libarchive/RHBZ#1378666.patch

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From e37b620fe8f14535d737e89a4dcabaed4517bf1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Kientzle <kientzle@acm.org>
Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2016 10:51:43 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Issue #767: Buffer overflow printing a filename
The safe_fprintf function attempts to ensure clean output for an
arbitrary sequence of bytes by doing a trial conversion of the
multibyte characters to wide characters -- if the resulting wide
character is printable then we pass through the corresponding bytes
unaltered, otherwise, we convert them to C-style ASCII escapes.
The stack trace in Issue #767 suggest that the 20-byte buffer
was getting overflowed trying to format a non-printable multibyte
character. This should only happen if there is a valid multibyte
character of more than 5 bytes that was unprintable. (Each byte
would get expanded to a four-charcter octal-style escape of the form
"\123" resulting in >20 characters for the >5 byte multibyte character.)
I've not been able to reproduce this, but have expanded the conversion
buffer to 128 bytes on the belief that no multibyte character set
has a single character of more than 32 bytes.
---
tar/util.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tar/util.c b/tar/util.c
index 9ff22f2..2b4aebe 100644
--- a/tar/util.c
+++ b/tar/util.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ safe_fprintf(FILE *f, const char *fmt, ...)
}
/* If our output buffer is full, dump it and keep going. */
- if (i > (sizeof(outbuff) - 20)) {
+ if (i > (sizeof(outbuff) - 128)) {
outbuff[i] = '\0';
fprintf(f, "%s", outbuff);
i = 0;