SOURCES/Add-PAC-full-checksums.patch

@@ -1,673 +0,0 @@
-From bf3e55bcd66c5d35fddadc94fd680bdd57508bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2022 03:05:23 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Add PAC full checksums
-
-A paper by Tom Tervoort noted that computing the PAC privsvr checksum
-over only the server checksum is vulnerable to collision attacks
-(CVE-2022-37967).  In response, Microsoft has added a second KDC
-checksum over the full contents of the PAC.  Generate and verify full
-KDC checksums in PACs for service tickets.  Update the t_pac.c ticket
-test case to use a ticket issued by a recent version of Active
-Directory (provided by Stefan Metzmacher).
-
-ticket: 9084 (new)
----
- doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst |   1 +
- src/include/krb5/krb5.hin        |   1 +
- src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c           |  92 +++++++++--------
- src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c      | 146 +++++++++++++++-----------
- src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c         | 171 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
- src/tests/t_authdata.py          |   5 +-
- 6 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 174 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst b/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst
-index c6ea088742..22ef2b2f42 100644
---- a/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst
-+++ b/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst
-@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ Public
-    KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM.rst
-    KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM.rst
-    KRB5_PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO.rst
-+   KRB5_PAC_FULL_CHECKSUM.rst
-    KRB5_PADATA_AFS3_SALT.rst
-    KRB5_PADATA_AP_REQ.rst
-    KRB5_PADATA_AS_CHECKSUM.rst
-diff --git a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-index 8e59628bd9..12a1d441b8 100644
---- a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-+++ b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-@@ -8187,6 +8187,7 @@ krb5_verify_authdata_kdc_issued(krb5_context context,
- #define KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM   16 /**< Ticket checksum */
- #define KRB5_PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO   17 /**< PAC attributes */
- #define KRB5_PAC_REQUESTOR         18 /**< PAC requestor SID */
-+#define KRB5_PAC_FULL_CHECKSUM     19 /**< KDC full checksum */
- 
- struct krb5_pac_data;
- /** PAC data structure to convey authorization information */
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-index 2f6ad4e1df..9c00178a28 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-@@ -500,7 +500,8 @@ zero_signature(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac, krb5_ui_4 type,
-     size_t i;
- 
-     assert(type == KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM ||
--           type == KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM);
-+           type == KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM ||
-+           type == KRB5_PAC_FULL_CHECKSUM);
-     assert(data->length >= pac->data.length);
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < pac->pac->cBuffers; i++) {
-@@ -567,17 +568,17 @@ verify_checksum(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac, uint32_t buffer_type,
- }
- 
- static krb5_error_code
--verify_server_checksum(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac,
--                       const krb5_keyblock *server)
-+verify_pac_checksums(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac,
-+                     krb5_boolean expect_full_checksum,
-+                     const krb5_keyblock *server, const krb5_keyblock *privsvr)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
--    krb5_data copy;             /* PAC with zeroed checksums */
-+    krb5_data copy, server_checksum;
- 
-+    /* Make a copy of the PAC with zeroed out server and privsvr checksums. */
-     ret = krb5int_copy_data_contents(context, &pac->data, &copy);
-     if (ret)
-         return ret;
--
--    /* Zero out both checksum buffers */
-     ret = zero_signature(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM, &copy);
-     if (ret)
-         goto cleanup;
-@@ -585,32 +586,46 @@ verify_server_checksum(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac,
-     if (ret)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
--    ret = verify_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM, server,
--                          KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, &copy);
-+    if (server != NULL) {
-+        /* Verify the server checksum over the PAC copy. */
-+        ret = verify_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM, server,
-+                              KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, &copy);
-+    }
- 
--cleanup:
--    free(copy.data);
--    return ret;
--}
-+    if (privsvr != NULL && expect_full_checksum) {
-+        /* Zero the full checksum buffer in the copy and verify the full
-+         * checksum over the copy with all three checksums zeroed. */
-+        ret = zero_signature(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_FULL_CHECKSUM, &copy);
-+        if (ret)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+        ret = verify_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_FULL_CHECKSUM, privsvr,
-+                              KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, &copy);
-+        if (ret)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+    }
- 
--static krb5_error_code
--verify_kdc_checksum(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac,
--                    const krb5_keyblock *privsvr)
--{
--    krb5_error_code ret;
--    krb5_data server_checksum;
-+    if (privsvr != NULL) {
-+        /* Verify the privsvr checksum over the server checksum. */
-+        ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM,
-+                                   &server_checksum);
-+        if (ret)
-+            return ret;
-+        if (server_checksum.length < PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH)
-+            return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
-+        server_checksum.data += PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-+        server_checksum.length -= PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
- 
--    ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM,
--                               &server_checksum);
--    if (ret)
--        return ret;
--    if (server_checksum.length < PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH)
--        return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
--    server_checksum.data += PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--    server_checksum.length -= PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-+        ret = verify_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM, privsvr,
-+                              KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, &server_checksum);
-+        if (ret)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    pac->verified = TRUE;
- 
--    return verify_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM, privsvr,
--                           KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, &server_checksum);
-+cleanup:
-+    free(copy.data);
-+    return ret;
- }
- 
- /* Per MS-PAC 2.8.3, tickets encrypted to TGS and password change principals
-@@ -638,6 +653,7 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
-     krb5_authdata **authdata, *orig, **ifrel = NULL, **recoded_ifrel = NULL;
-     uint8_t z = 0;
-     krb5_authdata zpac = { KV5M_AUTHDATA, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC, 1, &z };
-+    krb5_boolean is_service_tkt;
-     size_t i, j;
- 
-     *pac_out = NULL;
-@@ -679,7 +695,8 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
-     if (ret)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
--    if (privsvr != NULL && k5_pac_should_have_ticket_signature(server_princ)) {
-+    is_service_tkt = k5_pac_should_have_ticket_signature(server_princ);
-+    if (privsvr != NULL && is_service_tkt) {
-         /* To check the PAC ticket signatures, re-encode the ticket with the
-          * PAC contents replaced by a single zero. */
-         orig = ifrel[j];
-@@ -703,8 +720,9 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
-             goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
--    ret = krb5_pac_verify_ext(context, pac, enc_tkt->times.authtime, NULL,
--                              server, privsvr, FALSE);
-+    ret = verify_pac_checksums(context, pac, is_service_tkt, server, privsvr);
-+    if (ret)
-+        goto cleanup;
- 
-     *pac_out = pac;
-     pac = NULL;
-@@ -740,14 +758,8 @@ krb5_pac_verify_ext(krb5_context context,
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
- 
--    if (server != NULL) {
--        ret = verify_server_checksum(context, pac, server);
--        if (ret != 0)
--            return ret;
--    }
--
--    if (privsvr != NULL) {
--        ret = verify_kdc_checksum(context, pac, privsvr);
-+    if (server != NULL || privsvr != NULL) {
-+        ret = verify_pac_checksums(context, pac, FALSE, server, privsvr);
-         if (ret != 0)
-             return ret;
-     }
-@@ -759,8 +771,6 @@ krb5_pac_verify_ext(krb5_context context,
-             return ret;
-     }
- 
--    pac->verified = TRUE;
--
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c
-index 0f9581abbb..8ea61ac17b 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c
-@@ -187,26 +187,41 @@ k5_pac_encode_header(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac)
-     return 0;
- }
- 
--krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
--krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
--              krb5_const_principal principal, const krb5_keyblock *server_key,
--              const krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key, krb5_data *data)
-+/* Find the buffer of type buftype in pac and write within it a checksum of
-+ * type cksumtype over data.  Set *cksum_out to the checksum. */
-+static krb5_error_code
-+compute_pac_checksum(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, uint32_t buftype,
-+                     const krb5_keyblock *key, krb5_cksumtype cksumtype,
-+                     const krb5_data *data, krb5_data *cksum_out)
- {
--    return krb5_pac_sign_ext(context, pac, authtime, principal, server_key,
--                             privsvr_key, FALSE, data);
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_data buf;
-+    krb5_crypto_iov iov[2];
-+
-+    ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, buftype, &buf);
-+    if (ret)
-+        return ret;
-+
-+    assert(buf.length > PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH);
-+    *cksum_out = make_data(buf.data + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH,
-+                           buf.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH);
-+    iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    iov[0].data = *data;
-+    iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_CHECKSUM;
-+    iov[1].data = *cksum_out;
-+    return krb5_c_make_checksum_iov(context, cksumtype, key,
-+                                    KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, iov, 2);
- }
- 
--krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
--krb5_pac_sign_ext(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
--                  krb5_const_principal principal,
--                  const krb5_keyblock *server_key,
--                  const krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key, krb5_boolean with_realm,
--                  krb5_data *data)
-+static krb5_error_code
-+sign_pac(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
-+         krb5_const_principal principal, const krb5_keyblock *server_key,
-+         const krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key, krb5_boolean with_realm,
-+         krb5_boolean is_service_tkt, krb5_data *data)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
--    krb5_data server_cksum, privsvr_cksum;
-+    krb5_data full_cksum, server_cksum, privsvr_cksum;
-     krb5_cksumtype server_cksumtype, privsvr_cksumtype;
--    krb5_crypto_iov iov[2];
- 
-     data->length = 0;
-     data->data = NULL;
-@@ -214,67 +229,53 @@ krb5_pac_sign_ext(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
-     if (principal != NULL) {
-         ret = k5_insert_client_info(context, pac, authtime, principal,
-                                     with_realm);
--        if (ret != 0)
-+        if (ret)
-             return ret;
-     }
- 
--    /* Create zeroed buffers for both checksums */
-+    /* Create zeroed buffers for all checksums. */
-     ret = k5_insert_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM,
-                              server_key, &server_cksumtype);
--    if (ret != 0)
-+    if (ret)
-         return ret;
--
-     ret = k5_insert_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM,
-                              privsvr_key, &privsvr_cksumtype);
--    if (ret != 0)
-+    if (ret)
-         return ret;
-+    if (is_service_tkt) {
-+        ret = k5_insert_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_FULL_CHECKSUM,
-+                                 privsvr_key, &privsvr_cksumtype);
-+        if (ret)
-+            return ret;
-+    }
- 
--    /* Now, encode the PAC header so that the checksums will include it */
-+    /* Encode the PAC header so that the checksums will include it. */
-     ret = k5_pac_encode_header(context, pac);
--    if (ret != 0)
--        return ret;
--
--    /* Generate the server checksum over the entire PAC */
--    ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM,
--                               &server_cksum);
--    if (ret != 0)
-+    if (ret)
-         return ret;
- 
--    assert(server_cksum.length > PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH);
--
--    iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
--    iov[0].data = pac->data;
--
--    iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_CHECKSUM;
--    iov[1].data.data = server_cksum.data + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--    iov[1].data.length = server_cksum.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-+    if (is_service_tkt) {
-+        /* Generate a full KDC checksum over the whole PAC. */
-+        ret = compute_pac_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_FULL_CHECKSUM,
-+                                   privsvr_key, privsvr_cksumtype,
-+                                   &pac->data, &full_cksum);
-+        if (ret)
-+            return ret;
-+    }
- 
--    ret = krb5_c_make_checksum_iov(context, server_cksumtype,
--                                   server_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM,
--                                   iov, sizeof(iov)/sizeof(iov[0]));
--    if (ret != 0)
-+    /* Generate the server checksum over the whole PAC, including the full KDC
-+     * checksum if we added one. */
-+    ret = compute_pac_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM,
-+                               server_key, server_cksumtype, &pac->data,
-+                               &server_cksum);
-+    if (ret)
-         return ret;
- 
--    /* Generate the privsvr checksum over the server checksum buffer */
--    ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM,
-+    /* Generate the privsvr checksum over the server checksum buffer. */
-+    ret = compute_pac_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM,
-+                               privsvr_key, privsvr_cksumtype, &server_cksum,
-                                &privsvr_cksum);
--    if (ret != 0)
--        return ret;
--
--    assert(privsvr_cksum.length > PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH);
--
--    iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
--    iov[0].data.data = server_cksum.data + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--    iov[0].data.length = server_cksum.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--
--    iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_CHECKSUM;
--    iov[1].data.data = privsvr_cksum.data + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--    iov[1].data.length = privsvr_cksum.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--
--    ret = krb5_c_make_checksum_iov(context, privsvr_cksumtype,
--                                   privsvr_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM,
--                                   iov, sizeof(iov)/sizeof(iov[0]));
--    if (ret != 0)
-+    if (ret)
-         return ret;
- 
-     data->data = k5memdup(pac->data.data, pac->data.length, &ret);
-@@ -288,6 +289,26 @@ krb5_pac_sign_ext(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
-+krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
-+              krb5_const_principal principal, const krb5_keyblock *server_key,
-+              const krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key, krb5_data *data)
-+{
