h
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ extern volatile unsigned int _gcry_ct_vone;
static inline int
ct_lt (unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
- return (a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))) >> (sizeof(unsigned int)*8 - 1);
+ return (a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))) >> (sizeof(unsigned int) * 8 - 1);
}
static inline size_t
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ DEFINE_CT_TYPE_GEN_INV_MASK(uchar, unsigned char)
}
DEFINE_CT_TYPE_SELECT_FUNC(uintptr, uintptr_t)
DEFINE_CT_TYPE_SELECT_FUNC(ulong, unsigned long)
+DEFINE_CT_TYPE_SELECT_FUNC(uchar, unsigned char)
/*
* Return NULL when OP_ENABLED=1
diff --git a/tests/pkcs1v2-v15c.h b/tests/pkcs1v2-v15c.h
index 26c7b238..cb750d4f 100644
--- a/tests/pkcs1v2-v15c.h
+++ b/tests/pkcs1v2-v15c.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
const char *mesg;
const char *seed;
const char *encr;
+ const char *synt;
} m[20];
} tbl[] =
{
@@ -3915,5 +3916,308 @@
"25db1dd892b71bb74a5cf68263d8fd58f1a48e6c2fcb8c0b71a251cfc1a20157"
}
}
+ },
+ {
+ "A 2048-bit RSA Test vectors for the Bleichenbacher workaround",
+ "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",
+ "010001",
+ "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",
+ {
+ {
+ "1. a random positive test case",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6c6f72656d20697073756d20646f6c6f722073697420616d6574"
+ },{
+ "2. a random negative test case decrypting to empty",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ ""
+ },{
+ "3. invalid decrypting to max length message",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "22d850137b9eebe092b24f602dc5bb7918c16bd89ddbf20467b119d205f9c2e4bd7d2592cf1e532106e0f33557565923c73a02d4f09c0c22bea89148183e60317f7028b3aa1f261f91c979393101d7e15f4067e63979b32751658ef769610fe97cf9cef3278b3117d384051c3b1d82c251c2305418c8f6840530e631aad63e70e20e025bcd8efb54c92ec6d3b106a2f8e64eeff7d38495b0fc50c97138af4b1c0a67a1c4e27b077b8439332edfa8608dfeae653cd6a628ac550395f7e74390e42c11682234870925eeaa1fa71b76cf1f2ee3bda69f6717033ff8b7c95c9799e7a3bea5e7e4a1c359772fb6b1c6e6c516661dfe30c3"
+ },{
+ "4. invalid decrypting to message with length specified by second to last value from PRF",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "0f9b"
+ },{
+ "5. invalid decrypting to message with length specified by third to last value from PRF",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "4f02"
+ },{
+ "6. positive test with 11 byte long value",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6c6f72656d20697073756d"
+ },{
+ "7. positive test with 11 byte long value and zero padded ciphertext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6c6f72656d20697073756d"
+ },{
+ "8. positive test with 11 byte long value and zero truncated ciphertext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6c6f72656d20697073756d"
+ },{
+ "9. positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero padded ciphertext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6c6f72656d20697073756d"
+ },{
+ "10. a random negative test that generates an 11 byte long message",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "af9ac70191c92413cb9f2d"
+ },{
+ "11. an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "a1f8c9255c35cfba403ccc"
+ },{
+ "12. an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "e6d700309ca0ed62452254"
+ },{
+ "13. an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte in first byte of ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic plaintext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a"
+ },{
+ "14. an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte removed from first byte of ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic plaintext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a"
+ },{
+ "15. an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes in first bytes of ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic plaintext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "d5cf555b1d6151029a429a"
+ },{
+ "16. an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes removed from first bytes of ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic plaintext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "d5cf555b1d6151029a429a"
