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Don't warn in kadmin when no policy is specified

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Do not always canonicalize enterprise principals
This commit is contained in:
Robbie Harwood 2020-01-03 11:36:21 -05:00
parent d6ef09022c
commit fd463aed6a
15 changed files with 774 additions and 414 deletions
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64
Allow-client-canonicalization-in-non-krbtgt-AS-REP.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From 0bbb2104fd6c494552c9261137fac782941b6440 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 20:41:49 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Allow client canonicalization in non-krbtgt AS-REP
If a caller makes an AS-REQ with the canonicalize flag set (or with an
enterprise client principal or the anonymous flag), always allow the
KDC to change the client principal. Continue to restrict server name
changes to requests for TGS principals.
Also remove the conditional for setting canon_ok for fully anonymous
requests. Both kinds of anonymous requests change the client
principal or realm, but neither kind changes the server principal or
realm, so this logic is no longer needed now that canon_ok only
applies to server name changes.
[ghudson@mit.edu: clarified commit message; removed anonymous PKINIT
clause]
ticket: 8843 (new)
(cherry picked from commit c6c19b1d35c6523cb7ed220c1f2e97e12e039293)
---
src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c | 9 ++-------
src/tests/t_kdb.py | 3 +++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
index 79dede2c6..9ee605888 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
@@ -230,17 +230,12 @@ verify_as_reply(krb5_context context,
if (canon_req) {
canon_ok = IS_TGS_PRINC(request->server) &&
IS_TGS_PRINC(as_reply->enc_part2->server);
- if (!canon_ok && (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS)) {
- canon_ok = krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context,
- as_reply->client,
- krb5_anonymous_principal());
- }
} else
canon_ok = 0;
if ((!canon_ok &&
- (!krb5_principal_compare(context, as_reply->client, request->client) ||
- !krb5_principal_compare(context, as_reply->enc_part2->server, request->server)))
+ !krb5_principal_compare(context, as_reply->enc_part2->server, request->server))
+ || (!canon_req && !krb5_principal_compare(context, as_reply->client, request->client))
|| !krb5_principal_compare(context, as_reply->enc_part2->server, as_reply->ticket->server)
|| (request->nonce != as_reply->enc_part2->nonce)
/* XXX check for extraneous flags */
diff --git a/src/tests/t_kdb.py b/src/tests/t_kdb.py
index 7a082a5b9..cc5d2fc3c 100755
--- a/src/tests/t_kdb.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_kdb.py
@@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ realm.run([kadminl, 'modprinc', '+requires_preauth', 'canon'])
realm.kinit('canon', password('canon'))
realm.kinit('alias', password('canon'), ['-C'])
+# Test client name canonicalization in non-krbtgt AS reply
+realm.kinit('alias', password('canon'), ['-C', '-S', 'kadmin/changepw'])
+
mark('LDAP password history')
# Test password history.

7
Clear-forwardable-flag-instead-of-denying-request.patch
View File

@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ ticket: 7871
(cherry picked from commit 08e948cce2c79a3604066fcf7a64fc527456f83d)
---
src/kdc/do_as_req.c | 19 ++------
src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c | 58 +++++-----------------
src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c | 56 ++++-----------------
src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
src/kdc/kdc_util.h | 9 ++--
src/kdc/tgs_policy.c | 8 +--
src/tests/Makefile.in | 1 +
src/tests/gcred.c | 28 ++++++++---
src/tests/t_kdcoptions.py | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
8 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/tests/t_kdcoptions.py
diff --git a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
@ -146,10 +146,9 @@ index 587342a6c..1da099318 100644
- if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS) &&
- !isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
- clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
-
- if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
+
+ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED))
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
- } else

113
Do-not-always-canonicalize-enterprise-principals.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
From f1890cb3b09789e62c6711d79b032a7af0a09ea8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Nov 2019 13:32:32 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Do not always canonicalize enterprise principals
When processing an AS request in the KDC, do not assume
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE for enterprise client names. This change
allows the KDB module to only canonicalize enterprise client names if
the canonicalize flag was set on the request, as Windows does. The
KDB module may check the principal type and apply canonicalization as
appropriate.
[ghudson@mit.edu: edited comments; rewrote commit message]
ticket: 8858 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 3f5955631a2056f8ec4d1ce73d9681fa7da061c2)
---
src/include/kdb.h | 21 ++++++++++++---------
src/kdc/do_as_req.c | 9 ++++-----
src/tests/t_kdb.py | 12 ++++++++++++
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/include/kdb.h b/src/include/kdb.h
index 7749cfc99..1dd37cdab 100644
--- a/src/include/kdb.h
+++ b/src/include/kdb.h
@@ -1023,15 +1023,18 @@ typedef struct _kdb_vftabl {
* in-realm alias, fill in a different value for entries->princ than the
* one requested.
*
- * A module can return out-of-realm referrals if KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE
- * is set. For AS request clients (KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CLIENT_REFERRALS_ONLY is
- * also set), the module should do so by simply filling in an out-of-realm
- * name in entries->princ and setting all other fields to NULL. Otherwise,
- * the module should return the entry for the cross-realm TGS of the
- * referred-to realm. For TGS referals, the module can also include
- * tl-data of type KRB5_TL_SERVER_REFERRAL containing ASN.1-encoded Windows
- * referral data as documented in draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-11
- * appendix A; this will be returned to the client as encrypted padata.
+ * A module can return a referral to another realm if
+ * KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE is set, or if
+ * KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CLIENT_REFERRALS_ONLY is set and search_for->type is
+ * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL. If KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CLIENT_REFERRALS_ONLY is
+ * set, the module should return a referral by simply filling in an
+ * out-of-realm name in (*entry)->princ and setting all other fields to
+ * NULL. Otherwise, the module should return the entry for the cross-realm
+ * TGS of the referred-to realm. For TGS referals, the module can also
+ * include tl-data of type KRB5_TL_SERVER_REFERRAL containing ASN.1-encoded
+ * Windows referral data as documented in
+ * draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-11 appendix A; this will be
+ * returned to the client as encrypted padata.
*/
krb5_error_code (*get_principal)(krb5_context kcontext,
krb5_const_principal search_for,
diff --git a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
index 8a96c12a9..02c0a8a1f 100644
--- a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
+++ b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
@@ -585,15 +585,14 @@ process_as_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *req_pkt,
* of cross realm TGS entries.
*/
setflag(state->c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CLIENT_REFERRALS_ONLY);
- /*
- * Note that according to the referrals draft we should
- * always canonicalize enterprise principal names.
- */
+ /* Enterprise principals are implicitly alias-ok. */
if (isflagset(state->request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE) ||
state->request->client->type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
- setflag(state->c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(state->c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK);
}
+ if (isflagset(state->request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
+ setflag(state->c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
+ }
if (include_pac_p(kdc_context, state->request)) {
setflag(state->c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
}
diff --git a/src/tests/t_kdb.py b/src/tests/t_kdb.py
index cc5d2fc3c..7271fcbbd 100755
--- a/src/tests/t_kdb.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_kdb.py
@@ -340,11 +340,14 @@ ldap_modify('dn: krbPrincipalName=canon@KRBTEST.COM,cn=t1,cn=krb5\n'
'changetype: modify\n'
'add: krbPrincipalName\n'
'krbPrincipalName: alias@KRBTEST.COM\n'
+ 'krbPrincipalName: ent@abc@KRBTEST.COM\n'
'-\n'
'add: krbCanonicalName\n'
'krbCanonicalName: canon@KRBTEST.COM\n')
realm.run([kadminl, 'getprinc', 'alias'],
expected_msg='Principal: canon@KRBTEST.COM\n')
+realm.run([kadminl, 'getprinc', 'ent\@abc'],
+ expected_msg='Principal: canon@KRBTEST.COM\n')
realm.run([kadminl, 'getprinc', 'canon'],
expected_msg='Principal: canon@KRBTEST.COM\n')
realm.run([kvno, 'alias', 'canon'])
@@ -389,6 +392,15 @@ realm.run([kadminl, 'modprinc', '+requires_preauth', 'canon'])
realm.kinit('canon', password('canon'))
realm.kinit('alias', password('canon'), ['-C'])
+# Test enterprise alias with and without canonicalization.
+realm.kinit('ent@abc', password('canon'), ['-E', '-C'])
+realm.run([kvno, 'alias'])
+realm.klist('canon@KRBTEST.COM', 'alias@KRBTEST.COM')
+
+realm.kinit('ent@abc', password('canon'), ['-E'])
+realm.run([kvno, 'alias'])
+realm.klist('ent\@abc@KRBTEST.COM', 'alias@KRBTEST.COM')
+
# Test client name canonicalization in non-krbtgt AS reply
realm.kinit('alias', password('canon'), ['-C', '-S', 'kadmin/changepw'])

