- add fixes from MITKRB5-SA-2008-001 for use of null or dangling pointer

when v4 compatibility is enabled on the KDC (CVE-2008-0062,
    CVE-2008-0063, #432620, #432621)
- add fixes from MITKRB5-SA-2008-002 for array out-of-bounds accesses when
    high-numbered descriptors are used (CVE-2008-0947, #433596)
- add backport bug fix for an attempt to free non-heap memory in
    libgssapi_krb5 (CVE-2007-5901, #415321)
- add backport bug fix for a double-free in out-of-memory situations in
    libgssapi_krb5 (CVE-2007-5971, #415351)
This commit is contained in:
Nalin Dahyabhai 2008-03-18 18:13:22 +00:00
parent e7e5a76eb7
commit 7668599d1d
5 changed files with 459 additions and 1 deletions

13
krb5-CVE-2007-5901.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
Patch for CVE-2007-5901, pulled from SVN per #415321.
diff -up src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_initialize.c src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_initialize.c
--- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_initialize.c 2008-03-04 16:29:13.000000000 -0500
+++ src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_initialize.c 2008-03-04 16:29:16.000000000 -0500
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ gss_OID_set *mechSet;
free((*mechSet)->elements[j].elements);
}
free((*mechSet)->elements);
- free(mechSet);
+ free(*mechSet);
*mechSet = NULL;
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
}

12
krb5-CVE-2007-5971.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
Patch for CVE-2007-5971, pulled from SVN per #415351.
diff -up src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
--- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c 2008-03-04 16:22:29.000000000 -0500
+++ src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c 2008-03-04 16:22:22.000000000 -0500
@@ -248,7 +248,6 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_con
plain.data = 0;
if (err) {
zap(outbuf,bufsize);
- free(outbuf);
goto error;
}
if (sum.length != ctx->cksum_size)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
Patch from MITKRB5-SA-2008-001.
Index: src/kdc/dispatch.c
===================================================================
--- src/kdc/dispatch.c (revision 20192)
+++ src/kdc/dispatch.c (working copy)
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* kdc/dispatch.c
*
- * Copyright 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
+ * Copyright 1990, 2007 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
*
* Export of this software from the United States of America may
* require a specific license from the United States Government.
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@
retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE;
#ifndef NOCACHE
/* put the response into the lookaside buffer */
- if (!retval)
+ if (!retval && *response != NULL)
kdc_insert_lookaside(pkt, *response);
#endif
Index: src/kdc/kerberos_v4.c
===================================================================
--- src/kdc/kerberos_v4.c (revision 20192)
+++ src/kdc/kerberos_v4.c (working copy)
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* kdc/kerberos_v4.c
*
- * Copyright 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988,1991 by the Massachusetts Institute
+ * Copyright 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988,1991,2007 by the Massachusetts Institute
* of Technology.
* All Rights Reserved.
*
@@ -87,11 +87,6 @@
#define MSB_FIRST 0 /* 68000, IBM RT/PC */
#define LSB_FIRST 1 /* Vax, PC8086 */
-int f;
-
-/* XXX several files in libkdb know about this */
-char *progname;
-
#ifndef BACKWARD_COMPAT
static Key_schedule master_key_schedule;
static C_Block master_key;
@@ -143,10 +138,8 @@
#include "com_err.h"
#include "extern.h" /* to pick up master_princ */
-static krb5_data *response;
-
-void kerberos_v4 (struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT);
-void kerb_err_reply (struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT, long, char *);
+static krb5_data *kerberos_v4 (struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT);
+static krb5_data *kerb_err_reply (struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT, long, char *);
static int set_tgtkey (char *, krb5_kvno, krb5_boolean);
/* Attributes converted from V5 to V4 - internal representation */
@@ -262,12 +255,12 @@
(void) klog(L_KRB_PERR, "V4 request too long.");
return KRB5KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG;
}
