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1
.fmf/version Normal file
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1

34
.gitignore vendored
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SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-hobbled.tar.xz
libgcrypt-1.4.5-hobbled.tar.bz2
/libgcrypt-1.4.6-hobbled.tar.bz2
/libgcrypt-1.5.0-hobbled.tar.bz2
/libgcrypt-1.5.1-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.5.2-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.5.3-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.6.1-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.6.2-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.6.3-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.6.4-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.6.5-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.6.6-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.7.3-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.7.5-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.7.6-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.7.7-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.7.8-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.8.0-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.8.1-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.8.2-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.8.3-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.8.4-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.8.5-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.8.6-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.8.7-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.9.0-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.9.1-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.9.2-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.9.3-hobbled.tar.xz
/libgcrypt-1.10.0-beta221.tar.bz2
/libgcrypt-1.10.0-beta221.tar.bz2.sig
/libgcrypt-1.10.0.tar.bz2
/libgcrypt-1.10.0.tar.bz2.sig

1
.libgcrypt.metadata
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1edcc623a15ed87ff832e021b4cb77fd94eb66c9 SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-hobbled.tar.xz

144
SOURCES/curves.c
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@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
/* curves.c - ECC curves regression tests
* Copyright (C) 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of Libgcrypt.
*
* Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
* the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include <config.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "../src/gcrypt-int.h"
#define PGM "curves"
#include "t-common.h"
/* Number of curves defined in ../cipger/ecc.c */
#define N_CURVES 14
/* A real world sample public key. */
static char const sample_key_1[] =
"(public-key\n"
" (ecdsa\n"
" (p #00FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF#)\n"
" (a #00FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC#)\n"
" (b #5AC635D8AA3A93E7B3EBBD55769886BC651D06B0CC53B0F63BCE3C3E27D2604B#)\n"
" (g #046B17D1F2E12C4247F8BCE6E563A440F277037D812DEB33A0F4A13945D898C296"
"4FE342E2FE1A7F9B8EE7EB4A7C0F9E162BCE33576B315ECECBB6406837BF51F5#)\n"
" (n #00FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551#)\n"
" (h #000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001#)\n"
" (q #0442B927242237639A36CE9221B340DB1A9AB76DF2FE3E171277F6A4023DED146EE"
"86525E38CCECFF3FB8D152CC6334F70D23A525175C1BCBDDE6E023B2228770E#)\n"
" ))";
static char const sample_key_1_curve[] = "NIST P-256";
static unsigned int sample_key_1_nbits = 256;
static void
list_curves (void)
{
int idx;
const char *name;
unsigned int nbits;
for (idx=0; (name = gcry_pk_get_curve (NULL, idx, &nbits)); idx++)
{
if (verbose)
printf ("%s - %u bits\n", name, nbits);
}
if (idx != N_CURVES)
fail ("expected %d curves but got %d\n", N_CURVES, idx);
if (gcry_pk_get_curve (NULL, -1, NULL))
fail ("curve iteration failed\n");
}
static void
check_matching (void)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t key;
const char *name;
unsigned int nbits;
err = gcry_sexp_new (&key, sample_key_1, 0, 1);
if (err)
die ("parsing s-expression string failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
name = gcry_pk_get_curve (key, 0, &nbits);
if (!name)
fail ("curve name not found for sample_key_1\n");
else if (strcmp (name, sample_key_1_curve))
fail ("expected curve name %s but got %s for sample_key_1\n",
sample_key_1_curve, name);
else if (nbits != sample_key_1_nbits)
fail ("expected curve size %u but got %u for sample_key_1\n",
sample_key_1_nbits, nbits);
gcry_sexp_release (key);
}
static void
check_get_params (void)
{
gcry_sexp_t param;
const char *name;
param = gcry_pk_get_param (GCRY_PK_ECDSA, sample_key_1_curve);
if (!param)
fail ("error gerring parameters for `%s'\n", sample_key_1_curve);
name = gcry_pk_get_curve (param, 0, NULL);
if (!name)
fail ("get_param: curve name not found for sample_key_1\n");
else if (strcmp (name, sample_key_1_curve))
fail ("get_param: expected curve name %s but got %s for sample_key_1\n",
sample_key_1_curve, name);
gcry_sexp_release (param);
}
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
if (argc > 1 && !strcmp (argv[1], "--verbose"))
verbose = 1;
else if (argc > 1 && !strcmp (argv[1], "--debug"))
verbose = debug = 1;
if (!gcry_check_version (GCRYPT_VERSION))
die ("version mismatch\n");
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
if (debug)
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1u, 0);
list_curves ();
check_matching ();
check_get_params ();
return error_count ? 1 : 0;
}

1207
SOURCES/ecc-curves.c
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

11
SOURCES/hobble-libgcrypt
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@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Quit out if anything fails.
set -e -x
# Clean out patent-or-otherwise-encumbered code.
# EC: ????????? ??/??/2015
rm -f cipher/ecc-curves.c
rm -f tests/curves.c
rm -f tests/t-mpi-point.c

104
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.6.1-mpicoder-gccopt.patch
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@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.6.1/mpi/mpicoder.c.gccopt libgcrypt-1.6.1/mpi/mpicoder.c
--- libgcrypt-1.6.1/mpi/mpicoder.c.gccopt 2014-02-28 15:37:53.983139821 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/mpi/mpicoder.c 2014-02-28 15:47:35.312576387 +0100
@@ -627,16 +627,16 @@ _gcry_mpi_print (enum gcry_mpi_format fo
extra = 1;
}
- if (buffer && n > len)
- {
- /* The provided buffer is too short. */
- xfree (tmp);
- return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
- }
if (buffer)
{
unsigned char *s = buffer;
+ if (n > len)
+ {
+ /* The provided buffer is too short. */
+ xfree (tmp);
+ return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
+ }
if (extra == 1)
*s++ = 0;
else if (extra)
@@ -654,13 +654,12 @@ _gcry_mpi_print (enum gcry_mpi_format fo
/* Note: We ignore the sign for this format. */
/* FIXME: for performance reasons we should put this into
mpi_aprint because we can then use the buffer directly. */
-
- if (buffer && n > len)
- return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
if (buffer)
{
unsigned char *tmp;
+ if (n > len)
+ return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
tmp = _gcry_mpi_get_buffer (a, 0, &n, NULL);
if (!tmp)
return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
@@ -678,14 +677,14 @@ _gcry_mpi_print (enum gcry_mpi_format fo
if (negative)
return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
- if (buffer && n+2 > len)
- return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
-
if (buffer)
{
unsigned char *tmp;
unsigned char *s = buffer;
+ if (n+2 > len)
+ return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
+
s[0] = nbits >> 8;
s[1] = nbits;
@@ -724,16 +723,16 @@ _gcry_mpi_print (enum gcry_mpi_format fo
extra=1;
}
- if (buffer && n+4 > len)
- {
- xfree(tmp);
- return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
- }
-
if (buffer)
{
unsigned char *s = buffer;
+ if (n+4 > len)
+ {
+ xfree(tmp);
+ return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
+ }
+
*s++ = n >> 24;
*s++ = n >> 16;
*s++ = n >> 8;
@@ -761,15 +760,15 @@ _gcry_mpi_print (enum gcry_mpi_format fo
if (!n || (*tmp & 0x80))
extra = 2;
- if (buffer && 2*n + extra + negative + 1 > len)
- {
- xfree(tmp);
- return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
- }
if (buffer)
{
unsigned char *s = buffer;
+ if (2*n + extra + negative + 1 > len)
+ {
+ xfree(tmp);
+ return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
+ }
if (negative)
*s++ = '-';
if (extra)

122
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.7.3-ecc-test-fix.patch
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@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/benchmark.c.eccfix libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/benchmark.c
--- libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/benchmark.c.eccfix 2016-07-14 11:19:17.000000000 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/benchmark.c 2016-11-22 16:21:00.109004197 +0100
@@ -1412,7 +1412,7 @@ ecc_bench (int iterations, int print_hea
{
#if USE_ECC
gpg_error_t err;
- const char *p_sizes[] = { "192", "224", "256", "384", "521", "Ed25519",
+ const char *p_sizes[] = { "224", "256", "384", "521", "Ed25519",
"gost256", "gost512" };
int testno;
diff -up libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/dsa-rfc6979.c.eccfix libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/dsa-rfc6979.c
--- libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/dsa-rfc6979.c.eccfix 2016-02-18 09:38:03.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/dsa-rfc6979.c 2016-11-22 16:22:11.804674008 +0100
@@ -210,16 +210,6 @@ check_dsa_rfc6979 (void)
" ))"
},
{
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "(private-key"
- " (ecdsa"
- " (curve \"NIST P-192\")"
- " (q #04AC2C77F529F91689FEA0EA5EFEC7F210D8EEA0B9E047ED56"
- " 3BC723E57670BD4887EBC732C523063D0A7C957BC97C1C43#)"
- " (d #6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4#)"
- " ))"
- },
- {
"ECDSA, 224 bits (prime field)",
"(private-key"
" (ecdsa"
@@ -443,89 +433,6 @@ check_dsa_rfc6979 (void)
"C9F0BDABCC0D880BB137A994CC7F3980CE91CC10FAF529FC46565B15CEA854E1"
},
{
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-1, message = \"sample\"",
- "sha1", "sample",
- "37D7CA00D2C7B0E5E412AC03BD44BA837FDD5B28CD3B0021",
- "98C6BD12B23EAF5E2A2045132086BE3EB8EBD62ABF6698FF",
- "57A22B07DEA9530F8DE9471B1DC6624472E8E2844BC25B64"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-224, message = \"sample\"",
- "sha224", "sample",
- "4381526B3FC1E7128F202E194505592F01D5FF4C5AF015D8",
- "A1F00DAD97AEEC91C95585F36200C65F3C01812AA60378F5",
- "E07EC1304C7C6C9DEBBE980B9692668F81D4DE7922A0F97A"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-256, message = \"sample\"",
- "sha256", "sample",
- "32B1B6D7D42A05CB449065727A84804FB1A3E34D8F261496",
- "4B0B8CE98A92866A2820E20AA6B75B56382E0F9BFD5ECB55",
- "CCDB006926EA9565CBADC840829D8C384E06DE1F1E381B85"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-384, message = \"sample\"",
- "sha384", "sample",
- "4730005C4FCB01834C063A7B6760096DBE284B8252EF4311",
- "DA63BF0B9ABCF948FBB1E9167F136145F7A20426DCC287D5",
- "C3AA2C960972BD7A2003A57E1C4C77F0578F8AE95E31EC5E"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-512, message = \"sample\"",
- "sha512", "sample",
- "A2AC7AB055E4F20692D49209544C203A7D1F2C0BFBC75DB1",
- "4D60C5AB1996BD848343B31C00850205E2EA6922DAC2E4B8",
- "3F6E837448F027A1BF4B34E796E32A811CBB4050908D8F67"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-1, message = \"test\"",
- "sha1", "test",
- "D9CF9C3D3297D3260773A1DA7418DB5537AB8DD93DE7FA25",
- "0F2141A0EBBC44D2E1AF90A50EBCFCE5E197B3B7D4DE036D",
- "EB18BC9E1F3D7387500CB99CF5F7C157070A8961E38700B7"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-224, message = \"test\"",
- "sha224", "test",
- "F5DC805F76EF851800700CCE82E7B98D8911B7D510059FBE",
- "6945A1C1D1B2206B8145548F633BB61CEF04891BAF26ED34",
- "B7FB7FDFC339C0B9BD61A9F5A8EAF9BE58FC5CBA2CB15293"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-256, message = \"test\"",
- "sha256", "test",
- "5C4CE89CF56D9E7C77C8585339B006B97B5F0680B4306C6C",
- "3A718BD8B4926C3B52EE6BBE67EF79B18CB6EB62B1AD97AE",
- "5662E6848A4A19B1F1AE2F72ACD4B8BBE50F1EAC65D9124F"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-384, message = \"test\"",
- "sha384", "test",
- "5AFEFB5D3393261B828DB6C91FBC68C230727B030C975693",
- "B234B60B4DB75A733E19280A7A6034BD6B1EE88AF5332367",
- "7994090B2D59BB782BE57E74A44C9A1C700413F8ABEFE77A"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-512, message = \"test\"",
- "sha512", "test",
- "0758753A5254759C7CFBAD2E2D9B0792EEE44136C9480527",
- "FE4F4AE86A58B6507946715934FE2D8FF9D95B6B098FE739",
- "74CF5605C98FBA0E1EF34D4B5A1577A7DCF59457CAE52290"
- },
-
-
-
- {
"ECDSA, 224 bits (prime field)",
"With SHA-1, message = \"sample\"",
"sha1", "sample",

1311
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-cavs.patch
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35
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-reqs.patch
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@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.7.3/src/visibility.c.fips-reqs libgcrypt-1.7.3/src/visibility.c
--- libgcrypt-1.7.3/src/visibility.c.fips-reqs 2016-03-23 12:59:34.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.7.3/src/visibility.c 2016-11-22 16:29:36.992042480 +0100
@@ -1288,6 +1288,8 @@ gcry_kdf_derive (const void *passphrase,
unsigned long iterations,
size_t keysize, void *keybuffer)
{
+ if (!fips_is_operational ())
+ return gpg_error (fips_not_operational ());
return gpg_error (_gcry_kdf_derive (passphrase, passphraselen, algo, hashalgo,
salt, saltlen, iterations,
keysize, keybuffer));
@@ -1343,6 +1345,13 @@ void
gcry_mpi_randomize (gcry_mpi_t w,
unsigned int nbits, enum gcry_random_level level)
{
+ if (!fips_is_operational ())
+ {
+ (void)fips_not_operational ();
+ fips_signal_fatal_error ("called in non-operational state");
+ fips_noreturn ();
+ }
+
_gcry_mpi_randomize (w, nbits, level);
}
@@ -1368,6 +1377,8 @@ gcry_prime_generate (gcry_mpi_t *prime,
gcry_random_level_t random_level,
unsigned int flags)
{
+ if (!fips_is_operational ())
+ return gpg_error (fips_not_operational ());
return gpg_error (_gcry_prime_generate (prime, prime_bits, factor_bits,
factors, cb_func, cb_arg,
random_level, flags));

322
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.3-cmac-selftest.patch
View File

@ -1,322 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/cipher-cmac.c.cmac-selftest libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/cipher-cmac.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/cipher-cmac.c.cmac-selftest 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/cipher-cmac.c 2019-05-31 17:33:35.594407152 +0200
@@ -251,3 +251,246 @@ _gcry_cipher_cmac_set_subkeys (gcry_ciph
return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
}
+
+/* CMAC selftests.
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+
+
+
+/* Check one MAC with MAC ALGO using the regular MAC
+ * API. (DATA,DATALEN) is the data to be MACed, (KEY,KEYLEN) the key
+ * and (EXPECT,EXPECTLEN) the expected result. If TRUNC is set, the
+ * EXPECTLEN may be less than the digest length. Returns NULL on
+ * success or a string describing the failure. */
+static const char *
+check_one (int algo,
+ const void *data, size_t datalen,
+ const void *key, size_t keylen,
+ const void *expect, size_t expectlen)
+{
+ gcry_mac_hd_t hd;
+ unsigned char mac[512]; /* hardcoded to avoid allocation */
+ size_t macoutlen = expectlen;
+
+/* printf ("MAC algo %d\n", algo); */
+ if (_gcry_mac_get_algo_maclen (algo) != expectlen ||
+ expectlen > sizeof (mac))
+ return "invalid tests data";
+ if (_gcry_mac_open (&hd, algo, 0, NULL))
+ return "gcry_mac_open failed";
+ if (_gcry_mac_setkey (hd, key, keylen))
+ {
+ _gcry_mac_close (hd);
+ return "gcry_md_setkey failed";
+ }
+ if (_gcry_mac_write (hd, data, datalen))
+ {
+ _gcry_mac_close (hd);
+ return "gcry_mac_write failed";
+ }
+ if (_gcry_mac_read (hd, mac, &macoutlen))
+ {
+ _gcry_mac_close (hd);
+ return "gcry_mac_read failed";
+ }
+ _gcry_mac_close (hd);
+ if (macoutlen != expectlen || memcmp (mac, expect, expectlen))
+ {
+/* int i; */
+
+/* fputs (" {", stdout); */
+/* for (i=0; i < expectlen-1; i++) */
+/* { */
+/* if (i && !(i % 8)) */
+/* fputs ("\n ", stdout); */
+/* printf (" 0x%02x,", mac[i]); */
+/* } */
+/* printf (" 0x%02x } },\n", mac[i]); */
+
+ return "does not match";
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+selftests_cmac_tdes (int extended, selftest_report_func_t report)
+{
+ const char *what;
+ const char *errtxt;
+
+ what = "Basic TDES";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MAC_CMAC_3DES,
+ "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+ "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57", 20,
+ "\x8a\xa8\x3b\xf8\xcb\xda\x10\x62\x0b\xc1\xbf\x19\xfb\xb6\xcd\x58"
+ "\xbc\x31\x3d\x4a\x37\x1c\xa8\xb5", 24,
+ "\x74\x3d\xdb\xe0\xce\x2d\xc2\xed", 8);
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+
+ if (extended)
+ {
+ what = "Extended TDES #1";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MAC_CMAC_3DES,
+ "", 0,
+ "\x8a\xa8\x3b\xf8\xcb\xda\x10\x62\x0b\xc1\xbf\x19\xfb\xb6\xcd\x58"
+ "\xbc\x31\x3d\x4a\x37\x1c\xa8\xb5", 24,
+ "\xb7\xa6\x88\xe1\x22\xff\xaf\x95", 8);
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+
+ what = "Extended TDES #2";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MAC_CMAC_3DES,
+ "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96", 8,
+ "\x8a\xa8\x3b\xf8\xcb\xda\x10\x62\x0b\xc1\xbf\x19\xfb\xb6\xcd\x58"
+ "\xbc\x31\x3d\x4a\x37\x1c\xa8\xb5", 24,
+ "\x8e\x8f\x29\x31\x36\x28\x37\x97", 8);
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+
+ what = "Extended TDES #3";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MAC_CMAC_3DES,
+ "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+ "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51", 32,
+ "\x8a\xa8\x3b\xf8\xcb\xda\x10\x62\x0b\xc1\xbf\x19\xfb\xb6\xcd\x58"
+ "\xbc\x31\x3d\x4a\x37\x1c\xa8\xb5", 24,
+ "\x33\xe6\xb1\x09\x24\x00\xea\xe5", 8);
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ return 0; /* Succeeded. */
+
+ failed:
+ if (report)
+ report ("cmac", GCRY_MAC_CMAC_3DES, what, errtxt);
+ return GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+}
+
+
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+selftests_cmac_aes (int extended, selftest_report_func_t report)
+{
+ const char *what;
+ const char *errtxt;
+
+ what = "Basic AES128";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MAC_CMAC_AES,
+ "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+ "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+ "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11", 40,
+ "\x2b\x7e\x15\x16\x28\xae\xd2\xa6\xab\xf7\x15\x88\x09\xcf\x4f\x3c", 16,
+ "\xdf\xa6\x67\x47\xde\x9a\xe6\x30\x30\xca\x32\x61\x14\x97\xc8\x27", 16);
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+
+ what = "Basic AES192";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MAC_CMAC_AES,
+ "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+ "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+ "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11", 40,
+ "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+ "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b", 24,
+ "\x8a\x1d\xe5\xbe\x2e\xb3\x1a\xad\x08\x9a\x82\xe6\xee\x90\x8b\x0e", 16);
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+
+ what = "Basic AES256";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MAC_CMAC_AES,
+ "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+ "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+ "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11", 40,
+ "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+ "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4", 32,
+ "\xaa\xf3\xd8\xf1\xde\x56\x40\xc2\x32\xf5\xb1\x69\xb9\xc9\x11\xe6", 16);
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+ if (extended)
+ {
+ what = "Extended AES #1";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MAC_CMAC_AES,
+ "", 0,
+ "\x2b\x7e\x15\x16\x28\xae\xd2\xa6\xab\xf7\x15\x88\x09\xcf\x4f\x3c", 16,
+ "\xbb\x1d\x69\x29\xe9\x59\x37\x28\x7f\xa3\x7d\x12\x9b\x75\x67\x46", 16);
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+
+ what = "Extended AES #2";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MAC_CMAC_AES,
+ "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a", 16,
+ "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+ "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b", 24,
+ "\x9e\x99\xa7\xbf\x31\xe7\x10\x90\x06\x62\xf6\x5e\x61\x7c\x51\x84", 16);
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+
+ what = "Extended AES #3";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MAC_CMAC_AES,
+ "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+ "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+ "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+ "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10", 64,
+ "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+ "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4", 32,
+ "\xe1\x99\x21\x90\x54\x9f\x6e\xd5\x69\x6a\x2c\x05\x6c\x31\x54\x10", 16 );
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ return 0; /* Succeeded. */
+
+ failed:
+ if (report)
+ report ("cmac", GCRY_MAC_CMAC_AES, what, errtxt);
+ return GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+}
+
+
+/* Run a full self-test for ALGO and return 0 on success. */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+run_cmac_selftests (int algo, int extended, selftest_report_func_t report)
+{
+ gpg_err_code_t ec;
+
+ switch (algo)
+ {
+ case GCRY_MAC_CMAC_3DES:
+ ec = selftests_cmac_tdes (extended, report);
+ break;
+ case GCRY_MAC_CMAC_AES:
+ ec = selftests_cmac_aes (extended, report);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ec = GPG_ERR_MAC_ALGO;
+ break;
+ }
+ return ec;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/* Run the selftests for CMAC with CMAC algorithm ALGO with optional
+ reporting function REPORT. */
+gpg_error_t
+_gcry_cmac_selftest (int algo, int extended, selftest_report_func_t report)
+{
+ gcry_err_code_t ec = 0;
+
+ if (!_gcry_mac_algo_info( algo, GCRYCTL_TEST_ALGO, NULL, NULL ))
+ {
+ ec = run_cmac_selftests (algo, extended, report);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ec = GPG_ERR_MAC_ALGO;
+ if (report)
+ report ("mac", algo, "module", "algorithm not available");
+ }
+ return gpg_error (ec);
+}
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/cipher-proto.h.cmac-selftest libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/cipher-proto.h
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/cipher-proto.h.cmac-selftest 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/cipher-proto.h 2019-05-31 17:29:34.574588234 +0200
@@ -256,6 +256,8 @@ gcry_error_t _gcry_pk_selftest (int algo
selftest_report_func_t report);
gcry_error_t _gcry_hmac_selftest (int algo, int extended,
selftest_report_func_t report);
+gcry_error_t _gcry_cmac_selftest (int algo, int extended,
+ selftest_report_func_t report);
gcry_error_t _gcry_random_selftest (selftest_report_func_t report);
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c.cmac-selftest libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c.cmac-selftest 2018-11-01 15:40:36.051865535 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c 2019-05-31 17:31:20.157756640 +0200
@@ -521,29 +521,32 @@ run_digest_selftests (int extended)
/* Run self-tests for all HMAC algorithms. Return 0 on success. */
static int
-run_hmac_selftests (int extended)
+run_mac_selftests (int extended)
{
- static int algos[] =
+ static int algos[][2] =
{
- GCRY_MD_SHA1,
- GCRY_MD_SHA224,
- GCRY_MD_SHA256,
- GCRY_MD_SHA384,
- GCRY_MD_SHA512,
- GCRY_MD_SHA3_224,
- GCRY_MD_SHA3_256,
- GCRY_MD_SHA3_384,
- GCRY_MD_SHA3_512,
- 0
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0 },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA224, 0 },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA256, 0 },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA384, 0 },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA512, 0 },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA3_224, 0 },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA3_256, 0 },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA3_384, 0 },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA3_512, 0 },
+ { GCRY_MAC_CMAC_3DES, 1 },
+ { GCRY_MAC_CMAC_AES, 1 },
+ { 0, 0 }
};
int idx;
gpg_error_t err;
int anyerr = 0;
- for (idx=0; algos[idx]; idx++)
+ for (idx=0; algos[idx][0]; idx++)
{
- err = _gcry_hmac_selftest (algos[idx], extended, reporter);
- reporter ("hmac", algos[idx], NULL,
+ err = algos[idx][1] ? _gcry_cmac_selftest (algos[idx][0], extended, reporter) :
+ _gcry_hmac_selftest (algos[idx][0], extended, reporter);
+ reporter (algos[idx][1] ? "cmac" : "hmac", algos[idx][0], NULL,
err? gpg_strerror (err):NULL);
if (err)
anyerr = 1;
@@ -747,7 +750,7 @@ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (int extended)
if (run_digest_selftests (extended))
goto leave;
- if (run_hmac_selftests (extended))
+ if (run_mac_selftests (extended))
goto leave;
/* Run random tests before the pubkey tests because the latter

60
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-ctor.patch
View File

@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor 2017-11-23 19:25:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c 2020-04-17 16:29:59.258218015 +0200
@@ -141,6 +141,34 @@ global_init (void)
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE_PATH
+#define FIPS_MODULE_PATH "/etc/system-fips"
+#endif
+
+void __attribute__ ((constructor)) _gcry_global_constructor (void)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = access (FIPS_MODULE_PATH, F_OK);
+ if (rv < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
+ rv = 0;
+
+ if (!rv)
+ {
+ int no_secmem_save;
+
+ /* it should be always 0 at this point but let's keep on the safe side */
+ no_secmem_save = no_secure_memory;
+ no_secure_memory = 1;
+ /* force selftests */
+ global_init();
+ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (0);
+ if (!fips_mode())
+ _gcry_random_close_fds ();
+ no_secure_memory = no_secmem_save;
+ }
+}
+
/* This function is called by the macro fips_is_operational and makes
sure that the minimal initialization has been done. This is far
from a perfect solution and hides problems with an improper
@@ -671,8 +699,7 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd,
case GCRYCTL_FIPS_MODE_P:
if (fips_mode ()
- && !_gcry_is_fips_mode_inactive ()
- && !no_secure_memory)
+ && !_gcry_is_fips_mode_inactive ())
rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Used as TRUE value */
break;
@@ -749,9 +776,9 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd,
break;
case GCRYCTL_SET_ENFORCED_FIPS_FLAG:
- if (!any_init_done)
+ if (fips_mode ())
{
- /* Not yet initialized at all. Set the enforced fips mode flag */
+ /* We are in FIPS mode, we can set the enforced fips mode flag. */
_gcry_set_preferred_rng_type (0);
_gcry_set_enforced_fips_mode ();
}

113
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-enttest.patch
View File

@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-drbg.c.fips-enttest libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-drbg.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-drbg.c.fips-enttest 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-drbg.c 2019-06-24 10:04:23.219547141 +0200
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ struct drbg_state_s
unsigned char *ctr_null; /* CTR mode zero buffer */
int seeded:1; /* DRBG fully seeded? */
int pr:1; /* Prediction resistance enabled? */
+ int ent_primed:1; /* Previous entropy data primed? */
/* Taken from libgcrypt ANSI X9.31 DRNG: We need to keep track of the
* process which did the initialization so that we can detect a fork.
* The volatile modifier is required so that the compiler does not
@@ -324,6 +325,7 @@ struct drbg_state_s
pid_t seed_init_pid;
const struct drbg_state_ops_s *d_ops;
const struct drbg_core_s *core;
+ unsigned char ent_hash[64]; /* Hash of previous entropy data */
struct drbg_test_data_s *test_data;
};
@@ -610,11 +612,13 @@ drbg_get_entropy (drbg_state_t drbg, uns
size_t len)
{
int rc = 0;
+ unsigned char newhash[64];
/* Perform testing as defined in 11.3.2 */
if (drbg->test_data && drbg->test_data->fail_seed_source)
return -1;
+redo:
read_cb_buffer = buffer;
read_cb_size = len;
read_cb_len = 0;
@@ -634,6 +638,27 @@ drbg_get_entropy (drbg_state_t drbg, uns
#else
rc = -1;
#endif
+
+ /* to avoid storing the actual entropy obtained for indefinite
+ time, we just store the SHA-512 hash of the entropy gathered
+ */
+ _gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA512, newhash, buffer, len);
+
+ if (!drbg->ent_primed)
+ {
+ memcpy (drbg->ent_hash, newhash, sizeof (drbg->ent_hash));
+ drbg->ent_primed = 1;
+ goto redo;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp (newhash, drbg->ent_hash, sizeof (drbg->ent_hash)) == 0)
+ {
+ fips_signal_error ("Entropy source failed the continuous test");
+ return -1; /* continuous entropy test failed */
+ }
+
+ memcpy (drbg->ent_hash, newhash, sizeof (drbg->ent_hash));
+
return rc;
}
@@ -1341,26 +1366,38 @@ drbg_seed (drbg_state_t drbg, drbg_strin
}
else
{
+ int nonce = 0;
/* Gather entropy equal to the security strength of the DRBG.
* With a derivation function, a nonce is required in addition
* to the entropy. A nonce must be at least 1/2 of the security
* strength of the DRBG in size. Thus, entropy * nonce is 3/2
* of the strength. The consideration of a nonce is only
- * applicable during initial seeding. */
+ * applicable during initial seeding.
+ * To avoid pulling different length of data from entropy
+ * source, we use 2 * strength for initial seeding. */
entropylen = drbg_sec_strength (drbg->core->flags);
if (!entropylen)
return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
if (0 == reseed)
- /* make sure we round up strength/2 in
- * case it is not divisible by 2 */
- entropylen = ((entropylen + 1) / 2) * 3;
+ {
+ nonce = 1;
+ }
dbg (("DRBG: (re)seeding with %lu bytes of entropy\n", entropylen));
- entropy = xcalloc_secure (1, entropylen);
+ entropy = xcalloc_secure (nonce + 1, entropylen);
if (!entropy)
return GPG_ERR_ENOMEM;
ret = drbg_get_entropy (drbg, entropy, entropylen);
if (ret)
goto out;
+ if (nonce)
+ {
+ ret = drbg_get_entropy (drbg, entropy + entropylen, entropylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ /* make sure we round up strength/2 in
+ * case it is not divisible by 2 */
+ entropylen = 2 * entropylen;
+ }
drbg_string_fill (&data1, entropy, entropylen);
}
@@ -1597,6 +1634,7 @@ drbg_instantiate (drbg_state_t drbg,
drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
drbg->pr = pr;
drbg->seeded = 0;
+ drbg->ent_primed = 0;
if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC)
drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hmac_ops;
else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HASH_MASK)

18
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.3-md-fips-enforce.patch
View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-enforce libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-enforce 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c 2020-04-17 15:07:31.364945130 +0200
@@ -409,13 +409,10 @@ md_enable (gcry_md_hd_t hd, int algorith
}
- if (!err && algorithm == GCRY_MD_MD5 && fips_mode ())
+ if (!err && !spec->flags.fips && fips_mode ())
{
- _gcry_inactivate_fips_mode ("MD5 used");
if (_gcry_enforced_fips_mode () )
{
- /* We should never get to here because we do not register
- MD5 in enforced fips mode. But better throw an error. */
err = GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
}
}