-+    return sign_pac(context, pac, authtime, principal, server_key,
-+                    privsvr_key, FALSE, FALSE, data);
-+}
-+
-+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
-+krb5_pac_sign_ext(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
-+                  krb5_const_principal principal,
-+                  const krb5_keyblock *server_key,
-+                  const krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key, krb5_boolean with_realm,
-+                  krb5_data *data)
-+{
-+    return sign_pac(context, pac, authtime, principal, server_key, privsvr_key,
-+                    with_realm, FALSE, data);
-+}
-+
- /* Add a signature over der_enc_tkt in privsvr to pac.  der_enc_tkt should be
-  * encoded with a dummy PAC authdata element containing a single zero byte. */
- static krb5_error_code
-@@ -359,6 +380,7 @@ krb5_kdc_sign_ticket(krb5_context context, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
-     krb5_error_code ret;
-     krb5_data *der_enc_tkt = NULL, pac_data = empty_data();
-     krb5_authdata **list, *pac_ad;
-+    krb5_boolean is_service_tkt;
-     size_t count;
- 
-     /* Reallocate space for another authdata element in enc_tkt. */
-@@ -377,7 +399,8 @@ krb5_kdc_sign_ticket(krb5_context context, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
-     memmove(list + 1, list, (count + 1) * sizeof(*list));
-     list[0] = pac_ad;
- 
--    if (k5_pac_should_have_ticket_signature(server_princ)) {
-+    is_service_tkt = k5_pac_should_have_ticket_signature(server_princ);
-+    if (is_service_tkt) {
-         ret = encode_krb5_enc_tkt_part(enc_tkt, &der_enc_tkt);
-         if (ret)
-             goto cleanup;
-@@ -388,9 +411,8 @@ krb5_kdc_sign_ticket(krb5_context context, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
-             goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
--    ret = krb5_pac_sign_ext(context, pac, enc_tkt->times.authtime,
--                            client_princ, server, privsvr, with_realm,
--                            &pac_data);
-+    ret = sign_pac(context, pac, enc_tkt->times.authtime, client_princ, server,
-+                   privsvr, with_realm, is_service_tkt, &pac_data);
-     if (ret)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
-index 173bde7bab..81f1642ab0 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
-@@ -607,78 +607,102 @@ check_pac(krb5_context context, int index, const unsigned char *pdata,
- 
- static const krb5_keyblock ticket_sig_krbtgt_key = {
-     0, ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
--    32, U("\x7a\x58\x98\xd2\xaf\xa6\xaf\xc0\x6a\xce\x06\x04\x4b\xc2\x70\x84"
--          "\x9b\x8e\x0a\x6c\x4c\x07\xdc\x6f\xbb\x48\x43\xe1\xd2\xaa\x97\xf7")
-+    32, U("\x03\x73\x81\xEC\x43\x96\x7B\xC2\xAC\x3D\xF5\x2A\xAE\x95\xA6\x8E"
-+          "\xBE\x24\x58\xDB\xCE\x52\x28\x20\xAF\x5E\xB7\x04\xA2\x22\x71\x4F")
- };
- 
- static const krb5_keyblock ticket_sig_server_key = {
--    0, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
--    16, U("\xed\x23\x11\x20\x7a\x21\x44\x20\xbf\xc0\x8d\x36\xf7\xf6\xb2\x3e")
-+    0, ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
-+    32, U("\x11\x4A\x84\xE3\x14\x8F\xAA\xB1\xFA\x7B\x53\x51\xB2\x8A\xC2\xF1"
-+          "\xFD\x19\x6D\x61\xE0\xF3\xF2\x3E\x1F\xDB\xD3\xC1\x79\x7D\xC1\xEE")
- };
- 
-+/* A ticket issued by an Active Directory KDC (Windows Server 2022), containing
-+ * a PAC with a full checksum. */
- static const krb5_data ticket_data = {
--    .length = 972, .data =
--    "\x61\x82\x03\xC8\x30\x82\x03\xC4\xA0\x03\x02\x01\x05\xA1\x0A\x1B"
--    "\x08\x43\x44\x4F\x4D\x2E\x43\x4F\x4D\xA2\x0F\x30\x0D\xA0\x03\x02"
--    "\x01\x01\xA1\x06\x30\x04\x1B\x02\x73\x31\xA3\x82\x03\x9E\x30\x82"
--    "\x03\x9A\xA0\x03\x02\x01\x17\xA1\x03\x02\x01\x03\xA2\x82\x03\x8C"
--    "\x04\x82\x03\x88\x44\x31\x61\x20\x17\xC9\xFE\xBC\xAC\x46\xB5\x77"
--    "\xE9\x68\x04\x4C\x9B\x31\x91\x0C\xC1\xD4\xDD\xEF\xC7\x34\x20\x08"
--    "\x90\x91\xE8\x79\xE0\xB5\x03\x26\xA4\x65\xDE\xEC\x47\x03\x2A\x8F"
--    "\x61\xE7\x4D\x38\x5A\x42\x95\x5A\xF9\x2F\x41\x2C\x2A\x6E\x60\xA1"
--    "\xEB\x51\xB3\xBD\x4C\x00\x41\x2A\x44\x76\x08\x37\x1A\x51\xFD\x65"
--    "\x67\x7E\xBF\x3D\x90\x86\xE3\x9A\x54\x6B\x67\xA8\x08\x7A\x73\xCC"
--    "\xC3\xB7\x4B\xD5\x5C\x3A\x14\x6C\xC1\x5F\x54\x4B\x92\x55\xB4\xB7"
--    "\x92\x23\x3F\x53\x89\x47\x8E\x1F\x8B\xB9\xDB\x3B\x93\xE8\x70\xE4"
--    "\x24\xB8\x9D\xF0\x0E\x35\x28\xF8\x7A\x27\x5D\xF7\x25\x97\x9C\xF5"
--    "\x9F\x9F\x64\x04\xF2\xA3\xAB\x11\x15\xB6\xDA\x18\xD6\x46\xD5\xE6"
--    "\xB8\x08\xDE\x0A\x62\xFD\xF8\xAA\x52\x90\xD9\x67\x29\xB2\xCD\x06"
--    "\xB6\xB0\x50\x2B\x3F\x0F\xA3\xA5\xBF\xAA\x6E\x40\x03\xD6\x5F\x02"
--    "\xBC\xD8\x18\x47\x97\x09\xD7\xE4\x96\x3B\xCB\xEB\x92\x2C\x3C\x49"
--    "\xFF\x1F\x71\xE0\x52\x94\x0F\x8B\x9F\xB8\x2A\xBB\x9C\xE2\xA3\xDD"
--    "\x38\x89\xE2\xB1\x0B\x9E\x1F\x7A\xB3\xE3\xD2\xB0\x94\xDC\x87\xBE"
--    "\x37\xA6\xD3\xB3\x29\x35\x9A\x72\xC3\x7A\xF1\xA9\xE6\xC5\xD1\x26"
--    "\x83\x65\x44\x17\xBA\x55\xA8\x5E\x94\x26\xED\xE9\x8A\x93\x11\x5D"
--    "\x7E\x20\x1B\x9C\x15\x9E\x13\x37\x03\x4D\xDD\x99\x51\xD8\x66\x29"
--    "\x6A\xB9\xFB\x49\xFE\x52\x78\xDA\x86\x85\xA9\xA3\xB9\xEF\xEC\xAD"
--    "\x35\xA6\x8D\xAC\x0F\x75\x22\xBB\x0B\x49\x1C\x13\x52\x40\xC9\x52"
--    "\x69\x09\x54\xD1\x0F\x94\x3F\x22\x48\x67\xB0\x96\x28\xAA\xE6\x28"
--    "\xD9\x0C\x08\xEF\x51\xED\x15\x5E\xA2\x53\x59\xA5\x03\xB4\x06\x20"
--    "\x3D\xCC\xB4\xC5\xF8\x8C\x73\x67\xA3\x21\x3D\x19\xCD\xD4\x12\x28"
--    "\xD2\x93\xDE\x0D\xF0\x71\x10\x50\xD6\x33\x35\x04\x11\x64\x43\x39"
--    "\xC3\xDF\x96\xE3\x66\xE3\x85\xCA\xE7\x67\x14\x3A\xF0\x43\xAA\xBB"
--    "\xD4\x1D\xB5\x24\xB5\x74\x90\x25\xA7\x87\x7E\xDB\xD3\x83\x8A\x3A"
--    "\x69\xA8\x2D\xAF\xB7\xB8\xF3\xDC\x13\xAF\x45\x61\x3F\x59\x39\x7E"
--    "\x69\xDE\x0C\x04\xF1\x10\x6B\xB4\x56\xFA\x21\x9F\x72\x2B\x60\x86"
--    "\xE3\x23\x0E\xC4\x51\xF6\xBE\xD8\xE1\x5F\xEE\x73\x4C\x17\x4C\x2C"
--    "\x1B\xFB\x9F\x1F\x7A\x3B\x07\x5B\x8E\xF1\x01\xAC\xD6\x30\x94\x8A"
--    "\x5D\x22\x6F\x08\xCE\xED\x5E\xB6\xDB\x86\x8C\x87\xEB\x8D\x91\xFF"
--    "\x0A\x86\x30\xBD\xC0\xF8\x25\xE7\xAE\x24\x35\xF2\xFC\xE5\xFD\x1B"
--    "\xB0\x05\x4A\xA3\xE5\xEB\x2E\x05\xAD\x99\x67\x49\x87\xE6\xB3\x87"
--    "\x82\xA4\x59\xA7\x6E\xDD\xF2\xB6\x66\xE8\xF7\x70\xF5\xBD\xC9\x0E"
--    "\xFA\x9C\x79\x84\xD4\x9B\x05\x0E\xBB\xF5\xDB\xEF\xFC\xCC\x26\xF2"
--    "\x93\xCF\xD2\x04\x3C\xA9\x2C\x65\x42\x97\x86\xD8\x38\x0A\x1E\xF6"
--    "\xD6\xCA\x30\xB5\x1A\xEC\xFB\xBA\x3B\x84\x57\xB0\xFD\xFB\xE6\xBC"
--    "\xF2\x76\xF6\x4C\xBB\xAB\xB1\x31\xA1\x27\x7C\xE6\xE6\x81\xB6\xCE"
--    "\x84\x86\x40\xB6\x40\x33\xC4\xF8\xB4\x15\xCF\xAA\xA5\x51\x78\xB9"
--    "\x8B\x50\x25\xB2\x88\x86\x96\x72\x8C\x71\x4D\xB5\x3A\x94\x86\x77"
--    "\x0E\x95\x9B\x16\x93\xEF\x3A\x11\x79\xBA\x83\xF7\x74\xD3\x8D\xBA"
--    "\x15\xE1\x2C\x04\x57\xA8\x92\x1E\x9D\x00\x8E\x20\xFD\x30\x70\xE7"
--    "\xF5\x65\x2F\x19\x0C\x94\xBA\x03\x71\x12\x96\xCD\xC8\xB4\x96\xDB"
--    "\xCE\x19\xC2\xDF\x3C\xC2\xF6\x3D\x53\xED\x98\xA5\x41\x72\x2A\x22"
--    "\x7B\xF3\x2B\x17\x6C\xE1\x39\x7D\xAE\x9B\x11\xF9\xC1\xA6\x9E\x9F"
--    "\x89\x3C\x12\xAA\x94\x74\xA7\x4F\x70\xE8\xB9\xDE\x04\xF0\x9D\x39"
--    "\x24\x2D\x92\xE8\x46\x2D\x2E\xF0\x40\x66\x1A\xD9\x27\xF9\x98\xF1"
--    "\x81\x1D\x70\x62\x63\x30\x6D\xCD\x84\x04\x5F\xFA\x83\xD3\xEC\x8D"
--    "\x86\xFB\x40\x61\xC1\x8A\x45\xFF\x7B\xD9\xD4\x18\x61\x7F\x51\xE3"
--    "\xFC\x1E\x18\xF0\xAF\xC6\x18\x2C\xE1\x6D\x5D\xF9\x62\xFC\x20\xA3"
--    "\xB2\x8A\x5F\xE5\xBB\x29\x0F\x99\x63\x07\x88\x38\x3A\x3B\x73\x2A"
--    "\x6D\xDA\x3D\xA8\x0D\x8F\x56\x41\x89\x82\xE5\xB8\x61\x00\x64\x7D"
--    "\x17\x0C\xCE\x03\x55\x8F\xF4\x5B\x0D\x50\xF2\xEB\x05\x67\xBE\xDB"
--    "\x7B\x75\xC5\xEA\xA1\xAB\x1D\xB0\x3C\x6D\x42\x08\x0B\x9A\x45\x20"
--    "\xA8\x8F\xE5\x67\x47\x30\xDE\x93\x5F\x43\x05\xEB\xA8\x2D\x80\xF5"
--    "\x1A\xB8\x4A\x4E\x42\x2D\x0B\x7A\xDC\x46\x20\x2D\x13\x17\xDD\x4B"
--    "\x94\x96\xAA\x1F\x06\x0C\x1F\x62\x07\x9C\x40\xA1"
-+    .length = 1307, .data =
-+    "\x61\x82\x05\x17\x30\x82\x05\x13\xA0\x03\x02\x01\x05\xA1\x0F\x1B"
-+    "\x0D\x57\x32\x30\x32\x32\x2D\x4C\x37\x2E\x42\x41\x53\x45\xA2\x2A"
-+    "\x30\x28\xA0\x03\x02\x01\x01\xA1\x21\x30\x1F\x1B\x04\x63\x69\x66"
-+    "\x73\x1B\x17\x77\x32\x30\x32\x32\x2D\x31\x31\x38\x2E\x77\x32\x30"
-+    "\x32\x32\x2D\x6C\x37\x2E\x62\x61\x73\x65\xA3\x82\x04\xCD\x30\x82"
-+    "\x04\xC9\xA0\x03\x02\x01\x12\xA1\x03\x02\x01\x05\xA2\x82\x04\xBB"
-+    "\x04\x82\x04\xB7\x44\x5C\x7B\x5A\x3F\x2E\xA3\x50\x34\xDE\xB0\x69"
-+    "\x23\x2D\x47\x89\x2C\xC0\xA3\xF9\xDD\x70\xAA\xA5\x1E\xFE\x74\xE5"
-+    "\x19\xA2\x4F\x65\x6C\x9E\x00\xB4\x60\x00\x7C\x0C\x29\x43\x31\x99"
-+    "\x77\x02\x73\xED\xB9\x40\xF5\xD2\xD1\xC9\x20\x0F\xE3\x38\xF9\xCC"
-+    "\x5E\x2A\xBD\x1F\x91\x66\x1A\xD8\x2A\x80\x3C\x2C\x00\x3C\x1E\xC9"
-+    "\x2A\x29\x19\x19\x96\x18\x54\x03\x97\x8F\x1D\x5F\xDB\xE9\x66\x68"
-+    "\xCD\xB1\xD5\x00\x35\x69\x49\x45\xF1\x6A\x78\x7B\x37\x71\x87\x14"
-+    "\x1C\x98\x4D\x69\xCB\x1B\xD8\xF5\xA3\xD8\x53\x4A\x75\x76\x62\xBA"
-+    "\x6C\x3F\xEA\x8B\x97\x21\xCA\x8A\x46\x4B\x38\xDA\x09\x9F\x5A\xC8"
-+    "\x38\xFF\x34\x97\x5B\xA2\xE5\xBA\xC9\x87\x17\xD8\x08\x05\x7A\x83"
-+    "\x04\xD6\x02\x8E\x9B\x18\xB6\x40\x1A\xF7\x47\x25\x24\x3E\x37\x1E"
-+    "\xF6\xC1\x3A\x1F\xCA\xB3\x43\x5A\xAE\x94\x83\x31\xAF\xFB\xEE\xED"
-+    "\x46\x71\xEF\xE2\x37\x37\x15\xFE\x1B\x0B\x9E\xF8\x3E\x0C\x43\x96"
-+    "\xB6\x0A\x04\x78\xF8\x5E\xAA\x33\x1F\xE2\x07\x5A\x8D\xC4\x4E\x32"
-+    "\x6D\xD6\xA0\xC5\xEA\x3D\x12\x59\xD4\x41\x40\x4E\xA1\xD8\xBE\xED"
-+    "\x17\xCB\x68\xCC\x59\xCB\x53\xB2\x0E\x58\x8A\xA9\x33\x7F\x6F\x2B"
-+    "\x37\x89\x08\x44\xBA\xC7\x67\x17\xBB\x91\xF7\xC3\x0F\x00\xF8\xAA"
-+    "\xA1\x33\xA6\x08\x47\xCA\xFA\xE8\x49\x27\x45\x46\xF1\xC1\xC3\x5F"
-+    "\xE2\x45\x0A\x7D\x64\x52\x8C\x2E\xE1\xDE\xFF\xB2\x64\xEC\x69\x98"
-+    "\x15\xDF\x9E\xB1\xEB\xD6\x9D\x08\x06\x4E\x73\xC1\x0B\x71\x21\x05"
-+    "\x9E\xBC\xA2\x17\xCF\xB3\x70\xF4\xEF\xB8\x69\xA9\x94\x27\xFD\x5E"
-+    "\x72\xB1\x2D\xD2\x20\x1B\x57\x80\xAB\x38\x97\xCF\x22\x68\x4F\xB8"
-+    "\xB7\x17\x53\x25\x67\x0B\xED\xD1\x58\x20\x0D\x45\xF9\x09\xFA\xE7"
-+    "\x61\x3E\xDB\xC2\x59\x7B\x3A\x3B\x59\x81\x51\xAA\xA4\x81\xF4\x96"
-+    "\x3B\xE1\x6F\x6F\xF4\x8E\x68\x9E\xBA\x1E\x0F\xF2\x44\x68\x11\xFC"
-+    "\x2B\x5F\xBE\xF2\xEA\x07\x80\xB9\xCA\x9E\x41\xBD\x2F\x81\xF5\x11"
-+    "\x2A\x12\xF3\x4F\xD6\x12\x16\x0F\x21\x90\xF1\xD3\x1E\xF1\xA4\x94"
-+    "\x46\xEA\x30\xF3\x84\x06\xC1\xA4\x51\xFC\x43\x35\xBD\xEF\x4D\x89"
-+    "\x1D\xA5\x44\xB2\x69\xC4\x0F\xBF\x86\x01\x08\x44\x77\xD5\xB4\xB7"
-+    "\x5C\x3F\xA7\xD4\x2F\x39\x73\x85\x88\xEE\xB1\x64\x1D\x80\x6C\xEE"
-+    "\x6E\x31\x90\x92\x0D\xA1\xB7\xC4\x5C\xCC\xEE\x91\xC8\xCB\x11\x2D"
-+    "\x4A\x1A\x7D\x43\x8F\xEB\x60\x09\xED\x1B\x07\x58\xBE\xBC\xBD\x29"
-+    "\xF3\xB3\xA3\x4F\xC5\x8A\x30\x33\xB9\xA9\x9F\x43\x08\x27\x15\xC4"
-+    "\x9C\x5D\x8E\xBD\x5C\x05\xC6\x05\x9C\x87\x60\x08\x1E\xE2\x52\xB8"
-+    "\x45\x8D\x28\xB6\x2C\x15\x46\x74\x9F\x0E\xAA\x6B\x70\x3A\x2A\x55"
-+    "\x45\x26\xB2\x58\x4D\x35\xA6\xF1\x96\xBE\x60\xB2\x71\x7B\xF8\x54"
-+    "\xB9\x90\x21\x8E\xB9\x0F\x35\x98\x5E\x88\xEB\x1A\x53\xB4\x59\x7F"
-+    "\xAF\x69\x1C\x61\x67\xF4\xF6\xBD\xAC\x24\xCD\xB7\xA9\x67\xE8\xA1"
-+    "\x83\x85\x5F\x11\x74\x1F\xF7\x4C\x78\x36\xEF\x50\x74\x88\x58\x4B"
-+    "\x1A\x9F\x84\x9A\x9A\x05\x92\xEC\x1D\xD5\xF3\xC4\x95\x51\x28\xE2"
-+    "\x3F\x32\x87\xB2\xFD\x21\x27\x66\xE4\x6B\x85\x2F\xDC\x7B\xC0\x22"
-+    "\xEB\x7A\x94\x20\x5A\x7B\xD3\x7A\xB9\x5B\xF8\x1A\x5A\x84\x4E\xA1"
-+    "\x73\x41\x53\xD2\x60\xF7\x7C\xEE\x68\x59\x85\x80\xFC\x3D\x70\x4B"
-+    "\x04\x32\xE7\xF2\xFD\xBD\xB3\xD9\x21\xE2\x37\x56\xA2\x16\xCC\xDE"
-+    "\x8A\xD3\xBC\x71\xEF\x58\x19\x0E\x45\x8A\x5B\x53\xD6\x77\x30\x6A"
-+    "\xA7\xF8\x68\x06\x4E\x07\xCA\xCE\x30\xD7\x35\xAB\x1A\xC7\x18\xD4"
-+    "\xC6\x2F\x1A\xFF\xE9\x7A\x94\x0B\x76\x5E\x7E\x29\x0C\xE6\xD3\x3B"
-+    "\x5B\x44\x96\xA8\xF1\x29\x23\x95\xD9\x79\xB3\x39\xFC\x76\xED\xE1"
-+    "\x1E\x67\x4E\xF7\xE8\x7B\x7A\x12\x9E\xD8\x4B\x35\x09\x0A\xF2\xC1"
-+    "\x63\x5B\xEE\xFD\x2A\xC2\xA6\x66\x30\x3C\x1F\x95\xAF\x65\x22\x95"
-+    "\x14\x1D\xF5\xD5\xDC\x38\x79\x35\x1C\xCD\x24\x47\xE0\xFD\x08\xC8"
-+    "\xF4\x15\x55\x9F\xD9\xC7\xAC\x3F\x67\xB3\x4F\xEB\x26\x7C\x8E\xD6"
-+    "\x74\xB3\x0A\xCD\xE7\xFA\xBE\x7E\xA3\x3E\xEC\x61\x50\x77\x52\x56"
-+    "\xCF\x90\x5D\x48\xFB\xD4\x2C\x6C\x61\x8B\xDD\x2B\xF5\x92\x1F\x30"
-+    "\xBF\x3F\x80\x0D\x31\xDB\xB2\x0B\x7D\x84\xE3\xA6\x42\x7F\x00\x38"
-+    "\x44\x02\xC5\xB8\xD9\x58\x29\x9D\x68\x5C\x32\x8B\x76\xAE\xED\x15"
-+    "\xF9\x7C\xAE\x7B\xB6\x8E\xD6\x54\x24\xFF\xFA\x87\x05\xEF\x15\x08"
-+    "\x5E\x4B\x21\xA2\x2F\x49\xE7\x0F\xC3\xD0\xB9\x49\x22\xEF\xD5\xCA"
-+    "\xB2\x11\xF2\x17\xB6\x77\x24\x68\x76\xB2\x07\xF8\x0A\x73\xDD\x65"
-+    "\x9C\x75\x64\xF7\xA1\xC6\x23\x08\x84\x72\x3E\x54\x2E\xEB\x9B\x40"
-+    "\xA6\x83\x87\xEB\xB5\x00\x40\x4F\xE1\x72\x2A\x59\x3A\x06\x60\x29"
-+    "\x7E\x25\x2F\xD8\x80\x40\x8C\x59\xCA\xCF\x8E\x44\xE4\x2D\x84\x7E"
-+    "\xCB\xFD\x1E\x3B\xD5\xFF\x9A\xB9\x66\x93\x6D\x5E\xC8\xB7\x13\x26"
-+    "\xD6\x38\x1B\x2B\xE1\x87\x96\x05\xD5\xF3\xAB\x68\xF7\x12\x62\x2C"
-+    "\x58\xC1\xC9\x85\x3C\x72\xF1\x26\xEE\xC0\x09\x5F\x1D\x4B\xAC\x01"
-+    "\x41\xC8\x12\xF8\xF3\x93\x43\x41\xFF\xEC\x0B\x80\xE2\xEE\x20\x85"
-+    "\x25\xCD\x6C\x30\x8C\x0D\x24\x2E\xBA\x19\xEA\x28\x7F\xCF\xD5\x10"
-+    "\x5C\xE9\xB2\x9D\x5F\x16\xE4\xC0\xF3\xCC\xD9\x68\x4A\x05\x08\x70"
-+    "\x17\x26\xC8\x5C\x4A\xBF\x94\x6A\x0E\xD5\xDA\x67\x47\x4B\xAF\x44"
-+    "\xE3\x94\xAA\x05\xDB\xA2\x49\x74\xFA\x5C\x69\xAB\x44\xB7\xF7\xBA"
-+    "\xAE\x7A\x23\x87\xEB\x54\x7E\x80\xF1\x5B\x60\xA5\x93\xE5\xD4\x24"
-+    "\x84\xF7\x0A\x16\x10\xBE\xE9\x4D\xD8\x6B\x15\x40\x5D\x74\xDA\x1B"
-+    "\xFF\x2E\x4D\x17\x9D\x35\xF7\x0D\xCF\x66\x38\x0D\x8A\xE4\xDD\x6B"
-+    "\xE1\x0F\x1F\xBD\xFD\x4F\x30\x37\x3F\x96\xB4\x92\x54\xD3\x9A\x7A"
-+    "\xD1\x5B\x5B\xA9\x54\x16\xE6\x24\xAB\xD4\x23\x39\x7D\xD2\xC7\x09"
-+    "\xFA\xD4\x86\x55\x4D\x60\xC2\x87\x67\x6B\xE6"
- };
- 
- static void
-@@ -686,7 +710,7 @@ test_pac_ticket_signature(krb5_context context)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
-     krb5_ticket *ticket;
--    krb5_principal sprinc;
-+    krb5_principal cprinc, sprinc;
-     krb5_authdata **authdata1, **authdata2;
-     krb5_pac pac, pac2, pac3;
-     uint32_t *list;
-@@ -701,7 +725,13 @@ test_pac_ticket_signature(krb5_context context)
-     if (ret)
-         err(context, ret, "while decrypting ticket");
- 
--    ret = krb5_parse_name(context, "s1@CDOM.COM", &sprinc);
-+    ret = krb5_parse_name(context, "administrator@W2022-L7.BASE", &cprinc);
-+    if (ret)
-+        err(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name");
-+
-+    ret = krb5_parse_name(context,
-+                          "cifs/w2022-118.w2022-l7.base@W2022-L7.BASE",
-+                          &sprinc);
-     if (ret)
-         err(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name");
- 
-@@ -713,7 +743,7 @@ test_pac_ticket_signature(krb5_context context)
- 
-     /* In this test, the server is also the client. */
-     ret = krb5_pac_verify(context, pac, ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
--                          ticket->server, NULL, NULL);
-+                          cprinc, NULL, NULL);
-     if (ret)
-         err(context, ret, "while verifying PAC client info");
- 
-@@ -722,7 +752,7 @@ test_pac_ticket_signature(krb5_context context)
-     ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data = NULL;
- 
-     ret = krb5_kdc_sign_ticket(context, ticket->enc_part2, pac, sprinc,
--                               sprinc, &ticket_sig_server_key,
-+                               cprinc, &ticket_sig_server_key,
-                                &ticket_sig_krbtgt_key, FALSE);
-     if (ret)
-         err(context, ret, "while signing ticket");
-@@ -781,6 +811,7 @@ test_pac_ticket_signature(krb5_context context)
-     krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
-     krb5_pac_free(context, pac2);
-     krb5_pac_free(context, pac3);
-+    krb5_free_principal(context, cprinc);
-     krb5_free_principal(context, sprinc);
-     krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
- }
-diff --git a/src/tests/t_authdata.py b/src/tests/t_authdata.py
-index 4fbdbec052..b0666c3b81 100644
---- a/src/tests/t_authdata.py
-+++ b/src/tests/t_authdata.py
-@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf)
- # container.
- mark('baseline authdata')
- out = realm.run(['./adata', realm.host_princ])
--if '?512: ' not in out or '^-42: Hello' not in out:
-+if '?128: [6, 7, 10, 16, 19]' not in out or '^-42: Hello' not in out:
-     fail('expected authdata not seen for basic request')
- 
- # Requested authdata is copied into the ticket, with KDC-only types
-@@ -239,6 +239,9 @@ realm.run(['./s4u2proxy', usercache, 'service/2'])
- out = realm.run(['./adata', '-p', realm.user_princ, 'service/2'])
- if '+97: [indcl]' not in out or '[inds1]' in out:
-     fail('correct auth-indicator not seen for S4U2Proxy req')
-+# Make sure a PAC with an S4U_DELEGATION_INFO(11) buffer is included.
-+if '?128: [1, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16, 19]' not in out:
-+    fail('PAC with delegation info not seen for S4U2Proxy req')
- 
- # Get another S4U2Proxy ticket including request-authdata.
- realm.run(['./s4u2proxy', usercache, 'service/2', '-2', 'proxy_ad'])
--- 
-2.39.2
-