+ memset( &v4_pkt, 0, sizeof(v4_pkt));
v4_pkt.length = pkt->length;
v4_pkt.mbz = 0;
memcpy( v4_pkt.dat, pkt->data, pkt->length);
- kerberos_v4( &client_sockaddr, &v4_pkt);
- *resp = response;
+ *resp = kerberos_v4( &client_sockaddr, &v4_pkt);
return(retval);
}
@@ -300,19 +293,20 @@
}
static
-int krb4_sendto(int s, const char *msg, int len, int flags,
- const struct sockaddr *to, int to_len)
+krb5_data *make_response(const char *msg, int len)
{
+ krb5_data *response;
+
if ( !(response = (krb5_data *) malloc( sizeof *response))) {
- return ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
}
if ( !(response->data = (char *) malloc( len))) {
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, response);
- return ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
}
response->length = len;
memcpy( response->data, msg, len);
- return( 0);
+ return response;
}
static void
hang(void)
@@ -586,7 +580,7 @@
*cp = 0;
}
-void
+static krb5_data *
kerberos_v4(struct sockaddr_in *client, KTEXT pkt)
{
static KTEXT_ST rpkt_st;
@@ -599,8 +593,8 @@
KTEXT auth = &auth_st;
AUTH_DAT ad_st;
AUTH_DAT *ad = &ad_st;
+ krb5_data *response = 0;
-
static struct in_addr client_host;
static int msg_byte_order;
static int swap_bytes;
@@ -637,8 +631,7 @@
inet_ntoa(client_host));
/* send an error reply */
req_name_ptr = req_inst_ptr = req_realm_ptr = "";
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, KERB_ERR_PKT_VER, lt);
- return;
+ return kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, KERB_ERR_PKT_VER, lt);
}
/* check packet version */
@@ -648,8 +641,7 @@
KRB_PROT_VERSION, req_version, 0);
/* send an error reply */
req_name_ptr = req_inst_ptr = req_realm_ptr = "";
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, KERB_ERR_PKT_VER, lt);
- return;
+ return kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, KERB_ERR_PKT_VER, lt);
}
msg_byte_order = req_msg_type & 1;
@@ -707,10 +699,10 @@
if ((i = check_princ(req_name_ptr, req_inst_ptr, 0,
&a_name_data, &k5key, 0, &ck5life))) {
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, i, "check_princ failed");
+ response = kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, i, "check_princ failed");
a_name_data.key_low = a_name_data.key_high = 0;
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
- return;
+ return response;
}
/* don't use k5key for client */
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
@@ -722,11 +714,11 @@
/* this does all the checking */
if ((i = check_princ(service, instance, lifetime,
&s_name_data, &k5key, 1, &sk5life))) {
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, i, "check_princ failed");
+ response = kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, i, "check_princ failed");
a_name_data.key_high = a_name_data.key_low = 0;
s_name_data.key_high = s_name_data.key_low = 0;
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
- return;
+ return response;
}
/* Bound requested lifetime with service and user */
v4req_end = krb_life_to_time(kerb_time.tv_sec, req_life);
@@ -797,8 +789,7 @@
rpkt = create_auth_reply(req_name_ptr, req_inst_ptr,
req_realm_ptr, req_time_ws, 0, a_name_data.exp_date,
a_name_data.key_version, ciph);
- krb4_sendto(f, (char *) rpkt->dat, rpkt->length, 0,
- (struct sockaddr *) client, sizeof (struct sockaddr_in));
+ response = make_response((char *) rpkt->dat, rpkt->length);
memset(&a_name_data, 0, sizeof(a_name_data));
memset(&s_name_data, 0, sizeof(s_name_data));
break;
@@ -824,9 +815,8 @@
lt = klog(L_KRB_PERR,
"APPL request with realm length too long from %s",
inet_ntoa(client_host));
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, RD_AP_INCON,
- "realm length too long");
- return;
+ return kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, RD_AP_INCON,
+ "realm length too long");
}
auth->length += (int) *(pkt->dat + auth->length) +
@@ -835,9 +825,8 @@
lt = klog(L_KRB_PERR,
"APPL request with funky tkt or req_id length from %s",
inet_ntoa(client_host));
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, RD_AP_INCON,
- "funky tkt or req_id length");
- return;
+ return kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, RD_AP_INCON,
+ "funky tkt or req_id length");
}
memcpy(auth->dat, pkt->dat, auth->length);
@@ -848,18 +837,16 @@
if ((!allow_v4_crossrealm)&&strcmp(tktrlm, local_realm) != 0) {
lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
"Cross realm ticket from %s denied by policy,", tktrlm);
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
- KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
- return;
+ return kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
+ KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
}
if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno, 0)) {
- lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
+ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
"FAILED set_tgtkey realm %s, kvno %d. Host: %s ",
tktrlm, kvno, inet_ntoa(client_host));
/* no better error code */
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
- KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
- return;
+ return kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
+ KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
}
kerno = krb_rd_req(auth, "krbtgt", tktrlm, client_host.s_addr,
ad, 0);
@@ -869,9 +856,8 @@
"FAILED 3des set_tgtkey realm %s, kvno %d. Host: %s ",
tktrlm, kvno, inet_ntoa(client_host));
/* no better error code */
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
- KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
- return;
+ return kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
+ KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
}
kerno = krb_rd_req(auth, "krbtgt", tktrlm, client_host.s_addr,
ad, 0);
@@ -881,8 +867,7 @@
klog(L_ERR_UNK, "FAILED krb_rd_req from %s: %s",
inet_ntoa(client_host), krb_get_err_text(kerno));
req_name_ptr = req_inst_ptr = req_realm_ptr = "";
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, kerno, "krb_rd_req failed");
- return;
+ return kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, kerno, "krb_rd_req failed");
}
ptr = (char *) pkt->dat + auth->length;
@@ -904,22 +889,21 @@
req_realm_ptr = ad->prealm;
if (strcmp(ad->prealm, tktrlm)) {
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN,
- "Can't hop realms");
- return;
+ return kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN,
+ "Can't hop realms");
}
if (!strcmp(service, "changepw")) {
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN,
- "Can't authorize password changed based on TGT");
- return;
+ return kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN,
+ "Can't authorize password changed based on TGT");
}
kerno = check_princ(service, instance, req_life,
&s_name_data, &k5key, 1, &sk5life);
if (kerno) {
- kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, kerno, "check_princ failed");
+ response = kerb_err_reply(client, pkt, kerno,
+ "check_princ failed");
s_name_data.key_high = s_name_data.key_low = 0;
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
- return;
+ return response;
}
/* Bound requested lifetime with service and user */
v4endtime = krb_life_to_time((KRB4_32)ad->time_sec, ad->life);
@@ -975,8 +959,7 @@
rpkt = create_auth_reply(ad->pname, ad->pinst,
ad->prealm, time_ws,
0, 0, 0, ciph);
- krb4_sendto(f, (char *) rpkt->dat, rpkt->length, 0,
- (struct sockaddr *) client, sizeof (struct sockaddr_in));
+ response = make_response((char *) rpkt->dat, rpkt->length);
memset(&s_name_data, 0, sizeof(s_name_data));
break;
}
@@ -1001,6 +984,7 @@
break;
}
}
+ return response;
}
@@ -1010,7 +994,7 @@
* client.
*/
-void
+static krb5_data *
kerb_err_reply(struct sockaddr_in *client, KTEXT pkt, long int err, char *string)
{
static KTEXT_ST e_pkt_st;
@@ -1021,9 +1005,7 @@
strncat(e_msg, string, sizeof(e_msg) - 1 - 19);
cr_err_reply(e_pkt, req_name_ptr, req_inst_ptr, req_realm_ptr,
req_time_ws, err, e_msg);
- krb4_sendto(f, (char *) e_pkt->dat, e_pkt->length, 0,
- (struct sockaddr *) client, sizeof (struct sockaddr_in));
-
+ return make_response((char *) e_pkt->dat, e_pkt->length);
}
static int
Index: src/kdc/network.c
===================================================================
--- src/kdc/network.c (revision 20192)
+++ src/kdc/network.c (working copy)
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* kdc/network.c
*
- * Copyright 1990,2000 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
+ * Copyright 1990,2000,2007 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
*
* Export of this software from the United States of America may
* require a specific license from the United States Government.
@@ -747,6 +747,8 @@
com_err(prog, retval, "while dispatching (udp)");
return;
}
+ if (response == NULL)
+ return;
cc = sendto(port_fd, response->data, (socklen_t) response->length, 0,
(struct sockaddr *)&saddr, saddr_len);
if (cc == -1) {

75
krb5-CVE-2008-0947.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
Patch from MITKRB5-SA-2008-002.
