diff --git a/libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-enttest.patch b/libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-enttest.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 34e54bf..0000000
--- a/libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-enttest.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-drbg.c.fips-enttest libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-drbg.c
---- libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-drbg.c.fips-enttest	2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
-+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-drbg.c	2019-06-24 10:04:23.219547141 +0200
-@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ struct drbg_state_s
-   gcry_cipher_hd_t ctr_handle;	/* CTR mode cipher handle */
-   int seeded:1;			/* DRBG fully seeded? */
-   int pr:1;			/* Prediction resistance enabled? */
-+  int ent_primed:1;             /* Previous entropy data primed? */
-   /* Taken from libgcrypt ANSI X9.31 DRNG: We need to keep track of the
-    * process which did the initialization so that we can detect a fork.
-    * The volatile modifier is required so that the compiler does not
-@@ -324,6 +325,7 @@ struct drbg_state_s
-   pid_t seed_init_pid;
-   const struct drbg_state_ops_s *d_ops;
-   const struct drbg_core_s *core;
-+  unsigned char ent_hash[64];	/* Hash of previous entropy data */
-   struct drbg_test_data_s *test_data;
- };
- 
-@@ -610,11 +612,13 @@ drbg_get_entropy (drbg_state_t drbg, uns
- 		       size_t len)
- {
-   int rc = 0;
-+  unsigned char newhash[64];
- 
-   /* Perform testing as defined in 11.3.2 */
-   if (drbg->test_data && drbg->test_data->fail_seed_source)
-     return -1;
- 
-+redo:
-   read_cb_buffer = buffer;
-   read_cb_size = len;
-   read_cb_len = 0;
-@@ -634,6 +638,27 @@ drbg_get_entropy (drbg_state_t drbg, uns
- #else
-   rc = -1;
- #endif
-+
-+  /* to avoid storing the actual entropy obtained for indefinite
-+     time, we just store the SHA-512 hash of the entropy gathered
-+   */
-+  _gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA512, newhash, buffer, len);
-+
-+  if (!drbg->ent_primed)
-+    {
-+      memcpy (drbg->ent_hash, newhash, sizeof (drbg->ent_hash));
-+      drbg->ent_primed = 1;
-+      goto redo;
-+    }
-+
-+  if (memcmp (newhash, drbg->ent_hash, sizeof (drbg->ent_hash)) == 0)
-+    {
-+      fips_signal_error ("Entropy source failed the continuous test");
-+      return -1;  /* continuous entropy test failed */
-+    }
-+
-+  memcpy (drbg->ent_hash, newhash, sizeof (drbg->ent_hash));
-+
-   return rc;
- }
- 
-@@ -1341,26 +1366,38 @@ drbg_seed (drbg_state_t drbg, drbg_strin
-     }
-   else
-     {
-+      int nonce = 0;
-       /* Gather entropy equal to the security strength of the DRBG.
-        * With a derivation function, a nonce is required in addition
-        * to the entropy. A nonce must be at least 1/2 of the security
-        * strength of the DRBG in size. Thus, entropy * nonce is 3/2
-        * of the strength. The consideration of a nonce is only
--       * applicable during initial seeding. */
-+       * applicable during initial seeding.
-+       * To avoid pulling different length of data from entropy
-+       * source, we use 2 * strength for initial seeding. */
-       entropylen = drbg_sec_strength (drbg->core->flags);
-       if (!entropylen)
- 	return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
-       if (0 == reseed)
--	/* make sure we round up strength/2 in
--	 * case it is not divisible by 2 */
--	entropylen = ((entropylen + 1) / 2) * 3;
-+        {
-+	  nonce = 1;
-+        }
-       dbg (("DRBG: (re)seeding with %lu bytes of entropy\n", entropylen));
--      entropy = xcalloc_secure (1, entropylen);
-+      entropy = xcalloc_secure (nonce + 1, entropylen);
-       if (!entropy)
- 	return GPG_ERR_ENOMEM;
-       ret = drbg_get_entropy (drbg, entropy, entropylen);
-       if (ret)
- 	goto out;
-+      if (nonce)
-+        {
-+          ret = drbg_get_entropy (drbg, entropy + entropylen, entropylen);
-+          if (ret)
-+	    goto out;
-+	  /* make sure we round up strength/2 in
-+	   * case it is not divisible by 2 */
-+ 	  entropylen = 2 * entropylen;
-+        }
-       drbg_string_fill (&data1, entropy, entropylen);
-     }
- 
-@@ -1597,6 +1634,7 @@ drbg_instantiate (drbg_state_t drbg,
-   drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
-   drbg->pr = pr;
-   drbg->seeded = 0;
-+  drbg->ent_primed = 0;
-   if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC)
-     drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hmac_ops;
-   else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HASH_MASK)
diff --git a/libgcrypt.spec b/libgcrypt.spec
index a90a8ba..f09a85d 100644
--- a/libgcrypt.spec
+++ b/libgcrypt.spec
@@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ Patch13: libgcrypt-1.6.1-mpicoder-gccopt.patch
 Patch18: libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-ctor.patch
 # Do not try to open /dev/urandom if getrandom() works
 Patch24: libgcrypt-1.8.5-getrandom.patch
-# Continuous FIPS entropy test
-Patch26: libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-enttest.patch
 # Disable non-approved FIPS hashes in the enforced FIPS mode
 Patch27: libgcrypt-1.8.3-md-fips-enforce.patch
 # Missing Intel CET support in the library (#1954049)
@@ -89,7 +87,6 @@ applications using libgcrypt.
 %patch13 -p1 -b .gccopt
 %patch18 -p1 -b .fips-ctor
 %patch24 -p1 -b .getrandom
-%patch26 -p1 -b .fips-enttest
 %patch27 -p1 -b .fips-enforce
 %patch28 -p1 -b .intel-cet
 %patch30 -p1 -b .fips-module