rpms/libgcrypt
7
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity

FIPS selftest is run directly from the constructor

Browse Source 
FIPS module is implicit with kernel FIPS flag
This commit is contained in:
Tomas Mraz 2020-04-20 19:36:34 +02:00
parent 4dfc42c2d2
commit d7ce942d74
4 changed files with 171 additions and 215 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

224
libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-ctor.patch
View File

@ -1,196 +1,7 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-ctor 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c 2018-07-12 13:24:54.088403006 +0200
@@ -411,11 +411,8 @@ md_enable (gcry_md_hd_t hd, int algorith
if (!err && algorithm == GCRY_MD_MD5 && fips_mode ())
{
- _gcry_inactivate_fips_mode ("MD5 used");
if (_gcry_enforced_fips_mode () )
{
- /* We should never get to here because we do not register
- MD5 in enforced fips mode. But better throw an error. */
err = GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
}
}
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c.fips-ctor 2018-07-12 13:24:54.075402698 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c 2018-07-12 13:24:54.088403006 +0200
@@ -91,6 +91,31 @@ static void fips_new_state (enum module_
+/* Initialize the FSM lock - this function may only
+ be called once and is intended to be run from the library
+ constructor */
+void
+_gcry_initialize_fsm_lock (void)
+{
+ gpg_error_t err;
+ /* Intitialize the lock to protect the FSM. */
+ err = gpgrt_lock_init (&fsm_lock);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ /* If that fails we can't do anything but abort the
+ process. We need to use log_info so that the FSM won't
+ get involved. */
+ log_info ("FATAL: failed to create the FSM lock in libgcrypt: %s\n",
+ gpg_strerror (err));
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG
+ syslog (LOG_USER|LOG_ERR, "Libgcrypt error: "
+ "creating FSM lock failed: %s - abort",
+ gpg_strerror (err));
+#endif /*HAVE_SYSLOG*/
+ abort ();
+ }
+}
+
/* Check whether the OS is in FIPS mode and record that in a module
local variable. If FORCE is passed as true, fips mode will be
enabled anyway. Note: This function is not thread-safe and should
@@ -100,7 +125,6 @@ void
_gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force)
{
static int done;
- gpg_error_t err;
/* Make sure we are not accidentally called twice. */
if (done)
@@ -179,24 +203,6 @@ _gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force)
/* Yes, we are in FIPS mode. */
FILE *fp;
- /* Intitialize the lock to protect the FSM. */
- err = gpgrt_lock_init (&fsm_lock);
- if (err)
- {
- /* If that fails we can't do anything but abort the
- process. We need to use log_info so that the FSM won't
- get involved. */
- log_info ("FATAL: failed to create the FSM lock in libgcrypt: %s\n",
- gpg_strerror (err));
-#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG
- syslog (LOG_USER|LOG_ERR, "Libgcrypt error: "
- "creating FSM lock failed: %s - abort",
- gpg_strerror (err));
-#endif /*HAVE_SYSLOG*/
- abort ();
- }
-
-
/* If the FIPS force files exists, is readable and has a number
!= 0 on its first line, we enable the enforced fips mode. */
fp = fopen (FIPS_FORCE_FILE, "r");
@@ -359,16 +365,20 @@ _gcry_fips_is_operational (void)
{
int result;
- if (!fips_mode ())
+ lock_fsm ();
+ if (current_state == STATE_POWERON && !fips_mode ())
+ /* If we are at this point in POWERON state it means the FIPS
+ module installation was not completed. (/etc/system-fips
+ is not present.) */
result = 1;
else
{
- lock_fsm ();
- if (current_state == STATE_INIT)
+ if (current_state == STATE_INIT || current_state == STATE_SELFTEST)
{
- /* If we are still in the INIT state, we need to run the
- selftests so that the FSM can eventually get into
- operational state. Given that we would need a 2-phase
+ /* If we are still in the INIT (or SELFTEST) state,
+ we need to run (or finish) the selftests so
+ that the FSM can eventually get into operational
+ state. Given that we would need a 2-phase
initialization of libgcrypt, but that has traditionally
not been enforced, we use this on demand self-test
checking. Note that Proper applications would do the
@@ -384,9 +394,11 @@ _gcry_fips_is_operational (void)
lock_fsm ();
}
- result = (current_state == STATE_OPERATIONAL);
- unlock_fsm ();
+ result = (current_state == STATE_OPERATIONAL) || !fips_mode ();
+ /* We always run the selftests but ignore the result
+ in non-FIPS mode. */
}
+ unlock_fsm ();
return result;
}
@@ -709,9 +721,25 @@ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (int extended)
{
enum module_states result = STATE_ERROR;