160
Don-t-warn-in-kadmin-when-no-policy-is-specified.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
From aec16ed11477f08f477f915fb8119271d688711c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2019 17:49:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Don't warn in kadmin when no policy is specified
Not having policy defined is a normal occurrence. While it's a useful
message to log in case it's unexpected, the current form is
unnecessarily alarmist.
ticket: 8857 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 2ca842d5cbd5981ab5fa50e418359763c9f1a6d5)
---
doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst | 2 +-
doc/admin/database.rst | 4 ++--
doc/admin/install_kdc.rst | 6 +++---
src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c | 4 ++--
src/man/kadmin.man | 2 +-
src/po/de.po | 8 ++++----
src/po/mit-krb5.pot | 4 ++--
7 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst b/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst
index 71aa894f6..fafa61365 100644
--- a/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ Options:
Example::
kadmin: addprinc jennifer
- WARNING: no policy specified for "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU";
+ No policy specified for "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU";
defaulting to no policy.
Enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU:
Re-enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU:
diff --git a/doc/admin/database.rst b/doc/admin/database.rst
index cea60b009..8505fe1ec 100644
--- a/doc/admin/database.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/database.rst
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ If you want to create a principal which is contained by a LDAP object,
all you need to do is::
kadmin: addprinc -x dn=cn=jennifer,dc=example,dc=com jennifer
- WARNING: no policy specified for "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU";
+ No policy specified for "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU";
defaulting to no policy.
Enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type the password.
Re-enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <=Type it again.
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ If you want to create a principal under a specific LDAP container and
link to an existing LDAP object, all you need to do is::
kadmin: addprinc -x containerdn=dc=example,dc=com -x linkdn=cn=david,dc=example,dc=com david
- WARNING: no policy specified for "david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU";
+ No policy specified for "david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU";
defaulting to no policy.
Enter password for principal david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type the password.
Re-enter password for principal david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <=Type it again.
diff --git a/doc/admin/install_kdc.rst b/doc/admin/install_kdc.rst
index 3bec59f96..157c6059e 100644
--- a/doc/admin/install_kdc.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/install_kdc.rst
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ is created::
kadmin.local: addprinc admin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU
- WARNING: no policy specified for "admin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU";
+ No policy specified for "admin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU";
assigning "default".
Enter password for principal admin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Enter a password.
Re-enter password for principal admin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type it again.
@@ -316,11 +316,11 @@ following::
shell% kadmin
kadmin: addprinc -randkey host/kerberos.mit.edu
- NOTICE: no policy specified for "host/kerberos.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; assigning "default"
+ No policy specified for "host/kerberos.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; assigning "default"
Principal "host/kerberos.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created.
kadmin: addprinc -randkey host/kerberos-1.mit.edu
- NOTICE: no policy specified for "host/kerberos-1.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; assigning "default"
+ No policy specified for "host/kerberos-1.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; assigning "default"
Principal "host/kerberos-1.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created.
It is not strictly necessary to have the master KDC server in the
diff --git a/src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c b/src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c
index b4d1aad93..a6e858d82 100644
--- a/src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c
+++ b/src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c
@@ -1229,13 +1229,13 @@ kadmin_addprinc(int argc, char *argv[])
/* If the policy "default" exists, assign it. */
if (policy_exists("default")) {
if (!script_mode) {
- fprintf(stderr, _("NOTICE: no policy specified for %s; "
+ fprintf(stderr, _("No policy specified for %s; "
"assigning \"default\"\n"), canon);
}
princ.policy = "default";
mask |= KADM5_POLICY;
} else if (!script_mode) {
- fprintf(stderr, _("WARNING: no policy specified for %s; "
+ fprintf(stderr, _("No policy specified for %s; "
"defaulting to no policy\n"), canon);
}
}
diff --git a/src/man/kadmin.man b/src/man/kadmin.man
index 44859a378..b514fe279 100644
--- a/src/man/kadmin.man
+++ b/src/man/kadmin.man
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ Example:
.nf
.ft C
kadmin: addprinc jennifer
-WARNING: no policy specified for "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU";
+No policy specified for "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU";
defaulting to no policy.
Enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU:
Re\-enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU:
diff --git a/src/po/de.po b/src/po/de.po
index 40e31da90..5d78bdded 100644
--- a/src/po/de.po
+++ b/src/po/de.po
@@ -1690,16 +1690,16 @@ msgstr "WARNUNG: Richtlinie »%s« existiert nicht.\n"
#: ../../src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c:1230
#, c-format
-msgid "NOTICE: no policy specified for %s; assigning \"default\"\n"
+msgid "No policy specified for %s; assigning \"default\"\n"
msgstr ""
-"HINWEIS: Für %s wurde keine Richtlinie angegeben, es wird »default« "
+"Für %s wurde keine Richtlinie angegeben, es wird »default« "
"zugewiesen\n"
#: ../../src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c:1235
#, c-format
-msgid "WARNING: no policy specified for %s; defaulting to no policy\n"
+msgid "No policy specified for %s; defaulting to no policy\n"
msgstr ""
-"WARNUNG: Für %s wurde keine Richtlinie angegeben, es wird die Vorgabe "
+"Für %s wurde keine Richtlinie angegeben, es wird die Vorgabe "
"»keine\n"
"Richtlinie« verwandt.\n"
diff --git a/src/po/mit-krb5.pot b/src/po/mit-krb5.pot
index 8cfbe9f3c..de1998d2f 100644
--- a/src/po/mit-krb5.pot
+++ b/src/po/mit-krb5.pot
@@ -1645,12 +1645,12 @@ msgstr ""
#: ../../src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c:1228
#, c-format
-msgid "NOTICE: no policy specified for %s; assigning \"default\"\n"
+msgid "No policy specified for %s; assigning \"default\"\n"
msgstr ""
#: ../../src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c:1234
#, c-format
-msgid "WARNING: no policy specified for %s; defaulting to no policy\n"
+msgid "No policy specified for %s; defaulting to no policy\n"
msgstr ""
#: ../../src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c:1276

