rpms/krb5
7
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity

Add the backward-compatible parts of openssl3 support

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Robbie Harwood 2021-06-21 13:16:44 -04:00
parent 4df0096f20
commit 91bbbda93f
4 changed files with 764 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

57
Fix-k5tls-module-for-OpenSSL-3.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 201e38845e9f70234bcaa9ba7c25b28e38169b0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 29 May 2021 12:05:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix k5tls module for OpenSSL 3
Starting in OpenSSL 3, connection termination without a close_notify
alert causes SSL_read() to return SSL_ERROR_SSL instead of
SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL. OpenSSL 3 also provides a new option
SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF which allows an application to explicitly
ignore possible truncation attacks and receive SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN
instead.
Remove the call to SSL_CTX_get_options() since SSL_CTX_set_options()
doesn't clear existing options.
[ghudson@mit.edu: edited commit message and comment]
(cherry picked from commit aa9b4a2a64046afd2fab7cb49c346295874a5fb6)
---
src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c b/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c
index 76a43b3cd..99fda7ffc 100644
--- a/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ setup(krb5_context context, SOCKET fd, const char *servername,
char **anchors, k5_tls_handle *handle_out)
{
int e;
- long options;
+ long options = SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
SSL *ssl = NULL;
k5_tls_handle handle = NULL;
@@ -448,8 +448,19 @@ setup(krb5_context context, SOCKET fd, const char *servername,
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
if (ctx == NULL)
goto error;
- options = SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx);
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF
+ /*
+ * For OpenSSL 3 and later, mark close_notify alerts as optional. We don't
+ * need to worry about truncation attacks because the protocols this module
+ * is used with (Kerberos and change-password) receive a single
+ * length-delimited message from the server. For prior versions of OpenSSL
+ * we check for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when reading instead (this error changes
+ * to SSL_ERROR_SSL in OpenSSL 3).
+ */
+ options |= SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF;
+#endif
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options);
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback);
X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx), 0);