SOURCES/Add-PAC-ticket-signature-APIs.patch

@@ -1,840 +0,0 @@
-From 48be25aaa27487fcbbba76044083de37211b30e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 13:46:24 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Add PAC ticket signature APIs
-
-Microsoft added a third PAC signature over the ticket to prevent
-servers from setting the forwardable flag on evidence tickets.  Add
-new APIs to generate and verify ticket signatures, as well as defines
-for this and other new PAC buffer types.  Deprecate the old signing
-functions as they cannot generate ticket signatures.  Modify several
-error returns to better match the protocol errors generated by Active
-Directory.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: adjusted contracts for KDC requirements; simplified
-and commented code changes; wrote commit message.  rharwood@redhat.com
-also did some work on this commit.]
-
-ticket: 9043 (new)
----
- doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst    |   2 +
- doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst |   6 +
- src/include/krb5/krb5.hin        |  98 +++++++++++------
- src/lib/krb5/krb/deps            |   5 +-
- src/lib/krb5/krb/int-proto.h     |  12 ++
- src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c           | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c      | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++
- src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c         | 182 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports     |   2 +
- src/lib/krb5_32.def              |   3 +
- src/plugins/kdb/test/kdb_test.c  |   6 +-
- 11 files changed, 544 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst b/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
-index 9e03fd386f..d12be47c3c 100644
---- a/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
-+++ b/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
-@@ -223,6 +223,8 @@ Rarely used public interfaces
-    krb5_init_creds_step.rst
-    krb5_init_keyblock.rst
-    krb5_is_referral_realm.rst
-+   krb5_kdc_sign_ticket.rst
-+   krb5_kdc_verify_ticket.rst
-    krb5_kt_add_entry.rst
-    krb5_kt_end_seq_get.rst
-    krb5_kt_get_entry.rst
-diff --git a/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst b/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst
-index 001fb386a7..c6ea088742 100644
---- a/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst
-+++ b/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst
-@@ -234,12 +234,18 @@ Public
-    KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN.rst
-    KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN.rst
-    KRB5_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL.rst
-+   KRB5_PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO.rst
-    KRB5_PAC_CLIENT_INFO.rst
-+   KRB5_PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS.rst
-    KRB5_PAC_CREDENTIALS_INFO.rst
-    KRB5_PAC_DELEGATION_INFO.rst
-+   KRB5_PAC_DEVICE_CLAIMS.rst
-+   KRB5_PAC_DEVICE_INFO.rst
-    KRB5_PAC_LOGON_INFO.rst
-    KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM.rst
-+   KRB5_PAC_REQUESTOR.rst
-    KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM.rst
-+   KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM.rst
-    KRB5_PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO.rst
-    KRB5_PADATA_AFS3_SALT.rst
-    KRB5_PADATA_AP_REQ.rst
-diff --git a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-index a7060aa733..8e59628bd9 100644
---- a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-+++ b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-@@ -1918,7 +1918,7 @@ krb5_verify_checksum(krb5_context context, krb5_cksumtype ctype,
- #define KRB5_AUTHDATA_CAMMAC    96
- #define KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC 128
- #define KRB5_AUTHDATA_ETYPE_NEGOTIATION 129     /**< RFC 4537 */
--#define KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET        512     /**< formerly 142 in krb5 1.8 */
-+#define KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET        512     /**< @deprecated use PAC */
- #define KRB5_AUTHDATA_FX_ARMOR 71
- #define KRB5_AUTHDATA_AUTH_INDICATOR 97
- #define KRB5_AUTHDATA_AP_OPTIONS 143
-@@ -8181,6 +8181,12 @@ krb5_verify_authdata_kdc_issued(krb5_context context,
- #define KRB5_PAC_CLIENT_INFO       10 /**< Client name and ticket info */
- #define KRB5_PAC_DELEGATION_INFO   11 /**< Constrained delegation info */
- #define KRB5_PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO      12 /**< User principal name and DNS info */
-+#define KRB5_PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS     13 /**< Client claims information */
-+#define KRB5_PAC_DEVICE_INFO       14 /**< Device information */
-+#define KRB5_PAC_DEVICE_CLAIMS     15 /**< Device claims information */
-+#define KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM   16 /**< Ticket checksum */
-+#define KRB5_PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO   17 /**< PAC attributes */
-+#define KRB5_PAC_REQUESTOR         18 /**< PAC requestor SID */
- 
- struct krb5_pac_data;
- /** PAC data structure to convey authorization information */
-@@ -8338,56 +8344,84 @@ krb5_pac_verify_ext(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac,
-                     krb5_boolean with_realm);
- 
- /**
-- * Sign a PAC.
-+ * Verify a PAC, possibly including ticket signature
-  *
-- * @param [in]  context         Library context
-- * @param [in]  pac             PAC handle
-- * @param [in]  authtime        Expected timestamp
-- * @param [in]  principal       Expected principal name (or NULL)
-- * @param [in]  server_key      Key for server checksum
-- * @param [in]  privsvr_key     Key for KDC checksum
-- * @param [out] data            Signed PAC encoding
-+ * @param [in] context          Library context
-+ * @param [in] enc_tkt          Ticket enc-part, possibly containing a PAC
-+ * @param [in] server_princ     Canonicalized name of ticket server
-+ * @param [in] server           Key to validate server checksum (or NULL)
-+ * @param [in] privsvr          Key to validate KDC checksum (or NULL)
-+ * @param [out] pac_out         Verified PAC (NULL if no PAC included)
-  *
-- * This function signs @a pac using the keys @a server_key and @a privsvr_key
-- * and returns the signed encoding in @a data.  @a pac is modified to include
-- * the server and KDC checksum buffers.  Use krb5_free_data_contents() to free
-- * @a data when it is no longer needed.
-+ * If a PAC is present in @a enc_tkt, verify its signatures.  If @a privsvr is
-+ * not NULL and @a server_princ is not a krbtgt or kadmin/changepw service,
-+ * require a ticket signature over @a enc_tkt in addition to the KDC signature.
-+ * Place the verified PAC in @a pac_out.  If an invalid PAC signature is found,
-+ * return an error matching the Windows KDC protocol code for that condition as
-+ * closely as possible.
-  *
-- * @version New in 1.10
-+ * If no PAC is present in @a enc_tkt, set @a pac_out to NULL and return
-+ * successfully.
-+ *
-+ * @note This function does not validate the PAC_CLIENT_INFO buffer.  If a
-+ * specific value is expected, the caller can make a separate call to
-+ * krb5_pac_verify_ext() with a principal but no keys.
-+ *
-+ * @retval 0 Success; otherwise - Kerberos error codes
-+ *
-+ * @version New in 1.20
-  */
- krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
-+krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
-+                       krb5_const_principal server_princ,
-+                       const krb5_keyblock *server,
-+                       const krb5_keyblock *privsvr, krb5_pac *pac_out);
-+
-+/** @deprecated Use krb5_kdc_sign_ticket() instead. */
-+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
- krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
-               krb5_const_principal principal, const krb5_keyblock *server_key,
-               const krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key, krb5_data *data);
- 
-+/** @deprecated Use krb5_kdc_sign_ticket() instead. */
-+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
-+krb5_pac_sign_ext(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
-+                  krb5_const_principal principal,
-+                  const krb5_keyblock *server_key,
-+                  const krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key, krb5_boolean with_realm,
-+                  krb5_data *data);
-+
- /**
-- * Sign a PAC, possibly with a specified realm.
-+ * Sign a PAC, possibly including a ticket signature
-  *
-  * @param [in]  context         Library context
-+ * @param [in]  enc_tkt         The ticket for the signature
-  * @param [in]  pac             PAC handle
-- * @param [in]  authtime        Expected timestamp
-- * @param [in]  principal       Principal name (or NULL)
-- * @param [in]  server_key      Key for server checksum
-- * @param [in]  privsvr_key     Key for KDC checksum
-+ * @param [in]  server_princ    Canonical ticket server name
-+ * @param [in]  client_princ    PAC_CLIENT_INFO principal (or NULL)
-+ * @param [in]  server          Key for server checksum
-+ * @param [in]  privsvr         Key for KDC and ticket checksum
-  * @param [in]  with_realm      If true, include the realm of @a principal
-- * @param [out] data            Signed PAC encoding
-  *
-- * This function is similar to krb5_pac_sign(), but adds a parameter
-- * @a with_realm.  If @a with_realm is true, the PAC_CLIENT_INFO field of the
-- * signed PAC will include the realm of @a principal as well as the name.  This
-- * flag is necessary to generate PACs for cross-realm S4U2Self referrals.
-+ * Sign @a pac using the keys @a server and @a privsvr.  Include a ticket
-+ * signature over @a enc_tkt if @a server_princ is not a TGS or kadmin/changepw
-+ * principal name.  Add the signed PAC's encoding to the authorization data of
-+ * @a enc_tkt in the first slot, wrapped in an AD-IF-RELEVANT container.  If @a
-+ * client_princ is non-null, add a PAC_CLIENT_INFO buffer, including the realm
-+ * if @a with_realm is true.
-  *
-- * @version New in 1.17
-+ * @retval 0 on success, otherwise - Kerberos error codes
-+ *
-+ * @version New in 1.20
-  */
- krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
--krb5_pac_sign_ext(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
--                  krb5_const_principal principal,
--                  const krb5_keyblock *server_key,
--                  const krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key, krb5_boolean with_realm,
--                  krb5_data *data);
-+krb5_kdc_sign_ticket(krb5_context context, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
-+                     const krb5_pac pac, krb5_const_principal server_princ,
-+                     krb5_const_principal client_princ,
-+                     const krb5_keyblock *server, const krb5_keyblock *privsvr,
-+                     krb5_boolean with_realm);
- 
--
--/*
-+/**
-  * Read client information from a PAC.
-  *
-  * @param [in]  context         Library context
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/deps b/src/lib/krb5/krb/deps
-index 439ca02725..cd842b03cd 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/deps
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/deps
-@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ pac.so pac.po $(OUTPRE)pac.$(OBJEXT): $(BUILDTOP)/include/autoconf.h \
-   $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-utf8.h $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5.h \
-   $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/authdata_plugin.h $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/plugin.h \
-   $(top_srcdir)/include/port-sockets.h $(top_srcdir)/include/socket-utils.h \
--  authdata.h pac.c
-+  authdata.h int-proto.h pac.c
- pac_sign.so pac_sign.po $(OUTPRE)pac_sign.$(OBJEXT): \
-   $(BUILDTOP)/include/autoconf.h $(BUILDTOP)/include/krb5/krb5.h \
-   $(BUILDTOP)/include/osconf.h $(BUILDTOP)/include/profile.h \
-@@ -720,7 +720,8 @@ pac_sign.so pac_sign.po $(OUTPRE)pac_sign.$(OBJEXT): \
-   $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-trace.h $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-utf8.h \
-   $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5.h $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/authdata_plugin.h \
-   $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/plugin.h $(top_srcdir)/include/port-sockets.h \
--  $(top_srcdir)/include/socket-utils.h authdata.h pac_sign.c
-+  $(top_srcdir)/include/socket-utils.h authdata.h int-proto.h \
-+  pac_sign.c
- padata.so padata.po $(OUTPRE)padata.$(OBJEXT): $(BUILDTOP)/include/autoconf.h \
-   $(BUILDTOP)/include/krb5/krb5.h $(BUILDTOP)/include/osconf.h \
-   $(BUILDTOP)/include/profile.h $(COM_ERR_DEPS) $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-buf.h \
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/int-proto.h b/src/lib/krb5/krb/int-proto.h
-index fe61bebf5b..453ed60c6c 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/int-proto.h
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/int-proto.h
-@@ -386,4 +386,16 @@ k5_get_proxy_cred_from_kdc(krb5_context context, krb5_flags options,
-                            krb5_ccache ccache, krb5_creds *in_creds,
-                            krb5_creds **out_creds);
- 
-+/* Return true if mprinc will match any hostname in a host-based principal name
-+ * (possibly due to ignore_acceptor_hostname) with krb5_sname_match(). */
-+krb5_boolean
-+k5_sname_wildcard_host(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal mprinc);
-+
-+/* Guess the appropriate name-type for a principal based on the name. */
-+krb5_int32
-+k5_infer_principal_type(krb5_principal princ);
-+
-+krb5_boolean
-+k5_pac_should_have_ticket_signature(krb5_const_principal sprinc);
-+
- #endif /* KRB5_INT_FUNC_PROTO__ */
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-index 1b9ef12276..6eb23d8090 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
-  */
- 
- #include "k5-int.h"
-+#include "int-proto.h"
- #include "authdata.h"
- 
- #define MAX_BUFFERS 4096
-@@ -552,8 +553,10 @@ k5_pac_verify_server_checksum(krb5_context context,
-     checksum.checksum_type = load_32_le(p);
-     checksum.length = checksum_data.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-     checksum.contents = p + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-+    if (checksum.checksum_type == CKSUMTYPE_SHA1)
-+        return KRB5KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP;
-     if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(checksum.checksum_type))
--        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
-+        return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- 
-     pac_data.length = pac->data.length;
-     pac_data.data = k5memdup(pac->data.data, pac->data.length, &ret);
-@@ -586,7 +589,7 @@ k5_pac_verify_server_checksum(krb5_context context,
-     }
- 
-     if (valid == FALSE)
--        ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
-+        ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
- 
-     return ret;
- }
-@@ -623,7 +626,7 @@ k5_pac_verify_kdc_checksum(krb5_context context,
-     checksum.length = privsvr_checksum.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-     checksum.contents = p + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-     if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(checksum.checksum_type))
--        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
-+        return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- 
-     server_checksum.data += PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-     server_checksum.length -= PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-@@ -635,11 +638,148 @@ k5_pac_verify_kdc_checksum(krb5_context context,
-         return ret;
- 
-     if (valid == FALSE)
--        ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
-+        ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
- 
-     return ret;
- }
- 
-+static krb5_error_code
-+verify_ticket_checksum(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac,
-+                       const krb5_data *ticket, const krb5_keyblock *privsvr)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_checksum checksum;
-+    krb5_data checksum_data;
-+    krb5_boolean valid;
-+    krb5_octet *p;
-+
-+    ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM,
-+                               &checksum_data);
-+    if (ret != 0)
-+        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
-+
-+    if (checksum_data.length < PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH)
-+        return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
-+
-+    p = (krb5_octet *)checksum_data.data;
-+    checksum.checksum_type = load_32_le(p);
-+    checksum.length = checksum_data.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-+    checksum.contents = p + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-+    if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(checksum.checksum_type))
-+        return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-+
-+    ret = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context, privsvr,
-+                                 KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, ticket,
-+                                 &checksum, &valid);
-+    if (ret != 0)
-+        return ret;
-+
-+    return valid ? 0 : KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
-+}
-+
-+/* Per MS-PAC 2.8.3, tickets encrypted to TGS and password change principals
-+ * should not have ticket signatures. */
-+krb5_boolean
-+k5_pac_should_have_ticket_signature(krb5_const_principal sprinc)
-+{
-+    if (IS_TGS_PRINC(sprinc))
-+        return FALSE;
-+    if (sprinc->length == 2 && data_eq_string(sprinc->data[0], "kadmin") &&
-+        data_eq_string(sprinc->data[1], "changepw"))
-+        return FALSE;
-+    return TRUE;
-+}
-+
-+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
-+krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
-+                       krb5_const_principal server_princ,
-+                       const krb5_keyblock *server,
-+                       const krb5_keyblock *privsvr, krb5_pac *pac_out)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_pac pac = NULL;
-+    krb5_data *recoded_tkt = NULL;
-+    krb5_authdata **authdata, *orig, **ifrel = NULL, **recoded_ifrel = NULL;
-+    uint8_t z = 0;
-+    krb5_authdata zpac = { KV5M_AUTHDATA, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC, 1, &z };
-+    size_t i, j;
-+
-+    *pac_out = NULL;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Find the position of the PAC in the ticket authdata.  ifrel will be the
-+     * decoded AD-IF-RELEVANT container at position i containing a PAC, and j
-+     * will be the offset within the container.
-+     */
-+    authdata = enc_tkt->authorization_data;
-+    for (i = 0; authdata != NULL && authdata[i] != NULL; i++) {
-+        if (authdata[i]->ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT)
-+            continue;
-+
-+        ret = krb5_decode_authdata_container(context,
-+                                             KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT,
-+                                             authdata[i], &ifrel);
-+        if (ret)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+
-+        for (j = 0; ifrel[j] != NULL; j++) {
-+            if (ifrel[j]->ad_type == KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC)
-+                break;
-+        }
-+        if (ifrel[j] != NULL)
-+            break;
-+
-+        krb5_free_authdata(context, ifrel);
-+        ifrel = NULL;
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Stop and return successfully if we didn't find a PAC. */
-+    if (ifrel == NULL) {
-+        ret = 0;
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, ifrel[j]->contents, ifrel[j]->length, &pac);
-+    if (ret)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-+    if (privsvr != NULL && k5_pac_should_have_ticket_signature(server_princ)) {
-+        /* To check the PAC ticket signatures, re-encode the ticket with the
-+         * PAC contents replaced by a single zero. */
-+        orig = ifrel[j];
-+        ifrel[j] = &zpac;
-+        ret = krb5_encode_authdata_container(context,
-+                                             KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT,
-+                                             ifrel, &recoded_ifrel);
-+        ifrel[j] = orig;
-+        if (ret)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+        orig = authdata[i];
-+        authdata[i] = recoded_ifrel[0];
-+        ret = encode_krb5_enc_tkt_part(enc_tkt, &recoded_tkt);
-+        authdata[i] = orig;
-+        if (ret)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+
-+        ret = verify_ticket_checksum(context, pac, recoded_tkt, privsvr);
-+        if (ret)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    ret = krb5_pac_verify_ext(context, pac, enc_tkt->times.authtime, NULL,
-+                              server, privsvr, FALSE);
-+
-+    *pac_out = pac;
-+    pac = NULL;
-+
-+cleanup:
-+    krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
-+    krb5_free_data(context, recoded_tkt);
-+    krb5_free_authdata(context, ifrel);
-+    krb5_free_authdata(context, recoded_ifrel);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
- krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
- krb5_pac_verify(krb5_context context,
-                 const krb5_pac pac,
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c
-index 12f0259b4f..0f9581abbb 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
-  */
- 
- #include "k5-int.h"
-+#include "int-proto.h"
- #include "authdata.h"
- 
- /* draft-brezak-win2k-krb-authz-00 */
-@@ -286,3 +287,123 @@ krb5_pac_sign_ext(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
- 
-     return 0;
- }
-+
-+/* Add a signature over der_enc_tkt in privsvr to pac.  der_enc_tkt should be
-+ * encoded with a dummy PAC authdata element containing a single zero byte. */
-+static krb5_error_code
-+add_ticket_signature(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac,
-+                     krb5_data *der_enc_tkt, const krb5_keyblock *privsvr)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_data ticket_cksum;
-+    krb5_cksumtype ticket_cksumtype;
-+    krb5_crypto_iov iov[2];
-+
-+    /* Create zeroed buffer for checksum. */
-+    ret = k5_insert_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM,
-+                             privsvr, &ticket_cksumtype);
-+    if (ret)
-+        return ret;
-+
-+    ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM,
-+                               &ticket_cksum);
-+    if (ret)
-+        return ret;
-+
-+    iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    iov[0].data = *der_enc_tkt;
-+    iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_CHECKSUM;
-+    iov[1].data = make_data(ticket_cksum.data + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH,
-+                            ticket_cksum.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH);
-+    ret = krb5_c_make_checksum_iov(context, ticket_cksumtype, privsvr,
-+                                   KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, iov, 2);
-+    if (ret)
-+        return ret;
-+
-+    store_32_le(ticket_cksumtype, ticket_cksum.data);
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/* Set *out to an AD-IF-RELEVANT authdata element containing a PAC authdata
-+ * element with contents pac_data. */
-+static krb5_error_code
-+encode_pac_ad(krb5_context context, krb5_data *pac_data, krb5_authdata **out)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_authdata *container[2], **encoded_container = NULL;
-+    krb5_authdata pac_ad = { KV5M_AUTHDATA, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC };
-+    uint8_t z = 0;
-+
-+    pac_ad.contents = (pac_data != NULL) ? (uint8_t *)pac_data->data : &z;
-+    pac_ad.length = (pac_data != NULL) ? pac_data->length : 1;
-+    container[0] = &pac_ad;
-+    container[1] = NULL;
-+
-+    ret = krb5_encode_authdata_container(context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT,
-+                                         container, &encoded_container);
-+    if (ret)
-+        return ret;
-+
-+    *out = encoded_container[0];
-+    free(encoded_container);
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
-+krb5_kdc_sign_ticket(krb5_context context, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
-+                     const krb5_pac pac, krb5_const_principal server_princ,
-+                     krb5_const_principal client_princ,
-+                     const krb5_keyblock *server, const krb5_keyblock *privsvr,
-+                     krb5_boolean with_realm)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_data *der_enc_tkt = NULL, pac_data = empty_data();
-+    krb5_authdata **list, *pac_ad;
-+    size_t count;
-+
-+    /* Reallocate space for another authdata element in enc_tkt. */
-+    list = enc_tkt->authorization_data;
-+    for (count = 0; list != NULL && list[count] != NULL; count++);
-+    list = realloc(enc_tkt->authorization_data, (count + 2) * sizeof(*list));
-+    if (list == NULL)
-+        return ENOMEM;
-+    list[count] = NULL;
-+    enc_tkt->authorization_data = list;
-+
-+    /* Create a dummy PAC for ticket signing and make it the first element. */
-+    ret = encode_pac_ad(context, NULL, &pac_ad);
-+    if (ret)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    memmove(list + 1, list, (count + 1) * sizeof(*list));
-+    list[0] = pac_ad;
-+
-+    if (k5_pac_should_have_ticket_signature(server_princ)) {
-+        ret = encode_krb5_enc_tkt_part(enc_tkt, &der_enc_tkt);
-+        if (ret)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+
-+        assert(privsvr != NULL);
-+        ret = add_ticket_signature(context, pac, der_enc_tkt, privsvr);
-+        if (ret)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    ret = krb5_pac_sign_ext(context, pac, enc_tkt->times.authtime,
-+                            client_princ, server, privsvr, with_realm,
-+                            &pac_data);
-+    if (ret)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-+    /* Replace the dummy PAC with the signed real one. */
-+    ret = encode_pac_ad(context, &pac_data, &pac_ad);
-+    if (ret)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    free(list[0]->contents);
-+    free(list[0]);
-+    list[0] = pac_ad;
-+
-+cleanup:
-+    krb5_free_data(context, der_enc_tkt);
-+    krb5_free_data_contents(context, &pac_data);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
-index ccd165380d..173bde7bab 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
-@@ -605,6 +605,186 @@ check_pac(krb5_context context, int index, const unsigned char *pdata,
-     krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
- }
- 
-+static const krb5_keyblock ticket_sig_krbtgt_key = {
-+    0, ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
-+    32, U("\x7a\x58\x98\xd2\xaf\xa6\xaf\xc0\x6a\xce\x06\x04\x4b\xc2\x70\x84"
-+          "\x9b\x8e\x0a\x6c\x4c\x07\xdc\x6f\xbb\x48\x43\xe1\xd2\xaa\x97\xf7")
-+};
-+
-+static const krb5_keyblock ticket_sig_server_key = {
-+    0, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
-+    16, U("\xed\x23\x11\x20\x7a\x21\x44\x20\xbf\xc0\x8d\x36\xf7\xf6\xb2\x3e")
-+};
-+
-+static const krb5_data ticket_data = {
-+    .length = 972, .data =
-+    "\x61\x82\x03\xC8\x30\x82\x03\xC4\xA0\x03\x02\x01\x05\xA1\x0A\x1B"
-+    "\x08\x43\x44\x4F\x4D\x2E\x43\x4F\x4D\xA2\x0F\x30\x0D\xA0\x03\x02"
-+    "\x01\x01\xA1\x06\x30\x04\x1B\x02\x73\x31\xA3\x82\x03\x9E\x30\x82"
-+    "\x03\x9A\xA0\x03\x02\x01\x17\xA1\x03\x02\x01\x03\xA2\x82\x03\x8C"
-+    "\x04\x82\x03\x88\x44\x31\x61\x20\x17\xC9\xFE\xBC\xAC\x46\xB5\x77"
-+    "\xE9\x68\x04\x4C\x9B\x31\x91\x0C\xC1\xD4\xDD\xEF\xC7\x34\x20\x08"
-+    "\x90\x91\xE8\x79\xE0\xB5\x03\x26\xA4\x65\xDE\xEC\x47\x03\x2A\x8F"
-+    "\x61\xE7\x4D\x38\x5A\x42\x95\x5A\xF9\x2F\x41\x2C\x2A\x6E\x60\xA1"
-+    "\xEB\x51\xB3\xBD\x4C\x00\x41\x2A\x44\x76\x08\x37\x1A\x51\xFD\x65"
-+    "\x67\x7E\xBF\x3D\x90\x86\xE3\x9A\x54\x6B\x67\xA8\x08\x7A\x73\xCC"
-+    "\xC3\xB7\x4B\xD5\x5C\x3A\x14\x6C\xC1\x5F\x54\x4B\x92\x55\xB4\xB7"
-+    "\x92\x23\x3F\x53\x89\x47\x8E\x1F\x8B\xB9\xDB\x3B\x93\xE8\x70\xE4"
-+    "\x24\xB8\x9D\xF0\x0E\x35\x28\xF8\x7A\x27\x5D\xF7\x25\x97\x9C\xF5"
-+    "\x9F\x9F\x64\x04\xF2\xA3\xAB\x11\x15\xB6\xDA\x18\xD6\x46\xD5\xE6"
-+    "\xB8\x08\xDE\x0A\x62\xFD\xF8\xAA\x52\x90\xD9\x67\x29\xB2\xCD\x06"
-+    "\xB6\xB0\x50\x2B\x3F\x0F\xA3\xA5\xBF\xAA\x6E\x40\x03\xD6\x5F\x02"
-+    "\xBC\xD8\x18\x47\x97\x09\xD7\xE4\x96\x3B\xCB\xEB\x92\x2C\x3C\x49"
-+    "\xFF\x1F\x71\xE0\x52\x94\x0F\x8B\x9F\xB8\x2A\xBB\x9C\xE2\xA3\xDD"
-+    "\x38\x89\xE2\xB1\x0B\x9E\x1F\x7A\xB3\xE3\xD2\xB0\x94\xDC\x87\xBE"
-+    "\x37\xA6\xD3\xB3\x29\x35\x9A\x72\xC3\x7A\xF1\xA9\xE6\xC5\xD1\x26"
-+    "\x83\x65\x44\x17\xBA\x55\xA8\x5E\x94\x26\xED\xE9\x8A\x93\x11\x5D"
-+    "\x7E\x20\x1B\x9C\x15\x9E\x13\x37\x03\x4D\xDD\x99\x51\xD8\x66\x29"
-+    "\x6A\xB9\xFB\x49\xFE\x52\x78\xDA\x86\x85\xA9\xA3\xB9\xEF\xEC\xAD"
-+    "\x35\xA6\x8D\xAC\x0F\x75\x22\xBB\x0B\x49\x1C\x13\x52\x40\xC9\x52"
-+    "\x69\x09\x54\xD1\x0F\x94\x3F\x22\x48\x67\xB0\x96\x28\xAA\xE6\x28"
-+    "\xD9\x0C\x08\xEF\x51\xED\x15\x5E\xA2\x53\x59\xA5\x03\xB4\x06\x20"
-+    "\x3D\xCC\xB4\xC5\xF8\x8C\x73\x67\xA3\x21\x3D\x19\xCD\xD4\x12\x28"
-+    "\xD2\x93\xDE\x0D\xF0\x71\x10\x50\xD6\x33\x35\x04\x11\x64\x43\x39"
-+    "\xC3\xDF\x96\xE3\x66\xE3\x85\xCA\xE7\x67\x14\x3A\xF0\x43\xAA\xBB"
-+    "\xD4\x1D\xB5\x24\xB5\x74\x90\x25\xA7\x87\x7E\xDB\xD3\x83\x8A\x3A"
-+    "\x69\xA8\x2D\xAF\xB7\xB8\xF3\xDC\x13\xAF\x45\x61\x3F\x59\x39\x7E"
-+    "\x69\xDE\x0C\x04\xF1\x10\x6B\xB4\x56\xFA\x21\x9F\x72\x2B\x60\x86"
-+    "\xE3\x23\x0E\xC4\x51\xF6\xBE\xD8\xE1\x5F\xEE\x73\x4C\x17\x4C\x2C"
-+    "\x1B\xFB\x9F\x1F\x7A\x3B\x07\x5B\x8E\xF1\x01\xAC\xD6\x30\x94\x8A"
-+    "\x5D\x22\x6F\x08\xCE\xED\x5E\xB6\xDB\x86\x8C\x87\xEB\x8D\x91\xFF"
-+    "\x0A\x86\x30\xBD\xC0\xF8\x25\xE7\xAE\x24\x35\xF2\xFC\xE5\xFD\x1B"
-+    "\xB0\x05\x4A\xA3\xE5\xEB\x2E\x05\xAD\x99\x67\x49\x87\xE6\xB3\x87"
-+    "\x82\xA4\x59\xA7\x6E\xDD\xF2\xB6\x66\xE8\xF7\x70\xF5\xBD\xC9\x0E"
-+    "\xFA\x9C\x79\x84\xD4\x9B\x05\x0E\xBB\xF5\xDB\xEF\xFC\xCC\x26\xF2"
-+    "\x93\xCF\xD2\x04\x3C\xA9\x2C\x65\x42\x97\x86\xD8\x38\x0A\x1E\xF6"
-+    "\xD6\xCA\x30\xB5\x1A\xEC\xFB\xBA\x3B\x84\x57\xB0\xFD\xFB\xE6\xBC"
-+    "\xF2\x76\xF6\x4C\xBB\xAB\xB1\x31\xA1\x27\x7C\xE6\xE6\x81\xB6\xCE"
-+    "\x84\x86\x40\xB6\x40\x33\xC4\xF8\xB4\x15\xCF\xAA\xA5\x51\x78\xB9"
-+    "\x8B\x50\x25\xB2\x88\x86\x96\x72\x8C\x71\x4D\xB5\x3A\x94\x86\x77"
-+    "\x0E\x95\x9B\x16\x93\xEF\x3A\x11\x79\xBA\x83\xF7\x74\xD3\x8D\xBA"
-+    "\x15\xE1\x2C\x04\x57\xA8\x92\x1E\x9D\x00\x8E\x20\xFD\x30\x70\xE7"
-+    "\xF5\x65\x2F\x19\x0C\x94\xBA\x03\x71\x12\x96\xCD\xC8\xB4\x96\xDB"
-+    "\xCE\x19\xC2\xDF\x3C\xC2\xF6\x3D\x53\xED\x98\xA5\x41\x72\x2A\x22"
-+    "\x7B\xF3\x2B\x17\x6C\xE1\x39\x7D\xAE\x9B\x11\xF9\xC1\xA6\x9E\x9F"
-+    "\x89\x3C\x12\xAA\x94\x74\xA7\x4F\x70\xE8\xB9\xDE\x04\xF0\x9D\x39"
-+    "\x24\x2D\x92\xE8\x46\x2D\x2E\xF0\x40\x66\x1A\xD9\x27\xF9\x98\xF1"
-+    "\x81\x1D\x70\x62\x63\x30\x6D\xCD\x84\x04\x5F\xFA\x83\xD3\xEC\x8D"
-+    "\x86\xFB\x40\x61\xC1\x8A\x45\xFF\x7B\xD9\xD4\x18\x61\x7F\x51\xE3"
-+    "\xFC\x1E\x18\xF0\xAF\xC6\x18\x2C\xE1\x6D\x5D\xF9\x62\xFC\x20\xA3"
-+    "\xB2\x8A\x5F\xE5\xBB\x29\x0F\x99\x63\x07\x88\x38\x3A\x3B\x73\x2A"
-+    "\x6D\xDA\x3D\xA8\x0D\x8F\x56\x41\x89\x82\xE5\xB8\x61\x00\x64\x7D"
-+    "\x17\x0C\xCE\x03\x55\x8F\xF4\x5B\x0D\x50\xF2\xEB\x05\x67\xBE\xDB"
-+    "\x7B\x75\xC5\xEA\xA1\xAB\x1D\xB0\x3C\x6D\x42\x08\x0B\x9A\x45\x20"
-+    "\xA8\x8F\xE5\x67\x47\x30\xDE\x93\x5F\x43\x05\xEB\xA8\x2D\x80\xF5"
-+    "\x1A\xB8\x4A\x4E\x42\x2D\x0B\x7A\xDC\x46\x20\x2D\x13\x17\xDD\x4B"
-+    "\x94\x96\xAA\x1F\x06\x0C\x1F\x62\x07\x9C\x40\xA1"
-+};
-+
-+static void
-+test_pac_ticket_signature(krb5_context context)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_ticket *ticket;
-+    krb5_principal sprinc;
-+    krb5_authdata **authdata1, **authdata2;
-+    krb5_pac pac, pac2, pac3;
-+    uint32_t *list;
-+    size_t len, i;
-+    krb5_data data;
-+
-+    ret = krb5_decode_ticket(&ticket_data, &ticket);
-+    if (ret)
-+        err(context, ret, "while decoding ticket");
-+
-+    ret = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(context, &ticket_sig_server_key, ticket);
-+    if (ret)
-+        err(context, ret, "while decrypting ticket");
-+
-+    ret = krb5_parse_name(context, "s1@CDOM.COM", &sprinc);
-+    if (ret)
-+        err(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name");
-+
-+    ret = krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(context, ticket->enc_part2, sprinc,
-+                                 &ticket_sig_server_key,
-+                                 &ticket_sig_krbtgt_key, &pac);
-+    if (ret)
-+        err(context, ret, "while verifying ticket");
-+
-+    /* In this test, the server is also the client. */
-+    ret = krb5_pac_verify(context, pac, ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
-+                          ticket->server, NULL, NULL);
-+    if (ret)
-+        err(context, ret, "while verifying PAC client info");
-+
-+    /* We know there is only a PAC in this test's ticket. */
-+    authdata1 = ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data;
-+    ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data = NULL;
-+
-+    ret = krb5_kdc_sign_ticket(context, ticket->enc_part2, pac, sprinc,
-+                               sprinc, &ticket_sig_server_key,
-+                               &ticket_sig_krbtgt_key, FALSE);
-+    if (ret)
-+        err(context, ret, "while signing ticket");
-+
-+    authdata2 = ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data;
-+    assert(authdata2 != NULL);
-+    assert(authdata2[1] == NULL);
-+
-+    assert(authdata1[0]->length == authdata2[0]->length);
-+    assert(memcmp(authdata1[0]->contents, authdata2[0]->contents,
-+                  authdata1[0]->length) == 0);
-+
-+    /* Test adding signatures to a new PAC. */
-+    ret = krb5_pac_init(context, &pac2);
-+    if (ret)
-+        err(context, ret, "krb5_pac_init");
-+
-+    ret = krb5_pac_get_types(context, pac, &len, &list);
-+    if (ret)
-+        err(context, ret, "krb5_pac_get_types");
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-+        /* Skip server_cksum, privsvr_cksum, and ticket_cksum. */
-+        if (list[i] == 6 || list[i] == 7 || list[i] == 16)
-+            continue;
-+
-+        ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, list[i], &data);
-+        if (ret)
-+            err(context, ret, "krb5_pac_get_buffer");
-+
-+        ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, pac2, list[i], &data);
-+        if (ret)
-+            err(context, ret, "krb5_pac_add_buffer");
-+
-+        krb5_free_data_contents(context, &data);
-+    }
-+    free(list);
-+
-+    krb5_free_authdata(context, authdata1);
-+    krb5_free_authdata(context, ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data);
-+    ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data = NULL;
-+
-+    ret = krb5_kdc_sign_ticket(context, ticket->enc_part2, pac2, sprinc, NULL,
-+                               &ticket_sig_server_key, &ticket_sig_krbtgt_key,
-+                               FALSE);
-+    if (ret)
-+        err(context, ret, "while signing ticket");
-+
-+    /* We can't compare the data since the order of the buffers may differ. */
-+    ret = krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(context, ticket->enc_part2, sprinc,
-+                                 &ticket_sig_server_key,
-+                                 &ticket_sig_krbtgt_key, &pac3);
-+    if (ret)
-+        err(context, ret, "while verifying ticket");
-+
-+    krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
-+    krb5_pac_free(context, pac2);
-+    krb5_pac_free(context, pac3);
-+    krb5_free_principal(context, sprinc);
-+    krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
-+}
-+
- int
- main(int argc, char **argv)
- {
-@@ -618,6 +798,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
-     if (ret)
-         err(NULL, 0, "krb5_init_contex");
- 
-+    test_pac_ticket_signature(context);
-+
-     ret = krb5_set_default_realm(context, "WIN2K3.THINKER.LOCAL");
-     if (ret)
-         err(context, ret, "krb5_set_default_realm");
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports b/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
-index 48ae46f5c4..28784ec67c 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
-@@ -462,6 +462,8 @@ krb5_is_permitted_enctype
- krb5_is_referral_realm
- krb5_is_thread_safe
- krb5_kdc_rep_decrypt_proc
-+krb5_kdc_sign_ticket
-+krb5_kdc_verify_ticket
- krb5_kt_add_entry
- krb5_kt_client_default
- krb5_kt_close
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5_32.def b/src/lib/krb5_32.def
-index 209c6aaef5..8c3469a96c 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5_32.def
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5_32.def
-@@ -506,3 +506,6 @@ EXPORTS
- ; new in 1.20
- 	krb5_marshal_credentials			@472
- 	krb5_unmarshal_credentials			@473
-+	k5_sname_compare				@474 ; PRIVATE GSSAPI
-+	krb5_kdc_sign_ticket                            @475 ;
-+	krb5_kdc_verify_ticket                          @476 ;
-diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/test/kdb_test.c b/src/plugins/kdb/test/kdb_test.c
-index 38d371cb86..7d033acae4 100644
---- a/src/plugins/kdb/test/kdb_test.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/kdb/test/kdb_test.c
-@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ verify_kdc_signature(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac,
-     int tries;
- 
-     ret = krb5_pac_verify(context, pac, 0, NULL, NULL, tgt_key);
--    if (ret != KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY)
-+    if (ret != KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED)
-         return ret;
- 
-     kvno = tgt->key_data[0].key_data_kvno - 1;
-@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ verify_kdc_signature(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac,
-     for (tries = 2; tries > 0 && kvno > 0; tries--, kvno--) {
-         ret = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, tgt, -1, -1, kvno, &kd);
-         if (ret)
--            return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
-+            return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
-         ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, kd, &old_key, NULL);
-         if (ret)
-             return ret;
-@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ verify_kdc_signature(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac,
-         kvno = kd->key_data_kvno - 1;
-     }
- 
--    return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
-+    return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
- }
- 
- static krb5_error_code
--- 
-2.39.2
-