65
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.4-fips-keygen.patch
View File

@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/dsa.c.fips-keygen libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/dsa.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/dsa.c.fips-keygen 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/dsa.c 2019-02-12 14:29:25.629513989 +0100
@@ -457,11 +457,22 @@ generate_fips186 (DSA_secret_key *sk, un
&prime_q, &prime_p,
r_counter,
r_seed, r_seedlen);
- else
- ec = _gcry_generate_fips186_3_prime (nbits, qbits, NULL, 0,
+ else if (!domain->p || !domain->q)
+ ec = _gcry_generate_fips186_3_prime (nbits, qbits,
+ initial_seed.seed,
+ initial_seed.seedlen,
&prime_q, &prime_p,
r_counter,
r_seed, r_seedlen, NULL);
+ else
+ {
+ /* Domain parameters p and q are given; use them. */
+ prime_p = mpi_copy (domain->p);
+ prime_q = mpi_copy (domain->q);
+ gcry_assert (mpi_get_nbits (prime_p) == nbits);
+ gcry_assert (mpi_get_nbits (prime_q) == qbits);
+ ec = 0;
+ }
sexp_release (initial_seed.sexp);
if (ec)
goto leave;
@@ -855,13 +866,12 @@ dsa_generate (const gcry_sexp_t genparms
sexp_release (l1);
sexp_release (domainsexp);
- /* Check that all domain parameters are available. */
- if (!domain.p || !domain.q || !domain.g)
+ /* Check that p and q domain parameters are available. */
+ if (!domain.p || !domain.q || (!domain.g && !(flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_USE_FIPS186)))
{
_gcry_mpi_release (domain.p);
_gcry_mpi_release (domain.q);
_gcry_mpi_release (domain.g);
- sexp_release (deriveparms);
return GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE;
}
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/rsa.c.fips-keygen libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/rsa.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/rsa.c.fips-keygen 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.4/cipher/rsa.c 2019-02-12 14:29:25.630513971 +0100
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ generate_fips (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsig
if (nbits < 1024 || (nbits & 0x1FF))
return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
- if (_gcry_enforced_fips_mode() && nbits != 2048 && nbits != 3072)
+ if (fips_mode() && nbits < 2048)
return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
/* The random quality depends on the transient_key flag. */
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ generate_x931 (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsig
*swapped = 0;
- if (e_value == 1) /* Alias for a secure value. */
+ if (e_value == 1 || e_value == 0) /* Alias for a secure value. */
e_value = 65537;
/* Point 1 of section 4.1: k = 1024 + 256s with S >= 0 */

184
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.4-tests-fipsmode.patch
View File

@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/basic.c.tests-fipsmode libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/basic.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/basic.c.tests-fipsmode 2018-04-17 17:29:40.000000000 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/basic.c 2019-02-12 13:30:48.935791024 +0100
@@ -6964,7 +6964,7 @@ check_ciphers (void)
check_one_cipher (algos[i], GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, 0);
if (gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (algos[i]) == GCRY_CCM_BLOCK_LEN)
check_one_cipher (algos[i], GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 0);
- if (gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (algos[i]) == GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN)
+ if (!in_fips_mode && gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (algos[i]) == GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN)
check_one_cipher (algos[i], GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, 0);
if (gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (algos[i]) == GCRY_OCB_BLOCK_LEN)
check_one_cipher (algos[i], GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_OCB, 0);
@@ -7010,11 +7010,17 @@ check_cipher_modes(void)
check_cfb_cipher ();
check_ofb_cipher ();
check_ccm_cipher ();
- check_gcm_cipher ();
- check_poly1305_cipher ();
- check_ocb_cipher ();
+ if (!in_fips_mode)
+ {
+ check_gcm_cipher ();
+ check_poly1305_cipher ();
+ check_ocb_cipher ();
+ }
check_xts_cipher ();
- check_gost28147_cipher ();
+ if (!in_fips_mode)
+ {
+ check_gost28147_cipher ();
+ }
check_stream_cipher ();
check_stream_cipher_large_block ();
@@ -10001,7 +10007,7 @@ check_mac (void)
show_mac_not_available (algos[i].algo);
continue;
}
- if (gcry_mac_test_algo (algos[i].algo) && in_fips_mode)
+ if ((algos[i].algo == GCRY_MAC_GMAC_AES || gcry_mac_test_algo (algos[i].algo)) && in_fips_mode)
{
if (verbose)
fprintf (stderr, " algorithm %d not available in fips mode\n",
@@ -11095,8 +11101,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
/* If we are in fips mode do some more tests. */
gcry_md_hd_t md;
- /* First trigger a self-test. */
- xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE, 0);
if (!gcry_control (GCRYCTL_OPERATIONAL_P, 0))
fail ("not in operational state after self-test\n");
@@ -11121,15 +11125,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
gcry_md_close (md);
if (gcry_control (GCRYCTL_OPERATIONAL_P, 0))
fail ("expected error state but still in operational state\n");
- else
- {
- /* Now run a self-test and to get back into
- operational state. */
- xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE, 0);
- if (!gcry_control (GCRYCTL_OPERATIONAL_P, 0))
- fail ("did not reach operational after error "
- "and self-test\n");
- }
}
}
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/benchmark.c.tests-fipsmode libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/benchmark.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/benchmark.c.tests-fipsmode 2019-02-12 11:31:44.859603883 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/benchmark.c 2019-02-12 14:10:40.271999352 +0100
@@ -872,8 +872,10 @@ cipher_bench ( const char *algoname )
|| (blklen == 1 && modes[modeidx].mode != GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM))
continue;
- if (modes[modeidx].req_blocksize > 0
- && blklen != modes[modeidx].req_blocksize)
+ if ((modes[modeidx].req_blocksize > 0
+ && blklen != modes[modeidx].req_blocksize)
+ || (in_fips_mode
+ && modes[modeidx].mode == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM))
{
printf (" %7s %7s", "-", "-" );
continue;
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/bench-slope.c.tests-fipsmode libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/bench-slope.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/bench-slope.c.tests-fipsmode 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/bench-slope.c 2019-02-12 14:14:33.618763325 +0100
@@ -1338,7 +1338,7 @@ cipher_bench_one (int algo, struct bench
return;
/* GCM has restrictions for block-size */
- if (mode.mode == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM && blklen != GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN)
+ if (mode.mode == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM && (gcry_fips_mode_active () || blklen != GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN))
return;
/* XTS has restrictions for block-size */
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/pubkey.c.tests-fipsmode libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/pubkey.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/pubkey.c.tests-fipsmode 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/pubkey.c 2019-02-12 13:52:25.658746415 +0100
@@ -504,15 +504,30 @@ get_dsa_key_with_domain_new (gcry_sexp_t
rc = gcry_sexp_new
(&key_spec,
"(genkey (dsa (transient-key)(domain"
- "(p #d3aed1876054db831d0c1348fbb1ada72507e5fbf9a62cbd47a63aeb7859d6921"
- "4adeb9146a6ec3f43520f0fd8e3125dd8bbc5d87405d1ac5f82073cd762a3f8d7"
- "74322657c9da88a7d2f0e1a9ceb84a39cb40876179e6a76e400498de4bb9379b0"
- "5f5feb7b91eb8fea97ee17a955a0a8a37587a272c4719d6feb6b54ba4ab69#)"
- "(q #9c916d121de9a03f71fb21bc2e1c0d116f065a4f#)"
- "(g #8157c5f68ca40b3ded11c353327ab9b8af3e186dd2e8dade98761a0996dda99ab"
- "0250d3409063ad99efae48b10c6ab2bba3ea9a67b12b911a372a2bba260176fad"
- "b4b93247d9712aad13aa70216c55da9858f7a298deb670a403eb1e7c91b847f1e"
- "ccfbd14bd806fd42cf45dbb69cd6d6b43add2a78f7d16928eaa04458dea44#)"
+ " (p #a85378d8fd3f8d72ec7418080da21317e43ec4b62ba8c862"
+ " 3b7e4d04441dd1a0658662596493ca8e9e8fbb7e34aaddb6"
+ " 2e5d67b6d09a6e61b769e7c352aa2b10e20ca0636963b552"
+ " 3e86470decbbeda027e797e7b67635d4d49c30700e74af8a"
+ " 0ff156a801af57a26e7078f1d82f74908ecb6d07e70b3503"
+ " eed94fa32cf17a7fc3d6cf40dc7b00830e6a2566dc073e34"
+ " 3312517c6aa5152b4bfecd2e551fee346318a153423c996b"
+ " 0d5dcb9102aedd38798616f1f1e0d6c403525b1f9b3d4dc7"
+ " 66de2dfc4a56d7b8ba5963d60f3e16318870ad436952e557"
+ " 65374eab85e8ec17d6b9a4547b9b5f2752f3105be809b23a"
+ " 2c8d7469db02e24d592394a7dba069e9#)"
+ " (q #d277044e50f5a4e3f510a50a0b84fdffbca047ed27602056"
+ " 7441a0a5#)"
+ " (g #13d754e21fd241655da891c522a65a72a89bdc64ec9b54a8"
+ " 21ed4a898b490e0c4fcb72192a4a20f541f3f2925399f0ba"
+ " ecf929aafbf79dfe4332393b32cd2e2fcf272f32a627434a"
+ " 0df242b75b414df372121e53a553f222f836b000f016485b"
+ " 6bd0898451801dcd8de64cd5365696ffc532d528c506620a"
+ " 942a0305046d8f1876341f1e570bc3974ba6b9a438e97023"
+ " 02a2e6e67bfd06d32bc679962271d7b40cd72f386e64e0d7"
+ " ef86ca8ca5d14228dc2a4f16e3189886b5990674f4200f3a"
+ " 4cf65a3f0ddba1fa672dff2f5e143d10e4e97ae84f6da095"
+ " 35d5b9df259181a79b63b069e949972b02ba36b3586aab7e"
+ " 45f322f82e4e85ca3ab85591b3c2a966#)"
")))", 0, 1);
if (rc)
die ("error creating S-expression: %s\n", gcry_strerror (rc));
@@ -595,7 +610,7 @@ get_dsa_key_fips186_with_seed_new (gcry_
" (use-fips186)"
" (transient-key)"
" (derive-parms"
- " (seed #0cb1990c1fd3626055d7a0096f8fa99807399871#))))",
+ " (seed #8b4c4d671fff82e8ed932260206d0571e3a1c2cee8cd94cb73fe58f9b67488fa#))))",
0, 1);
if (rc)
die ("error creating S-expression: %s\n", gcry_strerror (rc));
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/t-cv25519.c.tests-fipsmode libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/t-cv25519.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/t-cv25519.c.tests-fipsmode 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/t-cv25519.c 2019-02-12 14:02:35.935705390 +0100
@@ -560,6 +560,9 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1u , 0);
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_ENABLE_QUICK_RANDOM, 0);
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
+ /* Curve25519 isn't supported in fips mode */
+ if (gcry_fips_mode_active())
+ return 77;
start_timer ();
check_cv25519 ();
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/t-secmem.c.tests-fipsmode libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/t-secmem.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/t-secmem.c.tests-fipsmode 2017-11-23 19:19:54.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.4/tests/t-secmem.c 2019-02-12 11:51:02.462190538 +0100
@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1u , 0);
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_ENABLE_QUICK_RANDOM, 0);
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, pool_size, 0);
- gcry_set_outofcore_handler (outofcore_handler, NULL);
+ if (!gcry_fips_mode_active ())
+ gcry_set_outofcore_handler (outofcore_handler, NULL);
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
/* Libgcrypt prints a warning when the first overflow is allocated;
@@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
test_secmem ();
- test_secmem_overflow ();
+ if (!gcry_fips_mode_active ())
+ test_secmem_overflow ();
/* FIXME: We need to improve the tests, for example by registering
* our own log handler and comparing the output of
* PRIV_CTL_DUMP_SECMEM_STATS to expected pattern. */

77
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.4-use-poll.patch
View File

@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.4/random/rndlinux.c.use-poll libgcrypt-1.8.4/random/rndlinux.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.4/random/rndlinux.c.use-poll 2018-10-26 13:50:20.000000000 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.4/random/rndlinux.c 2018-11-20 15:51:56.760669058 +0100
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <poll.h>
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL)
# include <sys/syscall.h>
#endif
@@ -241,9 +242,8 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
return with something we will actually use 100ms. */
while (length)
{
- fd_set rfds;
- struct timeval tv;
int rc;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
/* If we have a modern Linux kernel, we first try to use the new
* getrandom syscall. That call guarantees that the kernel's
@@ -300,36 +300,25 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
any_need_entropy = 1;
}
- /* If the system has no limit on the number of file descriptors
- and we encounter an fd which is larger than the fd_set size,
- we don't use the select at all. The select code is only used
- to emit progress messages. A better solution would be to
- fall back to poll() if available. */
-#ifdef FD_SETSIZE
- if (fd < FD_SETSIZE)
-#endif
+ pfd.fd = fd;
+ pfd.events = POLLIN;
+
+ _gcry_pre_syscall ();
+ rc = poll(&pfd, 1, delay);
+ _gcry_post_syscall ();
+ if (!rc)
{
- FD_ZERO(&rfds);
- FD_SET(fd, &rfds);
- tv.tv_sec = delay;
- tv.tv_usec = delay? 0 : 100000;
- _gcry_pre_syscall ();
- rc = select (fd+1, &rfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
- _gcry_post_syscall ();
- if (!rc)
- {
- any_need_entropy = 1;
- delay = 3; /* Use 3 seconds henceforth. */
- continue;
- }
- else if( rc == -1 )
- {
- log_error ("select() error: %s\n", strerror(errno));
- if (!delay)
- delay = 1; /* Use 1 second if we encounter an error before
- we have ever blocked. */
- continue;
- }
+ any_need_entropy = 1;
+ delay = 3000; /* Use 3 seconds henceforth. */
+ continue;
+ }
+ else if( rc == -1 )
+ {
+ log_error ("poll() error: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ if (!delay)
+ delay = 1000; /* Use 1 second if we encounter an error before
+ we have ever blocked. */
+ continue;
}
do

8156
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-aes-perf.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

14
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-build.patch
View File

@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-armv7-neon.S.build libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-armv7-neon.S
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-armv7-neon.S.build 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-armv7-neon.S 2020-01-30 17:26:12.026404286 +0100
@@ -87,9 +87,8 @@ _gcry_poly1305_armv7_neon_init_ext:
.Lpoly1305_init_ext_neon_local:
stmfd sp!, {r4-r11, lr}
sub sp, sp, #32
- mov r14, r2
+ mov r14, #-1
and r2, r2, r2
- moveq r14, #-1
UNALIGNED_LDMIA4(r1, r2, r3, r4, r5)
GET_DATA_POINTER(r7,.Lpoly1305_init_constants_neon,r8)
mov r6, r2

67
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-elgamal-blinding.patch
View File

@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
commit e8b7f10be275bcedb5fc05ed4837a89bfd605c61
Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
Date: Tue Apr 13 10:00:00 2021 +0900
cipher: Hardening ElGamal by introducing exponent blinding too.
* cipher/elgamal.c (do_encrypt): Also do exponent blinding.
--
Base blinding had been introduced with USE_BLINDING. This patch add
exponent blinding as well to mitigate side-channel attack on mpi_powm.
GnuPG-bug-id: 5328
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
diff --git a/cipher/elgamal.c b/cipher/elgamal.c
index 4eb52d62..9835122f 100644
--- a/cipher/elgamal.c
+++ b/cipher/elgamal.c
@@ -522,8 +522,9 @@ do_encrypt(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
static void
decrypt (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
{
- gcry_mpi_t t1, t2, r;
+ gcry_mpi_t t1, t2, r, r1, h;
unsigned int nbits = mpi_get_nbits (skey->p);
+ gcry_mpi_t x_blind;
mpi_normalize (a);
mpi_normalize (b);
@@ -534,20 +535,33 @@ decrypt (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
t2 = mpi_snew (nbits);
r = mpi_new (nbits);
+ r1 = mpi_new (nbits);
+ h = mpi_new (nbits);
+ x_blind = mpi_snew (nbits);
/* We need a random number of about the prime size. The random
number merely needs to be unpredictable; thus we use level 0. */
_gcry_mpi_randomize (r, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
+ /* Also, exponent blinding: x_blind = x + (p-1)*r1 */
+ _gcry_mpi_randomize (r1, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
+ mpi_set_highbit (r1, nbits - 1);
+ mpi_sub_ui (h, skey->p, 1);
+ mpi_mul (x_blind, h, r1);
+ mpi_add (x_blind, skey->x, x_blind);
+
/* t1 = r^x mod p */
- mpi_powm (t1, r, skey->x, skey->p);
+ mpi_powm (t1, r, x_blind, skey->p);
/* t2 = (a * r)^-x mod p */
mpi_mulm (t2, a, r, skey->p);
- mpi_powm (t2, t2, skey->x, skey->p);
+ mpi_powm (t2, t2, x_blind, skey->p);
mpi_invm (t2, t2, skey->p);
/* t1 = (t1 * t2) mod p*/
mpi_mulm (t1, t1, t2, skey->p);
+ mpi_free (x_blind);
+ mpi_free (h);
+ mpi_free (r1);
mpi_free (r);
mpi_free (t2);

13
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-fips-hwfeatures.patch
View File

@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/hwfeatures.c.hw-fips libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/hwfeatures.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/hwfeatures.c.hw-fips 2021-06-25 11:55:55.843819137 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/hwfeatures.c 2021-06-25 11:56:00.925895390 +0200
@@ -205,9 +205,6 @@ _gcry_detect_hw_features (void)
{
hw_features = 0;
- if (fips_mode ())
- return; /* Hardware support is not to be evaluated. */
-
parse_hwf_deny_file ();
#if defined (HAVE_CPU_ARCH_X86)

139
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-fips-module.patch
View File

@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c.fips-module libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c.fips-module 2020-04-20 19:07:45.924919645 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c 2020-04-20 19:10:33.690722470 +0200
@@ -35,10 +35,6 @@
#include "hmac256.h"
-/* The name of the file used to force libgcrypt into fips mode. */
-#define FIPS_FORCE_FILE "/etc/gcrypt/fips_enabled"
-
-
/* The states of the finite state machine used in fips mode. */
enum module_states
{
@@ -122,54 +118,6 @@ _gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force)
goto leave;
}
- /* For testing the system it is useful to override the system
- provided detection of the FIPS mode and force FIPS mode using a
- file. The filename is hardwired so that there won't be any
- confusion on whether /etc/gcrypt/ or /usr/local/etc/gcrypt/ is
- actually used. The file itself may be empty. */
- if ( !access (FIPS_FORCE_FILE, F_OK) )
- {
- gcry_assert (!no_fips_mode_required);
- goto leave;
- }
-
- /* Checking based on /proc file properties. */
- {
- static const char procfname[] = "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled";
- FILE *fp;
- int saved_errno;
-
- fp = fopen (procfname, "r");
- if (fp)
- {
- char line[256];
-
- if (fgets (line, sizeof line, fp) && atoi (line))
- {
- /* System is in fips mode. */
- fclose (fp);
- gcry_assert (!no_fips_mode_required);
- goto leave;
- }
- fclose (fp);
- }
- else if ((saved_errno = errno) != ENOENT
- && saved_errno != EACCES
- && !access ("/proc/version", F_OK) )
- {
- /* Problem reading the fips file despite that we have the proc
- file system. We better stop right away. */
- log_info ("FATAL: error reading `%s' in libgcrypt: %s\n",
- procfname, strerror (saved_errno));
-#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG
- syslog (LOG_USER|LOG_ERR, "Libgcrypt error: "
- "reading `%s' failed: %s - abort",
- procfname, strerror (saved_errno));
-#endif /*HAVE_SYSLOG*/
- abort ();
- }
- }
-
/* Fips not not requested, set flag. */
no_fips_mode_required = 1;
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h.fips-module libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h.fips-module 2020-04-20 19:07:45.918919759 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h 2020-04-20 19:11:05.003125740 +0200
@@ -422,6 +422,9 @@ gpg_err_code_t _gcry_sexp_vextract_param
/*-- fips.c --*/
+/* The name of the file used to force libgcrypt into fips mode. */
+#define FIPS_FORCE_FILE "/etc/gcrypt/fips_enabled"
+
void _gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force);
int _gcry_fips_mode (void);
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c.fips-module libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c.fips-module 2020-04-20 19:07:45.919919741 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c 2020-04-20 19:07:45.950919149 +0200
@@ -160,6 +160,53 @@ void __attribute__ ((constructor)) _gcry
rv = access (FIPS_MODULE_PATH, F_OK);
if (rv < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
rv = 0;
+
+ /* For testing the system it is useful to override the system
+ provided detection of the FIPS mode and force FIPS mode using a
+ file. The filename is hardwired so that there won't be any
+ confusion on whether /etc/gcrypt/ or /usr/local/etc/gcrypt/ is
+ actually used. The file itself may be empty. */
+ if ( !access (FIPS_FORCE_FILE, F_OK) )
+ {
+ rv = 0;
+ force_fips_mode = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Checking based on /proc file properties. */
+ {
+ static const char procfname[] = "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled";
+ FILE *fp;
+ int saved_errno;
+
+ fp = fopen (procfname, "r");
+ if (fp)
+ {
+ char line[256];
+
+ if (fgets (line, sizeof line, fp) && atoi (line))
+ {
+ /* System is in fips mode. */
+ rv = 0;
+ force_fips_mode = 1;
+ }
+ fclose (fp);
+ }
+ else if ((saved_errno = errno) != ENOENT
+ && saved_errno != EACCES
+ && !access ("/proc/version", F_OK) )
+ {
+ /* Problem reading the fips file despite that we have the proc
+ file system. We better stop right away. */
+ log_info ("FATAL: error reading `%s' in libgcrypt: %s\n",
+ procfname, strerror (saved_errno));
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG
+ syslog (LOG_USER|LOG_ERR, "Libgcrypt error: "
+ "reading `%s' failed: %s - abort",
+ procfname, strerror (saved_errno));
+#endif /*HAVE_SYSLOG*/
+ abort ();
+ }
+ }
if (!rv)
{

285
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-getrandom.patch
View File

@ -1,285 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/rand-internal.h.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/rand-internal.h
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/rand-internal.h.getrandom 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/rand-internal.h 2020-04-20 14:55:34.875949624 +0200
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ void _gcry_random_progress (const char *
/*-- random-csprng.c --*/
void _gcry_rngcsprng_initialize (int full);
+void _gcry_rngcsprng_deinit (void);
void _gcry_rngcsprng_close_fds (void);
void _gcry_rngcsprng_dump_stats (void);
void _gcry_rngcsprng_secure_alloc (void);
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ void _gcry_rngcsprng_fast_poll (void);
/*-- random-drbg.c --*/
void _gcry_rngdrbg_inititialize (int full);
+void _gcry_rngdrbg_deinit (void);
void _gcry_rngdrbg_close_fds (void);
void _gcry_rngdrbg_dump_stats (void);
int _gcry_rngdrbg_is_faked (void);
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random.c.getrandom 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random.c 2020-04-20 14:55:34.876949605 +0200
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ _gcry_random_read_conf (void)
unsigned int result = 0;
fp = fopen (fname, "r");
- if (!fp)
- return result;
+ if (!fp) /* We make only_urandom the default. */
+ return RANDOM_CONF_ONLY_URANDOM;
for (;;)
{
@@ -228,6 +228,22 @@ _gcry_random_initialize (int full)
}
+/* Deinitialize this random subsystem. */
+void
+_gcry_random_deinit (void)
+{
+ if (fips_mode ())
+ _gcry_rngdrbg_deinit ();
+ else if (rng_types.standard)
+ _gcry_rngcsprng_deinit ();
+ else if (rng_types.fips)
+ _gcry_rngdrbg_deinit ();
+ else
+ _gcry_rngcsprng_deinit ();
+ /* not needed for system */
+}
+
+
/* If possible close file descriptors used by the RNG. */
void
_gcry_random_close_fds (void)
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random-csprng.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random-csprng.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random-csprng.c.getrandom 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random-csprng.c 2020-04-20 15:04:27.182877975 +0200
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
#ifdef __MINGW32__
#include <process.h>
#endif
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL)
+# include <sys/syscall.h>
+# include <linux/random.h>
+#endif
#include "g10lib.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "rand-internal.h"
@@ -343,6 +347,21 @@ _gcry_rngcsprng_initialize (int full)
}
+void
+_gcry_rngcsprng_deinit (void)
+{
+ lock_pool();
+ pool_writepos = 0;
+ pool_readpos = 0;
+ pool_filled = 0;
+ pool_filled_counter = 0;
+ did_initial_extra_seeding = 0;
+ pool_balance = 0;
+ just_mixed = 0;
+ unlock_pool();
+}
+
+
/* Try to close the FDs of the random gather module. This is
currently only implemented for rndlinux. */
void
@@ -1116,6 +1135,22 @@ getfnc_gather_random (void))(void (*)(co
enum random_origins, size_t, int);
#if USE_RNDLINUX
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
+ long ret;
+ char buffer[1];
+
+ _gcry_pre_syscall ();
+ ret = syscall (__NR_getrandom,
+ (void*)buffer, (size_t)1, (unsigned int)GRND_NONBLOCK);
+ _gcry_post_syscall ();
+ if (ret != -1 || errno != ENOSYS)
+ {
+ fnc = _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random;
+ return fnc;
+ }
+ else
+ /* The syscall is not supported - fallback to /dev/urandom. */
+#endif
if ( !access (NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM, R_OK)
&& !access (NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM, R_OK))
{
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random-drbg.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random-drbg.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random-drbg.c.getrandom 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random-drbg.c 2020-04-20 15:02:37.782947902 +0200
@@ -1811,6 +1811,22 @@ _gcry_rngdrbg_inititialize (int full)
}
/*
+ * Deinitialize the DRBG invoked by the libgcrypt API
+ * It will be automatically re-initialized on next call
+ */
+void
+_gcry_rngdrbg_deinit (void)
+{
+ drbg_lock ();
+ if (drbg_state)
+ {
+ drbg_uninstantiate (drbg_state);
+ drbg_state = NULL;
+ }
+ drbg_unlock ();
+}
+
+/*
* Backend handler function for GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT
*
* Select a different DRBG type and initialize it.
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random.h.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random.h
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random.h.getrandom 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/random.h 2020-04-20 14:55:34.877949586 +0200
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ void _gcry_register_random_progress (voi
void _gcry_set_preferred_rng_type (int type);
void _gcry_random_initialize (int full);
+void _gcry_random_deinit (void);
void _gcry_random_close_fds (void);
int _gcry_get_rng_type (int ignore_fips_mode);
void _gcry_random_dump_stats(void);
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/rndlinux.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/rndlinux.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/rndlinux.c.getrandom 2020-04-20 15:01:50.159848963 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/random/rndlinux.c 2020-04-20 16:14:21.901610921 +0200
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <poll.h>
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL)
# include <sys/syscall.h>
+# include <linux/random.h>
#endif
#include "types.h"
@@ -147,12 +148,12 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
if (!add)
{
/* Special mode to close the descriptors. */
- if (fd_random != -1)
+ if (fd_random >= 0)
{
close (fd_random);
fd_random = -1;
}
- if (fd_urandom != -1)
+ if (fd_urandom >= 0)
{
close (fd_urandom);
fd_urandom = -1;
@@ -166,12 +167,12 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
apid = getpid ();
if (my_pid != apid)
{
- if (fd_random != -1)
+ if (fd_random >= 0)
{
close (fd_random);
fd_random = -1;
}
- if (fd_urandom != -1)
+ if (fd_urandom >= 0)
{
close (fd_urandom);
fd_urandom = -1;
@@ -216,7 +217,23 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
that we always require the device to be existent but want a more
graceful behaviour if the rarely needed close operation has been
used and the device needs to be re-opened later. */
- if (level >= GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM && !only_urandom)
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
+ if (fd_urandom != -2 && !_gcry_in_constructor ())
+ {
+ long ret;
+
+ _gcry_pre_syscall ();
+ ret = syscall (__NR_getrandom,
+ (void*)buffer, (size_t)1, (unsigned int)GRND_NONBLOCK);
+ _gcry_post_syscall ();
+ if (ret > -1 || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+ {
+ fd_urandom = -2;
+ fd_random = -2;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (level >= GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM && !only_urandom && !_gcry_in_constructor ())
{
if (fd_random == -1)
{
@@ -255,6 +272,7 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
* syscall and not a new device and thus we are not able to use
* select(2) to have a timeout. */
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
+ if (fd == -2)
{
long ret;
size_t nbytes;
@@ -270,9 +288,7 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
_gcry_post_syscall ();
}
while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
- if (ret == -1 && errno == ENOSYS)
- ; /* The syscall is not supported - fallback to pulling from fd. */
- else
+ if (1)
{ /* The syscall is supported. Some sanity checks. */
if (ret == -1)
log_fatal ("unexpected error from getrandom: %s\n",
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h.getrandom 2020-04-20 15:08:16.528538580 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h 2020-04-20 15:08:28.641309399 +0200
@@ -464,6 +464,6 @@ gpg_err_code_t _gcry_fips_run_selftests
void _gcry_fips_noreturn (void);
#define fips_noreturn() (_gcry_fips_noreturn ())
-
+int _gcry_in_constructor (void);
#endif /* G10LIB_H */
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c.getrandom 2020-04-20 15:06:21.891707597 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c 2020-04-20 15:07:29.018437509 +0200
@@ -145,10 +145,18 @@ global_init (void)
#define FIPS_MODULE_PATH "/etc/system-fips"
#endif
+static int in_constructor = 0;
+
+int _gcry_in_constructor(void)
+{
+ return in_constructor;
+}
+
void __attribute__ ((constructor)) _gcry_global_constructor (void)
{
int rv;
+ in_constructor = 1;
rv = access (FIPS_MODULE_PATH, F_OK);
if (rv < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
rv = 0;
@@ -163,10 +171,12 @@ void __attribute__ ((constructor)) _gcry
/* force selftests */
global_init();
_gcry_fips_run_selftests (0);
- if (!fips_mode())
- _gcry_random_close_fds ();
+ _gcry_random_close_fds ();
+ _gcry_random_deinit ();
no_secure_memory = no_secmem_save;
}
+
+ in_constructor = 0;
}
/* This function is called by the macro fips_is_operational and makes

348
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-intel-cet.patch
View File