551
Fix-softpkcs11-build-issues-with-openssl-3.0.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
From a86b780ef275b35e8dc1e6d1886ec8e8d941f7c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 17:35:25 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix softpkcs11 build issues with openssl 3.0
EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA() has been modified to have const return type. Remove
its usages in favor of the EVP_PKEY interface. Also remove calls to
RSA_blinding_off(), which we don't need and would require a non-const
object. Similarly, remove RSA_set_method() calls that set a pre-existing
default.
Since softpkcs11 doesn't link against krb5 and can't use zap(), allocate
buffers with OPENSSL_malloc() so can use OPENSSL_clear_free().
Move several argument validation checks to the top of their functions.
Fix some incorrect/inconsistent log messages.
(cherry picked from commit 00de1aad7b3647b91017c7009b0bc65cd0c8b2e0)
---
src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c | 360 ++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 141 insertions(+), 219 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c b/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
index 1cccdfb43..caa537b68 100644
--- a/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
+++ b/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
@@ -375,10 +375,9 @@ add_st_object(void)
return NULL;
soft_token.object.objs = objs;
- o = malloc(sizeof(*o));
+ o = calloc(1, sizeof(*o));
if (o == NULL)
return NULL;
- memset(o, 0, sizeof(*o));
o->attrs = NULL;
o->num_attributes = 0;
o->object_handle = soft_token.object.num_objs;
@@ -424,7 +423,7 @@ add_pubkey_info(struct st_object *o, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, EVP_PKEY *key)
CK_ULONG modulus_bits = 0;
CK_BYTE *exponent = NULL;
size_t exponent_len = 0;
- RSA *rsa;
+ const RSA *rsa;
const BIGNUM *n, *e;
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(key);
@@ -445,8 +444,6 @@ add_pubkey_info(struct st_object *o, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, EVP_PKEY *key)
add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
exponent, exponent_len);
- RSA_set_method(rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL());
-
free(modulus);
free(exponent);
}
@@ -679,10 +676,6 @@ add_certificate(char *label,
} else {
/* XXX verify keytype */
- if (key_type == CKK_RSA)
- RSA_set_method(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.private_key.key),
- RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL());
-
if (X509_check_private_key(cert, o->u.private_key.key) != 1) {
EVP_PKEY_free(o->u.private_key.key);
o->u.private_key.key = NULL;
@@ -695,7 +688,7 @@ add_certificate(char *label,
}
ret = CKR_OK;
- out:
+out:
if (ret != CKR_OK) {
st_logf("something went wrong when adding cert!\n");
@@ -1224,8 +1217,6 @@ C_Login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
}
/* XXX check keytype */
- RSA_set_method(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.private_key.key),
- RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL());
if (X509_check_private_key(o->u.private_key.cert, o->u.private_key.key) != 1) {
EVP_PKEY_free(o->u.private_key.key);
@@ -1495,8 +1486,9 @@ C_Encrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
struct st_object *o;
void *buffer = NULL;
CK_RV ret;
- RSA *rsa;
- int padding, len, buffer_len, padding_len;
+ size_t buffer_len = 0;
+ int padding;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
st_logf("Encrypt\n");
@@ -1512,70 +1504,58 @@ C_Encrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
}
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.public_key);
-
- if (rsa == NULL)
- return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
-
- RSA_blinding_off(rsa); /* XXX RAND is broken while running in mozilla ? */
-
- buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa);
-
- buffer = malloc(buffer_len);
- if (buffer == NULL) {
- ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
- goto out;
- }
-
- ret = CKR_OK;
- switch(state->encrypt_mechanism->mechanism) {
- case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
- padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- padding_len = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
- break;
- case CKM_RSA_X_509:
- padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
- padding_len = 0;
- break;
- default:
- ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((CK_ULONG)buffer_len + padding_len < ulDataLen) {
- ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
- goto out;
- }
-
if (pulEncryptedDataLen == NULL) {
st_logf("pulEncryptedDataLen NULL\n");
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
goto out;
}
- if (pData == NULL_PTR) {
+ if (pData == NULL) {
st_logf("data NULL\n");
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
goto out;
}
- len = RSA_public_encrypt(ulDataLen, pData, buffer, rsa, padding);
- if (len <= 0) {
+ switch(state->encrypt_mechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ break;
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(o->u.public_key, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, NULL, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- if (len > buffer_len)
- abort();
- if (pEncryptedData != NULL_PTR)
- memcpy(pEncryptedData, buffer, len);
- *pulEncryptedDataLen = len;
-
- out:
- if (buffer) {
- memset(buffer, 0, buffer_len);
- free(buffer);
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buffer_len);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
}
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, buffer, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ st_logf("Encrypt done\n");
+
+ if (pEncryptedData != NULL)
+ memcpy(pEncryptedData, buffer, buffer_len);
+ *pulEncryptedDataLen = buffer_len;
+
+ ret = CKR_OK;
+out:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(buffer, buffer_len);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
@@ -1646,8 +1626,9 @@ C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
struct st_object *o;
void *buffer = NULL;
CK_RV ret;
- RSA *rsa;
- int padding, len, buffer_len, padding_len;
+ size_t buffer_len = 0;
+ int padding;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
st_logf("Decrypt\n");
@@ -1663,41 +1644,6 @@ C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
}
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.private_key.key);
-
- if (rsa == NULL)
- return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
-
- RSA_blinding_off(rsa); /* XXX RAND is broken while running in mozilla ? */
-
- buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa);
-
- buffer = malloc(buffer_len);
- if (buffer == NULL) {
- ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
- goto out;
- }
-
- ret = CKR_OK;
- switch(state->decrypt_mechanism->mechanism) {
- case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
- padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- padding_len = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
- break;
- case CKM_RSA_X_509:
- padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
- padding_len = 0;
- break;
- default:
- ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((CK_ULONG)buffer_len + padding_len < ulEncryptedDataLen) {
- ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
- goto out;
- }
-
if (pulDataLen == NULL) {
st_logf("pulDataLen NULL\n");
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
@@ -1710,24 +1656,48 @@ C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
goto out;
}
- len = RSA_private_decrypt(ulEncryptedDataLen, pEncryptedData, buffer,
- rsa, padding);
- if (len <= 0) {
+ switch(state->decrypt_mechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ break;
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(o->u.private_key.key, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &buffer_len, pEncryptedData,
+ ulEncryptedDataLen) <= 0) {
ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- if (len > buffer_len)
- abort();
+
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buffer_len);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, buffer, &buffer_len, pEncryptedData,
+ ulEncryptedDataLen) <= 0) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ st_logf("Decrypt done\n");
if (pData != NULL_PTR)
- memcpy(pData, buffer, len);
- *pulDataLen = len;
+ memcpy(pData, buffer, buffer_len);
+ *pulDataLen = buffer_len;
- out:
- if (buffer) {
- memset(buffer, 0, buffer_len);
- free(buffer);
- }
+ ret = CKR_OK;
+out:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(buffer, buffer_len);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
@@ -1806,8 +1776,9 @@ C_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
struct st_object *o;
void *buffer = NULL;
CK_RV ret;
- RSA *rsa;
- int padding, len, buffer_len, padding_len;
+ int padding;
+ size_t buffer_len = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
st_logf("Sign\n");
VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state);
@@ -1822,40 +1793,6 @@ C_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
}
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.private_key.key);
-
- if (rsa == NULL)
- return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
-
- RSA_blinding_off(rsa); /* XXX RAND is broken while running in mozilla ? */
-
- buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa);
-
- buffer = malloc(buffer_len);
- if (buffer == NULL) {
- ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
- goto out;
- }
-
- switch(state->sign_mechanism->mechanism) {
- case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
- padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- padding_len = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
- break;
- case CKM_RSA_X_509:
- padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
- padding_len = 0;
- break;
- default:
- ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((CK_ULONG)buffer_len < ulDataLen + padding_len) {
- ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
- goto out;
- }
-
if (pulSignatureLen == NULL) {
st_logf("signature len NULL\n");
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
@@ -1868,26 +1805,46 @@ C_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
goto out;
}
- len = RSA_private_encrypt(ulDataLen, pData, buffer, rsa, padding);
- st_logf("private encrypt done\n");
- if (len <= 0) {
+ switch(state->sign_mechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ break;
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(o->u.private_key.key, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, NULL, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- if (len > buffer_len)
- abort();
- if (pSignature != NULL_PTR)
- memcpy(pSignature, buffer, len);
- *pulSignatureLen = len;
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buffer_len);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, buffer, &buffer_len, pData, ulDataLen) <= 0) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ st_logf("Sign done\n");
+
+ if (pSignature != NULL)
+ memcpy(pSignature, buffer, buffer_len);
+ *pulSignatureLen = buffer_len;
ret = CKR_OK;
-
- out:
- if (buffer) {
- memset(buffer, 0, buffer_len);
- free(buffer);
- }
+out:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(buffer, buffer_len);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
@@ -1951,10 +1908,9 @@ C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
{
struct session_state *state;
struct st_object *o;
- void *buffer = NULL;
CK_RV ret;
- RSA *rsa;
- int padding, len, buffer_len;
+ int padding;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
st_logf("Verify\n");
VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state);
@@ -1969,39 +1925,6 @@ C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
}
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.public_key);
-
- if (rsa == NULL)
- return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
-
- RSA_blinding_off(rsa); /* XXX RAND is broken while running in mozilla ? */
-
- buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa);
-
- buffer = malloc(buffer_len);
- if (buffer == NULL) {
- ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
- goto out;
- }
-
- ret = CKR_OK;
- switch(state->verify_mechanism->mechanism) {
- case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
- padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- break;
- case CKM_RSA_X_509:
- padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
- break;
- default:
- ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((CK_ULONG)buffer_len < ulDataLen) {
- ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
- goto out;
- }
-
if (pSignature == NULL) {
st_logf("signature NULL\n");
ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
@@ -2014,34 +1937,34 @@ C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
goto out;
}
- len = RSA_public_decrypt(ulDataLen, pData, buffer, rsa, padding);
- st_logf("private encrypt done\n");
- if (len <= 0) {
+ switch(state->verify_mechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ break;
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(o->u.public_key, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, pSignature, ulSignatureLen, pData,
+ ulDataLen) <= 0) {
ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- if (len > buffer_len)
- abort();
+ st_logf("Verify done\n");
- if ((CK_ULONG)len != ulSignatureLen) {
- ret = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (memcmp(pSignature, buffer, len) != 0) {
- ret = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
-
- out:
- if (buffer) {
- memset(buffer, 0, buffer_len);
- free(buffer);
- }
+ ret = CKR_OK;
+out:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
-
CK_RV
C_VerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
@@ -2072,7 +1995,6 @@ C_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
-
CK_FUNCTION_LIST funcs = {
{ 2, 11 },
C_Initialize,