30
Implement-krb5_cc_remove_cred-for-remaining-types.patch
View File

@ -266,25 +266,13 @@ index 8419f6ebf..98723fe2e 100644
- * with the time offsets, skip it. */
- while (krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey] == krcursor->princ_id ||
- krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey] == krcursor->offsets_id) {
- krcursor->currkey++;
- /* Check if we have now reached the end */
- if (krcursor->currkey >= krcursor->numkeys)
- return KRB5_CC_END;
- }
+ /* Read the key; the right size buffer will be allocated and
+ * returned. */
+ psize = keyctl_read_alloc(krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey],
+ &payload);
+ if (psize != -1) {
+ krcursor->currkey++;
- /* Read the key; the right size buffer will be allocated and returned. */
- psize = keyctl_read_alloc(krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey], &payload);
- if (psize == -1) {
- DEBUG_PRINT(("Error reading key %d: %s\n",
- krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey],
- strerror(errno)));
- return KRB5_FCC_NOFILE;
+
+ /* Unmarshal the cred using the file ccache version 4 format. */
+ ret = k5_unmarshal_cred(payload, psize, 4, creds);
+ free(payload);
@ -297,10 +285,22 @@ index 8419f6ebf..98723fe2e 100644
+
+ /* The current key was unlinked, probably by a remove_cred call; move
+ * on to the next one. */
+ krcursor->currkey++;
krcursor->currkey++;
- /* Check if we have now reached the end */
- if (krcursor->currkey >= krcursor->numkeys)
- return KRB5_CC_END;
}
- krcursor->currkey++;
- /* Read the key; the right size buffer will be allocated and returned. */
- psize = keyctl_read_alloc(krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey], &payload);
- if (psize == -1) {
- DEBUG_PRINT(("Error reading key %d: %s\n",
- krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey],
- strerror(errno)));
- return KRB5_FCC_NOFILE;
- }
- krcursor->currkey++;
-
- /* Unmarshal the credential using the file ccache version 4 format. */
- ret = k5_unmarshal_cred(payload, psize, 4, creds);
- free(payload);

137
Make-etype-names-in-KDC-logs-human-readable.patch
View File

@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ ticket: 8772 (new)
(cherry picked from commit a649279727490687d54becad91fde8cf7429d951)
---
src/kdc/kdc_log.c | 42 +++++++--------
src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 131 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
src/kdc/kdc_util.h | 6 +--
3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
3 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_log.c b/src/kdc/kdc_log.c
index 4eec50373..b160ba21a 100644
@ -132,16 +132,57 @@ index 0155c28c6..f5c581c82 100644
- * L10_2 = log10(2**x), rounded up; log10(2) ~= 0.301.
- */
-#define L10_2(x) ((int)(((x * 301) + 999) / 1000))
-
-/*
- * Max length of sprintf("%ld") for an int of type T; includes leading
- * minus sign and terminating NUL.
- */
-#define D_LEN(t) (L10_2(sizeof(t) * CHAR_BIT) + 2)
-
-void
-ktypes2str(char *s, size_t len, int nktypes, krb5_enctype *ktype)
+/* Wrapper of krb5_enctype_to_name() to include the PKINIT types. */
+static krb5_error_code
+enctype_name(krb5_enctype ktype, char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
{
- int i;
- char stmp[D_LEN(krb5_enctype) + 1];
- char *p;
+ char *name;
+
- if (nktypes < 0
- || len < (sizeof(" etypes {...}") + D_LEN(int))) {
- *s = '\0';
- return;
- }
+ if (buflen == 0)
+ return EINVAL;
+ *buf = '\0'; /* ensure these are always valid C-strings */
+
- snprintf(s, len, "%d etypes {", nktypes);
- for (i = 0; i < nktypes; i++) {
- snprintf(stmp, sizeof(stmp), "%s%ld", i ? " " : "", (long)ktype[i]);
- if (strlen(s) + strlen(stmp) + sizeof("}") > len)
- break;
- strlcat(s, stmp, len);
- }
- if (i < nktypes) {
- /*
- * We broke out of the loop. Try to truncate the list.
- */
- p = s + strlen(s);
- while (p - s + sizeof("...}") > len) {
- while (p > s && *p != ' ' && *p != '{')
- *p-- = '\0';
- if (p > s && *p == ' ') {
- *p-- = '\0';
- continue;
- }
- }
- strlcat(s, "...", len);
- }
- strlcat(s, "}", len);
- return;
+ /* rfc4556 recommends that clients wishing to indicate support for these
+ * pkinit algorithms include them in the etype field of the AS-REQ. */
+ if (ktype == ENCTYPE_DSA_SHA1_CMS)
@ -160,85 +201,47 @@ index 0155c28c6..f5c581c82 100644
+ name = "des-ede3-cbc-EnvOID";
+ else
+ return krb5_enctype_to_name(ktype, FALSE, buf, buflen);
-/*
- * Max length of sprintf("%ld") for an int of type T; includes leading
- * minus sign and terminating NUL.
- */
-#define D_LEN(t) (L10_2(sizeof(t) * CHAR_BIT) + 2)
+
+ if (strlcpy(name, buf, buflen) >= buflen)
+ return ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
-void
-ktypes2str(char *s, size_t len, int nktypes, krb5_enctype *ktype)
+char *
+ktypes2str(krb5_enctype *ktype, int nktypes)
{
+ struct k5buf buf;
int i;
- char stmp[D_LEN(krb5_enctype) + 1];
- char *p;
+ char name[64];
- if (nktypes < 0
- || len < (sizeof(" etypes {...}") + D_LEN(int))) {
- *s = '\0';
- return;
- }
+ if (nktypes < 0)
+ return NULL;
- snprintf(s, len, "%d etypes {", nktypes);
+ k5_buf_init_dynamic(&buf);
+ k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%d etypes {", nktypes);
for (i = 0; i < nktypes; i++) {
- snprintf(stmp, sizeof(stmp), "%s%ld", i ? " " : "", (long)ktype[i]);
- if (strlen(s) + strlen(stmp) + sizeof("}") > len)
- break;
- strlcat(s, stmp, len);
+ enctype_name(ktype[i], name, sizeof(name));
+ k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%s%s(%ld)", i ? ", " : "", name, (long)ktype[i]);
}
- if (i < nktypes) {
- /*
- * We broke out of the loop. Try to truncate the list.
- */
- p = s + strlen(s);
- while (p - s + sizeof("...}") > len) {
- while (p > s && *p != ' ' && *p != '{')
- *p-- = '\0';
- if (p > s && *p == ' ') {
- *p-- = '\0';
- continue;
- }
- }
- strlcat(s, "...", len);
- }
- strlcat(s, "}", len);
- return;
+ k5_buf_add(&buf, "}");
+ return buf.data;
}
-void
-rep_etypes2str(char *s, size_t len, krb5_kdc_rep *rep)
+char *
+rep_etypes2str(krb5_kdc_rep *rep)
+ktypes2str(krb5_enctype *ktype, int nktypes)
{
- char stmp[sizeof("ses=") + D_LEN(krb5_enctype)];
-
+ struct k5buf buf;
+ int i;
+ char name[64];
- if (len < (3 * D_LEN(krb5_enctype)
- + sizeof("etypes {rep= tkt= ses=}"))) {
- *s = '\0';
- return;
- }
+ if (nktypes < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ k5_buf_init_dynamic(&buf);
+ k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%d etypes {", nktypes);
+ for (i = 0; i < nktypes; i++) {
+ enctype_name(ktype[i], name, sizeof(name));
+ k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%s%s(%ld)", i ? ", " : "", name, (long)ktype[i]);
}
+ k5_buf_add(&buf, "}");
+ return buf.data;
+}
- snprintf(s, len, "etypes {rep=%ld", (long)rep->enc_part.enctype);
+char *
+rep_etypes2str(krb5_kdc_rep *rep)
+{
+ struct k5buf buf;
+ char name[64];
+ krb5_enctype etype;
- snprintf(s, len, "etypes {rep=%ld", (long)rep->enc_part.enctype);
+
+ k5_buf_init_dynamic(&buf);
+ k5_buf_add(&buf, "etypes {rep=");
+ enctype_name(rep->enc_part.enctype, name, sizeof(name));