SOURCES/Add-a-simple-DER-support-header.patch

@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-From 5c2f409c360560c8b99926d6cf1a80419e758b22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 00:19:33 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Add a simple DER support header
-
-(cherry picked from commit 548da160b52b25a106e9f6077d6a42c2c049586c)
----
- src/include/k5-der.h | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 149 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 src/include/k5-der.h
-
-diff --git a/src/include/k5-der.h b/src/include/k5-der.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..b8371d9b4d
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/src/include/k5-der.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
-+/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
-+/* include/k5-der.h - Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) declarations */
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2023 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
-+ * All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ *   the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ *   distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
-+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
-+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
-+ * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
-+ * COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
-+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
-+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
-+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Most ASN.1 encoding and decoding is done using the table-driven framework in
-+ * libkrb5.  When that is not an option, these helpers can be used to encode
-+ * and decode simple types.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef K5_DER_H
-+#define K5_DER_H
-+
-+#include <stdint.h>
-+#include <stdbool.h>
-+#include "k5-buf.h"
-+#include "k5-input.h"
-+
-+/* Return the number of bytes needed to encode len as a DER encoding length. */
-+static inline size_t
-+k5_der_len_len(size_t len)
-+{
-+    size_t llen;
-+
-+    if (len < 128)
-+        return 1;
-+    llen = 1;
-+    while (len > 0) {
-+        len >>= 8;
-+        llen++;
-+    }
-+    return llen;
-+}
-+
-+/* Return the number of bytes needed to encode a DER value (with identifier
-+ * byte and length) for a given contents length. */
-+static inline size_t
-+k5_der_value_len(size_t contents_len)
-+{
-+    return 1 + k5_der_len_len(contents_len) + contents_len;
-+}
-+
-+/* Add a DER identifier byte (composed by the caller, including the ASN.1
-+ * class, tag, and constructed bit) and length. */
-+static inline void
-+k5_der_add_taglen(struct k5buf *buf, uint8_t idbyte, size_t len)
-+{
-+    uint8_t *p;
-+    size_t llen = k5_der_len_len(len);
-+
-+    p = k5_buf_get_space(buf, 1 + llen);
-+    if (p == NULL)
-+        return;
-+    *p++ = idbyte;
-+    if (len < 128) {
-+        *p = len;
-+    } else {
-+        *p = 0x80 | (llen - 1);
-+        /* Encode the length bytes backwards so the most significant byte is
-+         * first. */
-+        p += llen;
-+        while (len > 0) {
-+            *--p = len & 0xFF;
-+            len >>= 8;
-+        }
-+    }
-+}
-+
-+/* Add a DER value (identifier byte, length, and contents). */
-+static inline void
-+k5_der_add_value(struct k5buf *buf, uint8_t idbyte, const void *contents,
-+                 size_t len)
-+{
-+    k5_der_add_taglen(buf, idbyte, len);
-+    k5_buf_add_len(buf, contents, len);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * If the next byte in in matches idbyte and the subsequent DER length is
-+ * valid, advance in past the value, set *contents_out to the value contents,
-+ * and return true.  Otherwise return false.  Only set an error on in if the
-+ * next bytes matches idbyte but the ensuing length is invalid.  contents_out
-+ * may be aliased to in; it will only be written to on successful decoding of a
-+ * value.
-+ */
-+static inline bool
-+k5_der_get_value(struct k5input *in, uint8_t idbyte,
-+                 struct k5input *contents_out)
-+{
-+    uint8_t lenbyte, i;
-+    size_t len;
-+    const void *bytes;
-+
-+    /* Do nothing if in is empty or the next byte doesn't match idbyte. */
-+    if (in->status || in->len == 0 || *in->ptr != idbyte)
-+        return false;
-+
-+    /* Advance past the identifier byte and decode the length. */
-+    (void)k5_input_get_byte(in);
-+    lenbyte = k5_input_get_byte(in);
-+    if (lenbyte < 128) {
-+        len = lenbyte;
-+    } else {
-+        len = 0;
-+        for (i = 0; i < (lenbyte & 0x7F); i++) {
-+            if (len > (SIZE_MAX >> 8)) {
-+                k5_input_set_status(in, EOVERFLOW);
-+                return false;
-+            }
-+            len = (len << 8) | k5_input_get_byte(in);
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    bytes = k5_input_get_bytes(in, len);
-+    if (bytes == NULL)
-+        return false;
-+    k5_input_init(contents_out, bytes, len);
-+    return true;
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* K5_DER_H */
--- 
-2.45.1
-

