Improve situation with libgcrypt blocking when getting kernel entropy on boot
make only_urandom a default in non-presence of configuration file run the full FIPS selftests only when the library is called from application
This commit is contained in:
Tomas Mraz
parent
1aa209e7a1
commit
6b6d4b0dbd
@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
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diff -up libgcrypt-1.6.2/cipher/md.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.6.2/cipher/md.c
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--- libgcrypt-1.6.2/cipher/md.c.fips-ctor 2014-08-21 14:50:39.000000000 +0200
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+++ libgcrypt-1.6.2/cipher/md.c 2015-02-25 13:57:21.175704866 +0100
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@@ -413,11 +413,8 @@ md_enable (gcry_md_hd_t hd, int algorith
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if (!err && algorithm == GCRY_MD_MD5 && fips_mode ())
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{
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- _gcry_inactivate_fips_mode ("MD5 used");
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if (_gcry_enforced_fips_mode () )
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{
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- /* We should never get to here because we do not register
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- MD5 in enforced fips mode. But better throw an error. */
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err = GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
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}
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}
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diff -up libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/global.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/global.c
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--- libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/global.c.fips-ctor 2015-02-25 13:57:21.174704842 +0100
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+++ libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/global.c 2015-02-25 14:03:07.066864208 +0100
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@@ -132,6 +132,36 @@ global_init (void)
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}
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+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE_PATH
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+#define FIPS_MODULE_PATH "/etc/system-fips"
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+#endif
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+
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+void __attribute__ ((constructor)) _gcry_global_constructor (void)
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+{
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+ int rv;
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+
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+ rv = access (FIPS_MODULE_PATH, F_OK);
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+ if (rv < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
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+ rv = 0;
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+
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+ if (!rv)
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+ {
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+ int no_secmem_save;
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+
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+ /* it should be always 0 at this point but let's keep on the safe side */
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+ no_secmem_save = no_secure_memory;
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+ no_secure_memory = 1;
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+ /* force selftests */
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+ global_init ();
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+ if (fips_mode ())
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+ _gcry_random_initialize (1);
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+ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (0);
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+ if (!fips_mode())
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+ _gcry_random_close_fds ();
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+ no_secure_memory = no_secmem_save;
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+ }
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+}
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+
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/* This function is called by the macro fips_is_operational and makes
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sure that the minimal initialization has been done. This is far
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from a perfect solution and hides problems with an improper
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@@ -542,8 +572,7 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd,
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case GCRYCTL_FIPS_MODE_P:
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if (fips_mode ()
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- && !_gcry_is_fips_mode_inactive ()
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- && !no_secure_memory)
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+ && !_gcry_is_fips_mode_inactive ())
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rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Used as TRUE value */
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break;
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@@ -635,7 +664,7 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd,
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break;
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case GCRYCTL_SET_ENFORCED_FIPS_FLAG:
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- if (!any_init_done)
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+ if (fips_mode ())
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{
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/* Not yet initialized at all. Set the enforced fips mode flag */
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_gcry_set_preferred_rng_type (0);
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253
libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-ctor.patch
Normal file
253
libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-ctor.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
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diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c
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--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-ctor 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
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+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c 2018-07-12 13:02:49.599423390 +0200
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@@ -411,11 +411,8 @@ md_enable (gcry_md_hd_t hd, int algorith
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if (!err && algorithm == GCRY_MD_MD5 && fips_mode ())
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{
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- _gcry_inactivate_fips_mode ("MD5 used");
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if (_gcry_enforced_fips_mode () )
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{
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- /* We should never get to here because we do not register
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- MD5 in enforced fips mode. But better throw an error. */
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err = GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
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}
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}
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diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c
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--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c.fips-ctor 2018-07-12 13:02:49.589423158 +0200
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+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c 2018-07-12 13:08:45.955663998 +0200
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@@ -91,6 +91,31 @@ static void fips_new_state (enum module_
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+/* Initialize the FSM lock - this function may only
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+ be called once and is intended to be run from the library
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+ constructor */
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+void
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+_gcry_initialize_fsm_lock (void)