65
Remove-3des-support.patch
View File

@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ their constants.
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h | 6 +-
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5seal.c | 35 +-
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealiov.c | 27 +-
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unseal.c | 88 ++--
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unseal.c | 102 ++---
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c | 38 +-
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/util_crypt.c | 11 -
.../api.current/chpass-principal-v2.exp | 4 +-
@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ their constants.
src/tests/t_salt.py | 5 +-
src/util/k5test.py | 10 -
.../leash/htmlhelp/html/Encryption_Types.htm | 13 -
96 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 4831 deletions(-)
96 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 4838 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 src/lib/crypto/builtin/des/ISSUES
delete mode 100644 src/lib/crypto/builtin/des/Makefile.in
delete mode 100644 src/lib/crypto/builtin/des/d3_aead.c
@ -5401,15 +5401,13 @@ index 9b183bc33..f0cc4a680 100644
+ if (signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5) {
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
+ }
-
- case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
- case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
- /* compute the checksum of the message */
-
- /* 8 = bytes of token body to be checksummed according to spec */
+ /* compute the checksum of the message */
-
- if (! (data_ptr = xmalloc(8 + plainlen))) {
- if (sealalg != 0xffff)
- xfree(plain);
@ -5418,9 +5416,33 @@ index 9b183bc33..f0cc4a680 100644
- *minor_status = ENOMEM;
- return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
- }
+ /* 8 = bytes of token body to be checksummed according to spec */
-
- (void) memcpy(data_ptr, ptr-2, 8);
-
- (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8, plain, plainlen);
-
- plaind.length = 8 + plainlen;
- plaind.data = data_ptr;
- code = krb5_k_make_checksum(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
- ctx->seq, sign_usage,
- &plaind, &md5cksum);
- xfree(data_ptr);
-
- if (code) {
- if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG)
- gssalloc_free(token.value);
- *minor_status = code;
- return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
- }
-
- code = k5_bcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum_len);
- break;
}
+ /* compute the checksum of the message */
+
+ /* 8 = bytes of token body to be checksummed according to spec */
+
+ if (! (data_ptr = xmalloc(8 + plainlen))) {
+ if (sealalg != 0xffff)
+ xfree(plain);
@ -5429,40 +5451,25 @@ index 9b183bc33..f0cc4a680 100644
+ *minor_status = ENOMEM;
+ return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
+ }
- (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8, plain, plainlen);
+
+ (void) memcpy(data_ptr, ptr-2, 8);
- plaind.length = 8 + plainlen;
- plaind.data = data_ptr;
- code = krb5_k_make_checksum(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
- ctx->seq, sign_usage,
- &plaind, &md5cksum);
- xfree(data_ptr);
+
+ (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8, plain, plainlen);
- if (code) {
- if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG)
- gssalloc_free(token.value);
- *minor_status = code;
- return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
- }
+
+ plaind.length = 8 + plainlen;
+ plaind.data = data_ptr;
+ code = krb5_k_make_checksum(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
+ ctx->seq, sign_usage,
+ &plaind, &md5cksum);
+ xfree(data_ptr);
- code = k5_bcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum_len);
- break;
+
+ if (code) {
+ if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG)
+ gssalloc_free(token.value);
+ *minor_status = code;
+ return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
+ }
+
+ code = k5_bcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum_len);
+
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &md5cksum);

60
Remove-Kerberos-v4-support-vestiges-from-ccapi.patch
View File

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Subject: [PATCH] Remove Kerberos v4 support vestiges from ccapi
src/ccapi/lib/ccapi_v2.c | 34 +--
src/ccapi/lib/win/OldCC/ccapi.h | 20 --
src/ccapi/server/ccs_ccache.c | 69 +-----
src/ccapi/test/test_ccapi_ccache.c | 227 +++-----------------
src/ccapi/test/test_ccapi_ccache.c | 223 +++-----------------
src/ccapi/test/test_ccapi_constants.c | 2 -
src/ccapi/test/test_ccapi_context.c | 3 -
src/ccapi/test/test_ccapi_v2.c | 89 --------
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Subject: [PATCH] Remove Kerberos v4 support vestiges from ccapi
src/windows/kfwlogon/kfwlogon.h | 2 +-
src/windows/leashdll/leash-int.h | 2 +-
src/windows/lib/cacheapi.h | 53 +----
15 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 873 deletions(-)
15 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 871 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ccapi/common/cci_cred_union.c b/src/ccapi/common/cci_cred_union.c
index 4c8981610..424a93dab 100644
@ -760,8 +760,29 @@ index a0fd84af1..fe63e6710 100644
- cc_ccache_destroy(ccache);
- ccache = NULL;
- }
-
-
+ // replace v5 only ccache's principal
+ if (!err) {
+ err = cc_context_create_new_ccache(context, cc_credentials_v5,
+ "foo@BAZ.ORG", &ccache);
+ }
+ if (!err) {
+ check_once_cc_ccache_set_principal(
+ ccache, cc_credentials_v5, "foo/BAZ@BAR.ORG", ccNoError,
+ "replace v5 only ccache's principal (empty ccache)");
+ }
+ else {
+ log_error(
+ "cc_context_create_new_ccache failed, can't complete test");
+ failure_count++;
+ }
+ // bad params
+ if (!err) {
+ check_once_cc_ccache_set_principal(ccache, cc_credentials_v5,
+ NULL, ccErrBadParam,
+ "NULL principal");
+ }
- // empty ccache
-
- // replace v5 only ccache's principal
@ -837,29 +858,6 @@ index a0fd84af1..fe63e6710 100644
- // replace v4 only ccache's principal
-
- // add v5 principal to v4 only ccache
+ // replace v5 only ccache's principal
+ if (!err) {
+ err = cc_context_create_new_ccache(context, cc_credentials_v5,
+ "foo@BAZ.ORG", &ccache);
+ }
+ if (!err) {
+ check_once_cc_ccache_set_principal(
+ ccache, cc_credentials_v5, "foo/BAZ@BAR.ORG", ccNoError,
+ "replace v5 only ccache's principal (empty ccache)");
+ }
+ else {
+ log_error(
+ "cc_context_create_new_ccache failed, can't complete test");
+ failure_count++;
+ }
+
+ // bad params
+ if (!err) {
+ check_once_cc_ccache_set_principal(ccache, cc_credentials_v5,
+ NULL, ccErrBadParam,
+ "NULL principal");
+ }
+
+ if (ccache) {
+ cc_ccache_destroy(ccache);
+ ccache = NULL;
@ -894,7 +892,8 @@ index a0fd84af1..fe63e6710 100644
}
if (!err) {
- check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v5, &time_offset, ccNoError, "offset set for v5 but not v4");
- }
+ check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v5, &time_offset, ccNoError, "offset set for v5");
}
- if (!err) {
- check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v4, &time_offset, ccErrTimeOffsetNotSet, "asking for v4 offset when only v5 is set");
- }
@ -903,10 +902,9 @@ index a0fd84af1..fe63e6710 100644
- }
- if (!err) {
- check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v4, &time_offset, ccNoError, "asking for v4 offset when v4 and v5 are set");
+ check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v5, &time_offset, ccNoError, "offset set for v5");
}
- }
-
check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v5, NULL, ccErrBadParam, "NULL time_offset out param");
- check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v4_v5, &time_offset, ccErrBadCredentialsVersion, "v4_v5 creds_vers in param (invalid)");