gcry_err_code_t ec = GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+ int in_poweron;
- if (fips_mode ())
- fips_new_state (STATE_SELFTEST);
+ lock_fsm ();
+ in_poweron = (current_state == STATE_POWERON);
+ unlock_fsm ();
+
+ fips_new_state (STATE_SELFTEST);
+
+ /* We first check the integrity of the binary.
+ If run from the constructor we are in POWERON state,
+ we return and finish the remaining selftests before
+ real use of the library. It will be in the POWERON
+ state meanwhile. */
+ if (in_poweron)
+ if (check_binary_integrity ())
+ goto leave;
+
+ if (in_poweron)
+ return 0;
if (run_cipher_selftests (extended))
goto leave;
@@ -730,18 +758,12 @@ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (int extended)
if (run_pubkey_selftests (extended))
goto leave;
- /* Now check the integrity of the binary. We do this this after
- having checked the HMAC code. */
- if (check_binary_integrity ())
- goto leave;
-
/* All selftests passed. */
result = STATE_OPERATIONAL;
ec = 0;
leave:
- if (fips_mode ())
- fips_new_state (result);
+ fips_new_state (result);
return ec;
}
@@ -797,6 +819,7 @@ fips_new_state (enum module_states new_s
{
case STATE_POWERON:
if (new_state == STATE_INIT
+ || new_state == STATE_SELFTEST
|| new_state == STATE_ERROR
|| new_state == STATE_FATALERROR)
ok = 1;
@@ -811,6 +834,8 @@ fips_new_state (enum module_states new_s
case STATE_SELFTEST:
if (new_state == STATE_OPERATIONAL
+ || new_state == STATE_INIT
+ || new_state == STATE_SELFTEST
|| new_state == STATE_ERROR
|| new_state == STATE_FATALERROR)
ok = 1;
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor 2017-11-23 19:25:58.000000000 +0100 --- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor 2017-11-23 19:25:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c 2018-07-17 19:15:43.933827112 +0200 +++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c 2020-04-17 16:29:59.258218015 +0200
@@ -141,6 +141,29 @@ global_init (void) @@ -141,6 +141,34 @@ global_init (void)
} }
@ -202,25 +13,30 @@ diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c
+{ +{
+ int rv; + int rv;
+ +
+ /* We always need the FSM lock to be functional. */
+ _gcry_initialize_fsm_lock ();
+
+ rv = access (FIPS_MODULE_PATH, F_OK); + rv = access (FIPS_MODULE_PATH, F_OK);
+ if (rv < 0 && errno != ENOENT) + if (rv < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
+ rv = 0; + rv = 0;
+ +
+ if (!rv) + if (!rv)
+ { + {
+ /* We run the integrity check at this point. The remaining + int no_secmem_save;
+ selftests are run before use of the library by application. */ +
+ /* it should be always 0 at this point but let's keep on the safe side */
+ no_secmem_save = no_secure_memory;
+ no_secure_memory = 1;
+ /* force selftests */
+ global_init();
+ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (0); + _gcry_fips_run_selftests (0);
+ if (!fips_mode())
+ _gcry_random_close_fds ();
+ no_secure_memory = no_secmem_save;
+ } + }
+} +}
+ +
/* This function is called by the macro fips_is_operational and makes /* This function is called by the macro fips_is_operational and makes
sure that the minimal initialization has been done. This is far sure that the minimal initialization has been done. This is far
from a perfect solution and hides problems with an improper from a perfect solution and hides problems with an improper
@@ -671,8 +694,7 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd, @@ -671,8 +699,7 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd,
case GCRYCTL_FIPS_MODE_P: case GCRYCTL_FIPS_MODE_P:
if (fips_mode () if (fips_mode ()
@ -230,7 +46,7 @@ diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c
rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Used as TRUE value */ rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Used as TRUE value */
break; break;
@@ -749,9 +771,9 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd, @@ -749,9 +776,9 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd,
break; break;
case GCRYCTL_SET_ENFORCED_FIPS_FLAG: case GCRYCTL_SET_ENFORCED_FIPS_FLAG:
@ -242,15 +58,3 @@ diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c
_gcry_set_preferred_rng_type (0); _gcry_set_preferred_rng_type (0);
_gcry_set_enforced_fips_mode (); _gcry_set_enforced_fips_mode ();
} }
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h.fips-ctor 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h 2018-07-12 13:24:54.089403030 +0200
@@ -422,6 +422,8 @@ gpg_err_code_t _gcry_sexp_vextract_param
/*-- fips.c --*/
+void _gcry_initialize_fsm_lock (void);
+
void _gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force);
int _gcry_fips_mode (void);

