import krb5-1.19.1-15.el9_0

This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources 2022-04-05 07:02:46 -04:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent 55761a7b50
commit 9b62daa65d
4 changed files with 242 additions and 34 deletions

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@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ If supported, use OpenSSL-provided KBKDF (aes-sha2 and camellia) and
KRB5KDF (3des and aes-sha1). We already use OpenSSL's PBKDF2 where KRB5KDF (3des and aes-sha1). We already use OpenSSL's PBKDF2 where
appropriate. OpenSSL added support for these KDFs in 3.0. appropriate. OpenSSL added support for these KDFs in 3.0.
OpenSSL's restrictions to use KRB5KDF in FIPS mode are bypassed in case
AES SHA-1 HMAC encryption types are allowed by the crypto policy.
(cherry picked from commit ef8d11f6fb1232201c9efd2ae2ed567023fb85d2) (cherry picked from commit ef8d11f6fb1232201c9efd2ae2ed567023fb85d2)
[rharwood@redhat.com: 3des removal] [rharwood@redhat.com: 3des removal]
--- ---
@ -201,7 +204,7 @@ index 6707a7308..8e474b38e 100644
+ goto done; + goto done;
+ } + }
+ +
+ kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "KRB5KDF", NULL); + kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "KRB5KDF", "-fips");
+ if (kdf == NULL) { + if (kdf == NULL) {
+ ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL; + ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+ goto done; + goto done;

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@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
From f0740c131b69f3346f07e7b7b03ebf27c50c0ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2022 11:33:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Use SHA-256 instead of SHA-1 for PKINIT CMS digest
Various organizations including NIST have been strongly recommending to
stop using SHA-1 for digital signatures for some years already. CMS
digest is used to generate such signatures, hence it should be upgraded
to use SHA-256.
---
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 27 ++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
index 42e5c581d..2a6ef4aaa 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
@@ -1240,7 +1240,7 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
/* will not fill-out EVP_PKEY because it's on the smartcard */
/* Set digest algs */
- p7si->digest_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1);
+ p7si->digest_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha256);
if (p7si->digest_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_alg->parameter);
@@ -1251,17 +1251,17 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
/* Set sig algs */
if (p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter);
- p7si->digest_enc_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption);
+ p7si->digest_enc_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption);
if (!(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()))
goto cleanup;
p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
/* add signed attributes */
- /* compute sha1 digest over the EncapsulatedContentInfo */
+ /* compute sha256 digest over the EncapsulatedContentInfo */
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto cleanup;
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, data_len);
md_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md_data, &md_len);
@@ -1289,9 +1289,10 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
goto cleanup2;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
- /* Some tokens can only do RSAEncryption without sha1 hash */
- /* to compute sha1WithRSAEncryption, encode the algorithm ID for the hash
- * function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo
+ /* Some tokens can only do RSAEncryption without sha256 hash */
+ /* to compute sha256WithRSAEncryption, encode the algorithm ID for the
+ * hash function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of type
+ * DigestInfo
* DigestInfo::=SEQUENCE {
* digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* digest OCTET STRING }
@@ -1310,7 +1311,7 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
if (alg == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha256), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
alg_len = i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, NULL);
digest = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
@@ -1339,7 +1340,7 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
#endif
{
pkiDebug("mech = %s\n",
- id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 ? "CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS" : "FS");
+ id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 ? "CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS" : "FS");
retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, abuf, alen,
&sig, &sig_len);
}
@@ -4189,7 +4190,7 @@ create_signature(unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len,
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
- EVP_SignInit(ctx, EVP_sha1());
+ EVP_SignInit(ctx, EVP_sha256());
EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, data_len);
*sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((*sig = malloc(*sig_len)) == NULL)
@@ -4663,10 +4664,10 @@ pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
#ifndef PKINIT_USE_MECH_LIST
/*
- * We'd like to use CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS for signing if it's available, but
+ * We'd like to use CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS for signing if it's available, but
* many cards seems to be confused about whether they are capable of
* this or not. The safe thing seems to be to ignore the mechanism list,
- * always use CKM_RSA_PKCS and calculate the sha1 digest ourselves.
+ * always use CKM_RSA_PKCS and calculate the sha256 digest ourselves.
*/
id_cryptoctx->mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
@@ -4694,7 +4695,7 @@ pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
if (mechp[i] == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
/* This seems backwards... */
id_cryptoctx->mech =
- (info.flags & CKF_SIGN) ? CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS : CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+ (info.flags & CKF_SIGN) ? CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS : CKM_RSA_PKCS;
}
}
free(mechp);
--
2.35.1