SOURCES/Add-request_timeout-configuration-parameter.patch

@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-From 433dd85aaf8d9ed0e923c873f107995232b94422 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 14:20:34 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Add request_timeout configuration parameter
-
-Add a parameter to limit the total amount of time taken for a KDC or
-password change request.
-
-ticket: 9106 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit 802318cda963456b3ed7856c836e89da891483be)
----
- doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst |  9 ++++++
- src/include/k5-int.h               |  2 ++
- src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c        | 14 +++++++-
- src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c       | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-index 315253e378..557094f6a2 100644
---- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-@@ -357,6 +357,15 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
-     (:ref:`duration` string.)  Sets the default renewable lifetime
-     for initial ticket requests.  The default value is 0.
- 
-+**request_timeout**
-+    (:ref:`duration` string.)  Sets the maximum total time for KDC or
-+    password change requests.  This timeout does not affect the
-+    intervals between requests, so setting a low timeout may result in
-+    fewer requests being attempted and/or some servers not being
-+    contacted.  A value of 0 indicates no specific maximum, in which
-+    case requests will time out if no server responds after several
-+    tries.  The default value is 0.  (New in release 1.22.)
-+
- **spake_preauth_groups**
-     A whitespace or comma-separated list of words which specifies the
-     groups allowed for SPAKE preauthentication.  The possible values
-diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
-index 912aaedac4..9d5e41ca2c 100644
---- a/src/include/k5-int.h
-+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
-@@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ typedef unsigned char   u_char;
- #define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_INDICATOR      "spake_preauth_indicator"
- #define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_KDC_CHALLENGE  "spake_preauth_kdc_challenge"
- #define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_GROUPS         "spake_preauth_groups"
-+#define KRB5_CONF_REQUEST_TIMEOUT              "request_timeout"
- #define KRB5_CONF_TICKET_LIFETIME              "ticket_lifetime"
- #define KRB5_CONF_UDP_PREFERENCE_LIMIT         "udp_preference_limit"
- #define KRB5_CONF_UNLOCKITER                   "unlockiter"
-@@ -1218,6 +1219,7 @@ struct _krb5_context {
-     kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle;
-     /* allowable clock skew */
-     krb5_deltat     clockskew;
-+    krb5_deltat     req_timeout;
-     krb5_flags      kdc_default_options;
-     krb5_flags      library_options;
-     krb5_boolean    profile_secure;
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
-index 9a4741fa64..1a6e0bf672 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
-@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
-     } seed_data;
-     krb5_data seed;
-     int tmp;
--    char *plugin_dir = NULL;
-+    char *plugin_dir = NULL, *timeout_str = NULL;
- 
-     /* Verify some assumptions.  If the assumptions hold and the
-        compiler is optimizing, this should result in no code being
-@@ -257,6 +257,17 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
-     get_integer(ctx, KRB5_CONF_CLOCKSKEW, DEFAULT_CLOCKSKEW, &tmp);
-     ctx->clockskew = tmp;
- 
-+    retval = profile_get_string(ctx->profile, KRB5_CONF_LIBDEFAULTS,
-+                                KRB5_CONF_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, NULL, NULL,
-+                                &timeout_str);
-+    if (retval)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    if (timeout_str != NULL) {
-+        retval = krb5_string_to_deltat(timeout_str, &ctx->req_timeout);
-+        if (retval)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-     get_integer(ctx, KRB5_CONF_KDC_DEFAULT_OPTIONS, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK,
-                 &tmp);
-     ctx->kdc_default_options = tmp;
-@@ -298,6 +309,7 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
- 
- cleanup:
-     profile_release_string(plugin_dir);
-+    profile_release_string(timeout_str);
-     krb5_free_context(ctx);
-     return retval;
- }
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
-index 8e4fcd2a38..f57117126e 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
-@@ -1390,34 +1390,41 @@ get_endtime(time_ms endtime, struct conn_state *conns)
- 
- static krb5_boolean
- service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
--            time_ms interval, struct conn_state *conns,
-+            time_ms interval, time_ms timeout, struct conn_state *conns,
-             struct select_state *seltemp, const krb5_data *realm,
-             int (*msg_handler)(krb5_context, const krb5_data *, void *),
-             void *msg_handler_data, struct conn_state **winner_out)
- {
-     int e, selret = 0;
--    time_ms endtime;
-+    time_ms curtime, interval_end, endtime;
-     struct conn_state *state;
- 
-     *winner_out = NULL;
- 
--    e = get_curtime_ms(&endtime);
-+    e = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
-     if (e)
-         return TRUE;
--    endtime += interval;
-+    interval_end = curtime + interval;
- 
-     e = 0;
-     while (selstate->nfds > 0) {
--        e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, get_endtime(endtime, conns),
--                              seltemp, &selret);
-+        endtime = get_endtime(interval_end, conns);
-+        /* Don't wait longer than the whole request should last. */
-+        if (timeout && endtime > timeout)
-+            endtime = timeout;
-+        e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, endtime, seltemp, &selret);
-         if (e == EINTR)
-             continue;
-         if (e != 0)
-             break;
- 
--        if (selret == 0)
--            /* Timeout, return to caller.  */
-+        if (selret == 0) {
-+            /* We timed out.  Stop if we hit the overall request timeout. */
-+            if (timeout && (get_curtime_ms(&curtime) || curtime >= timeout))
-+                return TRUE;
-+            /* Otherwise return to the caller to send the next request. */
-             return FALSE;
-+        }
- 
-         /* Got something on a socket, process it.  */
-         for (state = conns; state != NULL; state = state->next) {
-@@ -1490,7 +1497,7 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
-           void *msg_handler_data)
- {
-     int pass;
--    time_ms delay;
-+    time_ms delay, timeout = 0;
-     krb5_error_code retval;
-     struct conn_state *conns = NULL, *state, **tailptr, *next, *winner;
-     size_t s;
-@@ -1500,6 +1507,13 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
- 
-     *reply = empty_data();
- 
-+    if (context->req_timeout) {
-+        retval = get_curtime_ms(&timeout);
-+        if (retval)
-+            return retval;
-+        timeout += 1000 * context->req_timeout;
-+    }
-+
-     /* One for use here, listing all our fds in use, and one for
-      * temporary use in service_fds, for the fds of interest.  */
-     sel_state = malloc(2 * sizeof(*sel_state));
-@@ -1527,8 +1541,9 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
-             if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
-                            callback_info))
-                 continue;
--            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
--                               realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
-+            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns,
-+                               seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
-+                               &winner);
-         }
-     }
- 
-@@ -1540,13 +1555,13 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
-         if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
-                        callback_info))
-             continue;
--        done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
-+        done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns, seltemp,
-                            realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
-     }
- 
-     /* Wait for two seconds at the end of the first pass. */
-     if (!done) {
--        done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 2000, conns, seltemp,
-+        done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 2000, timeout, conns, seltemp,
-                            realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
-     }
- 
-@@ -1557,15 +1572,17 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
-             if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
-                            callback_info))
-                 continue;
--            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
--                               realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
-+            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns,
-+                               seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
-+                               &winner);
-             if (sel_state->nfds == 0)
-                 break;
-         }
-         /* Wait for the delay backoff at the end of this pass. */
-         if (!done) {
--            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, delay, conns, seltemp,
--                               realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
-+            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, delay, timeout, conns,
-+                               seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
-+                               &winner);
-         }
-         if (sel_state->nfds == 0)
-             break;
--- 
-2.44.0
-

SOURCES/End-connection-on-KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From a68fba22588cc21dcd1dc28550529187dca58331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 00:44:53 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] End connection on KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE
-
-In sendto_kdc.c:service_fds(), if a message handler indicates that a
-message should be discarded, kill the connection so we don't continue
-waiting on it for more data.
-
-ticket: 7899
-(cherry picked from commit ca80f64c786341d5871ae1de18142e62af64f7b9)
----
- src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
-index d76e24ccf0..8e4fcd2a38 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
-@@ -1435,7 +1435,10 @@ service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
-                 if (msg_handler != NULL) {
-                     krb5_data reply = make_data(state->in.buf, state->in.pos);
- 
--                    stop = (msg_handler(context, &reply, msg_handler_data) != 0);
-+                    if (!msg_handler(context, &reply, msg_handler_data)) {
-+                        kill_conn(context, state, selstate);
-+                        stop = 0;
-+                    }
-                 }
- 
-                 if (stop) {
--- 
-2.44.0
-

SOURCES/Factor-out-PAC-checksum-verification.patch

@@ -1,258 +0,0 @@
-From b0372e31b81321a820204450a35c7633caf1b7dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 02:05:58 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Factor out PAC checksum verification
-
-Reduce code repetition in PAC checksum handling by adding a helper
-function.  Remove the unnecessary prefix on several function names.
----
- src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c | 173 +++++++++++++----------------------------
- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-index 6eb23d8090..2f6ad4e1df 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-@@ -493,10 +493,8 @@ k5_pac_validate_client(krb5_context context,
- }
- 
- static krb5_error_code
--k5_pac_zero_signature(krb5_context context,
--                      const krb5_pac pac,
--                      krb5_ui_4 type,
--                      krb5_data *data)
-+zero_signature(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac, krb5_ui_4 type,
-+               krb5_data *data)
- {
-     PAC_INFO_BUFFER *buffer = NULL;
-     size_t i;
-@@ -530,151 +528,89 @@ k5_pac_zero_signature(krb5_context context,
- }
- 
- static krb5_error_code
--k5_pac_verify_server_checksum(krb5_context context,
--                              const krb5_pac pac,
--                              const krb5_keyblock *server)
-+verify_checksum(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac, uint32_t buffer_type,
-+                const krb5_keyblock *key, krb5_keyusage usage,
-+                const krb5_data *data)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
--    krb5_data pac_data; /* PAC with zeroed checksums */
-+    krb5_data buffer;
-+    krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
-     krb5_checksum checksum;
--    krb5_data checksum_data;
-     krb5_boolean valid;
--    krb5_octet *p;
-+    size_t cksumlen;
- 
--    ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM,
--                               &checksum_data);
-+    ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, buffer_type, &buffer);
-     if (ret != 0)
-         return ret;
--
--    if (checksum_data.length < PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH)
-+    if (buffer.length < PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH)
-         return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
- 
--    p = (krb5_octet *)checksum_data.data;
--    checksum.checksum_type = load_32_le(p);
--    checksum.length = checksum_data.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--    checksum.contents = p + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--    if (checksum.checksum_type == CKSUMTYPE_SHA1)
-+    cksumtype = load_32_le(buffer.data);
-+    if (buffer_type == KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM && cksumtype == CKSUMTYPE_SHA1)
-         return KRB5KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP;
--    if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(checksum.checksum_type))
-+    if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(cksumtype))
-         return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- 
--    pac_data.length = pac->data.length;
--    pac_data.data = k5memdup(pac->data.data, pac->data.length, &ret);
--    if (pac_data.data == NULL)
--        return ret;
--
--    /* Zero out both checksum buffers */
--    ret = k5_pac_zero_signature(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM,
--                                &pac_data);
--    if (ret != 0) {
--        free(pac_data.data);
--        return ret;
--    }
--
--    ret = k5_pac_zero_signature(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM,
--                                &pac_data);
--    if (ret != 0) {
--        free(pac_data.data);
-+    /* There may be an RODCIdentifier trailer (see [MS-PAC] 2.8), so look up
-+     * the length of the checksum by its type. */
-+    ret = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, cksumtype, &cksumlen);
-+    if (ret)
-         return ret;
--    }
-+    if (cksumlen > buffer.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH)
-+        return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
-+    checksum.checksum_type = cksumtype;
-+    checksum.length = cksumlen;
-+    checksum.contents = (uint8_t *)buffer.data + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
- 
--    ret = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context, server,
--                                 KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM,
--                                 &pac_data, &checksum, &valid);
-+    ret = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context, key, usage, data, &checksum, &valid);
-+    return ret ? ret : (valid ? 0 : KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED);
-+}
- 
--    free(pac_data.data);
-+static krb5_error_code
-+verify_server_checksum(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac,
-+                       const krb5_keyblock *server)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_data copy;             /* PAC with zeroed checksums */
- 
--    if (ret != 0) {
-+    ret = krb5int_copy_data_contents(context, &pac->data, &copy);
-+    if (ret)
-         return ret;
--    }
- 
--    if (valid == FALSE)
--        ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
-+    /* Zero out both checksum buffers */
-+    ret = zero_signature(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM, &copy);
-+    if (ret)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    ret = zero_signature(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM, &copy);
-+    if (ret)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-+    ret = verify_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM, server,
-+                          KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, &copy);
- 
-+cleanup:
-+    free(copy.data);
-     return ret;
- }
- 
- static krb5_error_code
--k5_pac_verify_kdc_checksum(krb5_context context,
--                           const krb5_pac pac,
--                           const krb5_keyblock *privsvr)
-+verify_kdc_checksum(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac,
-+                    const krb5_keyblock *privsvr)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
--    krb5_data server_checksum, privsvr_checksum;
--    krb5_checksum checksum;
--    krb5_boolean valid;
--    krb5_octet *p;
--
--    ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM,
--                               &privsvr_checksum);
--    if (ret != 0)
--        return ret;
--
--    if (privsvr_checksum.length < PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH)
--        return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
-+    krb5_data server_checksum;
- 
-     ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM,
-                                &server_checksum);
--    if (ret != 0)
-+    if (ret)
-         return ret;
--
-     if (server_checksum.length < PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH)
-         return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
--
--    p = (krb5_octet *)privsvr_checksum.data;
--    checksum.checksum_type = load_32_le(p);
--    checksum.length = privsvr_checksum.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--    checksum.contents = p + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--    if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(checksum.checksum_type))
--        return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
--
-     server_checksum.data += PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
-     server_checksum.length -= PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
- 
--    ret = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context, privsvr,
--                                 KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM,
--                                 &server_checksum, &checksum, &valid);
--    if (ret != 0)
--        return ret;
--
--    if (valid == FALSE)
--        ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
--
--    return ret;
--}
--
--static krb5_error_code
--verify_ticket_checksum(krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac,
--                       const krb5_data *ticket, const krb5_keyblock *privsvr)
--{
--    krb5_error_code ret;
--    krb5_checksum checksum;
--    krb5_data checksum_data;
--    krb5_boolean valid;
--    krb5_octet *p;
--
--    ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM,
--                               &checksum_data);
--    if (ret != 0)
--        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
--
--    if (checksum_data.length < PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH)
--        return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
--
--    p = (krb5_octet *)checksum_data.data;
--    checksum.checksum_type = load_32_le(p);
--    checksum.length = checksum_data.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--    checksum.contents = p + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
--    if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(checksum.checksum_type))
--        return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
--
--    ret = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context, privsvr,
--                                 KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, ticket,
--                                 &checksum, &valid);
--    if (ret != 0)
--        return ret;
--
--    return valid ? 0 : KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
-+    return verify_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM, privsvr,
-+                           KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, &server_checksum);
- }
- 
- /* Per MS-PAC 2.8.3, tickets encrypted to TGS and password change principals
-@@ -761,7 +697,8 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
-         if (ret)
-             goto cleanup;
- 
--        ret = verify_ticket_checksum(context, pac, recoded_tkt, privsvr);
-+        ret = verify_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM, privsvr,
-+                              KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, recoded_tkt);
-         if (ret)
-             goto cleanup;
-     }
-@@ -804,13 +741,13 @@ krb5_pac_verify_ext(krb5_context context,
-     krb5_error_code ret;
- 
-     if (server != NULL) {
--        ret = k5_pac_verify_server_checksum(context, pac, server);
-+        ret = verify_server_checksum(context, pac, server);
-         if (ret != 0)
-             return ret;
-     }
- 
-     if (privsvr != NULL) {
--        ret = k5_pac_verify_kdc_checksum(context, pac, privsvr);
-+        ret = verify_kdc_checksum(context, pac, privsvr);
-         if (ret != 0)
-             return ret;
-     }
--- 
-2.39.2
-

SOURCES/Fix-defcred-leak-in-krb5-gss_inquire_cred.patch

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From 058dfbaed97c8e09ac4f3f7a1655b64ab3cf0144 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2021 13:44:30 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix defcred leak in krb5 gss_inquire_cred()
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Commit 1cd2821c19b2b95e39d5fc2f451a035585a40fa5 altered the memory
-management of krb5_gss_inquire_cred(), introducing defcred to act as
-an owner pointer when the function must acquire a default credential.
-The commit neglected to update the code to release the default cred
-along the successful path.  The old code does not trigger because
-cred_handle is now reassigned, so the default credential is leaked.
-
-Reported by Pavel Březina.
-
-(a minimal alternative to commit 593e16448e1af23eef74689afe06a7bcc86e79c7)
-
-ticket: 9016
-version_fixed: 1.18.4
-
-(cherry picked from commit b92be484630b38e26f5ee4bd67973fbd7627009c)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/inq_cred.c | 4 +---
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/inq_cred.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/inq_cred.c
-index a8f2541102..cd8384d08c 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/inq_cred.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/inq_cred.c
-@@ -197,9 +197,7 @@ krb5_gss_inquire_cred(minor_status, cred_handle, name, lifetime_ret,
-         mechs = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
-     }
- 
--    if (cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
--        krb5_gss_release_cred(minor_status, (gss_cred_id_t *)&cred);
--
-+    krb5_gss_release_cred(minor_status, &defcred);
-     krb5_free_context(context);
-     *minor_status = 0;
-     return((lifetime == 0)?GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED:GSS_S_COMPLETE);
--- 
-2.44.0
-

SOURCES/Fix-two-unlikely-memory-leaks.patch

@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
-From efb3acd20cbe6330439635a9f297b9dae8a0a5d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 19:53:07 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix two unlikely memory leaks
-
-In gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(), one of the bounds checks (which
-could probably never be triggered) leaks plain.data.  Fix this leak
-and use current practices for cleanup throughout the function.
-
-In xmt_rmtcallres() (unused within the tree and likely elsewhere),
-store port_ptr into crp->port_ptr as soon as it is allocated;
-otherwise it could leak if the subsequent xdr_u_int32() operation
-fails.
-
-(cherry picked from commit c5f9c816107f70139de11b38aa02db2f1774ee0d)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c | 56 +++++++++++++++-------------------
- src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c         |  9 +++---
- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
-index 3b4f8cb837..e881eee835 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
-                                 int conf_req_flag, int toktype)
- {
-     size_t bufsize = 16;
--    unsigned char *outbuf = 0;
-+    unsigned char *outbuf = NULL;
-     krb5_error_code err;
-     int key_usage;
-     unsigned char acceptor_flag;
-@@ -75,9 +75,13 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
- #endif
-     size_t ec;
-     unsigned short tok_id;
--    krb5_checksum sum;
-+    krb5_checksum sum = { 0 };
-     krb5_key key;
-     krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
-+    krb5_data plain = empty_data();
-+
-+    token->value = NULL;
-+    token->length = 0;
- 
-     acceptor_flag = ctx->initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
-     key_usage = (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG
-@@ -107,14 +111,15 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
- #endif
- 
-     if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && conf_req_flag) {
--        krb5_data plain;
-         krb5_enc_data cipher;
-         size_t ec_max;
-         size_t encrypt_size;
- 
-         /* 300: Adds some slop.  */
--        if (SIZE_MAX - 300 < message->length)
--            return ENOMEM;
-+        if (SIZE_MAX - 300 < message->length) {
-+            err = ENOMEM;
-+            goto cleanup;
-+        }
-         ec_max = SIZE_MAX - message->length - 300;
-         if (ec_max > 0xffff)
-             ec_max = 0xffff;
-@@ -126,20 +131,20 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
- #endif
-         err = alloc_data(&plain, message->length + 16 + ec);
-         if (err)
--            return err;
-+            goto cleanup;
- 
-         /* Get size of ciphertext.  */
-         encrypt_size = krb5_encrypt_size(plain.length, key->keyblock.enctype);
-         if (encrypt_size > SIZE_MAX / 2) {
-             err = ENOMEM;
--            goto error;
-+            goto cleanup;
-         }
-         bufsize = 16 + encrypt_size;
-         /* Allocate space for header plus encrypted data.  */
-         outbuf = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize);
-         if (outbuf == NULL) {
--            free(plain.data);
--            return ENOMEM;
-+            err = ENOMEM;
-+            goto cleanup;
-         }
- 
-         /* TOK_ID */
-@@ -164,11 +169,8 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
-         cipher.ciphertext.length = bufsize - 16;
-         cipher.enctype = key->keyblock.enctype;
-         err = krb5_k_encrypt(context, key, key_usage, 0, &plain, &cipher);
--        zap(plain.data, plain.length);
--        free(plain.data);
--        plain.data = 0;
-         if (err)
--            goto error;
-+            goto cleanup;
- 
-         /* Now that we know we're returning a valid token....  */
-         ctx->seq_send++;
-@@ -181,7 +183,6 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
-         /* If the rotate fails, don't worry about it.  */
- #endif
-     } else if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && !conf_req_flag) {
--        krb5_data plain;
-         size_t cksumsize;
- 
-         /* Here, message is the application-supplied data; message2 is
-@@ -193,21 +194,19 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
-     wrap_with_checksum:
-         err = alloc_data(&plain, message->length + 16);
-         if (err)
--            return err;
-+            goto cleanup;
- 
-         err = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, cksumtype, &cksumsize);
-         if (err)
--            goto error;
-+            goto cleanup;
- 
-         assert(cksumsize <= 0xffff);
- 
-         bufsize = 16 + message2->length + cksumsize;
-         outbuf = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize);
-         if (outbuf == NULL) {
--            free(plain.data);
--            plain.data = 0;
-             err = ENOMEM;
--            goto error;
-+            goto cleanup;
-         }
- 
-         /* TOK_ID */
-@@ -239,23 +238,15 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
-         if (message2->length)
-             memcpy(outbuf + 16, message2->value, message2->length);
- 
--        sum.contents = outbuf + 16 + message2->length;
--        sum.length = cksumsize;
--
-         err = krb5_k_make_checksum(context, cksumtype, key,
-                                    key_usage, &plain, &sum);
--        zap(plain.data, plain.length);
--        free(plain.data);
--        plain.data = 0;
-         if (err) {
-             zap(outbuf,bufsize);
--            goto error;
-+            goto cleanup;
-         }
-         if (sum.length != cksumsize)
-             abort();
-         memcpy(outbuf + 16 + message2->length, sum.contents, cksumsize);
--        krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &sum);
--        sum.contents = 0;
-         /* Now that we know we're actually generating the token...  */
-         ctx->seq_send++;
- 
-@@ -285,12 +276,13 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
- 
-     token->value = outbuf;
-     token->length = bufsize;
--    return 0;
-+    outbuf = NULL;
-+    err = 0;
- 
--error:
-+cleanup:
-+    krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &sum);
-+    zapfree(plain.data, plain.length);
-     gssalloc_free(outbuf);
--    token->value = NULL;
--    token->length = 0;
-     return err;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c b/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
-index 8c7e30c21a..0748af34a7 100644
---- a/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
-+++ b/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
-@@ -160,11 +160,12 @@ xdr_rmtcallres(
- 	caddr_t port_ptr;
- 
- 	port_ptr = (caddr_t)(void *)crp->port_ptr;
--	if (xdr_reference(xdrs, &port_ptr, sizeof (uint32_t),
--	    xdr_u_int32) && xdr_u_int32(xdrs, &crp->resultslen)) {
--		crp->port_ptr = (uint32_t *)(void *)port_ptr;
-+	if (!xdr_reference(xdrs, &port_ptr, sizeof (uint32_t),
-+			   (xdrproc_t)xdr_u_int32))
-+		return (FALSE);
-+	crp->port_ptr = (uint32_t *)(void *)port_ptr;
-+	if (xdr_u_int32(xdrs, &crp->resultslen))
- 		return ((*(crp->xdr_results))(xdrs, crp->results_ptr));
--	}
- 	return (FALSE);
- }
- 
--- 
-2.44.0
-

