import UBI libcap-2.69-7.el10_1.1
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156
0003-fix-cve-2026-4878-toctou-cap-set-file.patch
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156
0003-fix-cve-2026-4878-toctou-cap-set-file.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
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From 286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
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Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 07:38:05 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH] Address a potential TOCTOU race condition in cap_set_file().
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This issue was researched and reported by Ali Raza (@locus-x64). It
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has been assigned CVE-2026-4878.
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The finding is that while cap_set_file() checks if a file is a regular
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file before applying or removing a capability attribute, a small
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window existed after that check when the filepath could be overwritten
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either with new content or a symlink to some other file. To do this
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would imply that the caller of cap_set_file() was directing it to a
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directory over which a local attacker has write access, and performed
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the operation frequently enough that an attacker had a non-negligible
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chance of exploiting the race condition. The code now locks onto the
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intended file, eliminating the race condition.
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Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
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---
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libcap/cap_file.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
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progs/quicktest.sh | 14 +++++++++-
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2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/libcap/cap_file.c b/libcap/cap_file.c
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index 0bc07f7..f02bf9f 100644
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--- a/libcap/cap_file.c
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+++ b/libcap/cap_file.c
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@@ -8,8 +8,13 @@
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#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
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#endif
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+#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
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+#define _GNU_SOURCE
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+#endif
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+
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <byteswap.h>
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+#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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@@ -322,26 +327,70 @@ int cap_set_file(const char *filename, cap_t cap_d)
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struct vfs_ns_cap_data rawvfscap;
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int sizeofcaps;
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struct stat buf;
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+ char fdpath[64];
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+ int fd, ret;
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+
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+ _cap_debug("setting filename capabilities");
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+ fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW);
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+ if (fd >= 0) {
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+ ret = cap_set_fd(fd, cap_d);
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+ close(fd);
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+ return ret;
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+ }
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- if (lstat(filename, &buf) != 0) {
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- _cap_debug("unable to stat file [%s]", filename);
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+ /*
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+ * Attempting to set a file capability on a file the process can't
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+ * read the content of. This is considered a non-standard use case
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+ * and the following (slower) code is complicated because it is
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+ * trying to avoid a TOCTOU race condition.
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+ */
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+
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+ fd = open(filename, O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW);
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+ if (fd < 0) {
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+ _cap_debug("cannot find file at path [%s]", filename);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+ if (fstat(fd, &buf) != 0) {
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+ _cap_debug("unable to stat file [%s] descriptor %d",
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+ filename, fd);
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+ close(fd);
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return -1;
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}
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if (S_ISLNK(buf.st_mode) || !S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) {
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- _cap_debug("file [%s] is not a regular file", filename);
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+ _cap_debug("file [%s] descriptor %d for non-regular file",
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+ filename, fd);
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+ close(fd);
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errno = EINVAL;
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return -1;
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}
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- if (cap_d == NULL) {
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- _cap_debug("removing filename capabilities");
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- return removexattr(filename, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
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+ /*
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+ * While the fd remains open, this named file is locked to the
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+ * origin regular file. The size of the fdpath variable is
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+ * sufficient to support a 160+ bit number.
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+ */
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+ if (snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd)
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+ >= sizeof(fdpath)) {
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+ _cap_debug("file descriptor too large %d", fd);
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+ errno = EINVAL;
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+ ret = -1;
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+
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+ } else if (cap_d == NULL) {
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+ _cap_debug("dropping file caps on [%s] via [%s]",
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+ filename, fdpath);
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+ ret = removexattr(fdpath, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
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+
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} else if (_fcaps_save(&rawvfscap, cap_d, &sizeofcaps) != 0) {
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- return -1;
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- }
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+ _cap_debug("problem converting cap_d to vfscap format");
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+ ret = -1;
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- _cap_debug("setting filename capabilities");
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- return setxattr(filename, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &rawvfscap, sizeofcaps, 0);
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+ } else {
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+ _cap_debug("setting filename capabilities");
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+ ret = setxattr(fdpath, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &rawvfscap,
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+ sizeofcaps, 0);
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+ }
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+ close(fd);
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+ return ret;
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}
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/*
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diff --git a/progs/quicktest.sh b/progs/quicktest.sh
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index e6c48e6..5dc72f9 100755
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--- a/progs/quicktest.sh
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+++ b/progs/quicktest.sh
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@@ -148,7 +148,19 @@ pass_capsh --caps="cap_setpcap=p" --inh=cap_chown --current
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pass_capsh --strict --caps="cap_chown=p" --inh=cap_chown --current
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# change the way the capability is obtained (make it inheritable)
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+chmod 0000 ./privileged
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./setcap cap_setuid,cap_setgid=ei ./privileged
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+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
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+ echo "FAILED to set file capability"
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+ exit 1
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+fi
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+chmod 0755 ./privileged
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+ln -s privileged unprivileged
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+./setcap -r ./unprivileged
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+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
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+ echo "FAILED by removing a capability from a symlinked file"
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+ exit 1
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+fi
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# Note, the bounding set (edited with --drop) only limits p
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# capabilities, not i's.
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@@ -246,7 +258,7 @@ EOF
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pass_capsh --iab='!%cap_chown,^cap_setpcap,cap_setuid'
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fail_capsh --mode=PURE1E --iab='!%cap_chown,^cap_setuid'
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fi
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-/bin/rm -f ./privileged
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+/bin/rm -f ./privileged ./unprivileged
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echo "testing namespaced file caps"
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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Name: libcap
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Version: 2.69
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Release: 7%{?dist}
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Release: 7%{?dist}.1
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Summary: Library for getting and setting POSIX.1e capabilities
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URL: https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/
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License: BSD-3-Clause OR GPL-2.0-only
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@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ Source1: https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/lib
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Source2: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/docs/kernel/pgpkeys.git/plain/keys/29EE848AE2CCF3F4.asc
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Patch0: 0001-doc-document-pam_cap-and-its-conf.patch
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Patch1: 0002-doc-document-the-use-of-to-refer-to-all-users.patch
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# RHEL-169301 - CVE-2026-4878: TOCTOU race condition in cap_set_file()
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# Backport https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/commit/?id=286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596
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Patch2: 0003-fix-cve-2026-4878-toctou-cap-set-file.patch
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BuildRequires: pam-devel gcc
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BuildRequires: make
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@ -107,6 +110,10 @@ chmod +x %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/*.so.*
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%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/{libcap,libpsx}.pc
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%changelog
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* Tue Apr 21 2026 Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki <ansasaki@redhat.com> - 2.69-7.1
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- Fix TOCTOU race condition in cap_set_file() (CVE-2026-4878)
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Resolves: RHEL-169301
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* Tue Oct 29 2024 Troy Dawson <tdawson@redhat.com> - 2.69-7
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- Bump release for October 2024 mass rebuild:
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Resolves: RHEL-64018
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