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
From d2b050a5acfacd8d400560ae097f6d5f392d7398 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From a7318c3cd6e1f58adb80493c05b59e6c180cd584 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 15:12:21 -0500 Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 17:34:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] FIPS with PRNG and RADIUS and MD4 Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] FIPS with PRNG and RADIUS and MD4
NB: Use openssl's PRNG in FIPS mode and taint within krad. NB: Use openssl's PRNG in FIPS mode and taint within krad.
@ -19,24 +19,33 @@ post6 restores MD4 (and therefore keygen-only RC4).
post7 restores MD5 and adds radius_md5_fips_override. post7 restores MD5 and adds radius_md5_fips_override.
Last-updated: krb5-1.17 post8 restores MD4/MD5 for OpenSSL 3.0
Use OpenSSL 3.0 library context to access MD4 and MD5 lazily from
legacy provider if RC4 encryption type is enabled, without affecting
global context.
Remove EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW flag since does not have any
effect anymore.
Last-updated: krb5-1.19
--- ---
doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 6 +++ doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 6 ++
src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c | 11 ++++- src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c | 11 ++-
.../crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c | 6 +++ .../crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c | 6 ++
src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c | 13 +++++- src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c | 13 +++-
.../crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c | 12 +++++ .../crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++-
src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c | 6 ++- src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c | 6 +-
src/lib/krad/attr.c | 46 ++++++++++++++----- src/lib/krad/attr.c | 46 ++++++++---
src/lib/krad/attrset.c | 5 +- src/lib/krad/attrset.c | 5 +-
src/lib/krad/internal.h | 28 ++++++++++- src/lib/krad/internal.h | 28 ++++++-
src/lib/krad/packet.c | 22 +++++---- src/lib/krad/packet.c | 22 +++---
src/lib/krad/remote.c | 10 +++- src/lib/krad/remote.c | 10 ++-
src/lib/krad/t_attr.c | 3 +- src/lib/krad/t_attr.c | 3 +-
src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c | 4 +- src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c | 4 +-
src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c | 6 +++ src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c | 6 ++
src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c | 6 +++ src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c | 6 ++
15 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) 15 files changed, 218 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
index 675175955..adba8238d 100644 index 675175955..adba8238d 100644
@ -149,41 +158,116 @@ index bc87c6f42..9bf407899 100644
* The cipher state here is a saved pointer to a struct arcfour_state * The cipher state here is a saved pointer to a struct arcfour_state
* object, rather than a flat byte array as in most enc providers. The * object, rather than a flat byte array as in most enc providers. The
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
index 1e0fb8fc3..2eb5139c0 100644 index 1e0fb8fc3..4b8e1a6b2 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c --- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c +++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, @@ -32,6 +32,50 @@
if (ctx == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
+ if (type == EVP_md4() || type == EVP_md5()) { #include "crypto_int.h"
+ /* See comments below in hash_md4() and hash_md5(). */ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); +#include <openssl/provider.h>
+#include <threads.h>
+
+typedef struct ossl_lib_md_context {
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *legacy_provider;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+} ossl_md_context_t;
+
+static thread_local ossl_md_context_t *ossl_md_ctx = NULL;
+
+static krb5_error_code
+init_ossl_md_ctx(ossl_md_context_t *ctx, const char *algo)
+{
+ ctx->libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_new();
+ if (!ctx->libctx)
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Load both legacy and default provider as both may be needed.
+ * If they fail keep going and an error will be raised when we try to
+ * fetch the cipher later.
+ */
+ ctx->legacy_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "legacy");
+
+ ctx->md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, algo, NULL);
+ if (!ctx->md)
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+deinit_ossl_ctx(ossl_md_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->md)
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
+
+ if (ctx->legacy_provider)
+ OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->legacy_provider);
+
+ if (ctx->libctx)
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(ctx->libctx);
+}
static krb5_error_code
hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
@@ -61,16 +104,53 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
return ok ? 0 : KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
}
+static krb5_error_code
+hash_legacy_evp(const char *algo, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+ krb5_data *output)
+{
+ krb5_error_code err;
+
+ if (!ossl_md_ctx) {
+ ossl_md_ctx = malloc(sizeof(ossl_md_context_t));
+ if (!ossl_md_ctx)
+ return ENOMEM;
+
+ err = init_ossl_md_ctx(ossl_md_ctx, algo);
+ if (err) {
+ deinit_ossl_ctx(ossl_md_ctx);
+ free(ossl_md_ctx);
+ ossl_md_ctx = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ err = hash_evp(ossl_md_ctx->md, data, num_data, output);
+
+end:
+ return err;
+} +}
+ +
ok = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < num_data; i++) {
if (!SIGN_IOV(&data[i]))
@@ -64,12 +69,19 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
static krb5_error_code static krb5_error_code
hash_md4(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output) hash_md4(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output)
{ {
- return hash_evp(EVP_md4(), data, num_data, output);
+ /* + /*
+ * MD4 is needed in FIPS mode to perform key generation for RC4 keys used + * MD4 is needed in FIPS mode to perform key generation for RC4 keys used
+ * by IPA. These keys are only used along a (separately) secured channel + * by IPA. These keys are only used along a (separately) secured channel
+ * for legacy reasons when performing trusts to Active Directory. + * for legacy reasons when performing trusts to Active Directory.
+ */ + */
return hash_evp(EVP_md4(), data, num_data, output); + return FIPS_mode() ? hash_legacy_evp("MD4", data, num_data, output)
+ : hash_evp(EVP_md4(), data, num_data, output);
} }
static krb5_error_code static krb5_error_code
hash_md5(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output) hash_md5(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output)
{ {
+ /* MD5 is needed in FIPS mode for communication with RADIUS servers. This - return hash_evp(EVP_md5(), data, num_data, output);
+ * is gated in libkrad by libdefaults->radius_md5_fips_override. */ + /*
return hash_evp(EVP_md5(), data, num_data, output); + * MD5 is needed in FIPS mode for communication with RADIUS servers. This
+ * is gated in libkrad by libdefaults->radius_md5_fips_override.
+ */
+ return FIPS_mode() ? hash_legacy_evp("MD5", data, num_data, output)
+ : hash_evp(EVP_md5(), data, num_data, output);
} }
static krb5_error_code
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
index 7dc59dcc0..769a50c00 100644 index 7dc59dcc0..769a50c00 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c --- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c