SOURCES/Fix-vulnerabilities-in-GSS-message-token-handling.patch

@@ -1,535 +0,0 @@
-From c73e8ed9f89fdc709d15656b6431492d43de94ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 10:56:12 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix vulnerabilities in GSS message token handling
-
-In gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3() and gss_krb5int_unseal_v3_iov(),
-verify the Extra Count field of CFX wrap tokens against the encrypted
-header.  Reported by Jacob Champion.
-
-In gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(), check for a decrypted plaintext
-length too short to contain the encrypted header and extra count
-bytes.  Reported by Jacob Champion.
-
-In kg_unseal_iov_token(), separately track the header IOV length and
-complete token length when parsing the token's ASN.1 wrapper.  This
-fix contains modified versions of functions from k5-der.h and
-util_token.c; this duplication will be cleaned up in a future commit.
-
-CVE-2024-37370:
-
-In MIT krb5 release 1.3 and later, an attacker can modify the
-plaintext Extra Count field of a confidential GSS krb5 wrap token,
-causing the unwrapped token to appear truncated to the application.
-
-CVE-2024-37371:
-
-In MIT krb5 release 1.3 and later, an attacker can cause invalid
-memory reads by sending message tokens with invalid length fields.
-
-ticket: 9128 (new)
-tags: pullup
-target_version: 1.21-next
-
-(cherry picked from commit b0a2f8a5365f2eec3e27d78907de9f9d2c80505a)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c    |   5 +
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3iov.c |   3 +-
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c |  80 +++++++++-
- src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c      | 233 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 4 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
-index e881eee835..d3210c1107 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
-@@ -400,10 +400,15 @@ gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(krb5_context *contextptr,
-             /* Don't use bodysize here!  Use the fact that
-                cipher.ciphertext.length has been adjusted to the
-                correct length.  */
-+            if (plain.length < 16 + ec) {
-+                free(plain.data);
-+                goto defective;
-+            }
-             althdr = (unsigned char *)plain.data + plain.length - 16;
-             if (load_16_be(althdr) != KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG
-                 || althdr[2] != ptr[2]
-                 || althdr[3] != ptr[3]
-+                || load_16_be(althdr+4) != ec
-                 || memcmp(althdr+8, ptr+8, 8)) {
-                 free(plain.data);
-                 goto defective;
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3iov.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3iov.c
-index 333ee124dd..f8e90c35b4 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3iov.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3iov.c
-@@ -402,9 +402,10 @@ gss_krb5int_unseal_v3_iov(krb5_context context,
-             if (load_16_be(althdr) != KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG
-                 || althdr[2] != ptr[2]
-                 || althdr[3] != ptr[3]
-+                || load_16_be(althdr + 4) != ec
-                 || memcmp(althdr + 8, ptr + 8, 8) != 0) {
-                 *minor_status = 0;
--                return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
-+                return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-             }
-         } else {
-             /* Verify checksum: note EC is checksum size here, not padding */
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c
-index 3ce2a90ce9..6a6585d9af 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
-  */
- 
- #include "k5-int.h"
-+#include "k5-der.h"
- #include "gssapiP_krb5.h"
- 
- static OM_uint32
-@@ -247,6 +248,73 @@ cleanup:
-     return retval;
- }
- 
-+/* Similar to k5_der_get_value(), but output an unchecked content length
-+ * instead of a k5input containing the contents. */
-+static inline bool
-+get_der_tag(struct k5input *in, uint8_t idbyte, size_t *len_out)
-+{
-+    uint8_t lenbyte, i;
-+    size_t len;
-+
-+    /* Do nothing if in is empty or the next byte doesn't match idbyte. */
-+    if (in->status || in->len == 0 || *in->ptr != idbyte)
-+        return false;
-+
-+    /* Advance past the identifier byte and decode the length. */
-+    (void)k5_input_get_byte(in);
-+    lenbyte = k5_input_get_byte(in);
-+    if (lenbyte < 128) {
-+        len = lenbyte;
-+    } else {
-+        len = 0;
-+        for (i = 0; i < (lenbyte & 0x7F); i++) {
-+            if (len > (SIZE_MAX >> 8)) {
-+                k5_input_set_status(in, EOVERFLOW);
-+                return false;
-+            }
-+            len = (len << 8) | k5_input_get_byte(in);
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    if (in->status)
-+        return false;
-+
-+    *len_out = len;
-+    return true;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Similar to g_verify_token_header() without toktype or flags, but do not read
-+ * more than *header_len bytes of ASN.1 wrapper, and on output set *header_len
-+ * to the remaining number of header bytes.  Verify the outer DER tag's length
-+ * against token_len, which may be larger (but not smaller) than *header_len.
-+ */
-+static gss_int32
-+verify_detached_wrapper(const gss_OID_desc *mech, size_t *header_len,
-+                        uint8_t **header_in, size_t token_len)
-+{
-+    struct k5input in, mech_der;
-+    gss_OID_desc toid;
-+    size_t len;
-+
-+    k5_input_init(&in, *header_in, *header_len);
-+
-+    if (get_der_tag(&in, 0x60, &len)) {
-+        if (len != token_len - (in.ptr - *header_in))
-+            return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
-+        if (!k5_der_get_value(&in, 0x06, &mech_der))
-+            return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
-+        toid.elements = (uint8_t *)mech_der.ptr;
-+        toid.length = mech_der.len;
-+        if (!g_OID_equal(&toid, mech))
-+            return G_WRONG_MECH;
-+    }
-+
-+    *header_in = (uint8_t *)in.ptr;
-+    *header_len = in.len;
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Caller must provide TOKEN | DATA | PADDING | TRAILER, except
-  * for DCE in which case it can just provide TOKEN | DATA (must
-@@ -267,8 +335,7 @@ kg_unseal_iov_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
-     gss_iov_buffer_t header;
-     gss_iov_buffer_t padding;
-     gss_iov_buffer_t trailer;
--    size_t input_length;
--    unsigned int bodysize;
-+    size_t input_length, hlen;
-     int toktype2;
- 
-     header = kg_locate_header_iov(iov, iov_count, toktype);
-@@ -298,15 +365,14 @@ kg_unseal_iov_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
-             input_length += trailer->buffer.length;
-     }
- 
--    code = g_verify_token_header(ctx->mech_used,
--                                 &bodysize, &ptr, -1,
--                                 input_length, 0);
-+    hlen = header->buffer.length;
-+    code = verify_detached_wrapper(ctx->mech_used, &hlen, &ptr, input_length);
-     if (code != 0) {
-         *minor_status = code;
-         return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-     }
- 
--    if (bodysize < 2) {
-+    if (hlen < 2) {
-         *minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
-         return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-     }
-@@ -314,7 +380,7 @@ kg_unseal_iov_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
-     toktype2 = load_16_be(ptr);
- 
-     ptr += 2;
--    bodysize -= 2;
-+    hlen -= 2;
- 
-     switch (toktype2) {
-     case KG2_TOK_MIC_MSG:
-diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c b/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c
-index fb8fe55111..8192935099 100644
---- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c
-+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c
-@@ -36,31 +36,41 @@
-  *
-  * 1. A pre-CFX wrap or MIC token processed with a CFX-only context causes a
-  *    null pointer dereference.  (The token must use SEAL_ALG_NONE or it will
-- *    be rejected.)
-+ *    be rejected.)  This vulnerability also applies to IOV unwrap.
-  *
-- * 2. A pre-CFX wrap or MIC token with fewer than 24 bytes after the ASN.1
-+ * 2. A CFX wrap token with a different value of EC between the plaintext and
-+ *    encrypted copies will be erroneously accepted, which allows a message
-+ *    truncation attack.  This vulnerability also applies to IOV unwrap.
-+ *
-+ * 3. A CFX wrap token with a plaintext length fewer than 16 bytes causes an
-+ *    access before the beginning of the input buffer, possibly leading to a
-+ *    crash.
-+ *
-+ * 4. A CFX wrap token with a plaintext EC value greater than the plaintext
-+ *    length - 16 causes an integer underflow when computing the result length,
-+ *    likely causing a crash.
-+ *
-+ * 5. An IOV unwrap operation will overrun the header buffer if an ASN.1
-+ *    wrapper longer than the header buffer is present.
-+ *
-+ * 6. A pre-CFX wrap or MIC token with fewer than 24 bytes after the ASN.1
-  *    header causes an input buffer overrun, usually leading to either a segv
-  *    or a GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN error due to garbage algorithm, filler, or
-- *    sequence number values.
-+ *    sequence number values.  This vulnerability also applies to IOV unwrap.
-  *
-- * 3. A pre-CFX wrap token with fewer than 16 + cksumlen bytes after the ASN.1
-+ * 7. A pre-CFX wrap token with fewer than 16 + cksumlen bytes after the ASN.1
-  *    header causes an integer underflow when computing the ciphertext length,
-  *    leading to an allocation error on 32-bit platforms or a segv on 64-bit
-  *    platforms.  A pre-CFX MIC token of this size causes an input buffer
-  *    overrun when comparing the checksum, perhaps leading to a segv.
-  *
-- * 4. A pre-CFX wrap token with fewer than conflen + padlen bytes in the
-+ * 8. A pre-CFX wrap token with fewer than conflen + padlen bytes in the
-  *    ciphertext (where padlen is the last byte of the decrypted ciphertext)
-  *    causes an integer underflow when computing the original message length,
-  *    leading to an allocation error.
-  *
-- * 5. In the mechglue, truncated encapsulation in the initial context token can
-+ * 9. In the mechglue, truncated encapsulation in the initial context token can
-  *    cause input buffer overruns in gss_accept_sec_context().
-- *
-- * Vulnerabilities #1 and #2 also apply to IOV unwrap, although tokens with
-- * fewer than 16 bytes after the ASN.1 header will be rejected.
-- * Vulnerabilities #2 and #5 can only be robustly detected using a
-- * memory-checking environment such as valgrind.
-  */
- 
- #include "k5-int.h"
-@@ -97,17 +107,25 @@ struct test {
-     }
- };
- 
--/* Fake up enough of a CFX GSS context for gss_unwrap, using an AES key. */
-+static void *
-+ealloc(size_t len)
-+{
-+    void *ptr = calloc(len, 1);
-+
-+    if (ptr == NULL)
-+        abort();
-+    return ptr;
-+}
-+
-+/* Fake up enough of a CFX GSS context for gss_unwrap, using an AES key.
-+ * The context takes ownership of subkey. */
- static gss_ctx_id_t
--make_fake_cfx_context()
-+make_fake_cfx_context(krb5_key subkey)
- {
-     gss_union_ctx_id_t uctx;
-     krb5_gss_ctx_id_t kgctx;
--    krb5_keyblock kb;
- 
--    kgctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*kgctx));
--    if (kgctx == NULL)
--        abort();
-+    kgctx = ealloc(sizeof(*kgctx));
-     kgctx->established = 1;
-     kgctx->proto = 1;
-     if (g_seqstate_init(&kgctx->seqstate, 0, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
-@@ -116,15 +134,10 @@ make_fake_cfx_context()
-     kgctx->sealalg = -1;
-     kgctx->signalg = -1;
- 
--    kb.enctype = ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96;
--    kb.length = 16;
--    kb.contents = (unsigned char *)"1234567887654321";
--    if (krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb, &kgctx->subkey) != 0)
--        abort();
-+    kgctx->subkey = subkey;
-+    kgctx->cksumtype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128;
- 
--    uctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*uctx));
--    if (uctx == NULL)
--        abort();
-+    uctx = ealloc(sizeof(*uctx));
-     uctx->mech_type = &mech_krb5;
-     uctx->internal_ctx_id = (gss_ctx_id_t)kgctx;
-     return (gss_ctx_id_t)uctx;
-@@ -138,9 +151,7 @@ make_fake_context(const struct test *test)
-     krb5_gss_ctx_id_t kgctx;
-     krb5_keyblock kb;
- 
--    kgctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*kgctx));
--    if (kgctx == NULL)
--        abort();
-+    kgctx = ealloc(sizeof(*kgctx));
-     kgctx->established = 1;
-     if (g_seqstate_init(&kgctx->seqstate, 0, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
-         abort();
-@@ -162,9 +173,7 @@ make_fake_context(const struct test *test)
-     if (krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb, &kgctx->enc) != 0)
-         abort();
- 
--    uctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*uctx));
--    if (uctx == NULL)
--        abort();
-+    uctx = ealloc(sizeof(*uctx));
-     uctx->mech_type = &mech_krb5;
-     uctx->internal_ctx_id = (gss_ctx_id_t)kgctx;
-     return (gss_ctx_id_t)uctx;
-@@ -194,9 +203,7 @@ make_token(unsigned char *token, size_t len, gss_buffer_t out)
- 
-     assert(mech_krb5.length == 9);
-     assert(len + 11 < 128);
--    wrapped = malloc(len + 13);
--    if (wrapped == NULL)
--        abort();
-+    wrapped = ealloc(len + 13);
-     wrapped[0] = 0x60;
-     wrapped[1] = len + 11;
-     wrapped[2] = 0x06;
-@@ -207,6 +214,18 @@ make_token(unsigned char *token, size_t len, gss_buffer_t out)
-     out->value = wrapped;
- }
- 
-+/* Create a 16-byte header for a CFX confidential wrap token to be processed by
-+ * the fake CFX context. */
-+static void
-+write_cfx_header(uint16_t ec, uint8_t *out)
-+{
-+    memset(out, 0, 16);
-+    store_16_be(KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG, out);
-+    out[2] = FLAG_WRAP_CONFIDENTIAL;
-+    out[3] = 0xFF;
-+    store_16_be(ec, out + 4);
-+}
-+
- /* Unwrap a superficially valid RFC 1964 token with a CFX-only context, with
-  * regular and IOV unwrap. */
- static void
-@@ -238,6 +257,134 @@ test_bogus_1964_token(gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
-     free(in.value);
- }
- 
-+static void
-+test_cfx_altered_ec(gss_ctx_id_t ctx, krb5_key subkey)
-+{
-+    OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+    uint8_t tokbuf[128], plainbuf[24];
-+    krb5_data plain;
-+    krb5_enc_data cipher;
-+    gss_buffer_desc in, out;
-+    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
-+
-+    /* Construct a header with a plaintext EC value of 3. */
-+    write_cfx_header(3, tokbuf);
-+
-+    /* Encrypt a plaintext and a copy of the header with the EC value 0. */
-+    memcpy(plainbuf, "truncate", 8);
-+    memcpy(plainbuf + 8, tokbuf, 16);
-+    store_16_be(0, plainbuf + 12);
-+    plain = make_data(plainbuf, 24);
-+    cipher.ciphertext.data = (char *)tokbuf + 16;
-+    cipher.ciphertext.length = sizeof(tokbuf) - 16;
-+    cipher.enctype = subkey->keyblock.enctype;
-+    if (krb5_k_encrypt(NULL, subkey, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL, NULL,
-+                       &plain, &cipher) != 0)
-+        abort();
-+
-+    /* Verify that the token is rejected by gss_unwrap(). */
-+    in.value = tokbuf;
-+    in.length = 16 + cipher.ciphertext.length;
-+    major = gss_unwrap(&minor, ctx, &in, &out, NULL, NULL);
-+    if (major != GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN)
-+        abort();
-+    (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
-+
-+    /* Verify that the token is rejected by gss_unwrap_iov(). */
-+    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM;
-+    iov[0].buffer = in;
-+    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
-+    major = gss_unwrap_iov(&minor, ctx, NULL, NULL, iov, 2);
-+    if (major != GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN)
-+        abort();
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+test_cfx_short_plaintext(gss_ctx_id_t ctx, krb5_key subkey)
-+{
-+    OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+    uint8_t tokbuf[128], zerobyte = 0;
-+    krb5_data plain;
-+    krb5_enc_data cipher;
-+    gss_buffer_desc in, out;
-+
-+    write_cfx_header(0, tokbuf);
-+
-+    /* Encrypt a single byte, with no copy of the header. */
-+    plain = make_data(&zerobyte, 1);
-+    cipher.ciphertext.data = (char *)tokbuf + 16;
-+    cipher.ciphertext.length = sizeof(tokbuf) - 16;
-+    cipher.enctype = subkey->keyblock.enctype;
-+    if (krb5_k_encrypt(NULL, subkey, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL, NULL,
-+                       &plain, &cipher) != 0)
-+        abort();
-+
-+    /* Verify that the token is rejected by gss_unwrap(). */
-+    in.value = tokbuf;
-+    in.length = 16 + cipher.ciphertext.length;
-+    major = gss_unwrap(&minor, ctx, &in, &out, NULL, NULL);
-+    if (major != GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN)
-+        abort();
-+    (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+test_cfx_large_ec(gss_ctx_id_t ctx, krb5_key subkey)
-+{
-+    OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+    uint8_t tokbuf[128] = { 0 }, plainbuf[20];
-+    krb5_data plain;
-+    krb5_enc_data cipher;
-+    gss_buffer_desc in, out;
-+
-+    /* Construct a header with an EC value of 5. */
-+    write_cfx_header(5, tokbuf);
-+
-+    /* Encrypt a 4-byte plaintext plus the header. */
-+    memcpy(plainbuf, "abcd", 4);
-+    memcpy(plainbuf + 4, tokbuf, 16);
-+    plain = make_data(plainbuf, 20);
-+    cipher.ciphertext.data = (char *)tokbuf + 16;
-+    cipher.ciphertext.length = sizeof(tokbuf) - 16;
-+    cipher.enctype = subkey->keyblock.enctype;
-+    if (krb5_k_encrypt(NULL, subkey, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL, NULL,
-+                       &plain, &cipher) != 0)
-+        abort();
-+
-+    /* Verify that the token is rejected by gss_unwrap(). */
-+    in.value = tokbuf;
-+    in.length = 16 + cipher.ciphertext.length;
-+    major = gss_unwrap(&minor, ctx, &in, &out, NULL, NULL);
-+    if (major != GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN)
-+        abort();
-+    (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+test_iov_large_asn1_wrapper(gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
-+{
-+    OM_uint32 minor, major;
-+    uint8_t databuf[10] = { 0 };
-+    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
-+
-+    /*
-+     * In this IOV array, the header contains a DER tag with a dangling eight
-+     * bytes of length field.  The data IOV indicates a total token length
-+     * sufficient to contain the length bytes.
-+     */
-+    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
-+    iov[0].buffer.value = ealloc(2);
-+    iov[0].buffer.length = 2;
-+    memcpy(iov[0].buffer.value, "\x60\x88", 2);
-+    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
-+    iov[1].buffer.value = databuf;
-+    iov[1].buffer.length = 10;
-+    major = gss_unwrap_iov(&minor, ctx, NULL, NULL, iov, 2);
-+    if (major != GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN)
-+        abort();
-+    free(iov[0].buffer.value);
-+}
-+
- /* Process wrap and MIC tokens with incomplete headers. */
- static void
- test_short_header(gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
-@@ -387,9 +534,7 @@ try_accept(void *value, size_t len)
-     gss_ctx_id_t ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
- 
-     /* Copy the provided value to make input overruns more obvious. */
--    in.value = malloc(len);
--    if (in.value == NULL)
--        abort();
-+    in.value = ealloc(len);
-     memcpy(in.value, value, len);
-     in.length = len;
-     (void)gss_accept_sec_context(&minor, &ctx, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &in,
-@@ -424,11 +569,23 @@ test_short_encapsulation()
- int
- main(int argc, char **argv)
- {
-+    krb5_keyblock kb;
-+    krb5_key cfx_subkey;
-     gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
-     size_t i;
- 
--    ctx = make_fake_cfx_context();
-+    kb.enctype = ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96;
-+    kb.length = 16;
-+    kb.contents = (unsigned char *)"1234567887654321";
-+    if (krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb, &cfx_subkey) != 0)
-+        abort();
-+
-+    ctx = make_fake_cfx_context(cfx_subkey);
-     test_bogus_1964_token(ctx);
-+    test_cfx_altered_ec(ctx, cfx_subkey);
-+    test_cfx_short_plaintext(ctx, cfx_subkey);
-+    test_cfx_large_ec(ctx, cfx_subkey);
-+    test_iov_large_asn1_wrapper(ctx);
-     free_fake_context(ctx);
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
--- 
-2.45.1
-