149
Remove-deprecated-OpenSSL-calls-from-softpkcs11.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
From 5072bfdfaddae762680d0f9d97afa6dbf8274760 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 18:04:58 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Remove deprecated OpenSSL calls from softpkcs11
Rewrite add_pubkey_info() in terms of the EVP_PKEY interface. In this
process, fix its unchecked allocations and fail fast for non-RSA keys.
(cherry picked from commit d6bf42279675100e3e4fe7c6e08eef74d49624cb)
---
src/configure.ac | 1 +
src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
index ea708491b..477819091 100644
--- a/src/configure.ac
+++ b/src/configure.ac
@@ -1118,6 +1118,7 @@ int i = 1;
])], k5_cv_openssl_version_okay=yes, k5_cv_openssl_version_okay=no)])
old_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, PKCS7_get_signer_info)
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param)
LIBS="$old_LIBS"
fi
if test "$k5_cv_openssl_version_okay" = yes && (test "$enable_pkinit" = yes || test "$enable_pkinit" = try); then
diff --git a/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c b/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
index caa537b68..86b4ef711 100644
--- a/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
+++ b/src/tests/softpkcs11/main.c
@@ -413,47 +413,83 @@ add_object_attribute(struct st_object *o,
return CKR_OK;
}
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_BN_PARAM
+
+/* Declare owner pointers since EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param() gives us copies. */
+#define DECLARE_BIGNUM(name) BIGNUM *name = NULL
+#define RELEASE_BIGNUM(bn) BN_clear_free(bn)
static CK_RV
-add_pubkey_info(struct st_object *o, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, EVP_PKEY *key)
+get_bignums(EVP_PKEY *key, BIGNUM **n, BIGNUM **e)
{
- switch (key_type) {
- case CKK_RSA: {
- CK_BYTE *modulus = NULL;
- size_t modulus_len = 0;
- CK_ULONG modulus_bits = 0;
- CK_BYTE *exponent = NULL;
- size_t exponent_len = 0;
- const RSA *rsa;
- const BIGNUM *n, *e;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(key, "n", n) == 0 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(key, "e", e) == 0)
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(key);
- RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
- modulus_bits = BN_num_bits(n);
-
- modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(n);
- modulus = malloc(modulus_len);
- BN_bn2bin(n, modulus);
-
- exponent_len = BN_num_bytes(e);
- exponent = malloc(exponent_len);
- BN_bn2bin(e, exponent);
-
- add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODULUS, modulus, modulus_len);
- add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODULUS_BITS,
- &modulus_bits, sizeof(modulus_bits));
- add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
- exponent, exponent_len);
-
- free(modulus);
- free(exponent);
- }
- default:
- /* XXX */
- break;
- }
return CKR_OK;
}
+#else
+
+/* Declare const pointers since the old API gives us aliases. */
+#define DECLARE_BIGNUM(name) const BIGNUM *name
+#define RELEASE_BIGNUM(bn)
+static CK_RV
+get_bignums(EVP_PKEY *key, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e)
+{
+ const RSA *rsa;
+
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(key);
+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL);
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static CK_RV
+add_pubkey_info(struct st_object *o, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, EVP_PKEY *key)
+{
+ CK_BYTE *modulus = NULL, *exponent = 0;
+ size_t modulus_len = 0, exponent_len = 0;
+ CK_ULONG modulus_bits = 0;
+ CK_RV ret;
+ DECLARE_BIGNUM(n);
+ DECLARE_BIGNUM(e);
+
+ if (key_type != CKK_RSA)
+ abort();
+
+ ret = get_bignums(key, &n, &e);
+ if (ret != CKR_OK)
+ goto done;
+
+ modulus_bits = BN_num_bits(n);
+ modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(n);
+ exponent_len = BN_num_bytes(e);
+
+ modulus = malloc(modulus_len);
+ exponent = malloc(exponent_len);
+ if (modulus == NULL || exponent == NULL) {
+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(n, modulus);
+ BN_bn2bin(e, exponent);
+
+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODULUS, modulus, modulus_len);
+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &modulus_bits,
+ sizeof(modulus_bits));
+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, exponent, exponent_len);
+
+ ret = CKR_OK;
+done:
+ free(modulus);
+ free(exponent);
+ RELEASE_BIGNUM(n);
+ RELEASE_BIGNUM(e);
+ return ret;
+}
static int
pem_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key)