160
Remove-PKINIT-draft-9-support.patch
View File

@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ ticket: 8817 (new)
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_accessor.h | 6 -
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c | 231 +++-----
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h | 1 -
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 221 ++------
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 219 ++-----
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c | 65 ---
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c | 531 +++++-------------
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c | 543 ++++++------------
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h | 4 -
src/tests/t_pkinit.py | 6 +-
10 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 809 deletions(-)
10 files changed, 282 insertions(+), 814 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h
index fe2ec0d31..b437fd53f 100644
@ -214,7 +214,18 @@ index 58400d555..1a642139a 100644
- auth_pack.clientDHNonce.length = 0;
- auth_pack.clientPublicValue = &info;
- auth_pack.supportedKDFs = (krb5_data **)supported_kdf_alg_ids;
-
+ memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
+ memset(&auth_pack, 0, sizeof(auth_pack));
+ auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.ctime = ctsec;
+ auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.cusec = cusec;
+ auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.nonce = nonce;
+ auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.paChecksum = *cksum;
+ if (!reqctx->opts->disable_freshness)
+ auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken = reqctx->freshness_token;
+ auth_pack.clientDHNonce.length = 0;
+ auth_pack.clientPublicValue = &info;
+ auth_pack.supportedKDFs = (krb5_data **)supported_kdf_alg_ids;
- /* add List of CMS algorithms */
- retval = create_krb5_supportedCMSTypes(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
- reqctx->cryptoctx,
@ -227,18 +238,6 @@ index 58400d555..1a642139a 100644
- pkiDebug("as_req: unrecognized pa_type = %d\n",
- (int)reqctx->pa_type);
- retval = -1;
+ memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
+ memset(&auth_pack, 0, sizeof(auth_pack));
+ auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.ctime = ctsec;
+ auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.cusec = cusec;
+ auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.nonce = nonce;
+ auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.paChecksum = *cksum;
+ if (!reqctx->opts->disable_freshness)
+ auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken = reqctx->freshness_token;
+ auth_pack.clientDHNonce.length = 0;
+ auth_pack.clientPublicValue = &info;
+ auth_pack.supportedKDFs = (krb5_data **)supported_kdf_alg_ids;
+
+ /* add List of CMS algorithms */
+ retval = create_krb5_supportedCMSTypes(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
+ reqctx->cryptoctx,
@ -356,19 +355,20 @@ index 58400d555..1a642139a 100644
- &req9->signedAuthPack.data,
- &req9->signedAuthPack.length);
- break;
+ &req->signedAuthPack.data,
+ &req->signedAuthPack.length);
+ }
+
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
-#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
- print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)req9->signedAuthPack.data,
- req9->signedAuthPack.length,
- "/tmp/client_signed_data_draft9");
-#endif
+ &req->signedAuthPack.data,
+ &req->signedAuthPack.length);
}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
+ print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)req->signedAuthPack.data,
+ req->signedAuthPack.length,
+ "/tmp/client_signed_data");
#endif
- }
+#endif
+
krb5_free_data(context, coded_auth_pack);
if (retval) {
@ -556,7 +556,13 @@ index 8aa2c5257..8c7fd0cca 100644
- goto cleanup2;
- PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
- V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid_copy);
-
+ /* create a content-type attr */
+ oid_copy = OBJ_dup(oid);
+ if (oid_copy == NULL)
+ goto cleanup2;
+ PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
+ V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid_copy);
- /* create the signature over signed attributes. get DER encoded value */
- /* This is the place where smartcard signature needs to be calculated */
- sk = p7si->auth_attr;
@ -565,13 +571,6 @@ index 8aa2c5257..8c7fd0cca 100644
- if (abuf == NULL)
- goto cleanup2;
- } /* signed attributes */
+ /* create a content-type attr */
+ oid_copy = OBJ_dup(oid);
+ if (oid_copy == NULL)
+ goto cleanup2;
+ PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
+ V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid_copy);
+
+ /* create the signature over signed attributes. get DER encoded value */
+ /* This is the place where smartcard signature needs to be calculated */
+ sk = p7si->auth_attr;
@ -1041,38 +1040,47 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
if (retval) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_PADATA_VERIFY_FAIL(context);
goto cleanup;
@@ -541,117 +513,87 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
@@ -541,118 +513,88 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
#endif
OCTETDATA_TO_KRB5DATA(&authp_data, &k5data);
- switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
- case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
- retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack(&k5data, &auth_pack);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context,
- auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
- if (retval)
- goto cleanup;
+ retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack(&k5data, &auth_pack);
+ if (retval) {
+ pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* check dh parameters */
+ if (auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
+ retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
+ reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
+ &auth_pack->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
+ plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
+ pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
-
- retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context,
- auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
- if (retval)
- goto cleanup;
-
- /* check dh parameters */
- if (auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
- retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
- reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
- &auth_pack->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
- plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
+ retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
-
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
- goto cleanup;
@ -1088,17 +1096,10 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
- der_req = cb->request_body(context, rock);
- retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, NULL,
- 0, der_req, &cksum);
+ /* check dh parameters */
+ if (auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
+ retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
+ reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
+ &auth_pack->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
+ plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
if (retval) {
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
+ pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
- goto cleanup;
- }
- if (cksum.length != auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length ||
- k5_bcmp(cksum.contents,
- auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
@ -1170,10 +1171,7 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
- if (!valid_kdcPkId)
- pkiDebug("kdcPkId in AS_REQ does not match KDC's cert"
- "RFC says to ignore and proceed\n");
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
-
- }
- /* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
- reqctx->rcv_auth_pack = auth_pack;
@ -1184,24 +1182,35 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
- retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(&k5data, &auth_pack9);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack_draft9\n");
+ ftoken = auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken;
+ if (ftoken != NULL) {
+ retval = cb->check_freshness_token(context, rock, ftoken);
+ if (retval)
goto cleanup;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- if (auth_pack9->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
- retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
- reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
- &auth_pack9->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
- plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
+ valid_freshness_token = TRUE;
+ }
-
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
- /* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
- reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 = auth_pack9;
- auth_pack9 = NULL;
- break;
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED;
+ goto cleanup;
}
+ ftoken = auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken;
+ if (ftoken != NULL) {
+ retval = cb->check_freshness_token(context, rock, ftoken);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+ valid_freshness_token = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* check if kdcPkId present and match KDC's subjectIdentifier */
+ if (reqp->kdcPkId.data != NULL) {
+ int valid_kdcPkId = 0;
@ -1214,18 +1223,15 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
+ if (!valid_kdcPkId) {
+ pkiDebug("kdcPkId in AS_REQ does not match KDC's cert; "
+ "RFC says to ignore and proceed\n");
}
- /* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
- reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 = auth_pack9;
- auth_pack9 = NULL;
- break;
}
+ }
+ }
+ /* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
+ reqctx->rcv_auth_pack = auth_pack;
+ auth_pack = NULL;
+
if (is_signed) {
retval = check_log_freshness(context, plgctx, request,
valid_freshness_token);
@@ -682,21 +624,13 @@ cleanup:
pkiDebug("pkinit_create_edata failed\n");
}
@ -1414,7 +1420,7 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
}
- pkiDebug("%s: return checksum instead of nonce = %d\n",
- __FUNCTION__, fixed_keypack);
-
- /* if this is an RFC reply or draft9 client requested a checksum
- * in the reply instead of the nonce, create an RFC-style keypack
- */
@ -1424,7 +1430,7 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
- retval = ENOMEM;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, 0,
- encrypting_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
- req_pkt, &key_pack->asChecksum);