SOURCES/Generate-and-verify-message-MACs-in-libkrad.patch

@@ -1,629 +0,0 @@
-From aad00d346e5c7923287fc0016a37b49c4618d78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 17:15:50 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Generate and verify message MACs in libkrad
-
-Implement some of the measures specified in
-draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 for mitigating the BlastRADIUS
-attack (CVE-2024-3596):
-
-* Include a Message-Authenticator MAC as the first attribute when
-  generating a packet of type Access-Request, Access-Reject,
-  Access-Accept, or Access-Challenge (sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4), if
-  the secret is non-empty.  (An empty secret indicates the use of Unix
-  domain socket transport.)
-
-* Validate the Message-Authenticator MAC in received packets, if
-  present.
-
-FreeRADIUS enforces Message-Authenticator as of versions 3.2.5 and
-3.0.27.  libkrad must generate Message-Authenticator attributes in
-order to remain compatible with these implementations.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: adjusted style and naming; simplified some
-functions; edited commit message]
-
-ticket: 9142 (new)
-tags: pullup
-target_version: 1.21-next
-
-(cherry picked from commit 871125fea8ce0370a972bf65f7d1de63f619b06c)
----
- src/include/k5-int.h                   |   5 +
- src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c |  28 ++++
- src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports     |   1 +
- src/lib/krad/attr.c                    |  17 ++
- src/lib/krad/attrset.c                 |  59 +++++--
- src/lib/krad/internal.h                |   7 +-
- src/lib/krad/packet.c                  | 206 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
- src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c               |   2 +-
- src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py               |   3 +-
- src/lib/krad/t_packet.c                |  11 ++
- src/tests/t_otp.py                     |   3 +
- 11 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
-index 9d5e41ca2c..d062617268 100644
---- a/src/include/k5-int.h
-+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
-@@ -2415,4 +2415,9 @@ void k5_change_error_message_code(krb5_context ctx, krb5_error_code oldcode,
- #define k5_prependmsg krb5_prepend_error_message
- #define k5_wrapmsg krb5_wrap_error_message
- 
-+/* Generate an HMAC-MD5 keyed checksum as specified by RFC 2104. */
-+krb5_error_code
-+k5_hmac_md5(const krb5_data *key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
-+            krb5_data *output);
-+
- #endif /* _KRB5_INT_H */
-diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
-index ec024f3966..a809388549 100644
---- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
-+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
-@@ -92,3 +92,31 @@ cleanup:
-     free(hash_iov);
-     return ret;
- }
-+
-+krb5_error_code
-+k5_hmac_md5(const krb5_data *key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
-+            krb5_data *output)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash = &krb5int_hash_md5;
-+    krb5_keyblock keyblock = { 0 };
-+    krb5_data hashed_key;
-+    uint8_t hkeybuf[16];
-+    krb5_crypto_iov iov;
-+
-+    /* Hash the key if it is longer than the block size. */
-+    if (key->length > hash->blocksize) {
-+        hashed_key = make_data(hkeybuf, sizeof(hkeybuf));
-+        iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+        iov.data = *key;
-+        ret = hash->hash(&iov, 1, &hashed_key);
-+        if (ret)
-+            return ret;
-+        key = &hashed_key;
-+    }
-+
-+    keyblock.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
-+    keyblock.length = key->length;
-+    keyblock.contents = (uint8_t *)key->data;
-+    return krb5int_hmac_keyblock(hash, &keyblock, data, num_data, output);
-+}
-diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports b/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
-index 9db1813810..b4dcd29937 100644
---- a/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
-+++ b/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
-@@ -107,3 +107,4 @@ krb5_c_prfplus
- krb5_c_derive_prfplus
- k5_enctype_to_ssf
- krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype
-+k5_hmac_md5
-diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attr.c b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
-index 42d354a3b5..65ed1d35e7 100644
---- a/src/lib/krad/attr.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
-@@ -125,6 +125,23 @@ static const attribute_record attributes[UCHAR_MAX] = {
-     {"NAS-Port-Type", 4, 4, NULL, NULL},
-     {"Port-Limit", 4, 4, NULL, NULL},
-     {"Login-LAT-Port", 1, MAX_ATTRSIZE, NULL, NULL},
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Password-Retry */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Prompt */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Connect-Info */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Configuration-Token */
-+    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* EAP-Message */
-+    {"Message-Authenticator", MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL, NULL},
- };
- 
- /* Encode User-Password attribute. */
-diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
-index 6ec031e320..e5457ebfd7 100644
---- a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
-@@ -164,15 +164,44 @@ krad_attrset_copy(const krad_attrset *set, krad_attrset **copy)
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-+/* Place an encoded attributes into outbuf at position *i.  Increment *i by the
-+ * length of the encoding. */
-+static krb5_error_code
-+append_attr(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
-+            const uint8_t *auth, krad_attr type, const krb5_data *data,
-+            uint8_t outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *i, krb5_boolean *is_fips)
-+{
-+    uint8_t buffer[MAX_ATTRSIZE];
-+    size_t attrlen;
-+    krb5_error_code retval;
-+
-+    retval = kr_attr_encode(ctx, secret, auth, type, data, buffer, &attrlen,
-+                            is_fips);
-+    if (retval)
-+        return retval;
-+
-+    if (attrlen > MAX_ATTRSETSIZE - *i - 2)
-+        return EMSGSIZE;
-+
-+    outbuf[(*i)++] = type;
-+    outbuf[(*i)++] = attrlen + 2;
-+    memcpy(outbuf + *i, buffer, attrlen);
-+    *i += attrlen;
-+
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
- krb5_error_code
- kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
--                  const unsigned char *auth,
-+                  const uint8_t *auth, krb5_boolean add_msgauth,
-                   unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
-                   krb5_boolean *is_fips)
- {
--    unsigned char buffer[MAX_ATTRSIZE];
-     krb5_error_code retval;
--    size_t i = 0, attrlen;
-+    krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
-+    const uint8_t zeroes[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
-+    krb5_data zerodata;
-+    size_t i = 0;
-     attr *a;
- 
-     if (set == NULL) {
-@@ -180,19 +209,21 @@ kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
--    K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(a, &set->list, list) {
--        retval = kr_attr_encode(set->ctx, secret, auth, a->type, &a->attr,
--                                buffer, &attrlen, is_fips);
--        if (retval != 0)
-+    if (add_msgauth) {
-+        /* Encode Message-Authenticator as the first attribute, per
-+         * draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 section 5.2. */
-+        zerodata = make_data((uint8_t *)zeroes, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
-+        retval = append_attr(set->ctx, secret, auth, msgauth_type, &zerodata,
-+                             outbuf, &i, is_fips);
-+        if (retval)
-             return retval;
-+    }
- 
--        if (i + attrlen + 2 > MAX_ATTRSETSIZE)
--            return EMSGSIZE;
--
--        outbuf[i++] = a->type;
--        outbuf[i++] = attrlen + 2;
--        memcpy(&outbuf[i], buffer, attrlen);
--        i += attrlen;
-+    K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(a, &set->list, list) {
-+        retval = append_attr(set->ctx, secret, auth, a->type, &a->attr,
-+                             outbuf, &i, is_fips);
-+        if (retval)
-+            return retval;
-     }
- 
-     *outlen = i;
-diff --git a/src/lib/krad/internal.h b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
-index b086598fb2..f3e4a1d8d3 100644
---- a/src/lib/krad/internal.h
-+++ b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
-@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
- #define UCHAR_MAX 255
- #endif
- 
-+#define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE 16
-+
- /* RFC 2865 */
- #define MAX_ATTRSIZE (UCHAR_MAX - 2)
- #define MAX_ATTRSETSIZE (KRAD_PACKET_SIZE_MAX - 20)
-@@ -75,10 +77,11 @@ kr_attr_decode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const unsigned char *auth,
-                krad_attr type, const krb5_data *in,
-                unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen);
- 
--/* Encode the attributes into the buffer. */
-+/* Encode set into outbuf.  If add_msgauth is true, include a zeroed
-+ * Message-Authenticator as the first attribute. */
- krb5_error_code
- kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
--                  const unsigned char *auth,
-+                  const uint8_t *auth, krb5_boolean add_msgauth,
-                   unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
-                   krb5_boolean *is_fips);
- 
-diff --git a/src/lib/krad/packet.c b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
-index fc2d248001..257bbc6345 100644
---- a/src/lib/krad/packet.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- typedef unsigned char uchar;
- 
- /* RFC 2865 */
-+#define MSGAUTH_SIZE (2 + MD5_DIGEST_SIZE)
- #define OFFSET_CODE 0
- #define OFFSET_ID 1
- #define OFFSET_LENGTH 2
-@@ -222,6 +223,106 @@ packet_set_attrset(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_packet *pkt)
-     return kr_attrset_decode(ctx, &tmp, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), &pkt->attrset);
- }
- 
-+/* Determine if a packet requires a Message-Authenticator attribute. */
-+static inline krb5_boolean
-+requires_msgauth(const char *secret, krad_code code)
-+{
-+    /* If no secret is provided, assume that the transport is a UNIX socket.
-+     * Message-Authenticator is required only on UDP and TCP connections. */
-+    if (*secret == '\0')
-+        return FALSE;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Per draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4,
-+     * Message-Authenticator is required in Access-Request packets and all
-+     * potential responses when UDP or TCP transport is used.
-+     */
-+    return code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Request") ||
-+        code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Reject") ||
-+        code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Accept") ||
-+        code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Challenge");
-+}
-+
-+/* Check if the packet has a Message-Authenticator attribute. */
-+static inline krb5_boolean
-+has_pkt_msgauth(const krad_packet *pkt)
-+{
-+    krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
-+
-+    return krad_attrset_get(pkt->attrset, msgauth_type, 0) != NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/* Return the beginning of the Message-Authenticator attribute in pkt, or NULL
-+ * if no such attribute is present. */
-+static const uint8_t *
-+lookup_msgauth_addr(const krad_packet *pkt)
-+{
-+    krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
-+    size_t i;
-+    uint8_t *p;
-+
-+    i = OFFSET_ATTR;
-+    while (i + 2 < pkt->pkt.length) {
-+        p = (uint8_t *)offset(&pkt->pkt, i);
-+        if (msgauth_type == *p)
-+            return p;
-+        i += p[1];
-+    }
-+
-+    return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Calculate the message authenticator MAC for pkt as specified in RFC 2869
-+ * section 5.14, placing the result in mac_out.  Use the provided authenticator
-+ * auth, which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request.
-+ */
-+static krb5_error_code
-+calculate_mac(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
-+              const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE],
-+              uint8_t mac_out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE])
-+{
-+    uint8_t zeroed_msgauth[MSGAUTH_SIZE];
-+    krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
-+    const uint8_t *msgauth_attr, *msgauth_end, *pkt_end;
-+    krb5_crypto_iov input[5];
-+    krb5_data ksecr, mac;
-+
-+    msgauth_attr = lookup_msgauth_addr(pkt);
-+    if (msgauth_attr == NULL)
-+        return EINVAL;
-+    msgauth_end = msgauth_attr + MSGAUTH_SIZE;
-+    pkt_end = (const uint8_t *)pkt->pkt.data + pkt->pkt.length;
-+
-+    /* Read code, id, and length from the packet. */
-+    input[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    input[0].data = make_data(pkt->pkt.data, OFFSET_AUTH);
-+
-+    /* Read the provided authenticator. */
-+    input[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    input[1].data = make_data((uint8_t *)auth, AUTH_FIELD_SIZE);
-+
-+    /* Read any attributes before Message-Authenticator. */
-+    input[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    input[2].data = make_data(pkt_attr(pkt), msgauth_attr - pkt_attr(pkt));
-+
-+    /* Read Message-Authenticator with the data bytes all set to zero, per RFC
-+     * 2869 section 5.14. */
-+    zeroed_msgauth[0] = msgauth_type;
-+    zeroed_msgauth[1] = MSGAUTH_SIZE;
-+    memset(zeroed_msgauth + 2, 0, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
-+    input[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    input[3].data = make_data(zeroed_msgauth, MSGAUTH_SIZE);
-+
-+    /* Read any attributes after Message-Authenticator. */
-+    input[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    input[4].data = make_data((uint8_t *)msgauth_end, pkt_end - msgauth_end);
-+
-+    mac = make_data(mac_out, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
-+    ksecr = string2data((char *)secret);
-+    return k5_hmac_md5(&ksecr, input, 5, &mac);
-+}
-+
- ssize_t
- krad_packet_bytes_needed(const krb5_data *buffer)
- {
-@@ -255,6 +356,7 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
-     krad_packet *pkt;
-     uchar id;
-     size_t attrset_len;
-+    krb5_boolean msgauth_required;
- 
-     pkt = packet_new();
-     if (pkt == NULL) {
-@@ -274,9 +376,13 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
-     if (retval != 0)
-         goto error;
- 
-+    /* Determine if Message-Authenticator is required. */
-+    msgauth_required = (*secret != '\0' &&
-+                        code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Request"));
-+
-     /* Encode the attributes. */
--    retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt),
--                               &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
-+    retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), msgauth_required,
-+                               pkt_attr(pkt), &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
-     if (retval != 0)
-         goto error;
- 
-@@ -285,6 +391,13 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
-     pkt_code_set(pkt, code);
-     pkt_len_set(pkt, pkt->pkt.length);
- 
-+    if (msgauth_required) {
-+        /* Calculate and set the Message-Authenticator MAC. */
-+        retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
-+        if (retval != 0)
-+            goto error;
-+    }
-+
-     /* Copy the attrset for future use. */
-     retval = packet_set_attrset(ctx, secret, pkt);
-     if (retval != 0)
-@@ -307,14 +420,19 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
-     krb5_error_code retval;
-     krad_packet *pkt;
-     size_t attrset_len;
-+    krb5_boolean msgauth_required;
- 
-     pkt = packet_new();
-     if (pkt == NULL)
-         return ENOMEM;
- 
-+    /* Determine if Message-Authenticator is required. */
-+    msgauth_required = requires_msgauth(secret, code);
-+
-     /* Encode the attributes. */
--    retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(request), pkt_attr(pkt),
--                               &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
-+    retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(request),
-+                               msgauth_required, pkt_attr(pkt), &attrset_len,
-+                               &pkt->is_fips);
-     if (retval != 0)
-         goto error;
- 
-@@ -330,6 +448,18 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
-     if (retval != 0)
-         goto error;
- 
-+    if (msgauth_required) {
-+        /*
-+         * Calculate and replace the Message-Authenticator MAC.  Per RFC 2869
-+         * section 5.14, use the authenticator from the request, not from the
-+         * response.
-+         */
-+        retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(request),
-+                               pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
-+        if (retval != 0)
-+            goto error;
-+    }
-+
-     /* Copy the attrset for future use. */
-     retval = packet_set_attrset(ctx, secret, pkt);
-     if (retval != 0)
-@@ -343,6 +473,34 @@ error:
-     return retval;
- }
- 
-+/* Verify the Message-Authenticator value in pkt, using the provided
-+ * authenticator (which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request). */
-+static krb5_error_code
-+verify_msgauth(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
-+               const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE])
-+{
-+    uint8_t mac[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
-+    krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
-+    const krb5_data *msgauth;
-+    krb5_error_code retval;
-+
-+    msgauth = krad_packet_get_attr(pkt, msgauth_type, 0);
-+    if (msgauth == NULL)
-+        return ENODATA;
-+
-+    retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, auth, mac);
-+    if (retval)
-+        return retval;
-+
-+    if (msgauth->length != MD5_DIGEST_SIZE)
-+        return EMSGSIZE;
-+
-+    if (k5_bcmp(mac, msgauth->data, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0)
-+        return EBADMSG;
-+
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* Decode a packet. */
- static krb5_error_code
- decode_packet(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const krb5_data *buffer,
-@@ -394,21 +552,35 @@ krad_packet_decode_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
-                            krad_packet **reqpkt)
- {
-     const krad_packet *tmp = NULL;
-+    krad_packet *req;
-     krb5_error_code retval;
- 
--    retval = decode_packet(ctx, secret, buffer, reqpkt);
--    if (cb != NULL && retval == 0) {
-+    retval = decode_packet(ctx, secret, buffer, &req);
-+    if (retval)
-+        return retval;
-+
-+    /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
-+    if (has_pkt_msgauth(req)) {
-+        retval = verify_msgauth(secret, req, pkt_auth(req));
-+        if (retval) {
-+            krad_packet_free(req);
-+            return retval;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    if (cb != NULL) {
-         for (tmp = (*cb)(data, FALSE); tmp != NULL; tmp = (*cb)(data, FALSE)) {
-             if (pkt_id_get(*reqpkt) == pkt_id_get(tmp))
-                 break;
-         }
--    }
- 
--    if (cb != NULL && (retval != 0 || tmp != NULL))
--        (*cb)(data, TRUE);
-+        if (tmp != NULL)
-+            (*cb)(data, TRUE);
-+    }
- 
-+    *reqpkt = req;
-     *duppkt = tmp;
--    return retval;
-+    return 0;
- }
- 
- krb5_error_code
-@@ -435,9 +607,17 @@ krad_packet_decode_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
-                 break;
-             }
- 
--            /* If the authenticator matches, then the response is valid. */
--            if (memcmp(pkt_auth(*rsppkt), auth, sizeof(auth)) == 0)
--                break;
-+            /* Verify the response authenticator. */
-+            if (k5_bcmp(pkt_auth(*rsppkt), auth, sizeof(auth)) != 0)
-+                continue;
-+
-+            /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
-+            if (has_pkt_msgauth(*rsppkt)) {
-+                if (verify_msgauth(secret, *rsppkt, pkt_auth(tmp)) != 0)
-+                    continue;
-+            }
-+
-+            break;
-         }
-     }
- 
-diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
-index 0f95762534..9a70529dc5 100644
---- a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
-@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ main()
-     noerror(krad_attrset_add(set, krad_attr_name2num("User-Password"), &tmp));
- 
-     /* Encode attrset. */
--    noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, buffer, &encode_len,
-+    noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, FALSE, buffer, &encode_len,
-                               &is_fips));
-     krad_attrset_free(set);
- 
-diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py b/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
-index 7668cd7f87..7fa0449a3c 100755
---- a/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
-+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ DICTIONARY = """
- ATTRIBUTE\tUser-Name\t1\tstring
- ATTRIBUTE\tUser-Password\t2\toctets
- ATTRIBUTE\tNAS-Identifier\t32\tstring
-+ATTRIBUTE\tMessage-Authenticator\t80\toctets
- """
- 
- class TestServer(server.Server):
-@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ class TestServer(server.Server):
-             if key == "User-Password":
-                 passwd = map(pkt.PwDecrypt, pkt[key])
- 
--        reply = self.CreateReplyPacket(pkt)
-+        reply = self.CreateReplyPacket(pkt, message_authenticator=True)
-         if passwd == ['accept']:
-             reply.code = packet.AccessAccept
-         else:
-diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c b/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
-index c22489144f..104b6507a2 100644
---- a/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
-@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
-     krb5_data username, password;
-     krb5_boolean auth = FALSE;
-     krb5_context ctx;
-+    const krad_packet *dupreq;
-+    const krb5_data *encpkt;
-+    krad_packet *decreq;
- 
-     username = string2data("testUser");
- 
-@@ -184,9 +187,17 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
- 
-     password = string2data("accept");
-     noerror(make_packet(ctx, &username, &password, &packets[ACCEPT_PACKET]));
-+    encpkt = krad_packet_encode(packets[ACCEPT_PACKET]);
-+    noerror(krad_packet_decode_request(ctx, "foo", encpkt, NULL, NULL,
-+                                       &dupreq, &decreq));
-+    krad_packet_free(decreq);
- 
-     password = string2data("reject");
-     noerror(make_packet(ctx, &username, &password, &packets[REJECT_PACKET]));
-+    encpkt = krad_packet_encode(packets[REJECT_PACKET]);
-+    noerror(krad_packet_decode_request(ctx, "foo", encpkt, NULL, NULL,
-+                                       &dupreq, &decreq));
-+    krad_packet_free(decreq);
- 
-     memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-     hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
-diff --git a/src/tests/t_otp.py b/src/tests/t_otp.py
-index cba871a0f2..1ec916598c 100755
---- a/src/tests/t_otp.py
-+++ b/src/tests/t_otp.py
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ ATTRIBUTE    User-Name    1    string
- ATTRIBUTE    User-Password   2    octets
- ATTRIBUTE    Service-Type    6    integer
- ATTRIBUTE    NAS-Identifier  32    string
-+ATTRIBUTE    Message-Authenticator 80 octets
- '''
- 
- class RadiusDaemon(Process):
-@@ -97,6 +98,8 @@ class RadiusDaemon(Process):
-             reply.code = packet.AccessReject
-             replyq['reply'] = False
- 
-+        reply.add_message_authenticator()
-+
-         outq.put(replyq)
-         if addr is None:
-             sock.send(reply.ReplyPacket())
--- 
-2.46.0
-

SOURCES/Use-14-instead-of-9-for-unkeyed-SHA-1-checksum.patch

@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
-From b6ada496a285a7b350e28c97b53b6f659a9a94b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2021 01:25:34 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Use 14 instead of 9 for unkeyed SHA-1 checksum
-
-Although MIT krb5 had been using the value 9 for unkeyed SHA-1 since
-its 1.0 release in 1996, RFC 3961 instead assigned this value to
-rsa-md5-des3 (likely never used), and assigned the values 10 and 14 to
-SHA-1.  Heimdal and Microsoft use the value 14.  Unkeyed SHA-1 almost
-never appears on the wire, but has been seen in PKINIT asChecksum
-fields in replies from Windows KDCs (despite the field being specified
-as a keyed checksum).
-
-Define a new symbol CKSUMTYPE_SHA1 with the value 14, and use it where
-we currently use CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA.  Continue to allow the value 9
-for ABI compatibility.  Remove the pkinit_clnt.c workaround as the
-value 14 will now work without adjustment.
-
-ticket: 9040 (new)
----
- doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst         |  1 +
- src/include/krb5/krb5.hin                |  6 ++++++
- src/lib/crypto/crypto_tests/t_cksums.c   |  2 +-
- src/lib/crypto/krb/cksumtypes.c          |  6 ++++++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_saslname.c     |  3 +--
- src/lib/krb5/os/trace.c                  |  2 +-
- src/plugins/kdb/test/kdb_test.c          |  2 +-
- src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c | 11 ++---------
- src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c  |  4 ++--
- 9 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst b/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst
-index 788d094bff..001fb386a7 100644
---- a/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst
-+++ b/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ Public
-    CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES.rst
-    CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5.rst
-    CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES.rst
-+   CKSUMTYPE_SHA1.rst
-    ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96.rst
-    ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128.rst
-    ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96.rst
-diff --git a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-index d2cf1eba2a..a7060aa733 100644
---- a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-+++ b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-@@ -449,6 +449,11 @@ typedef struct _krb5_crypto_iov {
- #define ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC        0x001a /**< RFC 6803 */
- #define ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN                     0x01ff
- 
-+/*
-+ * Historically we used the value 9 for unkeyed SHA-1.  RFC 3961 assigns this
-+ * value to rsa-md5-des3, which fortunately is unused.  For ABI compatibility
-+ * we allow either 9 or 14 for SHA-1.
-+ */
- #define CKSUMTYPE_CRC32         0x0001
- #define CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4       0x0002
- #define CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES   0x0003
-@@ -459,6 +464,7 @@ typedef struct _krb5_crypto_iov {
- #define CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES   0x0008
- #define CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA      0x0009
- #define CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3      0x000c /* @deprecated removed */
-+#define CKSUMTYPE_SHA1          0x000d /**< RFC 3962 */
- #define CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 0x000f /**< RFC 3962. Used with
-                                                 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 */
- #define CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256 0x0010 /**< RFC 3962. Used with
-diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/crypto_tests/t_cksums.c b/src/lib/crypto/crypto_tests/t_cksums.c
-index 84408fb68a..de5ed3a22b 100644
---- a/src/lib/crypto/crypto_tests/t_cksums.c
-+++ b/src/lib/crypto/crypto_tests/t_cksums.c
-@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ struct test {
-     },
-     {
-         { KV5M_DATA, 0, "" },
--        CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, 0, 0, { KV5M_DATA, 0, "" },
-+        CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, 0, 0, { KV5M_DATA, 0, "" },
-         { KV5M_DATA, 20,
-           "\xDA\x39\xA3\xEE\x5E\x6B\x4B\x0D\x32\x55\xBF\xEF\x95\x60\x18\x90"
-           "\xAF\xD8\x07\x09" }
-diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/cksumtypes.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/cksumtypes.c
-index f5fbe8a2a7..25a3ffd2d2 100644
---- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/cksumtypes.c
-+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/cksumtypes.c
-@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ const struct krb5_cksumtypes krb5int_cksumtypes_list[] = {
-       krb5int_unkeyed_checksum, NULL,
-       20, 20, CKSUM_UNKEYED },
- 
-+    { CKSUMTYPE_SHA1,
-+      "sha", { 0 }, "SHA-1",
-+      NULL, &krb5int_hash_sha1,
-+      krb5int_unkeyed_checksum, NULL,
-+      20, 20, CKSUM_UNKEYED },
-+
-     { CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR,
-       "hmac-md5-rc4", { "hmac-md5-enc", "hmac-md5-earcfour" },
-       "Microsoft HMAC MD5",
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_saslname.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_saslname.c
-index e25f9e0a53..2be0c8a69a 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_saslname.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_saslname.c
-@@ -58,8 +58,7 @@ oidToSaslName(OM_uint32 *minor, const gss_OID mech,
-     iov[2].data.length = sizeof(cksumBuf);
-     iov[2].data.data = (char *)cksumBuf;
- 
--    *minor = krb5_k_make_checksum_iov(NULL, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA,
--                                      NULL, 0, iov, 3);
-+    *minor = krb5_k_make_checksum_iov(NULL, CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, NULL, 0, iov, 3);
-     if (*minor != 0)
-         return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- 
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/trace.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/trace.c
-index e9b99f4ca0..abb8a3f21b 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/os/trace.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/trace.c
-@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ hash_bytes(krb5_context context, const void *ptr, size_t len)
-     krb5_data d = make_data((void *) ptr, len);
-     char *s = NULL;
- 
--    if (krb5_k_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, NULL, 0, &d,
-+    if (krb5_k_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, NULL, 0, &d,
-                              &cksum) != 0)
-         return NULL;
-     if (cksum.length >= 2)
-diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/test/kdb_test.c b/src/plugins/kdb/test/kdb_test.c
-index 95a6062e2a..38d371cb86 100644
---- a/src/plugins/kdb/test/kdb_test.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/kdb/test/kdb_test.c
-@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ make_keyblock(krb5_kvno kvno, krb5_enctype etype, int32_t salttype,
-                  (int)salttype, princstr, (int)realm->length, realm->data) < 0)
-         abort();
-     d = string2data(hashstr);
--    check(krb5_c_make_checksum(NULL, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, NULL, 0, &d, &cksum));
-+    check(krb5_c_make_checksum(NULL, CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, NULL, 0, &d, &cksum));
- 
-     /* Make the appropriate number of input bytes from the hash result. */
-     for (pos = 0; pos < keybytes; pos += n) {
-diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
-index 9b991ffe05..021e5f0723 100644
---- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
-@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ pa_pkinit_gen_req(krb5_context context,
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
--    retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, NULL, 0,
--                                  der_req, &cksum);
-+    retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, NULL, 0, der_req,
-+                                  &cksum);
-     if (retval)
-         goto cleanup;
-     TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_CHECKSUM(context, &cksum);
-@@ -701,13 +701,6 @@ pkinit_as_rep_parse(krb5_context context,
-             pkiDebug("failed to decode reply_key_pack\n");
-             goto cleanup;
-         }
--        /*
--         * This is hack but Windows sends back SHA1 checksum
--         * with checksum type of 14. There is currently no
--         * checksum type of 14 defined.
--         */
--        if (key_pack->asChecksum.checksum_type == 14)
--            key_pack->asChecksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA;
-         retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context,
-                                       key_pack->asChecksum.checksum_type,
-                                       &key_pack->replyKey,
-diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
-index 3ae56c0641..3bff456f8f 100644
---- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
-@@ -546,8 +546,8 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
-     der_req = cb->request_body(context, rock);
--    retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, NULL, 0,
--                                  der_req, &cksum);
-+    retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, NULL, 0, der_req,
-+                                  &cksum);
-     if (retval) {
-         pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
-         goto cleanup;
--- 
-2.39.2
-

