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Sync openssl3 patches with upstream

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Resolves: #1955873
This commit is contained in:
Robbie Harwood 2021-06-21 13:24:29 -04:00
parent 8855babfbf
commit e7aeea399f
18 changed files with 353 additions and 277 deletions
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2
Add-KCM_OP_GET_CRED_LIST-for-faster-iteration.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From baf60dbdeceb3cad35cad7d9930782f94b6c8221 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 2ff2d98511cd86d0dba9500367a6ab0f6ee0d5fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Pavel=20B=C5=99ezina?= <pbrezina@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 15:33:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add KCM_OP_GET_CRED_LIST for faster iteration

2
Add-buildsystem-detection-of-the-OpenSSL-3-KDF-inter.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From c76a5a01a70733c972627df0bdaa2757d323315c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 2f039fc910022c9569fe6941a194f0b26bd6c894 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2019 16:11:29 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Add buildsystem detection of the OpenSSL-3 KDF interface

2
Allow-kinit-with-keytab-to-defer-canonicalization.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 1bc00e294cddd2061012c50d78eaf65ae06146bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From cef07ebf97be9ed7aac4e2cecd96b82e6c030b96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 16:03:07 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Allow kinit with keytab to defer canonicalization

2
Fix-KCM-flag-transmission-for-remove_cred.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From ddbb295dee2adcc6cec26944974420bba188f191 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From d324514a8bee6d267555917f960560c3091dc137 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2021 14:32:56 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix KCM flag transmission for remove_cred

2
Fix-KCM-retrieval-support-for-sssd.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 6a00fd149edd017ece894566771e2e9d4ba089f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 63474541158d74bfd9133d4952fcad6d1d8bc7ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 14:04:07 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix KCM retrieval support for sssd

58
Fix-k5tls-module-for-OpenSSL-3.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
From 51938a8b731740299fe47d132b8840edba4141bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 29 May 2021 12:05:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix k5tls module for OpenSSL 3
Starting in OpenSSL 3, connection termination without a close_notify
alert causes SSL_read() to return SSL_ERROR_SSL instead of
SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL. OpenSSL 3 also provides a new option
SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF which allows an application to explicitly
ignore possible truncation attacks and receive SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN
instead.
Remove the call to SSL_CTX_get_options() since SSL_CTX_set_options()
doesn't clear existing options.
[ghudson@mit.edu: edited commit message and comment]
(cherry picked from commit aa9b4a2a64046afd2fab7cb49c346295874a5fb6)
(cherry picked from commit 201e38845e9f70234bcaa9ba7c25b28e38169b0a)
---
src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c b/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c
index 76a43b3cd..99fda7ffc 100644
--- a/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ setup(krb5_context context, SOCKET fd, const char *servername,
char **anchors, k5_tls_handle *handle_out)
{
int e;
- long options;
+ long options = SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
SSL *ssl = NULL;
k5_tls_handle handle = NULL;
@@ -448,8 +448,19 @@ setup(krb5_context context, SOCKET fd, const char *servername,
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
if (ctx == NULL)
goto error;
- options = SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx);
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF
+ /*
+ * For OpenSSL 3 and later, mark close_notify alerts as optional. We don't
+ * need to worry about truncation attacks because the protocols this module
+ * is used with (Kerberos and change-password) receive a single
+ * length-delimited message from the server. For prior versions of OpenSSL
+ * we check for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when reading instead (this error changes
+ * to SSL_ERROR_SSL in OpenSSL 3).
+ */
+ options |= SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF;
+#endif
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options);
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback);
X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx), 0);

2
Fix-kadmin-k-with-fallback-or-referral-realm.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From da276b30dacda8a96a98213e8293f484e8f4ae21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From bebfa3616a34b58a4e29501412c7f5b8b2d56716 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 15:00:41 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix kadmin -k with fallback or referral realm