@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/camellia-aesni-avx2-amd64.S.intel-cet libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/camellia-aesni-avx2-amd64.S
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/camellia-aesni-avx2-amd64.S.intel-cet 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/camellia-aesni-avx2-amd64.S 2020-01-23 15:36:44.148972045 +0100
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@
* License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
-#ifdef __x86_64
#include <config.h>
+
+#ifdef __x86_64
#if (defined(HAVE_COMPATIBLE_GCC_AMD64_PLATFORM_AS) || \
defined(HAVE_COMPATIBLE_GCC_WIN64_PLATFORM_AS)) && \
defined(ENABLE_AESNI_SUPPORT) && defined(ENABLE_AVX2_SUPPORT)
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/camellia-aesni-avx-amd64.S.intel-cet libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/camellia-aesni-avx-amd64.S
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/camellia-aesni-avx-amd64.S.intel-cet 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/camellia-aesni-avx-amd64.S 2020-01-23 15:36:44.145972088 +0100
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@
* License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
-#ifdef __x86_64
#include <config.h>
+
+#ifdef __x86_64
#if (defined(HAVE_COMPATIBLE_GCC_AMD64_PLATFORM_AS) || \
defined(HAVE_COMPATIBLE_GCC_WIN64_PLATFORM_AS)) && \
defined(ENABLE_AESNI_SUPPORT) && defined(ENABLE_AVX_SUPPORT)
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/chacha20-avx2-amd64.S.intel-cet libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/chacha20-avx2-amd64.S
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/chacha20-avx2-amd64.S.intel-cet 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/chacha20-avx2-amd64.S 2020-01-23 15:36:16.780250066 +0100
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
.globl _gcry_chacha20_amd64_avx2_blocks
ELF(.type _gcry_chacha20_amd64_avx2_blocks,@function;)
_gcry_chacha20_amd64_avx2_blocks:
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
.Lchacha_blocks_avx2_local:
vzeroupper
pushq %rbx
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/chacha20-sse2-amd64.S.intel-cet libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/chacha20-sse2-amd64.S
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/chacha20-sse2-amd64.S.intel-cet 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/chacha20-sse2-amd64.S 2020-01-23 15:36:16.783250095 +0100
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@
.globl _gcry_chacha20_amd64_sse2_blocks
ELF(.type _gcry_chacha20_amd64_sse2_blocks,@function;)
_gcry_chacha20_amd64_sse2_blocks:
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
.Lchacha_blocks_sse2_local:
pushq %rbx
pushq %rbp
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-avx2-amd64.S.intel-cet libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-avx2-amd64.S
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-avx2-amd64.S.intel-cet 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-avx2-amd64.S 2020-01-23 15:36:16.784250105 +0100
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
.globl _gcry_poly1305_amd64_avx2_init_ext
ELF(.type _gcry_poly1305_amd64_avx2_init_ext,@function;)
_gcry_poly1305_amd64_avx2_init_ext:
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
.Lpoly1305_init_ext_avx2_local:
xor %edx, %edx
vzeroupper
@@ -406,6 +409,9 @@ ELF(.size _gcry_poly1305_amd64_avx2_init
.globl _gcry_poly1305_amd64_avx2_blocks
ELF(.type _gcry_poly1305_amd64_avx2_blocks,@function;)
_gcry_poly1305_amd64_avx2_blocks:
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
.Lpoly1305_blocks_avx2_local:
vzeroupper
pushq %rbp
@@ -732,6 +738,9 @@ ELF(.size _gcry_poly1305_amd64_avx2_bloc
.globl _gcry_poly1305_amd64_avx2_finish_ext
ELF(.type _gcry_poly1305_amd64_avx2_finish_ext,@function;)
_gcry_poly1305_amd64_avx2_finish_ext:
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
.Lpoly1305_finish_ext_avx2_local:
vzeroupper
pushq %rbp
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-sse2-amd64.S.intel-cet libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-sse2-amd64.S
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-sse2-amd64.S.intel-cet 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/poly1305-sse2-amd64.S 2020-01-23 15:36:16.787250134 +0100
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@
.globl _gcry_poly1305_amd64_sse2_init_ext
ELF(.type _gcry_poly1305_amd64_sse2_init_ext,@function;)
_gcry_poly1305_amd64_sse2_init_ext:
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
.Lpoly1305_init_ext_x86_local:
xor %edx, %edx
pushq %r12
@@ -288,6 +291,9 @@ ELF(.size _gcry_poly1305_amd64_sse2_init
.globl _gcry_poly1305_amd64_sse2_finish_ext
ELF(.type _gcry_poly1305_amd64_sse2_finish_ext,@function;)
_gcry_poly1305_amd64_sse2_finish_ext:
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
.Lpoly1305_finish_ext_x86_local:
pushq %rbp
movq %rsp, %rbp
@@ -439,6 +445,9 @@ ELF(.size _gcry_poly1305_amd64_sse2_fini
.globl _gcry_poly1305_amd64_sse2_blocks
ELF(.type _gcry_poly1305_amd64_sse2_blocks,@function;)
_gcry_poly1305_amd64_sse2_blocks:
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
.Lpoly1305_blocks_x86_local:
pushq %rbp
movq %rsp, %rbp
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/serpent-avx2-amd64.S.intel-cet libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/serpent-avx2-amd64.S
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/serpent-avx2-amd64.S.intel-cet 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/serpent-avx2-amd64.S 2020-01-23 15:36:44.151972003 +0100
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@
* License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
-#ifdef __x86_64
#include <config.h>
+
+#ifdef __x86_64
#if (defined(HAVE_COMPATIBLE_GCC_AMD64_PLATFORM_AS) || \
defined(HAVE_COMPATIBLE_GCC_WIN64_PLATFORM_AS)) && defined(USE_SERPENT) && \
defined(ENABLE_AVX2_SUPPORT)
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/configure.ac.intel-cet libgcrypt-1.8.5/configure.ac
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/configure.ac.intel-cet 2019-08-29 15:00:08.000000000 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/configure.ac 2020-01-23 15:35:28.147774463 +0100
@@ -95,6 +95,12 @@ AH_TOP([
AH_BOTTOM([
#define _GCRYPT_IN_LIBGCRYPT 1
+/* Add .note.gnu.property section for Intel CET in assembler sources
+ when CET is enabled. */
+#if defined(__ASSEMBLER__) && defined(__CET__)
+# include <cet.h>
+#endif
+
/* If the configure check for endianness has been disabled, get it from
OS macros. This is intended for making fat binary builds on OS X. */
#ifdef DISABLED_ENDIAN_CHECK
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/config.links.intel-cet libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/config.links
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/config.links.intel-cet 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/config.links 2020-01-23 15:35:46.398952954 +0100
@@ -382,6 +382,16 @@ if test x"$mpi_cpu_arch" = x ; then
mpi_cpu_arch="unknown"
fi
+# Add .note.gnu.property section for Intel CET in assembler sources
+# when CET is enabled. */
+if test x"$mpi_cpu_arch" = xx86 ; then
+ cat <<EOF >> ./mpi/asm-syntax.h
+
+#if defined(__ASSEMBLER__) && defined(__CET__)
+# include <cet.h>
+#endif
+EOF
+fi
# Make sysdep.h
echo '/* created by config.links - do not edit */' >./mpi/sysdep.h
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/i386/mpih-add1.S.intel-cet libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/i386/mpih-add1.S
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/i386/mpih-add1.S.intel-cet 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/i386/mpih-add1.S 2020-01-23 15:37:40.470175379 +0100
@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ C_SYMBOL_NAME(_gcry_mpih_add_n:)
movl 20(%esp),%edx /* s2_ptr */
movl 24(%esp),%ecx /* size */
+#if defined __CET__ && (__CET__ & 1) != 0
+ pushl %ebx
+#endif
+
movl %ecx,%eax
shrl $3,%ecx /* compute count for unrolled loop */
negl %eax
@@ -63,6 +67,9 @@ C_SYMBOL_NAME(_gcry_mpih_add_n:)
subl %eax,%esi /* ... by a constant when we ... */
subl %eax,%edx /* ... enter the loop */
shrl $2,%eax /* restore previous value */
+#if defined __CET__ && (__CET__ & 1) != 0
+ leal -4(,%eax,4),%ebx /* Count for 4-byte endbr32 */
+#endif
#ifdef PIC
/* Calculate start address in loop for PIC. Due to limitations in some
assemblers, Loop-L0-3 cannot be put into the leal */
@@ -75,29 +82,53 @@ L0: leal (%eax,%eax,8),%eax
/* Calculate start address in loop for non-PIC. */
leal (Loop - 3)(%eax,%eax,8),%eax
#endif
+#if defined __CET__ && (__CET__ & 1) != 0
+ addl %ebx,%eax /* Adjust for endbr32 */
+#endif
jmp *%eax /* jump into loop */
ALIGN (3)
Loop: movl (%esi),%eax
adcl (%edx),%eax
movl %eax,(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 4(%esi),%eax
adcl 4(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,4(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 8(%esi),%eax
adcl 8(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,8(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 12(%esi),%eax
adcl 12(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,12(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 16(%esi),%eax
adcl 16(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,16(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 20(%esi),%eax
adcl 20(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,20(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 24(%esi),%eax
adcl 24(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,24(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 28(%esi),%eax
adcl 28(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,28(%edi)
@@ -110,6 +141,10 @@ Loop: movl (%esi),%eax
sbbl %eax,%eax
negl %eax
+#if defined __CET__ && (__CET__ & 1) != 0
+ popl %ebx
+#endif
+
popl %esi
popl %edi
ret
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/i386/mpih-sub1.S.intel-cet libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/i386/mpih-sub1.S
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/i386/mpih-sub1.S.intel-cet 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/mpi/i386/mpih-sub1.S 2020-01-23 15:37:40.472175351 +0100
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ C_SYMBOL_NAME(_gcry_mpih_sub_n:)
movl 20(%esp),%edx /* s2_ptr */
movl 24(%esp),%ecx /* size */
+#if defined __CET__ && (__CET__ & 1) != 0
+ pushl %ebx
+#endif
+
movl %ecx,%eax
shrl $3,%ecx /* compute count for unrolled loop */
negl %eax
@@ -64,6 +68,9 @@ C_SYMBOL_NAME(_gcry_mpih_sub_n:)
subl %eax,%esi /* ... by a constant when we ... */
subl %eax,%edx /* ... enter the loop */
shrl $2,%eax /* restore previous value */
+#if defined __CET__ && (__CET__ & 1) != 0
+ leal -4(,%eax,4),%ebx /* Count for 4-byte endbr32 */
+#endif
#ifdef PIC
/* Calculate start address in loop for PIC. Due to limitations in some
assemblers, Loop-L0-3 cannot be put into the leal */
@@ -76,29 +83,53 @@ L0: leal (%eax,%eax,8),%eax
/* Calculate start address in loop for non-PIC. */
leal (Loop - 3)(%eax,%eax,8),%eax
#endif
+#if defined __CET__ && (__CET__ & 1) != 0
+ addl %ebx,%eax /* Adjust for endbr32 */
+#endif
jmp *%eax /* jump into loop */
ALIGN (3)
Loop: movl (%esi),%eax
sbbl (%edx),%eax
movl %eax,(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 4(%esi),%eax
sbbl 4(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,4(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 8(%esi),%eax
sbbl 8(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,8(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 12(%esi),%eax
sbbl 12(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,12(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 16(%esi),%eax
sbbl 16(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,16(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 20(%esi),%eax
sbbl 20(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,20(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 24(%esi),%eax
sbbl 24(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,24(%edi)
+#ifdef _CET_ENDBR
+ _CET_ENDBR
+#endif
movl 28(%esi),%eax
sbbl 28(%edx),%eax
movl %eax,28(%edi)
@@ -111,6 +142,10 @@ Loop: movl (%esi),%eax
sbbl %eax,%eax
negl %eax
+#if defined __CET__ && (__CET__ & 1) != 0
+ popl %ebx
+#endif
+
popl %esi
popl %edi
ret

158
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-kdf-selftest.patch
View File

@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/kdf.c.kdf-selftest libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/kdf.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/kdf.c.kdf-selftest 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/cipher/kdf.c 2020-06-15 18:14:26.494995669 +0200
@@ -305,3 +305,99 @@ _gcry_kdf_derive (const void *passphrase
leave:
return ec;
}
+
+
+/* PBKDF2 selftests.
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2019, 2020 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+
+/* Check one PBKDF2 call with HASH ALGO using the regular KDF
+ * API. (passphrase,passphraselen) is the password to be derived,
+ * (salt,saltlen) the salt for the key derivation,
+ * iterations is the number of the kdf iterations,
+ * and (expect,expectlen) the expected result. Returns NULL on
+ * success or a string describing the failure. */
+
+static const char *
+check_one (int algo,
+ const void *passphrase, size_t passphraselen,
+ const void *salt, size_t saltlen,
+ unsigned long iterations,
+ const void *expect, size_t expectlen)
+{
+ unsigned char key[512]; /* hardcoded to avoid allocation */
+ size_t keysize = expectlen;
+
+ if (keysize > sizeof(key))
+ return "invalid tests data";
+
+ if (_gcry_kdf_derive (passphrase, passphraselen, GCRY_KDF_PBKDF2,
+ algo, salt, saltlen, iterations,
+ keysize, key))
+ return "gcry_kdf_derive failed";
+
+ if (memcmp (key, expect, expectlen))
+ return "does not match";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static gpg_err_code_t
+run_pbkdf2_selftest (int extended, selftest_report_func_t report)
+{
+ const char *what;
+ const char *errtxt;
+
+ what = "Basic PBKDF2 SHA256";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MD_SHA256,
+ "password", 8,
+ "salt", 4,
+ 2,
+ "\xae\x4d\x0c\x95\xaf\x6b\x46\xd3\x2d\x0a\xdf\xf9\x28\xf0\x6d\xd0"
+ "\x2a\x30\x3f\x8e\xf3\xc2\x51\xdf\xd6\xe2\xd8\x5a\x95\x47\x4c\x43", 32);
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+
+ if (extended)
+ {
+ what = "Extended PBKDF2 SHA256";
+ errtxt = check_one (GCRY_MD_SHA256,
+ "passwordPASSWORDpassword", 24,
+ "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", 36,
+ 4096,
+ "\x34\x8c\x89\xdb\xcb\xd3\x2b\x2f\x32\xd8\x14\xb8\x11\x6e\x84\xcf"
+ "\x2b\x17\x34\x7e\xbc\x18\x00\x18\x1c\x4e\x2a\x1f\xb8\xdd\x53\xe1"
+ "\xc6\x35\x51\x8c\x7d\xac\x47\xe9", 40);
+ if (errtxt)
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ return 0; /* Succeeded. */
+
+ failed:
+ if (report)
+ report ("kdf", GCRY_KDF_PBKDF2, what, errtxt);
+ return GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+}
+
+
+/* Run the selftests for KDF with KDF algorithm ALGO with optional
+ reporting function REPORT. */
+gpg_error_t
+_gcry_kdf_selftest (int algo, int extended, selftest_report_func_t report)
+{
+ gcry_err_code_t ec = 0;
+
+ if (algo == GCRY_KDF_PBKDF2)
+ {
+ ec = run_pbkdf2_selftest (extended, report);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ec = GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM;
+ if (report)
+ report ("kdf", algo, "module", "algorithm not available");
+ }
+ return gpg_error (ec);
+}
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/cipher-proto.h.kdf-selftest libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/cipher-proto.h
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/cipher-proto.h.kdf-selftest 2020-06-15 18:03:25.785353036 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/cipher-proto.h 2020-06-15 18:03:25.788353061 +0200
@@ -259,6 +259,8 @@ gcry_error_t _gcry_hmac_selftest (int al
selftest_report_func_t report);
gcry_error_t _gcry_cmac_selftest (int algo, int extended,
selftest_report_func_t report);
+gcry_error_t _gcry_kdf_selftest (int algo, int extended,
+ selftest_report_func_t report);
gcry_error_t _gcry_random_selftest (selftest_report_func_t report);
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c.kdf-selftest libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c.kdf-selftest 2020-06-15 18:03:25.777352968 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c 2020-06-15 18:08:40.651028096 +0200
@@ -490,6 +490,29 @@ run_mac_selftests (int extended)
return anyerr;
}
+/* Run self-tests for all KDF algorithms. Return 0 on success. */
+static int
+run_kdf_selftests (int extended)
+{
+ static int algos[] =
+ {
+ GCRY_KDF_PBKDF2,
+ 0
+ };
+ int idx;
+ gpg_error_t err;
+ int anyerr = 0;
+
+ for (idx=0; algos[idx]; idx++)
+ {
+ err = _gcry_kdf_selftest (algos[idx], extended, reporter);
+ reporter ("kdf", algos[idx], NULL, err? gpg_strerror (err):NULL);
+ if (err)
+ anyerr = 1;
+ }
+ return anyerr;
+}
+
/* Run self-tests for all required public key algorithms. Return 0 on
success. */
@@ -673,6 +696,9 @@ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (int extended)
if (run_mac_selftests (extended))
goto leave;
+ if (run_kdf_selftests (extended))
+ goto leave;
+
/* Run random tests before the pubkey tests because the latter
require random. */
if (run_random_selftests ())

1333
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-ppc-aes-gcm.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

274
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-ppc-bugfix.patch
View File

@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/cipher/crc-ppc.c b/cipher/crc-ppc.c
index 4d7f0add..b9a40130 100644
--- a/cipher/crc-ppc.c
+++ b/cipher/crc-ppc.c
@@ -154,26 +154,63 @@ static const vector16x_u8 bswap_const ALIGNED_64 =
#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# define CRC_VEC_U64_DEF(lo, hi) { (hi), (lo) }
# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(offs, ptr) \
- asm_swap_u64(vec_vsx_ld((offs), (const unsigned long long *)(ptr)))
+ asm_swap_u64(asm_vec_u64_load(offs, ptr))
# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(offs, ptr) \
- CRC_VEC_SWAP(vec_vsx_ld((offs), (const unsigned long long *)(ptr)))
+ CRC_VEC_SWAP(asm_vec_u64_load(offs, ptr))
# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(offs, ptr) \
- vec_vsx_ld((offs), (const unsigned long long *)(ptr))
+ asm_vec_u64_load(offs, ptr)
# define CRC_VEC_SWAP_TO_LE(v) CRC_VEC_SWAP(v)
# define CRC_VEC_SWAP_TO_BE(v) (v)
# define VEC_U64_LO 1
# define VEC_U64_HI 0
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE vector2x_u64
+asm_vec_u64_load(unsigned long offset, const void *ptr)
+{
+ vector2x_u64 vecu64;
+#if __GNUC__ >= 4
+ if (__builtin_constant_p (offset) && offset == 0)
+ __asm__ volatile ("lxvd2x %x0,0,%1\n\t"
+ : "=wa" (vecu64)
+ : "r" ((uintptr_t)ptr)
+ : "memory");
+ else
+#endif
+ __asm__ volatile ("lxvd2x %x0,%1,%2\n\t"
+ : "=wa" (vecu64)
+ : "r" (offset), "r" ((uintptr_t)ptr)
+ : "memory", "r0");
+ return vecu64;
+}
#else
# define CRC_VEC_U64_DEF(lo, hi) { (lo), (hi) }
-# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(offs, ptr) \
- vec_vsx_ld((offs), (const unsigned long long *)(ptr))
-# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(offs, ptr) CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD((offs), (ptr))
+# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(offs, ptr) asm_vec_u64_load_le(offs, ptr)
+# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(offs, ptr) asm_vec_u64_load_le(offs, ptr)
# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(offs, ptr) asm_vec_u64_load_be(offs, ptr)
# define CRC_VEC_SWAP_TO_LE(v) (v)
# define CRC_VEC_SWAP_TO_BE(v) CRC_VEC_SWAP(v)
# define VEC_U64_LO 0
# define VEC_U64_HI 1
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE vector2x_u64
+asm_vec_u64_load_le(unsigned long offset, const void *ptr)
+{
+ vector2x_u64 vecu64;
+#if __GNUC__ >= 4
+ if (__builtin_constant_p (offset) && offset == 0)
+ __asm__ volatile ("lxvd2x %x0,0,%1\n\t"
+ : "=wa" (vecu64)
+ : "r" ((uintptr_t)ptr)
+ : "memory");
+ else
+#endif
+ __asm__ volatile ("lxvd2x %x0,%1,%2\n\t"
+ : "=wa" (vecu64)
+ : "r" (offset), "r" ((uintptr_t)ptr)
+ : "memory", "r0");
+ return asm_swap_u64(vecu64);
+}
+
static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE vector2x_u64
asm_vec_u64_load_be(unsigned int offset, const void *ptr)
{
diff --git a/cipher/sha512-ppc.c b/cipher/sha512-ppc.c
index a758e1ea..31ea25bf 100644
--- a/cipher/sha512-ppc.c
+++ b/cipher/sha512-ppc.c
@@ -115,14 +115,62 @@ vec_merge_idx0_elems(vector2x_u64 v0, vector2x_u64 v1)
static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE vector2x_u64
vec_vshasigma_u64(vector2x_u64 v, unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
- asm ("vshasigmad %0,%1,%2,%3"
- : "=v" (v)
- : "v" (v), "g" (a), "g" (b)
- : "memory");
+ __asm__ ("vshasigmad %0,%1,%2,%3"
+ : "=v" (v)
+ : "v" (v), "g" (a), "g" (b)
+ : "memory");
return v;
}
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE vector2x_u64
+vec_u64_load(unsigned long offset, const void *ptr)
+{
+ vector2x_u64 vecu64;
+#if __GNUC__ >= 4
+ if (__builtin_constant_p (offset) && offset == 0)
+ __asm__ ("lxvd2x %x0,0,%1\n\t"
+ : "=wa" (vecu64)
+ : "r" ((uintptr_t)ptr)
+ : "memory");
+ else
+#endif
+ __asm__ ("lxvd2x %x0,%1,%2\n\t"
+ : "=wa" (vecu64)
+ : "r" (offset), "r" ((uintptr_t)ptr)
+ : "memory", "r0");
+#ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+ __asm__ ("xxswapd %x0, %x1"
+ : "=wa" (vecu64)
+ : "wa" (vecu64));
+#endif
+ return vecu64;
+}
+
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE void
+vec_u64_store(vector2x_u64 vecu64, unsigned long offset, void *ptr)
+{
+#ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+ __asm__ ("xxswapd %x0, %x1"
+ : "=wa" (vecu64)
+ : "wa" (vecu64));
+#endif
+#if __GNUC__ >= 4
+ if (__builtin_constant_p (offset) && offset == 0)
+ __asm__ ("stxvd2x %x0,0,%1\n\t"
+ :
+ : "wa" (vecu64), "r" ((uintptr_t)ptr)
+ : "memory");
+ else
+#endif
+ __asm__ ("stxvd2x %x0,%1,%2\n\t"
+ :
+ : "wa" (vecu64), "r" (offset), "r" ((uintptr_t)ptr)
+ : "memory", "r0");
+}
+
+
/* SHA2 round in vector registers */
#define R(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,k,w) do \
{ \
@@ -168,13 +216,13 @@ _gcry_sha512_transform_ppc8(u64 state[8],
vector2x_u64 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, t1, t2;
u64 w[16];
- h0 = vec_vsx_ld (8 * 0, (unsigned long long *)state);
+ h0 = vec_u64_load (8 * 0, (unsigned long long *)state);
h1 = vec_rol_elems (h0, 1);
- h2 = vec_vsx_ld (8 * 2, (unsigned long long *)state);
+ h2 = vec_u64_load (8 * 2, (unsigned long long *)state);
h3 = vec_rol_elems (h2, 1);
- h4 = vec_vsx_ld (8 * 4, (unsigned long long *)state);
+ h4 = vec_u64_load (8 * 4, (unsigned long long *)state);
h5 = vec_rol_elems (h4, 1);
- h6 = vec_vsx_ld (8 * 6, (unsigned long long *)state);
+ h6 = vec_u64_load (8 * 6, (unsigned long long *)state);
h7 = vec_rol_elems (h6, 1);
while (nblks >= 2)
@@ -514,10 +562,10 @@ _gcry_sha512_transform_ppc8(u64 state[8],
h2 = vec_merge_idx0_elems (h2, h3);
h4 = vec_merge_idx0_elems (h4, h5);
h6 = vec_merge_idx0_elems (h6, h7);
- vec_vsx_st (h0, 8 * 0, (unsigned long long *)state);
- vec_vsx_st (h2, 8 * 2, (unsigned long long *)state);
- vec_vsx_st (h4, 8 * 4, (unsigned long long *)state);
- vec_vsx_st (h6, 8 * 6, (unsigned long long *)state);
+ vec_u64_store (h0, 8 * 0, (unsigned long long *)state);
+ vec_u64_store (h2, 8 * 2, (unsigned long long *)state);
+ vec_u64_store (h4, 8 * 4, (unsigned long long *)state);
+ vec_u64_store (h6, 8 * 6, (unsigned long long *)state);
return sizeof(w);
}
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index b6b6455a..be35ce42 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1745,10 +1745,12 @@ AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether compiler supports PowerPC AltiVec/VSX intrinsics],
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE(
[[#include <altivec.h>
typedef vector unsigned char block;
+ typedef vector unsigned int vecu32;
block fn(block in)
{
block t = vec_perm (in, in, vec_vsx_ld (0, (unsigned char*)0));
- return vec_cipher_be (t, in);
+ vecu32 y = vec_vsx_ld (0, (unsigned int*)0);
+ return vec_cipher_be (t, in) ^ (block)y;
}
]])],
[gcry_cv_cc_ppc_altivec=yes])
@@ -1769,10 +1771,12 @@ if test "$gcry_cv_cc_ppc_altivec" = "no" &&
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE(
[[#include <altivec.h>
typedef vector unsigned char block;
+ typedef vector unsigned int vecu32;
block fn(block in)
{
block t = vec_perm (in, in, vec_vsx_ld (0, (unsigned char*)0));
- return vec_cipher_be (t, in);
+ vecu32 y = vec_vsx_ld (0, (unsigned int*)0);
+ return vec_cipher_be (t, in) ^ (block)y;
}]])],
[gcry_cv_cc_ppc_altivec_cflags=yes])])
if test "$gcry_cv_cc_ppc_altivec_cflags" = "yes" ; then
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 202ac888..fd447906 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2562,13 +2562,13 @@ if test "$found" = "1" ; then
GCRYPT_DIGESTS="$GCRYPT_DIGESTS crc-intel-pclmul.lo"
;;
powerpc64le-*-*)
- GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS crc-ppc.lo"
+ GCRYPT_DIGESTS="$GCRYPT_DIGESTS crc-ppc.lo"
;;
powerpc64-*-*)
- GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS crc-ppc.lo"
+ GCRYPT_DIGESTS="$GCRYPT_DIGESTS crc-ppc.lo"
;;
powerpc-*-*)
- GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS crc-ppc.lo"
+ GCRYPT_DIGESTS="$GCRYPT_DIGESTS crc-ppc.lo"
;;
esac
fi
@@ -2635,17 +2635,17 @@ if test "$found" = "1" ; then
;;
powerpc64le-*-*)
# Build with the crypto extension implementation
- GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS sha256-ppc.lo"
+ GCRYPT_DIGESTS="$GCRYPT_DIGESTS sha256-ppc.lo"
;;
powerpc64-*-*)
# Big-Endian.
# Build with the crypto extension implementation
- GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS sha256-ppc.lo"
+ GCRYPT_DIGESTS="$GCRYPT_DIGESTS sha256-ppc.lo"
;;
powerpc-*-*)
# Big-Endian.
# Build with the crypto extension implementation
- GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS sha256-ppc.lo"
+ GCRYPT_DIGESTS="$GCRYPT_DIGESTS sha256-ppc.lo"
esac
fi
@@ -2667,17 +2667,17 @@ if test "$found" = "1" ; then
;;
powerpc64le-*-*)
# Build with the crypto extension implementation
- GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS sha512-ppc.lo"
+ GCRYPT_DIGESTS="$GCRYPT_DIGESTS sha512-ppc.lo"
;;
powerpc64-*-*)
# Big-Endian.
# Build with the crypto extension implementation
- GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS sha512-ppc.lo"
+ GCRYPT_DIGESTS="$GCRYPT_DIGESTS sha512-ppc.lo"
;;
powerpc-*-*)
# Big-Endian.
# Build with the crypto extension implementation
- GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS sha512-ppc.lo"
+ GCRYPT_DIGESTS="$GCRYPT_DIGESTS sha512-ppc.lo"
esac
if test x"$neonsupport" = xyes ; then

3521
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-ppc-chacha20-poly1305.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

794
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-ppc-crc32.patch
View File