8
krb5.spec
View File

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
Summary: The Kerberos network authentication system
Name: krb5
Version: 1.19.1
Release: %{?zdpd}10%{?dist}
Release: %{?zdpd}11%{?dist}
# rharwood has trust path to signing key and verifies on check-in
Source0: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/%{version}/krb5-%{version}%{?dashpre}.tar.gz
@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ Patch17: Move-some-dejagnu-kadmin-tests-to-Python-tests.patch
Patch18: Fix-some-principal-realm-canonicalization-cases.patch
Patch19: Allow-kinit-with-keytab-to-defer-canonicalization.patch
Patch20: Fix-kadmin-k-with-fallback-or-referral-realm.patch
Patch21: Fix-softpkcs11-build-issues-with-openssl-3.0.patch
Patch22: Remove-deprecated-OpenSSL-calls-from-softpkcs11.patch
Patch23: Fix-k5tls-module-for-OpenSSL-3.patch
License: MIT
URL: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
@ -645,6 +648,9 @@ exit 0
%{_libdir}/libkadm5srv_mit.so.*
%changelog
* Mon Jun 21 2021 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 1.19.1-11
- Add the backward-compatible parts of openssl3 support
* Wed Jun 09 2021 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 1.19.1-10
- Fix three canonicalization cases for fallback