361
Fix-softpkcs11-build-issues-with-openssl-3.0.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 637773266d74864118d4ae4c6ca2c7f836b400cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From f85a818fe1a7438db7e1ea579818da67e0be017d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 17:35:25 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix softpkcs11 build issues with openssl 3.0
@ -6,22 +6,24 @@ Subject: [PATCH] Fix softpkcs11 build issues with openssl 3.0
EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA() has been modified to have const return type. Remove
its usages in favor of the EVP_PKEY interface. Also remove calls to
RSA_blinding_off(), which we don't need and would require a non-const
object.
object. Similarly, remove RSA_set_method() calls that set a pre-existing
default.
Since softpkcs11 doesn't link against krb5 and can't use zap(), allocate
buffers with OPENSSL_malloc() so can use OPENSSL_clear_free().
Move several argument validation checks to the top of their functions.
Fix an incorrect log message (public vs. private key encryption).
Fix some incorrect/inconsistent log messages.
(cherry picked from commit 8a0a2ab0296835380aede3bc190b7d10e2b162aa)
(cherry picked from commit 00de1aad7b3647b91017c7009b0bc65cd0c8b2e0)
(cherry picked from commit a86b780ef275b35e8dc1e6d1886ec8e8d941f7c4)
---
src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c | 306 +++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 128 insertions(+), 178 deletions(-)
src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c | 360 ++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 141 insertions(+), 219 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c b/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
index 1cccdfb43..500e3093d 100644
index 1cccdfb43..caa537b68 100644
--- a/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
+++ b/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
@@ -375,10 +375,9 @@ add_st_object(void)
@ -89,13 +91,13 @@ index 1cccdfb43..500e3093d 100644
CK_RV ret;
- RSA *rsa;
- int padding, len, buffer_len, padding_len;
+ size_t buffer_len;
+ int padding, padding_len;
+ size_t buffer_len = 0;
+ int padding;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
st_logf("Encrypt\n");
@@ -1512,22 +1504,18 @@ C_Encrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
@@ -1512,70 +1504,58 @@ C_Encrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
}
@ -111,98 +113,110 @@ index 1cccdfb43..500e3093d 100644
- buffer = malloc(buffer_len);
- if (buffer == NULL) {
- ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
+ if (pulEncryptedDataLen == NULL) {
+ st_logf("pulEncryptedDataLen NULL\n");
+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (pData == NULL) {
+ st_logf("data NULL\n");
+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
goto out;
}
- goto out;
- }
-
- ret = CKR_OK;
switch(state->encrypt_mechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
@@ -1542,40 +1530,41 @@ C_Encrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
goto out;
}
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(o->u.public_key, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, NULL, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if ((CK_ULONG)buffer_len + padding_len < ulDataLen) {
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
goto out;
}
- if (pulEncryptedDataLen == NULL) {
- st_logf("pulEncryptedDataLen NULL\n");
- ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buffer_len);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
- if (pData == NULL_PTR) {
- st_logf("data NULL\n");
- switch(state->encrypt_mechanism->mechanism) {
- case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
- padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- padding_len = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
- break;
- case CKM_RSA_X_509:
- padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
- padding_len = 0;
- break;
- default:
- ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((CK_ULONG)buffer_len + padding_len < ulDataLen) {
- ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
- goto out;
- }
-
if (pulEncryptedDataLen == NULL) {
st_logf("pulEncryptedDataLen NULL\n");
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
goto out;
}
- if (pData == NULL_PTR) {
+ if (pData == NULL) {
st_logf("data NULL\n");
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
goto out;
}
- len = RSA_public_encrypt(ulDataLen, pData, buffer, rsa, padding);
- if (len <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, buffer, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
+ switch(state->encrypt_mechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ break;
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(o->u.public_key, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, NULL, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- if (len > buffer_len)
- abort();
+ st_logf("Encrypt done\n");
- if (pEncryptedData != NULL_PTR)
- memcpy(pEncryptedData, buffer, len);
- *pulEncryptedDataLen = len;
+ if (pEncryptedData != NULL)
+ memcpy(pEncryptedData, buffer, buffer_len);
+ *pulEncryptedDataLen = buffer_len;
-
- out:
- if (buffer) {
- memset(buffer, 0, buffer_len);
- free(buffer);
- }
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buffer_len);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
}
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, buffer, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ st_logf("Encrypt done\n");
+
+ if (pEncryptedData != NULL)
+ memcpy(pEncryptedData, buffer, buffer_len);
+ *pulEncryptedDataLen = buffer_len;
+
+ ret = CKR_OK;
+out:
+ if (buffer != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(buffer, buffer_len);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
@@ -1646,8 +1635,9 @@ C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
@@ -1646,8 +1626,9 @@ C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
struct st_object *o;
void *buffer = NULL;
CK_RV ret;
- RSA *rsa;
- int padding, len, buffer_len, padding_len;
+ size_t buffer_len;
+ int padding, padding_len;
+ size_t buffer_len = 0;
+ int padding;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
st_logf("Decrypt\n");
@@ -1663,22 +1653,18 @@ C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
@@ -1663,41 +1644,6 @@ C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
}
@ -218,65 +232,73 @@ index 1cccdfb43..500e3093d 100644
- buffer = malloc(buffer_len);
- if (buffer == NULL) {
- ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
+ if (pulDataLen == NULL) {
+ st_logf("pulDataLen NULL\n");
+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (pEncryptedData == NULL_PTR) {
+ st_logf("data NULL\n");
+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
goto out;
}
- goto out;
- }
-
- ret = CKR_OK;
switch(state->decrypt_mechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
@@ -1693,41 +1679,43 @@ C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
goto out;
}
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(o->u.private_key.key, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &buffer_len, pEncryptedData,
+ ulEncryptedDataLen) <= 0) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if ((CK_ULONG)buffer_len + padding_len < ulEncryptedDataLen) {