@ -1,794 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/cipher/Makefile.am b/cipher/Makefile.am
index cb41c251..1728e9f9 100644
--- a/cipher/Makefile.am
+++ b/cipher/Makefile.am
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ cast5.c cast5-amd64.S cast5-arm.S \
chacha20.c chacha20-sse2-amd64.S chacha20-ssse3-amd64.S chacha20-avx2-amd64.S \
chacha20-armv7-neon.S \
crc.c \
- crc-intel-pclmul.c \
+ crc-intel-pclmul.c crc-ppc.c \
des.c des-amd64.S \
dsa.c \
elgamal.c \
@@ -159,3 +159,9 @@ sha512-ppc.o: $(srcdir)/sha512-ppc.c Makefile
sha512-ppc.lo: $(srcdir)/sha512-ppc.c Makefile
`echo $(LTCOMPILE) $(ppc_vcrypto_cflags) -c $< `
+
+crc-ppc.o: $(srcdir)/crc-ppc.c Makefile
+ `echo $(COMPILE) $(ppc_vcrypto_cflags) -c $< `
+
+crc-ppc.lo: $(srcdir)/crc-ppc.c Makefile
+ `echo $(LTCOMPILE) $(ppc_vcrypto_cflags) -c $< `
diff --git a/cipher/crc-ppc.c b/cipher/crc-ppc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4d7f0add
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cipher/crc-ppc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
+/* crc-ppc.c - POWER8 vpmsum accelerated CRC implementation
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
+ *
+ * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "g10lib.h"
+
+#include "bithelp.h"
+#include "bufhelp.h"
+
+
+#if defined(ENABLE_PPC_CRYPTO_SUPPORT) && \
+ defined(HAVE_COMPATIBLE_CC_PPC_ALTIVEC) && \
+ defined(HAVE_GCC_INLINE_ASM_PPC_ALTIVEC) && \
+ __GNUC__ >= 4
+
+#include <altivec.h>
+#include "bufhelp.h"
+
+
+#define ALWAYS_INLINE inline __attribute__((always_inline))
+#define NO_INLINE __attribute__((noinline))
+#define NO_INSTRUMENT_FUNCTION __attribute__((no_instrument_function))
+
+#define ASM_FUNC_ATTR NO_INSTRUMENT_FUNCTION
+#define ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE ASM_FUNC_ATTR ALWAYS_INLINE
+#define ASM_FUNC_ATTR_NOINLINE ASM_FUNC_ATTR NO_INLINE
+
+#define ALIGNED_64 __attribute__ ((aligned (64)))
+
+
+typedef vector unsigned char vector16x_u8;
+typedef vector unsigned int vector4x_u32;
+typedef vector unsigned long long vector2x_u64;
+
+
+/* Constants structure for generic reflected/non-reflected CRC32 PMULL
+ * functions. */
+struct crc32_consts_s
+{
+ /* k: { x^(32*17), x^(32*15), x^(32*5), x^(32*3), x^(32*2), 0 } mod P(x) */
+ unsigned long long k[6];
+ /* my_p: { floor(x^64 / P(x)), P(x) } */
+ unsigned long long my_p[2];
+};
+
+/* PMULL constants for CRC32 and CRC32RFC1510. */
+static const struct crc32_consts_s crc32_consts ALIGNED_64 =
+{
+ { /* k[6] = reverse_33bits( x^(32*y) mod P(x) ) */
+ U64_C(0x154442bd4), U64_C(0x1c6e41596), /* y = { 17, 15 } */
+ U64_C(0x1751997d0), U64_C(0x0ccaa009e), /* y = { 5, 3 } */
+ U64_C(0x163cd6124), 0 /* y = 2 */
+ },
+ { /* my_p[2] = reverse_33bits ( { floor(x^64 / P(x)), P(x) } ) */
+ U64_C(0x1f7011641), U64_C(0x1db710641)
+ }
+};
+
+/* PMULL constants for CRC24RFC2440 (polynomial multiplied with x⁸). */
+static const struct crc32_consts_s crc24rfc2440_consts ALIGNED_64 =
+{
+ { /* k[6] = x^(32*y) mod P(x) << 32*/
+ U64_C(0x08289a00) << 32, U64_C(0x74b44a00) << 32, /* y = { 17, 15 } */
+ U64_C(0xc4b14d00) << 32, U64_C(0xfd7e0c00) << 32, /* y = { 5, 3 } */
+ U64_C(0xd9fe8c00) << 32, 0 /* y = 2 */
+ },
+ { /* my_p[2] = { floor(x^64 / P(x)), P(x) } */
+ U64_C(0x1f845fe24), U64_C(0x1864cfb00)
+ }
+};
+
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE vector2x_u64
+asm_vpmsumd(vector2x_u64 a, vector2x_u64 b)
+{
+ __asm__("vpmsumd %0, %1, %2"
+ : "=v" (a)
+ : "v" (a), "v" (b));
+ return a;
+}
+
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE vector2x_u64
+asm_swap_u64(vector2x_u64 a)
+{
+ __asm__("xxswapd %x0, %x1"
+ : "=wa" (a)
+ : "wa" (a));
+ return a;
+}
+
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE vector4x_u32
+vec_sld_u32(vector4x_u32 a, vector4x_u32 b, unsigned int idx)
+{
+ return vec_sld (a, b, (4 * idx) & 15);
+}
+
+
+static const byte crc32_partial_fold_input_mask[16 + 16] ALIGNED_64 =
+ {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+ };
+static const byte crc32_shuf_shift[3 * 16] ALIGNED_64 =
+ {
+ 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f,
+ 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f,
+ 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08,
+ 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f,
+ 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f,
+ };
+static const byte crc32_refl_shuf_shift[3 * 16] ALIGNED_64 =
+ {
+ 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f,
+ 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+ 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f,
+ 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x1f,
+ };
+static const vector16x_u8 bswap_const ALIGNED_64 =
+ { 15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 };
+
+
+#define CRC_VEC_SWAP(v) ({ vector2x_u64 __vecu64 = (v); \
+ vec_perm(__vecu64, __vecu64, bswap_const); })
+
+#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+# define CRC_VEC_U64_DEF(lo, hi) { (hi), (lo) }
+# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(offs, ptr) \
+ asm_swap_u64(vec_vsx_ld((offs), (const unsigned long long *)(ptr)))
+# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(offs, ptr) \
+ CRC_VEC_SWAP(vec_vsx_ld((offs), (const unsigned long long *)(ptr)))
+# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(offs, ptr) \
+ vec_vsx_ld((offs), (const unsigned long long *)(ptr))
+# define CRC_VEC_SWAP_TO_LE(v) CRC_VEC_SWAP(v)
+# define CRC_VEC_SWAP_TO_BE(v) (v)
+# define VEC_U64_LO 1
+# define VEC_U64_HI 0
+#else
+# define CRC_VEC_U64_DEF(lo, hi) { (lo), (hi) }
+# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(offs, ptr) \
+ vec_vsx_ld((offs), (const unsigned long long *)(ptr))
+# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(offs, ptr) CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD((offs), (ptr))
+# define CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(offs, ptr) asm_vec_u64_load_be(offs, ptr)
+# define CRC_VEC_SWAP_TO_LE(v) (v)
+# define CRC_VEC_SWAP_TO_BE(v) CRC_VEC_SWAP(v)
+# define VEC_U64_LO 0
+# define VEC_U64_HI 1
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE vector2x_u64
+asm_vec_u64_load_be(unsigned int offset, const void *ptr)
+{
+ static const vector16x_u8 vec_load_le_const =
+ { ~7, ~6, ~5, ~4, ~3, ~2, ~1, ~0, ~15, ~14, ~13, ~12, ~11, ~10, ~9, ~8 };
+ vector2x_u64 vecu64;
+
+#if __GNUC__ >= 4
+ if (__builtin_constant_p (offset) && offset == 0)
+ __asm__ ("lxvd2x %%vs32,0,%1\n\t"
+ "vperm %0,%%v0,%%v0,%2\n\t"
+ : "=v" (vecu64)
+ : "r" ((uintptr_t)(ptr)), "v" (vec_load_le_const)
+ : "memory", "v0");
+#endif
+ else
+ __asm__ ("lxvd2x %%vs32,%1,%2\n\t"
+ "vperm %0,%%v0,%%v0,%3\n\t"
+ : "=v" (vecu64)
+ : "r" (offset), "r" ((uintptr_t)(ptr)),
+ "v" (vec_load_le_const)
+ : "memory", "r0", "v0");
+
+ return vecu64;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE void
+crc32r_ppc8_ce_bulk (u32 *pcrc, const byte *inbuf, size_t inlen,
+ const struct crc32_consts_s *consts)
+{
+ vector4x_u32 zero = { 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+ vector2x_u64 low_64bit_mask = CRC_VEC_U64_DEF((u64)-1, 0);
+ vector2x_u64 low_32bit_mask = CRC_VEC_U64_DEF((u32)-1, 0);
+ vector2x_u64 my_p = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(0, &consts->my_p[0]);
+ vector2x_u64 k1k2 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(0, &consts->k[1 - 1]);
+ vector2x_u64 k3k4 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(0, &consts->k[3 - 1]);
+ vector2x_u64 k4lo = CRC_VEC_U64_DEF(k3k4[VEC_U64_HI], 0);
+ vector2x_u64 k5lo = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(0, &consts->k[5 - 1]);
+ vector2x_u64 crc = CRC_VEC_U64_DEF(*pcrc, 0);
+ vector2x_u64 crc0, crc1, crc2, crc3;
+ vector2x_u64 v0;
+
+ if (inlen >= 8 * 16)
+ {
+ crc0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(0 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc0 ^= crc;
+ crc1 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(1 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc2 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(2 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc3 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(3 * 16, inbuf);
+
+ inbuf += 4 * 16;
+ inlen -= 4 * 16;
+
+ /* Fold by 4. */
+ while (inlen >= 4 * 16)
+ {
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(0 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc0 = asm_vpmsumd(crc0, k1k2) ^ v0;
+
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(1 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc1 = asm_vpmsumd(crc1, k1k2) ^ v0;
+
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(2 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc2 = asm_vpmsumd(crc2, k1k2) ^ v0;
+
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(3 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc3 = asm_vpmsumd(crc3, k1k2) ^ v0;
+
+ inbuf += 4 * 16;
+ inlen -= 4 * 16;
+ }
+
+ /* Fold 4 to 1. */
+ crc1 ^= asm_vpmsumd(crc0, k3k4);
+ crc2 ^= asm_vpmsumd(crc1, k3k4);
+ crc3 ^= asm_vpmsumd(crc2, k3k4);
+ crc = crc3;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(0, inbuf);
+ crc ^= v0;
+
+ inbuf += 16;
+ inlen -= 16;
+ }
+
+ /* Fold by 1. */
+ while (inlen >= 16)
+ {
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(0, inbuf);
+ crc = asm_vpmsumd(k3k4, crc);
+ crc ^= v0;
+
+ inbuf += 16;
+ inlen -= 16;
+ }
+
+ /* Partial fold. */
+ if (inlen)
+ {
+ /* Load last input and add padding zeros. */
+ vector2x_u64 mask = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(inlen, crc32_partial_fold_input_mask);
+ vector2x_u64 shl_shuf = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(inlen, crc32_refl_shuf_shift);
+ vector2x_u64 shr_shuf = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(inlen + 16, crc32_refl_shuf_shift);
+
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(inlen - 16, inbuf);
+ v0 &= mask;
+
+ crc = CRC_VEC_SWAP_TO_LE(crc);
+ v0 |= (vector2x_u64)vec_perm((vector16x_u8)crc, (vector16x_u8)zero,
+ (vector16x_u8)shr_shuf);
+ crc = (vector2x_u64)vec_perm((vector16x_u8)crc, (vector16x_u8)zero,
+ (vector16x_u8)shl_shuf);
+ crc = asm_vpmsumd(k3k4, crc);
+ crc ^= v0;
+
+ inbuf += inlen;
+ inlen -= inlen;
+ }
+
+ /* Final fold. */
+
+ /* reduce 128-bits to 96-bits */
+ v0 = asm_swap_u64(crc);
+ v0 &= low_64bit_mask;
+ crc = asm_vpmsumd(k4lo, crc);
+ crc ^= v0;
+
+ /* reduce 96-bits to 64-bits */
+ v0 = (vector2x_u64)vec_sld_u32((vector4x_u32)crc,
+ (vector4x_u32)crc, 3); /* [x0][x3][x2][x1] */
+ v0 &= low_64bit_mask; /* [00][00][x2][x1] */
+ crc = crc & low_32bit_mask; /* [00][00][00][x0] */
+ crc = v0 ^ asm_vpmsumd(k5lo, crc); /* [00][00][xx][xx] */
+
+ /* barrett reduction */
+ v0 = crc << 32; /* [00][00][x0][00] */
+ v0 = asm_vpmsumd(my_p, v0);
+ v0 = asm_swap_u64(v0);
+ v0 = asm_vpmsumd(my_p, v0);
+ crc = (vector2x_u64)vec_sld_u32((vector4x_u32)crc,
+ zero, 1); /* [00][x1][x0][00] */
+ crc ^= v0;
+
+ *pcrc = (u32)crc[VEC_U64_HI];
+}
+
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE u32
+crc32r_ppc8_ce_reduction_4 (u32 data, u32 crc,
+ const struct crc32_consts_s *consts)
+{
+ vector4x_u32 zero = { 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+ vector2x_u64 my_p = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(0, &consts->my_p[0]);
+ vector2x_u64 v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_DEF((u64)data, 0);
+ v0 = asm_vpmsumd(v0, my_p); /* [00][00][xx][xx] */
+ v0 = (vector2x_u64)vec_sld_u32((vector4x_u32)v0,
+ zero, 3); /* [x0][00][00][00] */
+ v0 = (vector2x_u64)vec_sld_u32((vector4x_u32)v0,
+ (vector4x_u32)v0, 3); /* [00][x0][00][00] */
+ v0 = asm_vpmsumd(v0, my_p); /* [00][00][xx][xx] */
+ return (v0[VEC_U64_LO] >> 32) ^ crc;
+}
+
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE void
+crc32r_less_than_16 (u32 *pcrc, const byte *inbuf, size_t inlen,
+ const struct crc32_consts_s *consts)
+{
+ u32 crc = *pcrc;
+ u32 data;
+
+ while (inlen >= 4)
+ {
+ data = buf_get_le32(inbuf);
+ data ^= crc;
+
+ inlen -= 4;
+ inbuf += 4;
+
+ crc = crc32r_ppc8_ce_reduction_4 (data, 0, consts);
+ }
+
+ switch (inlen)
+ {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ data = inbuf[0];
+ data ^= crc;
+ data <<= 24;
+ crc >>= 8;
+ crc = crc32r_ppc8_ce_reduction_4 (data, crc, consts);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ data = inbuf[0] << 0;
+ data |= inbuf[1] << 8;
+ data ^= crc;
+ data <<= 16;
+ crc >>= 16;
+ crc = crc32r_ppc8_ce_reduction_4 (data, crc, consts);
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ data = inbuf[0] << 0;
+ data |= inbuf[1] << 8;
+ data |= inbuf[2] << 16;
+ data ^= crc;
+ data <<= 8;
+ crc >>= 24;
+ crc = crc32r_ppc8_ce_reduction_4 (data, crc, consts);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ *pcrc = crc;
+}
+
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE void
+crc32_ppc8_ce_bulk (u32 *pcrc, const byte *inbuf, size_t inlen,
+ const struct crc32_consts_s *consts)
+{
+ vector4x_u32 zero = { 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+ vector2x_u64 low_96bit_mask = CRC_VEC_U64_DEF(~0, ~((u64)(u32)-1 << 32));
+ vector2x_u64 p_my = asm_swap_u64(CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(0, &consts->my_p[0]));
+ vector2x_u64 p_my_lo, p_my_hi;
+ vector2x_u64 k2k1 = asm_swap_u64(CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(0, &consts->k[1 - 1]));
+ vector2x_u64 k4k3 = asm_swap_u64(CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(0, &consts->k[3 - 1]));
+ vector2x_u64 k4hi = CRC_VEC_U64_DEF(0, consts->k[4 - 1]);
+ vector2x_u64 k5hi = CRC_VEC_U64_DEF(0, consts->k[5 - 1]);
+ vector2x_u64 crc = CRC_VEC_U64_DEF(0, _gcry_bswap64(*pcrc));
+ vector2x_u64 crc0, crc1, crc2, crc3;
+ vector2x_u64 v0;
+
+ if (inlen >= 8 * 16)
+ {
+ crc0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(0 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc0 ^= crc;
+ crc1 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(1 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc2 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(2 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc3 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(3 * 16, inbuf);
+
+ inbuf += 4 * 16;
+ inlen -= 4 * 16;
+
+ /* Fold by 4. */
+ while (inlen >= 4 * 16)
+ {
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(0 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc0 = asm_vpmsumd(crc0, k2k1) ^ v0;
+
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(1 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc1 = asm_vpmsumd(crc1, k2k1) ^ v0;
+
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(2 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc2 = asm_vpmsumd(crc2, k2k1) ^ v0;
+
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(3 * 16, inbuf);
+ crc3 = asm_vpmsumd(crc3, k2k1) ^ v0;
+
+ inbuf += 4 * 16;
+ inlen -= 4 * 16;
+ }
+
+ /* Fold 4 to 1. */
+ crc1 ^= asm_vpmsumd(crc0, k4k3);
+ crc2 ^= asm_vpmsumd(crc1, k4k3);
+ crc3 ^= asm_vpmsumd(crc2, k4k3);
+ crc = crc3;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(0, inbuf);
+ crc ^= v0;
+
+ inbuf += 16;
+ inlen -= 16;
+ }
+
+ /* Fold by 1. */
+ while (inlen >= 16)
+ {
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_BE(0, inbuf);
+ crc = asm_vpmsumd(k4k3, crc);
+ crc ^= v0;
+
+ inbuf += 16;
+ inlen -= 16;
+ }
+
+ /* Partial fold. */
+ if (inlen)
+ {
+ /* Load last input and add padding zeros. */
+ vector2x_u64 mask = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(inlen, crc32_partial_fold_input_mask);
+ vector2x_u64 shl_shuf = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(32 - inlen, crc32_refl_shuf_shift);
+ vector2x_u64 shr_shuf = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(inlen + 16, crc32_shuf_shift);
+
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD_LE(inlen - 16, inbuf);
+ v0 &= mask;
+
+ crc = CRC_VEC_SWAP_TO_LE(crc);
+ crc2 = (vector2x_u64)vec_perm((vector16x_u8)crc, (vector16x_u8)zero,
+ (vector16x_u8)shr_shuf);
+ v0 |= crc2;
+ v0 = CRC_VEC_SWAP(v0);
+ crc = (vector2x_u64)vec_perm((vector16x_u8)crc, (vector16x_u8)zero,
+ (vector16x_u8)shl_shuf);
+ crc = asm_vpmsumd(k4k3, crc);
+ crc ^= v0;
+
+ inbuf += inlen;
+ inlen -= inlen;
+ }
+
+ /* Final fold. */
+
+ /* reduce 128-bits to 96-bits */
+ v0 = (vector2x_u64)vec_sld_u32((vector4x_u32)crc,
+ (vector4x_u32)zero, 2);
+ crc = asm_vpmsumd(k4hi, crc);
+ crc ^= v0; /* bottom 32-bit are zero */
+
+ /* reduce 96-bits to 64-bits */
+ v0 = crc & low_96bit_mask; /* [00][x2][x1][00] */
+ crc >>= 32; /* [00][x3][00][x0] */
+ crc = asm_vpmsumd(k5hi, crc); /* [00][xx][xx][00] */
+ crc ^= v0; /* top and bottom 32-bit are zero */
+
+ /* barrett reduction */
+ p_my_hi = p_my;
+ p_my_lo = p_my;
+ p_my_hi[VEC_U64_LO] = 0;
+ p_my_lo[VEC_U64_HI] = 0;
+ v0 = crc >> 32; /* [00][00][00][x1] */
+ crc = asm_vpmsumd(p_my_hi, crc); /* [00][xx][xx][xx] */
+ crc = (vector2x_u64)vec_sld_u32((vector4x_u32)crc,
+ (vector4x_u32)crc, 3); /* [x0][00][x2][x1] */
+ crc = asm_vpmsumd(p_my_lo, crc); /* [00][xx][xx][xx] */
+ crc ^= v0;
+
+ *pcrc = _gcry_bswap32(crc[VEC_U64_LO]);
+}
+
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE u32
+crc32_ppc8_ce_reduction_4 (u32 data, u32 crc,
+ const struct crc32_consts_s *consts)
+{
+ vector2x_u64 my_p = CRC_VEC_U64_LOAD(0, &consts->my_p[0]);
+ vector2x_u64 v0 = CRC_VEC_U64_DEF((u64)data << 32, 0);
+ v0 = asm_vpmsumd(v0, my_p); /* [00][x1][x0][00] */
+ v0[VEC_U64_LO] = 0; /* [00][x1][00][00] */
+ v0 = asm_vpmsumd(v0, my_p); /* [00][00][xx][xx] */
+ return _gcry_bswap32(v0[VEC_U64_LO]) ^ crc;
+}
+
+
+static ASM_FUNC_ATTR_INLINE void
+crc32_less_than_16 (u32 *pcrc, const byte *inbuf, size_t inlen,
+ const struct crc32_consts_s *consts)
+{
+ u32 crc = *pcrc;
+ u32 data;
+
+ while (inlen >= 4)
+ {
+ data = buf_get_le32(inbuf);
+ data ^= crc;
+ data = _gcry_bswap32(data);
+
+ inlen -= 4;
+ inbuf += 4;
+
+ crc = crc32_ppc8_ce_reduction_4 (data, 0, consts);
+ }
+
+ switch (inlen)
+ {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ data = inbuf[0];
+ data ^= crc;
+ data = data & 0xffU;
+ crc = crc >> 8;
+ crc = crc32_ppc8_ce_reduction_4 (data, crc, consts);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ data = inbuf[0] << 0;
+ data |= inbuf[1] << 8;
+ data ^= crc;
+ data = _gcry_bswap32(data << 16);
+ crc = crc >> 16;
+ crc = crc32_ppc8_ce_reduction_4 (data, crc, consts);
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ data = inbuf[0] << 0;
+ data |= inbuf[1] << 8;
+ data |= inbuf[2] << 16;
+ data ^= crc;
+ data = _gcry_bswap32(data << 8);
+ crc = crc >> 24;
+ crc = crc32_ppc8_ce_reduction_4 (data, crc, consts);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ *pcrc = crc;
+}
+
+void ASM_FUNC_ATTR
+_gcry_crc32_ppc8_vpmsum (u32 *pcrc, const byte *inbuf, size_t inlen)
+{
+ const struct crc32_consts_s *consts = &crc32_consts;
+
+ if (!inlen)
+ return;
+
+ if (inlen >= 16)
+ crc32r_ppc8_ce_bulk (pcrc, inbuf, inlen, consts);
+ else
+ crc32r_less_than_16 (pcrc, inbuf, inlen, consts);
+}
+
+void ASM_FUNC_ATTR
+_gcry_crc24rfc2440_ppc8_vpmsum (u32 *pcrc, const byte *inbuf, size_t inlen)
+{
+ const struct crc32_consts_s *consts = &crc24rfc2440_consts;
+
+ if (!inlen)
+ return;
+
+ /* Note: *pcrc in input endian. */
+
+ if (inlen >= 16)
+ crc32_ppc8_ce_bulk (pcrc, inbuf, inlen, consts);
+ else
+ crc32_less_than_16 (pcrc, inbuf, inlen, consts);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/cipher/crc.c b/cipher/crc.c
index a1ce50b6..bbb159ce 100644
--- a/cipher/crc.c
+++ b/cipher/crc.c
@@ -43,11 +43,27 @@
#endif /* USE_INTEL_PCLMUL */
+/* USE_PPC_VPMSUM indicates whether to enable PowerPC vector
+ * accelerated code. */
+#undef USE_PPC_VPMSUM
+#ifdef ENABLE_PPC_CRYPTO_SUPPORT
+# if defined(HAVE_COMPATIBLE_CC_PPC_ALTIVEC) && \
+ defined(HAVE_GCC_INLINE_ASM_PPC_ALTIVEC)
+# if __GNUC__ >= 4
+# define USE_PPC_VPMSUM 1
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif /* USE_PPC_VPMSUM */
+
+
typedef struct
{
u32 CRC;
#ifdef USE_INTEL_PCLMUL
unsigned int use_pclmul:1; /* Intel PCLMUL shall be used. */
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PPC_VPMSUM
+ unsigned int use_vpmsum:1; /* POWER vpmsum shall be used. */
#endif
byte buf[4];
}
@@ -61,6 +77,20 @@ void _gcry_crc24rfc2440_intel_pclmul (u32 *pcrc, const byte *inbuf,
size_t inlen);
#endif
+#ifdef USE_ARM_PMULL
+/*-- crc-armv8-ce.c --*/
+void _gcry_crc32_armv8_ce_pmull (u32 *pcrc, const byte *inbuf, size_t inlen);
+void _gcry_crc24rfc2440_armv8_ce_pmull (u32 *pcrc, const byte *inbuf,
+ size_t inlen);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_PPC_VPMSUM
+/*-- crc-ppc.c --*/
+void _gcry_crc32_ppc8_vpmsum (u32 *pcrc, const byte *inbuf, size_t inlen);
+void _gcry_crc24rfc2440_ppc8_vpmsum (u32 *pcrc, const byte *inbuf,
+ size_t inlen);
+#endif
+
/*
* Code generated by universal_crc by Danjel McGougan
@@ -361,11 +391,13 @@ static void
crc32_init (void *context, unsigned int flags)
{
CRC_CONTEXT *ctx = (CRC_CONTEXT *) context;
-#ifdef USE_INTEL_PCLMUL
u32 hwf = _gcry_get_hw_features ();
-
+#ifdef USE_INTEL_PCLMUL
ctx->use_pclmul = (hwf & HWF_INTEL_SSE4_1) && (hwf & HWF_INTEL_PCLMUL);
#endif
+#ifdef USE_PPC_VPMSUM
+ ctx->use_vpmsum = !!(hwf & HWF_PPC_ARCH_2_07);
+#endif
(void)flags;
@@ -386,6 +418,13 @@ crc32_write (void *context, const void *inbuf_arg, size_t inlen)
return;
}
#endif
+#ifdef USE_PPC_VPMSUM
+ if (ctx->use_vpmsum)
+ {
+ _gcry_crc32_ppc8_vpmsum(&ctx->CRC, inbuf, inlen);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
if (!inbuf || !inlen)
return;
@@ -444,6 +483,10 @@ crc32rfc1510_init (void *context, unsigned int flags)
ctx->use_pclmul = (hwf & HWF_INTEL_SSE4_1) && (hwf & HWF_INTEL_PCLMUL);
#endif
+#ifdef USE_PPC_VPMSUM
+ u32 hwf = _gcry_get_hw_features ();
+ ctx->use_vpmsum = !!(hwf & HWF_PPC_ARCH_2_07);
+#endif
(void)flags;
@@ -774,6 +817,10 @@ crc24rfc2440_init (void *context, unsigned int flags)
ctx->use_pclmul = (hwf & HWF_INTEL_SSE4_1) && (hwf & HWF_INTEL_PCLMUL);
#endif
+#ifdef USE_PPC_VPMSUM
+ u32 hwf = _gcry_get_hw_features ();
+ ctx->use_vpmsum = !!(hwf & HWF_PPC_ARCH_2_07);
+#endif
(void)flags;
@@ -794,6 +841,13 @@ crc24rfc2440_write (void *context, const void *inbuf_arg, size_t inlen)
return;
}
#endif
+#ifdef USE_PPC_VPMSUM
+ if (ctx->use_vpmsum)
+ {
+ _gcry_crc24rfc2440_ppc8_vpmsum(&ctx->CRC, inbuf, inlen);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
if (!inbuf || !inlen)
return;
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 953a20e9..b6b6455a 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1916,6 +1916,7 @@ AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether GCC inline assembler supports PowerPC AltiVec/VSX/crypto
"vadduwm %v0, %v1, %v22;\n"
"vshasigmaw %v0, %v1, 0, 15;\n"
"vshasigmad %v0, %v1, 0, 15;\n"
+ "vpmsumd %v11, %v11, %v11;\n"
);
]])],
[gcry_cv_gcc_inline_asm_ppc_altivec=yes])
@@ -2556,6 +2557,15 @@ if test "$found" = "1" ; then
# Build with the assembly implementation
GCRYPT_DIGESTS="$GCRYPT_DIGESTS crc-intel-pclmul.lo"
;;
+ powerpc64le-*-*)
+ GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS crc-ppc.lo"
+ ;;
+ powerpc64-*-*)
+ GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS crc-ppc.lo"
+ ;;
+ powerpc-*-*)
+ GCRYPT_CIPHERS="$GCRYPT_CIPHERS crc-ppc.lo"
+ ;;
esac
fi

2138
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-ppc-sha2.patch
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

89
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.8.5-use-fipscheck.patch
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@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c.use-fipscheck libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c.use-fipscheck 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c 2020-04-23 10:18:36.235764741 +0200
@@ -581,23 +581,50 @@ run_random_selftests (void)
return !!err;
}
+#ifdef ENABLE_HMAC_BINARY_CHECK
+static int
+get_library_path(const char *libname, const char *symbolname, char *path, size_t pathlen)
+{
+ Dl_info info;
+ void *dl, *sym;
+ int rv = -1;
+
+ dl = dlopen(libname, RTLD_LAZY);
+ if (dl == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ sym = dlsym(dl, symbolname);
+
+ if (sym != NULL && dladdr(sym, &info)) {
+ strncpy(path, info.dli_fname, pathlen-1);
+ path[pathlen-1] = '\0';
+ rv = 0;
+ }
+
+ dlclose(dl);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+#endif
+
/* Run an integrity check on the binary. Returns 0 on success. */
static int
check_binary_integrity (void)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_HMAC_BINARY_CHECK
gpg_error_t err;
- Dl_info info;
+ char libpath[4096];
unsigned char digest[32];
int dlen;
char *fname = NULL;
- const char key[] = "What am I, a doctor or a moonshuttle conductor?";
-
- if (!dladdr ("gcry_check_version", &info))
+ const char key[] = "orboDeJITITejsirpADONivirpUkvarP";
+
+ if (get_library_path ("libgcrypt.so.20", "gcry_check_version", libpath, sizeof(libpath)))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
- dlen = _gcry_hmac256_file (digest, sizeof digest, info.dli_fname,
+ dlen = _gcry_hmac256_file (digest, sizeof digest, libpath,
key, strlen (key));
if (dlen < 0)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
@@ -605,7 +632,7 @@ check_binary_integrity (void)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
else
{
- fname = xtrymalloc (strlen (info.dli_fname) + 1 + 5 + 1 );
+ fname = xtrymalloc (strlen (libpath) + 1 + 5 + 1 );
if (!fname)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
@@ -614,7 +641,7 @@ check_binary_integrity (void)
char *p;
/* Prefix the basename with a dot. */
- strcpy (fname, info.dli_fname);
+ strcpy (fname, libpath);
p = strrchr (fname, '/');
if (p)
p++;
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/Makefile.am.use-fipscheck libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/Makefile.am
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/Makefile.am.use-fipscheck 2020-04-23 10:18:36.237764702 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/Makefile.am 2020-04-23 10:19:03.186247455 +0200
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ libgcrypt_la_LIBADD = $(gcrypt_res) \
../cipher/libcipher.la \
../random/librandom.la \
../mpi/libmpi.la \
- ../compat/libcompat.la $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS)
+ ../compat/libcompat.la $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS) -ldl
dumpsexp_SOURCES = dumpsexp.c

100
SOURCES/libgcrypt-1.9.3-CVE-2021-40528.patch
View File

@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
commit 3462280f2e23e16adf3ed5176e0f2413d8861320
Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
Date: Fri May 21 11:15:07 2021 +0900
cipher: Fix ElGamal encryption for other implementations.
* cipher/elgamal.c (gen_k): Remove support of smaller K.
(do_encrypt): Never use smaller K.
(sign): Folllow the change of gen_k.
--
Cherry-pick master commit of:
632d80ef30e13de6926d503aa697f92b5dbfbc5e
This change basically reverts encryption changes in two commits:
74386120dad6b3da62db37f7044267c8ef34689b
78531373a342aeb847950f404343a05e36022065
Use of smaller K for ephemeral key in ElGamal encryption is only good,
when we can guarantee that recipient's key is generated by our
implementation (or compatible).
For detail, please see:
Luca De Feo, Bertram Poettering, Alessandro Sorniotti,
"On the (in)security of ElGamal in OpenPGP";
in the proceedings of CCS'2021.
CVE-id: CVE-2021-33560
GnuPG-bug-id: 5328
Suggested-by: Luca De Feo, Bertram Poettering, Alessandro Sorniotti
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
diff --git a/cipher/elgamal.c b/cipher/elgamal.c
index 9835122f..eead4502 100644
--- a/cipher/elgamal.c
+++ b/cipher/elgamal.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static const char *elg_names[] =
static int test_keys (ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, int nodie);
-static gcry_mpi_t gen_k (gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k);
+static gcry_mpi_t gen_k (gcry_mpi_t p);
static gcry_err_code_t generate (ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits,
gcry_mpi_t **factors);
static int check_secret_key (ELG_secret_key *sk);
@@ -189,11 +189,10 @@ test_keys ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, int nodie )
/****************
* Generate a random secret exponent k from prime p, so that k is
- * relatively prime to p-1. With SMALL_K set, k will be selected for
- * better encryption performance - this must never be used signing!
+ * relatively prime to p-1.
*/
static gcry_mpi_t
-gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
+gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p )
{
gcry_mpi_t k = mpi_alloc_secure( 0 );
gcry_mpi_t temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
@@ -202,18 +201,7 @@ gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
char *rndbuf = NULL;
- if (small_k)
- {
- /* Using a k much lesser than p is sufficient for encryption and
- * it greatly improves the encryption performance. We use
- * Wiener's table and add a large safety margin. */
- nbits = wiener_map( orig_nbits ) * 3 / 2;
- if( nbits >= orig_nbits )
- BUG();
- }
- else
- nbits = orig_nbits;
-
+ nbits = orig_nbits;
nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
if( DBG_CIPHER )
@@ -492,7 +480,7 @@ do_encrypt(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
* error code.
*/
- k = gen_k( pkey->p, 1 );
+ k = gen_k( pkey->p );
mpi_powm (a, pkey->g, k, pkey->p);
/* b = (y^k * input) mod p
@@ -608,7 +596,7 @@ sign(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_secret_key *skey )
*
*/
mpi_sub_ui(p_1, p_1, 1);
- k = gen_k( skey->p, 0 /* no small K ! */ );
+ k = gen_k( skey->p );
mpi_powm( a, skey->g, k, skey->p );
mpi_mul(t, skey->x, a );
mpi_subm(t, input, t, p_1 );

