ksh/ksh-20120801-cve-2019-14868.patch

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diff --git a/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c b/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c
--- a/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c
+++ b/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c
@@ -513,21 +513,34 @@ Sfdouble_t sh_strnum(register const char *str, char** ptr, int mode)
char base=(shp->inarith?0:10), *last;
if(*str==0)
{
- if(ptr)
- *ptr = (char*)str;
- return(0);
- }
- errno = 0;
- d = strtonll(str,&last,&base,-1);
- if(*last || errno)
- {
- if(!last || *last!='.' || last[1]!='.')
- d = strval(shp,str,&last,arith,mode);
- if(!ptr && *last && mode>0)
- errormsg(SH_DICT,ERROR_exit(1),e_lexbadchar,*last,str);
+ d = 0.0;
+ last = (char*)str;
+ } else {
+ errno = 0;
+ d = strtonll(str,&last,&base,-1);
+ if (*last && !shp->inarith && sh_isstate(SH_INIT)) {
+ // This call is to handle "base#value" literals if we're importing untrusted env vars.
+ errno = 0;
+ d = strtonll(str, &last, NULL, -1);
+ }
+
+ if(*last || errno)
+ {
+ if (sh_isstate(SH_INIT)) {
+ // Initializing means importing untrusted env vars. Since the string does not appear
+ // to be a recognized numeric literal give up. We can't safely call strval() since
+ // that allows arbitrary expressions which would create a security vulnerability.
+ d = 0.0;
+ } else {
+ if(!last || *last!='.' || last[1]!='.')
+ d = strval(shp,str,&last,arith,mode);
+ if(!ptr && *last && mode>0)
+ errormsg(SH_DICT,ERROR_exit(1),e_lexbadchar,*last,str);
+ }
+ } else if (!d && *str=='-') {
+ d = -0.0;
+ }
}
- else if (!d && *str=='-')
- d = -0.0;
if(ptr)
*ptr = last;
return(d);