12
libgcrypt-1.8.3-md-fips-enforce.patch
View File

@ -1,12 +1,18 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-enforce libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-enforce libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-enforce 2018-11-01 15:40:36.051865535 +0100 --- libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-enforce 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c 2019-06-03 11:50:21.435401753 +0200 +++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c 2020-04-17 15:07:31.364945130 +0200
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ md_enable (gcry_md_hd_t hd, int algorith @@ -409,13 +409,10 @@ md_enable (gcry_md_hd_t hd, int algorith
} }
- if (!err && algorithm == GCRY_MD_MD5 && fips_mode ()) - if (!err && algorithm == GCRY_MD_MD5 && fips_mode ())
+ if (!err && !spec->flags.fips && fips_mode ()) + if (!err && !spec->flags.fips && fips_mode ())
{ {
- _gcry_inactivate_fips_mode ("MD5 used");
if (_gcry_enforced_fips_mode () ) if (_gcry_enforced_fips_mode () )
{ {
- /* We should never get to here because we do not register
- MD5 in enforced fips mode. But better throw an error. */
err = GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
}
}

139
libgcrypt-1.8.5-fips-module.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c.fips-module libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c.fips-module 2020-04-20 19:07:45.924919645 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/fips.c 2020-04-20 19:10:33.690722470 +0200
@@ -35,10 +35,6 @@
#include "hmac256.h"
-/* The name of the file used to force libgcrypt into fips mode. */
-#define FIPS_FORCE_FILE "/etc/gcrypt/fips_enabled"
-
-
/* The states of the finite state machine used in fips mode. */
enum module_states
{
@@ -122,54 +118,6 @@ _gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force)
goto leave;
}
- /* For testing the system it is useful to override the system
- provided detection of the FIPS mode and force FIPS mode using a
- file. The filename is hardwired so that there won't be any
- confusion on whether /etc/gcrypt/ or /usr/local/etc/gcrypt/ is
- actually used. The file itself may be empty. */
- if ( !access (FIPS_FORCE_FILE, F_OK) )
- {
- gcry_assert (!no_fips_mode_required);
- goto leave;
- }
-
- /* Checking based on /proc file properties. */
- {
- static const char procfname[] = "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled";
- FILE *fp;
- int saved_errno;
-
- fp = fopen (procfname, "r");
- if (fp)
- {
- char line[256];
-
- if (fgets (line, sizeof line, fp) && atoi (line))
- {
- /* System is in fips mode. */
- fclose (fp);
- gcry_assert (!no_fips_mode_required);
- goto leave;
- }
- fclose (fp);
- }
- else if ((saved_errno = errno) != ENOENT
- && saved_errno != EACCES
- && !access ("/proc/version", F_OK) )
- {
- /* Problem reading the fips file despite that we have the proc
- file system. We better stop right away. */
- log_info ("FATAL: error reading `%s' in libgcrypt: %s\n",
- procfname, strerror (saved_errno));
-#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG
- syslog (LOG_USER|LOG_ERR, "Libgcrypt error: "
- "reading `%s' failed: %s - abort",
- procfname, strerror (saved_errno));
-#endif /*HAVE_SYSLOG*/
- abort ();
- }
- }
-
/* Fips not not requested, set flag. */
no_fips_mode_required = 1;
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h.fips-module libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h.fips-module 2020-04-20 19:07:45.918919759 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/g10lib.h 2020-04-20 19:11:05.003125740 +0200
@@ -422,6 +422,9 @@ gpg_err_code_t _gcry_sexp_vextract_param
/*-- fips.c --*/
+/* The name of the file used to force libgcrypt into fips mode. */
+#define FIPS_FORCE_FILE "/etc/gcrypt/fips_enabled"
+
void _gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force);
int _gcry_fips_mode (void);
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c.fips-module libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c.fips-module 2020-04-20 19:07:45.919919741 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.5/src/global.c 2020-04-20 19:07:45.950919149 +0200
@@ -160,6 +160,53 @@ void __attribute__ ((constructor)) _gcry
rv = access (FIPS_MODULE_PATH, F_OK);
if (rv < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
rv = 0;
+
+ /* For testing the system it is useful to override the system
+ provided detection of the FIPS mode and force FIPS mode using a
+ file. The filename is hardwired so that there won't be any
+ confusion on whether /etc/gcrypt/ or /usr/local/etc/gcrypt/ is
+ actually used. The file itself may be empty. */
+ if ( !access (FIPS_FORCE_FILE, F_OK) )
+ {
+ rv = 0;
+ force_fips_mode = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Checking based on /proc file properties. */
+ {
+ static const char procfname[] = "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled";
+ FILE *fp;
+ int saved_errno;
+
+ fp = fopen (procfname, "r");
+ if (fp)
+ {
+ char line[256];
+
+ if (fgets (line, sizeof line, fp) && atoi (line))
+ {
+ /* System is in fips mode. */
+ rv = 0;
+ force_fips_mode = 1;
+ }
+ fclose (fp);
+ }
+ else if ((saved_errno = errno) != ENOENT
+ && saved_errno != EACCES
+ && !access ("/proc/version", F_OK) )
+ {
+ /* Problem reading the fips file despite that we have the proc
+ file system. We better stop right away. */
+ log_info ("FATAL: error reading `%s' in libgcrypt: %s\n",
+ procfname, strerror (saved_errno));
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG
+ syslog (LOG_USER|LOG_ERR, "Libgcrypt error: "
+ "reading `%s' failed: %s - abort",
+ procfname, strerror (saved_errno));
+#endif /*HAVE_SYSLOG*/
+ abort ();
+ }
+ }
if (!rv)
{