4
SOURCES/random.conf
View File

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
# use only /dev/urandom - see https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom/
only-urandom
# Keep jitter entropy generator enabled (should do no harm)
#disable-jent

1225
SOURCES/t-mpi-point.c
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

8
gating.yaml Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
--- !Policy
product_versions:
- rhel-9
decision_context: osci_compose_gate
rules:
- !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: baseos-ci.brew-build.tier1.functional}
- !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: baseos-ci.brew-build.userspace-fips-mode.functional}
- !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: baseos-ci.brew-build.tedude.validation}

77
libgcrypt-1.10.0-allow-short-salt.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
From 58c92098d053aae7c78cc42bdd7c80c13efc89bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 08:59:31 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] hmac,hkdf: Allow use of shorter salt for HKDF.
* cipher/md.c (prepare_macpads): Move the check to...
* src/visibility.c (gcry_mac_setkey): ... here.
* tests/t-kdf.c (check_hkdf): No failure is expected.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 6039
Fixes-commit: 76aad97dd312e83f2f9b8d086553f2b72ab6546f
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
---
cipher/md.c | 3 ---
src/visibility.c | 3 +++
tests/t-kdf.c | 12 +-----------
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/md.c b/cipher/md.c
index 4f4fc9bf..34336b5c 100644
--- a/cipher/md.c
+++ b/cipher/md.c
@@ -903,9 +903,6 @@ prepare_macpads (gcry_md_hd_t a, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
GcryDigestEntry *r;
- if (fips_mode () && keylen < 14)
- return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
-
if (!a->ctx->list)
return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO; /* Might happen if no algo is enabled. */
diff --git a/src/visibility.c b/src/visibility.c
index c98247d8..aee5bffb 100644
--- a/src/visibility.c
+++ b/src/visibility.c
@@ -946,6 +946,9 @@ gcry_mac_setkey (gcry_mac_hd_t hd, const void *key, size_t keylen)
if (!fips_is_operational ())
return gpg_error (fips_not_operational ());
+ if (fips_mode () && keylen < 14)
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+
return gpg_error (_gcry_mac_setkey (hd, key, keylen));
}
--
2.37.1
commit 02718ade6ab5eee38169c2102097166770a2456d
Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Thu Oct 20 16:33:11 2022 +0200
visiblity: Check the HMAC key length in FIPS mode
---
* src/visibility.c (gcry_md_setkey): Check the HMAC key length in FIPS
mode also in the md_ API.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
diff --git a/src/visibility.c b/src/visibility.c
index 150b197d..73db3dea 100644
--- a/src/visibility.c
+++ b/src/visibility.c
@@ -1357,6 +1357,10 @@ gcry_md_setkey (gcry_md_hd_t hd, const void *key, size_t keylen)
{
if (!fips_is_operational ())
return gpg_error (fips_not_operational ());
+
+ if (fips_mode () && keylen < 14)
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+
return gpg_error (_gcry_md_setkey (hd, key, keylen));
}

70
libgcrypt-1.10.0-allow-small-RSA-verify.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
From ca2afc9fb64d9a9b2f8930ba505d9ab6c8a57667 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 10:56:47 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] cipher: Allow verification of small RSA signatures in FIPS
mode
* cipher/rsa.c (rsa_check_keysize): Formatting.
(rsa_check_verify_keysize): New function.
(rsa_verify): Allow using smaller keys for verification.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 5975
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/rsa.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
index c6319b67..9f2b36e8 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa.c
@@ -352,13 +352,35 @@ generate_std (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e,
static gpg_err_code_t
rsa_check_keysize (unsigned int nbits)
{
- if (fips_mode() && nbits < 2048)
+ if (fips_mode () && nbits < 2048)
return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
}
+/* Check the RSA key length is acceptable for signature verification
+ *
+ * FIPS allows signature verification with RSA keys of size
+ * 1024, 1280, 1536 and 1792 in legacy mode, but this is up to the
+ * calling application to decide if the signature is legacy and
+ * should be accepted.
+ */
+static gpg_err_code_t
+rsa_check_verify_keysize (unsigned int nbits)
+{
+ if (fips_mode ())
+ {
+ if ((nbits >= 1024 && (nbits % 256) == 0) || nbits >= 2048)
+ return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
+
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+ }
+
+ return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
+}
+
+
/****************
* Generate a key pair with a key of size NBITS.
* USE_E = 0 let Libcgrypt decide what exponent to use.
@@ -1602,7 +1624,7 @@ rsa_verify (gcry_sexp_t s_sig, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
gcry_mpi_t result = NULL;
unsigned int nbits = rsa_get_nbits (keyparms);
- rc = rsa_check_keysize (nbits);
+ rc = rsa_check_verify_keysize (nbits);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.37.1

239
libgcrypt-1.10.0-disable-brainpool.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
From d651e25be0bc0c11f4d3d7c72be8cfbbe82b3874 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 18:39:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Allow building libgcrypt without Brainpool curves
* README: Document possibility to build without brainpool curves
* cipher/ecc-curves.c: Conditionalize brainpool curves definitions
* configure.ac: Implement possibility to build without brainpool curves
* tests/curves.c: Skip brainpool curves if they are not built-in
* tests/keygrip.c: Skip brainpool curves if they are not built-in
--
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
README | 3 +++
cipher/ecc-curves.c | 4 ++++
configure.ac | 13 +++++++++++++
tests/curves.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
tests/keygrip.c | 2 ++
5 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/README b/README
index 436b6cd4..1044109c 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -127,6 +127,9 @@
the list used with the current build the program
tests/version may be used.
+ --disable-brainpool
+ Do not build in support for Brainpool curves.
+
--disable-endian-check
Don't let configure test for the endianness but
try to use the OS provided macros at compile
diff --git a/cipher/ecc-curves.c b/cipher/ecc-curves.c
index 7c86e12c..8fd95a9c 100644
--- a/cipher/ecc-curves.c
+++ b/cipher/ecc-curves.c
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ static const struct
{ "NIST P-521", "1.3.132.0.35" },
{ "NIST P-521", "nistp521" }, /* rfc5656. */
+#ifdef ENABLE_BRAINPOOL
{ "brainpoolP160r1", "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.1" },
{ "brainpoolP192r1", "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.3" },
{ "brainpoolP224r1", "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.5" },
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ static const struct
{ "brainpoolP320r1", "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.9" },
{ "brainpoolP384r1", "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11"},
{ "brainpoolP512r1", "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13"},
+#endif /* ENABLE_BRAINPOOL */
{ "GOST2001-test", "1.2.643.2.2.35.0" },
{ "GOST2001-CryptoPro-A", "1.2.643.2.2.35.1" },
@@ -297,6 +299,7 @@ static const ecc_domain_parms_t domain_parms[] =
1
},
+#ifdef ENABLE_BRAINPOOL
{ "brainpoolP160r1", 160, 0,
MPI_EC_WEIERSTRASS, ECC_DIALECT_STANDARD,
"0xe95e4a5f737059dc60dfc7ad95b3d8139515620f",
@@ -391,6 +394,7 @@ static const ecc_domain_parms_t domain_parms[] =
"b2dcde494a5f485e5bca4bd88a2763aed1ca2b2fa8f0540678cd1e0f3ad80892",
1
},
+#endif /* ENABLE_BRAINPOOL */
{
"GOST2001-test", 256, 0,
MPI_EC_WEIERSTRASS, ECC_DIALECT_STANDARD,
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 6efbf139..f4ac1887 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -614,6 +614,14 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(fips-module-version,
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FIPS_MODULE_VERSION, "$fips_module_version",
[Define FIPS module version for certification])
+# Implementation of the --disable-brainpool switch.
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we want to disable the use of brainpool curves])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(brainpool,
+ AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-brainpool],
+ [Disable the brainpool curves]),
+ use_brainpool="$enableval",use_brainpool=yes)
+AC_MSG_RESULT($use_brainpool)
+
# Implementation of the --disable-jent-support switch.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether jitter entropy support is requested])
AC_ARG_ENABLE(jent-support,
@@ -2466,6 +2474,10 @@ if test x"$ppccryptosupport" = xyes ; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PPC_CRYPTO_SUPPORT,1,
[Enable support for POWER 8 (PowerISA 2.07) crypto extension.])
fi
+if test x"$use_brainpool" = xyes ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_BRAINPOOL, 1,
+ [Enable support for the brainpool curves.])
+fi
if test x"$jentsupport" = xyes ; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_JENT_SUPPORT, 1,
[Enable support for the jitter entropy collector.])
@@ -3296,6 +3308,7 @@ GCRY_MSG_WRAP([Enabled digest algorithms:],[$enabled_digests])
GCRY_MSG_WRAP([Enabled kdf algorithms: ],[$enabled_kdfs])
GCRY_MSG_WRAP([Enabled pubkey algorithms:],[$enabled_pubkey_ciphers])
GCRY_MSG_SHOW([Random number generator: ],[$random])
+GCRY_MSG_SHOW([Enabled Brainpool curves: ],[$use_brainpool])
GCRY_MSG_SHOW([Try using jitter entropy: ],[$jentsupport])
GCRY_MSG_SHOW([Using linux capabilities: ],[$use_capabilities])
GCRY_MSG_SHOW([FIPS module version: ],[$fips_module_version])
diff --git a/tests/curves.c b/tests/curves.c
index 3c738171..8eb79565 100644
--- a/tests/curves.c
+++ b/tests/curves.c
@@ -33,7 +33,11 @@
#include "t-common.h"
/* Number of curves defined in ../cipher/ecc-curves.c */
-#define N_CURVES 27
+#ifdef ENABLE_BRAINPOOL
+# define N_CURVES 27
+#else
+# define N_CURVES 20
+#endif
/* A real world sample public key. */
static char const sample_key_1[] =
@@ -52,6 +56,7 @@ static char const sample_key_1[] =
static char const sample_key_1_curve[] = "NIST P-256";
static unsigned int sample_key_1_nbits = 256;
+#ifdef ENABLE_BRAINPOOL
/* A made up sample public key. */
static char const sample_key_2[] =
"(public-key\n"
@@ -68,6 +73,7 @@ static char const sample_key_2[] =
" ))";
static char const sample_key_2_curve[] = "brainpoolP160r1";
static unsigned int sample_key_2_nbits = 160;
+#endif /* ENABLE_BRAINPOOL */
static int in_fips_mode;
@@ -113,6 +119,7 @@ check_matching (void)
gcry_sexp_release (key);
+#ifdef ENABLE_BRAINPOOL
if (!in_fips_mode)
{
err = gcry_sexp_new (&key, sample_key_2, 0, 1);
@@ -130,6 +137,7 @@ check_matching (void)
gcry_sexp_release (key);
}
+#endif /* ENABLE_BRAINPOOL */
}
#define TEST_ERROR_EXPECTED (1 << 0)
@@ -185,20 +193,26 @@ check_get_params (void)
{ GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.132.0.35" },
{ GCRY_PK_ECC, "nistp521" },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP160r1", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.1", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP192r1", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.3", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP224r1", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.5", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP256r1", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP320r1", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.9", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP384r1", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP512r1", TEST_NOFIPS },
- { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13", TEST_NOFIPS },
+#ifdef ENABLE_BRAINPOOL
+# define BRAINPOOL_FLAGS TEST_NOFIPS
+#else
+# define BRAINPOOL_FLAGS TEST_ERROR_EXPECTED
+#endif /* ENABLE_BRAINPOOL */
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP160r1", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.1", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP192r1", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.3", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP224r1", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.5", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP256r1", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP320r1", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.9", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP384r1", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "brainpoolP512r1", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+ { GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13", BRAINPOOL_FLAGS },
+#undef BRAINPOOL_ERROR_EXPECTED
{ GCRY_PK_ECC, "GOST2001-test", TEST_NOFIPS },
{ GCRY_PK_ECC, "1.2.643.2.2.35.0", TEST_NOFIPS },
@@ -282,6 +296,7 @@ check_get_params (void)
gcry_sexp_release (param);
+#ifdef ENABLE_BRAINPOOL
if (!in_fips_mode)
{
param = gcry_pk_get_param (GCRY_PK_ECDSA, sample_key_2_curve);
@@ -297,6 +312,7 @@ check_get_params (void)
gcry_sexp_release (param);
}
+#endif /* ENABLE_BRAINPOOL */
/* Some simple tests */
for (idx=0; idx < DIM (tv); idx++)
diff --git a/tests/keygrip.c b/tests/keygrip.c
index 49bd71bc..fc4c17be 100644
--- a/tests/keygrip.c
+++ b/tests/keygrip.c
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ static struct
" (q #04C8A4CEC2E9A9BC8E173531A67B0840DF345C32E261ADD780E6D83D56EFADFD5DE872F8B854819B59543CE0B7F822330464FBC4E6324DADDCD9D059554F63B344#)))",
"\xE6\xDF\x94\x2D\xBD\x8C\x77\x05\xA3\xDD\x41\x6E\xFC\x04\x01\xDB\x31\x0E\x99\xB6"
},
+#ifdef ENABLE_BRAINPOOL
{
GCRY_PK_ECC,
"(public-key"
@@ -197,6 +198,7 @@ static struct
"\xD6\xE1\xBF\x43\xAC\x9B\x9A\x12\xE7\x3F",
1
},
+#endif /*ENABLE_BRAINPOOL */
{ /* Ed25519 standard */
GCRY_PK_ECC,
"(public-key"
--
2.34.1

85
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-drbg.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
From 45b80678109e5817b7cd15566a9d6c96b064b95f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2023 15:39:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] random: Remove unused SHA384 DRBGs.
* random/random-drbg.c (global): Remove unused SHA384-based defines.
(drbg_cores): Remove SHA384 configurations.
(drbg_sec_strength): Remove unused SHA384.
--
These are no longer allowed by FIPS and it looks like they were never
usable as they do not have any conversion from the string flags.
GnuPG-bug-id: 6393
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
random/random-drbg.c | 13 ++-----------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/random/random-drbg.c b/random/random-drbg.c
index f1cfe286..af49a5a5 100644
--- a/random/random-drbg.c
+++ b/random/random-drbg.c
@@ -188,11 +188,9 @@
#define DRBG_HASHSHA1 ((u32)1<<4)
#define DRBG_HASHSHA224 ((u32)1<<5)
#define DRBG_HASHSHA256 ((u32)1<<6)
-#define DRBG_HASHSHA384 ((u32)1<<7)
#define DRBG_HASHSHA512 ((u32)1<<8)
#define DRBG_HASH_MASK (DRBG_HASHSHA1 | DRBG_HASHSHA224 \
- | DRBG_HASHSHA256 | DRBG_HASHSHA384 \
- | DRBG_HASHSHA512)
+ | DRBG_HASHSHA256 | DRBG_HASHSHA512)
/* type modifiers (A.3)*/
#define DRBG_HMAC ((u32)1<<12)
#define DRBG_SYM128 ((u32)1<<13)
@@ -211,23 +209,18 @@
#define DRBG_NOPR_CTRAES256 (DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM256)
#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA1 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA1)
#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA256 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA256)
-#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA384 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA384)
#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA512 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA512)
#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA1 (DRBG_HASHSHA1)
#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA256 (DRBG_HASHSHA256)
-#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA384 (DRBG_HASHSHA384)
#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA512 (DRBG_HASHSHA512)
#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA1 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA1 \
| DRBG_HMAC)
#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA256 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA256 \
| DRBG_HMAC)
-#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA384 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA384 \
- | DRBG_HMAC)
#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA512 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA512 \
| DRBG_HMAC)
#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA1 (DRBG_HASHSHA1 | DRBG_HMAC)
#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA256 (DRBG_HASHSHA256 | DRBG_HMAC)
-#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA384 (DRBG_HASHSHA384 | DRBG_HMAC)
#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA512 (DRBG_HASHSHA512 | DRBG_HMAC)
@@ -359,12 +352,10 @@ static const struct drbg_core_s drbg_cores[] = {
/* Hash DRBGs */
{DRBG_HASHSHA1, 55, 20, GCRY_MD_SHA1},
{DRBG_HASHSHA256, 55, 32, GCRY_MD_SHA256},
- {DRBG_HASHSHA384, 111, 48, GCRY_MD_SHA384},
{DRBG_HASHSHA512, 111, 64, GCRY_MD_SHA512},
/* HMAC DRBGs */
{DRBG_HASHSHA1 | DRBG_HMAC, 20, 20, GCRY_MD_SHA1},
{DRBG_HASHSHA256 | DRBG_HMAC, 32, 32, GCRY_MD_SHA256},
- {DRBG_HASHSHA384 | DRBG_HMAC, 48, 48, GCRY_MD_SHA384},
{DRBG_HASHSHA512 | DRBG_HMAC, 64, 64, GCRY_MD_SHA512},
/* block ciphers */
{DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM128, 32, 16, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128},
@@ -543,7 +534,7 @@ drbg_sec_strength (u32 flags)
else if (flags & DRBG_SYM192)
return 24;
else if ((flags & DRBG_SYM256) || (flags & DRBG_HASHSHA256) ||
- (flags & DRBG_HASHSHA384) || (flags & DRBG_HASHSHA512))
+ (flags & DRBG_HASHSHA512))
return 32;
else
return 32;
--
2.39.2

50
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-getrandom.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 0a5e608b8b18d4f41e4d7434c6262bf11507f859 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2022 15:30:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] random: Use getrandom (GRND_RANDOM) in FIPS mode
The SP800-90C (clarified in IG D.K.) requires the following when
different DRBGs are chained:
* the parent needs to be reseeded before generate operation
* the reseed & generate needs to be atomic
In RHEL, this is addressed by change in the kernel, that will do this
automatically, when the getentropy () is called with GRND_RANDOM flag.
* random/rndgetentropy.c (_gcry_rndgetentropy_gather_random): Use
GRND_RANDOM in FIPS Mode
---
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
random/rndgetentropy.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/random/rndgetentropy.c b/random/rndgetentropy.c
index 7580873e..db4b09ed 100644
--- a/random/rndgetentropy.c
+++ b/random/rndgetentropy.c
@@ -82,9 +82,18 @@ _gcry_rndgetentropy_gather_random (void (*add)(const void*, size_t,
* never blocking once the kernel is seeded. */
do
{
- nbytes = length < sizeof (buffer)? length : sizeof (buffer);
_gcry_pre_syscall ();
- ret = getentropy (buffer, nbytes);
+ if (fips_mode ())
+ {
+ /* The getrandom API returns maximum 32 B of strong entropy */
+ nbytes = length < 32 ? length : 32;
+ ret = getrandom (buffer, nbytes, GRND_RANDOM);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ nbytes = length < sizeof (buffer) ? length : sizeof (buffer);
+ ret = getentropy (buffer, nbytes);
+ }
_gcry_post_syscall ();
}
while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
--
2.37.1

277
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-indicator-md-hmac.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
From fd832687f36c1885d2388c55f7e8569184ba2593 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tobias Heider <tobias.heider@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2023 03:20:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fips: Add explicit indicators for md and mac algorithms
* src/fips.c (_gcry_fips_indicator_mac): New function indicating
non-approved mac algorithms
(_gcry_fips_indicator_md): new functions indicating non-approved
message digest algorithms
* src/g10lib.h (_gcry_fips_indicator_mac): new function
(_gcry_fips_indicator_md): ditto
* src/gcrypt.h.in (enum gcry_ctl_cmds): New symbols
GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MAC and
GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MD
* src/global.c (_gcry_vcontrol): Handle new FIPS indicators.
* doc/gcrypt.texi: Document the new option.
--
Signed-off-by: Tobias Heider <tobias.heider@canonical.com>
---
doc/gcrypt.texi | 13 +++++++++++++
src/fips.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/g10lib.h | 2 ++
src/gcrypt.h.in | 4 +++-
src/global.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/doc/gcrypt.texi b/doc/gcrypt.texi
index e44c2f2e..462c5931 100644
--- a/doc/gcrypt.texi
+++ b/doc/gcrypt.texi
@@ -992,6 +992,19 @@ certification. If the function is approved, this function returns
@code{GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR} (other restrictions might still apply).
Otherwise @code{GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED} is returned.
+@item GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MAC; Arguments: enum gcry_mac_algos
+
+Check if the given MAC is approved under the current FIPS 140-3
+certification. If the MAC is approved, this function returns
+@code{GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR}. Otherwise @code{GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED}
+is returned.
+
+@item GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MD; Arguments: enum gcry_md_algos
+
+Check if the given message digest algorithm is approved under the current
+FIPS 140-3 certification. If the algorithm is approved, this function returns
+@code{GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR}. Otherwise @code{GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED} is returned.
+
@end table
@end deftypefun
diff --git a/src/fips.c b/src/fips.c
index 272aabae..8b3b3f04 100644
--- a/src/fips.c
+++ b/src/fips.c
@@ -377,6 +377,57 @@ _gcry_fips_indicator_cipher (va_list arg_ptr)
}
}
+int
+_gcry_fips_indicator_mac (va_list arg_ptr)
+{
+ enum gcry_mac_algos alg = va_arg (arg_ptr, enum gcry_mac_algos);
+
+ switch (alg)
+ {
+ case GCRY_MAC_CMAC_AES:
+ case GCRY_MAC_HMAC_SHA1:
+ case GCRY_MAC_HMAC_SHA224:
+ case GCRY_MAC_HMAC_SHA256:
+ case GCRY_MAC_HMAC_SHA384:
+ case GCRY_MAC_HMAC_SHA512:
+ case GCRY_MAC_HMAC_SHA512_224:
+ case GCRY_MAC_HMAC_SHA512_256:
+ case GCRY_MAC_HMAC_SHA3_224:
+ case GCRY_MAC_HMAC_SHA3_256:
+ case GCRY_MAC_HMAC_SHA3_384:
+ case GCRY_MAC_HMAC_SHA3_512:
+ return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
+ default:
+ return GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+_gcry_fips_indicator_md (va_list arg_ptr)
+{
+ enum gcry_md_algos alg = va_arg (arg_ptr, enum gcry_md_algos);
+
+ switch (alg)
+ {
+ case GCRY_MD_SHA1:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHA224:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHA256:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHA384:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHA512:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHA512_224:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHA512_256:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHA3_224:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHA3_256:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHA3_384:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHA3_512:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHAKE128:
+ case GCRY_MD_SHAKE256:
+ return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
+ default:
+ return GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+}
+
int
_gcry_fips_indicator_kdf (va_list arg_ptr)
{
diff --git a/src/g10lib.h b/src/g10lib.h
index 6be0ab21..86337eed 100644
--- a/src/g10lib.h
+++ b/src/g10lib.h
@@ -467,6 +467,8 @@ void _gcry_fips_signal_error (const char *srcfile,
#endif
int _gcry_fips_indicator_cipher (va_list arg_ptr);
+int _gcry_fips_indicator_mac (va_list arg_ptr);
+int _gcry_fips_indicator_md (va_list arg_ptr);
int _gcry_fips_indicator_kdf (va_list arg_ptr);
int _gcry_fips_indicator_function (va_list arg_ptr);
diff --git a/src/gcrypt.h.in b/src/gcrypt.h.in
index aba22bfc..54080d46 100644
--- a/src/gcrypt.h.in
+++ b/src/gcrypt.h.in
@@ -330,7 +330,9 @@ enum gcry_ctl_cmds
GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_CIPHER = 81,
GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_KDF = 82,
GCRYCTL_NO_FIPS_MODE = 83,
- GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_FUNCTION = 84
+ GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_FUNCTION = 84,
+ GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MAC = 85,
+ GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MD = 86
};
/* Perform various operations defined by CMD. */
diff --git a/src/global.c b/src/global.c
index debf6194..d16d3709 100644
--- a/src/global.c
+++ b/src/global.c
@@ -791,6 +791,20 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd, va_list arg_ptr)
rc = _gcry_fips_indicator_cipher (arg_ptr);
break;
+ case GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MAC:
+ /* Get FIPS Service Indicator for a given message authentication code.
+ * Returns GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR if algorithm is allowed or
+ * GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED otherwise */
+ rc = _gcry_fips_indicator_mac (arg_ptr);
+ break;
+
+ case GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MD:
+ /* Get FIPS Service Indicator for a given message digest. Returns
+ * GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR if algorithm is allowed or GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * otherwise */
+ rc = _gcry_fips_indicator_md (arg_ptr);
+ break;
+
case GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_KDF:
/* Get FIPS Service Indicator for a given KDF. Returns GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR
* if algorithm is allowed or GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED otherwise */
--
2.39.2
From 2d193a955d05b4b9caed2895cf25600add3484da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tobias Heider <tobias.heider@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2023 03:21:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fips: Unblock MD5 in fips mode but mark non-approved in
indicator.
* cipher/mac-hmac.c (_gcry_mac_type_spec_hmac_md5): allow in fips mode
* cipher/md5.c (_gcry_digest_spec_md5): allow in fips mode
--
Signed-off-by: Tobias Heider <tobias.heider@canonical.com>
---
cipher/mac-hmac.c | 2 +-
cipher/md5.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/mac-hmac.c b/cipher/mac-hmac.c
index f1ab568b..9fac77dc 100644
--- a/cipher/mac-hmac.c
+++ b/cipher/mac-hmac.c
@@ -1413,7 +1413,7 @@ const gcry_mac_spec_t _gcry_mac_type_spec_hmac_tiger1 = {
#endif
#if USE_MD5
const gcry_mac_spec_t _gcry_mac_type_spec_hmac_md5 = {
- GCRY_MAC_HMAC_MD5, {0, 0}, "HMAC_MD5",
+ GCRY_MAC_HMAC_MD5, {0, 1}, "HMAC_MD5",
&hmac_ops
};
#endif
diff --git a/cipher/md5.c b/cipher/md5.c
index 5457fc38..744a2cc1 100644
--- a/cipher/md5.c
+++ b/cipher/md5.c
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static const gcry_md_oid_spec_t oid_spec_md5[] =
const gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_md5 =
{
- GCRY_MD_MD5, {0, 0},
+ GCRY_MD_MD5, {0, 1},
"MD5", asn, DIM (asn), oid_spec_md5, 16,
md5_init, _gcry_md_block_write, md5_final, md5_read, NULL,
NULL,
--
2.39.2
From f52f33389da3302f51b6b00451cf9fc7e7a7e277 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 17:26:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] tests: Improve test coverage for FIPS service indicators
* tests/basic.c (check_digests): Check the FIPS indicators
(check_mac): Ditto.
--
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
tests/basic.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tests/basic.c b/tests/basic.c
index 095bdc97..5d5ceac9 100644
--- a/tests/basic.c
+++ b/tests/basic.c
@@ -14086,6 +14086,7 @@ check_mac (void)
"\x13\x46\x76\xfb\x6d\xe0\x44\x60\x65\xc9\x74\x40\xfa\x8c\x6a\x58" },
{ 0 },
};
+ gcry_error_t err;
int i;
if (verbose)
@@ -15370,6 +15370,12 @@ check_digests (void)
{
if (in_fips_mode)
{
+ err = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MD, algos[i].md);
+ if (err == GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+ {
+ fail ("algo %d, gcry_md_test_algo failed while it should"
+ " have worked in FIPS mode\n", algos[i].md);
+ }
if (verbose)
fprintf (stderr, " algorithm %d not available in fips mode\n",
algos[i].md);
@@ -16948,6 +16954,7 @@ check_mac (void)
#endif /* USE_GOST28147 */
{ 0 },
};
+ gcry_error_t err;
int i;
if (verbose)
@@ -16961,6 +16968,12 @@ check_mac (void)
{
if (in_fips_mode)
{
+ err = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MAC, algos[i].algo);
+ if (err == GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+ {
+ fail ("algo %d, gcry_mac_test_algo failed while it should"
+ " have worked in FIPS mode\n", algos[i].algo);
+ }
if (verbose)
fprintf (stderr, " algorithm %d not available in fips mode\n",
algos[i].algo);
--
2.39.2