+ },{
+ "17. and invalid ciphertext, otherwise valid but starting with 000002, decrypts to random 11 byte long synthethic plaintext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "3d4a054d9358209e9cbbb9"
+ },{
+ "18. negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte in first byte of padding",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "1f037dd717b07d3e7f7359"
+ },{
+ "19. negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte at the eigth byte of padding",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "63cb0bf65fc8255dd29e17"
+ },{
+ "20. negative test with an otherwise valid plaintext but with missing separator byte",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6f09a0b62699337c497b0b"
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "A 2049-bit RSA Test vectors for the Bleichenbacher workaround",
+ "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",
+ "010001",
+ "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",
+ {
+ {
+ "1. malformed that generates length specified by 3rd last value from PRF",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "42"
+ },{
+ "2. simple positive test case",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6c6f72656d20697073756d"
+ },{
+ "3. positive test case with null padded ciphertext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6c6f72656d20697073756d"
+ },{
+ "4. positive test case with null truncated ciphertext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6c6f72656d20697073756d"
+ },{
+ "5. positive test case with double null padded ciphertext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6c6f72656d20697073756d"
+ },{
+ "6. positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6c6f72656d20697073756d"
+ },{
+ "7. a random negative test case that generates an 11 byte long message",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "1189b6f5498fd6df532b00"
+ },{
+ "8. otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "f6d0f5b78082fe61c04674"
+ },{
+ "9. otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "1ab287fcef3ff17067914d"
+ },{
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "RSA decrypt with 3072 bit keys",
+ "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",
+ "010001",
+ "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",
+ {
+ {
+ "1. a random invalid ciphertext that generates an empty synthethic one",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ ""
+ },{
+ "2. a random invalid that has PRF output with a length one byte too long",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "7db0390d75fcf9d4c59cf27b264190d856da9abd11e92334d0e5f71005cfed865a711dfa28b791188374b61916dbc11339bf14b06f5f3f68c206c5607380e13da3129bfb744157e1527dd6fdf6651248b028a496ae1b97702d44706043cdaa7a59c0f41367303f21f268968bf3bd2904db3ae5239b55f8b438d93d7db9d1666c071c0857e2ec37757463769c54e51f052b2a71b04c2869e9e7049a1037b8429206c99726f07289bac18363e7eb2a5b417f47c37a55090cda676517b3549c873f2fe95da9681752ec9864b069089a2ed2f340c8b04ee00079055a817a3355b46ac7dc00d17f4504ccfbcfcadb0c04cb6b22069e179385ae1eafabad5521bac2b8a8ee1dfff59a22eb3fdacfc87175d10d7894cfd869d056057dd9944b869c1784fcc27f731bc46171d39570fbffbadf082d33f6352ecf44aca8d9478e53f5a5b7c852b401e8f5f74da49da91e65bdc97765a9523b7a0885a6f8afe5759d58009fbfa837472a968e6ae92026a5e0202a395483095302d6c3985b5f5831c521a271",
+ "56a3bea054e01338be9b7d7957539c"
+ },{
+ "3. a random invalid that generates a synthethic of maximum size",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "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"
+ },{
+ "4. a positive test case that decrypts to 9 byte long value",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "666f7274792074776f"
+ },{
+ "5. a positive test case with null padded ciphertext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "666f7274792074776f"
+ },{
+ "6. a positive test case with double null padded ciphertext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "666f7274792074776f"
+ },{
+ "7. a positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "666f7274792074776f"
+ },{
+ "8. a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "257906ca6de8307728"
+ },{