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
goto out;
}
- if (pulDataLen == NULL) {
- st_logf("pulDataLen NULL\n");
- ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buffer_len);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
- if (pEncryptedData == NULL_PTR) {
- st_logf("data NULL\n");
- switch(state->decrypt_mechanism->mechanism) {
- case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
- padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- padding_len = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
- break;
- case CKM_RSA_X_509:
- padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
- padding_len = 0;
- break;
- default:
- ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((CK_ULONG)buffer_len + padding_len < ulEncryptedDataLen) {
- ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
- goto out;
- }
-
if (pulDataLen == NULL) {
st_logf("pulDataLen NULL\n");
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
@@ -1710,24 +1656,48 @@ C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
goto out;
}
- len = RSA_private_decrypt(ulEncryptedDataLen, pEncryptedData, buffer,
- rsa, padding);
- if (len <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, buffer, &buffer_len, pEncryptedData,
+ switch(state->decrypt_mechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ break;
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(o->u.private_key.key, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &buffer_len, pEncryptedData,
+ ulEncryptedDataLen) <= 0) {
ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- if (len > buffer_len)
- abort();
+
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buffer_len);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, buffer, &buffer_len, pEncryptedData,
+ ulEncryptedDataLen) <= 0) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ st_logf("Decrypt done\n");
if (pData != NULL_PTR)
@ -292,36 +314,29 @@ index 1cccdfb43..500e3093d 100644
- }
+ ret = CKR_OK;
+out:
+ if (buffer != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(buffer, buffer_len);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
@@ -1806,8 +1794,9 @@ C_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
@@ -1806,8 +1776,9 @@ C_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
struct st_object *o;
void *buffer = NULL;
CK_RV ret;
- RSA *rsa;
- int padding, len, buffer_len, padding_len;
+ int padding, padding_len;
+ size_t buffer_len;
+ int padding;
+ size_t buffer_len = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
st_logf("Sign\n");
VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state);
@@ -1822,18 +1811,15 @@ C_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
@@ -1822,40 +1793,6 @@ C_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
}
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.private_key.key);
+ if (pulSignatureLen == NULL) {
+ st_logf("signature len NULL\n");
+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ goto out;
+ }
-
- if (rsa == NULL)
- return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
-
@ -332,58 +347,75 @@ index 1cccdfb43..500e3093d 100644
- buffer = malloc(buffer_len);
- if (buffer == NULL) {
- ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
+ if (pData == NULL_PTR) {
+ st_logf("data NULL\n");
+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
goto out;
}
@@ -1851,43 +1837,41 @@ C_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
goto out;
}
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(o->u.private_key.key, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, NULL, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if ((CK_ULONG)buffer_len < ulDataLen + padding_len) {
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
goto out;
}
- if (pulSignatureLen == NULL) {
- st_logf("signature len NULL\n");
- ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buffer_len);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
- if (pData == NULL_PTR) {
- st_logf("data NULL\n");
- goto out;
- }
-
- switch(state->sign_mechanism->mechanism) {
- case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
- padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- padding_len = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
- break;
- case CKM_RSA_X_509:
- padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
- padding_len = 0;
- break;
- default:
- ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((CK_ULONG)buffer_len < ulDataLen + padding_len) {
- ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
- goto out;
- }
-
if (pulSignatureLen == NULL) {
st_logf("signature len NULL\n");
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
@@ -1868,26 +1805,46 @@ C_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
goto out;
}
- len = RSA_private_encrypt(ulDataLen, pData, buffer, rsa, padding);
- st_logf("private encrypt done\n");
- if (len <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, buffer, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
+ switch(state->sign_mechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ break;
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(o->u.private_key.key, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, NULL, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- if (len > buffer_len)
- abort();
+ st_logf("Sign done\n");
- if (pSignature != NULL_PTR)
- memcpy(pSignature, buffer, len);
- *pulSignatureLen = len;
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buffer_len);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, buffer, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ st_logf("Sign done\n");
+
+ if (pSignature != NULL)
+ memcpy(pSignature, buffer, buffer_len);
+ *pulSignatureLen = buffer_len;
@ -396,14 +428,12 @@ index 1cccdfb43..500e3093d 100644
- free(buffer);
- }
+out:
+ if (buffer != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(buffer, buffer_len);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
@@ -1951,10 +1935,9 @@ C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
@@ -1951,10 +1908,9 @@ C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
{
struct session_state *state;
struct st_object *o;
@ -416,7 +446,7 @@ index 1cccdfb43..500e3093d 100644
st_logf("Verify\n");
VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state);
@@ -1969,39 +1952,6 @@ C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
@@ -1969,39 +1925,6 @@ C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
}
@ -456,7 +486,7 @@ index 1cccdfb43..500e3093d 100644
if (pSignature == NULL) {
st_logf("signature NULL\n");
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
@@ -2014,34 +1964,35 @@ C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
@@ -2014,34 +1937,34 @@ C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
goto out;
}
@ -504,7 +534,6 @@ index 1cccdfb43..500e3093d 100644
- }
+ ret = CKR_OK;
+out:
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
@ -513,7 +542,7 @@ index 1cccdfb43..500e3093d 100644
CK_RV
C_VerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
@@ -2072,7 +2023,6 @@ C_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
@@ -2072,7 +1995,6 @@ C_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}