277
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-indicator-pk-flags.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
From 0c0268177666f6ce53c0a61e86c1c5bd2c53c0b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 15:57:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fips: Explicitly allow only some PK flags
* src/fips.c (_gcry_fips_indicator_pk_flags): New function for explicit
FIPS indicator for public key algorithm flags
* src/g10lib.h (_gcry_fips_indicator_pk_flags): New.
* src/gcrypt.h.in (GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_PK_FLAGS): New.
* src/global.c (_gcry_vcontrol): Handle the new option.
* doc/gcrypt.texi: Document new options.
--
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
doc/gcrypt.texi | 6 ++++++
src/fips.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
src/g10lib.h | 1 +
src/gcrypt.h.in | 3 ++-
src/global.c | 7 +++++++
5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/doc/gcrypt.texi b/doc/gcrypt.texi
index 462c5931..750b6718 100644
--- a/doc/gcrypt.texi
+++ b/doc/gcrypt.texi
@@ -1005,6 +1005,12 @@ Check if the given message digest algorithm is approved under the current
FIPS 140-3 certification. If the algorithm is approved, this function returns
@code{GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR}. Otherwise @code{GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED} is returned.
+@item GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_PK_FLAGS; Arguments: const char *
+
+Check if the given public key operation flag is approved under the current
+FIPS 140-3 certification. If the flag is approved, this function returns
+@code{GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR}. Otherwise @code{GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED} is returned.
+
@end table
@end deftypefun
diff --git a/src/fips.c b/src/fips.c
index 974ed833..cb547aa2 100644
--- a/src/fips.c
+++ b/src/fips.c
@@ -457,6 +457,21 @@ _gcry_fips_indicator_function (va_list arg_ptr)
}
+int
+_gcry_fips_indicator_pk_flags (va_list arg_ptr)
+{
+ const char *flag = va_arg (arg_ptr, const char *);
+
+ if (strcmp (flag, "param") == 0 ||
+ strcmp (flag, "raw") == 0 ||
+ strcmp (flag, "no-blinding") == 0 ||
+ strcmp (flag, "pss") == 0)
+ return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
+
+ return GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+
/* This is a test on whether the library is in the error or
operational state. */
int
diff --git a/src/g10lib.h b/src/g10lib.h
index 86337eed..acff2d6b 100644
--- a/src/g10lib.h
+++ b/src/g10lib.h
@@ -471,6 +471,7 @@ int _gcry_fips_indicator_mac (va_list arg_ptr);
int _gcry_fips_indicator_md (va_list arg_ptr);
int _gcry_fips_indicator_kdf (va_list arg_ptr);
int _gcry_fips_indicator_function (va_list arg_ptr);
+int _gcry_fips_indicator_pk_flags (va_list arg_ptr);
int _gcry_fips_is_operational (void);
diff --git a/src/gcrypt.h.in b/src/gcrypt.h.in
index 54080d46..121a2061 100644
--- a/src/gcrypt.h.in
+++ b/src/gcrypt.h.in
@@ -332,7 +332,8 @@ enum gcry_ctl_cmds
GCRYCTL_NO_FIPS_MODE = 83,
GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_FUNCTION = 84,
GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MAC = 85,
- GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MD = 86
+ GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MD = 86,
+ GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_PK_FLAGS = 87
};
/* Perform various operations defined by CMD. */
diff --git a/src/global.c b/src/global.c
index d16d3709..f39df422 100644
--- a/src/global.c
+++ b/src/global.c
@@ -818,6 +818,13 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd, va_list arg_ptr)
rc = _gcry_fips_indicator_function (arg_ptr);
break;
+ case GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_PK_FLAGS:
+ /* Get FIPS Service Indicator for a public key operation flags.
+ * Returns GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR if the flag is allowed to be used or
+ * GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED otherwise */
+ rc = _gcry_fips_indicator_pk_flags (arg_ptr);
+ break;
+
case PRIV_CTL_INIT_EXTRNG_TEST: /* Init external random test. */
rc = GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
break;
--
2.39.2
From 22a40df4c0210a671b331932a434f70b50354873 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 16:05:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fips: Explicitly disable overriding random in FIPS mode
* src/fips.c: (_gcry_fips_indicator_function): Mark using random
override non-approved in FIPS mode.
--
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
src/fips.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/fips.c b/src/fips.c
index cb547aa2..a7342030 100644
--- a/src/fips.c
+++ b/src/fips.c
@@ -450,7 +450,8 @@ _gcry_fips_indicator_function (va_list arg_ptr)
if (strcmp (function, "gcry_pk_sign") == 0 ||
strcmp (function, "gcry_pk_verify") == 0 ||
strcmp (function, "gcry_pk_encrypt") == 0 ||
- strcmp (function, "gcry_pk_decrypt") == 0)
+ strcmp (function, "gcry_pk_decrypt") == 0 ||
+ strcmp (function, "gcry_pk_random_override_new") == 0)
return GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
--
2.39.2
From 1c916b8c99ea0e30f1d81d606fd63b0c45657186 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 13:12:56 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] fips: More elaborate way of getting FIPS pk flags indicators.
* src/fips.c (_gcry_fips_indicator_pk_flags): List more allowed string
in the S-expression.
* doc/gcrypt.texi: Add document for the FIPS service indicator
GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_PK_FLAGS with example.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 6417
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
---
doc/gcrypt.texi | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
src/fips.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/gcrypt.texi b/doc/gcrypt.texi
index 750b6718..752f64d6 100644
--- a/doc/gcrypt.texi
+++ b/doc/gcrypt.texi
@@ -1007,9 +1007,45 @@ FIPS 140-3 certification. If the algorithm is approved, this function returns
@item GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_PK_FLAGS; Arguments: const char *
-Check if the given public key operation flag is approved under the current
-FIPS 140-3 certification. If the flag is approved, this function returns
-@code{GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR}. Otherwise @code{GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED} is returned.
+Check if the given public key operation flag or s-expression object name is
+approved under the current FIPS 140-3 certification. If the flag is
+approved, this function returns @code{GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR}.
+
+Otherwise @code{GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED} is returned.
+
+For compound s-expression objects, if the object name is allowed, the user
+is responsible to check also the internal members. For example:
+
+@example
+ gcry_sexp_t s_sig = NULL;
+ gcry_md_hd_t hd = NULL;
+ gcry_sexp_t s_sk = NULL;
+ const char *data_tmpl = "(data(flags pss)(hash %s %b)(salt-length 1:0))";
+
+ if (err = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_FUNCTION, "gcry_md_open") &&
+ err = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_MD, GCRY_MD_SHA512) &&
+ err = gcry_md_open (&hd, GCRY_MD_SHA512, 0))
+ @{
+ printf ("gcry_md_open failed: %s", gpg_strerror (err));
+ return;
+ @}
+ gcry_md_write (hd, buffer, buflen);
+
+ /* initialize the key in s_sk */
+
+ if (err = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_FUNCTION, "gcry_pk_hash_sign") &&
+ err = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_PK_FLAGS, "data") &&
+ err = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_PK_FLAGS, "flags") &&
+ err = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_PK_FLAGS, "pss") &&
+ err = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_PK_FLAGS, "hash") &&
+ err = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_PK_FLAGS, "salt-length")
+ err = gcry_pk_hash_sign (&s_sig, data_tmpl, s_sk, hd, NULL))
+ @{
+ printf ("gcry_pk_hash_sign failed: %s", gpg_strerror (err));
+ return;
+ @}
+ /* ok */
+@end example
@end table
diff --git a/src/fips.c b/src/fips.c
index a7342030..669cfd0e 100644
--- a/src/fips.c
+++ b/src/fips.c
@@ -457,16 +457,49 @@ _gcry_fips_indicator_function (va_list arg_ptr)
return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
}
+/* Note: the array should be sorted. */
+static const char *valid_string_in_sexp[] = {
+ "curve",
+ "d",
+ "data",
+ "e",
+ "ecdsa",
+ "flags",
+ "genkey",
+ "hash",
+ "n",
+ "nbits",
+ "pkcs1",
+ "private-key",
+ "pss",
+ "public-key",
+ "q",
+ "r",
+ "raw",
+ "rsa",
+ "rsa-use-e",
+ "s",
+ "salt-length",
+ "sig-val",
+ "value"
+};
+
+static int
+compare_string (const void *v1, const void *v2)
+{
+ const char * const *p_str1 = v1;
+ const char * const *p_str2 = v2;
+
+ return strcmp (*p_str1, *p_str2);
+}
int
_gcry_fips_indicator_pk_flags (va_list arg_ptr)
{
const char *flag = va_arg (arg_ptr, const char *);
- if (strcmp (flag, "param") == 0 ||
- strcmp (flag, "raw") == 0 ||
- strcmp (flag, "no-blinding") == 0 ||
- strcmp (flag, "pss") == 0)
+ if (bsearch (&flag, valid_string_in_sexp, DIM (valid_string_in_sexp),
+ sizeof (char *), compare_string))
return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
return GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
--
2.39.2

55
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-indicator.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From c34c9e70055ee43e5ef257384fa15941f064e5a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2022 10:47:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fips: Mark AES key wrapping as approved.
* src/fips.c (_gcry_fips_indicator_cipher): Add key wrapping mode as
approved.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 5512
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
src/fips.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/src/fips.c b/src/fips.c
index 6599121c..272aabae 100644
--- a/src/fips.c
+++ b/src/fips.c
@@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ _gcry_fips_indicator_cipher (va_list arg_ptr)
case GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM:
case GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM:
case GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_XTS:
+ case GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP:
return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
default:
return GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
--
commit d6117b04e0e4d5d68df8fb731f618b0d5126ee14
Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Jan 17 14:39:34 2023 +0100
fips: Remove GCM mode from the allowed FIPS indicators
* src/fips.c (_gcry_fips_indicator_cipher): Do not mark GCM mode as FIPS
approved.
---
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
diff --git a/src/fips.c b/src/fips.c
index 272aabae..774e7b4c 100644
--- a/src/fips.c
+++ b/src/fips.c
@@ -365,7 +365,6 @@ _gcry_fips_indicator_cipher (va_list arg_ptr)
case GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_OFB:
case GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR:
case GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM:
- case GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM:
case GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_XTS:
case GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP:
return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
--

1008
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-integrity.patch Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

190
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-integrity2.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
From 3c8b6c4a9cad59c5e1db5706f6774a3141b60210 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 10:28:05 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] fips: Fix gen-note-integrity.sh script not to use cmp
utility.
* src/gen-note-integrity.sh: Simplify detecting 32-bit machine
or 64-bit machine.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 5835
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
---
src/gen-note-integrity.sh | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/gen-note-integrity.sh b/src/gen-note-integrity.sh
index 969fdca6..878d7095 100755
--- a/src/gen-note-integrity.sh
+++ b/src/gen-note-integrity.sh
@@ -73,9 +73,9 @@ FILE=.libs/libgcrypt.so
#
# Fixup the ELF header to clean up section information
#
-printf '%b' '\002' > 2.bin
-dd ibs=1 skip=4 count=1 if=$FILE status=none > class-byte.bin
-if cmp class-byte.bin 2.bin; then
+BYTE002=$(printf '%b' '\002')
+CLASS_BYTE=$(dd ibs=1 skip=4 count=1 if=$FILE status=none)
+if test "$CLASS_BYTE" = "$BYTE002"; then
CLASS=64
HEADER_SIZE=64
else
@@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ END { print offset}")
dd ibs=1 skip=$HEADER_SIZE count=$OFFSET if=$FILE status=none) \
| ./hmac256 --stdkey --binary
-rm -f 2.bin class-byte.bin header-fixed.bin
+rm -f header-fixed.bin
--
2.39.1
From 052c5ef4cea56772b7015e36f231fa0bcbf91410 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 11:21:35 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] fips: Clarify what to be hashed for the integrity check.
* src/fips.c (get_file_offset): Compute the maximum offset
of segments.
* src/gen-note-integrity.sh: Likewise.
--
The result is same (in current format of ELF program).
Semantics is more clear. It hashes:
- From the start of shared library file,
- fixed up the ELF header to exclude link-time information,
- up to the last segment.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
---
src/fips.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
src/gen-note-integrity.sh | 20 ++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/fips.c b/src/fips.c
index d798d577..89f8204b 100644
--- a/src/fips.c
+++ b/src/fips.c
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ run_random_selftests (void)
/*
* In the ELF file opened as FP, fill the ELF header to the pointer
- * EHDR_P, determine the offset of last loadable segment in R_OFFSET.
+ * EHDR_P, determine the maximum offset of segments in R_OFFSET.
* Also, find the section which contains the hmac value and return it
* in HMAC. Rewinds FP to the beginning on success.
*/
@@ -624,24 +624,22 @@ get_file_offset (FILE *fp, ElfW (Ehdr) *ehdr_p,
if (fseek (fp, ehdr_p->e_phoff, SEEK_SET) != 0)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
- /* Iterate over the program headers, determine the last loadable
- segment. */
+ /* Iterate over the program headers, determine the last offset of
+ segments. */
for (i = 0; i < ehdr_p->e_phnum; i++)
{
+ unsigned long off;
+
if (fread (&phdr, sizeof (phdr), 1, fp) != 1)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
- if (phdr.p_type == PT_PHDR)
- continue;
-
- if (phdr.p_type != PT_LOAD)
- break;
-
- off_segment = phdr.p_offset + phdr.p_filesz;
+ off = phdr.p_offset + phdr.p_filesz;
+ if (off_segment < off)
+ off_segment = off;
}
if (!off_segment)
- /* The segment not found in the file */
+ /* No segment found in the file */
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
/* The section header entry size should match the size of the shdr struct */
diff --git a/src/gen-note-integrity.sh b/src/gen-note-integrity.sh
index 878d7095..50071bf5 100755
--- a/src/gen-note-integrity.sh
+++ b/src/gen-note-integrity.sh
@@ -95,21 +95,29 @@ else
dd ibs=1 count=6 if=/dev/zero status=none
fi > header-fixed.bin
-# Compute the end of loadable segment.
+#
+# Compute the end of segments, and emit the COUNT to read
+# (For each segment in program headers, calculate the offset
+# and select the maximum)
#
# This require computation in hexadecimal, and GNU awk needs
# --non-decimal-data option
#
-OFFSET=$($READELF --wide --program-headers $FILE | \
- $AWK $AWK_OPTION "/^ LOAD/ { offset=\$2+\$5-$HEADER_SIZE }\
-END { print offset}")
+COUNT=$($READELF --wide --program-headers $FILE | \
+ $AWK $AWK_OPTION \
+"BEGIN { max_offset=0 }
+/^\$/ { if (program_headers_start) program_headers_end=1 }
+(program_headers_start && !program_headers_end) { offset = \$2 + \$5 }
+(max_offset < offset) { max_offset = offset }
+/^ Type/ { program_headers_start=1 }
+END { print max_offset- $HEADER_SIZE }")
#
-# Feed the header fixed and loadable segments to HMAC256
+# Feed the header fixed and all segments to HMAC256
# to generate hmac hash of the FILE
#
(cat header-fixed.bin; \
- dd ibs=1 skip=$HEADER_SIZE count=$OFFSET if=$FILE status=none) \
+ dd ibs=1 skip=$HEADER_SIZE count=$COUNT if=$FILE status=none) \
| ./hmac256 --stdkey --binary
rm -f header-fixed.bin
--
2.39.1
From 3fd3bb31597f80c76a94ea62e42d58d796beabf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 16:16:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fips: Check return value from ftell
* src/fips.c (get_file_offset): Check return value of ftell to be able
to detect errors.
--
Originally reported by coverity.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
src/fips.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/fips.c b/src/fips.c
index 272aabae..0d89b6da 100644
--- a/src/fips.c
+++ b/src/fips.c
@@ -681,6 +681,8 @@ get_file_offset (FILE *fp, ElfW (Ehdr) *ehdr_p,
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
off = ftell (fp);
+ if (off < 0)
+ return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
if (shdr.sh_type == SHT_NOTE && shdr.sh_flags == 0 && shdr.sh_size == 48)
{
const char header_of_the_note[] = {
--
2.39.2

187
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-kdf.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
From 3c04b692de1e7b45b764ff8d66bf84609b012e3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tobias Heider <tobias.heider@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2022 13:31:05 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] kdf:pkdf2: Check minimum allowed key size when running in
FIPS mode.
* cipher/kdf.c (_gcry_kdf_pkdf2): Add output length check.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 6219
---
cipher/kdf.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/cipher/kdf.c b/cipher/kdf.c
index 81523320..67c60df8 100644
--- a/cipher/kdf.c
+++ b/cipher/kdf.c
@@ -160,6 +160,10 @@ _gcry_kdf_pkdf2 (const void *passphrase, size_t passphraselen,
return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
#endif
+ /* Check minimum key size */
+ if (fips_mode () && dklen < 14)
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+
/* Step 2 */
l = ((dklen - 1)/ hlen) + 1;
--
2.37.3
From e5a5e847b66eb6b80e60a2dffa347268f059aee3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2022 12:44:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] tests: Reproducer for short dklen in FIPS mode
* tests/t-kdf.c (check_pbkdf2): Add test vector with short dklen and
verify it fails in FIPS mode
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 6219
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
tests/t-kdf.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tests/t-kdf.c b/tests/t-kdf.c
index c0192d7b..716fb53e 100644
--- a/tests/t-kdf.c
+++ b/tests/t-kdf.c
@@ -909,6 +909,14 @@ check_pbkdf2 (void)
"\x0c\x60\xc8\x0f\x96\x1f\x0e\x71\xf3\xa9"
"\xb5\x24\xaf\x60\x12\x06\x2f\xe0\x37\xa6"
},
+ {
+ "password", 8,
+ "salt", 4,
+ GCRY_MD_SHA1,
+ 1,
+ 10, /* too short dklen for FIPS */
+ "\x0c\x60\xc8\x0f\x96\x1f\x0e\x71\xf3\xa9"
+ },
{
"password", 8,
"salt", 4,
@@ -1109,7 +1117,7 @@ check_pbkdf2 (void)
GCRY_KDF_PBKDF2, tv[tvidx].hashalgo,
tv[tvidx].salt, tv[tvidx].saltlen,
tv[tvidx].c, tv[tvidx].dklen, outbuf);
- if (in_fips_mode && tvidx > 6)
+ if (in_fips_mode && tvidx > 7)
{
if (!err)
fail ("pbkdf2 test %d unexpectedly passed in FIPS mode: %s\n",
@@ -1118,7 +1126,7 @@ check_pbkdf2 (void)
}
if (err)
{
- if (in_fips_mode && tv[tvidx].plen < 14)
+ if (in_fips_mode && (tv[tvidx].plen < 14 || tv[tvidx].dklen < 14))
{
if (verbose)
fprintf (stderr,
--
2.37.3
From f4a861f3e5ae82f278284061e4829c03edf9c3a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2022 09:49:50 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] pkdf2: Add checks for FIPS.
* cipher/kdf.c (_gcry_kdf_pkdf2): Require 8 chars passphrase for FIPS.
Set bounds for salt length and iteration count in FIPS mode.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 6039
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/kdf.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/cipher/kdf.c b/cipher/kdf.c
index d22584da..823c744e 100644
--- a/cipher/kdf.c
+++ b/cipher/kdf.c
@@ -160,6 +160,18 @@ _gcry_kdf_pkdf2 (const void *passphrase, size_t passphraselen,
return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
#endif
+ /* FIPS requires minimum passphrase length, see FIPS 140-3 IG D.N */
+ if (fips_mode () && passphraselen < 8)
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+
+ /* FIPS requires minimum salt length of 128 b (SP 800-132 sec. 5.1, p.6) */
+ if (fips_mode () && saltlen < 16)
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+
+ /* FIPS requires minimum iterations bound (SP 800-132 sec 5.2, p.6) */
+ if (fips_mode () && iterations < 1000)
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+
/* Check minimum key size */
if (fips_mode () && dklen < 14)
return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
--
2.39.0
From f5fe94810f3099c9ccc2ca3a5891502922ab0576 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 12:53:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] kdf: Update tests in regards to the allowed parameters in
FIPS mode.
* cipher/kdf.c (check_one): run selftests for more approved parameters
and check that wrong parameters correctly fail in FIPS mode.
--
Fixes-commit: 535a4d345872aa2cd2ab3a5f9c4411d0a0313328
GnuPG-bug-id: 5512
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/kdf.c | 22 +++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/kdf.c b/cipher/kdf.c
index 823c744e..12beec56 100644
--- a/cipher/kdf.c
+++ b/cipher/kdf.c
@@ -2059,17 +2059,25 @@ check_one (int algo, int hash_algo,
{
unsigned char key[512]; /* hardcoded to avoid allocation */
size_t keysize = expectlen;
-
- /* Skip test with shoter passphrase in FIPS mode. */
- if (fips_mode () && passphraselen < 14)
- return NULL;
+ int rv;
if (keysize > sizeof(key))
return "invalid tests data";
- if (_gcry_kdf_derive (passphrase, passphraselen, algo,
- hash_algo, salt, saltlen, iterations,
- keysize, key))
+ rv = _gcry_kdf_derive (passphrase, passphraselen, algo,
+ hash_algo, salt, saltlen, iterations,
+ keysize, key);
+ /* In fips mode we have special requirements for the input and
+ * output parameters */
+ if (fips_mode ())
+ {
+ if (rv && (passphraselen < 8 || saltlen < 16 ||
+ iterations < 1000 || expectlen < 14))
+ return NULL;
+ else if (rv)
+ return "gcry_kdf_derive unexpectedly failed in FIPS Mode";
+ }
+ else if (rv)
return "gcry_kdf_derive failed";
if (memcmp (key, expect, expectlen))
--
2.39.2

55
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-keygen.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From cd30ed3c0d715aa0c58a32a29cfb1476163a5b94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 15:09:41 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] cipher: Change the bounds for RSA key generation round.
* cipher/rsa.c (generate_fips): Use 10 for p, 20 for q.
--
Constants from FIPS 186-5-draft.
GnuPG-bug-id: 5919
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
---
cipher/rsa.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
index 486a34f0..771413b3 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa.c
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ generate_fips (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e,
retry:
/* generate p and q */
- for (i = 0; i < 5 * pbits; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < 10 * pbits; i++)
{
ploop:
if (!testparms)
@@ -506,10 +506,10 @@ generate_fips (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e,
else if (testparms)
goto err;
}
- if (i >= 5 * pbits)
+ if (i >= 10 * pbits)
goto err;
- for (i = 0; i < 5 * pbits; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < 20 * pbits; i++)
{
qloop:
if (!testparms)
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ generate_fips (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e,
else if (testparms)
goto err;
}
- if (i >= 5 * pbits)
+ if (i >= 20 * pbits)
goto err;
if (testparms)
--
2.37.3

145
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-pct.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
From 2ddeec574bc1ae90bb4242c4ce9ad9e7975a27bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2023 15:42:29 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ecc: Do not allow skipping tests in FIPS Mode.
* cipher/ecc.c (ecc_generate): Do not allow skipping tests PCT tests
in FIPS mode.
--
The new FIPS specification requires to run the PCT without any
exceptions.
GnuPG-bug-id: 6394
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/ecc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/cipher/ecc.c b/cipher/ecc.c
index 1e80200e..797f2368 100644
--- a/cipher/ecc.c
+++ b/cipher/ecc.c
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ ecc_generate (const gcry_sexp_t genparms, gcry_sexp_t *r_skey)
log_debug ("ecgen result using Ed25519+EdDSA\n");
}
- if (!(flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_KEYTEST) && fips_mode ())
+ if (fips_mode ())
test_keys_fips (*r_skey);
leave:
--
2.39.2
From 23a2d1285e35b2eb91bb422609eb1c965c8a9bf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2023 09:43:44 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ecc: Make the PCT recoverable in FIPS mode and consistent
with RSA.
* cipher/ecc.c (test_keys_fips): Replace calls to log_fatal with
return code on error.
(ecc_generate): Signal error when PCT fails in FIPS mode.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 6397
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/ecc.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/ecc.c b/cipher/ecc.c
index 797f2368..19520db3 100644
--- a/cipher/ecc.c
+++ b/cipher/ecc.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static void *progress_cb_data;
/* Local prototypes. */
static void test_keys (mpi_ec_t ec, unsigned int nbits);
-static void test_keys_fips (gcry_sexp_t skey);
+static int test_keys_fips (gcry_sexp_t skey);
static void test_ecdh_only_keys (mpi_ec_t ec, unsigned int nbits, int flags);
static unsigned int ecc_get_nbits (gcry_sexp_t parms);
@@ -308,9 +308,10 @@ test_keys (mpi_ec_t ec, unsigned int nbits)
/* We should get here only with the NIST curves as they are the only ones
* having the fips bit set in ecc_domain_parms_t struct so this is slightly
* simpler than the whole ecc_generate function */
-static void
+static int
test_keys_fips (gcry_sexp_t skey)
{
+ int result = -1; /* Default to failure */
gcry_md_hd_t hd = NULL;
const char *data_tmpl = "(data (flags rfc6979) (hash %s %b))";
gcry_sexp_t sig = NULL;
@@ -323,18 +324,27 @@ test_keys_fips (gcry_sexp_t skey)
/* Open MD context and feed the random data in */
rc = _gcry_md_open (&hd, GCRY_MD_SHA256, 0);
if (rc)
- log_fatal ("ECDSA operation: failed to initialize MD context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ {
+ log_error ("ECDSA operation: failed to initialize MD context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ goto leave;
+ }
_gcry_md_write (hd, plaintext, sizeof(plaintext));
/* Sign the data */
rc = _gcry_pk_sign_md (&sig, data_tmpl, hd, skey, NULL);
if (rc)
- log_fatal ("ECDSA operation: signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ {
+ log_error ("ECDSA operation: signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ goto leave;
+ }
/* Verify this signature. */
rc = _gcry_pk_verify_md (sig, data_tmpl, hd, skey, NULL);
if (rc)
- log_fatal ("ECDSA operation: verification failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ {
+ log_error ("ECDSA operation: verification failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ goto leave;
+ }
/* Modify the data and check that the signing fails. */
_gcry_md_reset(hd);
@@ -342,10 +352,16 @@ test_keys_fips (gcry_sexp_t skey)
_gcry_md_write (hd, plaintext, sizeof(plaintext));
rc = _gcry_pk_verify_md (sig, data_tmpl, hd, skey, NULL);
if (rc != GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
- log_fatal ("ECDSA operation: signature verification worked on modified data\n");
+ {
+ log_error ("ECDSA operation: signature verification worked on modified data\n");
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ result = 0;
+leave:
_gcry_md_close (hd);
sexp_release (sig);
+ return result;
}
@@ -677,8 +693,12 @@ ecc_generate (const gcry_sexp_t genparms, gcry_sexp_t *r_skey)
log_debug ("ecgen result using Ed25519+EdDSA\n");
}
- if (fips_mode ())
- test_keys_fips (*r_skey);
+ if (fips_mode () && test_keys_fips (*r_skey))
+ {
+ sexp_release (*r_skey); r_skey = NULL;
+ fips_signal_error ("self-test after key generation failed");
+ rc = GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+ }
leave:
mpi_free (public);
--
2.39.2

109
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-rsa-pss.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
From bf1e62e59200b2046680d1d3d1599facc88cfe63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:04:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] rsa: Prevent usage of long salt in FIPS mode
* cipher/rsa-common.c (_gcry_rsa_pss_encode): Prevent usage of large
salt lengths
(_gcry_rsa_pss_verify): Ditto.
* tests/basic.c (check_pubkey_sign): Check longer salt length fails in
FIPS mode
* tests/t-rsa-pss.c (one_test_sexp): Fix function name in error message
---
cipher/rsa-common.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
tests/basic.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
tests/t-rsa-pss.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/rsa-common.c b/cipher/rsa-common.c
index 233ddb2d..61cd60a4 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa-common.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa-common.c
@@ -809,6 +809,13 @@ _gcry_rsa_pss_encode (gcry_mpi_t *r_result, unsigned int nbits, int algo,
hlen = _gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
gcry_assert (hlen); /* We expect a valid ALGO here. */
+ /* The FIPS 186-4 Section 5.5 allows only 0 <= sLen <= hLen */
+ if (fips_mode () && saltlen > hlen)
+ {
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
/* Allocate a help buffer and setup some pointers. */
buflen = 8 + hlen + saltlen + (emlen - hlen - 1);
buf = xtrymalloc (buflen);
@@ -950,6 +957,13 @@ _gcry_rsa_pss_verify (gcry_mpi_t value, int hashed_already,
hlen = _gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
gcry_assert (hlen); /* We expect a valid ALGO here. */
+ /* The FIPS 186-4 Section 5.5 allows only 0 <= sLen <= hLen */
+ if (fips_mode () && saltlen > hlen)
+ {
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
/* Allocate a help buffer and setup some pointers.
This buffer is used for two purposes:
+------------------------------+-------+
diff --git a/tests/basic.c b/tests/basic.c
index 77e2fd93..429bd237 100644
--- a/tests/basic.c
+++ b/tests/basic.c
@@ -16602,6 +16602,7 @@ check_pubkey_sign (int n, gcry_sexp_t skey, gcry_sexp_t pkey, int algo,
const char *data;
int algo;
int expected_rc;
+ int flags;
} datas[] =
{
{ "(data\n (flags pkcs1)\n"
@@ -16672,6 +16673,22 @@ check_pubkey_sign (int n, gcry_sexp_t skey, gcry_sexp_t pkey, int algo,
" (random-override #4253647587980912233445566778899019283747#))\n",
GCRY_PK_RSA,
0 },
+ { "(data\n (flags pss)\n"
+ " (hash-algo sha256)\n"
+ " (value #11223344556677889900AABBCCDDEEFF#)\n"
+ " (salt-length 2:32)\n"
+ " (random-override #42536475879809122334455667788990192837465564738291"
+ "00122334455667#))\n",
+ GCRY_PK_RSA,
+ 0 },
+ { "(data\n (flags pss)\n"
+ " (hash-algo sha256)\n"
+ " (value #11223344556677889900AABBCCDDEEFF#)\n"
+ " (salt-length 2:33)\n"
+ " (random-override #42536475879809122334455667788990192837465564738291"
+ "0012233445566778#))\n",
+ GCRY_PK_RSA,
+ 0, FLAG_NOFIPS },
{ NULL }
};
@@ -16695,7 +16712,7 @@ check_pubkey_sign (int n, gcry_sexp_t skey, gcry_sexp_t pkey, int algo,
die ("converting data failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
rc = gcry_pk_sign (&sig, hash, skey);
- if (in_fips_mode && (flags & FLAG_NOFIPS))
+ if (in_fips_mode && (flags & FLAG_NOFIPS || datas[dataidx].flags & FLAG_NOFIPS))
{
if (!rc)
fail ("gcry_pk_sign did not fail as expected in FIPS mode\n");
diff --git a/tests/t-rsa-pss.c b/tests/t-rsa-pss.c
index c5f90116..82dd54b3 100644
--- a/tests/t-rsa-pss.c
+++ b/tests/t-rsa-pss.c
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ one_test_sexp (const char *n, const char *e, const char *d,
snprintf (p, 3, "%02x", out[i]);
if (strcmp (sig_string, s))
{
- fail ("gcry_pkhash_sign failed: %s",
+ fail ("gcry_pk_hash_sign failed: %s",
"wrong value returned");
info (" expected: '%s'", s);
info (" got: '%s'", sig_string);
--
2.39.0

1199
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-selftest.patch Normal file
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46
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-status-sign-verify.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 654d0dfa04993ebe28c0536d42f4bc6d87c28369 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2023 17:14:00 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] visibility: Check FIPS operational status for MD+Sign
operation.
* src/visibility.c (gcry_pk_hash_sign): Check fips status before
calling the operation itself.
(gcry_pk_hash_verify): Ditto.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 6396
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
src/visibility.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/visibility.c b/src/visibility.c
index 73db3dea..1f17e147 100644
--- a/src/visibility.c
+++ b/src/visibility.c
@@ -1050,6 +1050,11 @@ gcry_error_t
gcry_pk_hash_sign (gcry_sexp_t *result, const char *data_tmpl, gcry_sexp_t skey,
gcry_md_hd_t hd, gcry_ctx_t ctx)
{
+ if (!fips_is_operational ())
+ {
+ *result = NULL;
+ return gpg_error (fips_not_operational ());
+ }
return gpg_error (_gcry_pk_sign_md (result, data_tmpl, hd, skey, ctx));
}
@@ -1065,6 +1070,8 @@ gcry_error_t
gcry_pk_hash_verify (gcry_sexp_t sigval, const char *data_tmpl, gcry_sexp_t pkey,
gcry_md_hd_t hd, gcry_ctx_t ctx)
{
+ if (!fips_is_operational ())
+ return gpg_error (fips_not_operational ());
return gpg_error (_gcry_pk_verify_md (sigval, data_tmpl, hd, pkey, ctx));
}
--
2.39.2