=== src/lib/rpc/svc.c
==================================================================
--- src/lib/rpc/svc.c (revision 1666)
+++ src/lib/rpc/svc.c (local)
@@ -109,15 +109,17 @@
if (sock < FD_SETSIZE) {
xports[sock] = xprt;
FD_SET(sock, &svc_fdset);
+ if (sock > svc_maxfd)
+ svc_maxfd = sock;
}
#else
if (sock < NOFILE) {
xports[sock] = xprt;
svc_fds |= (1 << sock);
+ if (sock > svc_maxfd)
+ svc_maxfd = sock;
}
#endif /* def FD_SETSIZE */
- if (sock > svc_maxfd)
- svc_maxfd = sock;
}
/*
=== src/lib/rpc/svc_tcp.c
==================================================================
--- src/lib/rpc/svc_tcp.c (revision 1666)
+++ src/lib/rpc/svc_tcp.c (local)
@@ -54,6 +54,14 @@
extern errno;
*/
+#ifndef FD_SETSIZE
+#ifdef NBBY
+#define NOFILE (sizeof(int) * NBBY)
+#else
+#define NOFILE (sizeof(int) * 8)
+#endif
+#endif
+
/*
* Ops vector for TCP/IP based rpc service handle
*/
@@ -215,6 +223,19 @@
register SVCXPRT *xprt;
register struct tcp_conn *cd;
+#ifdef FD_SETSIZE
+ if (fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ (void) fprintf(stderr, "svc_tcp: makefd_xprt: fd too high\n");
+ xprt = NULL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+#else
+ if (fd >= NOFILE) {
+ (void) fprintf(stderr, "svc_tcp: makefd_xprt: fd too high\n");
+ xprt = NULL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+#endif
xprt = (SVCXPRT *)mem_alloc(sizeof(SVCXPRT));
if (xprt == (SVCXPRT *)NULL) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "svc_tcp: makefd_xprt: out of memory\n");
@@ -271,6 +292,10 @@
* make a new transporter (re-uses xprt)
*/
xprt = makefd_xprt(sock, r->sendsize, r->recvsize);
+ if (xprt == NULL) {
+ close(sock);
+ return (FALSE);
+ }
xprt->xp_raddr = addr;
xprt->xp_addrlen = len;
xprt->xp_laddr = laddr;

View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
Summary: The Kerberos network authentication system.
Name: krb5
Version: 1.6.3
Release: 9%{?dist}
Release: 10%{?dist}
# Maybe we should explode from the now-available-to-everybody tarball instead?
# http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/1.6/krb5-1.6.2-signed.tar
Source0: krb5-%{version}.tar.gz
@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ Patch70: krb5-trunk-kpasswd_tcp2.patch
Patch71: krb5-1.6.2-dirsrv-accountlock.patch
Patch72: krb5-1.6.3-ftp_fdleak.patch
Patch73: krb5-1.6.3-ftp_glob_runique.patch
Patch74: krb5-CVE-2008-0062,0063.patch
Patch75: krb5-CVE-2008-0947.patch
Patch76: krb5-CVE-2007-5901.patch
Patch77: krb5-CVE-2007-5971.patch
License: MIT, freely distributable.
URL: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
@ -226,6 +230,17 @@ to obtain initial credentials from a KDC using a private key and a
certificate.
%changelog
* Tue Mar 18 2008 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 1.6.3-10
- add fixes from MITKRB5-SA-2008-001 for use of null or dangling pointer
when v4 compatibility is enabled on the KDC (CVE-2008-0062, CVE-2008-0063,
#432620, #432621)
- add fixes from MITKRB5-SA-2008-002 for array out-of-bounds accesses when
high-numbered descriptors are used (CVE-2008-0947, #433596)
- add backport bug fix for an attempt to free non-heap memory in
libgssapi_krb5 (CVE-2007-5901, #415321)
- add backport bug fix for a double-free in out-of-memory situations in
libgssapi_krb5 (CVE-2007-5971, #415351)
* Tue Mar 18 2008 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 1.6.3-9
- rework file labeling patch to not depend on fragile preprocessor trickery,
in another attempt at fixing #428355 and friends
@ -1330,6 +1345,10 @@ popd
%patch71 -p1 -b .dirsrv-accountlock
%patch72 -p1 -b .ftp_fdleak
%patch73 -p1 -b .ftp_glob_runique
%patch74 -p0 -b .2008-0062,0063
%patch75 -p0 -b .2008-0947
%patch76 -p0 -b .2007-5901
%patch77 -p0 -b .2007-5971
cp src/krb524/README README.krb524
gzip doc/*.ps