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@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
Summary: The Kerberos network authentication system Summary: The Kerberos network authentication system
Name: krb5 Name: krb5
Version: 1.19.1 Version: 1.19.1
Release: %{?zdpd}13%{?dist} Release: %{?zdpd}15%{?dist}
# rharwood has trust path to signing key and verifies on check-in # rharwood has trust path to signing key and verifies on check-in
Source0: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/%{version}/krb5-%{version}%{?dashpre}.tar.gz Source0: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/%{version}/krb5-%{version}%{?dashpre}.tar.gz
@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ Patch25: Allow-kinit-with-keytab-to-defer-canonicalization.patch
Patch26: Fix-kadmin-k-with-fallback-or-referral-realm.patch Patch26: Fix-kadmin-k-with-fallback-or-referral-realm.patch
Patch27: Fix-KDC-null-deref-on-bad-encrypted-challenge.patch Patch27: Fix-KDC-null-deref-on-bad-encrypted-challenge.patch
Patch28: Fix-KDC-null-deref-on-TGS-inner-body-null-server.patch Patch28: Fix-KDC-null-deref-on-TGS-inner-body-null-server.patch
Patch29: Use-SHA256-instead-of-SHA1-for-PKINIT-CMS-digest.patch
License: MIT License: MIT
URL: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/ URL: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
@ -646,6 +647,13 @@ exit 0
%{_libdir}/libkadm5srv_mit.so.* %{_libdir}/libkadm5srv_mit.so.*
%changelog %changelog
* Mon Mar 14 2022 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.19.1-15
- Use SHA-256 instead of SHA-1 for PKINIT CMS digest
* Thu Feb 24 2022 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.19.1-14
- Bypass FIPS restrictions to use KRB5KDF in case AES SHA-1 HMAC is enabled
- Lazily load MD4/5 from OpenSSL if using RADIUS or RC4 enctype in FIPS mode
* Fri Dec 17 2021 Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com> - 1.19.1-13 * Fri Dec 17 2021 Antonio Torres <antorres@redhat.com> - 1.19.1-13
- Remove -specs= from krb5-config output - Remove -specs= from krb5-config output
- Resolves #1997021 - Resolves #1997021