+ "9. a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message based on second to last value from PRF",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "043383c929060374ed"
+ },{
+ "10. a random negative test that generates message based on 3rd last value from PRF",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "70263fa6050534b9e0"
+ },{
+ "11. an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6d8d3a094ff3afff4c"
+ },{
+ "12. an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "c6ae80ffa80bc184b0"
+ },{
+ "13. an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in first byte of padding",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "8542c626fe533467acffcd4e617692244c9b5a3bf0a215c5d64891ced4bf4f9591b4b2aedff9843057986d81631b0acb3704ec2180e5696e8bd15b217a0ec36d2061b0e2182faa3d1c59bd3f9086a10077a3337a3f5da503ec3753535ffd25b837a12f2541afefd0cffb0224b8f874e4bed13949e105c075ed44e287c5ae03b155e06b90ed247d2c07f1ef3323e3508cce4e4074606c54172ad74d12f8c3a47f654ad671104bf7681e5b061862747d9afd37e07d8e0e2291e01f14a95a1bb4cbb47c304ef067595a3947ee2d722067e38a0f046f43ec29cac6a8801c6e3e9a2331b1d45a7aa2c6af3205be382dd026e389614ee095665a611ab2e8dced2ee1c9d08ac9de11aef5b3803fc9a9ce8231ec87b5fed386fb92ee3db995a89307bcba844bd0a691c29ae51216e949dfc813133cb06a07265fd807bcb3377f6adb0a481d9b7f442003115895939773e6b95371c4febef29edae946fa245e7c50729e2e558cfaad773d1fd5f67b457a6d9d17a847c6fcbdb103a86f35f228cefc06cea0",
+ "a8a9301daa01bb25c7"
+ },{
+ "14. an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in eight byte of padding",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "6c716fe01d44398018"
+ },{
+ "15. an otherwise valid plaintext, but with null separator missing",
+ NULL,
+ "",
+ "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",
+ "aa2de6cde4e2442884"
+ },{
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ }
+ }
}
};
diff --git a/tests/pkcs1v2.c b/tests/pkcs1v2.c
index 65f25bb0..cdab4bea 100644
--- a/tests/pkcs1v2.c
+++ b/tests/pkcs1v2.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ data_from_hex (const char *string, size_t *r_length)
static int
extract_cmp_data (gcry_sexp_t sexp, const char *name, const char *expected,
- const char *description)
+ const char *description, int quiet)
{
gcry_sexp_t l1;
const void *a;
@@ -96,13 +96,15 @@ extract_cmp_data (gcry_sexp_t sexp, const char *name, const char *expected,
b = data_from_hex (expected, &blen);
if (!a)
{
- info ("%s: parameter \"%s\" missing in key\n", description, name);
+ if (!quiet)
+ info ("%s: parameter \"%s\" missing in key\n", description, name);
rc = 1;
}
else if ( alen != blen || memcmp (a, b, alen) )
{
- info ("%s: parameter \"%s\" does not match expected value\n",
- description, name);
+ if (!quiet)
+ info ("%s: parameter \"%s\" does not match expected value\n",
+ description, name);
rc = 1;
}
gcry_free (b);
@@ -192,7 +194,7 @@ check_oaep (void)
else
{
if (extract_cmp_data (ciph, "a", tbl[tno].m[mno].encr,
- tbl[tno].m[mno].desc))
+ tbl[tno].m[mno].desc, 0))
{
show_sexp ("encrypt result:\n", ciph);
fail ("mismatch in gcry_pk_encrypt\n");
@@ -227,7 +229,7 @@ check_oaep (void)
else
{
if (extract_cmp_data (plain, "value", tbl[tno].m[mno].mesg,
- tbl[tno].m[mno].desc))
+ tbl[tno].m[mno].desc, 0))
{
show_sexp ("decrypt result:\n", plain);
fail ("mismatch in gcry_pk_decrypt\n");
@@ -330,7 +332,7 @@ check_pss (void)
else
{
if (extract_cmp_data (sig, "s", tbl[tno].m[mno].sign,
- tbl[tno].m[mno].desc))
+ tbl[tno].m[mno].desc, 0))
{
show_sexp ("sign result:\n", sig);
fail ("mismatch in gcry_pk_sign\n");
@@ -437,44 +439,84 @@ check_v15crypt (void)
size_t mesg_len, seed_len, encr_len;
gcry_sexp_t plain, ciph;
+ if (tbl[tno].m[mno].desc == NULL)
+ break;
+
if (verbose)
info ("running test: %s\n", tbl[tno].m[mno].desc);
- mesg = data_from_hex (tbl[tno].m[mno].mesg, &mesg_len);
- seed = data_from_hex (tbl[tno].m[mno].seed, &seed_len);
+ if (tbl[tno].m[mno].mesg)
+ {
+ mesg = data_from_hex (tbl[tno].m[mno].mesg, &mesg_len);
+ seed = data_from_hex (tbl[tno].m[mno].seed, &seed_len);
+
+ err = gcry_sexp_build (&plain, NULL,
+ "(data (flags pkcs1)"
+ "(value %b)(random-override %b))",
+ (int)mesg_len, mesg,
+ (int)seed_len, seed);
+ if (err)
+ die ("constructing plain data failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
+ gcry_free (mesg);
+ gcry_free (seed);
+