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+{
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+ gpg_error_t err;
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+ /* Intitialize the lock to protect the FSM. */
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+ err = gpgrt_lock_init (&fsm_lock);
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+ if (err)
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+ {
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+ /* If that fails we can't do anything but abort the
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+ process. We need to use log_info so that the FSM won't
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+ get involved. */
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+ log_info ("FATAL: failed to create the FSM lock in libgcrypt: %s\n",
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+ gpg_strerror (err));
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+#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG
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+ syslog (LOG_USER|LOG_ERR, "Libgcrypt error: "
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+ "creating FSM lock failed: %s - abort",
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+ gpg_strerror (err));
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+#endif /*HAVE_SYSLOG*/
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+ abort ();
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+ }
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+}
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+
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/* Check whether the OS is in FIPS mode and record that in a module
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local variable. If FORCE is passed as true, fips mode will be
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enabled anyway. Note: This function is not thread-safe and should
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@@ -100,7 +125,6 @@ void
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_gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force)
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{
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static int done;
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- gpg_error_t err;
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/* Make sure we are not accidentally called twice. */
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if (done)
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@@ -179,24 +203,6 @@ _gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force)
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/* Yes, we are in FIPS mode. */
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FILE *fp;
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- /* Intitialize the lock to protect the FSM. */
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- err = gpgrt_lock_init (&fsm_lock);
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- if (err)
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- {
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- /* If that fails we can't do anything but abort the
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- process. We need to use log_info so that the FSM won't
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- get involved. */
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- log_info ("FATAL: failed to create the FSM lock in libgcrypt: %s\n",
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- gpg_strerror (err));
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-#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG
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- syslog (LOG_USER|LOG_ERR, "Libgcrypt error: "
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- "creating FSM lock failed: %s - abort",
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- gpg_strerror (err));
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-#endif /*HAVE_SYSLOG*/
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- abort ();
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- }
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-
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-
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/* If the FIPS force files exists, is readable and has a number
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!= 0 on its first line, we enable the enforced fips mode. */
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fp = fopen (FIPS_FORCE_FILE, "r");
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@@ -359,16 +365,20 @@ _gcry_fips_is_operational (void)
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{
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int result;
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- if (!fips_mode ())
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+ lock_fsm ();
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+ if (current_state == STATE_POWERON && !fips_mode ())
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+ /* If we are at this point in POWERON state it means the FIPS
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+ module installation was not completed. (/etc/system-fips
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+ is not present.) */
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result = 1;
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else
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{
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- lock_fsm ();
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- if (current_state == STATE_INIT)
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+ if (current_state == STATE_INIT || current_state == STATE_SELFTEST)
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{
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- /* If we are still in the INIT state, we need to run the
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- selftests so that the FSM can eventually get into
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- operational state. Given that we would need a 2-phase
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+ /* If we are still in the INIT (or SELFTEST) state,
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+ we need to run (or finish) the selftests so
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+ that the FSM can eventually get into operational
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+ state. Given that we would need a 2-phase
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initialization of libgcrypt, but that has traditionally
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not been enforced, we use this on demand self-test
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checking. Note that Proper applications would do the
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@@ -384,9 +394,11 @@ _gcry_fips_is_operational (void)
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lock_fsm ();
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}
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- result = (current_state == STATE_OPERATIONAL);
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- unlock_fsm ();
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+ result = (current_state == STATE_OPERATIONAL) || !fips_mode ();
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+ /* We always run the selftests but ignore the result
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+ in non-FIPS mode. */
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}
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+ unlock_fsm ();
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return result;
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}
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@@ -709,9 +721,25 @@ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (int extended)
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{
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enum module_states result = STATE_ERROR;
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gcry_err_code_t ec = GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
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+ int in_poweron;
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- if (fips_mode ())
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- fips_new_state (STATE_SELFTEST);
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+ lock_fsm ();
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+ in_poweron = (current_state == STATE_POWERON);
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+ unlock_fsm ();
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+
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+ fips_new_state (STATE_SELFTEST);
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+
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+ /* We first check the integrity of the binary.