51
Simplify-krb5_dbe_def_search_enctype.patch
View File

@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ kvno.
(cherry picked from commit fcfb0e47c995a7e9f956c3716be3175f44ad26e0)
---
src/lib/kdb/kdb_default.c | 117 +++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
src/lib/kdb/kdb_default.c | 111 +++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/kdb/kdb_default.c b/src/lib/kdb/kdb_default.c
index a1021f13a..231a0d8b4 100644
@ -59,18 +59,27 @@ index a1021f13a..231a0d8b4 100644
- krb5_key_data *datap;
- krb5_error_code ret;
- krb5_boolean saw_non_permitted = FALSE;
-
- ret = 0;
- if (ktype != -1 && !krb5_is_permitted_enctype(kcontext, ktype))
- return KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY;
-
- if (kvno == -1 && stype == -1 && ktype == -1)
- kvno = 0;
+ krb5_key_data *kd;
+ krb5_int32 db_salttype;
+ krb5_boolean saw_non_permitted = FALSE;
+ int i;
- ret = 0;
- if (ktype != -1 && !krb5_is_permitted_enctype(kcontext, ktype))
+ *kd_out = NULL;
+
+ if (enctype != -1 && !krb5_is_permitted_enctype(context, enctype))
return KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY;
+ if (ent->n_key_data == 0)
+ return KRB5_KDB_NO_MATCHING_KEY;
- if (kvno == -1 && stype == -1 && ktype == -1)
- kvno = 0;
+ /* Match the highest kvno if kvno is 0. Key data is sorted in descending
+ * order of kvno. */
+ if (kvno == 0)
+ kvno = ent->key_data[0].key_data_kvno;
- if (kvno == 0) {
- /* Get the max key version */
- for (i = 0; i < dbentp->n_key_data; i++) {
@ -79,7 +88,10 @@ index a1021f13a..231a0d8b4 100644
- }
- }
- }
+ *kd_out = NULL;
+ for (i = *start; i < ent->n_key_data; i++) {
+ kd = &ent->key_data[i];
+ db_salttype = (kd->key_data_ver > 1) ? kd->key_data_type[1] :
+ KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL;
- maxkvno = -1;
- idx = -1;
@ -104,28 +116,13 @@ index a1021f13a..231a0d8b4 100644
- continue;
- }
- if (stype >= 0 && db_stype != stype)
+ if (enctype != -1 && !krb5_is_permitted_enctype(context, enctype))
+ return KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY;
+ if (ent->n_key_data == 0)
+ return KRB5_KDB_NO_MATCHING_KEY;
+
+ /* Match the highest kvno if kvno is 0. Key data is sorted in descending
+ * order of kvno. */
+ if (kvno == 0)
+ kvno = ent->key_data[0].key_data_kvno;
+
+ for (i = *start; i < ent->n_key_data; i++) {
+ kd = &ent->key_data[i];
+ db_salttype = (kd->key_data_ver > 1) ? kd->key_data_type[1] :
+ KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL;
+
+ /* Match this entry against the arguments. Stop searching if we have
+ * passed the entries for the requested kvno. */
+ if (enctype != -1 && kd->key_data_type[0] != enctype)
+ continue;
+ if (salttype >= 0 && db_salttype != salttype)
continue;
- if (kvno >= 0 && dbentp->key_data[i].key_data_kvno != kvno)
+ if (salttype >= 0 && db_salttype != salttype)
+ continue;
+ if (kvno >= 0 && kd->key_data_kvno < kvno)
+ break;
+ if (kvno >= 0 && kd->key_data_kvno != kvno)

85
Simply-OpenSSL-PKCS7-decryption-code.patch
View File

@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ a larger refactoring]
(cherry picked from commit 210356653a2f963ffe9a8a1b1627c64fb8ca7a3d)
---
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 211 +++++-------------
1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 149 deletions(-)
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 213 ++++++------------
1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 150 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
@ -144,17 +144,6 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
- X509_ALGOR *enc_alg=NULL;
- STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk=NULL;
- PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
-
- p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
-
- rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
- enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
- data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
- evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
- if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ int ok = 0, plaintext_len = 0, final_len;
+ unsigned int keylen = 0, eklen = 0, blocksize;
@ -166,13 +155,24 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
- p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+ *data_out = NULL;
+ *len_out = 0;
- rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
- enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
- data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
- evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
- if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ *data_out = NULL;
+ *len_out = 0;
-
- /* It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key
- * with the private key */
+ p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
@ -195,14 +195,14 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,evp_cipher,NULL,NULL,NULL,0) <= 0)
+ evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+ if (evp_cipher == NULL)
+ goto cleanup;
goto cleanup;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
+ keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher);
+ blocksize = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(evp_cipher);
+
+ evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (evp_ctx == NULL)
goto cleanup;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit(evp_ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL) ||
+ EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx, enc_alg->parameter) <= 0)
goto cleanup;
@ -212,9 +212,7 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
- tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
- tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
- if (tkey == NULL)
+ tkey = malloc(keylen);
+ if (tkey == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey))
goto cleanup;
- goto cleanup;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
- goto cleanup;
- if (ek == NULL) {
@ -222,7 +220,7 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
- eklen = tkeylen;
- tkey = NULL;
- }
-
- if (eklen != (unsigned)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
- /* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
- * and effective key length. The key length is
@ -235,18 +233,29 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
- }
- }
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,ek,NULL,0) <= 0)
- goto cleanup;
+ /* Decrypt the secret key with the private key. */
+ ret = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
+ ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ri->enc_key),
+ ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), &ek, &eklen);
+ use_key = (ret || eklen != keylen) ? tkey : ek;
+ tkey = malloc(keylen);
+ if (tkey == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey))
goto cleanup;
- if (out == NULL)
- out=etmp;
- else
- BIO_push(out,etmp);
- etmp=NULL;
+ /* Decrypt the secret key with the private key. */
+ ret = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
+ ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ri->enc_key),
+ ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), &ek, &eklen);
+ use_key = (ret || eklen != keylen) ? tkey : ek;
- if (data_body->length > 0)
- bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
- else {
- bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio,0);
- }
- BIO_push(out,bio);
- bio=NULL;
+ /* Allocate a plaintext buffer and decrypt data_body into it. */
+ plaintext = malloc(data_body->length + blocksize);
+ if (plaintext == NULL)
@ -260,19 +269,6 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
+ goto cleanup;
+ plaintext_len += final_len;
- if (data_body->length > 0)
- bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
- else {
- bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio,0);
- }
- BIO_push(out,bio);
- bio=NULL;
+ *len_out = plaintext_len;
+ *data_out = plaintext;
+ plaintext = NULL;
+ ok = 1;
- if (0) {
- cleanup:
- if (out != NULL) BIO_free_all(out);
@ -289,6 +285,11 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
- OPENSSL_free(tkey);
- }
- return(out);
+ *len_out = plaintext_len;
+ *data_out = plaintext;
+ plaintext = NULL;
+ ok = 1;
+
+cleanup:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+ zapfree(plaintext, plaintext_len);