139
libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-x931.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
From 06ea5b5332ffdb44a0a394d766be8989bcb6a95c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2022 10:03:47 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] fips,rsa: Prevent usage of X9.31 keygen in FIPS mode.
* cipher/rsa.c (rsa_generate): Do not accept use-x931 or derive-parms
in FIPS mode.
* tests/pubkey.c (get_keys_x931_new): Expect failure in FIPS mode.
(check_run): Skip checking X9.31 keys in FIPS mode.
* doc/gcrypt.texi: Document "test-parms" and clarify some cases around
the X9.31 keygen.
--
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/rsa.c | 5 +++++
doc/gcrypt.texi | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
tests/pubkey.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
index df4af94b..45523e6b 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa.c
@@ -1256,6 +1256,11 @@ rsa_generate (const gcry_sexp_t genparms, gcry_sexp_t *r_skey)
if (deriveparms || (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_USE_X931))
{
int swapped;
+ if (fips_mode ())
+ {
+ sexp_release (deriveparms);
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP;
+ }
ec = generate_x931 (&sk, nbits, evalue, deriveparms, &swapped);
sexp_release (deriveparms);
if (!ec && swapped)
diff --git a/doc/gcrypt.texi b/doc/gcrypt.texi
index d0372f3e..e845a4dd 100644
--- a/doc/gcrypt.texi
+++ b/doc/gcrypt.texi
@@ -2699,8 +2699,7 @@ achieve fastest ECC key generation.
Force the use of the ANSI X9.31 key generation algorithm instead of
the default algorithm. This flag is only meaningful for RSA key
generation and usually not required. Note that this algorithm is
-implicitly used if either @code{derive-parms} is given or Libgcrypt is
-in FIPS mode.
+implicitly used if either @code{derive-parms} is given.
@item use-fips186
@cindex FIPS 186
@@ -3310,9 +3309,9 @@ This is currently only implemented for RSA and DSA keys. It is not
allowed to use this together with a @code{domain} specification. If
given, it is used to derive the keys using the given parameters.
-If given for an RSA key the X9.31 key generation algorithm is used
-even if libgcrypt is not in FIPS mode. If given for a DSA key, the
-FIPS 186 algorithm is used even if libgcrypt is not in FIPS mode.
+If given for an RSA key, the X9.31 key generation algorithm is used.
+If given for a DSA key, the FIPS 186 algorithm is used even if
+libgcrypt is not in FIPS mode.
@example
(genkey
@@ -3342,6 +3341,38 @@ FIPS 186 algorithm is used even if libgcrypt is not in FIPS mode.
(seed @var{seed-mpi}))))
@end example
+@item test-parms @var{list}
+This is currently only implemented for RSA keys. If given, the
+libgcrypt will not generate parameter, but tests whether the p,q is
+probably prime. Returns key with zeroes.
+
+The FIPS key generation algorithm is used even if libgcrypt is not
+in FIPS mode.
+
+@example
+(genkey
+ (rsa
+ (nbits 4:1024)
+ (rsa-use-e 1:3)
+ (test-parms
+ (e "65537")
+ (p #00bbccabcee15d343944a47e492d4b1f4de79633e2
+ 0cbb46f7d2d6813392a807ad048cf77528edd19f77
+ e7453f25173b9dcb70423afa2037aae147b81a33d5
+ 41fc58f875eff1e852ab55e2e09a3debfbc151b3b0
+ d17fef6f74d81fca14fbae531418e211ef818592af
+ 70de5cec3b92795cc3578572bf456099cd8727150e
+ 523261#)
+ (q #00ca87ecf2883f4ed00a9ec65abdeba81d28edbfcc
+ 34ecc563d587f166b52d42bfbe22bbc095b0b8426a
+ 2f8bbc55baaa8859b42cbc376ed3067db3ef7b135b
+ 63481322911ebbd7014db83aa051e0ca2dbf302b75
+ cd37f2ae8df90e134226e92f6353a284b28bb30af0
+ bbf925b345b955328379866ebac11d55bc80fe84f1
+ 05d415#)
+
+@end example
+
@item flags @var{flaglist}
This is preferred way to define flags. @var{flaglist} may contain any
diff --git a/tests/pubkey.c b/tests/pubkey.c
index bc44f3a5..2669b41a 100644
--- a/tests/pubkey.c
+++ b/tests/pubkey.c
@@ -430,7 +430,17 @@ get_keys_x931_new (gcry_sexp_t *pkey, gcry_sexp_t *skey)
rc = gcry_pk_genkey (&key, key_spec);
gcry_sexp_release (key_spec);
if (rc)
- die ("error generating RSA key: %s\n", gcry_strerror (rc));
+ {
+ if (in_fips_mode)
+ {
+ if (verbose)
+ fprintf (stderr, "The X9.31 RSA keygen is not available in FIPS modee.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ die ("error generating RSA key: %s\n", gcry_strerror (rc));
+ }
+ else if (in_fips_mode)
+ die ("generating X9.31 RSA key unexpected worked in FIPS mode\n");
if (verbose > 1)
show_sexp ("generated RSA (X9.31) key:\n", key);
@@ -777,7 +787,8 @@ check_run (void)
if (verbose)
fprintf (stderr, "Checking generated RSA key (X9.31).\n");
get_keys_x931_new (&pkey, &skey);
- check_keys (pkey, skey, 800, 0);
+ if (!in_fips_mode)
+ check_keys (pkey, skey, 800, 0);
gcry_sexp_release (pkey);
gcry_sexp_release (skey);
pkey = skey = NULL;
--
2.39.0

2249
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libgcrypt-1.10.0-marvin2.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
From f490ffd739f713fcf0be35b7fbbb8502dea40a0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
Date: Sat, 3 Jun 2023 13:20:07 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] addm/subm/mulm: fix case when destination is same MPI as
divider
* mpi/mpi-add.c (_gcry_mpi_addm, _gcry_mpi_subm): Take copy of M when
W and M are the same MPI.
* mpi/mpi-mul.c (_gcry_mpi_mulm): Likewise.
* tests/mpitests.c (test_addm_subm_mulm): New.
(main): Run addm/subm/mulm test.
--
Reported-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
---
mpi/mpi-add.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++
mpi/mpi-mul.c | 11 ++++++++++
tests/mpitests.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 86 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mpi/mpi-add.c b/mpi/mpi-add.c
index 41dc3900..51dc71b7 100644
--- a/mpi/mpi-add.c
+++ b/mpi/mpi-add.c
@@ -227,13 +227,35 @@ _gcry_mpi_sub(gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v)
void
_gcry_mpi_addm( gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, gcry_mpi_t m)
{
+ gcry_mpi_t temp_m = NULL;
+
+ if (w == m)
+ {
+ temp_m = mpi_copy (m);
+ m = temp_m;
+ }
+
mpi_add (w, u, v);
mpi_mod (w, w, m);
+
+ if (temp_m)
+ mpi_free(temp_m);
}
void
_gcry_mpi_subm( gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, gcry_mpi_t m)
{
+ gcry_mpi_t temp_m = NULL;
+
+ if (w == m)
+ {
+ temp_m = mpi_copy (m);
+ m = temp_m;
+ }
+
mpi_sub (w, u, v);
mpi_mod (w, w, m);
+
+ if (temp_m)
+ mpi_free(temp_m);
}
diff --git a/mpi/mpi-mul.c b/mpi/mpi-mul.c
index 60f1ca48..e8e57475 100644
--- a/mpi/mpi-mul.c
+++ b/mpi/mpi-mul.c
@@ -207,6 +207,17 @@ _gcry_mpi_mul (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v)
void
_gcry_mpi_mulm (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, gcry_mpi_t m)
{
+ gcry_mpi_t temp_m = NULL;
+
+ if (w == m)
+ {
+ temp_m = mpi_copy (m);
+ m = temp_m;
+ }
+
mpi_mul (w, u, v);
_gcry_mpi_tdiv_r (w, w, m);
+
+ if (temp_m)
+ mpi_free(temp_m);
}
diff --git a/tests/mpitests.c b/tests/mpitests.c
index 48ea18b2..2ee08bd3 100644
--- a/tests/mpitests.c
+++ b/tests/mpitests.c
@@ -687,6 +687,58 @@ test_powm (void)
}
+/* What we test here is that using the same mpi for divider and result
+ works. */
+static int
+test_addm_subm_mulm (void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ {
+ unsigned int expect;
+ const char *func;
+ gcry_mpi_t A;
+ gcry_mpi_t B;
+ gcry_mpi_t C;
+
+ A = gcry_mpi_set_ui (NULL, 2);
+ B = gcry_mpi_set_ui (NULL, 4);
+ C = gcry_mpi_set_ui (NULL, 7);
+
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ func = "mpi_addm";
+ expect = 6;
+ gcry_mpi_addm(C, A, B, C);
+ }
+ else if (i == 1)
+ {
+ func = "mpi_subm";
+ expect = 5;
+ gcry_mpi_subm(C, A, B, C);
+ }
+ else if (i == 2)
+ {
+ func = "mpi_mulm";
+ expect = 1;
+ gcry_mpi_mulm(C, A, B, C);
+ }
+
+ if (gcry_mpi_is_neg (C) || gcry_mpi_cmp_ui (C, expect))
+ {
+ die ("test_addm_subm_mulm failed for %s at %d\n", func, __LINE__);
+ }
+
+ gcry_mpi_release(A);
+ gcry_mpi_release(B);
+ gcry_mpi_release(C);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
int
main (int argc, char* argv[])
{
@@ -710,6 +762,7 @@ main (int argc, char* argv[])
test_sub ();
test_mul ();
test_powm ();
+ test_addm_subm_mulm ();
return !!error_count;
}
--
2.44.0

2187
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29
libgcrypt-1.10.0-ppc-hwf.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From 29bfb3ebbc63d7ed18b916c5c6946790fb3d15df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 09:49:20 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] hwf-ppc: fix missing HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_10 in HW feature
* src/hwf-ppc.c (ppc_features): Add HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_10.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: T5913
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
---
src/hwf-ppc.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/src/hwf-ppc.c b/src/hwf-ppc.c
index 7801f8b0..11d14dc1 100644
--- a/src/hwf-ppc.c
+++ b/src/hwf-ppc.c
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ static const struct feature_map_s ppc_features[] =
{ 0, PPC_FEATURE2_VEC_CRYPTO, HWF_PPC_VCRYPTO },
#endif
{ 0, PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_3_00, HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_00 },
+ { 0, PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_3_10, HWF_PPC_ARCH_3_10 },
};
#endif
--
2.34.1

621
libgcrypt-1.10.0-sha3-large.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,621 @@
From 2c1bb2f34f2812888f75c476037afae6d9e21798 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2022 18:39:20 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] keccak: Use size_t to avoid integer overflow
Any input to the SHA3 functions > 4GB was giving wrong result when it
was invoked in one-shot, while working correctly when it was fed by
chunks. It turned out that the calculation in the `keccak_write`
overflows the `unsigned int` type (`nlanes * 8` does not fit 32b when
the `inlen` > 4GB).
* cipher/keccak-armv7-neon.S: Fix function name in comment and change
parameter type to size_t
* cipher/keccak.c (keccak_ops_t): Change absorb function signature to
use size_t
(keccak_absorb_lanes64_avx512): Change nlanes type to size_t
(_gcry_keccak_absorb_lanes64_armv7_neon): Ditto.
(keccak_absorb_lanes64_armv7_neon): Ditto.
(keccak_absorb_lanes32bi): Ditto.
(keccak_absorb_lanes32bi_bmi2): Ditto.
(keccak_write): Change nlanes variable to use size_t and avoid
overflow when calculating count.
* cipher/keccak_permute_64.h (KECCAK_F1600_ABSORB_FUNC_NAME): Change
nlanes argument to use size_t.
---
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
cipher/keccak-armv7-neon.S | 10 +++++-----
cipher/keccak.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
cipher/keccak_permute_64.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/keccak-armv7-neon.S b/cipher/keccak-armv7-neon.S
index 0bec8d50..28a284a1 100644
--- a/cipher/keccak-armv7-neon.S
+++ b/cipher/keccak-armv7-neon.S
@@ -467,11 +467,11 @@ _gcry_keccak_permute_armv7_neon:
.ltorg
.size _gcry_keccak_permute_armv7_neon,.-_gcry_keccak_permute_armv7_neon;
-@//unsigned _gcry_keccak_permute_armv7_neon(u64 *state, @r4
-@ int pos, @r1
-@ const byte *lanes, @r2
-@ unsigned int nlanes, @r3
-@ int blocklanes) @ r5 callable from C
+@//unsigned _gcry_keccak_absorb_lanes64_armv7_neon(u64 *state, @r4
+@ int pos, @r1
+@ const byte *lanes, @r2
+@ size_t nlanes, @r3
+@ int blocklanes) @ r5 callable from C
.p2align 3
.global _gcry_keccak_absorb_lanes64_armv7_neon
.type _gcry_keccak_absorb_lanes64_armv7_neon,%function;
diff --git a/cipher/keccak.c b/cipher/keccak.c
index e7e42473..6c385f71 100644
--- a/cipher/keccak.c
+++ b/cipher/keccak.c
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ typedef struct
{
unsigned int (*permute)(KECCAK_STATE *hd);
unsigned int (*absorb)(KECCAK_STATE *hd, int pos, const byte *lanes,
- unsigned int nlanes, int blocklanes);
+ size_t nlanes, int blocklanes);
unsigned int (*extract) (KECCAK_STATE *hd, unsigned int pos, byte *outbuf,
unsigned int outlen);
} keccak_ops_t;
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ static const keccak_ops_t keccak_avx512_64_ops =
unsigned int _gcry_keccak_permute_armv7_neon(u64 *state);
unsigned int _gcry_keccak_absorb_lanes64_armv7_neon(u64 *state, int pos,
const byte *lanes,
- unsigned int nlanes,
+ size_t nlanes,
int blocklanes);
static unsigned int keccak_permute64_armv7_neon(KECCAK_STATE *hd)
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static unsigned int keccak_permute64_armv7_neon(KECCAK_STATE *hd)
static unsigned int
keccak_absorb_lanes64_armv7_neon(KECCAK_STATE *hd, int pos, const byte *lanes,
- unsigned int nlanes, int blocklanes)
+ size_t nlanes, int blocklanes)
{
if (blocklanes < 0)
{
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static const keccak_ops_t keccak_armv7_neon_64_ops =
static unsigned int
keccak_absorb_lanes32bi(KECCAK_STATE *hd, int pos, const byte *lanes,
- unsigned int nlanes, int blocklanes)
+ size_t nlanes, int blocklanes)
{
unsigned int burn = 0;
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ keccak_absorb_lane32bi_bmi2(u32 *lane, u32 x0, u32 x1)
static unsigned int
keccak_absorb_lanes32bi_bmi2(KECCAK_STATE *hd, int pos, const byte *lanes,
- unsigned int nlanes, int blocklanes)
+ size_t nlanes, int blocklanes)
{
unsigned int burn = 0;
@@ -873,7 +873,8 @@ keccak_write (void *context, const void *inbuf_arg, size_t inlen)
const byte *inbuf = inbuf_arg;
unsigned int nburn, burn = 0;
unsigned int count, i;
- unsigned int pos, nlanes;
+ unsigned int pos;
+ size_t nlanes;
#ifdef USE_S390X_CRYPTO
if (ctx->kimd_func)
@@ -918,8 +919,7 @@ keccak_write (void *context, const void *inbuf_arg, size_t inlen)
burn = nburn > burn ? nburn : burn;
inlen -= nlanes * 8;
inbuf += nlanes * 8;
- count += nlanes * 8;
- count = count % bsize;
+ count = ((size_t) count + nlanes * 8) % bsize;
}
if (inlen)
diff --git a/cipher/keccak_permute_64.h b/cipher/keccak_permute_64.h
index b28c871e..45ef462f 100644
--- a/cipher/keccak_permute_64.h
+++ b/cipher/keccak_permute_64.h
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ KECCAK_F1600_PERMUTE_FUNC_NAME(KECCAK_STATE *hd)
static unsigned int
KECCAK_F1600_ABSORB_FUNC_NAME(KECCAK_STATE *hd, int pos, const byte *lanes,
- unsigned int nlanes, int blocklanes)
+ size_t nlanes, int blocklanes)
{
unsigned int burn = 0;
--
GitLab
From 910dcbcef36e1cd3de3dde192d829a1513273e14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2022 22:23:22 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] tests/hashtest: add hugeblock & disable-hwf options and 6 gig
test vectors
* .gitignore: Add 'tests/hashtest-6g'.
* configure.ac: Add 'tests/hashtest-6g'.
* tests/Makefile: Add 'hashtest-6g'.
* tests/hashtest-6g.in: New.
* tests/hashtest-256g.in: Add SHA3-512 to algos.
* tests/hashtest.c (use_hugeblock): New.
(testvectors): Add 256 GiB test vectors for BLAKE2S, BLAKE2B and
whirlpool; Add 6 GiB test vectors for SHA1, SHA256, SHA512, SHA3, SM3,
BLAKE2S, BLAKE2B, WHIRLPOOL, CRC32 and CRC24.
(run_longtest); Use huge 5 GiB pattern block when requested.
(main): Add '--hugeblock' and '--disable-hwf' options.
* tests/testdrv.c: Add 'hashtest-6g'; Add SHA3 to 'hashtest-256g'.
---
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
---
.gitignore | 1 +
configure.ac | 1 +
tests/Makefile.am | 9 +-
tests/hashtest-256g.in | 2 +-
tests/hashtest-6g.in | 7 ++
tests/hashtest.c | 249 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
tests/testdrv.c | 7 +-
7 files changed, 261 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tests/hashtest-6g.in
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index c8f24dcc..c39257b5 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -3511,6 +3511,7 @@ src/libgcrypt.pc
src/versioninfo.rc
tests/Makefile
])
+AC_CONFIG_FILES([tests/hashtest-6g], [chmod +x tests/hashtest-6g])
AC_CONFIG_FILES([tests/hashtest-256g], [chmod +x tests/hashtest-256g])
AC_CONFIG_FILES([tests/basic-disable-all-hwf], [chmod +x tests/basic-disable-all-hwf])
AC_OUTPUT
diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
index 302d923b..75aa5cf7 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/Makefile.am
@@ -44,13 +44,14 @@ tests_bin_last = benchmark bench-slope
tests_sh = basic-disable-all-hwf
-tests_sh_last = hashtest-256g
+tests_sh_last = hashtest-6g hashtest-256g
TESTS = $(tests_bin) $(tests_sh) $(tests_bin_last) $(tests_sh_last)
# Force sequential run of some tests.
bench-slope.log: benchmark.log
-hashtest-256g.log: bench-slope.log
+hashtest-6g.log: bench-slope.log
+hashtest-256g.log: hashtest-6g.log
TESTS_ENVIRONMENT = GCRYPT_IN_REGRESSION_TEST=1
@@ -76,8 +77,8 @@ CLEANFILES = testdrv-build
EXTRA_DIST = README rsa-16k.key \
pkcs1v2-oaep.h pkcs1v2-pss.h pkcs1v2-v15c.h pkcs1v2-v15s.h \
t-ed25519.inp t-ed448.inp t-dsa.inp t-ecdsa.inp t-rsa-15.inp \
- t-rsa-pss.inp stopwatch.h hashtest-256g.in sha3-224.h \
- sha3-256.h sha3-384.h sha3-512.h blake2b.h blake2s.h \
+ t-rsa-pss.inp stopwatch.h hashtest-6g.in hashtest-256g.in \
+ sha3-224.h sha3-256.h sha3-384.h sha3-512.h blake2b.h blake2s.h \
basic-disable-all-hwf.in basic_all_hwfeature_combinations.sh
LDADD = $(standard_ldadd) $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS) @LDADD_FOR_TESTS_KLUDGE@
diff --git a/tests/hashtest-256g.in b/tests/hashtest-256g.in
index a52b8692..44b69897 100755
--- a/tests/hashtest-256g.in
+++ b/tests/hashtest-256g.in
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/bin/sh
-algos="SHA1 SHA256 SHA512 SM3"
+algos="SHA1 SHA256 SHA512 SHA3-512 SM3"
test "@RUN_LARGE_DATA_TESTS@" = yes || exit 77
echo " now running 256 GiB tests for $algos - this takes looong"
diff --git a/tests/hashtest-6g.in b/tests/hashtest-6g.in
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b3f3e2ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/hashtest-6g.in
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+algos="SHA1 SHA256 SHA512 SHA3-512 SM3 BLAKE2S_256 BLAKE2B_512 CRC32 CRC24RFC2440"
+
+test "@RUN_LARGE_DATA_TESTS@" = yes || exit 77
+echo " now running 6 GiB tests for $algos - this can take long"
+exec ./hashtest@EXEEXT@ --hugeblock --gigs 6 $algos
diff --git a/tests/hashtest.c b/tests/hashtest.c
index 4c9704f3..9389e50c 100644
--- a/tests/hashtest.c
+++ b/tests/hashtest.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#define PGM "hashtest"
#include "t-common.h"
+static int use_hugeblock;
static int missing_test_vectors;
static struct {
@@ -113,6 +114,169 @@ static struct {
{ GCRY_MD_SM3, 256, +64,
"ed34869dbadd62e3bec1f511004d7bbfc9cafa965477cc48843b248293bbe867" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2S_256, 256, -64,
+ "8a3d4f712275e8e8da70c76501cce364c75f8dd09748be58cf63c9ce38d62627" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2S_256, 256, -1,
+ "0c01c9ad1e60e27dc889f2c9034a949ca8b9a9dc90dd99be64963af306d47b92" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2S_256, 256, +0,
+ "f8c43d5c4bad93aca702c8c466987c5ac5e640a29b37dd9904252ff27b2348a0" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2S_256, 256, +1,
+ "24c34b167b4eea1a7eb7d572ff3cf669a9856ea91bb112e9ef2ccd4b1aceccb4" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2S_256, 256, +64,
+ "2f8d754f98e2d4ed7744389f89d0bdb9b770c9fa215b8badd3129ea1364af867" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2B_512, 256, -64,
+ "36d32ae4deeacab4119401c52e2aec5545675bd2dce4f67871ddc73671a05f94"
+ "e8332c2a31f32f5601878606a571aa7b43029dac3ae71cf9ef141d05651dc4bf" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2B_512, 256, -1,
+ "b5dc439f51664a6c9cbc87e2de98ce608ac4064a779e5140909d75d2120c9b2a"
+ "a1d4ae7be9c1ba97025be91ddcfbe42c791c3231cffbfa4b5368ba18f9590e1b" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2B_512, 256, +0,
+ "c413d011ba9abbf118dd96bfc827f5fd94493d8350df9f7aff834faace5adba2"
+ "0c3037069dfb2c81718ffc7b418ce1c1320d334b6fe8cddfb5d2dd19eb530853" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2B_512, 256, +1,
+ "b6dfb821f1c8167fb33995c29485010da56abd539c3d04ab9c222844301b8bba"
+ "6f57a48e45a748e40847084b93f26706aae82212550671c736becffcc6fb1496" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2B_512, 256, +64,
+ "8c21316a4a02044e302d503d0fe669d905c40d9d80ecd5aafc8e30f1df06736f"
+ "51fdaf6002160bb8fe4e868eaad9623fc5ecdd728bcbfee4a19b386503710f48" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL, 256, -64,
+ "aabf62344c1aa82d2dc7605f339b3571d540f1f320f97e6a8c0229645ee61f1f"
+ "da796acde2f96caa1c56eb2c2f9a6029a6242ad690479def66feac44334cc3af" },
+ { GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL, 256, -1,
+ "9a35ec14aa9cefd40e04295d45d39f3111a98c2d76d90c54a7d2b8f2f5b9302b"
+ "79663eab6b6674625c3ae3e4b5dbb3b0a2f5b2f49a7a59cd1723e2b16a3efea2" },
+ { GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL, 256, +0,
+ "818ad31a5110b6217cc6ffa099d554aaadc9566bf5291e104a5d58b21d51ae4d"
+ "c216c6de888d1359066c584e24e6606f530a3fce80ef78aed8564de4a28801c8" },
+ { GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL, 256, +1,
+ "298805f5fc68488712427c1bcb27581d91aa04337c1c6b4657489ed3d239bb8b"
+ "c70ef654065d380ac1f5596aca5cb59e6da8044b5a067e32ea4cd94ca606f9f3" },
+ { GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL, 256, +64,
+ "7bd35c3bee621bc0fb8907904b3b84d6cf4fae4c22cc64fbc744c8c5c8de806d"
+ "0f11a27892d531dc907426597737762c83e3ddcdc62f50d16d130aaefaeec436" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA1, 6, -64,
+ "eeee82d952403313bd63d6d7c8e342df0a1eea77" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA1, 6, -1,
+ "8217b9f987d67db5880bcfff1d6763a6514d629f" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA1, 6, +0,
+ "2b38aa63c05668217e5331320a4aee0adad7fc3b" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA1, 6, +1,
+ "f3222de4d0704554cff0a537bc95b30f15daa94f" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA1, 6, +64,
+ "b3bdd8065bb92d8208d55d28fad2281c6fbf2601" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA256, 6, -64,
+ "a2d5add5be904b70d6ef9bcd5feb9c6cfc2be0799732a122d9eccb576ff5a922" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA256, 6, -1,
+ "88293b7e0e5a47fdef1148c6e510f95272770db6b5296958380209ba57db7a5d" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA256, 6, +0,
+ "ccee8e8dfc366eba67471e49c45057b0041be0d2206c6de1aa765ce07ecfc434" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA256, 6, +1,
+ "f4a89e92b38e0e61ee17079dc31411de06cfe1f77c83095ae1a2e7aa0205d94b" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA256, 6, +64,
+ "338708608c2356ed2927a85b08fe745223c6140243fb3a87f309e12b31b946a8" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA512, 6, -64,
+ "658f52850932633c00b2f1d65b874c540ab84e2c0fe84a8a6c35f8e90e6f6a9c"
+ "2f7e0ccca5064783562a42ad8f47eab48687aaf6998b04ee94441e82c14e834d" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA512, 6, -1,
+ "9ead6d66b46a3a72d77c7990874cfebc1575e5bfda6026430d76b3db6cc62d52"
+ "4ca0dd2674b9c24208b2e780d75542572eee8df6724acadcc23a03eed8f82f0a" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA512, 6, +0,
+ "03e4549eb28bd0fb1606c321f1498503b5e889bec8d799cf0688567c7f8ac0d9"
+ "a7ec4e84d1d729d6a359797656e286617c3ef82abb51991bb576aaf05f7b6573" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA512, 6, +1,
+ "ffe52f6385ccde6fa7d45845787d8f9993fdcb5833fb58b13c424a84e39ea50f"
+ "52d40e254fe667cb0104ffe3837dc8d0eee3c81721cb8eac10d5851dfb1f91db" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA512, 6, +64,
+ "4a19da3d5eaaa79ac1eaff5e4062f23ee56573411f8d302f7bf3c6da8779bd00"
+ "a936e9ad7f535597a49162ed308b0cced7724667f97a1bb24540152fcfe3ec95" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA3_512, 6, -64,
+ "a99f2913d3beb9b45273402e30daa4d25c7a5e9eb8cf6039996eb2292a45c04c"
+ "b9e3a1a187f71920626f465ed6cf7dc34047ec5578e05516374bb9c56683903a" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA3_512, 6, -1,
+ "fca50bde79c55e5fc4c9d97e66eb5cfacef7032395848731e645ca42f07f8d38"
+ "be1d593727c2a82b9a9bc058ebc9744971f867fa920cfa902023448243ac017b" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA3_512, 6, +0,
+ "c61bb345c0a553edaa89fd38114ac9799b6d307ba8e3cde53552ad4c77cfe4b7"
+ "2671d82c1519c8e7b23153a9268e2939239564fc7c2060608aa42955e938840d" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA3_512, 6, +1,
+ "502a83d8d1b977312806382a45c1cc9c0e7db437ca962e37eb181754d59db686"
+ "14d91df286d510411adf69f7c9befc1027bdc0c33a48a5dd6ae0957b9061e7ca" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SHA3_512, 6, +64,
+ "207bfb83ae788ddd4531188567f0892bbddbbc88d69bc196b2357bee3e668706"
+ "c27f832ecb50e9ae5b63e9f384bdc37373958d4a14f3825146d2f6b1a65d8e51" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_SM3, 6, -64,
+ "41d96d19cef4c942b0f5f4cdc3e1afe440dc62c0bc103a2c0e9eee9e1733a74a" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SM3, 6, -1,
+ "b7689cc4ef6c7dc795b9e5e6998e5cc3dc1daec02bc1181cdbef8d6812b4957a" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SM3, 6, +0,
+ "c6eae4a82052423cf98017bde4dee8769947c66120a1a2ff79f0f0dc945a3272" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SM3, 6, +1,
+ "f6590f161fee11529585c7a9dfc725f8b81951e49b616844097a3dbdc9ffdbec" },
+ { GCRY_MD_SM3, 6, +64,
+ "f3277fa90c47afe5e4fc52374aadf8e96bc29c2b5a7a4ebf5d704245ada837ea" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2S_256, 6, -64,
+ "0f3c17610777c34d40a0d11a93d5e5ed444ce16edefebabd0bc8e30392d5c2db" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2S_256, 6, -1,
+ "92cbcf142c45de9d64da9791c51dce4e32b58f74d9f3d201b1ea74deac765f51" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2S_256, 6, +0,
+ "b20702cb5a0bee2ab104f38eb513429589310a7edde81dd1f40043be7d16d0de" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2S_256, 6, +1,
+ "bfc17dc74930989841da05aac08402bf0dcb4a597b17c52402a516ea7e541cdf" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2S_256, 6, +64,
+ "d85588cdf5a00bec1327da02f22f1a10b68dd9d6b730f30a3aa65af3a51c1722" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2B_512, 6, -64,
+ "30b6015f94524861b04b83f0455be10a993460e0f8f0fd755fc3d0270b0c7d00"
+ "039a6e01684ce0689ce4ef70932bd19a676acf4b4ea521c30337d2f445fc2055" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2B_512, 6, -1,
+ "49abef820ad7fc5e6ed9b63acddce639a69dcd749b0798b140216649bc3b927c"
+ "637dbe1cb39a41bbafe7f8b675401ccdcf69a7fba227ae4cda5cd28b9ff36776" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2B_512, 6, +0,
+ "4182a7307a89391b78af9dbc3ba1e8d643708abbed5919086aa6e2bc65ae9597"
+ "e40229450c86ac5d3117b006427dd0131f5ae4c1a1d64c81420d2731536c81d8" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2B_512, 6, +1,
+ "33c0d9e65b1b18e9556134a08c1e725c19155bbf6ed4349d7d6d678f1827fef3"
+ "74b6e3381471f3d3fff7ffbcb9474ce9038143b99e25cd5f8afbb336313d4648" },
+ { GCRY_MD_BLAKE2B_512, 6, +64,
+ "d2d7f388611af78a2ea40b06f99993cff156afd25cbc47695bdb567d4d35b992"
+ "0ff8c325c359a2bdeddf54ececc671ac7b981031e90a7d63d6e0415ec4484282" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL, 6, -64,
+ "247707d1f9cf31b90ee68527144b1c20ad5ce96293bdccd1a81c8f40bc9df10c"
+ "e7441ac3b3097162d6fbf4d4b67b8fa09de451e2d920f16aad78c47ab00cb833" },
+ { GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL, 6, -1,
+ "af49e4a553bdbec1fdafc41713029e0fb1666894753c0ab3ecb280fc5af6eff8"
+ "253120745a229d7a8b5831711e4fd16ed0741258504d8a47e2b42aa2f1886968" },
+ { GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL, 6, +0,
+ "f269ffa424bc2aad2da654f01783fc9b2b431219f2b05784d718da0935e78792"
+ "9207b000ebbfb63dfdcc8adf8e5bd321d9616c1b8357430b9be6cb4640df8609" },
+ { GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL, 6, +1,
+ "52b77eb13129151b69b63c09abb655dc9cb046cafd4cbf7d4a82ae04b61ef9e6"
+ "531dde04cae7c5ab400ed8ee8da2e3f490d177289b2b3aa29b12b292954b902c" },
+ { GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL, 6, +64,
+ "60a950c92f3f08abbc81c41c86ce0463679ffd5ab420e988e15b210615b454ae"
+ "69607d14a1806fa44aacf8c926fbdcee998af46f56e0c642d3fb4ee54c8fb917" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_CRC32, 6, -64, "20739052" },
+ { GCRY_MD_CRC32, 6, -1, "971a5a74" },
+ { GCRY_MD_CRC32, 6, +0, "bf48113c" },
+ { GCRY_MD_CRC32, 6, +1, "c7678ad5" },
+ { GCRY_MD_CRC32, 6, +64, "1efa7255" },
+
+ { GCRY_MD_CRC24_RFC2440, 6, -64, "747e81" },
+ { GCRY_MD_CRC24_RFC2440, 6, -1, "deb97d" },
+ { GCRY_MD_CRC24_RFC2440, 6, +0, "7d5bea" },
+ { GCRY_MD_CRC24_RFC2440, 6, +1, "acc351" },
+ { GCRY_MD_CRC24_RFC2440, 6, +64, "9d9032" },
+
{ 0 }
};
@@ -251,12 +415,38 @@ run_longtest (int algo, int gigs)
gcry_md_hd_t hd_post = NULL;
gcry_md_hd_t hd_post2 = NULL;
char pattern[1024];
- int i, g;
+ char *hugepattern = NULL;
+ size_t hugesize;
+ size_t hugegigs;
+ int i, g, gppos, gptot;
const unsigned char *digest;
unsigned int digestlen;
memset (pattern, 'a', sizeof pattern);
+ if (use_hugeblock)
+ {
+ hugegigs = 5;
+ if (sizeof(size_t) >= 8)
+ {
+ hugesize = hugegigs*1024*1024*1024;
+ hugepattern = malloc(hugesize);
+ if (hugepattern != NULL)
+ memset(hugepattern, 'a', hugesize);
+ else
+ show_note ("failed to allocate %d GiB huge pattern block: %s",
+ hugegigs, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ else
+ show_note ("cannot allocate %d GiB huge pattern block on 32-bit system",
+ hugegigs);
+ }
+ if (hugepattern == NULL)
+ {
+ hugegigs = 0;
+ hugesize = 0;
+ }
+
err = gcry_md_open (&hd, algo, 0);
if (err)
{
@@ -267,9 +457,17 @@ run_longtest (int algo, int gigs)
digestlen = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
-
- for (g=0; g < gigs; g++)
+ gppos = 0;
+ gptot = 0;
+ for (g=0; g < gigs; )
{
+ if (gppos >= 16)
+ {
+ gptot += 16;
+ gppos -= 16;
+ show_note ("%d GiB so far hashed with %s", gptot,
+ gcry_md_algo_name (algo));
+ }
if (g == gigs - 1)
{
for (i = 0; i < 1024*1023; i++)
@@ -283,16 +481,24 @@ run_longtest (int algo, int gigs)
die ("gcry_md_copy failed for %s (%d): %s",
gcry_md_algo_name (algo), algo, gpg_strerror (err));
gcry_md_write (hd, pattern, sizeof pattern);
+ g++;
+ gppos++;
+ }
+ else if (hugepattern != NULL && gigs - g > hugegigs)
+ {
+ gcry_md_write (hd, hugepattern, hugesize);
+ g += hugegigs;
+ gppos += hugegigs;
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < 1024*1024; i++)
gcry_md_write (hd, pattern, sizeof pattern);
+ g++;
+ gppos++;
}
- if (g && !(g % 16))
- show_note ("%d GiB so far hashed with %s", g, gcry_md_algo_name (algo));
}
- if (g >= 16)
+ if (g >= 16 && gppos)
show_note ("%d GiB hashed with %s", g, gcry_md_algo_name (algo));
err = gcry_md_copy (&hd_post, hd);
@@ -335,6 +541,8 @@ run_longtest (int algo, int gigs)
gcry_md_close (hd_pre2);
gcry_md_close (hd_post);
gcry_md_close (hd_post2);
+
+ free(hugepattern);
}
@@ -361,9 +569,12 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
{
fputs ("usage: " PGM " [options] [algos]\n"
"Options:\n"
- " --verbose print timings etc.\n"
- " --debug flyswatter\n"
- " --gigs N Run a test on N GiB\n",
+ " --verbose print timings etc.\n"
+ " --debug flyswatter\n"
+ " --hugeblock Use 5 GiB pattern block\n"
+ " --gigs N Run a test on N GiB\n"
+ " --disable-hwf <features> Disable hardware acceleration feature(s)\n"
+ " for benchmarking.\n",
stdout);
exit (0);
}
@@ -378,6 +589,11 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
debug++;
argc--; argv++;
}
+ else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--hugeblock"))
+ {
+ use_hugeblock = 1;
+ argc--; argv++;
+ }
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--gigs"))
{
argc--; argv++;
@@ -387,6 +603,21 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
argc--; argv++;
}
}
+ else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--disable-hwf"))
+ {
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (argc)
+ {
+ if (gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_HWF, *argv, NULL))
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ PGM
+ ": unknown hardware feature `%s' - option ignored\n",
+ *argv);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+ }
else if (!strncmp (*argv, "--", 2))
die ("unknown option '%s'", *argv);
}
diff --git a/tests/testdrv.c b/tests/testdrv.c
index 0ccde326..bfca4c23 100644
--- a/tests/testdrv.c
+++ b/tests/testdrv.c
@@ -78,7 +78,12 @@ static struct {
{ "t-ed448" },
{ "benchmark" },
{ "bench-slope" },
- { "hashtest-256g", "hashtest", "--gigs 256 SHA1 SHA256 SHA512 SM3",
+ { "hashtest-6g", "hashtest", "--hugeblock --gigs 6 SHA1 SHA256 SHA512 "
+ "SHA3-512 SM3 BLAKE2S_256 "
+ "BLAKE2B_512 CRC32 "
+ "CRC24RFC2440",
+ LONG_RUNNING },
+ { "hashtest-256g", "hashtest", "--gigs 256 SHA1 SHA256 SHA512 SHA3-512 SM3",
LONG_RUNNING },
{ NULL }
};
--
2.34.1
From 567bc62e1c3046594088de7209fee7c545ece1e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2022 14:54:14 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] tests: Avoid memory leak
* tests/hashtest.c (run_longtest): Avoid memory leak on error
--
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
---
tests/hashtest.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/tests/hashtest.c b/tests/hashtest.c
index 9389e50c..379f7c40 100644
--- a/tests/hashtest.c
+++ b/tests/hashtest.c
@@ -452,6 +452,7 @@ run_longtest (int algo, int gigs)
{
fail ("gcry_md_open failed for %s (%d): %s",
gcry_md_algo_name (algo), algo, gpg_strerror (err));
+ free(hugepattern);
return;
}
--
2.37.3