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+ If run from the constructor we are in POWERON state,
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+ we return and finish the remaining selftests before
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+ real use of the library. It will be in the POWERON
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+ state meanwhile. */
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+ if (in_poweron)
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+ if (check_binary_integrity ())
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+ goto leave;
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+
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+ if (in_poweron)
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+ return 0;
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if (run_cipher_selftests (extended))
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goto leave;
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@@ -730,18 +758,12 @@ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (int extended)
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if (run_pubkey_selftests (extended))
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goto leave;
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- /* Now check the integrity of the binary. We do this this after
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- having checked the HMAC code. */
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- if (check_binary_integrity ())
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- goto leave;
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-
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/* All selftests passed. */
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result = STATE_OPERATIONAL;
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ec = 0;
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leave:
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- if (fips_mode ())
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- fips_new_state (result);
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+ fips_new_state (result);
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return ec;
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}
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@@ -797,6 +819,7 @@ fips_new_state (enum module_states new_s
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{
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case STATE_POWERON:
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if (new_state == STATE_INIT
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+ || new_state == STATE_SELFTEST
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|| new_state == STATE_ERROR
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|| new_state == STATE_FATALERROR)
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ok = 1;
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@@ -811,6 +834,8 @@ fips_new_state (enum module_states new_s
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case STATE_SELFTEST:
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if (new_state == STATE_OPERATIONAL
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+ || new_state == STATE_INIT
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+ || new_state == STATE_SELFTEST
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|| new_state == STATE_ERROR
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|| new_state == STATE_FATALERROR)
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ok = 1;
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diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c
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--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor 2017-11-23 19:25:58.000000000 +0100
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+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c 2018-07-12 13:02:49.599423390 +0200
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@@ -141,6 +141,29 @@ global_init (void)
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}
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+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE_PATH
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+#define FIPS_MODULE_PATH "/etc/system-fips"
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+#endif
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+
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+void __attribute__ ((constructor)) _gcry_global_constructor (void)
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+{
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+ int rv;
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+
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+ /* We always need the FSM lock to be functional. */
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+ _gcry_initialize_fsm_lock ();
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+
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+ rv = access (FIPS_MODULE_PATH, F_OK);
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+ if (rv < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
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+ rv = 0;
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+
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+ if (!rv)
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+ {
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+ /* We run the integrity check at this point. The remaining
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+ selftests are run before use of the library by application. */
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+ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (0);
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+ }
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+}
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+
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/* This function is called by the macro fips_is_operational and makes
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sure that the minimal initialization has been done. This is far
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from a perfect solution and hides problems with an improper
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@@ -671,8 +694,7 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd,
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case GCRYCTL_FIPS_MODE_P:
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if (fips_mode ()
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- && !_gcry_is_fips_mode_inactive ()
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- && !no_secure_memory)
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+ && !_gcry_is_fips_mode_inactive ())
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rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Used as TRUE value */
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break;
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@@ -749,7 +771,7 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd,
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break;
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case GCRYCTL_SET_ENFORCED_FIPS_FLAG:
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- if (!any_init_done)
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+ if (fips_mode ())
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{
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/* Not yet initialized at all. Set the enforced fips mode flag */
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_gcry_set_preferred_rng_type (0);
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diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h
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--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h.fips-ctor 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
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+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h 2018-07-12 13:02:49.600423413 +0200
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@@ -422,6 +422,8 @@ gpg_err_code_t _gcry_sexp_vextract_param
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/*-- fips.c --*/
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+void _gcry_initialize_fsm_lock (void);
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+
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void _gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force);
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int _gcry_fips_mode (void);
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@ -1,6 +1,20 @@