11
Update-test-suite-to-avoid-single-DES-enctypes.patch
View File

@ -1931,7 +1931,7 @@ index c061d764e..e8adee234 100644
}
{
all-enctypes
@@ -248,114 +207,7 @@ set passes {
@@ -248,115 +207,8 @@ set passes {
{allow_weak_crypto(server)=false}
{dummy=[verbose -log "all default enctypes"]}
}
@ -1960,8 +1960,8 @@ index c061d764e..e8adee234 100644
- {dummy=[verbose -log \
- "DES3 TGT, KDC permitting only des-cbc-crc"]}
- }
-}
-
}
-# des.md5-tgt is set as unused, since it won't trigger the error case
-# if SUPPORT_DESMD5 isn't honored.
-
@ -2041,11 +2041,12 @@ index c061d764e..e8adee234 100644
- {master_key_type=aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96}
- {dummy=[verbose -log "AES via TCP"]}
- }
}
-}
-# {supported_enctypes=des-cbc-md5:normal des-cbc-crc:normal twofish256-hmac-sha1:normal }
-
# This shouldn't be necessary on dejagnu-1.4 and later, but 1.3 seems
# to need it because its runtest.exp doesn't deal with PASS at all.
if [info exists PASS] {
@@ -1095,7 +947,7 @@ proc setup_kerberos_db { standalone } {
global REALMNAME KDB5_UTIL KADMIN_LOCAL KEY
global tmppwd hostname

218
Use-backported-version-of-OpenSSL-3-KDF-interface.patch
View File

@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ Subject: [PATCH] Use backported version of OpenSSL-3 KDF interface
---
src/configure.in | 4 +
src/lib/crypto/krb/derive.c | 346 +++++++++++++-----
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 257 +++++++------
3 files changed, 423 insertions(+), 184 deletions(-)
src/lib/crypto/krb/derive.c | 356 +++++++++++++-----
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 257 ++++++++-----
3 files changed, 428 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/configure.in b/src/configure.in
index 1df6f18fc..3bd5e683d 100644
@ -56,8 +56,6 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+ const krb5_data *label, const krb5_data *context)
{
- size_t blocksize, keybytes, n;
- krb5_error_code ret;
- krb5_data block = empty_data();
+ krb5_error_code ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *digest;
@ -97,9 +95,7 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
- blocksize = enc->block_size;
- keybytes = enc->keybytes;
+
+static krb5_error_code
+openssl_kbkdf_feedback_cmac(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
+ krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
@ -145,10 +141,7 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
- if (blocksize == 1)
- return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
- if (inkey->keyblock.length != enc->keylength || outrnd->length != keybytes)
+
+static krb5_error_code
+openssl_krb5kdf(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc, krb5_key inkey,
+ krb5_data *outrnd, const krb5_data *in_constant)
@ -159,11 +152,9 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+
+ if (inkey->keyblock.length != enc->keylength ||
+ outrnd->length != enc->keybytes) {
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+ }
- /* Allocate encryption data buffer. */
- ret = alloc_data(&block, blocksize);
+
+ if (enc->encrypt == krb5int_aes_encrypt && enc->keylength == 16)
+ cipher = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
+ else if (enc->encrypt == krb5int_aes_encrypt && enc->keylength == 32)
@ -188,29 +179,14 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+
+ ret = 0;
+done:
if (ret)
- return ret;
+ if (ret)
+ zap(outrnd->data, outrnd->length);
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
- /* Initialize the input block. */
- if (in_constant->length == blocksize) {
- memcpy(block.data, in_constant->data, blocksize);
- } else {
- krb5int_nfold(in_constant->length * 8,
- (unsigned char *) in_constant->data,
- blocksize * 8, (unsigned char *) block.data);
- }
+
+#else /* OSSL_KDFS */
- /* Loop encrypting the blocks until enough key bytes are generated. */
- n = 0;
- while (n < keybytes) {
- ret = encrypt_block(enc, inkey, &block);
- if (ret)
- goto cleanup;
+
+/*
+ * NIST SP800-108 KDF in counter mode (section 5.1).
+ * Parameters:
@ -227,27 +203,34 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+ const krb5_data *context)
+{
+ krb5_crypto_iov iov[5];
+ krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_error_code ret;
- krb5_data block = empty_data();
+ krb5_data prf;
+ unsigned char ibuf[4], lbuf[4];
- if ((keybytes - n) <= blocksize) {
- memcpy(outrnd->data + n, block.data, (keybytes - n));
- break;
- }
- blocksize = enc->block_size;
- keybytes = enc->keybytes;
-
- if (blocksize == 1)
- return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
- if (inkey->keyblock.length != enc->keylength || outrnd->length != keybytes)
+ if (hash == NULL || outrnd->length > hash->hashsize)
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
- memcpy(outrnd->data + n, block.data, blocksize);
- n += blocksize;
- }
+ /* Allocate encryption data buffer. */
/* Allocate encryption data buffer. */
- ret = alloc_data(&block, blocksize);
+ ret = alloc_data(&prf, hash->hashsize);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
if (ret)
return ret;
-cleanup:
- zapfree(block.data, blocksize);
- /* Initialize the input block. */
- if (in_constant->length == blocksize) {
- memcpy(block.data, in_constant->data, blocksize);
- } else {
- krb5int_nfold(in_constant->length * 8,
- (unsigned char *) in_constant->data,
- blocksize * 8, (unsigned char *) block.data);
- }
+ /* [i]2: four-byte big-endian binary string giving the block counter (1) */
+ iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ iov[0].data = make_data(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf));
@ -265,7 +248,25 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+ iov[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ iov[4].data = make_data(lbuf, sizeof(lbuf));
+ store_32_be(outrnd->length * 8, lbuf);
+
- /* Loop encrypting the blocks until enough key bytes are generated. */
- n = 0;
- while (n < keybytes) {
- ret = encrypt_block(enc, inkey, &block);
- if (ret)
- goto cleanup;
-
- if ((keybytes - n) <= blocksize) {
- memcpy(outrnd->data + n, block.data, (keybytes - n));
- break;
- }
-
- memcpy(outrnd->data + n, block.data, blocksize);
- n += blocksize;
- }
-
-cleanup:
- zapfree(block.data, blocksize);
+ ret = krb5int_hmac(hash, inkey, iov, 5, &prf);
+ if (!ret)
+ memcpy(outrnd->data, prf.data, outrnd->length);
@ -286,7 +287,7 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
{
size_t blocksize, keybytes, n;
krb5_crypto_iov iov[6];
@@ -204,57 +349,95 @@ cleanup:
@@ -204,56 +349,94 @@ cleanup:
return ret;
}
@ -299,54 +300,28 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
- *
- * There are no uses requiring more than a single PRF invocation.
- */
-krb5_error_code
-k5_sp800_108_counter_hmac(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
- krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
- const krb5_data *label, const krb5_data *context)
+static krb5_error_code
+builtin_derive_random_rfc3961(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
+ krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
+ const krb5_data *in_constant)
{
- krb5_crypto_iov iov[5];
+{
+ size_t blocksize, keybytes, n;
krb5_error_code ret;
- krb5_data prf;
- unsigned char ibuf[4], lbuf[4];
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_data block = empty_data();
- if (hash == NULL || outrnd->length > hash->hashsize)
+
+ blocksize = enc->block_size;
+ keybytes = enc->keybytes;
+
+ if (blocksize == 1)
+ return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
+ if (inkey->keyblock.length != enc->keylength || outrnd->length != keybytes)
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
/* Allocate encryption data buffer. */
- ret = alloc_data(&prf, hash->hashsize);
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
+ /* Allocate encryption data buffer. */
+ ret = alloc_data(&block, blocksize);
if (ret)
return ret;
- /* [i]2: four-byte big-endian binary string giving the block counter (1) */
- iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[0].data = make_data(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf));
- store_32_be(1, ibuf);
- /* Label */
- iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[1].data = *label;
- /* 0x00: separator byte */
- iov[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[2].data = make_data("", 1);
- /* Context */
- iov[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[3].data = *context;
- /* [L]2: four-byte big-endian binary string giving the output length */
- iov[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[4].data = make_data(lbuf, sizeof(lbuf));
- store_32_be(outrnd->length * 8, lbuf);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Initialize the input block. */
+ if (in_constant->length == blocksize) {
+ memcpy(block.data, in_constant->data, blocksize);
@ -355,11 +330,7 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+ (unsigned char *) in_constant->data,
+ blocksize * 8, (unsigned char *) block.data);
+ }
- ret = krb5int_hmac(hash, inkey, iov, 5, &prf);
- if (!ret)
- memcpy(outrnd->data, prf.data, outrnd->length);
- zapfree(prf.data, prf.length);
+
+ /* Loop encrypting the blocks until enough key bytes are generated. */
+ n = 0;
+ while (n < keybytes) {
@ -378,15 +349,19 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+
+cleanup:
+ zapfree(block.data, blocksize);
return ret;
}
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* OSSL_KDFS */
+
+krb5_error_code
+k5_sp800_108_counter_hmac(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
+ krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
+ const krb5_data *label, const krb5_data *context)
+{
krb5_error_code
k5_sp800_108_counter_hmac(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
const krb5_data *label, const krb5_data *context)
{
- krb5_crypto_iov iov[5];
- krb5_error_code ret;
- krb5_data prf;
- unsigned char ibuf[4], lbuf[4];
+#ifdef OSSL_KDFS
+ return openssl_kbdkf_counter_hmac(hash, inkey, outrnd, label, context);
+#else
@ -394,7 +369,9 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+ context);
+#endif
+}
+
- if (hash == NULL || outrnd->length > hash->hashsize)
- return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+static krb5_error_code
+k5_sp800_108_feedback_cmac(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
+ krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
@ -406,7 +383,35 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+ return builtin_sp800_108_feedback_cmac(enc, inkey, outrnd, in_constant);
+#endif
+}
+
- /* Allocate encryption data buffer. */
- ret = alloc_data(&prf, hash->hashsize);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- /* [i]2: four-byte big-endian binary string giving the block counter (1) */
- iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[0].data = make_data(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf));
- store_32_be(1, ibuf);
- /* Label */
- iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[1].data = *label;
- /* 0x00: separator byte */
- iov[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[2].data = make_data("", 1);
- /* Context */
- iov[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[3].data = *context;
- /* [L]2: four-byte big-endian binary string giving the output length */
- iov[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[4].data = make_data(lbuf, sizeof(lbuf));
- store_32_be(outrnd->length * 8, lbuf);
-
- ret = krb5int_hmac(hash, inkey, iov, 5, &prf);
- if (!ret)
- memcpy(outrnd->data, prf.data, outrnd->length);
- zapfree(prf.data, prf.length);
- return ret;
+static krb5_error_code
+k5_derive_random_rfc3961(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
+ krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
@ -417,10 +422,9 @@ index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
+#else
+ return builtin_derive_random_rfc3961(enc, inkey, outrnd, in_constant);
+#endif
+}
}
krb5_error_code
krb5int_derive_random(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
@@ -266,10 +449,9 @@ krb5int_derive_random(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
switch (alg) {
@ -464,7 +468,11 @@ index 52976895b..dd718c2be 100644
+ krb5_error_code ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *digest;
+
-/* pkinit_alg_agility_kdf() --
- * This function generates a key using the KDF described in
- * draft_ietf_krb_wg_pkinit_alg_agility-04.txt. The algorithm is
- * described as follows:
+ /* RFC 8636 defines a SHA384 variant, but we don't use it. */
+ if (hash_bytes == 20) {
+ digest = EVP_sha1();
@ -476,11 +484,7 @@ index 52976895b..dd718c2be 100644
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "Bad hash type for SSKDF");
+ goto done;
+ }
-/* pkinit_alg_agility_kdf() --
- * This function generates a key using the KDF described in
- * draft_ietf_krb_wg_pkinit_alg_agility-04.txt. The algorithm is
- * described as follows:
+
+ ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SS);
+ if (!ctx) {
+ oerr(context, ret, _("Failed to instantiate SSKDF"));