2
Fix-some-principal-realm-canonicalization-cases.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 634db456d552d813c1227ec3c2078c1fcc269b17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From c6ec47dfe95c1ccbabe039fb56b730ed6422b422 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 13:27:29 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix some principal realm canonicalization cases

2
Handle-OpenSSL-3-s-providers.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From ea62d96f5b1e47818ab9f33ad143c4ffb460b3af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From c4b890e5b033fc7c5ed0faa1c66883368e29ec24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 21:18:06 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Handle OpenSSL 3's providers

40
Handle-SSL_read-changed-behavior-on-server-hangup.patch
View File

@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
From a57ebca127a49869296ee2790e28eb37fdd20488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 19 May 2021 19:33:34 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Handle SSL_read changed behavior on server hangup
(cherry picked from commit 948e3c5b89fcfdb64ea5af177c7e30a6ce8a477b)
---
src/include/k5-trace.h | 2 --
src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c | 5 +++--
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/include/k5-trace.h b/src/include/k5-trace.h
index 79b5a7a85..7bd385d68 100644
--- a/src/include/k5-trace.h
+++ b/src/include/k5-trace.h
@@ -395,8 +395,6 @@ void krb5int_trace(krb5_context context, const char *fmt, ...);
TRACE(c, "Received answer ({int} bytes) from {raddr}", len, raddr)
#define TRACE_SENDTO_KDC_HTTPS_ERROR_CONNECT(c, raddr) \
TRACE(c, "HTTPS error connecting to {raddr}", raddr)
-#define TRACE_SENDTO_KDC_HTTPS_ERROR_RECV(c, raddr) \
- TRACE(c, "HTTPS error receiving from {raddr}", raddr)
#define TRACE_SENDTO_KDC_HTTPS_ERROR_SEND(c, raddr) \
TRACE(c, "HTTPS error sending to {raddr}", raddr)
#define TRACE_SENDTO_KDC_HTTPS_SEND(c, raddr) \
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
index 0eedec175..e874130d9 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
@@ -1320,8 +1320,9 @@ https_read_bytes(krb5_context context, struct conn_state *conn,
} else if (st == WANT_WRITE) {
cm_write(selstate, conn->fd);
} else if (st == ERROR_TLS) {
- TRACE_SENDTO_KDC_HTTPS_ERROR_RECV(context, &conn->addr);
- kill_conn(context, conn, selstate);
+ /* In OpenSSL 3, a server hangup is a TLS error. Rely on our decoder
+ * to handle this instead. */
+ return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}

2
Make-KCM-iteration-fallback-work-with-sssd-kcm.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From f7702c5b11bdd186d03fed32568c9a252d049d44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From e36bd9d3d31be5eef0625753dd27fb2182520ba2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Pavel=20B=C5=99ezina?= <pbrezina@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2021 14:35:28 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Make KCM iteration fallback work with sssd-kcm