453
SPECS/libgcrypt.spec → libgcrypt.spec
View File

@ -1,76 +1,97 @@
Name: libgcrypt
Version: 1.8.5
Release: 7%{?dist}
URL: http://www.gnupg.org/
Source0: libgcrypt-%{version}-hobbled.tar.xz
# The original libgcrypt sources now contain potentially patented ECC
# cipher support. We have to remove it in the tarball we ship with
# the hobble-libgcrypt script.
# (We replace it with RH approved ECC in Source4-5)
#Source0: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-{version}.tar.bz2
#Source1: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-{version}.tar.bz2.sig
Source2: wk@g10code.com
Source3: hobble-libgcrypt
# Approved ECC support
Source4: ecc-curves.c
Source5: curves.c
Source6: t-mpi-point.c
Source7: random.conf
# make FIPS hmac compatible with fipscheck - non upstreamable
# update on soname bump
Patch2: libgcrypt-1.8.5-use-fipscheck.patch
# modify FIPS RSA and DSA keygen to comply with requirements
Patch5: libgcrypt-1.8.4-fips-keygen.patch
# fix the tests to work correctly in the FIPS mode
Patch6: libgcrypt-1.8.4-tests-fipsmode.patch
# update the CAVS tests
Patch7: libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-cavs.patch
# use poll instead of select when gathering randomness
Patch11: libgcrypt-1.8.4-use-poll.patch
# slight optimalization of mpicoder.c to silence Valgrind (#968288)
Patch13: libgcrypt-1.6.1-mpicoder-gccopt.patch
# fix tests to work with approved ECC
Patch14: libgcrypt-1.7.3-ecc-test-fix.patch
# Run the FIPS mode initialization in the shared library constructor
Patch18: libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-ctor.patch
# Block some operations if in FIPS non-operational state
Patch22: libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-reqs.patch
# Do not try to open /dev/urandom if getrandom() works
Patch24: libgcrypt-1.8.5-getrandom.patch
# CMAC selftest for FIPS POST
Patch25: libgcrypt-1.8.3-cmac-selftest.patch
# Continuous FIPS entropy test
Patch26: libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-enttest.patch
# Disable non-approved FIPS hashes in the enforced FIPS mode
Patch27: libgcrypt-1.8.3-md-fips-enforce.patch
# Intel CET support, in upstream master
Patch28: libgcrypt-1.8.5-intel-cet.patch
# Fix build on ARMv7
Patch29: libgcrypt-1.8.5-build.patch
# FIPS module is redefined a little bit (implicit by kernel FIPS mode)
Patch30: libgcrypt-1.8.5-fips-module.patch
# Backported AES performance improvements
Patch31: libgcrypt-1.8.5-aes-perf.patch
# FIPS selftest for PBKDF2
Patch32: libgcrypt-1.8.5-kdf-selftest.patch
# ppc64 performance for SHA2 (#1855231)
Patch33: libgcrypt-1.8.5-ppc-sha2.patch
# ppc64 performance for CRC32 (#1855231)
Patch34: libgcrypt-1.8.5-ppc-crc32.patch
# ppc64 bugfixes (#1855231)
Patch35: libgcrypt-1.8.5-ppc-bugfix.patch
# ppc64 performance AES-GCM (#1855231)
Patch36: libgcrypt-1.8.5-ppc-aes-gcm.patch
# Fix elgamal cross-configuration (CVE-2021-40528)
Patch37: libgcrypt-1.9.3-CVE-2021-40528.patch
# We can use HW optimizations in FIPS (#1976137)
Patch38: libgcrypt-1.8.5-fips-hwfeatures.patch
# ppc64 performance chacha20 and poly1305 (#1855231)
Patch39: libgcrypt-1.8.5-ppc-chacha20-poly1305.patch
# Fix CVE-2021-33560 (elgamal blinding)
Patch40: libgcrypt-1.8.5-elgamal-blinding.patch
# This is taken from gnutls.spec
%define srpmhash() %{lua:
local files = rpm.expand("%_specdir/libgcrypt.spec")
for i, p in ipairs(patches) do
files = files.." "..p
end
for i, p in ipairs(sources) do
files = files.." "..p
end
local sha256sum = assert(io.popen("cat "..files.."| sha256sum"))
local hash = sha256sum:read("*a")
sha256sum:close()
print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
}
%define gcrylibdir %{_libdir}
Name: libgcrypt
Version: 1.10.0
Release: 11%{?dist}
URL: https://www.gnupg.org/
Source0: https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-%{version}.tar.bz2
Source1: https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-%{version}.tar.bz2.sig
Source2: wk@g10code.com
Patch1: libgcrypt-1.10.0-disable-brainpool.patch
Patch3: libgcrypt-1.10.0-ppc-hwf.patch
Patch4: libgcrypt-1.10.0-allow-small-RSA-verify.patch
Patch5: libgcrypt-1.10.0-allow-short-salt.patch
Patch6: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-getrandom.patch
# https://dev.gnupg.org/T6127
# https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gcrypt-devel/2022-September/005379.html
Patch7: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-selftest.patch
# https://dev.gnupg.org/T6217
Patch9: libgcrypt-1.10.0-sha3-large.patch
# https://dev.gnupg.org/T5919
Patch10: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-keygen.patch
# https://dev.gnupg.org/T6219
# f4a861f3e5ae82f278284061e4829c03edf9c3a7
Patch11: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-kdf.patch
# c34c9e70055ee43e5ef257384fa15941f064e5a4
# https://gitlab.com/redhat-crypto/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-mirror/-/merge_requests/13
Patch12: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-indicator.patch
# beb5d6df5c5785db7c32a24a5d2a351cb964bfbc
# 521500624b4b11538d206137205e2a511dad7072
# 9dcf9305962b90febdf2d7cc73b49feadbf6a01f
# a340e980388243ceae6df57d101036f3f2a955be
Patch13: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-integrity.patch
# 3c8b6c4a9cad59c5e1db5706f6774a3141b60210
# 052c5ef4cea56772b7015e36f231fa0bcbf91410
# 3fd3bb31597f80c76a94ea62e42d58d796beabf1
Patch14: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-integrity2.patch
# 06ea5b5332ffdb44a0a394d766be8989bcb6a95c
Patch15: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-x931.patch
# bf1e62e59200b2046680d1d3d1599facc88cfe63
Patch16: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-rsa-pss.patch
# https://dev.gnupg.org/T6376
Patch17: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-indicator-md-hmac.patch
# https://dev.gnupg.org/T6394
# https://dev.gnupg.org/T6397
Patch18: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-pct.patch
# https://dev.gnupg.org/T6396
Patch19: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-status-sign-verify.patch
# https://dev.gnupg.org/T6393
Patch20: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-drbg.patch
# https://dev.gnupg.org/T6417
Patch21: libgcrypt-1.10.0-fips-indicator-pk-flags.patch
# a611e3a25d61505698e2bb38ec2db38bc6a74820
# 34c20427926010d6fa95b1666e4b1b60f60a8742
# c848459e512615c1865a23cf24debb3ad4a1e85b
# c31b70b2660c3d24bd54ee08c255c36d867fdea7
# bd08357436a9559766cd458d25781ee4f94012a2
# 58b62be844549ad3d57c507d834027f1e2756567
# 6d1d50ba3aad1850975f717adbedb4cb8b236fa7
# 1e9ddbd65c4627235611d75c3198c4ec197c9a05
# 137e35ad47ee8734d0f3ffb6af1d1669c4621e0b
# 84f934c09afac18b3f4351646c0fe6f93aede277
# 0c6ec6bbe788b8c4a6982b2128d442b51323c898
# 22dde5150ee2be01651410ed9756601ba6a29c93
# 4d3e0e30b98b2acb90acb2792b8327c26824a66f
# 179df341162c74da312f76363a0ff1f2f303aa78
# d4aee9ace9a904446b987dddc2999119c4d62dae
# aab6a42d5f44724b73a02598546a5e7d8b33298e
# 5c5ba1ec2b505726ee1311339ac9e8b5c62cac4a
# cf757cf90e9ae966b95dcebfd2f31b9212697f0c
# c419a04d529af7b5fb43732ec2b4304166c2579a
# 39d5364a9557d6f423de117601cb1e6414814f47
Patch22: libgcrypt-1.10.0-marvin.patch
# f490ffd739f713fcf0be35b7fbbb8502dea40a0c
Patch23: libgcrypt-1.10.0-marvin2.patch
# https://gitlab.com/redhat-crypto/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-mirror/-/merge_requests/19/
Patch24: libgcrypt-1.10.0-marvin3.patch
%global gcrylibdir %{_libdir}
%global gcrysoname libgcrypt.so.20
%global hmackey orboDeJITITejsirpADONivirpUkvarP
# Technically LGPLv2.1+, but Fedora's table doesn't draw a distinction.
# Documentation and some utilities are GPLv2+ licensed. These files
@ -79,18 +100,17 @@ License: LGPLv2+
Summary: A general-purpose cryptography library
BuildRequires: gcc
BuildRequires: gawk, libgpg-error-devel >= 1.11, pkgconfig
BuildRequires: fipscheck
# This is needed only when patching the .texi doc.
BuildRequires: texinfo
BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, libtool
BuildRequires: make
%package devel
Summary: Development files for the %{name} package
License: LGPLv2+ and GPLv2+
Requires(pre): /sbin/install-info
Requires(post): /sbin/install-info
Requires: libgpg-error-devel
Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: %{name}%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: pkgconfig
%description
Libgcrypt is a general purpose crypto library based on the code used
@ -103,64 +123,83 @@ applications using libgcrypt.
%prep
%setup -q
%{SOURCE3}
%patch2 -p1 -b .use-fipscheck
%patch5 -p1 -b .fips-keygen
%patch6 -p1 -b .tests-fipsmode
%patch7 -p1 -b .cavs
%patch11 -p1 -b .use-poll
%patch13 -p1 -b .gccopt
%patch14 -p1 -b .eccfix
%patch18 -p1 -b .fips-ctor
%patch22 -p1 -b .fips-reqs
%patch24 -p1 -b .getrandom
%patch25 -p1 -b .cmac-selftest
%patch26 -p1 -b .fips-enttest
%patch27 -p1 -b .fips-enforce
%patch28 -p1 -b .intel-cet
%patch29 -p1 -b .build
%patch30 -p1 -b .fips-module
%patch31 -p1 -b .aes-perf
%patch32 -p1 -b .kdf-selftest
%patch33 -p1 -b .ppc-sha2
%patch34 -p1 -b .ppc-crc32
%patch35 -p1 -b .ppc-bugfix
%patch36 -p1 -b .ppc-aes-gcm
%patch37 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-40528
%patch38 -p1 -b .hw-fips
%patch39 -p1 -b .ppc-chacha
%patch40 -p1 -b .elgamal-blinding
cp %{SOURCE4} cipher/
cp %{SOURCE5} %{SOURCE6} tests/
%patch1 -p1
%patch3 -p1
%patch4 -p1
%patch5 -p1
%patch6 -p1
%patch7 -p1
%patch9 -p1
%patch10 -p1
%patch11 -p1
%patch12 -p1
%patch13 -p1
%patch14 -p1
%patch15 -p1
%patch16 -p1
%patch17 -p1
%patch18 -p1
%patch19 -p1
%patch20 -p1
%patch21 -p1
%patch22 -p1
%patch23 -p1
%patch24 -p1
%build
# This package has a configure test which uses ASMs, but does not link the
# resultant .o files. As such the ASM test is always successful, even on
# architectures were the ASM is not valid when compiling with LTO.
#
# -ffat-lto-objects is sufficient to address this issue. It is the default
# for F33, but is expected to only be enabled for packages that need it in
# F34, so we use it here explicitly
%define _lto_cflags -flto=auto -ffat-lto-objects
# should be all algorithms except SM3 and SM4
export DIGESTS='crc gostr3411-94 md4 md5 rmd160 sha1 sha256 sha512 sha3 tiger whirlpool stribog blake2'
export CIPHERS='arcfour blowfish cast5 des aes twofish serpent rfc2268 seed camellia idea salsa20 gost28147 chacha20'
eval $(sed -n 's/^\(\(NAME\|VERSION_ID\)=.*\)/OS_\1/p' /etc/os-release)
export FIPS_MODULE_NAME="$OS_NAME ${OS_VERSION_ID%%.*} %name"
autoreconf -f
%configure --disable-static \
%ifarch sparc64
--disable-asm \
%endif
--enable-noexecstack \
--enable-hmac-binary-check \
--enable-pubkey-ciphers='dsa elgamal rsa ecc' \
--disable-O-flag-munging
--enable-hmac-binary-check=%{hmackey} \
--disable-brainpool \
--disable-jent-support \
--enable-digests="$DIGESTS" \
--enable-ciphers="$CIPHERS" \
--enable-marvin-workaround \
--with-fips-module-version="$FIPS_MODULE_NAME %{version}-%{srpmhash}"
sed -i -e '/^sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec/s,/lib /usr/lib,/usr/lib /lib64 /usr/lib64 /lib,g' libtool
make %{?_smp_mflags}
%make_build
%check
fipshmac src/.libs/libgcrypt.so.??
make check
# try in faked FIPS mode too
LIBGCRYPT_FORCE_FIPS_MODE=1 make check
# Add generation of HMAC checksums of the final stripped binaries
%define libpath $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{gcrylibdir}/%{gcrysoname}.?.?
%define __spec_install_post \
%{?__debug_package:%{__debug_install_post}} \
%{__arch_install_post} \
%{__os_install_post} \
fipshmac $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{gcrylibdir}/*.so.?? \
cd src \
sed -i -e 's|FILE=.*|FILE=\\\$1|' gen-note-integrity.sh \
READELF=readelf AWK=awk ECHO_N="-n" bash gen-note-integrity.sh %{libpath} > %{libpath}.hmac \
objcopy --update-section .note.fdo.integrity=%{libpath}.hmac %{libpath} %{libpath}.new \
mv -f %{libpath}.new %{libpath} \
rm -f %{libpath}.hmac
%{nil}
%install
make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%make_install
# Change /usr/lib64 back to /usr/lib. This saves us from having to patch the
# script to "know" that -L/usr/lib64 should be suppressed, and also removes
@ -201,32 +240,13 @@ popd
# Create /etc/gcrypt (hardwired, not dependent on the configure invocation) so
# that _someone_ owns it.
mkdir -p -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/gcrypt
install -m644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/gcrypt/random.conf
# Drop the pkgconfig as it would require an updated libgpg-error
rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/libgcrypt.pc
%post -p /sbin/ldconfig
%postun -p /sbin/ldconfig
%post devel
[ -f %{_infodir}/gcrypt.info.gz ] && \
/sbin/install-info %{_infodir}/gcrypt.info.gz %{_infodir}/dir
exit 0
%preun devel
if [ $1 = 0 -a -f %{_infodir}/gcrypt.info.gz ]; then
/sbin/install-info --delete %{_infodir}/gcrypt.info.gz %{_infodir}/dir
fi
exit 0
%ldconfig_scriptlets
%files
%dir /etc/gcrypt
%config(noreplace) /etc/gcrypt/random.conf
%{gcrylibdir}/libgcrypt.so.*
%{gcrylibdir}/.libgcrypt.so.*.hmac
%{!?_licensedir:%global license %%doc}
%{gcrylibdir}/libgcrypt.so.*.*
%{gcrylibdir}/%{gcrysoname}
%license COPYING.LIB
%doc AUTHORS NEWS THANKS
@ -237,42 +257,171 @@ exit 0
%{_bindir}/mpicalc
%{_includedir}/*
%{_libdir}/*.so
%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/libgcrypt.pc
%{_datadir}/aclocal/*
%{_mandir}/man1/*
%{_infodir}/gcrypt.info*
%{!?_licensedir:%global license %%doc}
%license COPYING
%changelog
* Tue Apr 05 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.8.5-7
- Fix CVE-2021-33560 (#2018525)
* Thu Aug 01 2024 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-11
- Fix CVE-2024-2236 (RHEL-34579)
* Mon Jun 28 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.8.5-6
- Fix for CVE-2021-40528 (#1971421)
- Enable HW optimizations in FIPS (#1976137)
- Performance enchancements for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 (#1855231)
* Mon Mar 20 2023 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-10
- Provide FIPS indicators for MD and HMACs
- Improve PCT tests for ECDSA and always run them after key is generated
- Add missing guards for FIPS status in md_sign/verify function
- Provider FIPS indicators for public key operation flags
* Thu May 13 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.8.5-5
- Performance enchancements for AES-GCM, CRC32 and SHA2 (#1855231)
* Tue Jan 24 2023 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-9
- Avoid usage of invalid arguments sizes for PBKDF2 in FIPS mode
- Do not allow large salt lengths with RSA-PSS padding
- Disable X9.31 key generation in FIPS mode
- Update the FIPS integrity checking code to upstream version
- Update cipher modes FIPS indicators for AES WRAP and GCM
- Disable jitter entropy generator
* Mon Jun 15 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-4
- add PBKDF2 selftest for FIPS POST
* Thu Oct 20 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-8
- Fix unneeded PBKDF2 passphrase length limitation in FIPS mode
- Enforce HMAC key lengths in MD API in FIPS mode
* Tue Apr 28 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-3
- new upstream version 1.8.5
* Thu Oct 06 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-7
- Properly enforce KDF limits in FIPS mode (#2130275)
- Fix memory leak in large digest test (#2129150)
- Fix function name FIPS service indicator by disabling PK encryption and decryption (#2130275)
- Skip RSA encryption/decryption selftest in FIPS mode (#2130275)
* Tue Sep 27 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-6
- Fix SHA3 digests with large inputs (#2129150)
- Fix FIPS RSA PCT (#2128455)
- Fix RSA FIPS Keygen that non-deterministically fails (#2130275)
- Get max 32B from getrandom in FIPS mode (#2130275)
* Wed Aug 17 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-5
- Allow signature verification with smaller RSA keys (#2083846)
- Allow short salt for KDF (#2114870)
- Reseed the kernel DRBG by using GRND_RANDOM (#2118695)
- Address FIPS review comments around selftests (#2118695)
- Disable RSA-OAEP in FIPS mode (#2118695)
* Fri May 06 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-4
- Backport ppc hardware flags detection (#2051307)
- Disable PKCS#1.5 encryption in FIPS mode (#2061328)
* Thu Mar 31 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-3
- Use correct FIPS module name (#2067123)
* Thu Feb 17 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-2
- Systematic FIPS module name with other FIPS modules
* Wed Feb 02 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-1
- Final release (#2026636)
* Thu Jan 27 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-0.3
- Fix broken soname in the previous beta
* Thu Jan 27 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-0.2
- Provide compat soname symlink as the new release is backward compatible
* Wed Jan 26 2022 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-0.1
- New upstream pre-release (#2026636)
- Upstream all patches
- Implement FIPS 140-3 support
* Tue Oct 12 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.9.3-5
- Allow HW optimizations in FIPS mode (#1990059)
* Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 1.9.3-4
- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
Related: rhbz#1991688
* Tue Jun 15 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.9.3-3
- Fix for CVE-2021-33560 (#1970098)
* Wed Apr 28 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.9.3-2
- Restore the CET protection (#1954049)
* Tue Apr 20 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.9.3-1
- New upstream release (#1951325)
* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 1.9.2-4
- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
* Thu Apr 15 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.9.2-3
- Fix issues reported by coverity
* Mon Mar 29 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.9.2-2
- Fix OCB tag creation on s390x (failing gnupg2 tests)
* Wed Feb 17 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.9.2-1
- New upstream release (#1929630)
* Fri Jan 29 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.9.1-1
- New upstream release (#1922156, #1922097)
* Wed Jan 20 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-1
- New upstream release (#1917878)
* Tue Nov 24 2020 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 1.8.7-1
- new upstream release (#1891123)
* Fri Aug 21 2020 Jeff Law <law@redhat.com> - 1.8.6-4
- Re-enable LTO
* Tue Jul 28 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.8.6-3
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
* Tue Jul 21 2020 Tom Stellard <tstellar@redhat.com> - 1.8.6-2
- Use make macros
- https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/UseMakeBuildInstallMacro
* Mon Jul 20 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.6-1
- new upstream version 1.8.6
* Wed Jul 1 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-7
- use the hmac256 tool to calculate the library hmac
* Tue Jun 30 2020 Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>
- Disable LTO
* Thu Apr 23 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-6
- Fix regression - missing -ldl linkage
* Wed Apr 22 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-5
- AES performance improvements backported from master branch
* Mon Apr 20 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-4
- FIPS selftest is run directly from the constructor
- FIPS module is implicit with kernel FIPS flag
- always run the FIPS selftests if FIPS module is installed
* Mon Jun 24 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.3-4
- improve the continuous FIPS entropy test
* Thu Jan 30 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-3
- fix the build on ARMv7
* Mon Jun 3 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.3-3
* Thu Jan 23 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-2
- Intel CET support by H. J. Lu
* Tue Sep 3 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-1
- new upstream version 1.8.5
- add CMAC selftest for FIPS POST
- add continuous FIPS entropy test
- disable non-approved FIPS hashes in the enforced FIPS mode
* Thu Jul 25 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.8.4-4
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
* Tue Feb 12 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.4-3
- fix the build tests to pass in the FIPS mode
* Fri Feb 01 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.8.4-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
* Tue Nov 20 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.4-1
- new upstream version 1.8.4
* Fri Jul 13 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.8.3-3
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
* Thu Jul 12 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.3-2
- make only_urandom a default in non-presence of configuration file
- run the full FIPS selftests only when the library is called from

23
plans/ci.fmf Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
/fips-disabled-buildroot-disabled:
plan:
import:
url: https://pkgs.devel.redhat.com/git/tests/libgcrypt
name: /plans/ci/fips-disabled-buildroot-disabled
/fips-disabled-buildroot-enabled:
plan:
import:
url: https://pkgs.devel.redhat.com/git/tests/libgcrypt
name: /plans/ci/fips-disabled-buildroot-enabled
/fips-enabled-buildroot-disabled:
plan:
import:
url: https://pkgs.devel.redhat.com/git/tests/libgcrypt
name: /plans/ci/fips-enabled-buildroot-disabled
/fips-enabled-buildroot-enabled:
plan:
import:
url: https://pkgs.devel.redhat.com/git/tests/libgcrypt
name: /plans/ci/fips-enabled-buildroot-enabled

2
sources Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
SHA512 (libgcrypt-1.10.0.tar.bz2) = 785c2e14272308956bb6adcea9567c4097edf103122e18cd3907fb42a110a48a5d59c0057f05a438acd7f221c70c7f7ff87e176bd6d7ed99d16e847f9d7be087
SHA512 (libgcrypt-1.10.0.tar.bz2.sig) = 75201612225b206faaae284297e92d1b25dcaf0665bcf1f4c5cc9a3a750a803063d0f7bd0af556dbe419f1276c953ce047554fd18a144a90085a42a7ec885168

0
SOURCES/wk@g10code.com → wk@g10code.com
View File