SOURCES/Wait-indefinitely-on-KDC-TCP-connections.patch

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-From 2e871df888d526a15e9e91807480c15ca4e40618 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 16:26:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Wait indefinitely on KDC TCP connections
-
-When making a KDC or password change request, wait indefinitely
-(limited only by request_timeout if set) once a KDC has accepted a TCP
-connection.
-
-ticket: 9105 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit 6436a3808061da787a43c6810f5f0370cdfb6e36)
----
- doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst |  2 +-
- src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c       | 50 ++++++++++++++++--------------
- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-index 557094f6a2..98fe231813 100644
---- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
-     for initial ticket requests.  The default value is 0.
- 
- **request_timeout**
--    (:ref:`duration` string.)  Sets the maximum total time for KDC or
-+    (:ref:`duration` string.)  Sets the maximum total time for KDC and
-     password change requests.  This timeout does not affect the
-     intervals between requests, so setting a low timeout may result in
-     fewer requests being attempted and/or some servers not being
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
-index f57117126e..19b78aba24 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
-@@ -134,7 +134,6 @@ struct conn_state {
-     krb5_data callback_buffer;
-     size_t server_index;
-     struct conn_state *next;
--    time_ms endtime;
-     krb5_boolean defer;
-     struct {
-         const char *uri_path;
-@@ -344,15 +343,19 @@ cm_select_or_poll(const struct select_state *in, time_ms endtime,
-                   struct select_state *out, int *sret)
- {
- #ifndef USE_POLL
--    struct timeval tv;
-+    struct timeval tv, *tvp;
- #endif
-     krb5_error_code retval;
-     time_ms curtime, interval;
- 
--    retval = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
--    if (retval != 0)
--        return retval;
--    interval = (curtime < endtime) ? endtime - curtime : 0;
-+    if (endtime != 0) {
-+        retval = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
-+        if (retval != 0)
-+            return retval;
-+        interval = (curtime < endtime) ? endtime - curtime : 0;
-+    } else {
-+        interval = -1;
-+    }
- 
-     /* We don't need a separate copy of the selstate for poll, but use one for
-      * consistency with how we use select. */
-@@ -361,9 +364,14 @@ cm_select_or_poll(const struct select_state *in, time_ms endtime,
- #ifdef USE_POLL
-     *sret = poll(out->fds, out->nfds, interval);
- #else
--    tv.tv_sec = interval / 1000;
--    tv.tv_usec = interval % 1000 * 1000;
--    *sret = select(out->max, &out->rfds, &out->wfds, &out->xfds, &tv);
-+    if (interval != -1) {
-+        tv.tv_sec = interval / 1000;
-+        tv.tv_usec = interval % 1000 * 1000;
-+        tvp = &tv;
-+    } else {
-+        tvp = NULL;
-+    }
-+    *sret = select(out->max, &out->rfds, &out->wfds, &out->xfds, tvp);
- #endif
- 
-     return (*sret < 0) ? SOCKET_ERRNO : 0;
-@@ -1094,11 +1102,6 @@ service_tcp_connect(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
-     }
- 
-     conn->state = WRITING;
--
--    /* Record this connection's timeout for service_fds. */
--    if (get_curtime_ms(&conn->endtime) == 0)
--        conn->endtime += 10000;
--
-     return conn->service_write(context, realm, conn, selstate);
- }
- 
-@@ -1373,19 +1376,18 @@ kill_conn:
-     return FALSE;
- }
- 
--/* Return the maximum of endtime and the endtime fields of all currently active
-- * TCP connections. */
--static time_ms
--get_endtime(time_ms endtime, struct conn_state *conns)
-+/* Return true if conns contains any states with connected TCP sockets. */
-+static krb5_boolean
-+any_tcp_connections(struct conn_state *conns)
- {
-     struct conn_state *state;
- 
-     for (state = conns; state != NULL; state = state->next) {
--        if ((state->state == READING || state->state == WRITING) &&
--            state->endtime > endtime)
--            endtime = state->endtime;
-+        if (state->addr.transport != UDP &&
-+            (state->state == READING || state->state == WRITING))
-+            return TRUE;
-     }
--    return endtime;
-+    return FALSE;
- }
- 
- static krb5_boolean
-@@ -1408,9 +1410,9 @@ service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
- 
-     e = 0;
-     while (selstate->nfds > 0) {
--        endtime = get_endtime(interval_end, conns);
-+        endtime = any_tcp_connections(conns) ? 0 : interval_end;
-         /* Don't wait longer than the whole request should last. */
--        if (timeout && endtime > timeout)
-+        if (timeout && (!endtime || endtime > timeout))
-             endtime = timeout;
-         e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, endtime, seltemp, &selret);
-         if (e == EINTR)
--- 
-2.44.0
-

SOURCES/downstream-Allow-to-make-AD-SIGNEDPATH-optional.patch

@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-From 274464a6faaee694c30ae4d1412a8ab516b1a982 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 16:22:06 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Allow to make AD-SIGNEDPATH optional
-
-MIT krb5 1.20 and newer KDCs do generate a minimal PAC instead of
-AD-SIGNEDPATH. As a consequence, an evidence ticket generated by an
-older KDC would fail to be processed by a newer KDC for a constrained
-delegation request.
-
-This commit modifies this behavior to check the AD-SIGNEDPATH whenever
-it is present in a TGS-REQ, but do not require it in case a PAC is
-provided AND the KDB plugin supports its verification. This is done
-regardless to the fact the constrained delegation request is from a
-local realm or a cross-realm.
-
-To enable this mechanism, the KDB plugin must set the
-"optional_ab_signedpath" string attribute to "true" for the local TGS
-principal.
----
- src/include/kdb.h      |  1 +
- src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/include/kdb.h b/src/include/kdb.h
-index c56947ab81..95d07d0195 100644
---- a/src/include/kdb.h
-+++ b/src/include/kdb.h
-@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@
- /* String attribute names recognized by krb5 */
- #define KRB5_KDB_SK_SESSION_ENCTYPES            "session_enctypes"
- #define KRB5_KDB_SK_REQUIRE_AUTH                "require_auth"
-+#define KRB5_KDB_SK_OPTIONAL_AD_SIGNEDPATH      "optional_ad_signedpath"
- 
- #if !defined(_WIN32)
- 
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c b/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c
-index 1ebe872467..c0fcccdf21 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c
-@@ -668,6 +668,13 @@ has_pac(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **authdata)
-     return has_kdc_issued_authdata(context, authdata, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC);
- }
- 
-+/* Return true if the AD-SIGNEDPATH is present in authorization data. */
-+static krb5_boolean
-+has_ad_signedpath(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **authdata)
-+{
-+    return has_kdc_issued_authdata(context, authdata, KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET);
-+}
-+
- /* Verify AD-SIGNTICKET authdata if we need to, and insert an AD-SIGNEDPATH
-  * element if we should. */
- static krb5_error_code
-@@ -680,24 +687,54 @@ handle_signticket(krb5_context context, unsigned int flags,
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret = 0;
-     krb5_principal *deleg_path = NULL;
--    krb5_boolean signed_path = FALSE;
--    krb5_boolean s4u2proxy;
-+    krb5_boolean s4u2proxy, adsp_present, adsp_optional, adsp_valid = FALSE;
-+    char *str;
- 
-     s4u2proxy = isflagset(flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
- 
--    /* For cross-realm the Windows PAC must have been verified, and it
--     * fulfills the same role as the signed path. */
--    if (req->msg_type == KRB5_TGS_REQ &&
--        (!isflagset(flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM) ||
--         !has_pac(context, enc_tkt_req->authorization_data))) {
--        ret = verify_signedpath(context, local_tgt, local_tgt_key, enc_tkt_req,
--                                &deleg_path, &signed_path);
--        if (ret)
--            goto cleanup;
-+    if (req->msg_type == KRB5_TGS_REQ) {
-+        adsp_present = has_ad_signedpath(context,
-+                                         enc_tkt_req->authorization_data);
-+
-+        /* In case of constained delegation, based on the value of the
-+         * "optional_ad_signedpath" string attribute of the local TGS principal:
-+         * - "true": in case AD-SIGNEDPATH is absent, the PAC must be present
-+         * - "false" or undefined: AD-SIGNEDPATH must be present
-+         */
-+        if (s4u2proxy && !adsp_present) {
-+            ret = krb5_dbe_get_string(context, local_tgt,
-+                                      KRB5_KDB_SK_OPTIONAL_AD_SIGNEDPATH,
-+                                      &str);
-+            /* TODO: should be using _krb5_conf_boolean(), but os-proto.h is not
-+             * available here.
-+             */
-+            adsp_optional = !ret && str && (strncasecmp(str, "true", 4) == 0
-+                                         || strncasecmp(str, "t",    1) == 0
-+                                         || strncasecmp(str, "yes",  3) == 0
-+                                         || strncasecmp(str, "y",    1) == 0
-+                                         || strncasecmp(str, "1",    1) == 0
-+                                         || strncasecmp(str, "on",   2) == 0);
-+
-+            if (!adsp_optional ||
-+                !has_pac(context, enc_tkt_req->authorization_data)) {
-+                ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
-+                goto cleanup;
-+            }
-+        }
- 
--        if (s4u2proxy && signed_path == FALSE) {
--            ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
--            goto cleanup;
-+        /* If AD-SIGNEDPATH is present, verify it */
-+        if (adsp_present) {
-+            ret = verify_signedpath(context, local_tgt, local_tgt_key,
-+                                    enc_tkt_req, &deleg_path, &adsp_valid);
-+            if (ret)
-+                goto cleanup;
-+
-+            /* In case of contrained delegation, if AD-SIGNEDPATH is present, it
-+             * has to be valid */
-+            if (s4u2proxy && !adsp_valid) {
-+                ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
-+                goto cleanup;
-+            }
-         }
-     }
- 
--- 
-2.41.0
-

SOURCES/downstream-Support-PAC-full-checksum-w-o-ticket-chec.patch

@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-From 8ded82fb279198f3fa20fb7c836e77290e7bc6f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 16:22:06 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Support PAC full checksum w/o ticket checksum
-
----
- doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst |  1 +
- src/include/krb5/krb5.hin     | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c        | 10 ++++++++-
- src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c   | 17 ++++++++++++++++
- src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports  |  1 +
- 5 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst b/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
-index d12be47c3c..ff813108bb 100644
---- a/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
-+++ b/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
-@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ Rarely used public interfaces
-    krb5_os_localaddr.rst
-    krb5_pac_add_buffer.rst
-    krb5_pac_free.rst
-+   krb5_pac_full_sign_compat.rst
-    krb5_pac_get_buffer.rst
-    krb5_pac_get_types.rst
-    krb5_pac_init.rst
-diff --git a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-index 12a1d441b8..dbe87561c5 100644
---- a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-+++ b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-@@ -8392,6 +8392,44 @@ krb5_pac_sign_ext(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
-                   const krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key, krb5_boolean with_realm,
-                   krb5_data *data);
- 
-+/**
-+ * Compatibility function used by IPA if the 1.20 KDB diver API is not
-+ * available.  It generates PAC signatures, including the extended KDC one when
-+ * relevant.
-+ *
-+ * It is similar to krb5_kdc_sign_ticket(), except it will not generate the
-+ * PAC ticket signature, and therefore does not expect encrypted ticket part as
-+ * parameter.
-+ *
-+ * @param [in]  context         Library context
-+ * @param [in]  pac             PAC handle
-+ * @param [in]  authtime        Expected timestamp
-+ * @param [in]  client_princ    Client principal name (or NULL)
-+ * @param [in]  server_princ    Server principal name
-+ * @param [in]  server_key      Key for server checksum
-+ * @param [in]  privsvr_key     Key for KDC checksum
-+ * @param [in]  with_realm      If true, include the realm of @a client_princ
-+ * @param [out] data            Signed PAC encoding
-+ *
-+ * This function signs @a pac using the keys @a server_key and @a privsvr_key
-+ * and returns the signed encoding in @a data.  @a pac is modified to include
-+ * the server and KDC checksum buffers.  Use krb5_free_data_contents() to free
-+ * @a data when it is no longer needed.
-+ *
-+ * If @a with_realm is true, the PAC_CLIENT_INFO field of the signed PAC will
-+ * include the realm of @a client_princ as well as the name.  This flag is
-+ * necessary to generate PACs for cross-realm S4U2Self referrals.
-+ */
-+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
-+krb5_pac_full_sign_compat(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac,
-+                          krb5_timestamp authtime,
-+                          krb5_const_principal client_princ,
-+                          krb5_const_principal server_princ,
-+                          const krb5_keyblock *server_key,
-+                          const krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key,
-+                          krb5_boolean with_realm,
-+                          krb5_data *data);
-+
- /**
-  * Sign a PAC, possibly including a ticket signature
-  *
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-index 9c00178a28..b7fa064100 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
-@@ -757,9 +757,17 @@ krb5_pac_verify_ext(krb5_context context,
-                     krb5_boolean with_realm)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_boolean has_full_chksum;
- 
-     if (server != NULL || privsvr != NULL) {
--        ret = verify_pac_checksums(context, pac, FALSE, server, privsvr);
-+        /* Fail only if full checksum is present and invalid.
-+         * Proceed if absent.
-+         */
-+        ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_FULL_CHECKSUM, NULL);
-+        has_full_chksum = ret != ENOENT;
-+
-+        ret = verify_pac_checksums(context, pac, has_full_chksum, server,
-+                                   privsvr);
-         if (ret != 0)
-             return ret;
-     }
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c
-index 8ea61ac17b..7c3a86d8eb 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac_sign.c
-@@ -309,6 +309,23 @@ krb5_pac_sign_ext(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
-                     with_realm, FALSE, data);
- }
- 
-+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
-+krb5_pac_full_sign_compat(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac,
-+                          krb5_timestamp authtime,
-+                          krb5_const_principal client_princ,
-+                          krb5_const_principal server_princ,
-+                          const krb5_keyblock *server_key,
-+                          const krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key,
-+                          krb5_boolean with_realm,
-+                          krb5_data *data)
-+{
-+    krb5_boolean is_service_tkt;
-+
-+    is_service_tkt = k5_pac_should_have_ticket_signature(server_princ);
-+    return sign_pac(context, pac, authtime, client_princ, server_key,
-+                    privsvr_key, with_realm, is_service_tkt, data);
-+}
-+
- /* Add a signature over der_enc_tkt in privsvr to pac.  der_enc_tkt should be
-  * encoded with a dummy PAC authdata element containing a single zero byte. */
- static krb5_error_code
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports b/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
-index 28784ec67c..ac94e0c236 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
-@@ -508,6 +508,7 @@ krb5_os_localaddr
- krb5_overridekeyname
- krb5_pac_add_buffer
- krb5_pac_free
-+krb5_pac_full_sign_compat
- krb5_pac_get_buffer
- krb5_pac_get_types
- krb5_pac_init
--- 
-2.40.1
-

SPECS/krb5.spec

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Summary: The Kerberos network authentication system
 Name: krb5
 Version: 1.18.2
 # for prerelease, should be e.g., 0.% {prerelease}.1% { ?dist } (without spaces)
-Release: 30%{?dist}
+Release: 22%{?dist}
 
 # lookaside-cached sources; two downloads and a build artifact
 Source0: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/1.18/krb5-%{version}%{prerelease}.tar.gz
@@ -94,21 +94,6 @@ Patch148: downstream-Fix-dejagnu-unit-tests-directory-name-for-RPC-lib.patch
 Patch149: krb5-krad-larger-attrs.patch
 Patch150: krb5-krad-remote.patch
 Patch151: Fix-integer-overflows-in-PAC-parsing.patch
-Patch152: Use-14-instead-of-9-for-unkeyed-SHA-1-checksum.patch
-Patch153: Add-PAC-ticket-signature-APIs.patch
-Patch154: Factor-out-PAC-checksum-verification.patch
-Patch155: Add-PAC-full-checksums.patch
-Patch156: downstream-Support-PAC-full-checksum-w-o-ticket-chec.patch
-Patch157: downstream-Allow-to-make-AD-SIGNEDPATH-optional.patch
-Patch158: End-connection-on-KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE.patch
-Patch159: Add-request_timeout-configuration-parameter.patch
-Patch160: Wait-indefinitely-on-KDC-TCP-connections.patch
-Patch161: Fix-two-unlikely-memory-leaks.patch
-Patch162: Fix-defcred-leak-in-krb5-gss_inquire_cred.patch
-Patch163: Add-a-simple-DER-support-header.patch
-Patch164: Fix-vulnerabilities-in-GSS-message-token-handling.patch
-Patch165: Remove-PKINIT-RSA-support.patch
-Patch166: Generate-and-verify-message-MACs-in-libkrad.patch
 
 License: MIT
 URL: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
@@ -719,44 +704,6 @@ exit 0
 %{_libdir}/libkadm5srv_mit.so.*
 
 %changelog
-* Thu Oct 17 2024 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.18.2-30
-- libkrad: implement support for Message-Authenticator (CVE-2024-3596)
-  Resolves: RHEL-50253
-- Remove RSA protocol for PKINIT
-  Resolves: RHEL-17616
-
-* Mon Jul 01 2024 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.18.2-29
-- CVE-2024-37370 CVE-2024-37371
-  Fix vulnerabilities in GSS message token handling
-  Resolves: RHEL-45398 RHEL-45386
-
-* Tue Apr 09 2024 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.18.2-28
-- Fix leak of default credentials in gss_inquire_cred()
-  Resolves: RHEL-32258
-
-* Thu Mar 21 2024 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.18.2-27
-- Fix memory leak in GSSAPI interface
-  Resolves: RHEL-27250
-- Fix memory leak in PMAP RPC interface
-  Resolves: RHEL-27244
-- Make TCP waiting time configurable
-  Resolves: RHEL-17131
-
-* Wed Sep 27 2023 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.18.2-26
-- Allow to make AD-SIGNEDPATH optional
-  Resolves: RHEL-10514
-
-* Thu Jul 06 2023 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.18.2-25
-- Bump release number
-
-* Wed Jul 05 2023 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.18.2-24
-- Remove downloadable source signature file
-- Resolves: rhbz#2219654
-
-* Wed May 31 2023 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.18.2-23
-- Support PAC with KDC extended signature and without ticket signature
-- Resolves: rhbz#2169477
-
 * Tue Nov 08 2022 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.18.2-22
 - Fix integer overflows in PAC parsing (CVE-2022-42898)
 - Resolves: rhbz#2140968