2
Move-some-dejagnu-kadmin-tests-to-Python-tests.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From a76c4be37be92c02b5ac698ff3c06e2124030427 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 45dd9fa8f227a7119816eae2f5e40823b74f5a85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 15:51:36 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Move some dejagnu kadmin tests to Python tests

111
softpkcs11-Remove-all-openssl-deprecated-functions.patch → Remove-deprecated-OpenSSL-calls-from-softpkcs11.patch
View File

@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
From 7fb3126fd893eaf943734896c92355fe150b44d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From c99ecf1bb49e2fbd0bf30a7b357cf06407b9588a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 18:04:58 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] softpkcs11: Remove all openssl deprecated functions
Subject: [PATCH] Remove deprecated OpenSSL calls from softpkcs11
Rewrite add_pubkey_info() in terms of the EVP_PKEY interface. In this
process, fix its unchecked allocations and fail fast for non-RSA keys.
(cherry picked from commit ec4a325dc939da23967bb115bb5339963da80098)
(cherry picked from commit d6bf42279675100e3e4fe7c6e08eef74d49624cb)
(cherry picked from commit 5072bfdfaddae762680d0f9d97afa6dbf8274760)
---
src/configure.ac | 1 +
src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
index 3e1052db7..eb6307468 100644
@ -25,12 +26,21 @@ index 3e1052db7..eb6307468 100644
fi
if test "$k5_cv_openssl_version_okay" = yes && (test "$enable_pkinit" = yes || test "$enable_pkinit" = try); then
diff --git a/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c b/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
index 500e3093d..c6f688dde 100644
index caa537b68..86b4ef711 100644
--- a/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
+++ b/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
@@ -416,42 +416,63 @@ add_object_attribute(struct st_object *o,
@@ -413,47 +413,83 @@ add_object_attribute(struct st_object *o,
return CKR_OK;
}
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_BN_PARAM
+
+/* Declare owner pointers since EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param() gives us copies. */
+#define DECLARE_BIGNUM(name) BIGNUM *name = NULL
+#define RELEASE_BIGNUM(bn) BN_clear_free(bn)
static CK_RV
add_pubkey_info(struct st_object *o, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, EVP_PKEY *key)
-add_pubkey_info(struct st_object *o, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, EVP_PKEY *key)
+get_bignums(EVP_PKEY *key, BIGNUM **n, BIGNUM **e)
{
- switch (key_type) {
- case CKK_RSA: {
@ -41,27 +51,18 @@ index 500e3093d..c6f688dde 100644
- size_t exponent_len = 0;
- const RSA *rsa;
- const BIGNUM *n, *e;
+ CK_BYTE *modulus = NULL, *exponent = 0;
+ size_t modulus_len = 0, exponent_len = 0;
+ CK_ULONG modulus_bits = 0;
+ CK_RV ret;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(key, "n", n) == 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(key, "e", e) == 0)
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(key);
- RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
- modulus_bits = BN_num_bits(n);
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_BN_PARAM
+ BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL;
+#else
+ const RSA *rsa;
+ const BIGNUM *n, *e;
+#endif
-
- modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(n);
- modulus = malloc(modulus_len);
- BN_bn2bin(n, modulus);
+ if (key_type != CKK_RSA)
+ abort();
-
- exponent_len = BN_num_bytes(e);
- exponent = malloc(exponent_len);
- BN_bn2bin(e, exponent);
@ -74,20 +75,49 @@ index 500e3093d..c6f688dde 100644
-
- free(modulus);
- free(exponent);
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_BN_PARAM
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(key, "n", &n) == 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(key, "e", &e) == 0) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ goto done;
}
- }
- default:
- /* XXX */
- break;
- }
return CKR_OK;
}
+#else
+
+/* Declare const pointers since the old API gives us aliases. */
+#define DECLARE_BIGNUM(name) const BIGNUM *name
+#define RELEASE_BIGNUM(bn)
+static CK_RV
+get_bignums(EVP_PKEY *key, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e)
+{
+ const RSA *rsa;
+
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(key);
+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL);
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static CK_RV
+add_pubkey_info(struct st_object *o, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, EVP_PKEY *key)
+{
+ CK_BYTE *modulus = NULL, *exponent = 0;
+ size_t modulus_len = 0, exponent_len = 0;
+ CK_ULONG modulus_bits = 0;
+ CK_RV ret;
+ DECLARE_BIGNUM(n);
+ DECLARE_BIGNUM(e);
+
+ if (key_type != CKK_RSA)
+ abort();
+
+ ret = get_bignums(key, &n, &e);
+ if (ret != CKR_OK)
+ goto done;
+
+ modulus_bits = BN_num_bits(n);
+ modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(n);
+ exponent_len = BN_num_bytes(e);
@ -97,29 +127,24 @@ index 500e3093d..c6f688dde 100644
+ if (modulus == NULL || exponent == NULL) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
+ goto done;
}
- return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(n, modulus);
+ BN_bn2bin(e, exponent);
+
+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODULUS, modulus, modulus_len);
+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODULUS_BITS,
+ &modulus_bits, sizeof(modulus_bits));
+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+ exponent, exponent_len);
+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &modulus_bits,
+ sizeof(modulus_bits));
+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, exponent, exponent_len);
+
+ ret = CKR_OK;
+done:
+ free(modulus);
+ free(exponent);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_BN_PARAM
+ BN_clear_free(n);
+ BN_clear_free(e);
+#endif
+
+ RELEASE_BIGNUM(n);
+ RELEASE_BIGNUM(e);
+ return ret;
}
+}
static int
pem_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key)

