backport RT#7183
- backport a fix to allow a PKINIT client to handle SignedData from a KDC that's signed with a certificate that isn't in the SignedData, but which is available as an anchor or intermediate on the client (RT#7183)
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krb5-trunk-pkinit-anchorsign.patch
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krb5-trunk-pkinit-anchorsign.patch
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commit db83abc7dcfe369bd4467c78eebb7028ba0c0e0d
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Author: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
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Date: Thu Jun 21 17:20:29 2012 -0400
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Handle PKINIT DH replies with no certs
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If a PKINIT Diffie-Hellman reply contains no certificates in the
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SignedData object, that may be because the signer certificate was a
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trust anchor as transmitted to the KDC. Heimdal's KDC, for instance,
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filters client trust anchors out of the returned set of certificates.
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Match against idctx->trustedCAs and idctx->intermediateCAs to handle
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this case. This fix only works with OpenSSL 1.0 or later; when built
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against OpenSSL 0.9.x, the client will still require a cert in the
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reply.
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Code changes suggested by nalin@redhat.com.
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ticket: 7183
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diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
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index 0136d4f..7120ecf 100644
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--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
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+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
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@@ -1398,8 +1398,15 @@ cms_signeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
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X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store, openssl_callback_ignore_crls);
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X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags);
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- /* get the signer's information from the CMS message */
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+ /*
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+ * Get the signer's information from the CMS message. Match signer ID
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+ * against anchors and intermediate CAs in case no certs are present in the
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+ * SignedData. If we start sending kdcPkId values in requests, we'll need
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+ * to match against the source of that information too.
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+ */
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CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, NULL, 0);
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+ CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, idctx->trustedCAs, CMS_NOINTERN);
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+ CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, idctx->intermediateCAs, CMS_NOINTERN);
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if (((si_sk = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms)) == NULL) ||
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((si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(si_sk, 0)) == NULL)) {
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/* Not actually signed; anonymous case */
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
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Summary: The Kerberos network authentication system
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Name: krb5
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Version: 1.10.2
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Release: 2%{?dist}
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Release: 3%{?dist}
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# Maybe we should explode from the now-available-to-everybody tarball instead?
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# http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/1.10/krb5-1.10.2-signed.tar
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Source0: krb5-%{version}.tar.gz
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@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ Patch102: krb5-trunk-7048.patch
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Patch103: krb5-1.10-gcc47.patch
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Patch105: krb5-kvno-230379.patch
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Patch106: krb5-1.10.2-keytab-etype.patch
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Patch107: krb5-trunk-pkinit-anchorsign.patch
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License: MIT
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URL: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
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@ -245,6 +246,7 @@ ln -s NOTICE LICENSE
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%patch103 -p0 -b .gcc47
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%patch105 -p1 -b .kvno
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%patch106 -p1 -b .keytab-etype
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%patch107 -p1 -b .pkinit-anchorsign
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rm src/lib/krb5/krb/deltat.c
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gzip doc/*.ps
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@ -753,6 +755,11 @@ exit 0
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%{_sbindir}/uuserver
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%changelog
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* Fri Jun 22 2012 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 1.10.2-3
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- backport a fix to allow a PKINIT client to handle SignedData from a KDC
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that's signed with a certificate that isn't in the SignedData, but which
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is available as an anchor or intermediate on the client (RT#7183)
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* Tue Jun 5 2012 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 1.10.2-2
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- back out this labeling change (dwalsh):
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- when building the new label for a file we're about to create, also mix
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