+ err = gcry_pk_encrypt (&ciph, plain, pub_key);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ show_sexp ("plain:\n", ciph);
+ fail ("gcry_pk_encrypt failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (extract_cmp_data (ciph, "a", tbl[tno].m[mno].encr,
+ tbl[tno].m[mno].desc, 0))
+ {
+ show_sexp ("encrypt result:\n", ciph);
+ fail ("mismatch in gcry_pk_encrypt\n");
+ }
+ gcry_sexp_release (ciph);
+ ciph = NULL;
+ }
+ gcry_sexp_release (plain);
+ plain = NULL;
+ }
- err = gcry_sexp_build (&plain, NULL,
- "(data (flags pkcs1)"
- "(value %b)(random-override %b))",
- (int)mesg_len, mesg,
- (int)seed_len, seed);
+ /* Now test the decryption. */
+ encr = data_from_hex (tbl[tno].m[mno].encr, &encr_len);
+
+#ifdef WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND
+ /* First try without implicit rejection -- this should fail for invalid inputs */
+ err = gcry_sexp_build (&ciph, NULL,
+ "(enc-val (flags pkcs1 no-implicit-rejection)"
+ "(rsa (a %b)))",
+ (int)encr_len, encr);
if (err)
- die ("constructing plain data failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
- gcry_free (mesg);
- gcry_free (seed);
+ die ("constructing cipher data failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
- err = gcry_pk_encrypt (&ciph, plain, pub_key);
+ err = gcry_pk_decrypt (&plain, ciph, sec_key);
if (err)
{
- show_sexp ("plain:\n", ciph);
- fail ("gcry_pk_encrypt failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
+ /* If the message is not set, the padding is invalid and failure is expected */
+ if (tbl[tno].m[mno].mesg != NULL)
+ {
+ show_sexp ("ciph:\n", ciph);
+ fail ("gcry_pk_decrypt failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
+ }
}
else
{
- if (extract_cmp_data (ciph, "a", tbl[tno].m[mno].encr,
- tbl[tno].m[mno].desc))
+ /* If the message is not set, it is in the synthetic field */
+ const char *msg = tbl[tno].m[mno].mesg;
+ if (msg == NULL)
+ msg = tbl[tno].m[mno].synt;
+ if (extract_cmp_data (plain, "value", msg,
+ tbl[tno].m[mno].desc, 0))
{
- show_sexp ("encrypt result:\n", ciph);
- fail ("mismatch in gcry_pk_encrypt\n");
+ show_sexp ("decrypt result:\n", plain);
+ fail ("mismatch in gcry_pk_decrypt.\n");
}
- gcry_sexp_release (ciph);
- ciph = NULL;
}
- gcry_sexp_release (plain);
- plain = NULL;
-
- /* Now test the decryption. */
- encr = data_from_hex (tbl[tno].m[mno].encr, &encr_len);
+#endif /* WITH_MARVIN_WORKAROUND */
err = gcry_sexp_build (&ciph, NULL,
"(enc-val (flags pkcs1)"
@@ -492,15 +534,19 @@ check_v15crypt (void)
}
else
{
- if (extract_cmp_data (plain, "value", tbl[tno].m[mno].mesg,
- tbl[tno].m[mno].desc))
+ /* If the message is not set, expect the synthetic message here */
+ const char *msg = tbl[tno].m[mno].mesg;
+ if (msg == NULL)
+ msg = tbl[tno].m[mno].synt;
+ if (extract_cmp_data (plain, "value", msg,
+ tbl[tno].m[mno].desc, 0))
{
show_sexp ("decrypt result:\n", plain);
- fail ("mismatch in gcry_pk_decrypt\n");
+ fail ("mismatch in gcry_pk_decrypt. Expected %s\n", msg);
}
- gcry_sexp_release (plain);
- plain = NULL;
}
+ gcry_sexp_release (plain);
+ plain = NULL;
gcry_sexp_release (ciph);
ciph = NULL;
}
@@ -592,7 +638,7 @@ check_v15sign (void)
else
{
if (extract_cmp_data (sig, "s", tbl[tno].m[mno].sign,
- tbl[tno].m[mno].desc))
+ tbl[tno].m[mno].desc, 0))
{
show_sexp ("sign result:\n", sig);
fail ("mismatch in gcry_pk_sign\n");
--
2.45.2
From 6a9db1de34311633d9182dc23cc961bb8fabb678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2024 13:42:13 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] ct: Use volatile to move data in buffer
---
src/const-time.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/const-time.c b/src/const-time.c
index c7c42aa1..2b6a4b4e 100644
--- a/src/const-time.c
+++ b/src/const-time.c
@@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ _gcry_ct_memmov_cond (void *dst, const void *src, size_t len,
unsigned long op_enable)
{
/* Note: dual mask with AND/OR used for EM leakage mitigation */
- unsigned char mask1 = ct_ulong_gen_mask(op_enable);
- unsigned char mask2 = ct_ulong_gen_inv_mask(op_enable);
+ volatile unsigned char mask1 = ct_ulong_gen_mask(op_enable);
+ volatile unsigned char mask2 = ct_ulong_gen_inv_mask(op_enable);
unsigned char *b_dst = dst;
const unsigned char *b_src = src;
size_t i;
--
2.45.2
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