2
Use-KCM_OP_RETRIEVE-in-KCM-client.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From ac0a117096324fa73afae291ed467f2ea66e279b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From c02c77660cee3f61482bd4ad1274271b4838cf31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2021 23:38:54 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Use KCM_OP_RETRIEVE in KCM client

2
Use-OpenSSL-s-KBKDF-and-KRB5KDF-for-deriving-long-te.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From d8540c91db499761148ec681eb46a455f0808e22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 21e3b9a4463f1d1aeb71de8a27c298f1307d186b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2019 14:49:29 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Use OpenSSL's KBKDF and KRB5KDF for deriving long-term keys

2
Use-OpenSSL-s-SSKDF-in-PKINIT-when-available.patch
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From cfdd0501ffea9cbe9343d1ff1e597df1689b547b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 8bbb492f2be1418e1e4bb2cf197414810dac9589 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2019 17:20:59 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Use OpenSSL's SSKDF in PKINIT when available

18
krb5.spec
View File

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
Summary: The Kerberos network authentication system
Name: krb5
Version: 1.19.1
Release: %{?zdpd}8%{?dist}
Release: %{?zdpd}9%{?dist}
# rharwood has trust path to signing key and verifies on check-in
Source0: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/%{version}/krb5-%{version}%{?dashpre}.tar.gz
@ -73,12 +73,12 @@ Patch8: Add-APIs-for-marshalling-credentials.patch
Patch9: Add-hostname-canonicalization-helper-to-k5test.py.patch
Patch10: Support-host-based-GSS-initiator-names.patch
Patch11: Fix-softpkcs11-build-issues-with-openssl-3.0.patch
Patch12: softpkcs11-Remove-all-openssl-deprecated-functions.patch
Patch13: Add-buildsystem-detection-of-the-OpenSSL-3-KDF-inter.patch
Patch14: Use-OpenSSL-s-SSKDF-in-PKINIT-when-available.patch
Patch15: Use-OpenSSL-s-KBKDF-and-KRB5KDF-for-deriving-long-te.patch
Patch16: Handle-OpenSSL-3-s-providers.patch
Patch17: Handle-SSL_read-changed-behavior-on-server-hangup.patch
Patch12: Remove-deprecated-OpenSSL-calls-from-softpkcs11.patch
Patch13: Fix-k5tls-module-for-OpenSSL-3.patch
Patch14: Add-buildsystem-detection-of-the-OpenSSL-3-KDF-inter.patch
Patch15: Use-OpenSSL-s-SSKDF-in-PKINIT-when-available.patch
Patch16: Use-OpenSSL-s-KBKDF-and-KRB5KDF-for-deriving-long-te.patch
Patch17: Handle-OpenSSL-3-s-providers.patch
Patch18: Add-KCM_OP_GET_CRED_LIST-for-faster-iteration.patch
Patch19: Fix-KCM-flag-transmission-for-remove_cred.patch
Patch20: Make-KCM-iteration-fallback-work-with-sssd-kcm.patch
@ -649,6 +649,10 @@ exit 0
%{_libdir}/libkadm5srv_mit.so.*
%changelog
* Mon Jun 21 2021 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 1.19.1-9
- Sync openssl3 patches with upstream
- Resolves: #1955873
* Thu Jun 17 2021 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 1.19.1-8
- Rebuild for rpminspect and mass rebuild cleanup; no code changes
- Resolves: #1967505