11
libgcrypt.spec
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
Name: libgcrypt Name: libgcrypt
Version: 1.8.5 Version: 1.8.5
Release: 3%{?dist} Release: 4%{?dist}
URL: http://www.gnupg.org/ URL: http://www.gnupg.org/
Source0: libgcrypt-%{version}-hobbled.tar.xz Source0: libgcrypt-%{version}-hobbled.tar.xz
# The original libgcrypt sources now contain potentially patented ECC # The original libgcrypt sources now contain potentially patented ECC
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Patch18: libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-ctor.patch
# Block some operations if in FIPS non-operational state # Block some operations if in FIPS non-operational state
Patch22: libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-reqs.patch Patch22: libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-reqs.patch
# Do not try to open /dev/urandom if getrandom() works # Do not try to open /dev/urandom if getrandom() works
Patch24: libgcrypt-1.8.4-getrandom.patch Patch24: libgcrypt-1.8.5-getrandom.patch
# CMAC selftest for FIPS POST # CMAC selftest for FIPS POST
Patch25: libgcrypt-1.8.3-cmac-selftest.patch Patch25: libgcrypt-1.8.3-cmac-selftest.patch
# Continuous FIPS entropy test # Continuous FIPS entropy test
@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ Patch27: libgcrypt-1.8.3-md-fips-enforce.patch
Patch28: libgcrypt-1.8.5-intel-cet.patch Patch28: libgcrypt-1.8.5-intel-cet.patch
# Fix build on ARMv7 # Fix build on ARMv7
Patch29: libgcrypt-1.8.5-build.patch Patch29: libgcrypt-1.8.5-build.patch
# FIPS module is redefined a little bit (implicit by kernel FIPS mode)
Patch30: libgcrypt-1.8.5-fips-module.patch
%define gcrylibdir %{_libdir} %define gcrylibdir %{_libdir}
@ -95,6 +97,7 @@ applications using libgcrypt.
%patch27 -p1 -b .fips-enforce %patch27 -p1 -b .fips-enforce
%patch28 -p1 -b .intel-cet %patch28 -p1 -b .intel-cet
%patch29 -p1 -b .build %patch29 -p1 -b .build
%patch30 -p1 -b .fips-module
cp %{SOURCE4} cipher/ cp %{SOURCE4} cipher/
cp %{SOURCE5} %{SOURCE6} tests/ cp %{SOURCE5} %{SOURCE6} tests/
@ -194,6 +197,10 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/gcrypt/random.conf
%license COPYING %license COPYING
%changelog %changelog
* Mon Apr 20 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-4
- FIPS selftest is run directly from the constructor
- FIPS module is implicit with kernel FIPS flag
* Thu Jan 30 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-3 * Thu Jan 30 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.5-3
- fix the build on ARMv7 - fix the build on ARMv7