18
Use-secure_getenv-where-appropriate.patch
View File

@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ ticket: 8800
src/lib/krb5/os/trace.c | 2 +-
src/lib/krb5/rcache/rc_base.c | 4 ++--
src/lib/krb5/rcache/rc_io.c | 4 ++--
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c | 11 +++--------
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c | 13 ++++---------
src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c | 2 +-
src/util/profile/prof_file.c | 2 +-
12 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
12 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/kadm5/alt_prof.c b/src/lib/kadm5/alt_prof.c
index 3f6b53651..5531a10fb 100644
@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c b/src/plugins/preauth/
index 8cd3fc640..b89c5d015 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c
@@ -29,16 +29,10 @@
@@ -29,15 +29,9 @@
* SUCH DAMAGES.
*/
@ -192,16 +192,16 @@ index 8cd3fc640..b89c5d015 100644
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "pkinit.h"
#include <dlfcn.h>
-#include <dlfcn.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
#include <dirent.h>
-#include "pkinit.h"
-#include <dirent.h>
-
#include "pkinit.h"
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
static void
free_list(char **list)
{
@@ -430,7 +424,8 @@ process_option_identity(krb5_context context,
switch (idtype) {
case IDTYPE_ENVVAR:

9
krb5.spec
View File

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Summary: The Kerberos network authentication system
Name: krb5
Version: 1.17.1
# for prerelease, should be e.g., 0.% {prerelease}.1% { ?dist } (without spaces)
Release: 2%{?dist}
Release: 3%{?dist}
# rharwood has trust path to signing key and verifies on check-in
Source0: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/1.17/krb5-%{version}%{prerelease}.tar.gz
@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ Patch167: Fix-minor-errors-in-softpkcs11.patch
Patch168: Update-test-suite-cert-message-digest-to-sha256.patch
Patch169: Use-backported-version-of-OpenSSL-3-KDF-interface.patch
Patch170: krb5-1.17post6-FIPS-with-PRNG-and-RADIUS-and-MD4.patch
Patch171: Don-t-warn-in-kadmin-when-no-policy-is-specified.patch
Patch172: Allow-client-canonicalization-in-non-krbtgt-AS-REP.patch
Patch173: Do-not-always-canonicalize-enterprise-principals.patch
License: MIT
URL: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
@ -688,6 +691,10 @@ exit 0
%{_libdir}/libkadm5srv_mit.so.*
%changelog
* Fri Jan 03 2020 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 1.17.1-3
- Don't warn in kadmin when no policy is specified
- Do not always canonicalize enterprise principals
* Fri Dec 13 2019 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 1.17.1-2
- Enable the LMDB backend for the KDB