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diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/random-csprng.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/random-csprng.c
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diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random.c
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--- libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/random-csprng.c.getrandom 2017-08-27 09:05:36.000000000 +0200
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--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random.c.getrandom 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
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+++ libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/random-csprng.c 2017-12-06 09:04:27.824175303 +0100
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+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random.c 2018-07-10 15:38:34.303855808 +0200
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@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ _gcry_random_read_conf (void)
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unsigned int result = 0;
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||||||
|
fp = fopen (fname, "r");
|
||||||
|
- if (!fp)
|
||||||
|
- return result;
|
||||||
|
+ if (!fp) /* We make only_urandom the default. */
|
||||||
|
+ return RANDOM_CONF_ONLY_URANDOM;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for (;;)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-csprng.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-csprng.c
|
||||||
|
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-csprng.c.getrandom 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
|
||||||
|
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-csprng.c 2018-06-14 16:31:04.731179208 +0200
|
||||||
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
|
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
|
||||||
#ifdef __MINGW32__
|
#ifdef __MINGW32__
|
||||||
#include <process.h>
|
#include <process.h>
|
||||||
@ -35,9 +49,9 @@ diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/random-csprng.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.1/random
|
|||||||
if ( !access (NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM, R_OK)
|
if ( !access (NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM, R_OK)
|
||||||
&& !access (NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM, R_OK))
|
&& !access (NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM, R_OK))
|
||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/rndlinux.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/rndlinux.c
|
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/rndlinux.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/rndlinux.c
|
||||||
--- libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/rndlinux.c.getrandom 2017-09-05 14:34:28.003872675 +0200
|
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/rndlinux.c.getrandom 2018-06-14 16:31:04.722178971 +0200
|
||||||
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/rndlinux.c 2018-02-06 16:31:56.047481806 +0100
|
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/rndlinux.c 2018-07-10 15:55:03.301075155 +0200
|
||||||
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
|
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
|
||||||
#include <poll.h>
|
#include <poll.h>
|
||||||
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL)
|
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL)
|
||||||
@ -46,7 +60,7 @@ diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/rndlinux.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/rndl
|
|||||||
#endif
|
#endif
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#include "types.h"
|
#include "types.h"
|
||||||
@@ -204,6 +205,16 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
|
@@ -204,6 +205,18 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
|
||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
if (fd_urandom == -1)
|
if (fd_urandom == -1)
|
||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
@ -57,22 +71,24 @@ diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/rndlinux.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.1/random/rndl
|
|||||||
+ ret = syscall (__NR_getrandom,
|
+ ret = syscall (__NR_getrandom,
|
||||||
+ (void*)buffer, (size_t)1, (unsigned int)GRND_NONBLOCK);
|
+ (void*)buffer, (size_t)1, (unsigned int)GRND_NONBLOCK);
|
||||||
+ _gcry_post_syscall ();
|
+ _gcry_post_syscall ();
|
||||||
+ if (ret == -1 && errno == ENOSYS)
|
+ if (ret > -1 || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
|
||||||
|
+ fd_urandom = -2;
|
||||||
|
+ else
|
||||||
+ /* The syscall is not supported - fallback to /dev/urandom. */
|
+ /* The syscall is not supported - fallback to /dev/urandom. */
|
||||||
+#endif
|
+#endif
|
||||||
fd_urandom = open_device (NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM, (ever_opened & 2));
|
fd_urandom = open_device (NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM, (ever_opened & 2));
|
||||||
ever_opened |= 2;
|
ever_opened |= 2;
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -230,7 +241,7 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
|
@@ -230,7 +243,7 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
|
||||||
* syscall and not a new device and thus we are not able to use
|
* syscall and not a new device and thus we are not able to use
|
||||||
* select(2) to have a timeout. */
|
* select(2) to have a timeout. */
|
||||||
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
|
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
|
||||||
- if (fd == fd_urandom)
|
- if (fd == fd_urandom)
|
||||||
+ if (fd == -1)
|
+ if (fd == -2)
|
||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
long ret;
|
long ret;
|
||||||
size_t nbytes;
|
size_t nbytes;
|
||||||
@@ -246,9 +257,7 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
|
@@ -246,9 +259,7 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
|
||||||
_gcry_post_syscall ();
|
_gcry_post_syscall ();
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
|
while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
|
||||||
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||||||
Name: libgcrypt
|
Name: libgcrypt
|
||||||
Version: 1.8.3
|
Version: 1.8.3
|
||||||
Release: 1%{?dist}
|
Release: 2%{?dist}
|
||||||
URL: http://www.gnupg.org/
|
URL: http://www.gnupg.org/
|
||||||
Source0: libgcrypt-%{version}-hobbled.tar.xz
|
Source0: libgcrypt-%{version}-hobbled.tar.xz
|
||||||
# The original libgcrypt sources now contain potentially patented ECC
|
# The original libgcrypt sources now contain potentially patented ECC
|
||||||
@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ Patch13: libgcrypt-1.6.1-mpicoder-gccopt.patch
|
|||||||
# fix tests to work with approved ECC
|
# fix tests to work with approved ECC
|
||||||
Patch14: libgcrypt-1.7.3-ecc-test-fix.patch
|
Patch14: libgcrypt-1.7.3-ecc-test-fix.patch
|
||||||
# Run the FIPS mode initialization in the shared library constructor
|
# Run the FIPS mode initialization in the shared library constructor
|
||||||
Patch18: libgcrypt-1.6.2-fips-ctor.patch
|
Patch18: libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-ctor.patch
|
||||||
# Block some operations if in FIPS non-operational state
|
# Block some operations if in FIPS non-operational state
|
||||||
Patch22: libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-reqs.patch
|
Patch22: libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-reqs.patch
|
||||||
# Do not try to open /dev/urandom if getrandom() works
|
# Do not try to open /dev/urandom if getrandom() works
|
||||||
Patch24: libgcrypt-1.8.1-getrandom.patch
|
Patch24: libgcrypt-1.8.3-getrandom.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%define gcrylibdir %{_libdir}
|
%define gcrylibdir %{_libdir}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -191,6 +191,11 @@ exit 0
|
|||||||
%license COPYING
|
%license COPYING
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%changelog
|
%changelog
|
||||||
|
* Thu Jul 12 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.3-2
|
||||||
|
- make only_urandom a default in non-presence of configuration file
|
||||||
|
- run the full FIPS selftests only when the library is called from
|
||||||
|
application
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Thu Jun 14 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.3-1
|
* Thu Jun 14 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.8.3-1
|
||||||
- new upstream version 1.8.3
|
- new upstream version 1.8.3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user